ML13210A063

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Initial Exam 2013-301 Final Administrative JPMs
ML13210A063
Person / Time
Site: Watts Bar Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Issue date: 07/26/2013
From:
NRC/RGN-II
To:
Tennessee Valley Authority
References
50-390/10-301
Download: ML13210A063 (205)


Text

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 201303 NRC Exam Administrative JPM 1

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE 1

2013-03 NRC Exam EVALUATION SHEET Task: CALCULATE TARGET BORON (CB) FOR LOAD ESCALATION Alternate Path: n/a Facility JPM #: Modified A.1-2 Safety Function: 2.3

Title:

Conduct of Operations K/A 2.1.25 Ability to interpret reference materials, such as graphs, curves, tables, etc.

Rating(s): 3.9/4.2 CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.12 Evaluation Method: Simulator In-Plant Classroom X*

References:

1.) SOI-62.02, Boron Concentration Control, Rev. 55 2.) Nuclear Parameters & Operations Package (NuPOP) WCAP-17401-P, Watts Bar Unit 1 Cycle 11, Rev. 1 Task Number: RO-062-SOI-62-016

Title:

Perform dilution of the Reactor Coolant system.

Task Standard: The applicant completes the calculations required by SOI-62.02, Appendix E REACTIVITY BALANCE CALCULATION, The target RCS Boron Concentration is determined to be 572.5 ppm (acceptable range 564.6 to 580.5 ppm).

Validation Time: 20 minutes Time Critical: Yes No X

===============================================================

Applicant: ___________________________ _________________ Time Start: ________

NAME Docket No. Time Finish: ________

Performance Rating: SAT ____ UNSAT ____ Performance Time ___

Examiner: _____________________________ _____________________________/________

NAME SIGNATURE DATE

==============================================================

=

COMMENTS Page 2 of 16

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE 1

2013-03 NRC Exam Tools/Equipment/Procedures Needed:

The following information will be handed out to each applicant:

1. Copy of XENON CALCULATION WATTS BAR UNIT 1 CYCLE 11 MOL NIX XENON DATA for power change from 80% to 100% at 2%/min.
2. Copy of SOI-62.02, Boron Concentration Control, Appendix E, Reactivity Balance Calculation.

3, Copy of Nuclear Parameters & Operations Package (NuPOP) WCAP-17401-P, Watts Bar Unit 1 Cycle 11, Rev. 1

4. NRC REFERENCE DISK.
  • NOTE: This JPM is designed to be performed in a classroom with procedures available to the applicant via a laptop computer loaded with the NRC REFERENCE DISK.

Page 3 of 16

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE 1

2013-03 NRC Exam READ TO APPLICANT DIRECTION TO APPLICANT:

I will explain the initial conditions, and state the task to be performed. All control room steps shall be performed for this JPM, including any required communications. I will provide initiating cues and reports on other actions when directed by you. Ensure you indicate to me when you understand your assigned task. To indicate that you have completed your assigned task return the cue sheet I provided you.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

1. Unit 1 is operating at 80% power.
2. Core average burnup is 8000 MWD/MTU, middle-of-life.
3. Control Bank D rods are at 190 steps.
4. RCS boron concentration is 600 ppm.
5. Target rod position at 100% power is 220 steps on Control Bank D.
6. Power will be raised at 2% per hour.
7. Xenon printout from REACTINW has been performed by an STA and is provided with this cue sheet.

INITIATING CUES:

The Shift Manager has directed you to calculate the target boron concentration for raising power to 100% per SOI-62.02, Appendix E, Reactivity Balance Calculation.

Page 4 of 16

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE 1

2013-03 NRC Exam STEP/STANDARD SAT/UNSAT START TIME: _______

EXAMINER JPM Steps 1 through 5 evaluate the applicants completion of the first page of Appendix E.

STEP 1: [1] CALCULATE Target CB by performing the following: ___ SAT Obtains: Current RCS Boron CB: __________PPM. ___ UNSAT STANDARD:

Applicant enters 600 ppm from the INITIAL CONDITIONS provided on the APPLICANT CUE SHEET.

COMMENTS:

STEP 2: Enters: Core Burnup: _______MWD/MTU ___ SAT

___ UNSAT STANDARD:

Applicant enters value 8000 from the INITIAL CONDITIONS provided on the APPLICANT CUE SHEET.

COMMENTS:

Page 5 of 16

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE 1

2013-03 NRC Exam STEP/STANDARD SAT/UNSAT STEP 3: Enters: CRITICAL STEP Initial Reactor power = ________ %

Final Reactor power = _________ % ___ SAT Calculates: Total Reactor Power change: _______% ___ UNSAT STANDARD:

Applicant enters target reactor power value from the INITIAL CONDITIONS provided on the APPLICANT CUE SHEET Initial Reactor Power = 80%.

Final Reactor Power = 100%.

Applicant determines total power change to be 20%.

Step is critical since the change in power is the basis for the calculation.

COMMENTS:

Page 6 of 16

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE 1

2013-03 NRC Exam STEP/STANDARD SAT/UNSAT STEP 4: Enters: ___ SAT Rate of Reactor Power change: ________ %/hr ___ UNSAT Number of hours to change power: ________ hr(s)

STANDARD:

Applicant determines rate of reactor power change to be 2% per hour from the INITIAL CONDITIONS provided on the APPLICANT CUE SHEET.

Applicant calculates number of hours projected to reach target power as 10 hrs.

COMMENTS:

STEP 5: Obtains: ___ SAT Current Rod Position: _________ steps ___ UNSAT Final Rod Position: _________ steps STANDARD:

Applicant determines current rod position is 190 steps from the INITIAL CONDITIONS provided on the Applicant Cue Sheet.

Applicant determines final rod position is 220 steps from the INITIAL CONDITIONS provided on the Applicant Cue Sheet.

COMMENTS:

EXAMINER JPM Steps 6 through 11 evaluate the applicants completion of the second page of Appendix E.

Page 7 of 16

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE 1

2013-03 NRC Exam STEP/STANDARD SAT/UNSAT STEP 6: Determines Power Defect. CRITICAL STEP NOTE: Must be entered into equation as a positive value Power Defect From NUPOP, from Table 7-17, 7-18, or 7-19 ___ SAT 1789 pcm PD - 2230 pcm PD = -441 pcm Power Defect ___ UNSAT Initial Final STANDARD:

Applicant determines the following:

The value for initial power level is 1789 pcm from Table 7-18.

The value for the final power level as 2230 pcm from Table 7-18, and enters the values in appropriate table locations.

Applicant then calculates Power Defect by algebraically subtracting the Final Power Defect from Initial Power Defect. The value determined is -441 pcm.

Step is critical since the change in power defect is one of the parameters that are the basis for the calculation.

COMMENTS:

Page 8 of 16

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE 1

2013-03 NRC Exam STEP/STANDARD SAT/UNSAT STEP 7: Determines Xenon. CRITICAL STEP NOTE: Must be entered into equation as a positive value Initial Xenon From REACTW (either current conditions or projection ___ SAT to initial condition).

Final Xenon: From REACTW (projection over time). ___ UNSAT 2739.7 pcm XE - 2621.5 pcm XE = 118.2 pcm Xenon Initial Final STANDARD: Applicant determines the following:

Xenon for the initial power level is -2739.7 pcm from Xenon REACTW printout and enters 2739.7 in appropriate table locations.

Xenon for final power level as -2621.5 pcm from the same printout, and enters 2621.5 in appropriate table locations.

Applicant then calculates Xenon by algebraically subtracting Final Xenon from Initial Xenon. The value determined is 118.2 pcm.

Step is critical since the change in xenon is one of the parameters that are the basis for the calculation.

COMMENTS:

Page 9 of 16

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE 1

2013-03 NRC Exam STEP/STANDARD SAT/UNSAT STEP 8 Determines rods. CRITICAL STEP NOTE Must be entered into equation as a positive value Rods Integral worth From NUPOP, Figure 6-24, Figure 6-25, or Figure 6-26. ___ SAT 150 pcm Rods - 0 pcm Rods = 150 pcm Rods ___ UNSAT Initial Final STANDARD: Applicant determines Initial Integral Rod Worth for current rod position as 150 pcm (accept 100 to 200 pcm) from NUPOP Figure 6-25.

Applicant determines Final Integral Rod Worth as 0 pcm (accept 0 to 10 pcm) from the same figure, and enters the values in appropriate table locations.

Applicant calculates Rods by algebraically subtracting Final Integral Rod Worth from Initial Integral Rod Worth.

The value determined is 150 pcm (accept 100 to 200 pcm).

Step is critical since the change in rods is one of the parameters that are the basis for the calculation.

COMMENTS:

Page 10 of 16

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE 1

2013-03 NRC Exam STEP/STANDARD SAT/UNSAT STEP 9: Determines . CRITICAL STEP Add reactivity values to determine pcm adjustment to be made by changing CB. (NOTE: Watch the signs.) ___ SAT

___ UNSAT STANDARD: Applicant adds values entered for:

POWER DEFECT = (-441 pcm)

XENON = (118.2 pcm)

RODS = (150 pcm) (accept 100 to 200 pcm) and enters a value of -172.8 pcm (accept -223 to -122.8 pcm) as the SUM.

Step is critical since this is the reactivity change required to accomplish the power change.

COMMENTS:

Page 11 of 16

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE 1

2013-03 NRC Exam STEP/STANDARD SAT/UNSAT STEP 10: Converts to PPM . CRITICAL STEP (NUPOP Figure 6-21) -159 ppm/% (Inverse Boron Worth) X -172.8 pcm (needed) X 0.001 %/cm = 27.5 ppm ___ SAT STANDARD: Applicant converts the reactivity change into a boron ___ UNSAT concentration change using the equation provided.

Applicant determines Inverse Boron Worth from NUPOP Figure 6-21 to be -159 ppm/% (accept -158.5 to -159.5 ppm/%) at 8000 MWD/MTU. After performing the indicated calculation, the applicant determines the change in boron concentration to be 27.5 ppm (accept 19.5 to 35.4 ppm).

Step is critical to determine the boron concentration change required to accomplish the power change.

COMMENTS:

STEP 11: Determines TARGET PPM. CRITICAL STEP 600 Current RCS CB 27.5 Total CB = 572.5 ppm

___ SAT STANDARD: Applicant determines Target Boron Concentration performing the indicated calculation and determines the ___ UNSAT TARGET PPM is 572.5 ppm (accept 564.6 to 580.5 ppm).

Step is critical since this is the target boron required for the planned power escalation.

COMMENTS:

END OF TASK STOP TIME ________

Page 12 of 16

1 KEY DO NOT HAND TO APPLICANT

NRC EXAM MATERIAL JPM 1 KEY

NRC EXAM MATERIAL Accept 100-200 pcm Accept 0-10 pcm Accept 200-100 pcm Accept -223 to -122.8 pcm Accept 158.5 to 159.5 pcm Accept -223 to -122.8 pcm Accept 19.5 to 35.4 pcm Accept 564.6 to 580.5 ppm JPM 1 KEY

1 Handout Package for Applicant

APPLICANT CUE SHEET (RETURN TO EXAMINER UPON COMPLETION OF TASK)

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

1. Unit 1 is operating at 80% power.
2. Core average burnup is 8000 MWD/MTU, middle-of-life.
3. Control Bank D rods are at 190 steps.
4. RCS boron concentration is 600 ppm.
5. Target rod position at 100% power will be 220 steps on Control Bank D.
6. Power will be raised at 2% per hour.
7. Xenon printout from REACTINW has been performed by an STA and is provided with this cue sheet.

INITIATING CUES:

The Shift Manager has directed you to calculate the target boron concentration for raising power to 100% per SOI-62.02, Appendix E, Reactivity Balance Calculation.

1

APPLICANT CUE SHEET (RETURN TO EXAMINER UPON COMPLETION OF TASK)

[REACTW - VERS WB3.4]

XENON CALCULATION WATTS BAR UNIT 1 CYCLE 11 MOL NIX XENON DATA XE DEL XE TIME POWER XE I WORTH WORTH (HRS) (%) (% EQ) (% EQ) (PCM) (PCM)

.0 80.0 93.2 80.0 -2739.7 .0 1.0 82.0 92.9 80.2 -2732.2 7.5 2.0 84.0 92.5 80.6 -2720.0 12.2 3.0 86.0 92.0 81.1 -2705.3 14.7 4.0 88.0 91.5 81.8 -2689.6 15.7 5.0 90.0 91.0 82.6 -2674.2 15.4 6.0 92.0 90.5 83.6 -2659.8 14.4 7.0 94.0 90.0 84.6 -2647.0 12.8 8.0 96.0 89.7 85.7 -2636.3 10.7 9.0 98.0 89.4 87.0 -2627.8 8.5 10.0 100.0 89.2 88.3 -2621.5 6.3 1

WBN Boron Concentration Control SOI-62.02 Unit 1 Rev. 0055 Page 55 of 58 Appendix E (Page 1 of 2)

REACTIVITY BALANCE CALCULATION 1.0 REACTIVITY BALANCE CALCULATION NOTES

1) One calculation is required for each major change. Calculation is an approximation of Final Target CB
2) Appendix E may be used by an SRO to approve and independently verify data provided by Reactor Engineering. In this case, an additional IV by another SRO is NOT required

[1] CALCULATE Target CB by performing the following:

Date: Performer Initials:

DATA REQUIRED DATA Where To Get Initial RCS Boron CB ppm Chem Lab Core Burnup MWD/MTU ICS U7981 Initial Reactor power  % NIS Final Reactor power  % As required for plant conditions Total Reactor Power change  % Initial to Final Reactor power Rate of Reactor power change  %/hr As required for plant conditions Number of hours to change power hr(s) As required for plant conditions Current Rod Position steps ICS or MCR Board Final rod position based on estimated number of steps Final Rod Position steps required to control I and insertion limits for power change.

Initial Reactor Power:  % Final Reactor Power:  %

Parameter Where To Get Calculation Value

WBN Boron Concentration Control SOI-62.02 Unit 1 Rev. 0055 Page 56 of 58 Appendix E (Page 2 of 2)

Date________ Initials 1.0 REACTIVITY BALANCE CALCULATION (continued)

POWER NOTE: Must be entered into equation as a positive value ________pcm Power Defect From NUPOP, Table 7-17, 7-18, or 7-19. ________pcm PD ________pcm PD =

DEFECT POWER Initial Final DEFECT XENON NOTE: Must be entered into equation as a positive value Initial Xenon From REACTW (either current conditions or projection to initial ________pcm condition). _________pcm XE ________pcm XE = XENON Final Xenon:From REACTW (projection over time). Initial Final RODS NOTE Must be entered into equation as a positive value Rods Integral worth From NUPOP, Figure 6-24, Figure 6-25, or Figure 6-26. _______pcm Rods ______pcm Rods = ________pcm RODS Initial Final

________pcm Add reactivity values to determine pcm adjustment to be made by changing CB. (NOTE: Watch the signs.) SUM needed Convert to ________ppm PPM (NUPOP Figure 6-21)________ppm/% (Inverse Boron Worth) X________pcm (needed) X 0.001 %/cm =

Total CB TARGET PPM ________Current RCS CB ________Total CB = ________ppm Target CB PERFORMER:

[2] APPROVE calculation and Target PPM change for planned change in reactor power. ________ SRO

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 201303 NRC Exam Administrative JPM 2

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE 2

2013-03 NRC Exam EVALUATION SHEET Task: EVALUATE CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS TREES.

Alternate Path: n/a Facility JPM #: Modified Safety Function: n/a

Title:

Conduct of Operations K/A 2.1.7 Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation.

Rating(s): 4.4/4.7 CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.12 / 45.13 Evaluation Method: Simulator X In-Plant Classroom

References:

FR-0, Status Trees, Rev.14.

Task Number: STA-113-FR-0-001

Title:

Analyze plant conditions utilizing status trees and/or Integrated Computer System.

Task Standard: The applicant evaluates parameters displayed on the STATIC SIMULATOR and determines the following:

1. Status Tree Priority:

FR-S - ORANGE FR-C - YELLOW FR-H - YELLOW FR-P - GREEN FR-Z - ORANGE FR-I - GREEN

2. 1-FR-S.1, Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS, ORANGE PATH is the highest priority CSFST.

