IR 05000369/2013008

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IR 05000369-13-008, 05000370-13-008; 10/21/2013-11/08/2013; McGuire Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2; Evaluations of Changes, Tests, and Experiments and Permanent Plant Modifications
ML13353A115
Person / Time
Site: McGuire, Mcguire  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 12/19/2013
From: Nease R
NRC/RGN-II/DRS/EB1
To: Capps S
Duke Energy Corp
References
IR-13-008
Download: ML13353A115 (15)
v • d • e


Text

UNITED STATES cember 19, 2013

SUBJECT:

MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION - NRC EVALUATION OF CHANGES, TESTS, AND EXPERIMENTS AND PERMANENT PLANT MODIFICATIONS BASELINE INSPECTION REPORT 05000369/2013008 AND 05000370/2013008

Dear Mr. Capps:

On November 8, 2013, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your McGuire Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 and discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The inspectors documented the results of this inspection in the enclosed inspection report.

No NRC-identified or self-revealing findings were identified during this inspection. However, inspectors documented a licensee-identified violation which was determined to be Severity Level IV in this report. The NRC is treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV)

consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violation or significance of the NCV, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC resident inspector at the McGuire Nuclear Station.

In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding, of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRCs Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely, RA Rebecca L. Nease, Chief Engineering Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety Docket Nos.: 50-369, 50-370 License Nos.: NPF-9, NPF-17

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000369/2013008, 05000370/2013008 w/Attachment: Supplementary Information

REGION II==

Docket Nos.: 50-369, 50-370 License Nos.: NPF-9, NPF-17 Report Nos.: 05000369/2013008, 05000370/2013008 Licensee: Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC Facility: McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 Location: Huntersville, NC 28078 Dates: October 21 - November 8, 2013 Inspectors: J. Eargle, Senior Reactor Inspector (Team Leader)

R. Patterson, Reactor Inspector T.C. Su, Reactor Inspector P. Cooper (Trainee)

W. Monk (Trainee)

Approved by: Rebecca L. Nease, Chief Engineering Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000369/2013008, 05000370/2013008; 10/21/2013-11/08/2013; McGuire Nuclear

Station Units 1 and 2; Evaluations of Changes, Tests, and Experiments and Permanent Plant Modifications This report covers a two-week on-site inspection by one senior reactor inspector, two reactor inspectors, and two trainees. One Severity Level IV license-identified violation was identified.

All violations of NRC requirements are dispositioned in accordance with the NRCs Enforcement Policy, dated January 28, 2013, revised July 9, 2013. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operations of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 4.

A Severity Level IV violation that was identified by the licensee has been reviewed by the NRC.

Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee have been entered into the licensees corrective action program. This violation and corrective action tracking numbers are listed in Section 4OA7 of this report.

REPORT DETAILS

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity

1R17 Evaluations of Changes, Tests, and Experiments and Permanent Plant

Modifications (71111.17T)

a. Inspection Scope

Evaluations of Changes, Tests, and Experiments: From October 21, 2013, through November 8, 2013, the team reviewed eight safety evaluations performed pursuant to Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 50.59 to determine if the evaluations were adequate and that prior NRC approval was obtained as appropriate. The team also reviewed 15 screenings where licensee personnel had determined that a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation was not necessary. The team reviewed these documents to determine if:

  • the changes, tests, or experiments performed were evaluated in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59 and that sufficient documentation existed to confirm that a license amendment was not required;
  • the safety issues requiring the changes, tests or experiments were resolved;
  • the licensee conclusions for evaluations of changes, tests, or experiments were correct and consistent with 10 CFR 50.59; and
  • the design and licensing basis documentation used to support the change was updated to reflect the change.

The team used, in part, Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 96-07, Guidelines for 10 CFR 50.59 Implementation, Revision 1, to determine acceptability of the completed evaluations, and screenings. The NEI document was endorsed by the NRC in Regulatory Guide 1.187, Guidance for Implementation of 10 CFR 50.59, Changes, Tests, and Experiments, dated November 2000. The team also consulted Part 9900 of the NRC Inspection Manual, 10 CFR Guidance for 10 CFR 50.59, Changes, Tests, and Experiments, dated March 2001.

This inspection constituted eight samples of evaluations and 15 samples of screenings as defined in Inspection Procedure (IP) 71111.17-04.

Permanent Plant Modifications: From October 21, 2013, through November 8, 2013, the team reviewed nine permanent plant modifications that had been installed in the plant during the last three years. The nine modifications reviewed are listed below:

  • EC 0000097654, Modify Air Operated Valve Control Circuit 2RN252B, Rev. 1
  • EC 0000104864, Provide Inspection Ports on Unit 1 & 2 Steel Containment Vessel, Rev. 0
  • EC 0000105123, U2 High Pressure Turbine Rotor Replacement - Instrument and Controls, 07/30/2013
  • EC 0000106320, Install New Check Valve for 2B Nuclear Service Water Pump Motor Cooler Supply, Rev. 0 The modifications were selected based upon risk significance, safety significance, and complexity. The team reviewed the modifications selected to determine if:
  • the supporting design and licensing basis documentation was updated;
  • the changes were in accordance with the specified design requirements;
  • the procedures and training plans affected by the modification had been adequately updated;
  • the test documentation as required by the applicable test programs had been updated; and
  • post-modification testing adequately verified system operability and/or functionality.

