ML23096A040
| ML23096A040 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 04/01/2023 |
| From: | Florida Power & Light Co |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML23096A089 | List: |
| References | |
| Download: ML23096A040 (1) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES CHAPTER 8 ELECTRIC POWER Page Amendment Page Amendment 8-1 30 8.3-4 24 8-2 30 8.3-5 26 8.3-5a 17 8-i 28 8.3-5aa 12 8-ii 28 8.3-5b 17 8-iii 30 8.3-5c 17 8-iv 27 8.3-5ca 12 8-v 31 8.3-5d 31 8.3-6 26 8.1-1 26 8.3-6a 15 8.1-2 22 8.3-7 18 8.3-8 23 F8.1-1 0 8.3-9 24 8.3-10 18 8.2-1 28 8.3-11 28 8.2-2 26 8.3-12 22 8.2-3 28 8.3-12a 4 8.2-4 28 8.3-13 25 8.2-5 27 8.3-14 25 8.2-6 27 8.3-15 25 8.2-7 27 8.3-16 25 8.2-8 26 8.3-17 25 8.2-9 0 8.3-18 25 8.2-10 26 8.3-19 7 F8.2-1 0 8.3-21 15 F8.2-2 19 8.3-22 25 F8.2-3a 27 8.3-23 15 F8.2-3b 27 8.3-24 18 F8.2-4a 27 8.3-25 28 F8.2-4b 27 8.3-26 17 F8.2-5a 27 8.3-27 24 F8.2-5b 27 8.3-28 30 F8.2-6a 27 8.3-29 0 F8.2-6b 27 8.3-30 25 F8-2.7a 27 8.3-31 26 F8-2.7b 27 8.3-32 25 F8-2.8a 27 8.3-33 25 F8-2.8b 27 8.3-34 18 F8-2.9a 27 8.3-35 25 F8-2.9b 27 8.3-36 31 F8-2.10a 27 8.3-37 25 F8-2.10b 27 8.3-38 22 8.3-39 17 8.3-1 30 8.3-40 28 8.3-1a 22 8.3-41 16 8.3-2 24 8.3-42 12 8.3-3 22 8.3-43 12 8.3-44 12 UNIT 1 8-1 Amendment No. 31 (11/21)
LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES (Cont'd) CHAPTER 8 Page Amendment Page Amendment 8.3-45 12 F8.3-11 15 8.3-46 12 F8.3-12 15 8.3-47 12 F8.3-13 15 8.3-48 12 F8.3-14 31 8.3-49 12 F8.3-15 2 8.3-50 12 F8.3-15a 0 8.3-51 12 F8.3-16 15 8.3-52 12 F8.3-17 15 8.3-53 12 F8.3-17a 15 8.3-54 12 F8.3-18 0 8.3-55 12 8.3-56 12 8.3-57 12 8.3-58 12 8.3-59 30 8.3-60 30 8.3-61 25 8.3-62 22 8.3-63 26 8.3-64 15 8.3-65 22 8.3-66 22 8.3-67 22 8.3-68 22 8.3-69 0 8.3-70 30 F8.3-1 15 F8.3-1a 15 F8.3-2 15 F8.3-3a 15 F8.3-3b 15 F8.3-4 25 F8.3-5 19 F8.3-6a 15 F8.3-6a1 22 F8.3-6b 15 F8.3-6c 15 F8.3-6d 15 F8.3-6d1 18 F8.3-6e 15 F8.3-6f 15 F8.3-6g 15 F8.3-6h 15 F8.3-6i 15 F8.3-7 15 F8.3-8 15 F8.3-9 15 F8.3-10 15 UNIT 1 8-2 Amendment No. 31 (11/21)
ELECTRIC POWER CHAPTER 8 TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Title Page
8.1 INTRODUCTION
8.1-1 8.1.1 GENERAL 8.1-1 8.1.2 DESIGN BASES 8.1-1 8.1.2.1 Offsite Power 8.1-1 8.1.2.2 Onsite Power 8.1-2 8.2 OFFSITE POWER AND TRANSMISSION SYSTEM 8.2-1 8.
2.1 DESCRIPTION
8.2-1 8.2.1.1 Transmission Lines 8.2-1 8.2.1.2 Switchyard Connections 8.2-1 8.2.1.3 Startup Transformers 8.2-1 8.2.1.4 Main Generator 8.2-2 8.2.2 ANALYSIS 8.2-2 8.2.2.1 Adequacy of Station Electric Distribution System Voltages 8.2-2 8.2.2.2 Offsite Power System Reliability 8.2-2 8.2.2.3 Transient Stability 8.2-5 8.2.2.4 Response to Generic Letter 2006-02 8.2-7 8.2.3 TESTING AND INSPECTION 8.2-8 REFERENCES 8.2-9 8.3 ONSITE POWER SYSTEM 8.3-1 8.3.1 AC POWER SYSTEM 8.3-1 8.3.1.1 Description 8.3-1 8.3.1.2 Analysis 8.3-22 8.3.1.3 Tests and Inspection 8.3-32 8.3.1.4 Instrumentation Application 8.3-35 8.3.1.5 Features Not Previously Used in Nuclear 8.3-35 Generating Stations 8.3.1.6 Independence of Redundant Systems 8.3-35 8.3.1.7 Physical Identification of Safety Related Equipment 8.3-35 UNIT 1 8-i Amendment No. 28 (05/17)
CHAPTER 8 TABLE OF CONTENTS (Cont'd) Section Title Page 8.3.2 DC POWER SYSTEM 8.3-35 8.3.2.1 Description 8.3-35 8.3.2.2 Analysis 8.3-37 8.3.2.3 Testing and Inspection 8.3-39 REFERENCES 8.3-40 UNIT 1 8-ii Amendment No. 28 (05/17)
ELECTRIC POWER CHAPTER 8 LIST OF TABLES Table Title Page 8.2-1 Main Generator Data 8.2-10 8.3-1 Electrical Bus Single - Line Diagrams for 8.3-41 6.9 KV, 4.16 KV and 480V Buses. 8.3-2 Emergency Diesel Generator Automatic Loading Sequence 8.3-59 8.3-3 Emergency Diesel Generator Data 8.3-61 8.3-3A AC Power System Instrumentation 8.3-62 8.3-3AA Diesel Generator Building Concentrations 6.3-64 8.3-4 Electrical Loads for 125V DC Buses 8.3-65 8.3-5 DELETED 8.3-68 8.3-6 Summary of Seismic Stresses for Underground Conduits 8.3-69 8.3-7 Emergency Diesel Generator Loading Sequence 8.3-70 8-iii Amendment No. 30 (05/20)
ELECTRIC POWER CHAPTER 8 LIST OF FIGURES FIGURE TITLE 8.1-1 State of Florida Electric System Map 8.2-1 Indian River Transmission Line Crossing Plan and Profile 8.2-2 Switchyard One Line Diagram 8.2-3a 2014 Grid Stability Analysis - Case 1 8.2-3b 2014 Grid Stability Analysis - Case 1 8.2-4a & 4b 2014 Grid Stability Analysis - Case 2 8.2-5a & 5b 2014 Grid Stability Analysis - Case 3 8.2-6a & 6b 2014 Grid Stability Analysis - Case 4 8.2-7a & 7b 2014 Grid Stability Analysis - Case 5 8.2-8a & 8b 2014 Grid Stability Analysis - Case 6 8.2-9a & 9b 2014 Grid Stability Analysis - Case 7 8.2-10a & 10b 2014 Grid Stability Analysis - Case 8 8.3-1 Main One Line Wiring Diagram 8.3-1a Combined Main & Auxiliary One Line Diagram 8.3-2 Auxiliary One Line Diagram 8.3-3a 480V Misc., 125 V DC and Vital AC One Line Diagram Sheet 1 8.3-3b 480V Misc., 125 V DC and Vital AC One Line Diagram Sheet 2 8.3-4 Emergency Diesel Generator 1A/1B Load List 8.3-5 Typical Diesel Generator Automatic Starting Logic 8.3-6a Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator 1A - Start Circuit 8.3-6a1 Schematic Diagram Diesel - Generator 1A Start Solenoid 8.3-6b Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator 1A - Lockout Relay 8.3-6c Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator 1A Breaker 8.3-6d Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator 1B - Start Circuit 8.3-6d1 Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator 1B - Start CKTS 8.3-6e Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator 1B Lockout Relay 8.3-6f Schematic Diagram Diesel Generator 1B Breaker 8.3-6g Schematic Diagram 4160 V SWGR 1A3 Load Shedding Relays UNIT 1 8-iv Amendment No. 27 (04/15)
CHAPTER 8 LIST OF FIGURES (Cont'd) FIGURE TITLE 8.3-6h Schematic Diagram 4160 V SWGR 1B3 Load Shedding Relays 8.3-6i Schematic Diagram 4160 V SWGR 1AB Load Shedding Relays 8.3-7 Reactor Auxiliary Building El.43'-0 62'-0 Conduit, Trays & Grounding - Sheet 1 8.3-8 Reactor Auxiliary Building El.19'-6" Conduit Trays & Grounding - Sheet 1 8.3-9 Reactor Auxiliary Building El.19'-6" Conduit Trays & Grounding - Sheet 2 8.3-10 Reactor Containment Bldg. El. 18'-0 Conduit, Trays & Grounding Plan 8.3-11 Reactor Auxiliary Building Penetration Area Conduit Trays & Grounding 8.3-12 Reactor Containment Bldg Penetration Details 8.3-13 Yard Duct Runs 8.3-14 DELETED EC294630 8.3-15 Diesel Generator Building General Arrangement and Elevation Drawing 8.3-15a Diesel Generator Louvers 8.3-16 Cable and Conduit List Installation Details 8.3-17 Control Wiring Diagram 4.16 KV SWGR 1A3 Undervoltage Relaying/Test 8.3-17a Control Wiring Diagram 4.16 KV SWGR 1B3 Undervoltage Relaying/Test 8.3-18 RAB Battery Rooms Sink and Shower Enclosures 8-v Amendment No. 31 (11/21)
CHAPTER 8 ELECTRIC POWER
8.1 INTRODUCTION
8.1.1 GENERAL The St. Lucie Plant Unit 1 is designed to deliver 850 MW with the extended power uprate (EPU) rating to approximately 1052.1 MW of electrical power to the Florida Power & Light Company transmission system (see Figure 8.1-1). The transmission network can provide power to the plant for operation of the plant onsite auxiliary power system during startup, or for plant operation, shutdown or accident conditions. Florida Power & Light Company supplies electric service to most of the territory along the east and lower west coasts of Florida, including the Cape Canaveral area, the agricultural area around southern and eastern Lake Okeechobee, and portions of central and north central Florida. The FP&L transmission grid is interconnected with the Florida Power Group, consisting of FP&L Co., Florida Power Corp., Tampa Electric Company, Jacksonville Electric, and Orlando Utilities. Connection of the St. Lucie Plant Unit I to the existing Florida Power & Light Company 230(1) kv network is made at St. Lucie Switching Station utilizing a breaker and a half switching arrangement and thence north and south to other Florida Power & Light Company power plants and to neighboring utilities through multiple lines (see Figure 8.1-1). The onsite ac and dc power systems are designed with redundancy and independence of onsite power sources, buses, switchgear, distribution cabling and controls to provide reliable supply of electrical power to safety related electrical loads needed to achieve safe plant shutdown or to mitigate the consequences of a design basis accident. The safety related loads are shown on one line diagrams listed in Table 8.3-1. 8.1.2 DESIGN BASES 8.1.2.1 Offsite Power The offsite transmission system is designed to provide reliable facilities to accept the electrical output of the plant and to provide offsite power for supplying the plant auxiliary power system for station startup, shutdown, or at any time that auxiliary power is unavailable from the unit auxiliary transformers. The system meets the requirements of AEC GDC 17 and Safety Guide 32.
- 1. In the past, FPLs 230 kv system was referred to as 240 kv; therefore, some engineering documents may still refer to 240 kv.
8.1-1 Amendment No. 26 (11/13)
8.1.2.2 Onsite Power The plant onsite auxiliary power system is designed to supply the functional requirements of all auxiliary loads required for all modes of plant operation. Sufficient instrumentation and protective control devices are provided to ensure operational reliability and availability of the system. Those portions of the auxiliary power system required for the distribution of power to safety related electrical components which are essential to shut down and maintain the unit in a safe condition and/or limit the release of radioactivity to the environment following a design basis accident meet the following safety design bases: a) Each redundant safety related electrical load group is provided with separate onsite emergency power sources, electrical buses, distribution cables, controls, relays or other electrical devices. b) Redundant parts of the system are electrically independent to the extent that a single electrical fault will not cause a loss of power to both redundant load groups. c) Redundant parts of the system are physically independent to the extent that a single event will not cause loss of power to both redundant load groups. d) In the event of loss of the normal sources of power to the system, the system will be connected to the onsite emergency power sources automatically, and in sufficient time that the consequences of a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) are within acceptable limits. e) The physical events that accompany a design basis accident shall not interfere with the ability of the system to mitigate the consequences of the accident to within acceptable limits. f) The system is designed to withstand design basis earthquake loads without loss of power to safety related electrical components. g) The system conforms to the applicable sections of IEEE-279 (August 1968) and IEEE-308 (November 1970). h) The system meets the requirements of AEC GDC 17 and 18, 10 CFR 50 Appendix A. i) The system meets the requirement of AEC Safety Guides 6 and 9 (February 1, 1971). Safety related ac loads are shown on one line diagrams listed in Table 8.3-1. Table 8.3-2 shows the emergency diesel generator powered loads and Table 8.3-4 lists all the dc system loads. 8.1-2 Amendment No. 22 (05/07)
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8.2 OFFSITE POWER AND TRANSMISSION SYSTEM 8.
2.1 DESCRIPTION
8.2.1.1 Transmission Lines The transmission system design consists of four separate transmission circuits; the three overhead lines are placed parallel to each other as shown in Figure 8.2-1. Over the Indian River, the towers supporting the separate lines are spaced 200 feet apart. They rise 173 feet, holding the conductors 153 feet above the river. Tower spacing keeps the conductors at least 90 feet above the Intracoastal Waterway and 61 feet above water elsewhere. Each circuit conductor consists of one 3400 kc mil ACSR/AW line. Over land, the transmission structures for the separate lines are spaced 126 feet apart and rise 60 to 80 feet above grade. Tower structures on each line will be spaced at 660 foot intervals, except where road or rail crossings require greater clearance. Right-of-way easements are 1200 feet; each circuit contains two 1691 kc mil conductors. Each circuit is rated 1111 MVA at 230 kV (1160 MVA at 240 kV) and is capable of handling the total net generation output of St. Lucie Units 1 or 2. Electrostatic shield wires and other lightning protection equipment is provided at each tower as required. The distance from the switchyard to the Midway substation for lines 1 and 2 is approximately 11.7 miles. The distance from the St. Lucie Plant switchyard to the Treasure Substation is approximately 10.5 miles. The fourth transmission line connected to the St. Lucie Plant switchyard has been installed underground from the Turnpike Substation with a length of approximately 13 miles. The new Turnpike transmission line increases the diversity and reliability of Offsite Power to the St. Lucie Plant switchyard. The Turnpike line has been sized to meet the same capabilities of each of the three transmission lines connected to the St. Lucie Plant switchyard. 8.2.1.2 Switchyard Connections A six bay 230 kV (nominal) switchyard provides switching capability for main generator output, each of the two startup transformers and the four outgoing transmission lines. The switchyard also provides switching capability for the main generator output of Unit 2 and two additional startup transformers. The plant switchyard and one line diagram for Unit 1 and Unit 2 is shown in Figure 8.2-2. The Unit 1 and Unit 2 main generators produce power at 22 kV. This is transformed up to 230 kV and enters the 230 kV switchyard through overhead lines to the east pull-off tower in Bays No. 1 and 3, respectively. The two 230 kV transmission lines identified as Midway 1 and 2 terminate at the pull-off towers for switchyard Bays 1A - east and 2 - west. The 230 kV transmission line identified as the Treasure line terminates at the pull-off towers for switchyard Bay 3 - west. The 230 kV transmission line identified as the Turnpike line terminates at the pull-off towers for switchyard Bay 6 - east. The "Loop" feeds (two lines) for the Hutchinson Island distribution substation are fed from Bay 4 and Bay 6 (one distribution feeder line from each Bay). The east pull-off tower in Bay No. 2 serves startup transformers 1A and 2A located in the Unit No. 1 transformer yard. Both transformers 1A and 2A are connected to a single overhead line from the switchyard. The 1B and 2B startup transformers are located in the Unit No. 2 transformer yard and are served from the east pull-off tower in Bay No. 4 as is done for the 1A and 2A startup transformers. Either set of startup transformers, 1A and 2A or 1B and 2B, can be supplied from any one of the transmission lines. 8.2.1.3 Startup Transformers Each startup transformer (SUT), 1A and 1B, is rated 21/28/35/39.2 MVA: SUT 1A - oil air/forced air/forced oil and air at 55°C rise/forced oil and air at 65°C rise (OA/FA/FOA at 55C/FOA at 65C); SUT 1B - oil air/forced oil air (one cooling bank)/forced oil air at 55°C rise (both cooling banks)/forced oil air at 65°C rise (both cooling banks) (OA/FOA/FOA at 55C/FOA at 65C), double secondary winding, 230-6.9-4.16KV. UNIT 1 8.2-1 Amendment No. 28 (05/17)
The SUT 1A 6.9 KV secondary is rated 12.6/16.8/21.0/23.6 MVA and 4.16 KV secondary is rated 8.4/11.2/14.0/15.7 MVA, OA/FA/FOA at 55C rise /FOA at 65C rise. The SUT 1B 6.9 KV secondary is rated 12.6/16.8/21.0/23.52 MVA and 4.16 KV secondary is rated 8.4/11.2/14.0/15.68 MVA, OA/FOA (one cooling bank)/FOA at 55C rise (both cooling banks)/FOA at 65C (both cooling banks). The startup transformers are sized to accommodate the auxiliary loads of the unit under any operating or accident condition. Each set of startup transformers (1A-2A, 1B-2B) is provided with a manual switching arrangement which permits paralleling of 4.16 KV busses of one power train division (A or B) of Units 1 and 2 under administrative control. In the event one of the four startup transformers has to be removed from service for repair, the 4.16 KV power to both Units 1 and 2 could be paralleled to facilitate continued operation of both units. A single startup transformer is adequately sized to accommodate the outage auxiliary loads of both units. If it should ever be necessary to align one startup transformer to supply 4.16 KV power to both units, appropriate analysis and operating procedures will be developed to assure that the startup transformer is not overloaded should an accident condition arise. 8.2.1.4 Main Generator The station main generator is a 1200 Mva Westinghouse generator which provides power to the offsite transmission network at various loads to a design rating of 1080 MWe. The main generator data are given by Table 8.2-1. The main generator is direct connected through a 22 KV, 33,200 ampere rated isolated phase bus to the main transformers, where it is stepped up to 230 KV and then tied to one bay of the outdooor switchyard. The main transformer bank consists of two (2), three-phase transformers, 635 Mva each, forced oil and air (FOA) cooled at 65°C temperature rise, connected in parallel, with separate cooling equipment. These transformers are provided with lightning arresters on the high voltage side. The generator isolated phase bus is forced air cooled and is rated for both normal (two main transformers in service) and emergency operation (one main transformer out of service) all at 65°C rise. Two 100 percent capacity sets of cooling equipment are provided. 8.2.2 ANALYSIS 8.2.2.1 Adequacy of Station Electric Distribution System Voltages In response to an NRC letter dated 8/8/79 expressing a concern that the offsite power system (grid) and onsite electrical distribution system is of sufficient capacity and capability to automatically start and operate all required safety loads, voltage analyses were performed. See Reference 1. The results verified the adequacy of the design. 8.2.2.2 Offsite Power System Reliability The following reliability considerations satisfy the requirements of AEC GDC 17 and Safety Guide 32 for offsite power systems and minimize the probability of power failure due to faults in the network interconnections and the associated switching. 8.2-2 Amendment No. 26 (11/13)
a) The network interconnections consist of four 230 KV transmission lines. Any two circuits may be interrupted with the remaining two circuits being capable of carrying the full net output of the station Units 1 and 2 combined as each circuit is sized for 1111 MVA at 230 kV (1160 MVA at 240 kV). b) The three separate overhead 230 KV lines crossing the Indian River are designed to withstand hurricane winds of 153 mph; the lines west of the river are designed for winds of 140 mph. With a spacing of 200 feet between towers, 173 feet over mean high water, and a spacing of 126 feet between 80 foot high towers on land, the failure or collapse of one structure cannot affect any other line. The fourth diverse 230 KV line runs directly from the Turnpike Substation to the St. Lucie Switchyard entirely underground and under the Indian River. c) The 230 KV system is protected from lightning and switching surges by overhead electrostatic shield wires and lightning protection equipment. d) The switching arrangement in the 230 kV switchyard includes two full capacity main buses, which are tied to the generator, start-up transformers and outgoing transmission lines through circuit breakers connected to each bus. Protective features provide reliable protection for isolation of faults to ensure continuity of power supply from alternate sources. The protective relay system includes high speed primary and backup relaying. For each of the four 230 kV lines the primary and secondary relaying consists of phase and ground distance relays. Primary and secondary bus differential relaying, and backup protection for breaker failure to trip, is also provided. These provisions permit the following:
- 1) Any circuit can be switched under normal conditions without affecting another circuit.
