ML15113A787

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CEA Drop Time Technical Specification Change Request April 22, 2015 Revised Public Meeting Slides
ML15113A787
Person / Time
Site: Waterford Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 04/22/2015
From:
Entergy Operations
To: Michael Orenak
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Wang A
References
Download: ML15113A787 (69)
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Text

CEA DROP TIME T S CHANGE REQUEST CEA DROP TIME T.S. CHANGE REQUEST WATERFORD 3 APRIL 22, 2015 1

Licensee Attendees

  • Waterford 3

- John Jarrell - Manager, Regulatory Assurance John Jarrell Manager, Regulatory Assurance

- Pamela Hernandez - Supervisor, Reactor Engineering

- Leia Milster - Licensing Engineer, Regulatory Assurance Willi St l

C t

t SMI

- William Steelman - Contractor, SMI

- Kim Jones - Fellow Engineer, Setpoints, Controls & Containment g

p

- Matthew Wilcox - Senior Engineer, Setpoints, Controls & Containment

- Amanda Maguire - Senior Engineer, Regulatory Compliance 2

Outline

  • Background for the License Amendment Request (LAR)
  • LAR Technical Content
  • LAR Technical Content

- Control Element Assembly (CEA) SCRAM Insertion Curve position vs. time

- Safety Analysis Margin

- Core Operating Limit Supervisory System (COLSS) Required Overpower Margin (ROPM)

  • Schedule 3

Background for LAR

  • CEA Drop Times have challenged the Technical Specification (TS) limit in the last two surveillance performances limit in the last two surveillance performances

- Waterford 3 TS 3.1.3.4 requires:

  • the arithmetic average of all CEA Drop Times be 3.0 seconds
  • Individual CEA drop times 3 2 seconds
  • Individual CEA drop times 3.2 seconds
  • Insertion time is measured from fully withdrawn position to 90% inserted 4

Historical Drop Times CEA drop time group arithmetic average 3100 3200 2900 3000 3100 lliseconds) 2700 2800 to 90% (mil 2500 2600 Time t 2400 Cycle Number Cycle Number

  • Cycle 20 includes repeated test 5

Potential Causes Plant Primary Side Modifications

  • Reactor Vessel Head replacement
  • Reactor Vessel Head replacement
  • CEA replacement
  • Transition to Next Generation Fuel Product 6

Proposed TS Change

- Raise the arithmetic average of all CEA Drop Times to be 3.2 seconds Raise the arithmetic average of all CEA Drop Times to be 3.2 seconds

- Raise the Individual CEA drop times to 3.5 seconds 7

Analysis Goal Overall

  • The Chapter 15 Safety Analyses continue to meet all acceptance criteria criteria
  • The current Licensing Basis will remain bounding for the revised analyses Th h

t th COLSS d CPCS d t b d

  • The are no changes to the COLSS and CPCS databases and addressable constants.

8

CEA SCRAM Insertion Curve Average Position vs Time 100 120 80 hdrawn 40 60 Percent With 0

20 0

0 1

2 3

4 Time Safety Analysis SCRAM Curve Safety Analysis SCRAM Curve with Delay 9

Safety Analysis Basis Analysis Margin

  • Safety analysis input (SAIs) consist of plant design and operating parameters that include uncertainties associated with them.
  • Safety analyses apply the uncertainties in a conservative, or more t i ti di ti restrictive, direction.
  • On some parameters, the SAI uses a bounding input value, which is more adverse than the plant parameter plus uncertainty is more adverse than the plant parameter plus uncertainty.
  • Thus, the bounding SAI includes analysis margin, which can be reclaimed later.

10

Safety Analysis Margin Revised Reactivity Safety Analysis Input vs Time 0.2 0

1 2

3 4

Time

-0.2 0

-0.6

-0.4 Reactivity

-0.8

-1.2

-1 Current Reactivity SAI Current Reactivity SAI with Delay Revised Reactivity SAI Current Reactivity SAI Current Reactivity SAI with Delay Revised Reactivity SAI 11

Safety Analysis Margin COLSS ROPM

  • Waterford is a Combustion Engineering Design Digital Plant Digital Plant

- Limiting Conditions for Operations (LCOs)

  • Technical Specifications Technical Specifications
  • Core Operating Limits Supervisory System

- Maintains Departure from Nuclear Boiling

(

)

Ration (DNBR) Margin

>> Required Overpower Margin (ROPM)

>> Linear Heat Rate (LHR)

- DNB and LHR Protection

  • Core Protection Calculator Systems (CPCS) 12

Safety Analysis Margin COLSS ROPM (contd)

  • ROPM

- Event ROPM is the actual thermal margin change during the Event ROPM is the actual thermal margin change during the design basis event (DBE).