Validation Time: 15 minutes Time Critical: Yes No X

============================================================

Applicant: ___________________________ _________________ Time Start: ________

NAME Docket No. Time Finish: ________

Performance Rating: SAT ____ UNSAT ____ Performance Time ___

Examiner: _____________________________ _____________________________/________

NAME SIGNATURE DATE

==============================================================

COMMENTS Page 2 of 15

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE 2

2013-03 NRC Exam SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS:

1. ENSURE NRC Examination Security has been established.
2. RESET to Initial Condition 347 by performing the following actions:
a. Select ICManager on the THUNDERBAR menu (right hand side of Instructor Console Screen).
b. Locate IC# 347.
c. Right click on IC# 347.
d. Select Reset on the drop down menu.
e. Right click on RESET.
f. Enter the password for IC# 347.
g. Select Yes on the INITIAL CONDITION RESET pop-up window.
h. Perform SWITCH CHECK.
3. ENSURE the following information appears on the Director Summary Screen:

Key Type Event Delay Inserted Ramp Initial Final Value hs-72-10a-1 05010 rwst spray hdr b fcv(green) O 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Off Off hs-72-21a-1 06010 cntmt spray pump b mtr sw (green) O 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Off Off hs-72-2a-1 05070 cs hdr b isol vlv hand sw (green) O 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Off Off hs-72-45a-1 05030 cntmt sump hdr b fcv(green) O 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Off Off hs-72-13a-1 05050 cs pump b recirc fcv (green) O 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Off Off fi-3-147a 02070 stm gen #3 aux fw in O 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 130 110 fi-3-147b 02070 stm gen #3 aux fw in O 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 130 110 csr04 containment spray pump b power R 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Off Off fw29c main fw reg vlv fcv-3-90 fail position M 1 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 0 0 th03b loca - small leak loop2 M 1 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 37.5 37.5 cs01a containment spray system pump a trip M 13 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 Active Active

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE 2

2013-03 NRC Exam Key Type Event Delay Inserted Ramp Initial Final Value ni04a ir channel failure ir chnl 1 M 19 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 0.05 0.05 ni04b ir channel failure ir chnl 2- M 19 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 0.055 0.055 nini35d 07030 n35 startup-rate (dpm) ao O 19 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 0.33 0.33 nini36d 07030 n36 startup-rate (dpm) ao O 18 00:00:00 00:00:00 00:00:00 0.35 0.35

4. ENSURE SIMULATOR REMAINS IN FREEZE FOR THE DURATION OF ALL OF THE JPM PERFORMANCES.
6. PERFORM a board walk-down to verify:
a. Startup Rate on 1-NI-35D, IR STARTUP RATE DPM and 1-NI-36D, IR STARTUP RATE DPM indicate a positive value, approximately 0.3 DPM.
b. TOTAL AFW flow is approximately 430 gpm.
c. WHITE motor trip-out and GREEN light LIT on 1-HS-72-27A, CNTMT SPRAY PUMP A.
d. Containment pressure is approximately 5 psig.
7. ENSURE HOLD ORDER Tags are hung on 1-HS-72-10A, CNTMT SPRAY PUMP B, 1-HS-72-21A, RWST TO CS PMP B SUCTION, 1-HS-72-2A, CNTMT SPRAY HDR B TO CNTMT, 1-HS-72-13, CNTMT SPRAY PMP B MINI FLOW.
8. ENSURE ALL ICS Screens are closed on each ICS terminal. Windows Desktop screen should be visible.
9. RESET/ACKNOWLEDGE annunciators that are flashing.
10. INFORM the Examiner that Copies of FR-0, Status Trees, are available for each applicant as part of this JPM package.

Page 4 of 15

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE 2

2013-03 NRC Exam DIRECTIONS TO APPLICANT DIRECTION TO APPLICANT:

I will explain the initial conditions, and state the task to be performed. All control room steps shall be performed for this JPM, including any required communications. I will provide initiating cues and reports on other actions when directed by you. Ensure you indicate to me when you understand your assigned task. To indicate that you have completed your assigned task return the cue sheet I provided you.

NOTE: THE SIMULATOR WILL REMAIN IN FREEZE FOR THE DURATION OF THE JPM.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

1. Unit 1 tripped from 100% power.
2. A Safety Injection occurred 15 minutes ago.
3. The crew is performing actions in 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.
4. The ICS/SPDS computer is NOT available for monitoring Critical Safety Functions.

INITIATING CUE:

You have been directed perform a manual evaluation the Critical Safety Functions using FR-0, Status Trees, based on the indications displayed on the simulator.

ENSURE THAT YOU:

1. Document each Critical Safety Function evaluation performed in FR-0, Status Trees.
2. Report the highest priority Function Restoration Procedure (FR) required to be implemented, if any.

Page 5 of 15

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE 2

2013-03 NRC Exam STEP/STANDARD SAT/UNSAT START TIME: _______

STEP 1: Evaluate SUBCRITICALITY FR-S Status Tree. CRITICAL STEP STANDARD:

___ SAT

___ UNSAT Applicant determines that an ORANGE path exists on FR-S Status Tree, and that FR-S.1, Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS, is required to be entered.

The step is critical to properly evaluate FR-0, Status Trees, to determine that an ORANGE path condition exists. This is the highest priority FR for the conditions given. If this is not evaluated properly, a transition to a lower level procedure could occur, and the highest priority FR would not be implemented.

COMMENTS:

Page 6 of 15

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE 2

2013-03 NRC Exam STEP/STANDARD SAT/UNSAT STEP 2: Evaluate CORE COOLING FR-C Status Tree. CRITICAL STEP STANDARD: ___ SAT

___ UNSAT Applicant determines that a YELLOW path exists on FR-C Status Tree.

The applicant notes that when no RED or ORANGE path exists, the YELLOW path Function Restoration Instruction can be implemented at the Operators discretion.

The step is critical to properly evaluate FR-0, Status Trees, to determine each CSF properly to complete task successfully. This CSF evaluation should determine the CSF color and procedure, if any, that apply.

COMMENTS:

Page 7 of 15

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE 2

2013-03 NRC Exam STEP/STANDARD SAT/UNSAT STEP 3: Evaluate HEAT SINK FR-H Status Tree. CRITICAL STEP STANDARD: ___ SAT

___ UNSAT Applicant determines that a YELLOW path exists on FR-H Status Tree.

The applicant notes that when no RED or ORANGE path exists, the YELLOW path Function Restoration Instruction can be implemented at the Operators discretion.

The step is critical to properly evaluate FR-0, Status Trees, to determine each CSF properly to complete task successfully. This CSF evaluation should determine the CSF color and procedure, if any, that apply.

COMMENTS:

Page 8 of 15

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE 2

2013-03 NRC Exam STEP/STANDARD SAT/UNSAT STEP 4: Evaluate PRESSURIZED THERMAL SHOCK FR-P Status CRITICAL Tree. STEP STANDARD: ___ SAT

___ UNSAT Applicant determines that a GREEN path exists on FR-P Status Tree.

The step is critical to properly evaluate FR-0, Status Trees, to determine each CSF properly to complete task successfully. This CSF evaluation should determine the CSF color and procedure, if any, that apply.

COMMENTS:

Page 9 of 15

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE 2

2013-03 NRC Exam STEP/STANDARD SAT/UNSAT STEP 5: Evaluate CONTAINMENT FR-Z Status Tree. CRITICAL STEP STANDARD:

___ SAT

___ UNSAT Applicant determines that an ORANGE path exists on FR-Z Status Tree, and that FR-Z.1 is required to be entered after FR-S.1 actions are complete (assuming the conditions still exist).

The step is critical to properly evaluate FR-0, Status Trees, to determine each CSF properly to complete task successfully. This CSF evaluation should determine the CSF color and procedure, if any, that apply.

COMMENTS:

Page 10 of 15

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE 2

2013-03 NRC Exam STEP/STANDARD SAT/UNSAT STEP 6: Evaluate INVENTORY FR-I Status Tree. CRITICAL STEP STANDARD:

___ SAT

___ UNSAT Applicant determines that a GREEN path exists on FR-I Status Tree.

The step is critical to properly evaluate FR-0, Status Trees, to determine each CSF properly to complete task successfully. This CSF evaluation should determine the CSF color and procedure, if any, that apply.

COMMENTS:

Page 11 of 15

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE 2

2013-03 NRC Exam STEP/STANDARD SAT/UNSAT STEP 7: Determination of priority of Critical Safety Functions. CRITICAL STEP STANDARD:

___ SAT Applicant evaluates the results of FR-0, Status Trees, and determines that FR-S, SUBCRITICALITY, ORANGE PATH is of the highest priority ___ UNSAT and that FR-S.1, Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS, must be implemented.

The step is critical to properly evaluate FR-0, Status Trees, to determine each CSF properly to complete task successfully. This CSF evaluation should determine the CSF color and procedure, if any, that apply.

COMMENTS:

END OF TASK STOP TIME ________

Page 12 of 15

2 KEY DO NOT HAND TO APPLICANT 2

WBN NRC EXAM MATERIAL Status Trees FR-0 Unit 1 Rev. 0014 Attachment 1 (Page 1 of 8)

Monitoring Critical Safety Functions SUBCRITICALITY FR-S NOW Orange FR-S.1 Page 4 of 11 A.1-1 JPM SRO 2 KEY KEY

WBN NRC EXAM MATERIAL Status Trees FR-0 Unit 1 Rev. 0014 Attachment 1 (Page 2 of 8)

Monitoring Critical Safety Functions CORE COOLING FR-C Yellow FR-C.3 Page 5 of 11 A.1-1 JPM SRO 2 KEY KEY

WBN NRC EXAM MATERIAL Status Trees FR-0 Unit 1 Rev. 0014 Attachment 1 (Page 3 of 8)

Monitoring Critical Safety Functions HEAT SINK FR-H Yellow FR-H.5 Page 6 of 11 A.1-1 JPM SRO 2 KEY KEY

WBN NRC EXAM MATERIAL Status Trees FR-0 Unit 1 Rev. 0014 Attachment 1 (Page 4 of 8)

Monitoring Critical Safety Functions PRESSURIZED THERMAL SHOCK FR-P Green N/A Page 7 of 11 A.1-1 JPM SRO 2 KEY KEY

WBN NRC EXAM MATERIAL Status Trees FR-0 Unit 1 Rev. 0014 Attachment 1 (Page 5 of 8)

Monitoring Critical Safety Functions COLD OVERPRESSURE LIMIT CURVE FIGURE 1 Page 8 of 11 A.1-1JPM SRO 2 KEY KEY

WBN NRC EXAM MATERIAL Status Trees FR-0 Unit 1 Rev. 0014 Attachment 1 (Page 6 of 8)

Monitoring Critical Safety Functions LIMIT A CURVE FIGURE 2 Page 9 of 11 A.1-1 JPM SRO 2 KEY KEY

WBN NRC EXAM MATERIAL Status Trees FR-0 Unit 1 Rev. 0014 Attachment 1 (Page 7 of 8)

Monitoring Critical Safety Functions CONTAINMENT FR-Z Orange FR-Z.1 Page 10 of 11 A.1-1 JPM SRO 2 KEY KEY

WBN NRC EXAM MATERIAL Status Trees FR-0 Unit 1 Rev. 0014 Attachment 1 (Page 8 of 8)

Monitoring Critical Safety Functions INVENTORY FR-I Green N/A Page 11 of 11 A.1-1 JPM SRO 2 KEY KEY

2 Handout Package for Applicant 2

APPLICANT CUE SHEET (RETURN TO EXAMINER UPON COMPLETION OF TASK)

NOTE: THE SIMULATOR WILL REMAIN IN FREEZE FOR THE DURATION OF THE JPM.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

1. Unit 1 tripped from 100% power.
2. A Safety Injection occurred 15 minutes ago.
3. The crew is performing actions in 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.
4. The ICS/SPDS computer is NOT available for monitoring Critical Safety Functions.

INITIATING CUE:

You have been directed perform a manual evaluation the Critical Safety Functions using FR-0, Status Trees, based on the indications displayed on the simulator.

ENSURE THAT YOU:

1. Document each Critical Safety Function evaluation performed in FR-0, Status Trees.
2. Report the highest priority Function Restoration Procedure (FR) required to be implemented, if any.

2

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Emergency Operating Instruction FR-0 Status Trees Revision 0014 Quality Related Level of Use: Continuous Use Effective Date: 12-21-2010 Responsible Organization: OPS, Operations Prepared By: Nicholas Armour Approved By: Brian McIlnay Current Revision Description Minor/editorial revision: Converted to Word 2007 (PCR 4899).

WBN Status Trees FR-0 Unit 1 Rev. 0014 1.0 PURPOSE This instruction provides parameters to be monitored for challenges to Critical Safety Functions and to identify the appropriate Function Restoration Instruction to implement.

2.0 SYMPTOMS AND ENTRY CONDITIONS Status Trees monitoring is initiated when transitioned out of E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, or as instructed in E-0.

Page 2 of 11

WBN Status Trees FR-0 Unit 1 Rev. 0014 Step Action/Expected Response Response Not Obtained 3.0 OPERATOR ACTIONS NOTE The following rules of usage apply to Status Tree monitoring.

A. While any RED or ORANGE path exists, the Status Trees will be monitored continuously. When no RED or ORANGE path exists, the Status Trees will be monitored every 10 to 20 minutes until the plant operation is controlled by normal operating instructions (GOs) with ESF System ARMED, OR the plant is in COLD SHUTDOWN.

B. Status Trees shall be monitored in the following priority:

1. FR-S, Subcriticality,
2. FR-C, Core Cooling,
3. FR-H, Heat Sink,
4. FR-P, Pressurized Thermal Shock (PTS),
5. FR-Z, Containment,
6. FR-I, Inventory.

C. If a RED path is diagnosed, then the Function Restoration Instruction will be implemented IMMEDIATELY.

D. If an ORANGE path is diagnosed, then the remaining Status Trees will be checked. If NO RED path exists, then the ORANGE path Function Restoration Instruction will be implemented.

E. Once implemented due to any RED or ORANGE path, that Function Restoration Instruction will be performed to completion or to a point of transition UNLESS a higher priority condition develops.

F. When no RED or ORANGE path exists, the YELLOW path Function Restoration Instruction can be implemented at the Operators discretion.

Page 3 of 11

WBN Status Trees FR-0 Unit 1 Rev. 0014 Attachment 1 (Page 1 of 8)

Monitoring Critical Safety Functions SUBCRITICALITY FR-S Page 4 of 11

WBN Status Trees FR-0 Unit 1 Rev. 0014 Attachment 1 (Page 2 of 8)

Monitoring Critical Safety Functions CORE COOLING FR-C Page 5 of 11

WBN Status Trees FR-0 Unit 1 Rev. 0014 Attachment 1 (Page 3 of 8)

Monitoring Critical Safety Functions HEAT SINK FR-H Page 6 of 11

WBN Status Trees FR-0 Unit 1 Rev. 0014 Attachment 1 (Page 4 of 8)

Monitoring Critical Safety Functions PRESSURIZED THERMAL SHOCK FR-P Page 7 of 11

WBN Status Trees FR-0 Unit 1 Rev. 0014 Attachment 1 (Page 5 of 8)

Monitoring Critical Safety Functions COLD OVERPRESSURE LIMIT CURVE FIGURE 1 Page 8 of 11

WBN Status Trees FR-0 Unit 1 Rev. 0014 Attachment 1 (Page 6 of 8)

Monitoring Critical Safety Functions LIMIT A CURVE FIGURE 2 Page 9 of 11

WBN Status Trees FR-0 Unit 1 Rev. 0014 Attachment 1 (Page 7 of 8)

Monitoring Critical Safety Functions CONTAINMENT FR-Z Page 10 of 11

WBN Status Trees FR-0 Unit 1 Rev. 0014 Attachment 1 (Page 8 of 8)

Monitoring Critical Safety Functions INVENTORY FR-I Page 11 of 11

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 201303 NRC Exam Administrative JPM 3 R

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE 3R 2013-03 NRC Exam EVALUATION SHEET Task: PERFORM A CLEARANCE WITHOUT USE OF ESOMS COMPUTER.

Alternate Path: n/a Facility JPM #: New Safety Function: 2.2

Title:

Equipment Control K/A 2.2.13 Knowledge of tagging and clearance procedures.

Rating(s): 4.2/4.3 CFR: 41.10/45.13 Evaluation Method: Simulator In-Plant Classroom X*

References:

1.) 1-47W811-1, Mechanical Flow Diagram Safety Injection System, Rev. 50.

2.) NPG-SPP-10.2, Clearance Procedure to Safely Control Energy, Rev. 1 3.) TVA 17984 [11-2005]. CLEARANCE TAG LIST AND OPERATIONAL STEPS.

Task Number: RO-119-NOMS-010

Title:

Enter/edit devices held for active clearances.

Task Standard: The applicant:

1.) Identifies the critical breakers and fuses, their required positions to electrically clear the 1B-B SI pump in preparation for relay replacement.

2). Identifies the critical components and positions required to isolate the correct section of piping in preparation for lubrication and oil sample collection of the 1B-B SI pump.

3.) Identifies that electrical isolations are required prior to mechanical isolations.

Validation Time: 45 minutes Time Critical: Yes No X

============================================================

=

Applicant: ___________________________ _________________ Time Start: ________

NAME Docket No. Time Finish: ________

Performance Rating: SAT ____ UNSAT ____ Performance Time ___

Examiner: _____________________________ _____________________________/________

NAME SIGNATURE DATE

==============================================================

=

COMMENTS Page 2 of 11

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE 3R 2013-03 NRC Exam Tools/Equipment/Procedures Needed:

  • PRINT HANDOUT containing:

1-45W724-1 through - 4 1-45W760-63-1 through - 9 1-47W811-1 through - 1A

  • BLANK TVA 17984 [11-2005] Clearance Tag List and Operational Steps.
  • NRC REFERENCE DISK.
  • NOTE: This JPM is designed to be performed in a classroom with procedures available to the applicant via a laptop computer loaded with the NRC REFERENCE DISK.