- 2) Any single circuit breaker can be isolated for maintenance without interrupting the power or protection to any circuit.
- 3) Short circuits in a single main bus will be isolated without interrupting service to any circuit.
- 4) Short circuit failure of a single bay breaker will not result in the permanent loss of any transmission line or any startup transformer.
- 5) Physical independence of power for the startup transformers is achieved by separating their switchyard 230 KV connections in two different bays. Each bay consists of separate circuit breakers and associated equipment to connect the startup transformers with the two main 230 KV busses. Two spatially separated over-head lines are used to supply power to the startup transformers (one line for startup transformers 1A and 2A in the Unit 1 transformer yard, and one line for startup transformers 1B and 2B in the Unit 2 transformer yard).
e) The results of the system stability analysis demonstrate that the loss of St. Lucie Unit 1 or the largest generating unit on the system other than St. Lucie Unit 1 does not negate the ability to provide offsite power to the Unit 1 engineered safety features loads. UNIT 1 8.2-3 Amendment No. 28 (05/17)
f) The offsite power system satisfies the regulatory position of AEC Safety Guide 32 in that two immediate access circuits through the startup transformers are provided to the transmission network in the event of a trip of the unit auxiliary transformers. With the above protective features, the probability of loss of more than one source of 230 KV power from faults is low; however, in the case of any occurrence causing loss of all four 230 KV lines, the safety-related loads can be supplied from either of two emergency full capacity diesel generators. A turbine trip initiates a generator lockout to prevent generator damage. A turbine trip with the failure of one of the generator breakers to open does not affect safe shutdown of the reactor or prevent mitigating the consequences of a LOCA. If one of the generator breakers fail to open, the generator circuit could still be cleared by the remaining switchyard and/or remote line terminal breakers. Two sources of offsite power will still be immediately available. UNIT 1 8.2-4 Amendment No. 28 (05/17)
8.2.2.3 Transient Stability The transient stability study for 1975 was carried out to study system results for the following contingencies: Case I Loss of largest supply to the grid (loss of St. Lucie Unit #1, 820 mw). Case II Removal of the largest load from the grid (loss of Ringling load, 645 MW). In response to the 1996 UFSAR review project and recommendations of various NRC Information Notices, a dynamic stability analysis was performed in 1998 (see PSL-ENG-SENS-98-056). This analysis assessed the response of the transmission system to the loss of the largest generator, the loss of largest load and the loss of most critical transmission circuit. The 1998 analysis has been updated with information for 2014; this analysis is summarized below. PROCEDURE: Contingencies were selected to conform with the USNRC Standard Review Plan (SRP), Section 8.2.III.1.f. Several cases were analyzed for each of the single event outages specified in the SRP. The most up to date transmission model representing the 2014 summer peak load conditions was used. Additional non-firm transfers were modeled in the 2014 summer peak load case to bring the total Florida import level up to the transfer limit of 3700 MW. This represents the most conservative scenario. The Power Technologies Inc. (PTI) dynamic simulation software (PSS/E, Rev. 32) was used to simulate the outage events. The simulation results were analyzed for any signs of instability, protective relay action or load shedding. The figures accompanying the simulation results, Figures 8.2-3a through 8.2-10b for cases 1 through 8 respectively, show the St. Lucie and FPL transmission system response to the contingency events modeled. Each Case figure is divided into parts which show voltage magnitude, machine angle, bus frequency and line flows. Power flow analysis of the post transient condition for each case was done using the PTI load flow program (PSS/E, Rev. 32). This analysis was used to assess whether the event causes any voltage or line loading violations. ANALYSIS RESULTS: Loss of the Largest St. Lucie Unit Load Case 1: The largest local power source within the Florida Interconnected power system is the St. Lucie #2 generator, which is modeled with a gross output of 1052 MW. The sudden trip of St. Lucie #2 is modeled in case 1. A St. Lucie #2 auxiliary load of 50 MW and 31 MVAR is left connected to the St. Lucie 230 kV bus. System response is stable and no voltage or thermal limits are reached. Post-contingency voltage at the St. Lucie switchyard is 240.6 kV. The frequency briefly dips to 59.92 Hz and settles at 59.99 hertz. This response is consistent with observed response of the grid. The decline in machine angles is due to the slight decline in overall grid frequency. Machine angles are calculated relative to a fixed 60 hertz source with this simulation software. No transmission overloads, generator reactive overloads or voltage problems are caused by this outage. Case 2: St. Lucie #2 is assumed to be off line with its capacity replaced by increased generation at the Martin, Manatee and Sanford power plants. The sudden trip of St. Lucie #1 (1032 MW) is modeled in case 2. A total St. Lucie auxiliary load of 100 MW and 62 MVAR is left connected to the St. Lucie 230 kV bus. UNIT 1 8.2-5 Amendment No. 27 (04/15)
System response is stable and no voltage or thermal limits are reached. The St. Lucie 230 kV bus voltage drops from 104.2% (of 230 kV) to 103.5% (231.8 kV). The frequency briefly dips to 59.94 Hz and settles at 59.99 Hz. This response is consistent with observed response of the grid. No transmission overloads, generator reactive overloads or voltage problems are caused by this event. Loss of the Most Critical Transmission Circuit Case 3: One of the St. Lucie-Midway 230 kV lines are faulted and tripped in case 3. A three phase fault at the St. Lucie end of this circuit is disconnected after a total fault duration of 0.067 seconds (normal fault clearing time). The same system response would occur for an outage of the other circuits as the St. Lucie-Midway 230 kV circuits have nearly identical impedances. System response is stable and no voltage or thermal limits are reached. Post-contingency voltage at the St. Lucie Switchyard is 240.0 kV. The loads for the remaining lines are well within their 1111 MVA ratings. No transmission overloads, generator reactive overloads or voltage problems are caused by this outage. Case 4: The Midway 500/230 kV autotransformer is faulted and tripped in case 4. A three phase fault on the 230 kV side is disconnected after a total fault duration of 0.067 seconds (normal fault clearing time). The Midway 500/230 autotransformer could be regarded as the most critical transmission circuit affecting the St. Lucie Plant. System response is stable and no voltage or thermal limits are reached. Post-contingency voltage at the St. Lucie Switchyard is 238.2 kV. No transmission overloads, generator reactive overloads or voltage problems are caused by this outage. Case 5: The Duval-Thalmann 500 kV circuit is faulted and tripped in case 5. A three phase fault is modeled on the Duval side. The fault is disconnected after a total fault duration of 0.067 seconds (normal fault clearing time). The Duval-Thalmann 500 kV circuit could be regarded as the most critical transmission circuit affecting the Florida transmission system as this contingency frequently sets the Georgia to Florida transfer limit. System response is stable and no voltage or thermal limits are reached. Post-contingency voltage at the St. Lucie Switchyard is 240.5 kV. No transmission overloads, generator reactive overloads or voltage problems are caused by this outage. Loss of the Largest Transmission System Load Case 6: The Midway-Ranch 230 kV circuit is faulted and tripped in case 6, which causes the loss of a total of 210 MW of load. Although not the largest FPL system load loss following a single contingency, it is the largest load loss, for a single-contingency event, with the greatest impact on the St. Lucie Plant. The System response is stable and no voltage or thermal limits are reached. Post-contingency voltage at the St. Lucie Switchyard is 240.9 kV. UNIT 1 8.2-6 Amendment No. 27 (04/15)
Case 7: The Nobhill station is isolated by tripping the Andytown-Nobhill and Conservation-Nobhill 230 kV circuits. This disconnects five distribution stations with a total load of 334 MW. This is the largest amount of load which can be interrupted by the outage of a single transmission system element. System response is stable and no voltage or thermal limits are reached. Post-contingency voltage at the St. Lucie Switchyard is 241.0 kV. No transmission overloads, generator reactive overloads or voltage problems are caused by this outage. Loss of the Largest Single FPL System Generation Unit Case 8: The largest power source within the Florida interconnected power systems is the Sanford combined-cycle Unit 5. The loss of Sanford Unit 5 represents a total loss of 1063 MW of generation capacity. The System response is stable and no voltage or thermal limits are reached. Post-contingency voltage at the St. Lucie Switchyard is 240.2 kV. CONCLUSION: The transmission system and St. Lucie response is stable for all of the contingency events simulated. None of the outage events modeled cause transmission voltage or line loadings to exceed ratings. 8.2.2.4 Response to Generic Letter 2006-02 Generic Letter (GL) 2006-02, "Grid Reliability and the Impact on Plant Risk and the Operability of Offsite Power," was issued to determine if compliance is being maintained with NRC requirements governing electric power sources and associated personnel training. The GL requested information in four areas: (1) use of protocols between the nuclear power plant (NPP) and the transmission system operator (TSO), independent system operator (ISO), or reliability coordinator/authority (RC/RA) and the use of transmission load flow analysis tools (analysis tools) by TSOs to assist NPPs in monitoring grid conditions to determine the operability of offsite power systems under plant technical specifications (TSs); (2) use of NPP/TSO protocols and analysis tools by TSOs to assist NPPs in monitoring grid conditions for consideration in maintenance risk assessments; (3) offsite power restoration procedures in accordance with Section 2 of NRC Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.155, "Station Blackout;" and (4) losses of offsite power caused by grid failures at a frequency equal to or greater than once in 20 site-years in accordance with RG 1.155. FPL provided response to GL 2006-02 in letter L-2006-073. The response included, in part, discussion of the formal interface agreement between St. Lucie and the FPL Transmission System Operator (TSO) as well as the associated implementing procedures, the TSO contingency analysis program, related operator and Work Control personnel training, offsite power operability declarations and entry into applicable Technical Specification action statements upon notification of potential degraded grid conditions, consideration of potential grid degradation/instability in the performance of risk assessments required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4), and compliance with GDC 17, Electric Power Systems. UNIT 1 8.2-7 Amendment No. 27 (04/15)
8.2.3 TESTING AND INSPECTION A testing and inspection program is implemented in the switchyard to ensure the reliability of the components of the offsite power system. The maintenance performed and the schedule are consistent with industry practices. The following list of components is included: Transmission relays & breakers Coupling Capacitor voltage transformer Bus differential relays Switchyard batteries The transfer of power among the nuclear power unit (unit auxiliary transformer), the offsite power system and the onsite power system can be tested on the system level. 8.2-8 Amendment No. 26 (11/13)
REFERENCES FOR SECTION 8.2
- 1. R. E. Uhrig (FPL) to W. Gammil (NRC) Re: St. Lucie Unit 1 Docket No. 50-335, Station Electric Distribution Systems, L-79-324 dated 11/9/79.
8.2-9
TABLE 8.2-1 MAIN GENERATOR DATA Rating, MVA 1200 Power factor 0.90 Voltage, kV 22 Frequency, Hz 60 Speed, rpm 1800 Hydrogen pressure, psig 75 Synchronous reactance* 199.31 Transient reactance* 47.06 Subtransient reactance* 30.85
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8.3 ONSITE POWER SYSTEM The on-site power system one line diagrams are shown in Figures 8.3-1, 8.3-1a, 8.3-2, 8.3-3a and 8.3-3b. 8.3.1 AC POWER SYSTEM 8.3.1.1 Description 8.3.1.1.1 Power Sources The normal source of auxiliary ac power for plant start-up or shutdown is from the incoming off-site transmission lines through the plant switchyard and start-up transformers. The start-up transformers step down the 230 KV incoming line voltage to 6.9 KV and 4.16 KV for auxiliary system use. During normal plant operation, ac power is provided from the main generator through the unit auxiliary transformers. The unit auxiliary transformers step down the main generator output voltage from 22 KV to 6.9 KV and 4.16 KV. Unit Auxiliary Transformer 1A is rated 21/28/35/39.2 MVA, OA/FA/FOA at 55°C rise / FOA at 65°C rise, EC291388 double secondary 20.9/6.9/4.16KV. The 6.9KV secondary is rated 12.6/16.8/21/23.6 MVA, OA/FA/FOA at 55°C rise / FOA at 65°C rise, and the 4.16 KV secondary is rated 8.4/11.2/14/15.7 MVA, OA/FA/FOA at 55°C rise / FOA at 65°C rise. Unit Auxiliary Transformer 1B is rated 21/28/35MVA, ONAN/ONAF/ONAF at 55°C rise, EC291388 23.5/31.4/39.2MVA, ONAN/ONAF/ONAF at 65°C rise, double secondary 20.9/6.9/4/16KV. The 6.9KV secondary is rated 12.6/16.8/21MVA, ONAN/ONAF/ONAF at 55°C rise and 14.1/18.8/23.5 ONAN/ONAF/ONAF 65°C rise. The 4.16 KV secondary is rated 8.4/11.2/14MVA, ONAN/OANF/ONAF at 55°C rise and 9.4/12.5/15.7 ONAN/ONAF/ONAF at 65°C rise. Normal transfer of the 6.9 KV or 4.16 KV auxiliary buses between the unit auxiliary and start-up transformers will be initiated by the operator from the control room; emergency transfer from the auxiliary transformer to the start-up transformer will be initiated automatically by protective relay action. Routine bus transfers used on start-up or shutdown of a unit will be "live bus" transfers, i.e., the incoming source feeder circuit breaker will be momentarily paralleled with the running source feeder circuit breaker. This will result in transfers without power interruption. Emergency bus transfers, initiated automatically by protective relay action, will be "fast-dead" bus transfers. A "fast-dead" bus transfer is accomplished by simultaneously tripping the auxiliary transformer secondary circuit breaker and closing the start-up transformer secondary breaker. The approximate dead bus time is 3 cycles duration. There will be a "fast-dead" automatic transfer to the start-up transformers upon an automatic or emergency manual tripping of the main generator. In the event of a complete loss of the normal offsite ac power sources, i.e. Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP), station on-site emergency ac power system will be supplied by the on-site emergency diesel generators (EDGs) and station batteries. In the event that all offsite and onsite power sources fail, except for one Unit 2 EDG (i.e. Station Blackout - SBO), power will be transferred from the only operating Unit 2 EDG to one of the Unit 1 4.16 KV Class 1E distribution busses via the station blackout cross-tie. This SBO cross-tie connects the two safety related "swing" 4.16 KV busses 1AB and 2AB. Plant emergency procedures will assure that a Unit 2 EDG will not be loaded above its capacity of 3936 KW. Each of the Unit 2 EDGs is capable of powering its dedicated division of safety loads without load shedding and a complement of selected Unit 1 loads necessary to maintain hot standby through the duration of the SBO event. Plant procedures administratively limit the total demand on the available diesel-generator set and define the loading prior to energization of any loads to assure that transient capability of the EDG is not exceeded. The SBO tie can be completed only under administrative controls and the control circuitry assures that the tie can be completed only under blackout conditions or under test with the two units electrical systems separated. Per the SBO analysis, the SBO cross-tie was originally intended for use for SBO events initiated with both units operating in Mode 1. 8.3-1 Amendment No. 30 (05/20)
Additionally, the SBO analysis did not consider the availability of offsite power to the opposite unit. If, during a blackout event, offsite power is available to Unit 2, the SBO cross-tie may be used to provide offsite power from Unit 2 to Unit 1, regardless of the initial operating Mode of either unit. Use of the cross-tie for these non-licensed blackout events is controlled via plant procedures. Further, the present St. Lucie design also does have the capability of electrically connecting the two units' 4.16 KV buses 1A2 and 2A2 (1B2 and 2B2) through 4.16 KV bus 2A4 (2B4). This tie can only be implemented manually by racking and reracking a 4.16 KV breaker at 4.16 KV switchgear 2A4 (2B4) 8.3-1a Amendment No. 22 (05/07)
under strict administrative controls. This transfer takes approximately 1/2 hour. During this time, operator action in both Unit 1 and Unit 2, in accordance with procedures, load shed all loads on the Unit 2 operating diesel generator not required for this event; verifies that all non-safety loads on the 4.16 kV 1A2(1B2) and 4.16 kV 2A2(2B2) are inoperative; and prepares for the manual initiation of the required Unit 1 loads on the onsite safety-related 4.16 kV 1A3(1B3) bus. This tie may be utilized in case of a blackout on Unit 1 with either offsite or onsite power available on Unit 2. Each of the unit auxiliary and start-up transformers and each emergency diesel generator has sufficient capacity to supply the safety related loads for safe plant shutdown or to mitigate the consequences of a design basis accident. Drawings showing 6.9 kV, 4.16 kV and 480 V bus connections and loads are given in Table 8.3-1. Bus arrangements are shown on Figures 8.3-1, 8.3-1a and 8.3-2. All power sources and loads for safety related equipment are controlled from the control room. Control power is either 125 V dc or 120 V ac and is supplied by the same safety system as the device controlled. Instrumentation for these systems is discussed under the applicable sections and Section 8.3.1.4. 8.3.1.1.2 6.9 kV System Two 6.9 kV buses are provided, each supplied from a unit auxiliary or alternatively from a start-up transformer. Each 6.9 kV bus serves two reactor coolant pump motors and one steam generator feed water pump motor. The 6.9 kV buses are quality related because inclusion of reactor coolant pump (RCP) discussion in Technical Specifications requires components associated with the circuit-path to provide power to the RCPs from offsite power to be considered quality related. Hence, they do not require back-up from the emergency power system. The buses are rated at 2000 amps and are provided with 2000 amp incoming breakers and 1200 amp outgoing breakers, all with 500 MVA short circuit interrupting capacity. The buses are protected by differential relays which also protect the breakers. Incoming breakers are also protected by overcurrent relays and additional back-up relaying has been added to trip the corresponding supply transformer if any of these breakers fail to open on a fault. The motors connected to these buses are protected by short- circuit/locked-rotor relays. These relays are set to trip selectively the individual motor feeder breaker at current values which are greater than the operating values for that particular motor, but less than the current value causing the incoming supply breaker to trip. Alarms are provided for motor overloads. 8.3.1.1.3 4.16 kV System The 4.16 kV system consists of normal and emergency buses. Normal buses provide power to loads which are non-safety related. All safety related loads are powered from the emergency buses. There are two normal buses (1A2 and 1B2) which receive power directly from the unit auxiliary or start-up transformers. The emergency portion of the 4.16 kV system is arranged into two redundant load groups (A and B). Each of these load groups consists of the complement of safety related equipment needed to achieve safe plant shutdown and/or to mitigate the consequences of a design basis accident. Additional safety related equipment (e.g., the third component cooling and Intake Cooling Water Pumps) is arranged as a "third service" or "swing" load group AB. This load group consists of equipment which can be used as back-up or replacement to the equipment in either of the main redundant load groups A or B. Load group A is powered from the emergency bus 1A-3 and load group B from the emergency bus 1B-3. Emergency bus 1AB serves load group AB. 8.3-2 Amendment No. 24 (06/10)
Whenever the normal power sources are available, power is supplied directly to the 4.16 KV system through the two normal buses, each of which is tied to one of the redundant emergency buses. Emergency bus 1AB is normally tied to either (but never both) emergency bus 1A-3 or 1B-3. The tie breakers of bus 1AB are interlocked electrically to prevent this bus from being simultaneously connected to both buses 1A-3 and 1B-3. Electrical and physical separation of the redundant load groups is discussed fully in Section 8.3.1.2. Upon a loss of the normal power sources, the tie breakers between the normal and emergency buses will automatically open and the emergency diesel generators will automatically start and begin supplying power directly to the emergency buses. The pressurizer heater transformers, which are a non-safety related load, are supplied from the emergency 4.16 KV emergency buses. Upon loss of offsite power the pressurizer heaters are tripped from their buses and can only be reconnected to the buses manually. The diesel generator automatic starting and loading sequence is discussed further in Section 8.3.1.1.7. In the event that a LOOP occurs during power operations and the Unit 1 EDGs fail to start (SBO), the blackout tie will be used to provide power from a Unit 2 EDG to the unit 1 essential auxiliaries required to maintain the unit in a hot standby condition. If SBO occurs on Unit 2, power can be provided from a Unit 1 EDG to one of the essential Unit 2 buses. The 4.16 KV normal buses 1A-2 and 1B-2 are rated 3000 amps and are provided with 3000 amp incoming breakers with 350 MVA short circuit interrupting capacity. Emergency buses 1A-3, 1B-3 and 1AB are rated 1200 amps. The incoming feeder breakers of these last three buses and all outgoing breakers of all five 4.16 KV buses are 1200 amps, 350 MVA interrupting capacity and 132,000 amp momentary duty. Relay protection is the same as for the 6.9 KV buses except that no motor differential protection is used. The neutrals of both the 4.16 KV and 6.9 KV systems are grounded through grounding transformers and current limiting resistors which enable the systems to operate safely, if a ground fault should occur, until the ground is located and eliminated. 8.3.1.1.4 480 Volt System The arrangement of the 480 volt system is similar to that of the 4.16 KV system, with buses designated as normal or emergency. There are two normal 480 volt buses each powered by one of the normal 4.16 KV buses through a station service transformer. There are no interconnections between the normal and emergency portions of the 480 volt system. The emergency portion of the 480 volt system is also arranged into redundant load groups A and B served by 480 volt buses 1A-2 and 1B-2 respectively with a swing load group AB served by 480 volt bus 1AB. Power is transmitted from the 4.16 KV emergency buses through the station service transformer to 480 volt buses 1A-2 and 1B-2. The swing bus 1AB is normally tied to either one of the redundant emergency 480 volt buses but never both at the same time. Normally all the AB buses (4.16 KV, 480 volt, and 125 volt dc) will be connected to either the corresponding A train or B at any one time. That is, for example, the operation of the 4.16 KV bus AB connected to the 4.16 KV bus 1A-3 and the 480 volt bus AB connected to the 480 volt bus 1B-2, will not be permitted except during the transitional period when realigning the AB power supply from the selected train to the non-selected train and back again. This would be necessary, for example, when substituting a C train component (e.g., CCW, ICW or Charging pump) for an A train component that has to be removed from service. Alarms are provided to alert the operator if the AB 8.3-3 Amendment No. 22 (05/07)