- Initial Analysis ROPM is the thermal margin set aside by the Safety Analyses at the start of the event Safety Analyses at the start of the event.

- COLSS ROPM is the thermal margin reserved by the COLSS to support the Technical Specification LCOs.

- If COLSS ROPM > Event ROPM, then the minimum DNBR (mDNBR) > DNB Specified Acceptable Fuel Design Limit (SAFDL) g

(

)

- ROPM can be used to offset calculated fuel failures due to DNB.

13

Method of Analysis Analysis Basis

  • There are no changes to the LOCA or Non-LOCA transient analysis methods from those in the current UFSAR.

methods from those in the current UFSAR.

  • There are no changes to the Core Design / Neutronics methods that provide input to the LOCA and Non-LOCA transient analyses h

h UFSAR that support the current UFSAR.

14

DNBR Correlation Analysis Basis

  • There are no changes to the DNBR critical heat flux correlation.

15

Topical Reports Applicability

  • The change in CEA SCRAM Insertion Curve does not impact the topical reports cited by Waterford Unit 3.

topical reports cited by Waterford Unit 3.

  • Non-LOCA case results presented in the topical reports provide illustrative examples to confirm methodology, simulations, and d

i d

determine trends.

  • Conservative selection of inputs are performed in the plant specific analyses to support the UFSAR.

specific analyses to support the UFSAR.

16

UFSAR Chapter 15 Non-LOCA Analyses Event Categorization

  • Each Non-LOCA UFSAR Chapter 15 Events will be discussed
  • For each event they are categorized as:
  • For each event, they are categorized as:

- Evaluated (Impact analysis and/or evaluation utilizing current methodology)

A d (I t d t i

ti d j tifi ti id d)

- Assessed (Impact determination and justification provided)

- Bounded by another DBE

- Not Impacted 17

A l

E l

t d Analyses Evaluated 18

Analyses Evaluated Chapter 15.1.1.3: Increased Main Steam Flow

  • Impacted by revised CEA SCRAM Insertion Curve
  • Impacted by revised CEA SCRAM Insertion Curve.

- ROPM increases ~1%.

  • Evaluated

- Benefit of Revised Reactivity Safety Analysis Input

  • ROPM decreases by ~0.6% for initial power 50%.
  • No benefit for initial power < 50%.

p

- Hot Full Power (HFP)

  • COLSS HFP ROPM > Initial Analysis ROPM

- Intermediate power levels for CPCS Intermediate power levels for CPCS

  • Both trip and no-trip cases are analyzed.
  • No-trip cases bound trip cases.

19

Analyses Evaluated Chapter 15.1.1.3: Increased Main Steam Flow

  • Summary

- Hot Full Power Hot Full Power

  • Revised Reactivity SAI and COLSS ROPM offset the revised CEA SCRAM Insertion Curve.

- Intermediate Power Intermediate Power

  • No-trip cases are expected to remain bounding.
  • Conclusions N

h COLSS M i

d

- No changes to COLSS Margin expected.

- No changes to CPCS Input expected.

20

Analyses Evaluated Chapter 15.1.2.3: Increased Main Steam Flow with Single Failure (SF)

  • Supports radiological dose fuel failure limit of 8%.
  • Analyzed at HFP
  • Analyzed at HFP.

- Cycle specific fuel failure is ~50% of the limit.

  • Impacted by revised CEA SCRAM Insertion Curve.

- Expected fuel failure to increase by ~2%.

  • Evaluated Revised Reactivity SAI to lower expected fuel failure ~1%

- Revised Reactivity SAI to lower expected fuel failure ~1%.

21

Analyses Evaluated Chapter 15.1.2.3: Increased Main Steam Flow with Single Failure

  • Summary of the Combined Impact

- Expected fuel failure to increase by ~1%.

Expected fuel failure to increase by 1%.

  • Conclusions

- Calculated fuel failure is expected to be < 8%.