Page 3 of 11

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE 3R 2013-03 NRC Exam DIRECTION TO APPLICANT:

I will explain the initial conditions, and state the task to be performed. All control room steps shall be performed for this JPM, including any required communications. I will provide initiating cues and reports on other actions when directed by you. Ensure you indicate to me when you understand your assigned task. To indicate that you have completed your assigned task return the cue sheet I provided you.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

1. Unit 1 is in Mode 1.
2. Electrical Maintenance will be replacing the 30X, 1X and 30RX relays in the 1B-B SI pump circuit. While relay replacement is in progress, the 1B-B SI pump will be lubricated and oil samples collected.
3. The eSOMS Clearance System computer program is NOT available.

INITIATING CUES:

Using the references provided, manually prepare a TVA 17984 [11-2005],

Clearance Tag List and Operational Steps, to de-energize and isolate the 1B-B SI pump for relay replacement, cleaning and lubrication.

NOTE: Complete the first, third, fourth, and fifth columns on TVA 17984

[11-2005], Clearance Tag List and Operational Steps.

Page 4 of 11

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE 3R 2013-03 NRC Exam STEP/STANDARD SAT/UNSAT START TIME: _______

EXAMINER: Control power fuses are REQUIRED to be pulled. Per NPG-SPP-10.2, Clearance Procedure to Safely Control Energy, Requirement O. states, Control power circuits shall be tagged if (1) the work is on the control circuit, (2) the proximity of the work is near the energized control circuit, or (3) there exists a possibility of grounding the control circuit.

Control power fuses are REQUIRED to be addressed to satisfy the CRITICAL STEP.

STEP 1: Applicant identifies components that must be operated to support CRITICAL replacing the 30X, 1X and 30RX relays in the 1B-B SI pump STEP circuit, lubricating and collecting oil samples from the 1B-B SI pump. Applicant enters data in the Equipment ID, Equipment ___ SAT Description, Equipment Location Column.

___ UNSAT STANDARD:

The applicant completes Column 1 of the TVA 17984 [11-2005] form provided:

1-BKR-63-15, SIP 1B-B (1-PMP-63-15), 6.9KV SD BD 1B-B, C/15 1-FU-211-B15/1N SIS PUMP 1B-B FUSE 6.9 KV SD BD 1B-B, C/15 1-FU-211-B15/1A SIS PUMP 1B-B FUSE 6.9 KV SD BD 1B-B, C/15 1-FU-211-B15/2N SIS PUMP 1B-B FUSE 6.9 KV SD BD 1B-B, C/15 1-FU-211-B15/2A SIS PUMP 1B-B FUSE 6.9 KV SD BD 1B-B, C/15 1-BKR-63-175, SI PUMP 1-B-B MINI FLOW RECIRC TO RWST, 480V RX MOV BD 1B1-B, C/13D 1-ISV-63-527, SI PUMP DISCHG ISOL, A7V/700 1-FCV-63-175, SI PUMP 1B-B MINI FLOW RECIRC TO RWST, A6U/692 Listed components are critical to correctly isolate the electrical and mechanical portions of the system prior to work being performed.

COMMENTS:

Page 5 0f 11

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE 3R 2013-03 NRC Exam STEP/STANDARD SAT/UNSAT STEP 2: Applicant identifies components that must be operated to support CRITICAL replacing the 30X, 1X and 30RX relays in the 1B-B SI pump STEP circuit, lubricating and collecting oil samples from the 1B-B SI pump. Applicant enters data in the Tag Type Column. ___ SAT STANDARD: ___ UNSAT The applicant completes Column 3 of the TVA 17984 [11-2005] form provided:

The applicant enters DANGER in the Tag Type Column for each of the components.

Listed components are critical to correctly isolate the electrical and mechanical portions of the system prior to work being performed.

COMMENTS:

Page 6 0f 11

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE 3R 2013-03 NRC Exam STEP/STANDARD SAT/UNSAT STEP 3: Applicant identifies components that must be operated to support CRITICAL replacing the 30X, 1X and 30RX relays in the 1B-B SI pump STEP circuit, lubricating and collecting oil samples from the 1B-B SI pump. Applicant identifies enters data in the Place Seq. Column.

___ SAT STANDARD:

___ UNSAT The applicant completes Column 4 of the TVA 17984 [11-2005]

form by entering the following sequence ( ) for operation of the following components:

1-BKR-63-15, SIP 1B-B (1-PMP-63-15), 6.9KV SD BD 1B-B, C/15 (2) 1-FU-211-B15/1N SIS PUMP 1B-B FUSE 6.9 KV SD BD 1B-B, C/15 (3) 1-FU-211-B15/1A SIS PUMP 1B-B FUSE 6.9 KV SD BD 1B-B, C/15 (3) 1-FU-211-B15/2N SIS PUMP 1B-B FUSE 6.9 KV SD BD 1B-B, C/15(3) 1-FU-211-B15/2A SIS PUMP 1B-B FUSE 6.9 KV SD BD 1B-B, C/15 (3) 1-BKR-63-175, SI PUMP 1-B-B MINI FLOW RECIRC TO RWST, 480V RX MOV BD 1B1-B, C/13D (4) 1-ISV-63-527, SI PUMP DISCHG ISOL, A7V/700 (5) 1-FCV-63-175, SI PUMP 1B-B MINI FLOW RECIRC TO RWST, A6U/692 (5)

Listed components are critical to correctly de-energize and isolate the portion of the system prior to work being performed.

NOTE: Sequence variations are allowed as long as the sequence does not result in Mechanical Isolations prior to Electrical isolations.

COMMENTS:

Page 7 0f 11

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE 3R 2013-03 NRC Exam STEP/STANDARD SAT/UNSAT STEP 4: Applicant identifies components that must be operated to support CRITICAL replacing the 30X, 1X and 30RX relays in the 1B-B SI pump STEP circuit, lubricating and collecting oil samples from the 1B-B SI pump SAFELY. Applicant enters the correct position in the Place Config. Column. ___ SAT STANDARD: ___ UNSAT The applicant completes Column 5 of the TVA 17984 [11-2005]

form by listings the following POSITION for each of the following components:

1-BKR-63-15, SIP 1B-B (1-PMP-63-15), 6.9KV SD BD 1B-B, C/15 -

RACKED DOWN 1-FU-211-B15/1N SIS PUMP 1B-B FUSE 6.9 KV SD BD 1B-B, C/15 REMOVED 1-FU-211-B15/1A SIS PUMP 1B-B FUSE 6.9 KV SD BD 1B-B, C/15 REMOVED 1-FU-211-B15/2NSIS PUMP 1B-B FUSE 6.9 KV SD BD 1B-B, C/15 REMOVED 1-FU-211-B15/2A SIS PUMP 1B-B FUSE 6.9 KV SD BD 1B-B, C/15 REMOVED 1-BKR-63-175, SI PUMP 1-B-B MINI FLOW RECIRC TO RWST, 480V RX MOV BD 1B1-B, C/13D - OFF 1-ISV-63-527, SI PUMP DISCHG ISOL, A7V/700 - CLOSED 1-FCV-63-175, SI PUMP 1B-B MINI FLOW RECIRC TO RWST, A6U/692 - CLOSED Positions of listed components are critical to correctly de-energize and isolate the portion of the system prior to work being performed.

COMMENTS:

END OF TASK STOP TIME ________

Page 8 0f 11

3R KEY DO NOT HAND TO APPLICANT 3R

Tennessee Valley Authority Clearance Tag List and Operational Steps Clearance No. Page 1 of 2 Apparatus: Lubricate, sample oil and replace 30X, 1X and 30RX relays on 1B Safety Injection Pump.

Equipment ID Place. Place. Restore Restore Equipment Description Tag Serial Tag Place. Place. 1st 2nd Rest. Restore As left 1st 2nd Tag Notes Equipment Location No. Type Seq. Config. Verifier Verifier Seq. Config. Confg. Verifier Verifier 1-HS-63-15A SIS PUMP B-B Danger 1 PULL-TO-LOCK 1-M-6 1-HS-63-175A SIP 1B-B RECIRC TO RWST Danger 1 MID POSITION 1-M-6 AFTER CLOSE 1-BRK-63-15 SIP 1B-B (1-PMP-63-15) Danger 2 RACKED DOWN 6.9KV SD BD 1B, C/15 1-FU-211-B15/1N SIS PUMP 1B-B FUSES Danger 3 REMOVED 6.9 KV SD BD 1B-B, C/15 1-FU-211-B15/ 1A SIS PUMP 1B-B FUSES Danger 3 REMOVED 6.9 KV SD BD 1B-B, C/15 1-FU-211-B15/ 2N SIS PUMP 1B-B FUSES Danger 3 REMOVED 6.9 KV SD BD 1B-B, C/15 1-FU-211-B15/2A, SIS PUMP 1B-B FUSE Danger 3 REMOVED 6.9 KV SD BD 1B-B, C/15 1-BKR-63-175, SI PUMP 1B-B MINI FLOW RECIRC TO RWST 480V Danger 4 OFF RX MOV BD 1B1-B, C13D 1-ISV-63-527 SI PUMP 1B-B DISCHARGE ISOLATION Danger 5 CLOSED RM 692-A12 SI PUMP !B-B RM EL.

692 A6U/692 1-FCV-63-175 SI PUMP MINI FLOW RECIRC TO RWST Danger 5 CLOSED RM 692-A12 SI PUMP !B-B RM EL.

692 A6U/692 CRITICAL ITEMS ARE IN BOLD PRINT.

TVA 17984 [11-2005]

NPG Standard Clearance Procedure to Safely Control NPG-SPP-10.2 Programs and Energy Rev. 0005 Processes Page 34 of 80 5.0 DEFINITIONS Affected Employee - Employees, contractors, and others who are required to operate or use equipment identified for servicing, maintenance, or modification under a clearance or works in an area where such servicing, maintenance, or modification is being performed.

Affected employees include the general population who works in an area where equipment is under clearance or may observe clearance tags on such equipment. An affected employee becomes an authorized employee when that person performs servicing, maintenance, or modification on equipment under clearance. An affected employee may become an authorized employee, a primary authorized employee, or a responsible employee based on the level of training received and work functions assigned.

Authorized Employees - Employees, contractors, and others who perform servicing, maintenance, or modification on machines or equipment under a clearance and have successfully completed the appropriate level of training required by this procedure. These employees work on equipment under a clearance that has been issued in accordance with this procedure. An authorized employee may become a primary authorized employee or a responsible employee based on the level of training received and work functions assigned.

Capable Of Being Locked Out - An energy-isolating device is capable of being locked out if it has a hasp or other means of attachment to which, or through which, a lock can be affixed, or it has a locking mechanism built into it. Other energy-isolating devices are capable of being locked out, if lockout can be achieved without the need to dismantle, rebuild, or replace the energy-isolating device or permanently alter its energy control capability.

Caution Order Tag - A Caution Order is a yellow tag that is attached to plant equipment, switches, or controls where a hazardous or abnormal condition(s) exists. The Caution Order Tag has its own set of instructions for the condition under caution. See Appendix G.

Clearance - A condition established by an issued clearance meaning that all energy sources of feed and feedback, such as electrical, mechanical and/or hydraulic, have been isolated and tagged. A clearance is established when it is placed in issued status by the Responsible Employee in accordance with this procedure.

Clearance Boundary - Points at energy-isolating devices established in accordance with this procedure that allows authorized employees to safely work on equipment under a clearance.

Clearance Personal Accountability Log (CPAL) - A log that identifies all Authorized Employees who are working on equipment under a specific clearance.

Current SRO - An individual who has obtained and currently holds a valid SRO license for the plant at which they are working and is up to date on all auxiliary requirements such as licensed operator training requirements and medical requirements. This individual may or may not be currently qualified to hold an on-shift SRO position (i.e., be an Active SRO).

Danger Tag - A red tag used to identify energy-isolating devices for a clearance. See Appendix F, Danger Tag.

Electrical Representative PAE - A PAE authorized by the Plant Manager to be qualified to install and remove temporary protective grounds and to receive and return ground discs.

NPG Standard Clearance Procedure to Safely Control NPG-SPP-10.2 Programs and Energy Rev. 0005 Processes Page 35 of 80 5.0 DEFINITIONS (continued)

Electrically De-energized - Free from any electrical connection to a source of potential difference and from electric charge; not having a potential different from that of the earth.

Note: The term is used only with reference to current-carrying parts, which are sometimes electrically energized (live).

Electrically Energized (live) - Electrically connected to a source of potential difference, or electrically charged so as to have a potential significantly different from that of earth in the vicinity.

Emergency - Conditions that threaten the life of an employee or member of the public, or the plant operability.

Energy Isolating Device - A device that physically prevents the transmission or release of energy including, but not limited to, the following: An electrical circuit breaker; a disconnect switch; a manually operated switch by which the conductors of a circuit can be disconnected from all ungrounded supply conductors, and, in addition, no pole can be operated independently; a line valve; a block; and any similar device with a visible indication of the position of the device used to block or isolate energy. Push buttons, selector switches and other control-circuit type devices are not energy-isolating devices.

Energy Source - Any electrical, mechanical, hydraulic, pneumatic, chemical, nuclear, thermal, or other energy source that could cause injury to personnel.

External Energy Source - Any electrical, mechanical (e.g., rotation of a shaft with a come-a-long), hydraulic, pneumatic, chemical, nuclear, thermal, or other energy source that is not provided by the equipments normal designed energy source(s).

Group Tagout - The process by which a PAE holds a clearance for two or more authorized employees who will work on the equipment under a specific clearance. The authorized employees indicate that they are working under the clearance through the Clearance Personal Accountability Log (CPAL).

Issued Clearance - A clearance is issued when all actions required to establish a clearance in accordance with this procedure are completed and the responsible employee places the clearance in issued status. Regardless of the presence of a danger tag, all equipment is considered energized unless it is known to be controlled by a clearance in issued status.

Lines - Refers to transmission system conductors that are installed to distribute electrical power in the power transmission system.

Lockout - The placement of a lockout device on an energy-isolating device, in accordance with an established procedure, ensures that the energy-isolating device and the equipment being controlled cannot be operated until the lockout device is removed.

Lockout Device - A device that utilizes a positive means such as a lock, either key or combination type, to hold an energy-isolating device in the safe position and prevent the energizing of a machine or equipment. Included are blank flanges and bolted slip blinds.

NPG Standard Clearance Procedure to Safely Control NPG-SPP-10.2 Programs and Energy Rev. 0005 Processes Page 36 of 80 5.0 DEFINITIONS (continued)

Normal Energy Source - This is the energy normally available to the machine or equipment for its proper operation. There may be more than one type of normal energy source supplied such as electric, mechanical, hydraulic, pneumatic, etc.

Management Official-In-Charge - This means the plant, facility, production, or site manager.

Operating Permit Tag - An operating permit is a blue tag shown in Figure H-1 that is attached to equipment or controls when the equipment is to be operated by any person other than its operator. The equipment operator may not operate equipment except by instruction of the person holding the operating permit. The operating permit does not authorize persons other than the operator to operate the equipment from a switchboard. It does authorize the operator to operate equipment from a switchboard only under direction of the person holding the Operating Permit. The Operating Permit does not signify that the equipment tagged is de-energized. Where it is necessary for the equipment to be de-energized for work on the equipment, a danger tag clearance shall be issued.

Official Plant Clearance List - A list of names approved by the Plant Manager. The personnel are approved to perform the specific authorized functions designated on the list in accordance with this procedure. A RE, QE, or PAE on this list may be issued clearances.

Primary Authorized Employees - Employees, contractors, and others who request/identify the work to be performed under a clearance, walk down the boundaries of a clearance to determine if energy-isolating devices are set in proper position and tagged in accordance with the applicable clearance instruction; and have successfully completed the appropriate level of training and the associated qualifying examination(s) required by this procedure.

The primary authorized employee is responsible for administering the CPAL.

Qualified Employees - Employees, contractors, and others who prepare equipment for servicing, maintenance, and modification and return equipment to operational status and have successfully completed the training and the associated qualifying examination(s) required by this procedure. They have completed appropriate training for the area of the plant for which they have clearance responsibilities.

Released Clearance- A clearance is released when all actions required to release a clearance in accordance with this procedure are completed and the responsible employee removes the clearance from issued status.

Responsible Employees - Employees, contractors, and others who write and issue clearances in accordance with this procedure and have successfully completed the appropriate level of training and the associated qualifying examination(s) required by this procedure.

Servicing, Maintenance, and Modification - Workplace activities such as constructing, installing, setting up, adjusting, inspecting, modifying, and maintaining and/or servicing machines or equipment. These activities include lubrication, cleaning or un-jamming of machines or equipment and making adjustments or tool changes, where the employee may be exposed to the unexpected energizing or startup of the equipment or release of hazardous energy.

NPG Standard Clearance Procedure to Safely Control NPG-SPP-10.2 Programs and Energy Rev. 0005 Processes Page 37 of 80 5.0 DEFINITIONS (continued)

Sign-on/Sign-off - A personal act an employee, contractor, or other person takes to acknowledge his or her responsibilities for their name being on a log, list, or other documentation associated with a clearance.

