ML17318A123

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Licensee Presentation Slides for November 16, 2017, Category 1 Public Meeting Regarding Engineered Safety Features Actuation System
ML17318A123
Person / Time
Site: Waterford Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 11/16/2017
From:
Entergy Operations
To: April Pulvirenti
Plant Licensing Branch IV
Pulvirenti A
References
EPID L-2017-LRM-0051
Download: ML17318A123 (24)


Text

1 ESFAS SPV Elimination Pre-Submittal Meeting

Introductions

John Jarrell - Regulatory Assurance Manager Maria Zamber - Regulatory Assurance Jason Laque - Project Manager Miguel Barreto - Design Engineer Griff Finkenaur - Entergy Contract Support William Steelman - Entergy Contract Support 2

ESFAS SPV Elimination Pre-Submittal Meeting Agenda

  • Adverse Condition - Single Point Vulnerability
  • Resolution - Modify the MSIS and CSAS Circuit
  • Technical Specification Change 3

ESFAS Design

  • Engineering Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) is part of the Plant Protection System (PPS)
  • The PPS can be broken down into two subsystems;

- Reactor Protection System (RPS)

- Engineering Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS)

  • The ESFAS generates actuation signals for the ESF and ESF support systems to mitigate the consequences of accident conditions.

4

ESFAS Design The following is a list of the ESFAS signals:

  • Safety Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS)
  • Containment Isolation Actuation Signal (CIAS)
  • Recirculation Actuation Signal (RAS)
  • Emergency Feedwater Actuation Signal for SG 2 (EFAS-2) 5

ESFAS Design 6

Adverse Condition

  • The following ESFAS signals have SPV identified in their circuitry (1 out of 1 Logic):

- K305A or B and K313A or B Actuation Relay failure will close Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV), Feedwater Isolation Valve (FWIV), Feedwater Regulating Valve, and Feedwater Startup Regulating Valve

- Closure of a single MSIV will result in asymmetric steam generator transient (ASGT), resulting in a CPC high differential cold leg temperature trip and a loss of thermal margin.

- Closure of both MSIVs will result in a complete loss of the secondary heat sink requiring a reactor trip on high pressurizer pressure.

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Adverse Condition

- K114A or B Actuation Relay failure will close Component Cooling Water (CCW) flow to the non-critical loop .

- This will result in loss of Component Cooling Water (CCW) flow to the Reactor Coolant Pumps (RCPs) and the Control Element Drive Mechanism (CEDM) cooling coils.

Loss of seal cooling to the RCP can result in serious RCP seal damage with the potential for a small break LOCA.

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1 out of 1 Logic 9

Resolution - Modify the MSIS and CSAS Circuit

  • Revise the ESFAS Actuation Circuit from a 1 out of 1 logic to a parallel 2 out of 2 logic.

- Removed the SPV from the circuit

- Parallel 2 out of 2 logic meets the Reg Guide 1.22 requirements

  • Add a LED Test Fixture with a LED to illuminate when a ESFAS Actuation Relay Contact closes.

- Provides indication of failed relay

- Provides safe means to test quarterly without need for intrusive maintenance using meters for voltage and continuity checks 10

Resolution - Parallel 2 out of 2 Logic Actuation Relay Contacts 11

Testing LED Lights Test 125VDC Push Button 12

Testing of Actuation Relay Test 125VDC Push Button 13

Testing of Actuation Relay Test 125VDC Push Button 14

ESFAS Actuation Test 125VDC Push Button 15

Proposed Design (MSIS) 36VDC 36VDC 36VDC 36VDC Power Supply Power Supply MAIN STEAM Power Supply Power Supply ISOLATION SIGNAL BLOCKING DIODES BLOCKING DIODES (MSIS A) 120VAC 120VAC 120VAC VITAL BUS B VITAL BUS A 120VAC VITAL BUS A VITAL BUS B TO + TO ANNUNCIATOR ANNUNCIATOR CIRCUIT CIRCUIT Push to Test 6VDC Test Power Supply Rotary Test Initiate K305 Initiate K105 Sw itch Full Actuation (MSIS K411) (exis ting) Initiate K404 LOCKOUT RELAY Initiate K313 LOCKOUT RELAY RESET Initiate K205 RESET CONTACT CONTACT K519 K511 K819 36VDC K411 K212 K712 36VDC ESFAS INITIATION ESFAS INITIATION K411 K212 K411 K212 K411 K212 RELAY CONTACTS RELAY CONTACTS SSR3A SSR1A K411 SSR2A SSR4A K212 K605 K613 K705 K504 K805 INTERPOSING INTERPOSING K623 -- K723 RELAY RELAY MANUAL TRIP MANUAL TRIP K520 K820 K520 K820 POWER (SUBGROUP) K605 K613 K504 K705 K805 POWER (SUBGROUP)