- No change to the radiological dose results expected.

22

Analyses Evaluated Chapters 15.2.1.3/15.2.2.3: Loss of Condenser Vacuum (LOCV)

  • Impact estimate based on engineering judgment

- Estimated peak RCS pressure increase < 1 psi.

Estimated peak SG pressure increase < 2 psi

- Estimated peak SG pressure increase < 2 psi.

23

Analyses Evaluated Chapters 15.2.1.3/15.2.2.3: LOCV (w/wo SF)

  • Evaluated

- Impact of revised CEA SCRAM Insertion Curve on peak RCS and SG pressure Impact of revised CEA SCRAM Insertion Curve on peak RCS and SG pressure evaluated to determine increases.

  • < 1 psi prior to 90% insertion for RCS pressure.
  • < 5 psi after 90% insertion for RCS pressure.

5 psi after 90% insertion for RCS pressure.

  • < 1 psi for SG pressure.

- Benefit of Revised Reactivity SAI on peak RCS and SG pressure evaluated to determine decreases.

determine decreases.

  • 0 psi prior to 90% insertion for RCS pressure.
  • > 3 psi after 90% insertion for RCS pressure.
  • 0 psi for SG pressure 0 psi for SG pressure.

24

Analyses Evaluated Chapters 15.2.1.3/15.2.2.3: LOCV (w/wo SF)

  • Summary of the combined impact

- Prior to 90% insertion - Peak RCS pressure increases < 1 psi.

Prior to 90% insertion Peak RCS pressure increases < 1 psi.

- After 90% insertion - Peak RCS pressure increases < 2 psi.

- Peak SG pressure < 1 psi.

  • Confirmed Engineering judgment 25

Analyses Evaluated Chapters 15.2.1.3/15.2.2.3: LOCV (w/wo SF)

  • Current Chapter 15 Results

- Current peak RCS pressure = 2711 psia < 2750 psia criterion.

Current peak RCS pressure 2711 psia < 2750 psia criterion.

- Current peak SG pressure = 1181 psia < 1210 psia criterion.

  • Conclusions

- Updated peak RCS pressure < 2750 psia criterion.

- Update peak SG pressure < 1210 psia criterion.

  • Results are used to confirm assessments on subsequent DBEs.

Results are used to confirm assessments on subsequent DBEs.

26

Analyses Evaluated Chapter 15.3.2.1: Total Loss of Forced Reactor Coolant Flow

  • Impacted by revised CEA SCRAM Insertion Curve
  • Impacted by revised CEA SCRAM Insertion Curve.

- ROPM increases ~1%.

  • Evaluated

- Safety analysis margin benefit

  • Revised Reactivity SAI
  • COLSS HFP ROPM > Initial Analysis Margin y

g

  • Summary

- No impact on the results and conclusions.

27

Analyses Evaluated Chapters 15.3.3.1/15.3.3.2: Single Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) Shaft

  • Supports radiological dose fuel failure limit of 15%.

Seizure/Single RCP with a stuck open secondary safety valve pp g

  • Analyzed at HFP.

- Cycle specific fuel failure is ~50% of the limit.

  • Impacted by revised CEA SCRAM Insertion Curve.

- Expected fuel failure to increase ~2%.

  • Evaluated Evaluated

- Benefit of revised Reactivity SAI to lower expected fuel failure ~1%.

28

Analyses Evaluated Chapters 15.3.3.1/15.3.3.2: Single Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) Shaft

  • Summary Seizure/Single RCP with a stuck open secondary safety valve y

- Expected fuel failure to increase ~1 %.

- Total cycle specific fuel failure < 15 %.

Insignificant impact on steam releases

- Insignificant impact on steam releases.

- No recalculation of radiological doses.

  • Conclusion

- No changes to radiological doses.

- No changes to COLSS ROPM.

29

Analyses Evaluated Chapter 15.4.1.1: Uncontrolled CEA Withdrawal from a Subcritical

  • Supports Condition pp

- mDNBR

- Fuel Melt Limit C

t R lt

  • Current Results

- mDNBR >> DNB SAFDL

- Fuel Centerline Temperature << Fuel Melt Limit

  • Impacted by revised CEA SCRAM Insertion Curve.