Tagout - The placement of a tagout device on an energy-isolating device, in accordance with a clearance instruction, to indicate that the energy-isolating device and the equipment being controlled shall not be operated until the tagout device is removed.

Tagout device - A prominent warning device, such as a tag and a means of attachment, which can be securely fastened to an energy-isolating device in accordance with a clearance instruction, to indicate that the energy-isolating device and the equipment being controlled shall not be operated until the tagout device is removed.

Transmission Operator (Dispatcher) - refers to the TVA power system transmission operator who controls the transmission system lines and equipment.

NPG Standard Clearance Procedure to Safely Control NPG-SPP-10.2 Programs and Energy Rev. 0005 Processes Page 54 of 80 Appendix D (Page 1 of 3)

Special Requirements for Electrical Clearances 1.0 REQUIREMENTS A. Only component handswitches that meet the definition of an energy isolating device may be used as a clearance energy isolation point.

B. Component handswitches not meeting the definition of a clearance isolating device may be tagged as indication/information that associated equipment is under a clearance.

C. If potential or station service transformers are outside of the clearance zone, they may be cleared from the primary side. If they are inside the clearance zone, they shall be cleared from both the primary and secondary side.

D. Coupling capacitors within a clearance zone shall have their secondary circuits shorted if work is to be performed on or within the minimum approach distance to them.

E. Static capacitors within a clearance zone shall be grounded. The PAE holding the clearance is responsible for discharging and grounding the static capacitors.

F. The RE who is responsible for maintaining protection to equipment shall approve any changes in current transformer secondary circuits that are in service.

G. Blocks shall be removed in current transformer secondaries when connected in parallel with current transformers that are energized, before work is performed on them. If blocks are not available, it will be necessary to short circuit the current transformer, ground, and open the secondary circuits.

H. When two or more transformers are connected to ground through a common reactor, the transformers neutral ground switch for the transformer to be cleared shall be opened and tagged with a danger tag.

I. All disconnecting devices or breakers that establish a clearance boundary shall be opened made inoperable, when possible, and tagged to ensure that they will not be closed.

J. Gang or motor-operated disconnects/air-break switches shall be mechanically locked in the open position and visually checked to verify that all blades are open.

K. The QE should verify, by secondary means, the absence of energy on circuits involving circuit breakers whenever a means of verification is available.

L. When opening molded case breakers, positive indication in the form of a snap or click is required to ensure that the breaker is open. If positive indication is not verified, evaluate the situation with the RE.

M. The procedure for clearing a 161 kV or 500 kV air blast power circuit breaker requires the breaker and its disconnects to be opened and then the breaker cycled at the direction of the transmission operator to discharge any capacitors that may be in parallel with the contacts of the breaker.

NPG Standard Clearance Procedure to Safely Control NPG-SPP-10.2 Programs and Energy Rev. 0005 Processes Page 55 of 80 Appendix D (Page 2 of 3)

Special Requirements for Electrical Clearances 1.0 REQUIREMENTS (continued)

N. When placing or removing clearances inside electrical boards, the QE shall ensure that no loose materials remain in the breaker compartment.

O. Control power circuits shall be tagged if (1) the work is on the control circuit, (2) the proximity of the work is near the energized control circuit, or (3) there exists a possibility of grounding the control circuit.

P. Clearances on fused circuits other than control circuits (e.g., bus PT, voltage regulator PT, metering PT, etc.) shall have the danger tag attached to the fuse compartment door after the fuses have been removed from the circuit. The fuses shall be placed in an approved storage location.

Q. Clearances involving control fuses located on multi-fused terminal boards required to be tagged shall have the control fuses removed, a danger tag attached to non-conducting fuse blanks, and the blanks inserted into the fuse clips.

R. Clearances on fused control circuits (1) on boards with molded case breakers or (2) for which fuse blanks are not provided, do not require tagging and installation of fuse blanks. The location from which fuses were removed shall have a danger tag attached. Fuses removed should be placed in a secure, easily identifiable location where adverse plant conditions would not occur if they became dislodged from that location. Fuse storage may be in a fuse storage cabinet or in an appropriate bag attached to the compartment from which the fuses were removed (e.g., door handle, lugs attached to the relay covers, etc.). Fuses stored in a fuse storage cabinet should be clearly annotated on the clearance sheet.

S. The following applies for placement of clearances on low voltage circuits (250V or less):

1. When available, appropriate electrical prints for load lists and electrical circuit prints shall be utilized.
2. If plant conditions preclude tagging of main breaker to multiple components in a circuit, fuses shall be removed and tagged where available to isolate only those components affected by the work.
3. If the circuit involves relays or solenoids that are normally energized, the impact of a loss of power as well as a return to power to these components shall be evaluated, e.g. review of applicable logic or control diagrams.

NPG Standard Clearance Procedure to Safely Control NPG-SPP-10.2 Programs and Energy Rev. 0005 Processes Page 56 of 80 Appendix D (Page 3 of 3)

Special Requirements for Electrical Clearances 1.0 REQUIREMENTS (continued)

4. Circuits that supply power to a board or panel often "daisy-chain" and supply additional panels and components. A detailed search of wiring connection prints is required to determine all the components affected.
5. When low-voltage circuits are de-energized, alarms and responses shall be evaluated to ensure expected results are obtained. The MCR shall be contacted immediately prior to opening the circuit. When the affected unit is at power, the MCR shall be contacted after the circuit is opened to verify expected results.

NPG Standard Clearance Procedure to Safely Control NPG-SPP-10.2 Programs and Energy Rev. 0005 Processes Page 57 of 80 Appendix E (Page 1 of 3)

Special Requirements for Mechanical Clearances 1.0 REQUIREMENTS A. An air-operated valve that fails open on a loss of air is not be considered closed for blocking purposes unless it is held closed with an installed jacking device or device used to secure the valve in the required position. A clearance tag will be issued and attached to the jacking or other device.

B. An air-operated valve that fails closed shall have its air supply electrically or mechanically isolated, depressurized, and the valve visually checked-to-be-closed by local or remote indication. The air supply energy-isolating devices shall be tagged.

C. An air-operated valve that fails as is shall be closed and mechanically restrained. Its air supply should be electrically or mechanically isolated, depressurized, and the valve visually checked to be closed by local or remote indication. The air supply energy-isolating devices and mechanical restraint shall be tagged.

D. In cases where it is not possible to physically secure an air operated valve that fails as-is in the closed position, the valve will be tagged closed by applying closing air to the valve diaphragm by the use of the solenoid valve air overrides and tagging both the handswitch in the closed position and the solenoid valve air overrides. Prior to allowing work to begin, the equipment will be drained and de-pressurized to ensure the boundary valves are holding. This condition will be noted in the remarks section of the clearance sheet to inform PAE/Authorized Employee(s) that pressurized air is required to ensure the valve remains closed. This work is considered working on energized equipment and must be approved by the Plant Manager.

E. Pressure controlled valves, relief valves, and check valves will not be used as isolation boundary valves under normal conditions. Where such a valve does not have an external means of physical restraint, the work is considered working on energized equipment and must be approved by the Plant Manager.

F. The following instructions govern the use of freeze plugs

1. The clearance should be in place, but not issued, before establishing the freeze plug.
2. The need for the freeze plug should be identified on the Remarks Section of the clearance sheet. The freeze plug should not be listed as a device held on the clearance sheet. The establishment and maintenance of the freeze plug shall be in accordance with approved procedures or work documents.
3. The freeze plug shall be attended by qualified personnel to ensure that it is maintained intact until all work is complete and the proper Post Maintenance Tests (PMTs) are performed.
4. If the clearance must be released to allow performance of a PMT, the equipment shall be retagged before allowing the freeze plug to thaw. This will prevent migration of a portion of the plug.

NPG Standard Clearance Procedure to Safely Control NPG-SPP-10.2 Programs and Energy Rev. 0005 Processes Page 58 of 80 Appendix E (Page 2 of 3)

Special Requirements for Mechanical Clearances 1.0 REQUIREMENTS (continued)

5. The clearance must be released before allowing the freeze plug to thaw.

However, to prevent migration of the freeze plug, tags on boundary valves shall not be removed until the freeze plug has completely thawed.

6. All vents and drains shall be verified CLOSED before allowing the freeze plug to thaw.

G. If suitable means are not available to depressurize or control hazardous energy, the PAE, RE, and responsible manager(s) will determine actions necessary to protect employees. These actions must be approved by the Plant Manager or designee and documented in the Remarks section. The inability to depressurize shall be clearly documented in the remarks section and communicated to the proposed clearance holder. In cases where the component design does not include a vent or drain path within the clearance boundary, the clearance shall be locked to preclude clearance holder sign-on and initiation of work prior to direct communication with the RE.

Suitable methods to depressurize and prevent repressurization shall be agreed upon by the RE and the PAE before the clearance is held by the PAE.

H. When performing Temporary Lifts that could result in fluid flow (e.g., Motor Operated Valve Actuator Test (MOVAT) testing, valve stroke, etc.) the PAE responsible for the activity shall ensure that a flow blocking clearance is in place to maintain safe isolation and adequate flow blocking.

I. Clearances for work on high energy systems (operate with temperature greater than 200°F or pressure greater than 500 psig), lethal chemical systems, or systems connected to high energy systems shall, when possible isolate the work area by two closed valves in series. If equipped, a tell-tale vent or drain between the isolation valves should be opened. Lack of two valve isolation shall be clearly documented and communicated to the proposed clearance holder before issue.

J. The use of Abandoned Equipment Boundary valves as energy isolating devices requires the application of the same constraints that apply for the use on any other valve used as an energy isolating device. For example: position verification capability, maintenance of isolation from hazardous energy, etc.

K. The establishment of a safe boundary to allow work to be done on an Abandoned Equipment Boundary valve shall utilize equipment NOT abandoned. The boundary shall meet the same criteria as any other boundary.

L. When underground piping systems with slip-joint construction, e.g., a fire protection system, is being cleared, write the clearance to isolate at the second valve back from the work location to prevent release of energy at the first valve by a slip joint during excavation and work. The first valve back from the work location is tagged in the opened position to relieve pressure. If the location of the second valve back is such that the valve may be disturbed by the excavation, then a valve further back shall be closed and tagged to provide a safe clearance.

NPG Standard Clearance Procedure to Safely Control NPG-SPP-10.2 Programs and Energy Rev. 0005 Processes Page 59 of 80 Appendix E (Page 3 of 3)

Special Requirements for Mechanical Clearances 1.0 REQUIREMENTS (continued)

M. Clearances for entry into Permit Required Confined Spaces with piping, lines, or ducts (steam, water, inert gases, chemicals, etc) must be completely protected against the release of energy and material into the space by such means as:, 1) blanking or blinding:, 2) misaligning or removing sections of lines, pipes, or ducts:, 3) a double block and bleed system, such as two closed valves in series with an open vent between the valves. Entry into confined spaces must comply with TSP 801, Confined Space Entry.

3R Handout Package for Applicant 3R

APPLICANT CUE SHEET (RETURN TO EXAMINER UPON COMPLETION OF TASK)

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

1. Unit 1 is in Mode 1.
2. Electrical Maintenance will be replacing the 30X, 1X and 30RX relays in the 1B-B SI pump circuit. While relay replacement is in progress, the 1B-B SI pump will be lubricated and oil samples collected.
3. The eSOMS Clearance System computer program is NOT available.

INITIATING CUES:

Using the references provided, manually prepare a TVA 17984 [11-2005],

Clearance Tag List and Operational Steps, to de-energize and isolate the 1B-B SI pump for relay replacement, cleaning and lubrication.

NOTE: Complete the first, third, fourth, and fifth columns on TVA 17984

[11-2005], Clearance Tag List and Operational Steps.

3R

Tennessee Valley Authority Clearance Tag List and Operational Steps Clearance Sheet Clearance No. Page of Apparatus:

Equipment ID Place. Place. Restore Restore st nd st nd Equipment Description Tag Serial Tag Place. Place. 1 2 Rest. Restore As left 1 2 Tag Notes Equipment Location No. Type Seq. Config. Verifier Verifier Seq. Config. Confg. Verifier Verifier TVA 17984 [11-2005]

Tennessee Valley Authority Clearance Tag List and Operational Steps Clearance Sheet Clearance No. Page of Apparatus:

Equipment ID Place. Place. Restore Restore st nd st nd Equipment Description Tag Serial Tag Place. Place. 1 2 Rest. Restore As left 1 2 Tag Notes Equipment Location No. Type Seq. Config. Verifier Verifier Seq. Config. Confg. Verifier Verifier TVA 17984 [11-2005]

Tennessee Valley Authority Clearance Tag List and Operational Steps Clearance Sheet Clearance No. Page of Apparatus:

Equipment ID Place. Place. Restore Restore st nd st nd Equipment Description Tag Serial Tag Place. Place. 1 2 Rest. Restore As left 1 2 Tag Notes Equipment Location No. Type Seq. Config. Verifier Verifier Seq. Config. Confg. Verifier Verifier TVA 17984 [11-2005]

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 201303 NRC Exam Administrative JPM 3 S

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE 3S 2013-03 NRC Exam EVALUATION SHEET Task: PERFORM A CLEARANCE WITHOUT USE OF ESOMS COMPUTER.

Alternate Path: n/a Facility JPM #: New Safety Function: 2.2

Title:

Equipment Control K/A 2.2.13 Knowledge of tagging and clearance procedures.

Rating(s): 4.2/4.3 CFR: 41.10/45.13 Evaluation Method: Simulator In-Plant Classroom X*

References:

1.) 1-47W859-1, Mechanical Flow Diagram Component Cooling Water, Rev. 50.

2.) NPG-SPP-10.2, Clearance Procedure to Safely Control Energy, Rev. 1 3.) TVA 17984 [11-2005]. CLEARANCE TAG LIST AND OPERATIONAL STEPS.

Task Number: RO-119-NOMS-010

Title:

Enter/edit devices held for active clearances.

Task Standard: The applicant:

1.) Identifies the handswitches, breakers and their required positions to electrically clear the 1B-B SI pump in preparation for relay replacement.

2). Identifies the components and positions required to isolate the correct section of piping in preparation for lubrication and oil sample collection of the 1B-B SI.

3.) Identifies that electrical isolations are required prior to mechanical isolations.

4.) Determines that the failure of the 1A-A SI pump room cooler requires entry into LCO 3.0.3, and the plant needs to be in Mode 4 within 13 hours1.50463e-4 days <br />0.00361 hours <br />2.149471e-5 weeks <br />4.9465e-6 months <br />.

Validation Time: 45 minutes Time Critical: Yes No X

================================================================

Applicant: ___________________________ _________________ Time Start: ________

NAME Docket No. Time Finish: ________

Performance Rating: SAT ____ UNSAT ____ Performance Time ___

Examiner: _____________________________ _____________________________/________

NAME SIGNATURE DATE

================================================================

COMMENTS PAGE 2 OF 13

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE 3S 2013-03 NRC Exam Tools/Equipment/Procedures Needed:

  • PRINT HANDOUT containing:

1-45W724-1 through - 4 1-45W760-63-1 through - 9 1-47W811-1 through - 1A

  • BLANK TVA 17984 [11-2005] Clearance Tag List and Operational Steps.
  • NRC REFERENCE DISK.
  • NOTE: This JPM is designed to be performed in a classroom with procedures available to the applicant via a laptop computer loaded with the NRC REFERENCE DISK.

PAGE 3 OF 13

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE 3S 2013-03 NRC Exam DIRECTION TO APPLICANT:

I will explain the initial conditions, and state the task to be performed. All control room steps shall be performed for this JPM, including any required communications. I will provide initiating cues and reports on other actions when directed by you. Ensure you indicate to me when you understand your assigned task. To indicate that you have completed your assigned task return the cue sheet I provided you.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

1. Unit 1 is in Mode 1.
2. Electrical Maintenance will be replacing the 30X, 1X and 30RX relays in the 1B-B SI pump circuit. While relay replacement is in progress, the 1B-B SI pump will be lubricated and oil samples collected.
3. The eSOMS Clearance System computer program is NOT available.

INITIATING CUES:

Part 1 - Using the references provided, manually prepare a TVA 17984

[11-2005], Clearance Tag List and Operational Steps, to de-energize and isolate the 1B-B SI pump for relay replacement, cleaning and lubrication.

NOTE: Complete the first, third, fourth, and fifth columns on TVA 17984

[11-2005], Clearance Tag List and Operational Steps.

ASSUME WORK IS NOW IN PROGRESS ON THE 1B-B SI PUMP.

Part 2 - The Auxiliary Building AUO reports the ERCW supply line to the 1A SI Pump room cooler has ruptured. Local actions have been taken to isolate the leak.

What, if any, Technical Specifications/Technical Requirements must be entered due to the failure of the 1A-A SI Pump Room Cooler? What, if any, actions are required to be taken?