buses on all voltage levels are not aligned properly. Electrical and physical separation of the redundant load groups is discussed fully in Section 8.3.2. The 480 volt buses supply power directly to motors rated above 100 hp, but generally below 300 hp, and to 480 volt motor control centers (MCCs) throughout the plant. The MCCs provide power to motors rated below 100 hp. Emergency MCCs are powered from emergency power centers while normal MCC's are powered from normal power centers. A "third service" emergency MCC is provided which is fed from 480 volt bus 1AB. The four station service transformers, two emergency and two normal, are rated 4.16 kV/480 V, 1500/2000 kVA, 3-phase, AA/FA, 80°C rise dry type, with approximately 9 percent impedance on 1500 kVA base. Each transformer has the capacity to furnish the requirements of two 480 volt buses. Switchgear sections 1A-1 and 1B-1 (normal service) and 1A-2 and 1B-2 (emergency service) are throat connected to their respective station service transformers through 3000 amperes continuous rating breakers. Each of these four buses is split in two sections, connected through a 1600 amp current limiting reactor. The first section, connected to the service transformer, feeds motors generally between 100 and 250 hp through 600 (800 for 1A-1, 1B-1 and 1B-2) amp breakers, and also the 1600 amp tie breakers. This bus section has a 30,000 amp symmetrical short circuit rating. The second section has only 22,000 amp symmetrical short circuit rating, this level reduction being accomplished by the current limiting reactor. This section feeds 480 volt MCCs and other loads throughout the plant, through 600 (800 for 1A-1, 1B-1 and 1B-2) amp breakers. Emergency 480 volt bus 1AB may be connected to either (but never both in plant modes 1, 2, 3, and
- 4) bus 1A-2 or bus 1B-2 through 1600 amp breakers with delayed trips. There are two breakers in series in each tie which are electrically interlocked to prevent the 1AB bus from being simultaneously connected to bus 1A-2 and 1B-2 in plant modes 1 through 4. The short circuit level of bus 1AB is 30,000 amp symmetrical. This section feeds a third charging pump and the emergency "third service" MCC 1AB through 800 amp breakers.
There are numerous 480 volt motor control centers throughout the plant, including seven for emergency service. All MCCs except 1AB are fed from the reduced short circuit level sections of the 480V switchgears as explained above. In no case are two redundant pieces of equipment connected to the same motor control center. For both normal and emergency services, there are two redundant MCCs in each area, each one connected to a redundant 480v switchgear. For normal vital services there is a "common" MCC 1C fed from either one of the two normal 480v switchgears through breakers at the switchgears and an automatic transfer switch at the MCC. For emergency third service loads there is an MCC 1AB fed from the 480V switchgear 1AB. This last MCC is provided with a current limiting reactor to reduce its short circuit level down to 14,000 amp symmetrical. All other MCCs in the plant also have a short circuit level of 14,000 amp symmetrical but do not require reactors since they are fed from the short circuit low level (after the reactors) section of the 480v switchgear buses. 8.3-4 Amendment No. 24 (06/10)
In some cases, there are non-emergency loads connected to emergency MCCs. Whenever this occurs, the MCC bus is split into a vital and a non-vital section connected through a bus isolating contactor that automatically drops open during an emergency, thus separating the non-emergency loads from these MCCs. The bus isolating contactors for the Fuel Handling Building motor control centers (1A8 and 1B8) are tripped open via SIAS actuation to enhance system response to degraded grid conditions. These non-emergency loads consist of normal lighting, normal power panels and power receptacles. The bus isolating contactors for the motor control centers (1A5, 1B5, 1A6, and 1B6) are also tripped open via SIAS actuation to enhance system response to degraded grid conditions. These non-emergency loads consist of normal lighting panels, normal power panels, power receptacles, sump pumps, hoists, compressors, heaters, and switches. There are two normal 480 volt buses, fed from individual 750 kVA, dry type, 3 phase, 80°C rise transformers, that feed the pressurizer heaters. The criteria for the protection and grounding of the 480 v system is the same as for the 4.16 kV or 6.9 kV system except for the following: a) no bus differential protection b) circuit overloads for MCC circuits normally result in the opening of a contactor and not a breaker. c) no motor overload alarm for MCC supplied motors 8.3.1.1.4.1 Undervoltage and Degraded Grid Protection for Class 1E Buses a) First Level Undervoltage Protection Each Class 1E 4160V Bus (1A3 and 1B3) utilizes two undervoltage definite-time delay relays, in a 2-out-of-2 coincident logic, for loss-of-voltage detection. The undervoltage relays are set to trip at no less than 2900 volts (69.7% of 4160 volts) with a time delay of 1 +/- 0.5 seconds. The function of these relays is to initiate source disconnection, load shedding, diesel generator starting, and load sequencing on the effected train (bus). b) Second Level Undervoltage Protection Each Class 1E 4160 Bus (1A3 and 1B3) utilizes two sets of 2 undervoltage definite time delay relays in a 2-out-of-2 coincident logic for degraded grid voltage detection. The relays are set to actuate at no less than 3831 volts (92.1% of 4160 volts) with a time delay of 18 + 2 seconds. The function of these relays is the same as described in a) above. In addition, a second set of undervoltage relays is provided for each 4160 volt Class 1E bus, set to actuate at voltages at/below 3951 volts (95% of 4160) with a time delay of 23 + 2 seconds. These relays are used to alarm the undervoltage condition in the control room. 8.3-5 Amendment No. 26 (11/13)
In addition, in each Class 1E 480V Bus (1A2 and 1B2) utilizes two undervoltage definite time delay relays in a 2-out-of-2 coincident logic scheme. These relays are also interlocked with a engineered safeguards features actuation signal (ESFAS) to ensure adequate starting voltages during accident conditions. The relays are set to actuate at no less than 415 volts (86.5% of 480 volts) with a time delay of 8 +/- 1 seconds. This setpoint is equivalent to 3850 volts (92.5% of 4160 volts) on the 4160 volt busses under accident conditions with all the normal and all the ESFAS initiated loads operating. For sustained degraded voltages concurrent with or without a safeguard signal, all the above undervoltage schemes will initiate automatic disconnection from the offsite sources, load shedding diesel generator starting and load sequencing. These systems will be bypassed 0.2 seconds after diesel generator breaker closing and automatically reinstated following breaker tripping. c) Compliance With PSB-1 NRC Staff Positions - Evaluation St. Lucie 1 has been licensed as not requiring full compliance with the requirements of PSB-1, dated July 1981. The evaluation below reflects the degree of compliance of the existing system.
- i. NRC Staff Position 1: Second Level of Undervoltage or Overvoltage Protection with a Time Delay Each position is evaluated against St. Lucie Plant degraded grid undervoltage protection system.
Position B.1.a) The selection of voltage and time setpoints shall be determined from an analysis of the voltage requirements of the safety related loads at all onsite system distribution levels;
- 1) The setpoints of not less than 3831 volts (92.1% of 4160) with a time delay of 18 + 2 seconds for non-accident conditions, and not less than 415 volts (86.5% of 480 volts) with a time delay 8 +/- 1 seconds for accident conditions will protect the Class 1E equipment including relays, contactors, and other components whose functional performance would be inadequate because of undervoltage. These setpoints were derived on the basis of the auxiliary system analysis which met criteria of providing acceptable voltage for all the Class 1E equipment required to perform safety functions.
B.1.b) Two separate time delays shall be selected for the second level of undervoltage protection based on the following conditions;
- 1) The first time delay should be of a duration that established the existence of a sustained degraded voltage condition (i.e., something longer than a motor starting transient). Following this delay, an alarm in the control room should alert the operator to the degraded condition. The subsequent occurrence of a safety injection actuation signal (SIAS) should immediately separate the Class 1E distribution system from the offsite power system.
8.3-5a Amendment No. 17 (10/99)
- 2) The second time delay should be of a limited duration such that the permanently connected Class 1E loads will not be damaged. Following this delay, if the operator has failed to restore adequate voltages, the Class 1E distribution system should be automatically separated from the offsite power system. Bases and justification must be provided in support of the actual delay chosen.
A voltage level has been established, which, when reached, will be alarmed in the control room. This level has been chosen as the 4160 volt bus voltage corresponding to a full power operation with a minimum predicted sustained grid voltage of 230 kV. This voltage level has been found to be safe to operate with, but since it represents an excursion from normal operational practices it was established as an appropriate alarm level. The time delay for that setpoint has been chosen to assure that starting of the largest motor in the 4160 volt system will not result in an inadvertent actuation of the protective relays. A SIAS signal concurrent with the alarm will not, by itself, result in a system separation from the offsite power, EDG start, etc. A separate voltage setpoint has been derived to perform that function, and it is based on the minimum allowable voltage of the Class 1E equipment required to mitigate the accident. This setpoint has been chosen to be no lower than the minimum allowable voltage for any equipment as reflected at the 480 volt Class 1E bus with a time delay such as not to interfere with the accident scenario emergency diesel generator loading. B.1.c) The voltage sensors shall be designed to satisfy the following applicable requirements derived from IEEE Std. 279-1971, "Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations";
- 1) Class 1E equipment shall be utilized and shall be physically located at and electrically connected to the Class 1E switchgear.
All the individual components of the undervoltage/degraded voltage protective relaying are Class 1E and are located within Class 1E switchgear.
- 2) An independent scheme shall be provided for each division of the Class 1E power system.
An independent protective relaying scheme is provided for each division of the Class 1E power system.
- 3) The undervoltage protection shall include coincidence logic on a per bus basis to preclude spurious trips of the offsite power source.
The protective scheme includes coincident logic therefore assuring that no spurious actuation of individual relay will result in a spurious trip of the offsite power source. 8.3-5aa Amendment No. 12, (12/93)
- 4) The voltage sensors shall automatically initiate the disconnection of offsite power sources whenever the voltage setpoint and time delay limits (cited in Item 1.b.2 above) have been exceeded.
Once the voltage setpoints and time delay limits are exceeded, the offsite power source will be disconnected without a need for meeting any other conditions.
- 5) Capability for test and calibration during power operation shall be provided.
The protective scheme implemented allows for testing and calibration during power operations.
- 6) Annunciations must be provided in the control room for any bypasses incorporated in the design.
Relay test is annunciated in the control room. There are no other bypasses incorporated in the design. B.1.d) The Technical Specifications shall include limiting conditions for operation, surveillance requirements, trip setpoints with minimum and maximum limits, and allowable values for the second-level voltage protection monitors and associated time delay devices.
- 1) The Technical Specifications include requirements undervoltage/degraded grid voltage systems, which include trip setpoints surveillance requirements and limiting conditions for operation. Trip setpoints are included as limit only to allow flexibility in choice of more conservative values.
8.3-5b Amendment No. 17 (10/99)
B.2) The Class 1E bus load shedding scheme should automatically prevent shedding during sequencing of the emergency loads to the bus. The load shedding feature should, however, be reinstated upon completion of the load sequencing action. The technical specifications must include a test requirement to demonstrate the operability of the automatic bypass and reinstatement features of least once per 18 months during shutdown. In the event an adequate basis can be provided for retaining the load shed feature during the above transient conditions, the setpoint value in the Technical Specifications for the first level of undervoltage protection (loss of offsite power) must specify a value having maximum and minimum limits. The basis for the setpoints and limits selected must be documented. The load-shed feature is bypassed once the onsite sources are supplying the Class 1E buses. This bypassing occurs 0.2 seconds after the diesel generator breakers close and is auto-reinstated following breaker tripping. This bypasssing/reinstating is accomplished by utilizing close/trip signals from the diesel generator output breakers. B.3) The voltage levels at the safety-related buses should be optimized for the maximum and minimum load conditions that are expected throughout the anticipated range of voltage variations of the offsite power sources by appropriate adjustment of the voltage tap settings of the intervening transformers. The tap settings selected should be based on an analysis of the voltage at the terminals of the Class 1E loads. The analyses performed to determine minimum operating voltages should typically consider maximum unit steady state and transient loads for events such as a unit trip, loss-of-coolant accident, startup or shutdown; with the offsite power supply (grid) at minimum anticipated voltage and only the offsite source being considered available. Maximum voltages should be analyzed with the offsite power supply (grid) at maximum expected voltage concurrent with minimum unit load (i.e., cold shutdown, refueling). A separate set of the above analyses should be performed for each available connection to the offsite power supply. The system analysis was performed for both normal and accident operational loading coupled with minimum transmission system voltages with the auxiliary system supplied via the start-up transformer. Further, minimal loading and maximum expected transmission system voltage were analyzed as to the impact on the equipment and found not to exceed the allowable limits. Similarity, system was analyzed, when powered via the auxiliary transformer, with a maximum and minimum allowable main generator output voltages. In all of the cases analyzed, system performance was such as to assure performance of the safety functions of the Class 1E equipment without exposure to unacceptably low/high voltages. B.4) The analytical techniques and assumptions used in the voltage analyses cited in Item 3 above must be verified by actual measurement. The verification and test should be performed prior to initial full-power reactor operation on all sources of offsite power by: 8.3-5c Amendment No. 17 (10/99)
a) loading the station distribution buses, including all Class 1E buses down to the 120/208 volt level, to at least 30%; b) recording the existing grid and Class 1E bus voltages and bus loading down to the 120/208 volt level at steady state conditions and during the starting of both a large Class 1E and non-Class 1E motor (not concurrently); Note: To minimize the number of instrumented locations, (recorders) during the motor starting transient tests, the bus voltages and loading need only be recorded on that string of buses which previously showed the lowest analyzed voltages from Item 3 above. c) using the analytical techniques and assumptions of the previous voltage analyses cited in Item 3 above, and the measured existing grid voltage and bus loading conditions recorded during conduct of the test, calculate new set of voltages for all the Class 1E buses down to the 120/208 volt level; d) compare the analytical derived voltage values against the test results. With good correlation between the analytical results and the test results, the test verification requirement will be met. That is, the validity of the mathematical model used in performance of the analyses of Item 3 will have been established; therefore, the validity of the results of the analyses is also established. In general, the test results should not be more than 3% lower than the analytical results; however, the difference between the two when subtracted from the voltage levels determined in the original analyses should never be less than the Class 1E equipment rated voltages. The analytical techniques used in the St. Lucie Unit 1 analysis were not specifically verified, as required by the NRC, since the position was developed and formalized after St. Lucie Unit 1 was operational. However, same techniques were used in the system analysis and verified to provide good correlation by actual test on St. Lucie Unit 2. Conclusion Based on the above Undervoltage/Degraded Grid Voltage Detection System meets the intent of PSB-1. All of the staff's requirements and design bases criteria have been met. The voltage and time delay trip settings will protect the Class 1E equipment from sustained degraded voltages from the offsite sources during accident and non-accident conditions. 8.3-5ca Amendment No. 12, (12/93)
Bypassing the load-shed feature by using a close signal from the diesel generator breaker to prevent an adverse interaction when the onsite sources are supplying the Class 1E buses. The load-shed feature is auto-reinstated following diesel generator breaker tripping. Thus, NRC Staff Position 2 is met. The existing Technical Specifications include tests which have been reviewed and found to meet the requirements of NRC Staff Position 3. Analysis of station electric system voltages was performed under steady-state conditions with the full plant running load and minimum design switchyard voltage supplying the onsite system through the startup transformers. The results of this analysis demonstrates that, as well as also shown in the analysis of the Unit Auxiliary Transformer, all voltages on the Class 1Esystems remain above minimum acceptable design conditions. The worst case starting transient was also analyzed for the most limiting conditions (the 1A system with the 1AB bus connected, since it is the most heavily loaded with all normal plant running loads on the buses) when the startup transformer is supplying the system and offsite switchyard voltage is at the design minimum of 235 kV. 8.3.1.1.4.2 Open Phase Protection for Class 1E Buses The function of the Open Phase Detection and Protection (OPDP) system is to provide an Open Phase EC292245 Condition (OPC) alarm in the control room. Each SUT has a dedicated OPDP system with three independent channels. Each channel uses fiber optic current sensors that cover the range from unloaded to fully loaded conditions. The three channel architecture allows the OPDP system to use a 2-out-of-3 logic for indicating an OPC to minimize spurious alarms. If one of the three independent channels is out of service for any reason, the OPDP system defaults to a 2-out-of-2 logic. EC292245 Upon receipt of an OPC alarm, Operators will validate the alarm via bus current indication and a visual inspection of the switchyard and Startup Transformer (SUTs) 1A or 1B overhead lines. If an alarm is validated, then the low side breakers of SUT 1A or 1B (both the 4.16 kV and 6.9 kV Switchgear incoming breakers) will be tripped manually and disabled to prevent closing. The OPDP system is classified as quality related due to regulatory requirement per section 4.2.1.2 (I) of the NEE fleet procedure EN-AA-203-1102 (Safety Classification Determination), though, the system is installed on the non-Class 1E side of the SUT. It is electrically separated from the Class 1E safety related circuits by safety related breakers. Indication is provided in the control room for an OPDP system trouble alarm as well as detection of an OPC. 8.3-5d Amendment No. 31 (11/21)
8.3.1.1.5 120/208 Volt System Power is supplied for normal lighting and other plant loads requiring an unregulated power supply by the 120/208 volt system. This system consist of distribution panels and transformers fed from 480 volt MCCs. Some of the 120/208 volt panels feed safety related loads such as engineered safety features process monitoring instrumentation. In all such cases, the stepdown transformer is fed from an emergency MCC and a Class 1E power panel. Safety related loads, as well as some non-safety related loads are connected to these panels. The 120/208 volt 3 phase 4 wire system has a solid neutral ground. 8.3.1.1.6 Instrument Power Supply System Four redundant 120 volt ac single phase instrument power buses (1MA, 1MB, 1MC and 1MD) provide power to essential instrumentation and control loads under all operating conditions. Each bus is supplied separately from an inverter connected to one of the two Class 1E 125 volt dc buses described in Section 8.3.2.1. The instrument power supply system one line diagram is shown on Figure 8.3-3A. To permit maintenance of any inverter without disabling the corresponding instrument bus, two maintenance bypass buses (1A and 1B) fed from Isolimiters 1A and 1B, respectively, are provided. Instrument buses can be connected to the bypass busses by individual "make before break" transfer switches. Breaker interlocks prevent simultaneous connection of more than one instrument bus to a maintenance bypass bus. Each of the four redundant measurement channels of the nuclear instrumentation and reactor protective systems equipment described in Section 7.2 is supplied from a separate bus of 8.3-5e Amendment No. 17 (10/99)
the four redundant buses. Also, each instrumentation channel of the four redundant measurement channels of the engineered safety features actuation system described in Section 7.3 is supplied from a separate bus of the four redundant buses. The system is arranged so that no single failure will prevent the reactor protective system and engineered safety features actuation system from performing their safety functions. For the balance of the plant a separate 120 volt vital ac system is provided to supply non-emergency instrumentation and control power. It consists of a distribution panel, supplied from SUPS (Static Uninterruptible Power Supply) fed either from the common emergency motor control center or the common dc bus. The four instrument bus inverters are each rated 125 V dc /120 V ac + 2%, single phase, 10 kVA, 60 + 1 percent Hz, voltage and frequency regulated. The two isolimiters 1A and 1B are each rated 10 kVA, single phase, 480/120 volt, 60 hertz. Isolimiter is a trade name of a unit which is a combination of a bypass transformer and a voltage regulator. The vital ac bus uninterruptible power supply (SUPS) is rated 20 kVA, 120 V ac + 2 percent, 60 Hz, single phase and is a grounded system. The station security SUPS is rated 125 V dc/120 + 2 %, single phase and 20 kVA. 8.3.1.1.7 Standby Power Supply
- a. Diesel Generator Sets The standby ac power source consists of two redundant diesel generator sets, their attendant air starting and fuel supply system, and automatic control circuitry.