30

Analyses Evaluated Chapter 15.4.1.1: Uncontrolled CEA Withdrawal from a Subcritical

  • Evaluated/Assessed Condition

- Expectation that mDNBR >> DNB SAFDL.

- Expectation that Fuel Centerline Temperature << Fuel Melt Limit.

  • Conclusions
  • Conclusions

- Negligible impact on the results and conclusion.

- No change to the UFSAR.

31

Analyses Evaluated Chapter 15.4.1.2: Uncontrolled CEA Withdrawal at Low Power

  • Supports

- mDNBR

- Fuel Melt Limit

  • Current Results

- mDNBR >> DNB SAFDL mDNBR >> DNB SAFDL

- Fuel Centerline Temperature << Fuel Melt Limit

  • Impacted by revised CEA SCRAM Insertion Curve.

E l

d/A d

  • Evaluated/Assessed

- Expectation that mDNBR >> DNB SAFDL.

- Expectation that Fuel Centerline Temperature << Fuel Melt Limit.

  • Conclusions

- Negligible impact on the results and conclusion.

- No change to the UFSAR.

g 32

Analyses Evaluated Chapter 15.4.1.3: Uncontrolled CEA Withdrawal at Power

  • Impacted by revised CEA SCRAM Insertion Curve.

Impacted by revised CEA SCRAM Insertion Curve.

- ROPM increases ~1%.

  • Evaluated Benefit of Revised Reactivity Safety Analysis Input

- Benefit of Revised Reactivity Safety Analysis Input

  • ROPM decreases by ~0.6% for initial power 50%.
  • No benefit for initial power < 50%.

HFP

- HFP

  • COLSS HFP ROPM > Initial Analysis ROPM

- Intermediate power levels for CPCS h

i d

i l

d

  • Both trip and no-trip cases are analyzed.
  • No-trip cases bound trip cases.

33

Analyses Evaluated Chapter 15.4.1.3: Uncontrolled CEA Withdrawal at Power

  • Summary

- HFP: Revised Reactivity SAI and COLSS ROPM offset revised CEA SCRAM Insertion Curve.

- Intermediate Power: No-trip cases are expected to remain bounding.

  • Conclusions

- No changes to COLSS Margin expected.

- No changes to CPCS Input expected.

34

Analyses Evaluated Chapter 15.4.3.6: CEA Ejection

  • Supports radiological dose fuel failure limit of 15% for DNB and 0% for fuel rod enthalpy.

0% for fuel rod enthalpy.

  • Analyzed parametric in power from HFP to Hot Zero Power (HZP).

- Cycle specific fuel failure is ~70% of the limit.

  • Defines key Non-LOCA Input.

- COLSS ROPM for HFP and intermediate power levels

- CPCS input CPCS input

- Bounding physics input

  • Impacted by revised CEA SCRAM Insertion Curve.

- Expected fuel failure to increase by ~2%.

- Expected rod enthalpy to increase above the limit.

- Insignificant for steam releases.

g 35

Analyses Evaluated Chapter 15.4.3.6: CEA Ejection

  • Evaluated

- Benefit of revised Reactivity SAI partially offsets the revised CEA SCRAM Benefit of revised Reactivity SAI partially offsets the revised CEA SCRAM Insertion Curve for initial power levels 50%.

  • Expected to lower fuel failure ~1%.
  • Expected benefit to offset ~50% of the enthalpy increase
  • Expected benefit to offset 50% of the enthalpy increase.

- If calculated fuel failures exceed radiological dose limits, OR if fuel rod enthalpies exceed the limits, THEN:

C dit SAI i i b di h

i d t f ll l

l if

  • Credit SAI margin in bounding physics data for all power levels if needed to maintain current results.
  • Reduce bounding physics values for ejected CEA rod worth and ejected k

peaks.

36

Analyses Evaluated Chapter 15.4.3.6: CEA Ejection

  • Summary

- Reduction in bounding ejected CEA rod worth expected.

Reduction in bounding ejected CEA rod worth expected.

- Reduction in bounding ejected CEA peak expected.

- No changes to COLSS ROPM expected.

N h

t CPCS i t

t d

- No changes to CPCS input expected.

  • Conclusion

- Expected impact on fuel failure to remain < 15% for DNB and 0% for fuel p

p rod enthalpy.