PAGE 4 OF 13

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE 3S 2013-03 NRC Exam STEP/STANDARD SAT/UNSAT START TIME: _______

EXAMINER: Control power fuses are REQUIRED to be pulled. Per NPG-SPP-10.2, Clearance Procedure to Safely Control Energy, Requirement O. states, Control power circuits shall be tagged if (1) the work is on the control circuit, (2) the proximity of the work is near the energized control circuit, or (3) there exists a possibility of grounding the control circuit.

Control power fuses are REQUIRED to be addressed to satisfy the CRITICAL STEP.

STEP 1: Applicant identifies components that must be operated to support CRITICAL replacing the 30X, 1X and 30RX relays in the 1B-B SI pump STEP circuit, lubricating and collecting oil samples from the 1B-B SI pump. Applicant enters data in the Equipment ID, Equipment ___ SAT Description, Equipment Location Column.

___ UNSAT STANDARD:

The applicant completes Column 1 of the TVA 17984 [11-2005] form provided:

1-BKR-63-15, SIP 1B-B (1-PMP-63-15), 6.9KV SD BD 1B-B, C/15 1-FU-211-B15/1N SIS PUMP 1B-B FUSE 6.9 KV SD BD 1B-B, C/15 1-FU-211-B15/1A SIS PUMP 1B-B FUSE 6.9 KV SD BD 1B-B, C/15 1-FU-211-B15/2N SIS PUMP 1B-B FUSE 6.9 KV SD BD 1B-B, C/15 1-FU-211-B15/2A SIS PUMP 1B-B FUSE 6.9 KV SD BD 1B-B, C/15 1-BKR-63-175, SI PUMP 1-B-B MINI FLOW RECIRC TO RWST, 480V RX MOV BD 1B1-B, C/13D 1-ISV-63-527, SI PUMP DISCHG ISOL, A7V/700 1-FCV-63-175, SI PUMP 1B-B MINI FLOW RECIRC TO RWST, A6U/692 Listed components are critical to correctly isolate the electrical and mechanical portions of the system prior to work being performed.

COMMENTS:

PAGE 5 0F 13

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE 3S 2013-03 NRC Exam STEP/STANDARD SAT/UNSAT STEP 2: Applicant identifies components that must be operated to support CRITICAL replacing the 30X, 1X and 30RX relays in the 1B-B SI pump STEP circuit, lubricating and collecting oil samples from the 1B-B SI pump. Applicant enters data in the Tag Type Column. ___ SAT STANDARD: ___ UNSAT The applicant completes Column 3 of the TVA 17984 [11-2005] form provided:

The applicant enters DANGER in the Tag Type Column for each of the components.

Listed components are critical to correctly isolate the electrical and mechanical portions of the system prior to work being performed.

COMMENTS:

PAGE 6 0F 13

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE 3S 2013-03 NRC Exam STEP/STANDARD SAT/UNSAT STEP 3: Applicant identifies components that must be operated to support CRITICAL replacing the 30X, 1X and 30RX relays in the 1B-B SI pump STEP circuit, lubricating and collecting oil samples from the 1B-B SI pump. Applicant identifies enters data in the Place Seq. Column.

___ SAT STANDARD:

___ UNSAT The applicant completes Column 4 of the TVA 17984 [11-2005]

form by entering the following sequence ( ) for operation of the following components:

1-BKR-63-15, SIP 1B-B (1-PMP-63-15), 6.9KV SD BD 1B-B, C/15 (2) 1-FU-211-B15/1N SIS PUMP 1B-B FUSE 6.9 KV SD BD 1B-B, C/15 (3) 1-FU-211-B15/1A SIS PUMP 1B-B FUSE 6.9 KV SD BD 1B-B, C/15 (3) 1-FU-211-B15/2N SIS PUMP 1B-B FUSE 6.9 KV SD BD 1B-B, C/15(3) 1-FU-211-B15/2A SIS PUMP 1B-B FUSE 6.9 KV SD BD 1B-B, C/15 (3) 1-BKR-63-175, SI PUMP 1-B-B MINI FLOW RECIRC TO RWST, 480V RX MOV BD 1B1-B, C/13D (4) 1-ISV-63-527, SI PUMP DISCHG ISOL, A7V/700 (5) 1-FCV-63-175, SI PUMP 1-B-B MINI FLOW RECIRC TO RWST, A6U/692 (5)

Listed components are critical to correctly de-energize and isolate the portion of the system prior to work being performed.

NOTE: Sequence variations are allowed as long as the sequence does not result in Mechanical Isolations prior to Electrical isolations.

COMMENTS:

PAGE 7 0F 13

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE 3S 2013-03 NRC Exam STEP/STANDARD SAT/UNSAT STEP 4: Applicant identifies components that must be operated to support CRITICAL replacing the 30X, 1X and 30RX relays in the 1B-B SI pump STEP circuit, lubricating and collecting oil samples from the 1B-B SI pump SAFELY. Applicant enters the correct position in the Place Config. Column. ___ SAT STANDARD: ___ UNSAT The applicant completes Column 5 of the TVA 17984 [11-2005]

form by listings the following POSITION for each of the following components:

1-BKR-63-15, SIP 1B-B (1-PMP-63-15), 6.9KV SD BD 1B-B, C/15 -

RACKED DOWN 1-FU-211-B15/1N SIS PUMP 1B-B FUSE 6.9 KV SD BD 1B-B, C/15 REMOVED 1-FU-211-B15/1A SIS PUMP 1B-B FUSE 6.9 KV SD BD 1B-B, C/15 REMOVED 1-FU-211-B15/2NSIS PUMP 1B-B FUSE 6.9 KV SD BD 1B-B, C/15 REMOVED 1-FU-211-B15/2A SIS PUMP 1B-B FUSE 6.9 KV SD BD 1B-B, C/15 REMOVED 1-BKR-63-175, SI PUMP 1-B-B MINI FLOW RECIRC TO RWST, 480V RX MOV BD 1B1-B, C/13D - OFF 1-ISV-63-527, SI PUMP DISCHG ISOL, A7V/700 - CLOSED 1-FCV-63-175, SI PUMP 1-B-B MINI FLOW RECIRC TO RWST, A6U/692 - CLOSED Positions of listed components are critical to correctly de-energize and isolate the portion of the system prior to work being performed.

COMMENTS:

PAGE 8 0F 13

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE 3S 2013-03 NRC Exam STEP/STANDARD SAT/UNSAT STEP 5: Applicant answers the question in Part 2 of the JPM. CRITICAL STEP The Auxiliary Building AUO reports the ERCW supply line to the 1A SI Pump room cooler has ruptured. Local actions have been taken to isolate the leak. ___ SAT What, if any, Technical Specifications/Technical Requirements ___ UNSAT must be entered due to the failure of the 1A-A SI Pump Room Cooler? What, if any, actions are required to be taken?

STANDARD:

OPERABLE-OPERABILITY A system, subsystem, train, component, or device shall be OPERABLE or have OPERABILITY when it is capable of performing its specified safety function(s) and when all necessary attendant instrumentation, controls, normal or emergency electrical power, cooling and seal water, lubrication, and other auxiliary equipment that are required for the system, subsystem, train, component, or device to perform its specified safety function(s) are also capable of performing their related support function(s).

The applicant determines:

Loss of the 1A-A SI pump room cooler renders the 1A-A SI pump inoperable.

With both of the SI pumps inoperable, entry into LCO 3.0.3 is required.

The plant needs to be in Mode 4 within 13 hours1.50463e-4 days <br />0.00361 hours <br />2.149471e-5 weeks <br />4.9465e-6 months <br />.

LCO 3.0.3 - When an LCO is not met and the associated ACTIONS are not met, an associated ACTION is not provided, or if directed by the associated ACTIONS the unit shall be placed in a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO is not applicable. Action shall be initiated within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> to place the unit, as applicable, in:

a. MODE 3 within 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br />;
b. MODE 4 within 13 hours1.50463e-4 days <br />0.00361 hours <br />2.149471e-5 weeks <br />4.9465e-6 months <br />; and
c. MODE 5 within 37 hours4.282407e-4 days <br />0.0103 hours <br />6.117725e-5 weeks <br />1.40785e-5 months <br />.

Exceptions to this Specification are stated in the individual Specifications. Where corrective measures are completed that permit operation in accordance with the LCO or ACTIONS, completion of the actions required by LCO 3.0.3 is not required.

LCO 3.0.3 is only applicable in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

COMMENTS:

END OF TASK STOP TIME ________

PAGE 9 0F 13

3S KEY DO NOT HAND TO APPLICANT 3S

Tennessee Valley Authority Clearance Tag List and Operational Steps Clearance No. Page 1 of 2 Apparatus: Lubricate, sample oil and replace 30X, 1X and 30RX relays on 1B Safety Injection Pump.

Equipment ID Place. Place. Restore Restore Equipment Description Tag Serial Tag Place. Place. 1st 2nd Rest. Restore As left 1st 2nd Tag Notes Equipment Location No. Type Seq. Config. Verifier Verifier Seq. Config. Confg. Verifier Verifier 1-HS-63-15A SIS PUMP B-B Danger 1 PULL-TO-LOCK 1-M-6 1-HS-63-175A SIP 1B-B RECIRC TO RWST Danger 1 MID POSITION 1-M-6 AFTER CLOSE 1-BRK-63-15 SIP 1B-B (1-PMP-63-15) Danger 2 RACKED DOWN 6.9KV SD BD 1B, C/15 1-FU-211-B15/1N SIS PUMP 1B-B FUSES Danger 3 REMOVED 6.9 KV SD BD 1B-B, C/15 1-FU-211-B15/ 1A SIS PUMP 1B-B FUSES Danger 3 REMOVED 6.9 KV SD BD 1B-B, C/15 1-FU-211-B15/ 2N SIS PUMP 1B-B FUSES Danger 3 REMOVED 6.9 KV SD BD 1B-B, C/15 1-FU-211-B15/2A, SIS PUMP 1B-B FUSE Danger 3 REMOVED 6.9 KV SD BD 1B-B, C/15 1-BKR-63-175, SI PUMP 1B-B MINI FLOW RECIRC TO RWST 480V Danger 4 OFF RX MOV BD 1B1-B, C13D 1-ISV-63-527 SI PUMP 1B-B DISCHARGE ISOLATION Danger 5 CLOSED RM 692-A12 SI PUMP !B-B RM EL.

692 A6U/692 1-FCV-63-175 SI PUMP MINI FLOW RECIRC TO RWST Danger 5 CLOSED RM 692-A12 SI PUMP !B-B RM EL.

692 A6U/692 CRITICAL ITEMS ARE IN BOLD PRINT.

TVA 17984 [11-2005]

NPG Standard Clearance Procedure to Safely Control NPG-SPP-10.2 Programs and Energy Rev. 0005 Processes Page 34 of 80 5.0 DEFINITIONS Affected Employee - Employees, contractors, and others who are required to operate or use equipment identified for servicing, maintenance, or modification under a clearance or works in an area where such servicing, maintenance, or modification is being performed.

Affected employees include the general population who works in an area where equipment is under clearance or may observe clearance tags on such equipment. An affected employee becomes an authorized employee when that person performs servicing, maintenance, or modification on equipment under clearance. An affected employee may become an authorized employee, a primary authorized employee, or a responsible employee based on the level of training received and work functions assigned.

Authorized Employees - Employees, contractors, and others who perform servicing, maintenance, or modification on machines or equipment under a clearance and have successfully completed the appropriate level of training required by this procedure. These employees work on equipment under a clearance that has been issued in accordance with this procedure. An authorized employee may become a primary authorized employee or a responsible employee based on the level of training received and work functions assigned.

Capable Of Being Locked Out - An energy-isolating device is capable of being locked out if it has a hasp or other means of attachment to which, or through which, a lock can be affixed, or it has a locking mechanism built into it. Other energy-isolating devices are capable of being locked out, if lockout can be achieved without the need to dismantle, rebuild, or replace the energy-isolating device or permanently alter its energy control capability.

Caution Order Tag - A Caution Order is a yellow tag that is attached to plant equipment, switches, or controls where a hazardous or abnormal condition(s) exists. The Caution Order Tag has its own set of instructions for the condition under caution. See Appendix G.

Clearance - A condition established by an issued clearance meaning that all energy sources of feed and feedback, such as electrical, mechanical and/or hydraulic, have been isolated and tagged. A clearance is established when it is placed in issued status by the Responsible Employee in accordance with this procedure.

Clearance Boundary - Points at energy-isolating devices established in accordance with this procedure that allows authorized employees to safely work on equipment under a clearance.

Clearance Personal Accountability Log (CPAL) - A log that identifies all Authorized Employees who are working on equipment under a specific clearance.

Current SRO - An individual who has obtained and currently holds a valid SRO license for the plant at which they are working and is up to date on all auxiliary requirements such as licensed operator training requirements and medical requirements. This individual may or may not be currently qualified to hold an on-shift SRO position (i.e., be an Active SRO).

Danger Tag - A red tag used to identify energy-isolating devices for a clearance. See Appendix F, Danger Tag.

Electrical Representative PAE - A PAE authorized by the Plant Manager to be qualified to install and remove temporary protective grounds and to receive and return ground discs.

NPG Standard Clearance Procedure to Safely Control NPG-SPP-10.2 Programs and Energy Rev. 0005 Processes Page 35 of 80 5.0 DEFINITIONS (continued)

Electrically De-energized - Free from any electrical connection to a source of potential difference and from electric charge; not having a potential different from that of the earth.

Note: The term is used only with reference to current-carrying parts, which are sometimes electrically energized (live).

Electrically Energized (live) - Electrically connected to a source of potential difference, or electrically charged so as to have a potential significantly different from that of earth in the vicinity.

Emergency - Conditions that threaten the life of an employee or member of the public, or the plant operability.

Energy Isolating Device - A device that physically prevents the transmission or release of energy including, but not limited to, the following: An electrical circuit breaker; a disconnect switch; a manually operated switch by which the conductors of a circuit can be disconnected from all ungrounded supply conductors, and, in addition, no pole can be operated independently; a line valve; a block; and any similar device with a visible indication of the position of the device used to block or isolate energy. Push buttons, selector switches and other control-circuit type devices are not energy-isolating devices.

Energy Source - Any electrical, mechanical, hydraulic, pneumatic, chemical, nuclear, thermal, or other energy source that could cause injury to personnel.

External Energy Source - Any electrical, mechanical (e.g., rotation of a shaft with a come-a-long), hydraulic, pneumatic, chemical, nuclear, thermal, or other energy source that is not provided by the equipments normal designed energy source(s).

Group Tagout - The process by which a PAE holds a clearance for two or more authorized employees who will work on the equipment under a specific clearance. The authorized employees indicate that they are working under the clearance through the Clearance Personal Accountability Log (CPAL).

Issued Clearance - A clearance is issued when all actions required to establish a clearance in accordance with this procedure are completed and the responsible employee places the clearance in issued status. Regardless of the presence of a danger tag, all equipment is considered energized unless it is known to be controlled by a clearance in issued status.

Lines - Refers to transmission system conductors that are installed to distribute electrical power in the power transmission system.

Lockout - The placement of a lockout device on an energy-isolating device, in accordance with an established procedure, ensures that the energy-isolating device and the equipment being controlled cannot be operated until the lockout device is removed.

Lockout Device - A device that utilizes a positive means such as a lock, either key or combination type, to hold an energy-isolating device in the safe position and prevent the energizing of a machine or equipment. Included are blank flanges and bolted slip blinds.

NPG Standard Clearance Procedure to Safely Control NPG-SPP-10.2 Programs and Energy Rev. 0005 Processes Page 36 of 80 5.0 DEFINITIONS (continued)

Normal Energy Source - This is the energy normally available to the machine or equipment for its proper operation. There may be more than one type of normal energy source supplied such as electric, mechanical, hydraulic, pneumatic, etc.

Management Official-In-Charge - This means the plant, facility, production, or site manager.

Operating Permit Tag - An operating permit is a blue tag shown in Figure H-1 that is attached to equipment or controls when the equipment is to be operated by any person other than its operator. The equipment operator may not operate equipment except by instruction of the person holding the operating permit. The operating permit does not authorize persons other than the operator to operate the equipment from a switchboard. It does authorize the operator to operate equipment from a switchboard only under direction of the person holding the Operating Permit. The Operating Permit does not signify that the equipment tagged is de-energized. Where it is necessary for the equipment to be de-energized for work on the equipment, a danger tag clearance shall be issued.

Official Plant Clearance List - A list of names approved by the Plant Manager. The personnel are approved to perform the specific authorized functions designated on the list in accordance with this procedure. A RE, QE, or PAE on this list may be issued clearances.

Primary Authorized Employees - Employees, contractors, and others who request/identify the work to be performed under a clearance, walk down the boundaries of a clearance to determine if energy-isolating devices are set in proper position and tagged in accordance with the applicable clearance instruction; and have successfully completed the appropriate level of training and the associated qualifying examination(s) required by this procedure.

The primary authorized employee is responsible for administering the CPAL.

Qualified Employees - Employees, contractors, and others who prepare equipment for servicing, maintenance, and modification and return equipment to operational status and have successfully completed the training and the associated qualifying examination(s) required by this procedure. They have completed appropriate training for the area of the plant for which they have clearance responsibilities.