The diesel generator sets supply power to those electrical loads which are needed to achieve safe shutdown of the plant or to mitigate the consequences of a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) in the event of a coincident loss of normal ac power supply. The power required for the accident condition is higher by a large margin over that required for shutdown. Table 8.3-2 lists the equipment and loads supplied by each diesel generator for both cases. The size of each diesel generator set satisfies the requirements of AEC Safety Guide 9 in the following manner:
- 1) The maximum predicted loads as shown on Table 8.3-2 do not exceed 90 percent of the 30 minute rating of the set.
- 2) The engine is capable of starting, accelerating and supplying the above loads in the sequence shown in Table 8.3-2 without exceeding 5 percent speed drop maximum at any time.
8.3-6 Amendment No. 26 (11/13)
- 3) The generator is capable of starting, accelerating and supplying the above loads in their proper sequence without exceeding 20 percent voltage drop at its terminals.
- 4) The diesel generator is capable of starting, accelerating and running the largest motor (600 HP nameplate) at any time after the automatic loading sequence is over, assuming that the motor had failed to start automatically.
8.3-6a Amendment 15, (1/97)
- 5) The diesel generator sets are capable of reaching full speed and voltage within 10 seconds after receiving a signal to start.
- 6) The speed of the diesel generator set will not exceed 103 percent of nominal speed (900 rpm) during recovery from transients caused by disconnection of the largest single load.
The engine trip set points is 1031 rpm. (114.5% nominal)
- 7) The recovery of the diesel generator from transients will be within 10 percent of nominal voltage and 2 percent of nominal frequency within 40 percent of each load sequence time interval. The recovery from transients was verified during preoperational testing.
- 8) Predicted loads were verified during preoperational testing.
Each diesel generator consists of two diesel engines mounted in tandem with a 3500 kw generator coupled directly between the engines. Each engine in each diesel generator set has a self-contained cooling system which consists of a forced circulation cooling water system which cools the engine directly and an air cooled radiator system which removes the heat from the cooling water. The cooling water pump and radiator fan are driven directly from the engine crankshaft. After starting, the diesel generator set cooling system requires no external source of power and does not depend on any plant cooling system. The engine of each diesel generator set has a self-contained lube oil system consisting of a lube oil sump located at the base of the engine, a lube oil pump, piping, and a heat exchanger. The lube oil heat exchanger is served by the diesel generator set cooling water system. No external source of power or other plant system is required for the diesel generator set lube oil system. Design data for the diesel generator sets are given in Table 8.3-3.
- b. Starting System Each diesel generator set has an independent air starting system. Each diesel generator is provided with two sets of two air receivers. Each set of air receivers has a sufficient air charge for starting a cold diesel generator set five times. Each diesel generator set is also provided with two air compressors, one of which is driven by a separate diesel engine, the other is driven electrically. These compressors provide charging air to the two sets of air receivers. The diesel generator sets are started by the air starting systems 8.3-7 Amendment 18, (04/01)
and do not depend on normal plant electrical power (except for 125V dc power) or any other plant systems for starting operation. Diesel generator starting tests are described in Section 8.3.1.3.
- c. Fuel Supply System The diesel oil fuel supply system is shown on Figures 9.5-1, 9.5-2 and 9.5-3. Two diesel oil storage tanks and two day tanks (per engine set) are provided with a combined usable volume which is sufficient for at least 7 days accident load operation of one diesel generator set. Two diesel oil transfer pumps are provided to replenish the day tanks from oil storage tanks. These pumps are automatically controlled by day tank level and have a capacity of 25 gpm each. The diesel oil supply system is discussed more fully in Section 9.5.4.
Each of the engines on each diesel generator set has its own fuel system which includes a day tank, a fuel pump, actuator and piping. The fuel system for each engine of a diesel generator set takes its supply from the day tank provided for that diesel engine.
- d. Automatic Starting and Loading In the event of loss of normal sources of power to the onsite power system, each diesel generator set is automatically started and loaded by controls and circuitry which are independent of that used to start and load the redundant unit. Typical diesel generator starting and loading logic is shown on figure 8.3-5 and is as follows:
- 1) The diesel generator sets will start upon loss of/degraded voltage in the emergency 4.16 kV and/or actuation of safety injection actuation signal (SIAS).
- 2) Upon loss of/degraded voltage in the 4.16 kV and/or 480 V emergency buses, these buses will be automatically separated from the normal supply buses and all loads on the emergency buses will be tripped except those shown in Table 8.3-2 as part of the first load block. The pressurizer heater transformers, which are non-safety related loads, are connected to the 4.16 kV buses. They are tripped from the buses upon loss of offsite power, however, and can only be reconnected to the buses manually.
- 3) After each diesel generator set has attained normal frequency and voltage, its breaker will close if normal ac power has been lost, thus immediately starting all loads belonging to the first block for which "starting required" signals are present (from engineered safety features actuation signals or from circuit conditions indicating that they were previously running). If normal ac power is still present, the diesel generator breaker will not close but the set will remain at full frequency and voltage until shut down manually.
8.3-8 Amendment No. 23 (11/08)
- 4) The starting of subsequent loads are delayed by timing relays with 3 second intervals between them. Load sequencing of the diesel generator is shown on Table 8.3-2.
- 5) If normal ac power is lost but no engineered safety features actuation signal is present, only the loads shown under the column "Loss of Off-Site Power" in Table 8.3-2 will be automatically started.
- 6) If, while operating as per (5) a safety injection actuation signal appears, the EDG output breaker will be automatically tripped, reclosed after 2.0 seconds time delay and the required emergency loads will be started automatically as in (3) and (4).
- 7) Means are provided for periodic exercising of the diesel generator sets under load when normal bus supply is from the unit auxiliary transformer. If normal ac power is lost or an accident occurs during this exercising, the diesel generator breaker is opened and the sequence returns to (3).
An idle start capability for the diesel generator sets is installed to provide a manual ability for an idle period prior to a fast start, a controlled acceleration, and a timed idle period prior to shutdown. This feature reduces wear to the engine internals and turbocharger gear train during normal testing of the diesels. This feature is automatically overriden on an emergency start signal. All control circuits and their components are provided with means for manual testing during normal plant operation and meet IEEE-279 criteria. The starting and loading circuitry for the diesel generator and 4.16 kV busses is shown schematically on Figures 8.3-6a through 8.3-6i. Means are provided to permit applying any load in the plant to the diesel generator set within its capability. However, this is strictly a manual operation under the operator's full control.
- e. Protection The diesel generator is shut down and its breaker is tripped whenever a diesel generator lockout occurs.
Below is a list of conditions causing a lockout, during normal testing operations, in the absence of a SIAS.
- 1) low engine oil pressure
- 2) high engine water temperature
- 3) engine overspeed
- 4) generator differential
- 5) generator overcurrent
- 6) reverse power flow to generator
- 7) loss of generator excitation
- 8) high crankcase pressure These conditions are alarmed locally and annunciated in the control room as a lockout of the 1A and 1B diesel generator. Besides the above lockouts, the generator breaker is tripped and the engine is left running if a 4.16 kV bus failure occurs. Each diesel generator can be manually started or stopped both locally and from the control room.
8.3-9 Amendment No. 24 (06/10)
If the diesel is started as a result of a SIAS or loss of offsite power, all but two diesel generator lockout signals are overriden. Those which remain functional are engine overspeed and generator differential. Overriding all but two of the lockout signals reduces the probability of spuriously tripping a diesel generator when it may be required to shut down the plant or mitigate the consequences of an accident. The rationale for retaining the engine overspeed and generator differential lockouts is in mitigating the probability of seriously damaging a diesel should one of these adverse conditions occur. The lockouts may permit a repair and return to service during an accident or loss of offsite power condition. The two trips that are not overriden are commonly used in power plant application and have histories of highly reliable operation. The reliability of the two lockouts discussed above warrants maintaining their protective capability during both normal and accident conditions. By means of potential and current transformer test blocks and a test position of the diesel generator circuit breakers the capability is provided to periodically test the protective relaying components and the system as a whole. Figures 8.3-6b and e show the diesel generator lockout relays.
- f. Instrumentation All power supply sources for the diesel generator instrumentation and control system are in accordance with the redundancy criteria discussed in Section 8.3.1.2.
The following parameters are monitored and indicated either locally or in the control room: Control Room Local
- 1) generator voltage * *
- 2) 4 kV bus voltage * *
- 3) generator current * *
- 4) generator watts * *
- 5) generator watt-hours *
- 6) generator frequency * *
- 7) generator reactive power * *
- 8) generator field voltage *
- 9) generator field current *
- 10) diesel generator elapsed
- running time
- 11) generator breaker position *
- 8.3-10 Amendment 18, (04/01)
Control Room Local
- 12) miscellaneous water, lube oil,
- fuel oil pressure and temperature Local and control room alarms are provided for all conditions causing diesel generator lockout as discussed in Subsection "e" above even if a lockout is overridden. Local alarms and control room annunciation are also provided for, between others, low starting air pressure, air receiver outlet valve not full open, high or low day tank level, isolation valve between diesel oil storage tank and diesel generator day tank not full open, overcrank, low fuel storage tank level, low engine lube oil level, low engine cooling water level, generator ground, and starting circuit dc failure. In addition, indication of DC control circuit failed fuses is provided.
8.3.1.1.7.g Diesel Generator Reliability Program The Emergency Diesel Generator Reliability Program for the St. Lucie plant meets the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.155, "Station Blackout," Position 1.2 "Reliability Program." These Regulatory Guide requirements are satisfied through plant surveillance , administrative and maintenance procedures. The Regulatory Guide requirements are: a) Unit "average" target reliability of 0.975 for a four ( 4 ) hour blackout duration, based on an offsite power design characteristic group of "P3*" and an emergency AC power configuration group "C". b) Surveillance testing and reliability monitoring program to track EDG performance are included in plant procedures. c) Maintenance program that assures target EDG reliability is achieved and provides the capability to perform root cause analyses. d) System to collect the data and compare the achieved reliability level with the target value. e) Identifies responsibilities for the program's major elements and management oversight for reviewing reliability levels and ensuring that the reliability program is functioning properly. 8.3.1.1.8 Electrical System Sizing Requirements a) Motor size is determined by the characteristics of the driven load. After the motor size is determined, the speed-torque curves of each (driven load and motor) are compared to ensure that the motor is capable of safely starting and driving the load. The 4.16 and 6.9 kv motors have either Class B sealed or vacuum impregnated insulation systems. The 460 volt motors use Class B sealed insulation system. Motors below 460 volts use the manufacturers standard insulation system. b) The interrupting capacity of switchgear, load centers and motor control centers are selectively chosen such that 1) any bus is capable of starting the largest motor with all other equipment in operation without exceeding the allowed voltage drop limit of the motor, and 2) the interrupting devices can safely interrupt any short circuit that may occur in the system. c) Electric circuit protection and grounding are discussed in Sections 8.3.1.1.2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. d) Design criteria for the diesel generator sets are discussed in Section 8.3.1.1.7. UNIT 1 8.3-11 Amendment No. 28 (05/17)
8.3.1.1.9 Class 1E Underground Cables The Class 1E underground cable system consists of Class 1E cables in Class 1E directly buried ducts utilizing PVC conduit, adequately protected by concrete slabs and Class 1 fill. All plant underground ducts (Class 1E and Non-Class 1E) are shown on Figure 8.3-13. These cables supply 5 KV power, 480 and 120 V power and 120 V control and instrumentation. Many different cable manufacturers have provided the cable utilized in this system, mainly General Cable, Rome Cable, Okonite, Kerite and Cerro. The typical general characteristics of the cables are: Rome Cable General Cable Okonite Jacket PVC PVC PVC Insulation CLPE CLPE CLPE Conductor Copper Copper Copper Shield Shielding Tape(3) Lead(2) Lead(2) Okonite Cerro Kerite Jacket Okolon (Hypalon) Neoprene FR Insulation X-Olene FMR (XLP) CLPE(L) HTK FR2(4) Conductor Copper Copper Copper Shield Shielding Tape(4) Shielding Tape(3) Shielding Tape (1) Filled CLPE (2) 5 KV cable only (3) instrumentation cable only (4) Control & Instrumentation Cables See Table 3A-1 and Appendix 3A, Section D, for the other vendor's data and testing summary. The 5 KV cable complies with the requirements of AEIC No. 5, while the lower voltage cable complies with IPCEA-S-66-524 requirements. The Class 1E power and control cables are insulated with a polyethylene compound which has been crosslinked to increase softening and melting temperatures and to raise the allowable operating temperature to 90°C. When compared to other cable insulations, polyethylene requires the fewest additions of other materials for processing and extrusion over the conductor. A polyethylene compound which is to be crosslinked contains a carefully controlled amount of a dicumyl peroxide. The crosslinking is accomplished by heat treatment of the cable after the insulation has been extruded over the conductor. An antioxydant is added to stabilize the insulation during extrusion. This is usual industry practice which was followed by all manufacturers who supplied cable for St. Lucie Unit 1. It results in excellent uniformity of cables. New cables (used after the unit went into commercial operation) for low voltage power, control and instrumentation are as follows (See References 1 and 2): 8.3-12 Amendment No. 22 (05/07)
The Kerite 600 volt power cables are insulated with a high temperature kerite insulation (HTK) and covered with black heavy duty flame resistant (FR) jackets. The Kerite 600 volt control cables are insulated with kerite flame resistant insulation and covered with heavy duty flame resistant (FR) jackets. New instrumentation cables are 600 volt rather than 300 volt cable originally used. The Kerite 600 volt instrumentation cables are insulated with kerite flame resistant insulation, polymer layer, mylar or aluminum mylar and glass mylar core tapes, with flame resistant (FR) jacket. Kerite insulation maintains the dry/wet/alternately wet and dry properties of crosslinked polyethylene cable while offering greatly enhanced fire retardancy capability. These cables are Post-LOCA qualified. The Okonite 600 volt low voltage power, control and instrumentation cables are insulated with X-Olene FNR (XLP) insulation and covered with a flame resistant Okolon (Hypalon) jackets. The Okonite 300 volt instrumentation cables are insulated with X-Olene FNR (XLP) insulation and covered with flame resistant Okolon (Nypalon) jackets. Okonite insulation maintains the dry/wet/alternately wet and dry properties of crosslinked polyethylene cable while offering enhanced fire retardancy capability. These cables are Post-LOCA qualified. 8.3-12a Am. 4-7/86
All cables meet the requirements of Insulated Power Cable Engineers Association (IPCEA) Standard S-66-524. For the unfilled insulating compound which was specified, this Standard limits the filler (carbon black) to 2-1/2 percent for the 5000 Volt cables. For the lesser insulation requirements of the cables rated 600 volts and lower, a higher percentage of carbon black is specified by the IPCEA Standard. The additional carbon black increases the resistance of the insulation to sunlight and abrasion. Except for low voltage power, control and instrumentation cabling discussed previously all replacement cables will have the same type of insulation as the original cable. Use of another insulating material will not be made without a documented 10 CFR 50.59 review. The installed Class 1E underground system is in conformance with applicable industry standards and has been designed in accordance with 10 CFR 50 General Design Criteria 1, 2, 3, 4, 17, and IEEE 308-1970 Section 5.2.1. The specific design criteria are addressed as follows for the Class 1E underground cable system. a) General Design Criterion 1 - (Quality Standards and Records) Cable - All cables installed for plant operation are Class 1E with a minimum environmental qualification of Category I-B (15 minute post LOCA, Section 3.11.1.2). In addition, the cables were purchased in accordance with applicable industry standards, appropriately specified in purchase specifications for underground and above ground installation in wet or dry locations. Vendor documentation for cable material, cable environmental qualification, IPCEA tests and shipment is retrievable. The cables were installed in accordance with Quality Compliance, Quality Assurance, and Construction Procedures with appropriate documentation (see Section 8.3.1.2.5). The installed cables were tested in accordance with Florida Power & Light Company procedures with results being likewise documented. Duct - The PVC duct was purchased in accordance with Industrial Standards NEMA TC2 and Federal Standards 1904 Type 2. This duct also has an Underwriters Laboratory (UL) rating. Vendor Documentation is traceable showing location of plant, date and shift manufactured, and fabricating machine used. The duct was installed in accordance with Quality Compliance, Quality Assurance, and Construction Procedures with appropriate documentation (see Section 8.3.1.2.5). Engineering calculations associated with both the cable and the duct systems are retrievable to further demonstrate the pre-engineered application of the Class 1E duct/cable design. 8.3-13 Amendment No. 25 (04/12)
b) General Design Criterion 2 - (Design Basis for Protection Against Natural Phenomena). Cable - All cables were specified and purchased for underground or aboveground installation in wet or dry areas and are suitable for use where there is periodic flooding of the underground duct system. Long term testing of similar cable under water at elevated temperatures has been performed by various vendors with the results demonstrating that the installed cable is suitable for the intended wet/dry duct services. Other natural phenomena (earthquakes, tornadoes, etc.) are addressed by demonstrating the adequacy of the duct system and thereby precluding adverse effects on the Class 1E cable. Duct - Protection of the ducts from tornado missiles is described in Item d), GDC 4. Seismic Analysis of Underground Electrical Conduit Seismic design of the duct runs can be accomplished by using a rigid design (concrete encasement) or a flexible (unencased) design. The flexible design concept for underground electrical duct runs was decided upon in 1970. The flexible design has been verified for seismic loadings utilizing concepts derived from N.M. Newmark's paper, "Earthquake Response Analysis of Reactor Structures," Nuclear Engineering and Design, Vol. 20. pp. 303-322. The design method utilizes soil strains induced by seismic waves and frictional resistance between the duct and soil to determine the shear and moment acting on a particular buried element. Relative displacement is considered by using flexible joints at the ends of the manholes. Table 8.3-6 outlines the seismic stresses for the various cases considered. The results show that the calculated stresses are below acceptable stress levels. Where seismic design is considered, the seismic effects of the soil on the ducts is a relevant consideration. Ideally, the ducts should move with the soil. This condition is approached in the St. Lucie design by utilizing a conduit system with sufficient flexibility in soil and by separation of the manhole from other structures. At St. Lucie, the soil surrounding the Class 1E duct runs is comprised entirely of Class I backfill for which the pertinent physical soil parameters are known and condition of installation documented. Flexibility is achieved by not encasing the duct runs in concrete; the moment of inertia and modulus of elasticity of the unencased duct bank is considerably less than that of an encased duct run. Structural separation of the duct runs from other structures is achieved by use of 3 inch isolation joints permitting three dimensional movement between the structures and the manholes. A typical isolation joint is shown in Figure 3.4-2. 8.3-14 Amendment No. 25 (04/12)