The team also used applicable industry standards to evaluate acceptability of the modifications and performed walk downs of accessible portions of the modifications.

Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

This inspection constituted nine permanent plant modification samples as defined in IP 71111.17-04.

b. Findings

1. (Opened) Unresolved Item (URI): Fuel Manipulator Crane Digital Modification

Introduction:

The inspectors identified a URI associated with a potential failure to conduct an adequate 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation for a digital modification to the fuel manipulator crane control system. This item remains unresolved pending the inspectors review of additional information to determine compliance with 10 CFR 50.59, Changes, Tests, and Experiments.

Description:

The fuel handling system consists of the equipment needed for the refueling operation of the reactor core. This equipment is comprised of manipulator cranes, fuel handling equipment and a fuel transfer system. The manipulator cranes have the potential to initiate a fuel handling accident as described in Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) section 15.7.4. The postulated accident assumes a fuel assembly is damaged while being moved inside containment or the Spent Fuel Pool Building.

Engineering changes EC 77048, Unit 1 Manipulator Crane Upgrade Project, Rev. 18 and EC 77051, Unit 2 Manipulator Crane Upgrade Project, Rev. 15, were implemented to address reliability and obsolescence problems confronting the fuel manipulator cranes in the reactor containment and spent fuel building. The power and control systems were upgraded, including the position sensors, motor drives, control consoles, and wiring.

The existing analog controls were replaced using a digital programmable logic controller (PLC) with a graphic user interface. The PLC can now be programmed in advance with the refueling sequence, and the step-wise destinations of each fuel assembly. The PLC controls allow multi-axial travel (in the x-y dimensions) within established safe operation zones. The maximum crane bridge and trolley speeds were increased, but the existing acceleration limits were retained. The hoist slow-speed zones were reduced, but an adequate distance had been retained for the safe insertion of a fuel assembly into a storage or core location.

The licensee performed a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation in accordance with procedure NSD-209, 10 CFR 50.59 Process, Rev. 14, and determined the change could be implemented without prior NRC review and approval. After reviewing the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation, the inspectors found that they did not have sufficient information to determine that NRC review and approval was not required prior to the implementation of the modification. The inspectors could not verify the licensees conclusions regarding the reliability and dependability of the software used to operate the manipulator crane.

Specifically, the licensee did not address software failure modes and effects, and the software development processes described in section 5.3.3 of NEI 01-01, Digital System Quality, Rev. 1, in enough detail for the team to reach the same conclusion.

In order to determine the adequacy of the licensees 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation and whether or not there is a violation of 10 CFR 50.59, Changes, Tests, and Experiments, this issue remains unresolved pending the inspectors review of additional information to be provided by the licensee to address the issues described above. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as problem investigation program (PIP) report M-13-11029 to track the actions taken to address the teams concern.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

On November 8, 2013, and on December 9, 2013, the team presented the inspection results to Mr. Capps and other members of the licensees staff. The team verified that no proprietary information was retained by the inspectors or documented in this report.

4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violations

The following Severity Level IV violation was identified by the licensee and is a violation of NRC requirements which meets the criteria of the NRC Enforcement Policy, for being dispositioned as a NCV.

  • 10 CFR 50.71(e) requires, in part, that each person licensed to operate a nuclear power reactor, shall update periodically, the FSAR originally submitted as part of the application for the license, to assure that the information included in the report contains the latest information developed. This submittal shall include the effects of all changes made in the facility or procedures as described in the FSAR.

Contrary to the above, since November 30, 2012, the site failed to include updates related to a modification that changed the actuation of the containment spray system from automatic to manual. Traditional enforcement is applicable because the violation could impact the regulatory process, and was evaluated using the NRCs Enforcement Policy. This violation was determined to be a Severity Level IV violation because the lack of up-to-date information did not result in an unacceptable change to the facility or procedures. This violation was documented in the licensees corrective action program as PIPs M-13-08057, M-13-08607, and M-13-08684.

ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee personnel

Steven Capps, Site Vice President

Charles Morris, Plant Manager

Jeff Robertson, Regulator Affairs Manager

Steve Snider, Engineering Manager

N. Kunkel, Engineering Manager

Don Brenton, Major Projects Manager

Abid Khan, Engineering Supervisor

Mathew Isenhour, Engineering Supervisor

Mike Wilder, Engineering Supervisor

Kay Crane, Regulatory Affairs

Brian Richards, Regulatory Affairs

Cecil Fletcher, Corporate Compliance

NRC personnel

J. Zeiler, Senior Resident Inspector, McGuire
J. Heath, Resident Inspector, McGuire

LIST OF ITEMS

OPENED AND CLOSED

Opened

05000369, 370/2013008-01 URI Fuel Manipulator Crane Digital Modification (Section 1R17)

Closed

None

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

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