Released Clearance- A clearance is released when all actions required to release a clearance in accordance with this procedure are completed and the responsible employee removes the clearance from issued status.

Responsible Employees - Employees, contractors, and others who write and issue clearances in accordance with this procedure and have successfully completed the appropriate level of training and the associated qualifying examination(s) required by this procedure.

Servicing, Maintenance, and Modification - Workplace activities such as constructing, installing, setting up, adjusting, inspecting, modifying, and maintaining and/or servicing machines or equipment. These activities include lubrication, cleaning or un-jamming of machines or equipment and making adjustments or tool changes, where the employee may be exposed to the unexpected energizing or startup of the equipment or release of hazardous energy.

NPG Standard Clearance Procedure to Safely Control NPG-SPP-10.2 Programs and Energy Rev. 0005 Processes Page 37 of 80 5.0 DEFINITIONS (continued)

Sign-on/Sign-off - A personal act an employee, contractor, or other person takes to acknowledge his or her responsibilities for their name being on a log, list, or other documentation associated with a clearance.

Tagout - The placement of a tagout device on an energy-isolating device, in accordance with a clearance instruction, to indicate that the energy-isolating device and the equipment being controlled shall not be operated until the tagout device is removed.

Tagout device - A prominent warning device, such as a tag and a means of attachment, which can be securely fastened to an energy-isolating device in accordance with a clearance instruction, to indicate that the energy-isolating device and the equipment being controlled shall not be operated until the tagout device is removed.

Transmission Operator (Dispatcher) - refers to the TVA power system transmission operator who controls the transmission system lines and equipment.

NPG Standard Clearance Procedure to Safely Control NPG-SPP-10.2 Programs and Energy Rev. 0005 Processes Page 54 of 80 Appendix D (Page 1 of 3)

Special Requirements for Electrical Clearances 1.0 REQUIREMENTS A. Only component handswitches that meet the definition of an energy isolating device may be used as a clearance energy isolation point.

B. Component handswitches not meeting the definition of a clearance isolating device may be tagged as indication/information that associated equipment is under a clearance.

C. If potential or station service transformers are outside of the clearance zone, they may be cleared from the primary side. If they are inside the clearance zone, they shall be cleared from both the primary and secondary side.

D. Coupling capacitors within a clearance zone shall have their secondary circuits shorted if work is to be performed on or within the minimum approach distance to them.

E. Static capacitors within a clearance zone shall be grounded. The PAE holding the clearance is responsible for discharging and grounding the static capacitors.

F. The RE who is responsible for maintaining protection to equipment shall approve any changes in current transformer secondary circuits that are in service.

G. Blocks shall be removed in current transformer secondaries when connected in parallel with current transformers that are energized, before work is performed on them. If blocks are not available, it will be necessary to short circuit the current transformer, ground, and open the secondary circuits.

H. When two or more transformers are connected to ground through a common reactor, the transformers neutral ground switch for the transformer to be cleared shall be opened and tagged with a danger tag.

I. All disconnecting devices or breakers that establish a clearance boundary shall be opened made inoperable, when possible, and tagged to ensure that they will not be closed.

J. Gang or motor-operated disconnects/air-break switches shall be mechanically locked in the open position and visually checked to verify that all blades are open.

K. The QE should verify, by secondary means, the absence of energy on circuits involving circuit breakers whenever a means of verification is available.

L. When opening molded case breakers, positive indication in the form of a snap or click is required to ensure that the breaker is open. If positive indication is not verified, evaluate the situation with the RE.

M. The procedure for clearing a 161 kV or 500 kV air blast power circuit breaker requires the breaker and its disconnects to be opened and then the breaker cycled at the direction of the transmission operator to discharge any capacitors that may be in parallel with the contacts of the breaker.

NPG Standard Clearance Procedure to Safely Control NPG-SPP-10.2 Programs and Energy Rev. 0005 Processes Page 55 of 80 Appendix D (Page 2 of 3)

Special Requirements for Electrical Clearances 1.0 REQUIREMENTS (continued)

N. When placing or removing clearances inside electrical boards, the QE shall ensure that no loose materials remain in the breaker compartment.

O. Control power circuits shall be tagged if (1) the work is on the control circuit, (2) the proximity of the work is near the energized control circuit, or (3) there exists a possibility of grounding the control circuit.

P. Clearances on fused circuits other than control circuits (e.g., bus PT, voltage regulator PT, metering PT, etc.) shall have the danger tag attached to the fuse compartment door after the fuses have been removed from the circuit. The fuses shall be placed in an approved storage location.

Q. Clearances involving control fuses located on multi-fused terminal boards required to be tagged shall have the control fuses removed, a danger tag attached to non-conducting fuse blanks, and the blanks inserted into the fuse clips.

R. Clearances on fused control circuits (1) on boards with molded case breakers or (2) for which fuse blanks are not provided, do not require tagging and installation of fuse blanks. The location from which fuses were removed shall have a danger tag attached. Fuses removed should be placed in a secure, easily identifiable location where adverse plant conditions would not occur if they became dislodged from that location. Fuse storage may be in a fuse storage cabinet or in an appropriate bag attached to the compartment from which the fuses were removed (e.g., door handle, lugs attached to the relay covers, etc.). Fuses stored in a fuse storage cabinet should be clearly annotated on the clearance sheet.

S. The following applies for placement of clearances on low voltage circuits (250V or less):

1. When available, appropriate electrical prints for load lists and electrical circuit prints shall be utilized.
2. If plant conditions preclude tagging of main breaker to multiple components in a circuit, fuses shall be removed and tagged where available to isolate only those components affected by the work.
3. If the circuit involves relays or solenoids that are normally energized, the impact of a loss of power as well as a return to power to these components shall be evaluated, e.g. review of applicable logic or control diagrams.

NPG Standard Clearance Procedure to Safely Control NPG-SPP-10.2 Programs and Energy Rev. 0005 Processes Page 56 of 80 Appendix D (Page 3 of 3)

Special Requirements for Electrical Clearances 1.0 REQUIREMENTS (continued)

4. Circuits that supply power to a board or panel often "daisy-chain" and supply additional panels and components. A detailed search of wiring connection prints is required to determine all the components affected.
5. When low-voltage circuits are de-energized, alarms and responses shall be evaluated to ensure expected results are obtained. The MCR shall be contacted immediately prior to opening the circuit. When the affected unit is at power, the MCR shall be contacted after the circuit is opened to verify expected results.

NPG Standard Clearance Procedure to Safely Control NPG-SPP-10.2 Programs and Energy Rev. 0005 Processes Page 57 of 80 Appendix E (Page 1 of 3)

Special Requirements for Mechanical Clearances 1.0 REQUIREMENTS A. An air-operated valve that fails open on a loss of air is not be considered closed for blocking purposes unless it is held closed with an installed jacking device or device used to secure the valve in the required position. A clearance tag will be issued and attached to the jacking or other device.

B. An air-operated valve that fails closed shall have its air supply electrically or mechanically isolated, depressurized, and the valve visually checked-to-be-closed by local or remote indication. The air supply energy-isolating devices shall be tagged.

C. An air-operated valve that fails as is shall be closed and mechanically restrained. Its air supply should be electrically or mechanically isolated, depressurized, and the valve visually checked to be closed by local or remote indication. The air supply energy-isolating devices and mechanical restraint shall be tagged.

D. In cases where it is not possible to physically secure an air operated valve that fails as-is in the closed position, the valve will be tagged closed by applying closing air to the valve diaphragm by the use of the solenoid valve air overrides and tagging both the handswitch in the closed position and the solenoid valve air overrides. Prior to allowing work to begin, the equipment will be drained and de-pressurized to ensure the boundary valves are holding. This condition will be noted in the remarks section of the clearance sheet to inform PAE/Authorized Employee(s) that pressurized air is required to ensure the valve remains closed. This work is considered working on energized equipment and must be approved by the Plant Manager.

E. Pressure controlled valves, relief valves, and check valves will not be used as isolation boundary valves under normal conditions. Where such a valve does not have an external means of physical restraint, the work is considered working on energized equipment and must be approved by the Plant Manager.

F. The following instructions govern the use of freeze plugs

1. The clearance should be in place, but not issued, before establishing the freeze plug.
2. The need for the freeze plug should be identified on the Remarks Section of the clearance sheet. The freeze plug should not be listed as a device held on the clearance sheet. The establishment and maintenance of the freeze plug shall be in accordance with approved procedures or work documents.
3. The freeze plug shall be attended by qualified personnel to ensure that it is maintained intact until all work is complete and the proper Post Maintenance Tests (PMTs) are performed.
4. If the clearance must be released to allow performance of a PMT, the equipment shall be retagged before allowing the freeze plug to thaw. This will prevent migration of a portion of the plug.

NPG Standard Clearance Procedure to Safely Control NPG-SPP-10.2 Programs and Energy Rev. 0005 Processes Page 58 of 80 Appendix E (Page 2 of 3)

Special Requirements for Mechanical Clearances 1.0 REQUIREMENTS (continued)

5. The clearance must be released before allowing the freeze plug to thaw.

However, to prevent migration of the freeze plug, tags on boundary valves shall not be removed until the freeze plug has completely thawed.

6. All vents and drains shall be verified CLOSED before allowing the freeze plug to thaw.

G. If suitable means are not available to depressurize or control hazardous energy, the PAE, RE, and responsible manager(s) will determine actions necessary to protect employees. These actions must be approved by the Plant Manager or designee and documented in the Remarks section. The inability to depressurize shall be clearly documented in the remarks section and communicated to the proposed clearance holder. In cases where the component design does not include a vent or drain path within the clearance boundary, the clearance shall be locked to preclude clearance holder sign-on and initiation of work prior to direct communication with the RE.

Suitable methods to depressurize and prevent repressurization shall be agreed upon by the RE and the PAE before the clearance is held by the PAE.

H. When performing Temporary Lifts that could result in fluid flow (e.g., Motor Operated Valve Actuator Test (MOVAT) testing, valve stroke, etc.) the PAE responsible for the activity shall ensure that a flow blocking clearance is in place to maintain safe isolation and adequate flow blocking.

I. Clearances for work on high energy systems (operate with temperature greater than 200°F or pressure greater than 500 psig), lethal chemical systems, or systems connected to high energy systems shall, when possible isolate the work area by two closed valves in series. If equipped, a tell-tale vent or drain between the isolation valves should be opened. Lack of two valve isolation shall be clearly documented and communicated to the proposed clearance holder before issue.

J. The use of Abandoned Equipment Boundary valves as energy isolating devices requires the application of the same constraints that apply for the use on any other valve used as an energy isolating device. For example: position verification capability, maintenance of isolation from hazardous energy, etc.

K. The establishment of a safe boundary to allow work to be done on an Abandoned Equipment Boundary valve shall utilize equipment NOT abandoned. The boundary shall meet the same criteria as any other boundary.

L. When underground piping systems with slip-joint construction, e.g., a fire protection system, is being cleared, write the clearance to isolate at the second valve back from the work location to prevent release of energy at the first valve by a slip joint during excavation and work. The first valve back from the work location is tagged in the opened position to relieve pressure. If the location of the second valve back is such that the valve may be disturbed by the excavation, then a valve further back shall be closed and tagged to provide a safe clearance.

NPG Standard Clearance Procedure to Safely Control NPG-SPP-10.2 Programs and Energy Rev. 0005 Processes Page 59 of 80 Appendix E (Page 3 of 3)

Special Requirements for Mechanical Clearances 1.0 REQUIREMENTS (continued)

M. Clearances for entry into Permit Required Confined Spaces with piping, lines, or ducts (steam, water, inert gases, chemicals, etc) must be completely protected against the release of energy and material into the space by such means as:, 1) blanking or blinding:, 2) misaligning or removing sections of lines, pipes, or ducts:, 3) a double block and bleed system, such as two closed valves in series with an open vent between the valves. Entry into confined spaces must comply with TSP 801, Confined Space Entry.

LCO Applicability 3.0 3.0 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) APPLICABILITY LCO 3.0.1 LCOs shall be met during the MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability, except as provided in LCO 3.0.2.

LCO 3.0.2 Upon discovery of a failure to meet an LCO, the Required Actions of the associated Conditions shall be met, except as provided in LCO 3.0.5 and LCO 3.0.6.

If the LCO is met or is no longer applicable prior to expiration of the specified Completion Time(s), completion of the Required Action(s) is not required unless otherwise stated.

LCO 3.0.3 When an LCO is not met and the associated ACTIONS are not met, an associated ACTION is not provided, or if directed by the associated ACTIONS the unit shall be placed in a MODE or other specified condition in which the LCO is not applicable. Action shall be initiated within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> to place the unit, as applicable, in:

a. MODE 3 within 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br />;
b. MODE 4 within 13 hours1.50463e-4 days <br />0.00361 hours <br />2.149471e-5 weeks <br />4.9465e-6 months <br />; and
c. MODE 5 within 37 hours4.282407e-4 days <br />0.0103 hours <br />6.117725e-5 weeks <br />1.40785e-5 months <br />.

Exceptions to this Specification are stated in the individual Specifications.

Where corrective measures are completed that permit operation in accordance with the LCO or ACTIONS, completion of the actions required by LCO 3.0.3 is not required.

LCO 3.0.3 is only applicable in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

LCO 3.0.4 When an LCO is not met, entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability shall only be made:

a. When the associated ACTIONS to be entered permit continued operation in the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability for an unlimited period of time; (continued)

Watts Bar-Unit 1 3.0-1 Amendment 55

ECCS - Operating 3.5.2 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) 3.5.2 ECCS - Operating LCO 3.5.2 Two ECCS trains shall be OPERABLE.


NOTES------------------------------------------

1. In MODE 3, both safety injection (SI) pump flow paths may be isolated by closing the isolation valves for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> to perform pressure isolation valve testing per SR 3.4.14.1.
2. In MODE 3, the safety injection pumps and charging pumps may be made incapable of injecting to support transition into or from the Applicability of the LCO 3.4.12, Cold Overpressure Mitigation System (COMS) for up to four hours or until the temperature of all the RCS cold legs exceeds 375°F, whichever occurs first.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more trains A.1 Restore train(s) to OPERABLE 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> inoperable. status.

AND At least 100% of the ECCS flow equivalent to a single OPERABLE ECCS train available.

B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> associated Completion Time not met. AND B.2 Be in MODE 4. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> Watts Bar-Unit 1 3.5-4 Amendment 55

3S Handout Package for Applicant 3S

APPLICANT CUE SHEET (RETURN TO EXAMINER UPON COMPLETION OF TASK)

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

1. Unit 1 is in Mode 1.
2. Electrical Maintenance will be replacing the 30X, 1X and 30RX relays in the 1B-B SI pump circuit. While relay replacement is in progress, the 1B-B SI pump will be lubricated and oil samples collected.
3. The eSOMS Clearance System computer program is NOT available.

INITIATING CUES:

Part 1 - Using the references provided, manually prepare a TVA 17984

[11-2005], Clearance Tag List and Operational Steps, to de-energize and isolate the 1B-B SI pump for relay replacement, cleaning and lubrication.

NOTE: Complete the first, third, fourth, and fifth columns on TVA 17984

[11-2005], Clearance Tag List and Operational Steps.

3S

APPLICANT CUE SHEET (RETURN TO EXAMINER UPON COMPLETION OF TASK)

ASSUME WORK IS NOW IN PROGRESS ON THE 1B-B SI PUMP.

Part 2 - The Auxiliary Building AUO reports the ERCW supply line to the 1A SI Pump room cooler has ruptured. Local actions have been taken to isolate the leak.

What, if any, Technical Specifications/Technical Requirements must be entered due to the failure of the 1A-A SI Pump Room Cooler? What, if any, actions are required to be taken?

3S

Tennessee Valley Authority Clearance Tag List and Operational Steps Clearance Sheet Clearance No. Page of Apparatus:

Equipment ID Place. Place. Restore Restore st nd st nd Equipment Description Tag Serial Tag Place. Place. 1 2 Rest. Restore As left 1 2 Tag Notes Equipment Location No. Type Seq. Config. Verifier Verifier Seq. Config. Confg. Verifier Verifier TVA 17984 [11-2005]

Tennessee Valley Authority Clearance Tag List and Operational Steps Clearance Sheet Clearance No. Page of Apparatus:

Equipment ID Place. Place. Restore Restore st nd st nd Equipment Description Tag Serial Tag Place. Place. 1 2 Rest. Restore As left 1 2 Tag Notes Equipment Location No. Type Seq. Config. Verifier Verifier Seq. Config. Confg. Verifier Verifier TVA 17984 [11-2005]

Tennessee Valley Authority Clearance Tag List and Operational Steps Clearance Sheet Clearance No. Page of Apparatus:

Equipment ID Place. Place. Restore Restore st nd st nd Equipment Description Tag Serial Tag Place. Place. 1 2 Rest. Restore As left 1 2 Tag Notes Equipment Location No. Type Seq. Config. Verifier Verifier Seq. Config. Confg. Verifier Verifier TVA 17984 [11-2005]

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 201303 NRC Exam Administrative JPM 4

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE 4

2013-03 NRC Exam EVALUATION SHEET Task: DETERMINE REQUIREMENTS FOR LOCKED HIGH RADIATION AREA (LHRA)

Alternate Path: n/a Facility JPM #: 3-OT-JPMADA.3-2 Safety Function: 2.3

Title:

Radiation Control K/A 2.3.13 Knowledge of radiological safety procedures pertaining to licensed operator duties, such as response to radiation monitor alarms, containment entry requirements, fuel handling responsibilities, access to locked high-radiation areas, aligning filters, etc.