The unencased ducts are backfilled after the duct bank is completed. Backfilling is accomplished by a combination of hydraulically placed backfill and vibration. The method of placement of backfill was witnessed by the cognizant soils engineer to ensure acceptable implementation. This assures that a high soil density in duct run 8.3-15 Amendment No. 25 (04/12)
areas is achieved. Density checks of the backfill have been made to determine that the 98 percent Modified Proctor Density was achieved. The results of these tests are documented and test results are retrievable. Protection from excavation damage, normally achieved by concrete encasement, is obtained by the installation of a reinforced concrete slab over the Class 1E duct runs. These slabs are 9 inches thick except under roadways where the slabs are 1 foot 3 inches thick. Non-Class 1E runs are concrete encased because there are no seismic considerations. The Class I soil in the area of the duct banks has been chemically analysed with the results being typical for beach sand except for a somewhat higher than normal level of calcium carbonate (sea shells). Leaching of chemical compounds in the soils would not have any detrimental effect upon the cables or ducts. An alternate concept, namely, concrete encasement of underground duct runs, has been provided at some facilities for protection against external effects and for strength to support structural loads which may be imposed on the duct run (including seismic). Underground piping may be encased in concrete for the same reasons. The flexible approach discussed above was chosen for the St. Lucie site because the design could be more readily implemented to accommodate seismic considerations with an acceptable factor of safety. In contrast to the cables, concrete tunnels to carry Class I underground piping are used for two piping runs. One run,connects the RAB pipe chase and the Component Cooling Water Area while the other connects the Fuel Handling Building and the CCW area. Both tunnels are approximately 35 feet long. The principal reason for selecting a tunnel for the piping is the seismic design considerations. Direct burial of the piping between two separate structures would result in soil loads being imposed directly on the pipe. Because the pipe ranges in sizes up to 20 inches in diameter, there is insufficient flexibility of the pipe over short runs such as 35 feet to allow for a flexible design approach. The tunnel functions, therefore, are to transfer seismic loads and movements from the soil to specific points of support for the pipe. No high shear stresses develop with this method of support. Piping differs from cable runs in that the pipe is relatively rigid between any two points while the cables and ducts are much more flexible. Tunnels have the disadvantage of using considerable space. c) General Design Criterion 3 - (Fire Protection) A redundant and independent Class 1E underground cable system is used for each safety system, as is shown on Figure 8.3-13. There-8.3-16 Amendment No. 25 (04/12)
fore, any fire in the Class 1E underground cable system of one redundant safety system will have no effect on the other redundant safety systems. Adjacent manholes have a concrete wall (1 foot thick) as their common side. The isolated duct systems SA, SB, SAB have a minimum separation of two feet with an average of seven feet. Cable ampacity ratings for St. Lucie plant are based upon industry accepted calculation methods as outlined in IPCEA Publication P-46-426. As a conservative measure, an earth ambient temperature of 30°C was used in the calculations for the St. Lucie cables in the underground ducts instead of the temperatures of 20°C which are normally used. The ampacities tabulated in IPCEA Publication P-46-426 are calculated by use of the Neher McGrath method of calculation. The method was outlined in an AIEE paper published in 1957. It has been accepted for universal use in the United States and in other countries. This calculation method has been checked by field tests and found to be conservative. With confidence in the method and the conservative factors used in the calculations, allowable cable insulation temperatures will not be exceeded in normal operation or in any conceivable emergency situation. d) General Design Criterion 4 - (Environmental and Missile Design Basis) Cables - The Class 1E cables installed in the Class 1E underground cable system are protected by the duct system against environmental and missile conditions, except water. As stated above for GDC 1 and 2 all cables are designed to accommodate water. Ducts - Protection against a tornado missile is provided for Class 1E ducting as shown on Figure 8.3-13. There is a minimum of two feet three inches of compacted backfill and 9 inches of reinforced concrete providing tornado missile protection. The inherent capability of this protection is well within the bases of Section 4.0 of Appendix 3F for the spectrum of tornado missiles identified therein. The ducts are protected from the direct effects of the winds associated with the design basis natural phenomena by virtue of being below grade. All underground electrical system components are located at least 8 feet above the normal ground water level. Due to maintenance considerations, manholes are constructed to minimize the infiltration of water. A gravity or pumped drainage system is provided. During severe hurricanes, or excessive rain storms, flooding of the areas surrounding the plant island could result in backup of the storm water system which in turn could result in a wetting of underground cables. As stated in previous sections, no adverse effect will result from this condition. 8.3-17 Amendment No. 25 (04/12)
The strength of the PVC schedule 40 ducts have been analyzed as flexible buried pipes. Analysis methods in American Water Works Association Manual Mll entitled, "Steel Pipe Design Manual," were used to determine the magnitude of loading transmitted from the surface to the buried ducts, and the resulting deflection and stressing of the duct. The maximum design roadway loading was that associated with movement of the Unit 2 steam generator (in the order of 650 tons divided over two transporters). This results in a roadway surface loading of 5000 psf and 3000 psf at the top of the duct bank. Calculated stresses (buckling) in the ducts due to the steam generators load are 118 psi (the ducts can accommodate buckling stresses of 566 psi). The results of the analysis demonstrate that the ducts can withstand this surface loading with ample margins of safety against crushing or overstressing. The steam generator transporter is considered the design basis load. e) General Design Criterion 17 - (Electrical Power Systems) GDC 17 states in part "the on-site electrical power sources, including the batteries, and the on-site electrical distribution system, shall have sufficient independence, redundancy and testability to perform their safety function assuming a single failure." The Class 1E underground cable system is composed of three (A, AB, & B) systems (i.e., redundancy) which are separated from each other (ie, independence) via separate manholes and duct banks (see Figure 8.3-13). As stated in GDC 3, redundant duct bank systems are separated either by distance, reinforced concrete or both. Periodic testing of the Class 1E underground cable system (i.e., testability) is as follows:
- 1) Cable Testing:
Substantial industry experience had identified no failures of cable used in wet-dry environments, therefore, testing of buried cables is not required. However, new cable will be tested in accordance with appropriate standards such as IPCEA, NEMA,, AEIC Standards and purchase order specifications to ensure their suitability for normal, dry, alternately wet and dry and submerged conditions of service in tray, conduit and underground installations.
- 2) Testing of the ducts under roadways subsequent to application of the heavy load:
The Class 1E ducts installed under roadways will be tested as described below following passage along the roadway of the design basis load. The diesel generators will be in operation 8.3-18 Amendment No. 25 (04/12)
PAGES 8.3-19 AND 8.3-20 HAVE BEEN INTENTIONALLY DELETED 8.3-19 Am. 7-7/88
prior to and during movement of the load over Class 1E duct banks. The Class 1E ducts will be tested within 30 days of this occurrence. In addition to cables under roads, the duct test is to be applied to cables beneath any other location when loading at ground surface exceeds 80 percent of the design basis loading. Following loading at the ground surface to 80 percent of the design basis loading, the following steps are to be performed within 30 days: (a) The ducts are to be inspected visually at load locations and where accessible. (b) A mandrel with a diameter of 80 percent of the duct inside diameter is to be pulled through a spare duct. (c) One of the ducts exposed to the severest loading (with or without cables) will be physically inspected to verify duct integrity. Tests will be conducted by site personnel; the results shall be reviewed to ensure that design bases have not been unacceptably affected, and test results will be documented in accordance with the Commission's requirements. f) IEEE Guide 308 (November 1970) - Class 1E Electric Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations IEEE 308 (November 1970), at Section 5.2.1(5) states "Common Mode Failures: The preferred and the standby power supply shall not have a common failure mode. In addition, the generating sources of the standby power supply shall not have a common failure mode for any design basis event." IEEE Guide 308, Section 5.2.1, Table 1 defines design basis events as 1) Natural Phenomena a) Earthquake b) Wind, c) Hurricane, d)Tornado, e) Rain, f) Ice, e) Snow, h) Floods, i) Lightning and j)Temperature, and 2) Postulated Phenomena - a) Post-accident environment b) Fire c) Accident-generated missiles, d) Fire-protection system operation, e) Accident-generated flooding, sprays or jets, f) Postulated loss of the preferred power supply combined with any of the above, g) Single equipment malfunction, h) Single act, event, component failure or circuit fault that can cause multiple equipment malfunction, and i) Single equipment maintenance outage. For the Class 1E underground cable system only 1) a,c,d,e,h,j, and 2b above are applicable. Of these 1) a,c,d,e,h, 2)b, have been covered previously by GDC 2, 3 and 4. 1) j is discussed in Section 8.3.1.2.3. 8.3-21 Amendment 15, (1/97)
g) IEEE Preliminary Guide P422 - (Guide for the Design and Installation of Cable Systems in Power Generating Station) Paragraph below represents status at the time of review of the operating license application. IEEE P422 is presently in draft form, and has not been issued for trial use and comment. This notwithstanding, the document has been reviewed. Section 13.3.2.2(6) as amended at the May 14, 1975 committee meeting might warrant comment. It states, "Directly burried nonmetallic conduits should not be installed under roadways or in areas where heavy equipment may be moved over them unless protected structurally or conduits are made from certain resilient compounds suitable for this service." As stated in GDC 2 and 4 above, the PVC conducts are structurally protected for the roadway concerns. 8.3.1.2 Analysis 8.3.1.2.1 Redundancy Redundancy of the emergency auxiliary power system has been provided for the operation of redundant safety related electrical load groups. This redundancy extends from the emergency power source, through 4.16 kV buses, station service transformers, 480 volt buses, MCCs, distribution cables, switchgear and protective devices. No redundant essential electrical component is dependent for its emergency power supply upon electrical equipment or devices which are common to the power supply of its redundant counterpart. Each of the redundant on-site emergency power sources and associated load groups can independently provide for safe shutdown of the plant and/or mitigate the consequences of a design accident. 8.3-22 Amendment No. 25 (04/12)
8.3.1.2.2 Electrical Separation The electrical separation of redundant portions of the emergency auxiliary power system conforms to IEEE 308 and AEC Safety Guide 6. There are no direct connections between parts of the system which serve load group A and those parts which serve load group B. There are no automatic transfers of loads between load groups A and B. Buses serving load group AB can be manually connected with either of the buses serving load groups A or B. Ties from the AB buses to the A or B buses have a breaker at each end of the tie. Interlock is provided to prevent closing both ties at the same time. Administrative procedures call for tying the AB buses on all ac and dc voltage levels to the same load group (either A or B). In this way, the split bus system is maintained throughout the plant including the supply of dc power for proper breaker operation. Any violation of the administrative controls is annunciated in the control room. The alarms are actuated whenever the 4.16 kV, 480 volt and 125 volt dc AB buses are not all aligned to the same A or B load group. There are two alarms provided, one uses auxiliary contacts from the AB bus breakers while the other uses auxiliary contacts from the A and B breakers feeding the AB bus breakers. The elimination of direct ties between buses serving load groups A and B, and the provision of double breakers and interlocks on tie lines to AB buses prevent a single fault from affecting both redundant systems or from accidentally paralleling emergency power sources. All power circuits have both overload and short circuit protection provided by breakers or, for some control power circuits, by fuses. On three phase circuits, all three phases will be simultaneously interrupted by the breakers. On single phase grounded circuits, only the line side will be interrupted in accordance with normal practice. 8.3.1.2.3 Physical Separation Physical separation as a protection against common failure of emergency power to both redundant electrical load groups has been achieved by spatial separation and/or erection of physical barriers between the redundant emergency portions of the auxiliary power system. Physical separation has been provided between load group A and load group B and between load group AB and both load groups A and B since load group AB may at various times function as part of either load group A or B. Separate cable tray and conduit systems are provided for each of the redundant load groups. Separate electrical equipment rooms have been provided in the reactor auxiliary building for redundant 4.16 kV and 480 volt emergency buses as shown by Figure 8.3-7. The 480 volt emergency MCC's are located inside the reactor auxiliary building and spatial separation is provided between redundant MCCs. 8.3-23 Amendment 15, (1/97)
The emergency diesel generator sets are located in the diesel generator building with each diesel generator set and its auxiliary equipment in separate rooms. The wall separating the diesel generator sets is flood tight and fire resistant, and protects the redundant sets against internally generated missiles. Tornado missile protection is provided at the diesel generator air intake, exhaust ports, and access doors. The diesel generator building general arrangement and elevation drawings, showing the size and location of both the intake and exhaust ports, are shown on Figure 8.3-15. Figure 8.3-15A shows the details of the air intake louvers. Figures 8.3-7 through 8.3-10 show typical separation of cable tray and conduit runs in the reactor auxiliary building and the containment. In general, the separation of redundant cables is accomplished by spatial separation. In no instance where spatial separation alone is used will it be less than 4 feet vertical or 18 inches horizontal. In areas of natural convergence of cables, such as in the cable spreading room, these minimum separation distances cannot always be maintained. In these instances, permanent physical barriers are provided for a minimum of 18 inches beyond the point of minimum convergence. Details for these barriers are specified on Figure 8.3-16. The above separation criteria do not necessarily apply to embedded conduits. However, the separation criteria do apply at points where embedded conduits leave the material in which they are embedded. Wherever possible, panel mounted equipment associated with redundant channels is located in separate cabinets. Whenever this is not possible, a minimum of 12 inches of separation is provided inside the cabinets or permanent physical barriers are provided. In addition, these specific criteria were applied for cable runs: a) Separate tray and conduit systems are furnished for the following classes of cable: 15 kV, 5 kV, 600 volt power, 600 volt unshielded control and 300 volt shielded instrument cable. Generally, power, control and shielded instrumentation cables are routed in separate wireways (trays, conduits, ladders and junction boxes). In some instances 600 volt power and 600 volt unshielded control cables are placed in the same tray. In these cases there is a solid metal barrier between them. b) Different parameter signal cables are in the same wireway as long as they do not belong to separate redundant channels. c) A raceway is defined as a cable tray or conduit in which cables are routed. Physical independence within raceways is maintained as follows: (1) Safety related and non-safety related cables are mixed. However, all cables are of the same type and have similar overload and short circuit protective features. This ensures that the non-safety related cables do not jeopardize the integrity of the safety related cables. 8.3-24 Amendment No. 18, (04/01)
(2) Any non-safety cable routed in the raceways of a redundant safety system will not be routed in either the raceways of the other redundant safety system or in a raceway with a non-safety cable which has been routed in raceways of the other redundant system. (3) The correct routing of all cabling is assured by a design and engineering review of all cable runs following a stringent document control procedure. Cable pull cards which are approved by construction detailing are controlled by quality control. d) Base ampacity rating of cables is based on the tables published in IPCEA P-46-426, 1962 edition. To this basic rating a grouping derating factor, also in accordance with IPCEA P-46-426, has been applied. When definite spacing between cables is not maintained, as is the case with randomly filled cable trays, they are loaded using the most conservative rating factor (50 percent) in Table VIII A of IPCEA P-46-426. Credit was taken for a load diversity factor where applicable. e) Power cables are derated in accordance with IPCEA P-46-426 as required to account for the thermal effects of increased number of conductors in a raceway. Derating of power cable ampacity is also done where flame-retardant coatings are applied to raceways and for fire barrier penetrations to allow for reduced cable cooling. Cable trays are generally designed for a loading factor of 40 percent fill, based on tray and cable areas. Some trays may be loaded to higher fill percentages than this value. Where the cable tray fill exceeds 40 percent an evaluation is performed for acceptability. f) In general, cable splices are avoided; however, if the need for a splice arises outside the containment, it is made in a pull box or manhole only. Inside the containment, cables are joined via connectors, terminal boards or splices. Splices are used to provide a cable joining that is both mechanically and electrically adequate for all environmental conditions that may exist in the containment, including LOCA environment. Such splices utilize a heat shrinkable outer covering (Raychem "thermofit" or equal). Cables that are required to be functional in the LOCA environment are joined inside containment by splices. g) All cables are inspected by site quality control to assure that they have not been damaged in the process of cable pulling. h) Safety related cabling located in the electrical tunnel at elevation 0' - 0" is separated in accordance with Section 8.3.1.2.3 a), b) and c). i) Cable constructions should pass the IEEE-383 or approved equivalent per the PSL-FPER-04-017 (Reference 4) described in the Fire Protection Design Basis Document (Reference 3) flame test (with additional fire protection if required) or be covered with an approved flame retardant coating if test requirements are not met. A limited number of trays bearing instrumentation and control cable, which are completely enclosed with solid bottoms and covers, were not sprayed with the originally approved fire retardant, Flamastic. Certain Control Room computer peripheral devices cables are not qualified in accordance with IEEE-383 or approved equivalent. These cables are confined to locations below the Control Room Operator's Surveillance Area raised floor. This area effectively isolates the cables from interacting with any Class 1E or Safe Shutdown cable, since the area is bounded by the concrete floor below and the concrete floor tile with metallic skin above. The cables in question are low energy computer cables used to extend a PC keyboard and/or mouse from the CPU console to the specific workstation locations throughout the surveillance area. There are no ignition sources in the vicinity of the cable routes. These cables are routed with other non-safety related instrument cables. However, none of the cables are Safe Shutdown cables. The cable insulation has been included in the fire safety analysis for the Control Room fire area contained in the PSL-FPER-05-047 (Reference 5) described in the Fire Protection Design Basis Document (Reference 3). UNIT 1 8.3-25 Amendment No. 28 (05/17)