37

Analyses Evaluated Chapter 15.9: Asymmetric Steam Generator Transient

  • Supports COLSS ROPM and CPCS input.
  • Impacted by revised CEA SCRAM Insertion Curve
  • Impacted by revised CEA SCRAM Insertion Curve.

- ROPM increases ~1%.

  • Evaluated

- Benefit of Revised Reactivity Safety Analysis Input

  • ROPM decrease by ~0.6% for initial power 50%.
  • Initial Analysis ROPM > Event ROPM
  • Initial Analysis ROPM > Event ROPM
  • COLSS ROPM > Initial Analysis ROPM 38

Analyses Evaluated Chapter 15.9: Asymmetric Steam Generator Transient

  • Summary

- HFP HFP

  • Revised Reactivity SAI and COLSS ROPM offset the impact of revised CEA SCRAM Insertion Curve.

- Intermediate Power

- Intermediate Power

  • Revised Reactivity SAI and Initial Analysis ROPM offset the impact of revised CEA SCRAM Insertion Curve.

C l

i

  • Conclusion

- No change to the COLSS Margin expected.

- No change to the CPCS Input expected.

39

A l

A d

Analyses Assessed 40

Analyses Assessed Chapter 15.1.1.4: Inadvertent Opening of an Atmospheric Dump Valve

  • Hot Zero Power

- mDNBR mDNBR

- LHR

- Steam releases C

R l

  • Current Results

- mDNBR >> DNB SAFDL at ~85 seconds

- LHR << Steady State Limit at ~83 second y

- Reactor trip occurs at 600 seconds hour steam releases = ~1 M-lbm Shutdown cooling steam releases = ~2 5 M lbm

- Shutdown cooling steam releases = 2.5 M-lbm 41

Analyses Assessed Chapter 15.1.1.4: Inadvertent Opening of an Atmospheric Dump Valve

  • Impact of the revised CEA SCRAM Insertion Curve

- No Impact on mDNBR and peak LHR.

No Impact on mDNBR and peak LHR.

- Insignificant impact on steam releases.

  • Conclusion

- No impact on the results and conclusions.

42

Analyses Assessed Chapter 15.1.2.4: Inadvertent Opening of an Atmospheric Dump Valve

  • Hot Full Power with SF
  • Hot Full Power

- Supports radiological dose; fuel failure limit is zero.

  • Impacted by revised CEA SCRAM Insertion Curve

- mDNBR < DNB SAFDL

  • Assessed/Evaluated Benefit of revised Reactivity SAI to increase mDNBR

- Benefit of revised Reactivity SAI to increase mDNBR

- COLSS HFP ROPM > Initial Analysis ROPM 43

Analyses Assessed Chapter 15.1.2.4: Inadvertent Opening of an Atmospheric Dump Valve

  • Impact of CEA SCRAM Insertion Curve is offset by benefit of safety with SF
  • Impact of CEA SCRAM Insertion Curve is offset by benefit of safety analysis margin.

- Revised Reactivity SAI

- Analysis Margin in COLSS HFP ROPM value

- mDNBR > DNB SAFDL

- No Fuel Failure

  • Conclusions

- No impact on the results and conclusions.

44

Analyses Assessed Chapter 15.1.3.1: Steam System Piping Failures Post-trip Return-to-

  • Hot Full Power and Hot Zero Power w/wo LOAC Power (R-t-P) and Return-to-Criticality (R-t-C)
  • Assessed

- Insignificant impact on steam releases.

Rate of reactivity insertion during the CEA SCRAM rod insertion has a

- Rate of reactivity insertion during the CEA SCRAM rod insertion has a negligible impact on the reactivity balance at the time of R-t-P and R-t-C.

  • Conclusions

- No impact on the results and conclusions.

45

Analyses Assessed Chapter 15.1.3.3: Steam System Piping Failures Pre-trip Power

  • Supports radiological dose fuel failure limit of 8%.

Excursion Analysis

- Current calculated fuel failure is zero.

- mDNBR >> DNB SAFDL

  • Impacted by revised CEA SCRAM Insertion Curve.

Impacted by revised CEA SCRAM Insertion Curve.

  • Assessed

- Use results from the Increased Main Steam Flow

- COLSS ROPM > Event ROPM 46

Analyses Assessed Chapters 15.1.3.3: Steam System Piping Failures Pre-trip Power

  • Impact of the CEA SCRAM Insertion Time offset by safety analysis Excursion Analysis p

y y

y margin.