Rating(s): 3.4/3.8 CFR: 41.12 / 43.4 / 45.9 / 45.10 Evaluation Method: Simulator In-Plant Classroom X*

References:

RCI-100, "Control of Radiological Work," Revision 38 RCI-153, "Radiation Work Permits," Revision 3 NPG-SPP-05.1, :"Radiological Controls," Revision 2 Radiation work Permit (RWP) #13105000 Survey Map # M-20120217-1 Task Number: AUO-119-SPP-5.51-001

Title:

Use a Radiation Work Permit AUO-119-SPP-5.01-001 Control Personal Radiation Exposure Task Standard: Applicant determines:

1.) C-zone protective clothing (Dressout), RP coverage, and radiological briefing requirements from the provided Radiation Work Permit.

2.) The maximum inspection time without exceeding the administrative dose level is 35 min (0.58) (OR 30 min (0.5 hrs) based on RCI-100.)

3.) That the LHRA key can only be issued to RP personnel in this situation and that only the RP Shift Supervisor can issue LHRA key.

Validation Time: 15 minutes Time Critical: Yes No X

===============================================================

Applicant: ___________________________ _________________ Time Start: ________

NAME Docket No. Time Finish: ________

Performance Rating: SAT ____ UNSAT ____ Performance Time ___

Examiner: _____________________________ _____________________________/________

NAME SIGNATURE DATE

==============================================================

=

COMMENTS PAGE 2 OF 11

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE 4

2013-03 NRC Exam Tools/Equipment/Procedures Needed:

The following information will be handed out to each applicant:

1. Radiation work Permit (RWP) #13105000
2. Survey Map # M-20120217-1
3. Drawing: 47W200-16 EQUIPMENT PLAN-EL 692 & 685.5, Rev. 16
  • NRC REFERENCE DISK.
  • NOTE: This JPM is designed to be performed in a classroom with procedures available to the applicant via a laptop computer loaded with the NRC REFERENCE DISK.

PAGE 3 OF 11

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE 4

2013-03 NRC Exam READ TO APPLICANT DIRECTION TO APPLICANT:

I will explain the initial conditions, and state the task to be performed. All control room steps shall be performed for this JPM, including any required communications. I will provide initiating cues and reports on other actions when directed by you. Ensure you indicate to me when you understand your assigned task. To indicate that you have completed your assigned task return the cue sheet I provided you.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

1. You are the Auxiliary Building AUO, and will be entering the Spent Resin Storage Tank (SRST) valve gallery to inspect instrument sense lines for damage.
2. Your current year dose (CYD) is 650 mrem TEDE.
3. This inspection may require climbing, crawling, or kneeling in the SRST valve gallery, however, entry into the room where the Spent Resin Storage Tank is will not be required.
4. The SRST valve gallery is in a Locked High Radiation Area (LHRA).
5. Unit 1 is at 100% power and no emergency has been declared.

INITIATING CUES:

1. Using the Radiological Work Permit (RWP) and Survey Map provided, determine the following requirements for the task:
a. c-zone protective clothing (Dressout).
b. radiological protection personnel coverage.
c. radiological briefing.
2. Determine the maximum inspection time available without exceeding the TVA annual administrative dose level (ADL) based on the highest general area dose rate in the SRST valve gallery. Show ALL calculations.
3. Determine the following:
a. personnel the LHRA key can be issued to in this situation.
b. personnel authorized to issue the LHRA key.

PAGE 4 OF 11

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE 4

2013-03 NRC Exam STEP/STANDARD SAT/UNSAT START TIME: _______

STEP 1: Determine C-zone protective clothing, radiological protection CRITICAL personnel coverage and radiological briefing requirements from STEP the provided Radiological Work Permit (RWP).

___ SAT STANDARD:

___ UNSAT Applicant determines the following requirements from the RWP:

C-zone protective clothing (Dressout) required is: 1 PR coveralls, 1 PR booties, 1 PR shoe covers , 1 PR rubber gloves, cloth inserts, surgeons cap, secure gloves / booties, modesty clothing.

EXAMINER: This protective clothing is required by the RWP due to potential climbing, crawling, or kneeling in SRST valve gallery.

Radiological Protection coverage is: Continuous Radiological Briefing: Brief on current radiological conditions is required prior to RCA entry (Daily Briefing). May also enter Pre-Job Brief Step is critical to ensure compliance with Radiological Work Permit requirements.

COMMENTS:

PAGE 5 0F 11

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE 4

2013-03 NRC Exam STEP/STANDARD SAT/UNSAT STEP 2: Determine the maximum inspection time available without CRITICAL exceeding the TVA annual administrative dose level based on the STEP highest general area dose rate in the SRST valve gallery.

___ SAT STANDARD:

___ UNSAT Applicant determines the remaining administrative dose is 350 mrem.

1000 mrem - 650 mrem = 350 mrem EXAMINER: The TVA administrative dose level (ADL) is 1000 mrem.

Applicant determines the maximum General area dose to be 600 mrem /

hour from the survey map near the piping in the upper right portion of the SRST valve gallery.

Applicant calculates the maximum inspection time to be 35 minutes (0.58 hours6.712963e-4 days <br />0.0161 hours <br />9.589947e-5 weeks <br />2.2069e-5 months <br />).

(350 mr) x (1 hr / 600 mr) x (60 min / 1hr) = 35 min (or 0.58 hours6.712963e-4 days <br />0.0161 hours <br />9.589947e-5 weeks <br />2.2069e-5 months <br />) 350 mr 1 hr 60 min = 35 min 600 mr 1 hr EXAMINER: Applicant may use the calculation formula contained in RCI-100, which subtracts 50 mr to ensure the dose limit is not exceeded.

(350 mr)-(50 mr) x (1 hr / 600 mr) x (60 min / 1hr) = 30 min (or 0.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />)

Applicant calculates the maximum inspection time to be 30 minutes (0.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />).

350 mr-50 mr 1 hr 60 min = 30 min 600 mr 1 hr Step is critical to ensure the TVA annual administrative dose level is not exceeded.

COMMENTS:

PAGE 6 0F 11

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE 4

2013-03 NRC Exam STEP/STANDARD SAT/UNSAT STEP 3: Determine the personnel the LHRA key can be issued to in this CRITICAL situation and who is authorized to issue the LHRA key. STEP STANDARD: ___ SAT Applicant determines that LHRA keys for this task can only be issued to ___ UNSAT RP personnel in this non-emergency situation, and that LHRA keys can only be issued by the RP Shift supervisor.

NOTE:

RCI-100 Section 2.6, "Key Control" States:

C. HRA, LHRA and VHRA keys may only be issued to RP personnel, except in declared emergency situations.

I. The on-duty RP Shift Supervisor shall maintain control of the access key to the HRA/LHRA key box. Issue of the key to a HRA or LHRA must be authorized by the on-duty RP Shift Supervisor.

HRA/LHRA keys shall only be issued by a RP Shift Supervisor.

Step is critical to ensure proper RP control and monitoring of this non-emergency work and prevent inadvertent entry into the LHRA.

COMMENTS:

END OF TASK STOP TIME ________

PAGE 7 0F 11

4 Handout Package for Applicant

APPLICANT CUE SHEET (RETURN TO EXAMINER UPON COMPLETION OF TASK)

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

1. You are the Auxiliary Building AUO, and will be entering the Spent Resin Storage Tank (SRST) valve gallery to inspect instrument sense lines for damage.
2. Your current year dose (CYD) is 650 mrem TEDE.
3. This inspection may require climbing, crawling, or kneeling in the SRST valve gallery, however, entry into the room where the Spent Resin Storage Tank is will not be required.
4. The SRST valve gallery is in a Locked High Radiation Area (LHRA).
5. Unit 1 is at 100% power and no emergency has been declared.

INITIATING CUES:

1. Using the Radiological Work Permit (RWP) and Survey Map provided, determine the following requirements for the task:
a. c-zone protective clothing (Dressout).
b. radiological protection personnel coverage.
c. radiological briefing.
2. Determine the maximum inspection time available without exceeding the TVA annual administrative dose level (ADL) based on the highest general area dose rate in the SRST valve gallery. Show ALL calculations.
3. Determine the following:
a. personnel the LHRA key can be issued to in this situation.
b. personnel authorized to issue the LHRA key.

4

APPLICANT CALCULATION SHEET (RETURN TO EXAMINER UPON COMPLETION OF TASK)

Calculations:

MAXIMUM INSPECTION TIME: MINUTES 4

APPLICANT CALCULATION SHEET (RETURN TO EXAMINER UPON COMPLETION OF TASK)

Calculations:

MAXIMUM INSPECTION TIME: MINUTES 4

13105000 2012 2013

13105000

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 201303 NRC Exam Administrative JPM 5 S

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE 5S 2013-03 NRC Exam EVALUATION SHEET Task: CLASSIFY THE EVENT PER THE RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PLAN Alternate Path: n/a Facility JPM #: 3-OT-JPMS090 Safety Function: n/a

Title:

K/A 2.4.38 Ability to take actions called for in the facility emergency plan, including supporting or acting as emergency coordinator if required.

Rating(s): 2.4/4.4 CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.11 Evaluation Method: Simulator In-Plant Classroom X*

References:

EPIP-1 Emergency Plan Classification Flowpath, Rev. 37.

EPIP-2, Notification of Unusual Event, Rev. 31.

EPIP-3 "Alert", Rev. 36.

EPIP-4, Site Area Emergency, Rev. 34.

EPIP-5 General Emergency, Rev. 40.

Task Number: SRO-113-EPIP-001

Title:

Classify emergency events requiring Emergency Plan Implementation.

Task Standard: The applicant 1.) Classifies the event as a SITE AREA EMERGENCY, based on EAL 3.1 LOSS OF AC (Power Ops), within 15 minutes.

2.) Completes EPIP-4, Site Area Emergency, Appendix A, TVA Initial Notification Form For Site Area Emergency.

Validation Time: 30 minutes Time Critical: Yes X No

============================================================

=

Applicant: ___________________________ _________________ Time Start: ________

NAME Docket No. Time Finish: ________

Performance Rating: SAT ____ UNSAT ____ Performance Time ___

Examiner: _____________________________ _____________________________/________

NAME SIGNATURE DATE

==============================================================

=

COMMENTS

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE 5S 2013-03 NRC Exam Tools/Equipment/Procedures Needed:

  • NRC REFERENCE DISK.
  • NOTE: This JPM is designed to be performed in a classroom with procedures available to the applicant via a laptop computer loaded with the NRC REFERENCE DISK.

EXAMINER: Multiple copies of each of the following forms will be available for use by the applicants:

EPIP-2, Notification of Unusual Event, Appendix A, Notification of Unusual Event Initial Notification Form, and Appendix B, State of Tennessee Notification.

EPIP-3, Alert, Appendix A, Alert Notification Form, and Appendix B, State of Tennessee Notification.

EPIP-4, Site Area Emergency, Appendix A, Site Area Emergency Initial Notification Form, and Appendix B, State of Tennessee Notification.

EPIP-5, General Emergency, Appendix A, General Emergency Initial Notification Form, Appendix B, State of Tennessee Notification, and Appendix H, Initial - Protective Action Recommendations.

PAGE 3 0F 10

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE 5S 2013-03 NRC Exam DIRECTION TO APPLICANT:

I will explain the initial conditions, and state the task to be performed. All control room steps shall be performed for this JPM, including any required communications. I will provide initiating cues and reports on other actions when directed by you. Ensure you indicate to me when you understand your assigned task. To indicate that you have completed your assigned task return the cue sheet I provided you.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

TREAT THIS AS A RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY DRILL.

Unit 1 is cooling down to support outage work. RCS temperature is 285°F and RCS pressure is 350 psig. 1A-A 6.9kV Shutdown Board is de-energized and tagged for inspection of lugs, repairs will take 90 minutes.

At 1600, the following occur:

1. A tornado touched down in the Watts Bar Hydroelectric Switchyard, severely damaging both 161kv lines to the plant which resulted in the lines being lost.
2. The 1B-B DG tripped when started. The AUO at the DG Bldg reports that the 1B-B DG Engine 2 is severely damaged.

At 1615 the AUO at the DG Bldg reports that another tornado caused damage to the C-S Diesel Building.

INITIATING CUES:

1. Assuming the listed conditions have not changed at 1618, classify the event.
2. RAISE YOUR HAND when your classification is complete.
3. Complete the associated TVA Initial Classification form.
4. Determine what, if any, Protective Action Recommendations are required.
5. RAISE YOUR HAND when you have completed the notification form.

Element(s) of this task is/are time critical.

PAGE 4 0F 10

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE 5S 2013-03 NRC Exam STEP/STANDARD SAT/UNSAT START TIME: _______

EXAMINER: Potential exists for the applicant to INCORRECTLY choose:

EAL 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown), if operating mode is applied incorrectly EAL 5.2, Tornado, since there is damage to the Diesel Building and 1B-B Diesel Generator, EAL 6.2, Loss of AC (Shutdown) if operating mode is applied incorrectly.

STEP 1: Refers to EPIP-1 to determine level of classification required CRITICAL for the events in progress. STEP STANDARD: ___ SAT Applicant refers to EPIP-1, Section 3, Loss of Power. ___ UNSAT Applicant determines that the plant is in Mode 4, and that the EAL 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) column is applicable.

Based on Emergency Class Criteria", the applicant determines that a Site Area Emergency, needs to be declared, based on EAL 3.1, Loss of AC (Power Ops), Loss of Offsite and Onsite AC Power >15 minutes.

The applicant may also indicate that EPIP-1, Section 5, Destructive Phenomenon, EAL 5.2, Tornado should be evaluated. EAL 5.2 would result in an ALERT, since the Diesel Building and 1B Diesel Generator were damaged by the tornado.

Criteria to meet the critical step is for the EALs to be correctly identified and the declaration made within 15 minutes.

EXAMINER: RECORD time that declaration was made:_________

COMMENTS:

PAGE 5 0F 10

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE 5S 2013-03 NRC Exam STEP/STANDARD SAT/UNSAT EXAMINER: A completed copy of EPIP-4, Site Ares Emergency, Appendix A for this JPM is included and marked NRC EXAM MATERIAL - S 5 KEY.

EXAMINER: NO PAR RECOMMENDATION IS REQUIRED FOR THIS DECLARATION.

STEP 2: INITIATES EPIP-4, SITE AREA EMERGENCY Appendix A, CRITICAL TVA Initial Notification Form For Site Area Emergency. STEP STANDARD: ___ SAT Applicant completes EPIP-4, Appendix A, TVA Initial Notification Form ___ UNSAT For Site Area Emergency, within 15 minutes of initial event classification.

Critical elements that must appear on Appendix A form:

Item 3. - EAL Designators - EAL 3.1, Item 4. - Brief Description of the Event - Loss of AC (Power Ops),

Loss of Offsite and Onsite AC Power >15 minutes.

Item 5. - Radiological Conditions - EITHER Minor releases within federally approved limits OR Release Information not known checked or otherwise indicated on form.

Item 6. - Time that applicant declared the event and the date.

COMMENTS:

END OF TASK STOP TIME ________

PAGE 6 0F 10

5S KEY DO NOT HAND TO APPLICANT

WBN Emergency Plan Classification Logic EPIP-1 Unit 0 Rev. 0037 Page 23 of 53 03-2013 NRCAttachment Exam3 5S JPM KEY (Page 1 of 4)

Loss of Power FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad 1.2 RCS 1.3 Containment SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.6 RCS Identified Leakage 2.2 Loss of Function/Communication 2.7 Uncontrolled Cool Down 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection 2.8 Turbine Failure 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.9 Technical Specification 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage 2.10 Safety Limit LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3.3 Loss of DC HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT 4.1 Fire 4.3 Flammable Gas 4.5 Control Room 4.2 Explosion 4.4 Toxic Gas Evacuation Table 4-1 Table 4-2 4.6 Security Figure 4-A Figure 4-B 4.7 SED Judgment DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.4 River Level High 5.2 Tornado 5.5 River Level Low 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile 5.6 Watercraft Crash Crash Figure 5-A Table 5-1 SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 6.3 Loss of DC (Shutdown)

RADIOLOGICAL 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.2 Liquid Effluent 7.4 Fuel Handling Table 7-1 Table 7-2 Figure 7-A

WBN Emergency Plan Classification Logic EPIP-1 Unit 0 Rev. 0037 Page 24 of 53 03-2013 NRCAttachment Exam3 5S JPM KEY (Page 2 of 4)

UNUSUAL EVENT, ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY and GENERAL INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a protected EMERGENCY: (see SED Judgment 4.7). area without authorization.