The electrical tunnel lies in the base concrete of the reactor building internal structure between elevations 0.0 and +7.5 ft. Access to the tunnel from above is restricted to two vertical accessways originating at floor elevation +18 ft. The tunnel also communicates with the reactor cavity via various vent openings including two at elevation 0.0 ft. For situations other than LOCA or steam line break which would initiate containment spray action and thereby possibly induce flooding, there does not exist a credible series of events that could cause flooding of the electrical tunnel at a time when the instruments located in the tunnel are serving a safety related function (i.e., normal operation or anticipated operation occurrence). The preceding is based on the following: a) The two accessways to the electrical tunnel from floor elevation +18 ft are surrounded by 6" high curbs; one accessway has a checker plate cover. The pipe trenches and associated floor/trench drains at elevation +18 ft would carry off any discharging water before the 6" curb height could be exceeded. The volume of water required to saturate the drains and at the same time flood floor elevation +18 ft to a height of 6 inches does not exist inside the containment. b) Assuming water could enter the electrical tunnel from floor elevation +18 ft, it would drain to the reactor cavity sump. The water will not accumulate in the electrical tunnel without first actuating the reactor cavity sump level alarm. Refer to Section 5.2.4, Leak Detection. For cables entering the containment, there are forty-five penetrations, and five spare twelve inch sleeves. The eight penetrations for 6.9 kv power use 18 inch sleeves. All others are 12 inch sleeves. The penetrations are arranged in five horizontal rows of ten penetration sleeves each. The spacing between penetrations is approximately 40 inches horizontally and 30 inches vertically, center to center. In the penetration room outside the shield building, a vertical wall divides the penetration area into two separate compartments with 25 penetrations on each side. This wall extends from floor to ceiling and will prevent damage in one compartment from affecting penetrations or cables in the other compartment. Cables serving load group A are run in one compartment and cables serving load group B are run in the other. There are no load group AB cables penetrating the containment. The cable tray arrangement in the penetration area is shown on Figures 8.3-11 and 8.3-12. In the annulus within the shield building, each penetration is sleeved. The sleeves are designed to allow for differential movement between the shield building and containment vessel and allow any leakage past the containment canister seal to vent into the annulus. The sleeves will prevent damage in one penetration from affecting other penetrations. Inside the containment vessel the penetration cables are run into cable trays as near the penetration as possible. The cable separation criteria described previously are applied for the cable tray runs inside the containment. For underground cable runs such as between the diesel generator building and reactor auxiliary building, separation is provided by routing the cables associated with redundant load groups in separate groups of buried conduit. Typical separation of underground conduit is shown on Figure 8.3-13. 8.3-26 Amendment No. 17 (10/99)
All cables, except lighting, receptacles and small power cables are tagged at their terminations with a unique identifying number. All electrical safety related equipment (switchgear, motor control centers, junction boxes, cables, cable trays, conduits, etc.) are identified by color coded tags, paint or tape according to the following scheme: System A (Power, Control, and Instrumentation) (SA): orange System B (Power, Control, and Instrumentation) (SB): purple System AB (Power, Control, and Instrumentation) (SAB): pink Measurement Channel A (Protection System) (MA): red Measurement Channel B (Protection System) (MB): yellow Measurement Channel C (Protection System) (MC): green Measurement Channel D (Protection System) (MD): blue Color coded tray numbers are either stencilled or engraved on both sides of cable trays at thirty foot intervals. Additional tray designations are placed at elbows, room entrances and other areas of possible confusion. 8.3.1.2.4 Loss of Normal Power Sources Upon signal of the complete loss of all normal sources of power for the plant on-site power system, the emergency portion of the system will automatically be electrically isolated from the normal portion of the system by the operation of circuit breakers on the tie lines between normal and emergency 4.16 kV buses. Loads will be automatically removed from the emergency buses as necessary to allow for sequential loading of the emergency diesel generators. The emergency diesel generators will automatically start, and when available for supplying power, will automatically be connected to the emergency 4.16 kV buses. The emergency loads necessary for station shutdown or, in the event of a LOCA, to limit consequences of the accident, will automatically and sequentially be connected to the emergency buses. This automatic diesel starting and loading sequence is discussed further in Section 8.3.1.1.7. The loading sequence is arranged to provide power to engineered safety feature components required in the event of a design basis accident, with the time delay period specified for their operation in Chapter 15, Safety Analysis. With load group A-B tied to one of the redundant load groups A or B, the design assures that the emergency generator loading sequence for that load group will include only one of the pumps available for each function (component cooling or intake cooling water) to prevent overloading the diesel generator set. 8.3-27 Amendment No. 24 (06/10)
The results of an analysis by the manufacturer of failure to start of a single engine during starting of a dual engine diesel generator set indicates that fires or explosions should not be encountered. Conditions for failure to start considered in the analysis were lack of and excessive fuel, lack of air, exhaust blockage and mechanical failure. Tests have shown that exhaust temperature provides a rapid determination of the operational status of a diesel engine. A temperature sensor is installed in the exhaust of each diesel engine. A temperature differential switch compares the exhaust temperature of both engines. Should the diesel generator receive a start signal and one engine fails to start or run (or runs at lower power output than expected), an alarm is sounded in the control room. As described in Section 8.3.1.2.2 the redundant emergency portions of the onsite power system are electrically independent to the extent that no single fault will cause interconnection of the emergency power sources at any voltage level. 8.3.1.2.5 Conformance With Appropriate Quality Assurance Standards The quality control of design, fabrication, shipment, field storage, installation and component checkout, and the documentation of such control measures is carried out in accordance with the applicable company procedures. 8.3.1.2.6 Service Environment All components of the emergency portion of the auxiliary power system which are essential to limit the consequences of a LOCA are designed to operate in the post-accident environment which is expected in the area in which they are located. Accident environmental conditions are considered in addition to the effects of operation in the normal service environment. Refer to Section 3.11 for discussion of environmental design of safety related electrical components for post-accident conditions. Cables in the reactor auxiliary building and other plant areas are designed to be operable in the normal service environment. Power cable for 4.16 and 6.9 kV service has stranded copper conductor, cross- linked polyethylene insulation with thickness for 5 kV and 15 kV. Typically, these cables will EC290363 include a lead sheath and polyvinyl-chloride (PVC) overall jacket. No multi-conductor cables will be used at these voltage levels. Cables for 480V, 208V, 120V ac and 125V dc have copper conductor, cross-linked polyethylene insulation with thickness for 600 volts, PVC jacket, and PVC overall. The same type of cable insulation is used for lighting and receptacles. Other materials, such as ethylene propylene and silicone rubber insulations and neoprene or CSPE jackets are also used. All classes of cable except the shielded instrument cable are run in open type trays. All vertical runs have solid covers front and rear with fire stops placed at regular intervals. Wherever an open wireway crosses a wall, a fire stop is provided to prevent the spread of fire across the wall. Also Flamastic is used as a fire proofing material in cable trays, except where the trays are fully enclosed with solid bottoms and covers. Solid tray covers are used when trays are, or may be, subject to falling debris, hot weld material or when used for protection of secondary combustibles. All cable bus shall be installed in elevated, ventilated aluminum ducting with non-conductive spacers EC290363 to maintain cable separation. Ducting installed for outdoor applications shall be ventilated on the sides and bottom only. All outdoor termination compartments associated with the cable bus shall be sealed to prevent water intrusion. The cables for the 4.16 and 6.9kV cable bus have stranded copper conductors, ethylene propylene rubber (EPR) insulation, with a chlorinated polyethylene (CPE) jacket. The typical lead sheath is not required for cable bus as the elevated, ventilated ducting prevents the accumulation of water. UNIT 1 8.3-28 Amendment No. 30 (05/20)
Outside the biological shields, cables are installed in either trays or conduits. Within the shielded areas, steel conduits are used. Redundant wireways are spatially separated or have barriers between them to protect against common failure from a single event. Fire detectors are installed in areas of large concentration of cables to alarm if fire occurs. No permanently installed fire protection system (e.g., automatic waterspray or CO2) is used for the cable system. The plant fire protection system is described in Section 9.5.1. All underground safety related cabling is contained in PVC conduits which are designed for submerged service. By being buried, the cables are protected from lightning, wind loading, and missile damage. 8.3.1.2.7 Natural Phenomena The emergency portion of the onsite power system is designed to seismic Class I criteria to ensure that the system will be available to limit the consequence of a design basis accident during and following a design basis earthquake. Refer to Section 3.10 for discussion of the seismic design of Class I electrical components. With the exception of the diesel oil storage tanks, all other components of the emergency portion of the auxiliary power system which are essential to shutdown and which maintain the unit in a safe condition are housed within structures that are designed to withstand design tornado wind loadings and missiles and maximum flood levels. Requirements to accommodate environmental conditions are no longer required in many instances due to the NRC backfit requirements to accommodate tornado missiles as discussed in Appendix 3F. The outdoor equipment is designed to withstand the design tornado wind loading. Protection from the tornado or other external missiles has been provided by tornado missile shielding or by separating the redundant tanks, pumps and valves such that a single missile could only damage a single component. The outdoor motors and valves are protected by locating them above elevation +22 ft which is above the calculated maximum wave runup level. There is no electrical equipment located below the maximum flood level which, if flooded, could cause a sudden plant trip. The plant switchyard will be protected from flooding during a PMH because its base elevation is 18 ft MLW. During a PMH, the critical wave-approach direction to the switchyard will be an angle 60 degrees counter-clockwise from the east to west traverse line of the storm. The corresponding surge level is 13.7 ft MLW and the wave runup was calculated to be 3.3 feet by the Saville's method including the assumed erosion rate in Section 2.4.5.4. The diesel generator intake is designed to insure that the air entering the building is forced to change direction. This provides adequate assurance that unacceptable quantities of entrained water are not carried into the building. The intake is seismically designed; it is designed to accommodate the PMH (Probable Maximum Hurricane) and it precludes entrance of unacceptable quantities of rain during the PMP (Probable Maximum Precipitation). The bottom of the intake is at elevation +22.67 ft which is above the PMH protection level for wave runup. 8.3-29
Water spouts are discussed in Section 2.3.1.3. Non-trivial amounts of water may be entrained in water spouts. Photogrametric analysis of the lower Matecumbe Key waterspout of September 2, 1967 resulted in estimates of water droplets of up to 1 centimeter in diameter in a spray which averaged 50 feet in height. The water-laden portion of a water spout which struck the Wite Star liner Pittsburg in 1923 was estimated by deck officers to be 40 to 50 feet wide and 70 feet high. Water spout wind speeds are relatively low, and the estimated contribution of water droplets to the mass density of the vortex-column is 4 percent. Thus, wind loadings due to waterspouts are below DBT and PMH wind loading criteria. The diesel generator building air intake is designed to withstand the wind loadings associated with the DBT, and will preclude entrance of unacceptable quantities of water contained in water spouts. For the purposes of diesel generator building air intake design, the design criteria regarding water intrusion are;
- 1. Water entering the building will not exceed the capacity of the floor drainage system.
- 2. Airborne water will not effect the reliability of the diesel generator sets.
The intake design is such that the only water reaching the diesel's air intake filter is that contained in 100 percent relative humidity air. This is assured by multiple changes in direction of air, i.e., the air is turned by the building intake and once again within the building to reach the diesel generator's air intake. Diesel generator operating reliability is not impaired by airborne water because:
- 1. Multiple turns of air prevent entrained water from entering the diesel's air intake.
- 2. The diesel is designed to start and operate in 100 percent relative humidity air.
- 3. Diesel generator air intake filters are provided. The filter is designed to operate saturated with water for 24 hours. The expected life of the air filters during normal operation is approximately one year.
Each section of the diesel generator building is fitted with 8 three inch drains connected to a 4 inch line through an oil separating tank and into the site drainage ditch. This drain system is capable of draining the building at a rate of 100 gpm. 8.3-30 Amendment No. 25 (04/12)
The diesel generator fire protection system includes a sprinkler system. However, all equipment is mounted on a 4 inch pedestal. It would take 3760 gallons to fill this 4 inch high volume. Starting and operating reliability would not be impaired by effects other than injection of water laden air since:
- 1. The diesel generators sets (which includes the diesel cooling and lubrication systems, and the air starting systems) have been designed for the environmental conditions existing within the diesel generator building.
- 2. The diesel generator installation is designed to withstand severe natural phenomena, i.e.,
design basis earthquake, probable maximum hurricane, probable maximum precipitation and design basis tornado. 8.3-31 Amendment No. 26 (11/13)
8.3.1.3 Tests and Inspection The manufacturers of electrical equipment have performed production shop tests to verify proper continuity, operability and insulation resistance as called for by the equipment specifications. The air intake filter manufacturer demonstrated that the paper filters, which are treated to resist moisture, will operate longer than 7 days in a 99 percent relative humidity. The filters have not been tested to operate under conditions with entrained water droplets; however, the diesel generator building barriers discussed in Section 8.3.1.2.7 prevent entrained water droplets from entering the building, thereby precluding the need to contend with water droplets. Additional qualification or type testing has been performed to demonstrate the capability of certain equipment to function under special requirements such as seismic loading, post-accident, containment environment and fast starting for the emergency diesel generators. Seismic and environmental testing are discussed in Sections 3.10 and 3.11. Shop tests were performed on one of the diesel Generator sets installed for St. Lucie Unit 1 to demonstrate fast starting reliability. 8.3-32 Amendment No. 25 (04/12)
The starting test requirements included: a) A sufficient number of starts to demonstrate a 0.99 probability of starting and supplying load with a confidence level of 95 percent. b) A requirement for bringing the set to full speed and voltage automatically. c) A requirement for loading of the generator to at least 2100 Kw (60 percent of continuous rating) immediately after each sutcessful start and maintaining this load for at least 5 minutes. d) A requirement for the time between tests to allow the equipment to return to within 10°F of the initial base temperature (130°F). e) Monitoring of operating conditions throughout the duration of the test with significant parameters such as voltage, frequency, operating temperatures, air pressures, acceleration times and other pertinent functions being recorded. Failures considered were limited to those caused by malfunctions of the engine generator set only. Failures caused by malfunctions in the test equipment or external circuitry, or loads are not attributable to the unreliability of the engine generator set. Provisions were made in the testing procedure to determine the cause of any malfunctions and to classify it as a valid failure of the equipment being tested or an external non-valid failure. such determination of cause and classification of failures were fully supported by documentation. At the completion of the tests, an inspection was performed on the unit with inspection points including air box and crank case covers pulled with cylinder liners and bearing inspection made; turbo-charger drive train and turbo-charger bearings; a thorough inspection of the compete starting system; and an inspection performed on support systems and engine govenors. At the completion of the inspection, an inspection report was made and the engine was re-assembled. The diesel generator was tested for starting capacity at the vendor's plant in June 1973. During this test, the unit was successfully started five times on each set of two air tanks with the compressors disconnected. Certified copies of tests and inspection reports will be available subsequent to completion of the tests and inspection. After assembly of the sets in the field, in situ tests were performed. With the exception of the manufacturers test for 0.99 probability of starting and supplying load with a confidence level of 95 percent, the in situ tests demonstrated compliance with performance criteria stated herein and in Section 8.3.1.1.7. Specifically, these tests included (i) sequence testing simulating loss of offsite power and loss of offsite power concurrent with a LOCA (see Table 8.3-2); (ii) a full load acceptance test; and (iii) a load rejection test. Data was recorded in accordance with preoperational test procedures. 8.3-33 Amendment No. 25 (04/12)