- Revised Reactivity SAI COLSS HFP ROPM > Event ROPM

- COLSS HFP ROPM > Event ROPM

- mDNBR > > DNB SAFDL

- Calculated fuel failure to remain zero.

  • Conclusions

- No impact on the results and conclusions.

47

Analyses Assessed Chapters 15.2.2.5/15.2.3.2: Loss of Normal Feedwater Flow (w/wo SF)

  • Assessed using LOCV results.
  • Expectation is the benefit of the Revised Reactivity SAI offsets the
  • Expectation is the benefit of the Revised Reactivity SAI offsets the revised CEA SCRAM Insertion Curve.

48

Analyses Assessed Chapter 15.2.3.1: Feedwater System Pipe Breaks

  • Assessed using LOCV results.
  • Expectation is the benefit of the Revised Reactivity SAI offsets the
  • Expectation is the benefit of the Revised Reactivity SAI offsets the revised CEA SCRAM Insertion Curve.

49

Analyses Assessed Chapter 15.4.1.4: CEA Misoperation: Single CEA Withdrawal (SCEAW)

  • Impacted by revised CEA SCRAM Insertion Curve.
  • Current results

- Analysis performed at intermediate power levels.

- Both trip and no-trip cases are analyzed.

- No-trip cases bound trip cases.

  • Assessed using CEAW at power results
  • Assessed using CEAW at power results.
  • Impact

- Benefit of revised Reactivity SAI is available to offset some of the increase for the trip cases due to revised CEA SCRAM Insertion Curve for initial power levels p

p 50%.

- No-trip cases are expected to bound the trip cases.

  • Conclusions h

- No change to COLSS Margin expected.

- No change to CPCS Input expected.

- No changes to results and conclusions are expected.

50

Analyses Assessed Chapter 15.6.3.2: Steam Generator Tube Rupture

  • Supports radiological doses.

- Primary-to-secondary mass transfer Primary to secondary mass transfer

- Steam releases

  • Assessed

- Rate of reactivity insertion during the CEA SCRAM has an insignificant impact on the primary-to-secondary mass transfer and secondary steam releases.

  • Conclusions

- No impact on the results and conclusions expected.

51

Analyses Assessed Chapter 15.6.3.3: LOCA

- SCRAM rod insertion not credited.

SCRAM rod insertion not credited.

- Not Impacted

- The expectation is that the impact will be negligible.

  • Long term cooling

- SCRAM rod insertion is not credited SCRAM rod insertion is not credited.

- Not Impacted

  • Conclusions

- No changes to the results and conclusions are expected.

52

Analyses Assessed Chapter 15.8: Anticipated Transient Without SCRAM

  • Diversified SCRAM System setpoints not impacted
  • Diversified SCRAM System setpoints not impacted
  • Rate of reactivity insertion during the CEA SCRAM has a negligible impact on the results.
  • Not Impacted 53

A l

B d d b A th Analyses Bounded by Another Analysis y

54

Analyses Bounded by Another Analysis

  • Chapters 15.1.1.1/15.1.2.1: Decrease in Feedwater Temperature (w/wo SF)

(w/wo SF)

- Bounded by the Increased Main Steam Flow (w/wo SF) in Chapters 15.1.1.3/15.1.2.3.

  • Chapters 15.1.1.2/15.1.2.2: Increase in Feedwater Flow (w/wo SF)

- Bounded by the Increased Main Steam Flow (w/wo SF) in Chapters 15.1.1.3/15.1.2.3.

55

Analyses Bounded by Another Analysis

  • Chapters 15.2.1.1/15.2.2.1: Loss of External Load (w/wo SF)

- Bounded by the Loss of Condenser Vacuum (LOCV) (w/wo SF) in Chapters Bounded by the Loss of Condenser Vacuum (LOCV) (w/wo SF) in Chapters 15.2.1.3/15.2.2.3.

- Bounded by the LOCV (w/wo SF) in Chapters 15.2.1.3/15.2.2.3.

56

Analyses Bounded by Another Analysis

  • Chapters 15.2.1.4/15.2.2.4: Loss of Normal AC Power (w/wo SF)

- Bounded by the LOCV (w/wo SF) in Chapters 15.2.1.3/15.2.2.3.