CIRCUIT BREAKER CIRCUIT BREAKER LOCKOUT RELAY K519 K623 K305 K313 K404 K205 K105 K723 K819 LOCKOUT RELAY

+62.5 VDC Fuse TB LTF 1 2A To CSAS LEDs ac (limit switch - clos ed when valve is o pen) 1H 1H 1F 1F 2B 2B 2E 2E 1C 1C 1E 3E 1H 2H 2C 3C 2M 2M 2E 4E LED K313A K205A K313A K205A K313A K205A K313A K205A K305A K205A K305A K205A K305A K205A K305A K205A K305A K205A K305A K205A Power (105 - 140) 1J 1J 1E 1E 2C 2C 2F 2F 1B 1B 1F 3F 1J 2J 2B 3B 2L 2L 2F 4F Lamp TB LTF 11 TB LTF 12 Test TB LTF 3 TB LTF 4 TB LTF 5 TB LTF 6 TB LTF 7 TB LTF 8 TB LTF 9 TB LTF 10 TB LTF 13 TB LTF 14 TB LTF 15 TB LTF 16 TB LTF 17 TB LTF 18 TB LTF 19 TB LTF 20 TB LTF 21 TB LTF 22 125 VDC 1H 1H 1F 1F 2B 2B 2E 2E 1C 1C 3E 3E 2H 2H 3C 3C 2M 2M 4E 4E K105A K404A K105A K404A K105A K404A K105A K404A K105A K404A K105A K404A K105A K404A K105A K404A K105A K404A K105A K404A 1J 1J 1E 1E 2C 2C 2F 2F 1B 1B 3F 3F 2J 2J 3B 3B 2L 2L 4F 4F COX (closed when valve (clos ed when valve COX is open)

LC is open) LC Fuse 2A To TB LTF 2 CSAS LEDs MS-124B MS-124B FW-166A MS-124A MS-124A FW-184B FW-184A FW-184A FW-166B FW-173B (SV-1A) (SV-2A) (SV-1A) MS-124A (COX/LC)

(COX/LC) FW-173A (SV-2A)

-62.5 VDC 16

Proposed Design (CSAS) 36VDC 36VDC 36VDC 36VDC Power Supply Power Supply Containment Spray Power Supply Power Supply Actuation Signal BLOCKING DIODES BLOCKING DIODES (CSAS A) 120VAC 120VAC 120VAC VITAL BUS B VITAL BUS A 120VAC VITAL BUS A VITAL BUS B

+

TO TO ANNUNCIATOR ANNUNCIATOR CIRCUIT CIRCUIT Push to Test 6VDC Test Power Supply Rotary Test Initiate K405 Initiate K114 Switch Full Actuation - Initiate K212 (existing) Initiate K406 LOCKOUT RELAY Initiate K208 LOCKOUT RELAY CONTACT RESET RESET CONTACT K621 K712 K818 36VDC K411 K212 K511 SSR1A SSR2A ESFAS INITIATION K411 K212 K411 K212 ESFAS INITIATION K212 K411 RELAY CONTACTS RELAY CONTACTS K814 K505 K708 K506 SSR3A SSR4A MANUAL TRIP MANUAL TRIP K622 K817 K622 K817 POWER (SUBGROUP) K505 K506 K708 K814 POWER (SUBGROUP)

CIRCUIT BREAKER CIRCUIT BREAKER LOCKOUT RELAY K621 K405 K406 K208 K114 K818 LOCKOUT RELAY

+62.5 VDC From MSIS LEDs 4L 4L LED K208A K405A Power Lamp (105 - 140) 4M 4M Test TB LTF 23 TB LTF 24 125 VDC 4L 4L K406A K114A 4M 4M From MSIS LEDs CC-710

-62.5 VDC 17

ESFAS Aux Relay Cabinet Layout Concept Notes

1. Informatio n d eveloped from drawing 1564-6336 and manu al TD-C490.0645
2. Cabinet weight is 13,000lbs
3. One c abinet sh own.

Bo th C ab in et A an d B are 4 3 2 1 identical 56" 5 6 7 8 View A-A 144" A

8" 5 6 7 8 13"x24" 13"x24" New LED Test (existing) (existing) Fixture 20" Side View 24" HIGH, 20" LED Test WIDE, 8" DEEP, OVERALL Fixture FLANGES:

27.33" X 25.33" 40" ESFAS 60" 90" BAY 8 (Side View)

Int ernal C ro ss memb ers Door interior 10-1/2 A

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LED Test Fixture 19

Technical Specifications Change

ØRemove ESFAS Relays K305, K313, K114 from Technical Specifications Table 4.3-2 note 3

ØThis will change the frequency of testing of ESFAS Relays K305, K313, K114 (and the added MSIS &

CSAS Relays) to the frequency established by the Surveillance Frequency Control Program

ØThe relay surveillance frequency will be changed to be tested during power operation.

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Technical Specifications Change Current Technical Specification Table 4.3-2 Note 3 21

Technical Specifications Change Revised Technical Specification Table 4.3-2 Note 3 22

Closing

  • Waterford 3 is being proactive with eliminating the identified Single Point Vulnerability in the ESFAS circuity.
  • The proposed ESFAS circuitry modification will:

- Eliminate identified Single Point Vulnerability

- Allow for non-intrusive, safe method for testing on-line

- Will identify a failure of an ESFAS Actuation Relay

- Will comply with Reg. Guide 1.22

  • Expected submittal date is December 5th, 2017.

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Conclusion

  • Thank you for your time and attention.
  • Questions?

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