During the reliability tests conducted by the manufacturer to demonstrate the confidence level to perform the diesel function, i.e., the 300 start test, periodic maintenance functions were performed. To insure an in situ confidence level equivalent to that demonstrated by the manufacturer, these functions will be performed on site. The frequency of maintenance functions will be consistent with the schedule followed by the manufacturer during the shop tests. Preoperational testing was performed to verify that all components, automatic and manual controls, and sequences of the integrated emergency power system functioned as required by the plant safety analysis. A switch is provided for testing each of the 4.16 kV emergency buses (1A3 and 1B3) load shed relays (27X-1, 27X-2, etc.). Each switch, which has a spring return to normal operation, has three positions - lamp test, normal, and relay test. The "lamp test" position is used to verify that the lamp is working. Turning the test switch to the "relay test" position bypasses the undervoltage trip actuating relay contacts (disconnecting them from the actuating circuit) and connects them to the test lamp circuit. Similar arrangement is provided to test the 480 V load center degraded voltage relays. Schematics for this system are provided - see Figures 8.3-6g, 6h and 6i. A separate test circuit is provided for the 4.16 kV emergency busses (1A3 and 1B3) loss of/degraded voltage detection relays (see Figures 8.3-17 and 8.3-17a). A six (6) position selector switch and a test pushbutton allows individual testing of each of the relays and their associated timers. Periodic testing of the system after plant start-up, will be performed as described in the plant Technical Specifications. The diesel generators will be inspected in accordance with a licensee-controlled maintenance program. This program will require inspection in accordance with procedures prepared in conjunction with the manufacturers recommendations for this class of standby service. Changes to the maintenance program will be controlled under 10CFR50.59. 8.3-34 Amendment No.18, (04/01)
8.3.1.4 Instrumentation Application Table 8.3-3A lists the 4.16 kV and 480 V parameters measured by the ac Power System Instrumentation. The table also lists tripping devices and control switch locations of the 4.16 kV and 480 V buses. 8.3.1.5 Features Not Previously Used In Nuclear Generating Stations The only electrical equipment that has not been previously qualified for a nuclear generating station is the tandem diesel generators. These diesel generators differ from other solid-coupled units because of the solid-coupled tandem feature. One is a 12 cylinder unit and the other is a 16 cylinder unit. The tandem diesel generators were qualified as described in Section 8.3.1.3. 8.3.1.6 Independence of Redundant Systems A discussion of the independence of redundant Class 1E electrical systems including: electrical and physical separation of power and control cables, cable tray fill, sharing and derating, tray marking, and fire protection are discussed in Sections 8.3.1.2.1 through 8.3.1.2.7. The administrative controls used to assure compliance with these criteria are reflected in site and engineering procedures. 8.3.1.7 Physical Identification of Safety Related Equipment The scheme for identifying safety related equipment is described in Sections 8.3.1.2.3 and 7.1.2.3. 8.3.2 DC POWER SYSTEM 8.3.2.1 Description The dc power system is shown on Figures 8.3-3a and 8.3-3b. Power is provided at 125 volts dc (ungrounded) for plant control and instrumentation and for operation of dc motor operated equipment such as valve operators and emergency lube oil pumps. As for the 4.16 kV and 480 volt ac emergency systems, the 125 volt dc system is arranged into two main redundant load groups A and B and a third service or swing load group AB. Load 8.3-35 Amendment No. 25 (04/12)
groups A and B are each capable of supplying the minimum dc power requirements to safely shut down the plant and/or mitigate the consequences of a LOCA. Load group A is served by dc bus 1A and load group B by dc bus 1B. Load group AB is served by dc bus 1AB which is normally tied to either (but never both) dc bus 1A or 1B corresponding to the manner in which the 4.16kV and 480 V AB busses are connected to their respective A or B busses. There are two breakers in series in each tie which are key interlocked to prevent the 1AB bus from being simultaneously connected to both the 1A and 1B busses. The dc loads served by each bus are given in Table 8.3-4. To prevent the simultaneous and inadvertent opening of the breakers (72-2-A and 72-2B) from both station batteries (1A and 1B respectively) to their 125 volt dc busses, an auxiliary switch for remote position monitoring is provided. The resultant annunciators will alarm in the control room upon opening of the battery bus breakers. The 125 volt dc busses will be supplied by battery chargers 1A and 1AA for train "A" and 1B and 1BB for train "B". Each charger has a 300 amp capacity and will operate continuously. The load in these chargers will be equally distributed by means of a load sharing device. Each charger is sized to carry normal dc load and to recharge a battery from 1.75 volts per cell. The worst loading condition on the battery chargers occurs during post LOCA condition with loss of off-site power. After the initial 40 second battery operation, each battery charger is sufficient to recharge its battery within a 1/2 hour period. Two 125 volt dc battery chargers operate on each of the busses. A fifth 125 volt dc battery charger on the AB bus provides a backup for the four operating 125 volt dc chargers. Each of the two 125 v lead-calcium type station safety batteries is rated at 2400 ampere/hr at an 8 hour discharge rate. The above rating is sufficient for a one-hour DC coping period without assistance EC294630 from a battery charger. The battery chargers and inverters are automatically loaded on the diesel generator approximately 40 seconds after loss of offsite power, thus returning the DC system to normal. The above 8 hour battery rating is more than adequate for this design limiting case of 40 second battery operation. The turbine generator DC emergency pump motors (bearing oil and seal oil pumps), are fed from the non-safety batteries and DC Bus 1C or 1D. This non-safety bus is normally supplied from a 300 ampere charger identical with the safety system chargers. 8.3-36 Amendment No. 31 (11/21)
The 30 kVA Static Uninterruptible Power Supplies (SUPS) 1C and 1D are powered during a loss of offsite power by the non-safety 125 V DC batteries 1C and 1D via the non-safety 125 V DC busses 1C and 1D respectively. SUPS 1C and 1D power redundant trains of the SAS "A" and "B". Two separate dc systems are provided for the 230 kV switchyard oil circuit breakers, control and protective relaying. The system consists of two 125 volt batteries, three battery chargers, and two dc distribution panels. The two 125 V lead-calcium switchyard batteries consist of 60 cells and are rated 400 ampere-hr at 8 hour discharge rate. This rating permits approximately 24 hours operation without assistance from a charger. The three switchyard battery chargers are rated at 50 amp each and will recharge a battery in a maximum of 20 hours after a 24 hour battery emergency operation. In response to Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) guidance, a personnel emergency shower was installed in each Class 1E battery room in the reactor auxiliary building. The Staff in its SER expressed concern over these showers because of a potential for water degradation of equipment. To allay this concern and to remain responsive to OSHA guidance, one shower was relocated to a readily accessible location outside the battery room, the design of the other shower was modified by enclosures to preclude the potential for degradation of equipment and where shower piping routing within a battery room is required, portions therein are seismic Class I. (See Figure 8.3-18) 8.3.2.2 Analysis 8.3.2.2.1 Redundancy Redundancy of power sources and distribution equipment has been provided for the supply of dc power to redundant dc load groups. This redundancy extends from the station batteries and battery chargers through distribution panels, cabling, switchgear and protective devices. 8.3-37 Amendment No. 25 (04/12)
Each redundant dc subsystem and its associated load group can independently provide the required dc power for safe shutdown of the plant and/ or to mitigate the consequences of a LOCA. 8.3.2.2.2 Electrical Separation Electrical separation of the redundant portions of the dc power system has been provided in the same manner as for the emergency ac power system as described in Section 8.3.1.2.2. 8.3.2.2.3 Physical Separation Physical separation as a protection against common failure of dc power to both redundant dc load groups has been achieved by spatial separation and/or erection of physical barriers between redundant portions of the dc system. Physical separation has been provided between load group A and load group B and between load group AB and both load groups A and B since load group AB may at various times function as part of either load group A or B. Separate rooms have been provided for the station batteries in the reactor auxiliary building. The redundant Class 1E battery rooms are totally enclosed to maintain the independence of the onsite dc power system. The 125 v dc emergency panels, inverters and nuclear instrument buses are located in the cable spreading room as shown on Figure 8.3-7. The emergency equipment belonging to load groups A and B are located on opposite sides of the room with about 55 feet of spatial separation between them. The equipment belonging to load group AB is located on the same side of the room as load group A equipment with a concrete barrier placed between them. Physical separation and identification of redundant dc cabling has been achieved in the manner described in Section 8.3.1.2.3 for redundant ac cabling. 8.3.2.2.4 Loss of Normal Power Sources Since the station batteries are normally connected to the essential distribution panels for charging, they will maintain voltage to the 125 V dc system in the event of loss of the battery chargers as a power source. Thus, upon a loss of normal power, there will be no discontinuity of dc power for protective system and emergency diesel generator control circuitry. The station batteries have more than enough capacity to supply all essential dc power until the battery chargers can be restored on emergency or normal ac power source. Refer to calculation PSL-1FSE-05-002 for additional details on loading of the safety related batteries. 8.3-38 Amendment No. 22 (05/07)
8.3.2.2.5 Conformance With Appropriate Quality Assurance Standards The quality control of design, fabrication, shipment, field storage, installation and component checkout, and the documentation of such measures are carried out in accordance with the quality assurance program as reflected in Corporate Quality Program. 8.3.2.2.6 Service Environment All essential portions of the dc power system are located in the reactor auxiliary building in areas where the accident ambient conditions are not expected to be significantly different from normal ambient conditions. Refer to Section 8.3.1.2.6 for discussion of cable qualification, construction and methods of installation. 8.3.2.2.7 Natural Phenomena All portions of the dc power system necessary to achieve safe plant shutdown or mitigate the consequences of a design basis accident are designed as seismic Class I. This includes station batteries and racks, battery chargers, distribution panels and cabling. All components are located in the seismic Class I reactor auxiliary building. Refer to Section 3.10 for discussion of the seismic design of Class I electrical components. Due to their location within the reactor auxiliary building, all components of the dc power system necessary to achieve safe plant shutdown are protected from the effects of design wind loadings, external missiles and maximum flood levels. 8.3.2.2.8 Regulatory Items Generic Letter 91-06, Resolution of Generic Issue A-30 Adequacy of Safety Related DC Power Supplies. The response to this generic letter provided in FPL letter L-91-291 identified instrumentation which provides indication and/or alarms in the control room with the following system information:
- 1) battery breaker in open position (alarm),
- 2) battery charger disconnect or breaker open (alarm),
- 3) bus voltage (indication, no alarm),
- 4) dc ground (alarm),
- 5) dc under voltage (alarm),
- 6) dc over voltage (alarm), and
- 7) battery charger failure (alarm).
8.3.2.3 Testing and Inspection The manufacturers of electrical equipment perform production shop tests to verify circuit continuity, operability and insulation resistance as called for by the equipment specifications. Seismic and environmental testing of the original plant equipment are discussed in Sections 3.10 and 3.11. Pre-operational testing was performed to verify that all components, automatic and manual controls, and sequences of the integrated emergency power system functioned as required by the plant safety analysis. Periodic testing after plant startup is as required by the plant Technical Specifications. When these tests are conducted on the batteries, such that the battery bus breakers are open, the control room operators are notified via an alarm. 8.3-39 Amendment No. 17 (10/99)
REFERENCES FOR SECTION 8.3
- 1. R. E. Uhrig (FPL) to K. Kniel (NRC) Re: Use of Kerite Cable for St. Lucie Unit No. 2, Docket No.
50-389, L-77-363 dated 12/6/77.
- 2. R. E. Uhrig (FPL) to R. W. Reid (NRC) Re: Use of Kerite Cable for St. Lucie Unit No. 1, Docket No. 50-335, L-80-110 dated 3/31/80.
- 3. DBD-FP-1, Fire Protection Design Basis Document.
- 4. PSL-FPER-04-017, Acceptable Electrical Cable Flame Propagation Tests In Addition to IEEE 383-1974.
- 5. PSL-FPER-05-047, Fire Protection Evaluation for St. Lucie Unit 1 Control Room Modifications.
UNIT 1 8.3-40 Amendment No. 28 (05/17)
TABLE 8.3-1 ELECTRICAL BUS SINGLE-LINE DIAGRAMS FOR 6.9 KV, 4.16 KV AND 480V BUSES BUS ID LEVEL SINGLE-LINE DIAGRAM 1A-1 6.9 kv 8770-G-275 Sheet 1 1B-1 6.9 kv 8770-G-275 Sheet 1 1A-2 4.16 kv 8770-G-275 Sheet 1 1B-2 4.16 kv 8770-G-275 Sheet 1 1A-3 (1E) 4.16 kv 8770-G-275 Sheet 1 1B-3 (1E) 4.16 kv 8770-G-275 Sheet 1 1AB (1E) 4.16 kv 8770-G-275 Sheet 1 1A-1 480v Load Center 8770-G-275 Sheet 2 1B-1 480v Load Center 8770-G-275 Sheet 2 1A-2 (1E) 480v Load Center 8770-G-275 Sheet 2 1B-2 (1E) 480v Load Center 8770-G-275 Sheet 2 Press. Htr. Bus 1A-3 480v Load Center 8770-G-275 Sheet 2 Press. Htr. Bus 1B-3 480v Load Center 8770-G-275 Sheet 2 1AB (1E) 480v Load Center 8770-G-275 Sheet 2 1A1 480v Motor Control Center 8770-G-275 Sheet 3 1A2 480v Motor Control Center 8770-G-275 Sheet 4,5 1A3 480v Motor Control Center 8770-G-275 Sheet 5 1A4 480v Motor Control Center 8770-G-275 Sheet 5 1A5 (1E) 480v Motor Control Center 8770-G-275 Sheet 6,6A 1A6 (1E) 480v Motor Control Center 8770-G-275 Sheet 7 1A7 (1E) 480v Motor Control Center 8770-G-275 Sheet 8 1A8 480v Motor Control Center 8770-G-275 Sheet 8 1B1 480v Motor Control Center 8770-G-275 Sheet 3 1B2 480v Motor Control Center 8770-G-275 Sheet 4,5 1B3 480v Motor Control Center 8770-G-275 Sheet 5 1B4 480v Motor Control Center 8770-G-275 Sheet 5 1B5 (1E) 480v Motor Control Center 8770-G-275 Sheet 6,6A 1B6 (1E) 480v Motor Control Center 8770-G-275 Sheet 7 1B7 (1E) 480v Motor Control Center 8770-G-275 Sheet 8 1B8 480v Motor Control Center 8770-G-275 Sheet 8 1AB (1E) 480v Motor Control Center 8770-G-275 Sheet 4 1 C 480v Motor Control Center 8770-G-275 Sheet 3 8.3-41 Amendment No. 16, (1/98)
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TABLE 8.3-2 EC288458 EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR AUTOMATIC LOADING SEQUENCE Load Timing
- Equipment Per EDG Added Load KW EC288458 Block Sequence Description Qty Rated HP Rated KW Note LOOP LOOP/LOCA 1 0 secs Emergency Lighting Panels Lot 150.0 150.0 150.0 1 0 secs Power Panels Lot 180.0 180.0 180.0 1 0 secs CCW Pump 1A (or CCW 1C installed spare) 1 450.0 354.9 354.9 1 0 secs Charging Pump 1A 1 100.0 71.3 30.8 1 0 secs Motor Operated Valves Lot --- 4 59.3 69.7 1 0 secs Boric Acid Makeup Pumps 1A & 1B (25hp each) 2 50.0 1 19.8 19.8 1 0 secs RCP Oil Lift Pmps (10hp) [2 / EDG LOOP/LOCA, 4/EDG for 2 to 4 40.0 36.0 18.0 LOOP]
1 0 secs EDG Air Compr. 1 7.5 6.7 6.7 1 0 secs EDG Fuel Transfer Pump 1A 1 5.0 9 2.3 2.3 1 0 secs EDG Oil Circ. Pumps 1A1 & 1A2 (@ 1 Hp each) 2 2.0 1.8 1.8 1 0 secs Cable Spread A/C & Elec Eq Rms HVA-4, ACC-4 Lot 27.2 12 27.2 27.2 1 0 secs Computer Room A/C ACC-10A 1 12.0 10.8 10.8 1 0 secs Control Rm A/C ACC-3C (Indoor - Installed Spare) 1 7.5 14 0.0 0.0 1 0 secs UPS Inverter Rectifier 1 20.0 20.0 20.0 1 0 secs Plant Security Inverter 1 15.0 15.0 15.0 1 0 secs Isolimiter 1A 1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1 0 secs Hydrogen Analyzer Cub. "SA" 1 1.6 0.0 1.6 1 0 secs Boric Acid Heat Trace/Waste Mgmt 1 20.0 9 10.0 10.0 1 0 secs CVCS Heat Trace 1 7.9 9 4.0 4.0 1 0 secs Boric Acid Tank Heater 1 6.8 6.8 6.8 1 0 secs Transformer & Cable losses Lot 25.0 25.0 2 3 secs Cont Fan Clrs HVS-1A & HVS-1B (150 hp each) 2 300.0 123.6 262.8 2 3 secs LPSI Pump 1A 1 400.0 0.0 304.8 3 6 secs HPSI Pump 1A 1 400.0 0.0 324.4 3 6 secs Shield Building Exhaust Fan HVE-6A 1 60.0 0.0 27.0 3 6 secs Shield Building Ventilation Heaters HVE-6A1 & HVE-6A2 Lot 31.5 0.0 31.5 4 9 secs ICW Pump 1A (or 1C installed spare) 1 600.0 7 481.3 481.3 5 12 secs Containment Spray Pump 1A 1 500.0 8 0.0 403.2 6 15 secs Aux Feedwater Pump 1A (shift due to 235 sec AFAS Delay) 1 350.0 11 0.0 0.0 6 15 secs Motor Operated Valves Lot --- 4, 13 0.0 (-)8.1 7 18 secs Charging Pump 1C 1 100.0 71.3 30.8 7 18 secs Auxiliary Bldg. Supply Fan HVS-4A 1 60.0 55.7 55.7 7 18 secs ECCS Area Exhaust Fan HVE-9A 1 50.0 2 0.0 38.1 7 18 secs Reactor Support Cooling Fan HVE-3A 1 40.0 21.6 0.0 7 18 secs Reactor Cavity Cooling Fan HVS-2A 1 20.0 15.5 0.0 7 18 secs Control Room A/C HVA-3A (Outdoor) 1 26.3 26.3 26.3 7 18 secs Control Room A/C ACC-3A (Indoor) 1 7.5 6.7 6.7 7 18 secs Control Room Booster Fan HVE-13A 1 3.0 0.0 2.1 8.3-59 Amendment No. 30 (05/20)
TABLE 8.3-2 (Contd) EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR AUTOMATIC LOADING SEQUENCE EC288458 Load Timing
- Equipment Per EDG Added Load KW EC288458 Block Sequence Description Qty Rated HP Rated KW Note LOOP LOOP/LOCA 8 30 sec Battery Chargers 1A & 1AA (50 kW each initially) 2 100.0 5 100.0 100.0 9 35 sec Fire Pump 1A 1 250.0 3 198.4 0.0 10 60 sec ICW Pump 1A (or 1C installed spare) 1 600.0 6, 13 0.0 (-)32.1 10 60 sec Motor Operated Valves Lot --- 4, 13 (-)59.3 (-)61.6 11 90 sec Control Rm A/C HVA-3C (Outdoor-Installed Spare) 1 26.3 14 0.0 0.0 12 250 sec Aux Feedwater Pump 1A (shift due to 235 sec AFAS Delay) 1 350.0 11 306.5 322.6 13 300 sec Aux. Bldg. Swgr. Room Sup. Fan HVS-5A 1 30.0 12 26.2 26.2 13 300 sec Aux. Bldg. Swgr. Room Exh. Fan HVE-11 1 7.5 12 4.1 4.1 13 300 sec Aux. Bldg. Swgr. Room Roof Vent RV-3 1 1.5 12 1.4 1.4 NOTES:
*Time is counted from when the EDG Output Breaker closes. This is true for all loads.
- 1. Both Boric Acid Makeup Pumps 1A & 1B are fed from EDG 1A. Both start under SIAS. BAM pumps are assumed to be secured at 100 minutes, during Operator manual actions subsequent to SIAS. Only one starts after LOOP only if previously running. To assure worst case load is captured in the LOOP scenario, the assumption is made that 2 pumps run at 70 gpm each.
- 2. HVE-9A "A" Train Fan is 50 hp-HVE-9B "B" Train Fan is 40 hp.
- 3. The Fire Pump is blocked for LOOP/LOCA. It is enabled to start under LOOP only conditions at T = 35 seconds, but will not automatically start until the pressure in the fire water header drops below 85 psig (cyclic operation to maintain pressure).
- 4. MOV Variable load shedding for LOOP/LOCA up to 60 seconds, as MOVs complete valve stroke.
- 5. 2 Battery Chargers' load automatically decreases to less than one chargers capacity (set @ 50 kW/2 BC's) at 30 minutes.
- 6. Added Load kW negative sign (-) indicates bhp load reduced due to MOV end of stroke, process flows/amps reduced or equipment secured.
- 7. Timing sequence for ICW Pump 1C is 9.0 seconds if pump 1A (1B for "B" Train alignment) is manually stopped and switch placed in "Pull to Lock" position. Otherwise, 3rd pump interlock relay will block the 1C ICW from starting.
- 8. Containment Spray Pump motor 1A (1B) running kW may go to 439.5 kW at T = 100 minutes.
- 9. These loads are Intermittent.
- 10. Automatic load sequence/enable stops at T = 300 seconds.
- 11. AFW Pump motor 1A (1B) horsepower is rated 350 hp; for LOOP/LOCA for period from 250 seconds to 30 minutes, load brake horsepower of AFW pump motor is 400. For LOOP, load is 380 bhp. While the AFW pumps have a 15-sec EDG load sequencer timer, which is tested at 15 sec. during periodic ESFAS testing, they will not load at 15 sec during an actual LOOP or LOOP/LOCA, due to the 235 second AFAS time-delay (See Calculation PSL-1-F-J-E-90-0013, Section 3.5).
- 12. During SIAS the ICW 1A pump (1B for "B" Train operation) motor load drops from 600 bhp to 560 bhp after MOVs isolate flow to Turbine Plant Cooling Water. However, for LOOP the flow to TCW is not isolated and the pump load remains at 600 bhp.
- 13. HVA/ACC-4 is running. HVS-5A, HVE-11 and RV3 are started at 300 seconds.
- 14. Control Room A/C "C" Indoor (0 sec) & Outdoor (90 sec) Units are installed spares for "A". "C" is not normally running.
8.3-60 Amendment No. 30 (05/20)
TABLE 8.3-3 EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DATA
- 1. Diesel Engine Manufacturers General Motors EMD Model and type 645-E4 Total no. of cylinders per set 28 (One 16 cylinder engine and one 12 cylinder engine)
Set arrangement Two engines in tandem with generator in the middle Rated speed 900 rpm Continuous (8760) hour rating at 93°F 5165 bhp*, 3500 Kw 2000 hours/year rating 5540 bhp*, 3730 Kw 7 days/year rating 5640 bhp*, 3790 Kw 4 hours/year rating 5735 bhp*, 3860 Kw 30 minutes/year rating 5860 bhp*, 3960 Kw Method of cooling Air radiators with shaft driven fans Starting time 10 seconds maximum, including generator breaker closing time.