Bounded by the LOCV (w/wo SF) in Chapters 15.2.1.3/15.2.2.3.

- Bounded by the Total Loss of Forced Reactor Coolant Flow in Chapter 15.3.2.1.

57

Analyses Bounded by Another Analysis

  • Chapters 15.3.1.1/15.3.2.2: Partial Loss of Forced Reactor Coolant Flow (w/wo SF)

Flow (w/wo SF)

- Bounded by the Total Loss of Forced Reactor Coolant Flow in Chapter 15.3.2.1.

58

Analyses Bounded by Another Analysis

  • Chapter 15.4.1.5: Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS)

Malfunction (inadvertent boron dilution)

Malfunction (inadvertent boron dilution)

- Operational Modes 1 and 2

  • Bounded by the CEA Withdrawal at Power in Chapter 15.4.1.3.
  • Bounded by the CEA Withdrawal at Low Power in Chapter 15 4 1 2
  • Bounded by the CEA Withdrawal at Low Power in Chapter 15.4.1.2.

- Operational Modes 3, 4, 5 and 6

  • Rods are full inserted for Modes 3, 4, 5, and 6.

N t I t d

  • Not Impacted 59

A l

N t I t d Analyses Not Impacted 60

Analyses Not Impacted

  • Chapter 15.1.3.2: Steam System Piping Failures Inside and Outside Containment (Modes 3 and 4 with All CEAs Fully Inserted)

Containment (Modes 3 and 4 with All CEAs Fully Inserted)

  • Chapter 15.4.1.4: CEA Misoperation: Single and Subgroup CEA Drop

- No reactor trip generated 61

Analyses Not Impacted

  • Chapter 15.4.1.6: Startup of an Inactive RCS Pump

- Analyzed in Operational Modes 3, 4, and 5.

Analyzed in Operational Modes 3, 4, and 5.

- CEA SCRAM rods are fully inserted.

Ch t

15 4 3 1 I d

t t L di f F l A bl i t th

  • Chapter 15.4.3.1: Inadvertent Loading of Fuel Assembly into the Improper Position

- CEA SCRAM rods do not impact this event.

62

Analyses Not Impacted

- High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI) system head is less than normal Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure

  • Chapter 15.6.3.1: Primary Sample or Instrument Line Break

- Assumes Operator Action for Reactor Trip 63

Analyses Not Impacted

  • Chapter 15.7.3.3: Postulated Radioactive Release Due to Liquid Containing Tank Failures Containing Tank Failures

- Not relevant to this event Ch 15 7 3 4 D i

B i F l H dli A

id

  • Chapter 15.7.3.4: Design Basis Fuel Handling Accidents

- Not relevant to this event

  • Chapter 15.7.3.5: Spent Fuel Cask Accidents

- Not relevant to this event 64

Analysis Summary UFSAR Chapter 15

  • Minimal impact on the LOCA safety analyses.
  • Minimal impact on the Non-LOCA safety analyses
  • Minimal impact on the Non-LOCA safety analyses.
  • No changes to COLSS ROPM expected.
  • No changes to CPCS inputs expected.

g p

p

  • Potential decrease in bounding CEA Ejection physics data.
  • No changes expected to the results and conclusions contained in the current UFSAR Chapter 15.

65

COLSS and CPCS Summary Database and Addressable Constants

  • No changes are expected to the COLSS and CPCS database
  • No changes are expected to the COLSS and CPCS database.
  • No changes are expected to the COLSS and CPCS addressable g

p constants.

66

Summary Overall

  • The Chapter 15 Safety Analyses continue to meet all acceptance criteria criteria
  • The current Licensing Basis will remain bounding for the revised analyses Th h

t th COLSS d CPCS d t b d

  • The are no changes to the COLSS and CPCS databases and addressable constants.

67

License Amendment Request Schedule

  • CEA Drop Time testing is performed at the end of the refueling outage prior to criticality and is typically a critical path activity outage prior to criticality and is typically a critical path activity
  • Failure of the surveillance test would result in an immediate delay in startup following the next refueling outage
  • License Amendment Request is expected to be submitted in June 2015 2015
  • Waterford 3 requests the LAR approval be completed by October 25, 2015 68

Conclusion

  • Thank you for your time and consideration
  • Questions?
  • Questions?

69

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