*In addition to the bhp rating shown, the engine delivers 140 bhp to its auxiliaries.
- 2. Generator Manufacturer Electric Machinery Voltage, phase & frequency 4160 V, 3 phase, 60 Hz Kw, kVA, power factor 3500 kw, 4375 kVA, 80% P.F.
Synchronous reactance, Xd (Direct Axis) 98% Transient reactance, X'd (Direct Axis) 16% Subtransient reactance X"d (Direct Axis) 12% Excitation system Solid state, forced excitation 8.3-61 Amendment No. 25 (04/12)
TABLE 8.3-3A AC POWER SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION CONTROL SWITCH LOCATION TRIPPING DEVICES ANNUNCIATION INSTRUMENTATION LOCAL Shortcircuit Load Bkr. Close Failure Control BUS BUS Switchgear Local Control Room or Overcurrent Bus Shedding Overload or Ground Room 1A-3 4 KV SWITCHGEAR 1B-3 Close Trip Close & Trip Close & Trip Relays Lockout Relays Alarm/Trip Bkr. Isolated Ammeter Light Ammeter 1A High Pressure Safety Inj. Pump 1B X X X X X X X X X 1A Low Pressure Safety Inj. Pump 1B X X X X X X X X X 1A Containment Spray Pump 1B X X X X X X X X X 1A Pressurizer Heater Transformer 1B X X X X X X X X X 1A Component Cooling Water Pump 1B X X X X X X X X X X Feeder to 4 KV Bus 1AB X X X X X X X X X 1A2 Incoming Feeder From Bus 1B2 X X X X X X X X X 1A2 Feeder to 480V Switchgear 1B2 X X X X X X X X X 1A Emergency Diesel Gen. Mo. 1B X X X Via DG Lockout X X X See Section 8.3.1.1.7 1A Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1B X X X X X X X X X X X 1A Intake Cooling Water Pump 1B X X X X X X X X X X X Control power supply comes from 125V dc bus 1A, circuit 8 for 4 KV bus 1A3, and 125V dc bus 1B, circuit 8 for 4 KV bus 1B3. 4 KV Bus 1AB SBO Tie X X X X X Component Cooling Water Pump 1C X X X X X X X X X X X Intake Cooling Water Pump 1C X X X X X X X X X X X
- Incoming Feeders 1B3 X X X X X X X X
- Incoming Feeders 1A3 X X X X X X X XX X XX
- Interlocking Prevents Paralleling XX X XX Control power for 4 KV bus 1AB comes from 125V dc bus 1AB circuit 1.
No trip when ESF are actuated. XX Ammeter and voltmeter connected to the bus. 8.3-62 Amendment No. 22 (05/07)
TABLE 8.3-3A (Cont'd) CONTROL SWITCH LOCATION TRIPPING DEVICES ANNUNCIATION INSTRUMENTATION Load Bkr. Close Failure BUS BUS Switchgear Local Control Room Overload Shedding Overload or LOCAL 1A-2 480 VOLT SWITCHGEAR 1B-2 Close Trip Close & Trip Close & Trip Trip Relays Alarm Trip Bkr. Isolated AMMETER 1A6 Reactor Area MCC 1B6 X X X X X 1A7 Diesel Building MCC 1B7 X X X X X 1A5 Reactor Area MCC 1B5 X X X X X 1A8 Fuel Handling Building MCC 1B8 X X X X X 1A Fire Pump 1B X X X X X X 1A Charging Pump 1B X X X X X X X X A CDM Cooling HVE-21 B X X X X X X X 1A Air Recirculating Unit Fan HVS 1C X X X X X X X X X 1B Air Recirculating Unit Fan HVS 1D X X X X X X X X X 1A CEA Drive MG Set 1B X X X X X X A Reactor Auxiliary Building Fan HVS-10 Main Exc. B X X X X X X 1A2 Station Service Trans. Bkr. 1B2 X X X X X X X Bus Tie to 480V Switchgear 1AB X X X X X X X Reactor Building Crane #1 X X X X X A RAB Fan HVS-4 B X X X X X X X X X X Main Supply Control power for 480V bus 1A2 comes from 125V dc bus 1A, circuit 1. Control power for 480V bus 1B2 comes from 125V dc 1B2, circuit 5. 480V BUS 1AB
*Bus Tie to 480V Switchgear 1A2 X X X X X X X Reactor Area Commun. MCC 1AB X X X X X
*Bus Tie to 450V Switchgear 1B2 X X X X X X X Charging Pump 1C X X X X X X X X X
- Interlocking Prevents Paralleling Control power for 480V bus 1AB comes from 125V dc bus 1AB, circuit 2.
8.3-63 Amendment No. 26 (11/13)
TABLE 8.3-3AA DIESEL GENERATOR BUILDING CONCENTRATIONS Chlorine Release (ppm) T (Sec) Puff Continuous Total 0 1.85(4) 0 1.85(4) 50 4.13(3) 4.08(2) 4.13(3) 100 9.21(2) 4.85(2) 1.41(3) 200 4.56(1) 4.75(2) 5.21(2) 300 2.28 4.42(2) 4.44(2) 400 1.14(-1) 4.11(2) 4.11(2) 500 5.70(-3) 3.82(2) 3.82(2) 1000 1.73(-9) 2.65(2) 2.65(2) 2040 1.24(2) 1.24(2) 3000 3.85(-11) 3.85(-11) 4000 5000 6000 ( ) = 10(exponent)
- The information in this table is historical. Large chlorine containers, for which the original analysis was performed, are no longer in use at St. Lucie site.
8.3-64 Amendment 15, (1/97)
TABLE 8.3-4 ELECTRICAL LOADS FOR 125V DC BUSES BATTERY LOAD GROUP A-DC LOADS UTILIZED FOR BATTERY DESIGN CASE Loading Periods ** Load Description
- 0 minute - 1 minute - 30 minutes - 239 minutes -
1 minute 30 minutes 239 minutes 240 minutes 480V SWGR 1A-1 X X X X 480V SWGR 1A-2 X X X X 4160V SWGR 1A-2 X X X X 4160V SWGR 1A-3 X X X X 6900V SWGR 1A-1 X X X X DG 1-A Control Panel X X X X Reactor Trip SWGR X X X X Main Transformer 1A X X X X AUX Transformer 1A X X X X SU Transformer 1A X X X X Static Inverter 1A X X X X Static Inverter 1C X X X X CCW Surge Tank X X X X ISO Panel 1A X X X X RTGB 103 X X X X RTGB 104 X X X X RTGB 105 X X X X RTGB 106 X X X X DC LTG Panel LP 127 X X X X DC Panel PP 118 X X X X Control Room AUX Console X X X X QSPDS Panel 1A X X X X PORV *** X X X X
- The loads shown which would be energized from the battery if the supply from the charger(s) was lost. The load will be operable for each of the indicated periods.
- The loading periods shown are those used in the 4 hour emergency load profile.
- Intermittent Loading SEE CALCULATION PSL-1FSE-05-002 AND PDMD 8770-B-335 SHEET 66 FOR LOAD INFORMATION.
- The loading periods shown are those used in the 4 hour emergency load profile.
8.3-65 Amendment No. 22 (05/07)
TABLE 8.3-4 (Cont'd) ELECTRICAL LOADS FOR 125V DC BUSES BATTERY LOAD GROUP AB-DC LOADS UTILIZED FOR BATTERY DESIGN CASE Loading Periods ** Load Description
- 0 minute - 1 minute - 30 minutes - 239 minutes -
1 minute 30 minutes 239 minutes 240 minutes Bus 1AB-1 AUX Feedwater MV 08-14 X X X X AUX Feedwater MV 09-11 X X X X AUX Feedwater MV 09-12 X X X X AUX Feedwater MV 09-13 X X X X Bus 1AB PP 138 X X X X RTGB 101 X X X X RTGB 102 X X X X RTGB 103 X X X X RTGB 104 X X X X RTGB 105 X X X X RTGB 106 X X X X 480V SWGR 1AB X X X X 4160V SWGR 1AB X X X X AUX FW Turbine 1C Control X PP 139 X X X X
- The loads shown which would be energized from the battery if the supply from the charger(s) was lost. The load will be operable for each of the indicated periods.
- The loading periods shown are those used in the 4 hour emergency load profile.
- Intermittent Loading SEE CALCULATION PSL-1FSE-05-002 AND PDMD 8770-B-335 SHEETS 68 AND 68A FOR LOAD INFORMATION.
- The loading periods shown are those used in the 4 hour emergency load profile.
8.3-66 Amendment No. 22 (05/07)
TABLE 8.3-4 (Cont'd) ELECTRICAL LOADS FOR 125V DC BUSES BATTERY LOAD GROUP B-DC LOADS UTILIZED FOR BATTERY DESIGN CASE Loading Periods ** Load Description
- 0 minute - 1 minute - 30 minutes - 239 minutes -
1 minute 30 minutes 239 minutes 240 minutes 480V SWGR 1B-1 X X X X 480V SWGR 1B-2 X X X X 4160V SWGR 1B-2 X X X X 4160V SWGR 1B-3 X X X X 6900V SWGR 1B-1 X X X X DG 1-B Control Panel X X X X Reactor Trip SWGR X X X X Main Transformer 1B X X X X AUX Transformer 1B X X X X SU Transformer 1B X X X X Static Inverter 1D X X X X Static Inverter 1B X X X X ISO Panel 1B X X X X RTGB 103 X X X X RTGB 104 X X X X RTGB 105 X X X X RTGB 106 (Sh. 1 & 2) X X X X DC LTG Panel LP 128 X X X X DC Panel PP 119 X X X X Control Room AUX Console X X X X QSPDS Panel 1B X X X X Hydrogen Panel X X X X PORV *** X X X X Line Repeat Panel X X X X
- The loads shown which would be energized from the battery if the supply from the charger(s) was lost. The load will be operable for each of the indicated periods.
- The loading periods shown are those used in the 4 hour emergency load profile.
- Intermittent Loading SEE CALCULATION PSL-1FSE-05-002 AND PDMD 8770-B-335 SHEET 67 FOR LOAD INFORMATION.
- The loading periods shown are those used in the 4 hour emergency load profile.
8.3-67 Amendment No. 22 (05/07)
TABLE 8.3-5 DELETED 8.3-68 Amendment No. 22 (05/07)
TABLE 8.3-6
SUMMARY
OF SEISMIC STRESSES FOR UNDERGROUND C0NDUITS Axial Stress(1) Bending Stress Shear Stress(1) A. Straight Conduit 571 psi 0 psi 286 psi B. Bent Conduit (90o bend) 571 psi 0 psi 286 psi Allowable Stresses: Tensile 7000 psi Compressive 9000 psi Flexual 12,000 psi Shear 8,000 psi (1) Axial stresses occur with axial displacements. Shear stresses occur with transverse displacements. Stresses are based on a shear wave velocity of 700 ft/sec. 8.3-69
TABLE 8.3-7 EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR LOADING SEQUENCE EDG STEADY-STATE LOADING
SUMMARY
LOOP LOOP/LOCA Load Block Load EDG Total Load Block Load EDG Total Load Block Time (KW) (KW) (KW) (KW) 1 0 Sec. 1002.0 1002.0 955.5 955.5 EC288458 2 3 Sec. 123.6 1125.6 567.6 1523.1 3 6 Sec. 0.0 1125.6 382.9 1906.0 4 9 Sec. 481.3 1606.9 481.3 2387.3 5 12 Sec. 0.0 1606.9 403.2 2790.5 6 15 Sec. 0.0 1606.9 -8.1 2782.4 7 18 Sec. 197.1 1804.0 159.7 2942.1 8 30 Sec. 100.0 1904.0 100.0 3042.1 9 35 Sec. 198.4 2102.4 0.0 3042.1 10 60 Sec. -59.3 2043.1 -93.7 2948.4 11 90 Sec. 0.0 2043.1 0.0 2948.4 12 250 Sec. 306.5 2349.6 322.6 3271.0 13 300 Sec. 31.7 2381.3 31.7 3302.7 14 30 Min. 171.0 2552.3 -81.8 3220.9 15 60 Min. -6.7 2545.6 -88.5 3132.4 16 100 Min. -13.1 2532.5 -283.4 2849.0 17 2 Hr. -27.2 2505.3 -27.2 2821.8 18 4 Hr. -19.8 2485.5 -16.0 2805.8 19 6 Hr. 0.0 2485.5 -43.1 2762.7 20 24 Hr. 0.0 2485.5 -61.6 2701.1 21 27 Hr. -278.2 2207.3 0.0 2701.1 22 72 Hr. 0.0 2207.3 -196.2 2504.9 End 7 Days -2207.3 0.0 -2504.9 0.0
- Time from EDG breaker closure.
EC288458
- Automatic EDG Load Sequencing Ends at 300 Seconds.
EC288458 Note: Extracted from calculation PSL-1-F-J-E-90-0013. 8.3-70 Amendment No. 30 (05/20)
Refer to drawing 8770-G-272 FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 1 MAIN ONE LINE WIRING DIAGRAM FIGURE 8.3-1 Amendment No. 15 (1 /97)
Refer to drawing 2998-G-272A FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 1 COMBINED MAIN AND AUXILIARY ONE LINE DIGRAM FIGURE 8.3-1 a Amendment No. 15 (1 /97)
Refer to drawing 8770-G-274 FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 1 AUXILIARY ONE LINE DIGRAM FIGURE 8.3-2 Amendment No. 15 (1 /97)
Refer to drawing 8770-G-332 SHEET 1 FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 1 480 V MISCELLANEOUS, 125V D-C AND VITAL A- C ONE LINE, SH.1 FIGURE 8.3-3a Amendment No. 15 (1 /97)
Refer to drawing 8770-G-332 SHEET 2 FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 1 480 V MISCELLANEOUS, 125V DC AND VITAL A C ONE LINE, SH.2 FIGURE 8.3-3b Amendment No. 15 (1 /97)
THIS FIGURE HAS BEEN DELETED FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 1 EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR 1A/1B LOAD LIST FIGURE 8.3-4 Amendment No. 25 (04/12)
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Amendment No. 19 (1 0/02) FLORIDA POWER & UGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PV.NT UNIT 1 Typical Diesel Generator Automatic Starting
- Logic FIGURE 8.3-S
Refer to drawing 8770-B-326 Sheet 957 FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 1 SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM DIESEL GENERATOR 1A-START CKTS FIGURE 8.3-6a Amendment No. 15 (1 /97)
Refer to drawing 8770-B-326 Sheet 959 FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 1 SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM DIESEL-GENERATOR 1A START SOLENOID FIGURE 8.3-6a1 Amendment No. 22 (05/07)
Refer to drawing 8770-8-326 Sheet 956 FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 1 SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM DIESEL GENERATOR 1A-LOCKOUT RELAY FIGURE 8.3-6b Amendment No. 15 (1/97)
Refer to drawing 8770-B-326 Sheet 953 FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 1 SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM DIESEL GENERATOR 1A BKR FIGURE 8.3-6c Amendment No. 15 (1 /97)
Refer to drawing 8770-B-326 Sheet 967 FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 1 SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM DIESEL GENERATOR 18-START CKTS FIGURE 8.3-6d Amendment No. 15 (1 /97)
Refer to drawing 8770-B-326 Sheet 969 FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 1 SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM DIESEL GENERATOR 1B-START CKTS FIGURE 8.3-6d1 Amendment No. 18, (04/01)
Refer to drawing 8770-B-326 Sheet 966 FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 1 SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM DIESEL GENERATOR 18-LOCKOUT RELAY FIGURE 8.3-6e Amendment No. 15 (1 /97)
Refer to drawing 8770-B-326 Sheet 963 FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 1 SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM DIESEL GENERATOR 18 BKR FIGURE 8.3-6f Amendment No. 15 (1 /97)
Refer to drawing 8770-B-326 Sheet 949 FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 1 SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM 4160V SWGR 1A3 LOAD SHEDDING RELAYS FIGURE 8.3-6g Amendment No. 15 (1 /97)
Refer to drawing 8770-B-326 Sheet 950 FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 1 SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM 4160V SWGR 1 83 LOAD SHEDDING RELAYS FIGURE 8.3-6h Amendment No. 15 (1 /97)
Refer to drawing 8770-B-326 Sheet 951 FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 1 SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM 4160V SWGR 1AB LOAD SHEDDING RELAYS FIGURE 8.3-6i Amendment No. 15 (1 /97)
Refer to drawing 8770-G-394 FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 1 REACTOR AUXILIARY BUILDING EL.43'-0 62'-0 CONDUIT, TRAYS & GROUNDING-SH 1 FIGURE 8.3-7 Amendment No. 15 (1 /97)
Refer to drawing 8770-G-392 FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 1 REACTOR AUXILIARY BUILDING EL.19'-6 CONDUIT, TRAYS & GROUNDING-SH 1 FIGURE 8.3-8 Amendment No. 15 (1 /97)
Refer to drawing 8770-G-393 FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 1 REACTOR AUXILIARY BUILDING EL.19'-6 CONDUIT, TRAYS & GROUNDING-SH 2 FIGURE 8.3-9 Amendment No. 15 (1 /97)
Refer to drawing 8770-G-365 FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 1 REACTOR CONTAINMENT BLDG. EL 18'-0 CONDUIT, TRAYS & GROUNDING PLAN FIGURE 8.3-10 Amendment No. 15 (1 /97)
Refer to drawing 8770-G-374 SHEET 1 FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 1 REACTOR AUX. BLDG PENETRATION AREA CONDUIT TRAYS AND GROUNDING FIGURE 8.3-11 Amendment No. 15 (1 /97)
Refer to drawing 8770-G-375 SHEET 1 FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 1 REACTOR CONTAINMENT BLDG PENETRATION DETAILS FIGURE 8.3-12 Amendment No. 15 (1 /97)
Refer to drawing 8770-G-407 SHEET 1 FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 1 YARD DUCT RUNS FIGURE 8.3-13 Amendment No. 15 (1 /97)
DELETED EC294630 FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 1 FIGURE 8.3-14 Amendment No. 31 (11/21)
~--AIR START SYSTEM AlR DRYER IDLE START---~
CONTROL CABINE SECTION A-A MONORAIL MONORAIL iI ~I MONORAIL DIESEL MCC 1A7 DIESEL GEN 1A GEN 18 ct. 'i. I I I LOUVER (TYfiCAL SEE FIG. 8.3-15Al SECTION 8-B MISSILE PROTECTION (TYPICAL) Am. 2-7/84 FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 1 FADIATDR EXHAUST DIESEL GENERATO~ BUILDING
- IDLE START CONTROL CABINET GENERAL ARRANGEMENT AND ELEVATION DRII.WING FIGURE 8.3-15
Refer to drawing 8770-B-328 Sheet 10 FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 1 CABLE AND CONDUIT LIST INSTALLATION DETAILS FIGURE 8.3-16 Amendment No. 15 (1 /97)
Refer to drawing 8770-B-327 sheet 1258 FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 1 CONTROL WIRING DIAGRAM 4.16 KV SWGR. 1A3 UNDERVOLTAGE RELAYING/TEST FIGURE 8.3-17 Amendment No. 15 (1 /97)
Refer to drawing 8770-B-327 sheet 1259 FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ST. LUCIE PLANT UNIT 1 CONTROL WIRING DIAGRAM 4.16 KV SWGR. 183 UNDERVOLTAGE RELAYING/TEST FIGURE 8.3-17a Amendment No. 15 (1 /97)
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Withheld Under 10 CFR 2.390}}