BOMB: An explosive device (See EXPLOSION). ODCM: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual.

CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons violently ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates protesting station operations or activities at the site. that the CSF(s) is under severe challenge.

CREDIBLE SITE-SPECIFIC -The determination is made by WBN senior plant PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant management through use of information found in the Safeguards structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Damage is Contingency Plan. sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein.

CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are PROTECTED AREA: Encompasses all owner controlled areas within the six CSFs: Sub-criticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal security protected area fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

Shock, Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the FR-0 which indicates EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition is made that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator action is that one or more of the conditions associated with the event exist. Implicit in required.

this definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e. within 15 minutes.

RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): The demarcation of the area of a magnitude greater than charging pump capacity.

surrounding the WBN units in which postulated FSAR accidents will not result SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or mis-operation of plant in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable.

Figure 7-A.

SECURITY CONDITION- Any Security Event as listed in the approved EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion or a catastrophic security contingency plan that constitutes a threat/compromise to site failure of pressurized equipment that potentially imparts significant energy to security, threat/risk to site personnel, or a potential degradation to the level of near-by structures and materials.

safety of the plant. A SECURITY CONDITION does not involve a HOSTILE EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force. ACTION.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e., SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam of the following: (1) An automatic turbine runback > 15% thermal reactor generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized. power; (2) Electrical load rejection > 25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip or (4) Safety Injection System Activation.

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Source of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not SITE PERIMETER: Encompasses all owner controlled areas in the constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large immediate site environs as shown on Figures 4-A and 7-A.

quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases maintained at concentrations less body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA. The than the LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL) will not explode due to ignition. STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations.

HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or demands will be met by the station. skin contact (e.g., chlorine).

HOSTILE ACTION: An act toward a nuclear power plant or its personnel that UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of normal includes the use of violent force to destroy equipment, take hostages, and/or operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or intimidates the licensee to achieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency or water; using guns, explosives, projectiles, vehicles, or other devices used procedures are UNPLANNED.

to deliver destructive force. Other acts that satisfy the overall intent may be UNPLANNED: (With specific regard to radioactivity releases) A release of included. HOSTILE ACTION should NOT be construed to include acts of civil radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been authorized by a disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of a concerted attack on the Discharge Permit (DP). Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, nuclear power plant. Non-terrorism-based EALs should be used to address unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified such activities, (e.g., violent acts between individuals in the owner controlled on the DP, e.g., alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release area.)

times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank.

HOSTILE FORCE: Individual(s) involved with a HOSTILE ACTION. One or VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it more individuals who are engaged in a determined assault, overtly or by is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications stealth and deception, equipped with suitable weapons capable of killing, on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant maiming, or causing destruction.

personnel. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e.,

INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a within 15 minutes.

reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observable without from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH.

measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is sufficient enough to cause A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety parameters, e.g., Increasing Trend in Reactor Vessel Water Level (Full structure, system, or component. Example damage includes: deformation RVLIS) and/or Decreasing Trend on Core Thermocouple Temperatures.

due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, and/or paint INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches) should NOT be personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes of Emergency included.

Plan Classification.

VITAL AREA: Is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.

WBN Emergency Plan Classification Logic EPIP-1 Unit 0 Rev. 0037 Page 25 of 53 03-2013 NRCAttachment Exam3 5S JPM KEY (Page 3 of 4) 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown)

Mode Initiating/Condition Mode Initiating/Condition 1,2, Prolonged loss of Offsite and Onsite AC Not Applicable 3,4 power (1 and 2)

G 1. 1A and 1B 6.9KV Shutdown Boards E de-energized for >15 minutes N

E 2. (a or b)

R A a. Core Cooling Red or Orange L b. Restoration of Either 1A or 1B 6.9KV Shutdown Board(s) is not likely within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> of loss.

S 1,2, Loss of Offsite and Onsite AC Power Not Applicable I 3,4 > 15 minutes T 1. 1A and 1B 6.9KV Shutdown Boards E de-energized for >15 minutes 1,2, Loss of Offsite Power for >15 minutes 5,6, or UNPLANNED loss of Offsite and Onsite AC A 3,4 Defuel power for >15 minutes L (1 and 2)

E 1. 1A and 1B 6.9KV Shutdown Boards

1. C and D CSSTs are not available for de-energized for >15 minutes R >15 minutes T Also Refer to Loss of Shutdown Systems (6.1)
2. 1A or 1B Diesel Generator not available U

1,2 Loss of Offsite Power for >15 minutes 5,6, or UNPLANNED loss of Offsite Power for N

3,4 Defuel >15 minutes (1 and 2)

U (1 and 2)

S 1. C and D CSSTs not available for U 1. C and D CSSTs not available for >15 minutes A >15 minutes L 2. Either Diesel Generator is supplying power

2. Each Diesel Generator is supplying power to to its respective Shutdown Board its respective Shutdown Board E

V E

N T

WBN Emergency Plan Classification Logic EPIP-1 Unit 0 Rev. 0037 Page 35 of 53 03-2013 NRCAttachment Exam5 5S JPM KEY (Page 1 of 7)

Destructive Phenomenon FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad 1.2 RCS 1.3 Containment SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.6 RCS Identified Leakage 2.2 Loss of Function/Communication 2.7 Uncontrolled Cool Down 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection 2.8 Turbine Failure 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.9 Technical Specification 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage 2.10 Safety Limit LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3.3 Loss of DC HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT 4.1 Fire 4.3 Flammable Gas 4.5 Control Room 4.2 Explosion 4.4 Toxic Gas Evacuation Table 4-1 Table 4-2 4.6 Security Figure 4-A Figure 4-B 4.7 SED Judgment DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.4 River Level High 5.2 Tornado 5.5 River Level Low 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile 5.6 Watercraft Crash Crash Figure 5-A Table 5-1 SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 6.3 Loss of DC (Shutdown)

RADIOLOGICAL 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.2 Liquid Effluent 7.4 Fuel Handling Table 7-1 Table 7-2 Figure 7-A

WBN Emergency Plan Classification Logic EPIP-1 Unit 0 Rev. 0037 Page 36 of 53 03-2013 NRCAttachment Exam5 5S JPM KEY (Page 2 of 7)

UNUSUAL EVENT, ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY and GENERAL INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a protected EMERGENCY: (see SED Judgment 4.7). area without authorization.

BOMB: An explosive device (See EXPLOSION). ODCM: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual.

CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons violently ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates protesting station operations or activities at the site. that the CSF(s) is under severe challenge.

CREDIBLE SITE-SPECIFIC -The determination is made by WBN senior plant PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant management through use of information found in the Safeguards structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Damage is Contingency Plan. sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein.

CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are PROTECTED AREA: Encompasses all owner controlled areas within the six CSFs: Sub-criticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal security protected area fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

Shock, Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the FR-0 which indicates EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition is made that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator action is that one or more of the conditions associated with the event exist. Implicit in required.

this definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e. within 15 minutes.

RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): The demarcation of the area of a magnitude greater than charging pump capacity.

surrounding the WBN units in which postulated FSAR accidents will not result SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or mis-operation of plant in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable.

Figure 7-A.

SECURITY CONDITION- Any Security Event as listed in the approved EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion or a catastrophic security contingency plan that constitutes a threat/compromise to site failure of pressurized equipment that potentially imparts significant energy to security, threat/risk to site personnel, or a potential degradation to the level of near-by structures and materials.

safety of the plant. A SECURITY CONDITION does not involve a HOSTILE EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force. ACTION.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e., SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam of the following: (1) An automatic turbine runback > 15% thermal reactor generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized. power; (2) Electrical load rejection > 25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip or (4) Safety Injection System Activation.

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Source of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not SITE PERIMETER: Encompasses all owner controlled areas in the constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large immediate site environs as shown on Figures 4-A and 7-A.

quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases maintained at concentrations less body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA. The than the LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL) will not explode due to ignition. STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations.

HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or demands will be met by the station. skin contact (e.g., chlorine).

HOSTILE ACTION: An act toward a nuclear power plant or its personnel that UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of normal includes the use of violent force to destroy equipment, take hostages, and/or operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or intimidates the licensee to achieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency or water; using guns, explosives, projectiles, vehicles, or other devices used procedures are UNPLANNED.

to deliver destructive force. Other acts that satisfy the overall intent may be UNPLANNED: (With specific regard to radioactivity releases) A release of included. HOSTILE ACTION should NOT be construed to include acts of civil radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been authorized by a disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of a concerted attack on the Discharge Permit (DP). Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, nuclear power plant. Non-terrorism-based EALs should be used to address unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified such activities, (e.g., violent acts between individuals in the owner controlled on the DP, e.g., alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release area.)

times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank.

HOSTILE FORCE: Individual(s) involved with a HOSTILE ACTION. One or VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it more individuals who are engaged in a determined assault, overtly or by is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications stealth and deception, equipped with suitable weapons capable of killing, on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant maiming, or causing destruction.

personnel. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e.,

INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a within 15 minutes.

reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observable without from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH.

measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is sufficient enough to cause A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety parameters, e.g., Increasing Trend in Reactor Vessel Water Level (Full structure, system, or component. Example damage includes: deformation RVLIS) and/or Decreasing Trend on Core Thermocouple Temperatures.

due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, and/or paint INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches) should NOT be personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes of Emergency included.

Plan Classification.

VITAL AREA: Is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.

WBN Emergency Plan Classification Logic EPIP-1 Unit 0 Rev. 0037 Page 37 of 53 03-2013 NRCAttachment Exam5 5S JPM KEY (Page 3 of 7) 5.1 Earthquake 5.2 Tornado Mode Initiating/Condition Mode Initiating/Condition G

Refer to Fission Product Barrier Matrix Refer to Fission Product Barrier Matrix" E

N E

R A

L S

Refer to Fission Product Barrier Matrix Refer to Fission Product Barrier Matrix I

T E

All Earthquake detected by site seismic All Tornado or High Winds strikes any structure instrumentation (1 and 2) listed in Table 5-1 and results in VISIBLE DAMAGE (1 and 2)

1. (a and b)
1. Tornado or High Winds (Sustained >80 mph
a. Ann.166 D indicates OBE Spectra > one minute) strikes any structure listed in Exceeded" Table 5-1 A b. Ann.166 E indicates Seismic 2. (a or b)

L Recording Initiated E a. Confirmed report of any VISIBLE

2. (a or b) DAMAGE R

T a. Ground motion sensed by Plant b. Control Room indications of degraded personnel Safety System or component response

b. National Earthquake Information due to event Center at 1-(303) 273-8500 can Note: Site Met Data Instrumentation fails to 0 at confirm the event. >100 mph. National Weather Service Morristown 1-(423) 586-8400 can provide additional information if needed.

U All Earthquake detected by site seismic All Tornado within the SITE PERIMETER N

instrumentation (1 and 2)

U 1. Plant personnel report a Tornado has been S 1. Ann. 166 E indicator Seismic Recording sighted within the SITE PERIMETER (Refer U Initiated to Figure 5-A)

A L 2. (a or b)

a. Ground motion sensed by Plant personnel E

V b. National Earthquake Information E Center at 1-(303) 273-8500 can N confirm the event.

T

WBN Site Area Emergency EPIP-4 Unit 0 Rev. 0034 Page 13 of 26 03-2013 NRCAppendix ExamA 5S JPM KEY (Page 1 of 1)

Site Area Emergency Initial Notification Form

1. X This is a Drill This is an Actual Event - Repeat - This is an Actual Event
2. ____________________

APPLICANT's NAME the SED at Watts Bar has declared a Site Area Emergency entered here CRITICAL 3.1 Loss of Offsite and Onsite AC Power > 15 min.

STEP

3. EAL Designator: ________________________________

CRITICAL 4. Brief Description of the Event:

STEP _____________________________________________________________________________________

Applicant states in own words the following:

Loss of Offsite and Onsite AC Power > 15 minutes 1. 1A and 1B 6.9 KV Shutdown Boards de-energized for

> 15 minutes.

CRITICAL STEP 5. Radiological Conditions: (Check one under both Airborne and Liquid column.)

Airborne Releases Offsite Liquid Releases Offsite Minor releases within federally approved limits1 Minor releases within federally approved limits1 Checking Checking either of Releases above federally approved limits1 Releases above federally approved limits1 either of these these items is items is acceptabl Release information not known Release information not known acceptable

e. (1Tech Specs/ODCM) (1Tech Specs/ODCM) .

CRITICAL TIME TODAY

6. Event Declared: Time:________________ Date:__________________

STEP Eastern Time

7. Provide Protective Action Recommendation: None Completed By: _______________________________________

APPLICANT's NAME entered here Approved By: _______________________________________

WBN Site Area Emergency EPIP-4 Unit 0 Rev. 0034 Page 14 of 26 03-2013 NRCAppendix ExamB 5S JPM KEY (Page 1 of 1)

State of Tennessee Notification 1.0 State Notification CAUTION Notification of the State of Tennessee is required to be completed as soon as possible not to exceed 15 minutes from the time of emergency classification declaration.

[1] FAX a copy of completed Appendix A to the State of Tennessee at 9-1-615-242-9635

[2] REPORT to the State of Tennessee the information on Appendix A utilizing:

24 Hours Primary: 9-1-800-262-3300 Backup: 9-1-615-741-0001 Backup: 9-1-800-262-3400 NOTE The Time of the notification is when the State Representative answers the phone.

[3] RECORD Information from the notification Name of Person Notified: ____________________________

Time and Date of Notification: _________________________

[4] RETURN the completed Appendix B and Appendix A to the SED

5S BLANK FORMS HAND REQUESTED FORM TO APPLICANT

WBN Notification of Unusual Event EPIP-2 Unit 0 Rev. 0031 Page 12 of 22 Appendix A (Page 1 of 1)

Notification of Unusual Event Initial Notification Form

1. This is a Drill This is an Actual Event - Repeat - This is an Actual Event
2. _______________________ the SED at Watts Bar has declared a NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT.
3. EAL Designator: _____________________________(USE ONLY ONE EAL DESIGNATOR)
4. Brief Description of the Event:
5. Radiological Conditions: (Check one under both Airborne and Liquid column.)

Airborne Releases Offsite Liquid Releases Offsite Minor releases within federally approved limits1 Minor releases within federally approved limits1 Releases above federally approved limits1 Releases above federally approved limits1 Release information not known Release information not known (1Tech Specs/ODCM) (1Tech Specs/ODCM)

6. Event Declared: Time:________________ Date:__________________

Eastern Time

7. Protective Action Recommendation: None Completed By : ________________________________________

Approved By: ________________________________________

WBN Notification of Unusual Event EPIP-2 Unit 0 Rev. 0031 Page 13 of 22 Appendix B (Page 1 of 1)

State of Tennessee Notification 1.0 State of Tennessee Notification CAUTION Notification of the State of Tennessee is required to be completed as soon as possible not to exceed 15 minutes from the time of emergency classification declaration.

[1] FAX a copy of completed Appendix A to the State of Tennessee at 9-1-615-242-9635.

[2] REPORT to the State of Tennessee the information on Appendix A utilizing:

24 Hours Primary: 9-1-800-262-3300 Backup: 9-1-615-741-0001 Backup: 9-1-800-262-3400 NOTE The Time of the notification is when the State Representative answers the phone.

[3] RECORD information from the notification Name of Person Notified:

Time and Date of Notification:

[4] RETURN the completed Appendix B and Appendix A to the SED

WBN Alert EPIP-3 Unit 0 Rev. 0036 Page 13 of 28 Appendix A (Page 1 of 1)

Alert Initial Notification Form

1. This is a Drill This is an Actual Event - Repeat - This is an Actual Event
2. __________________, the SED at Watts Bar has declared an ALERT
3. EAL Designator: ________________________________
4. Brief Description of the Event:
5. Radiological Conditions: (Check one under both Airborne and Liquid column.)

Airborne Releases Offsite Liquid Releases Offsite Minor releases within federally approved limits1 Minor releases within federally approved limits1 Releases above federally approved limits1 Releases above federally approved limits1 Release information not known Release information not known (1Tech Specs/ODCM) (1Tech Specs/ODCM)

6. Event Declared: Time:________________ Date:__________________

Eastern Time

7. Protective Action Recommendation: None Completed by: ____________________________________________

Approved by: ____________________________________________

WBN Alert EPIP-3 Unit 0 Rev. 0036 Page 14 of 28 Appendix B (Page 1 of 1)

State of Tennessee Notification 1.0 State of Tennessee Notification CAUTION Notification of the State of Tennessee is required to be completed as soon as possible not to exceed 15 minutes from the time of emergency classification declaration.

[1] FAX a copy of completed Appendix A to the State of Tennessee at 9-1-615-242-9635.

[2] REPORT to the State of Tennessee the information on Appendix A utilizing:

24 Hours Primary: 9-1-800-262-3300 Backup: 9-1-615-741-0001 Backup: 9-1-800-262-3400 NOTE The Time of notification is when the State Representative answers the phone.

[3] RECORD information from the notification Name of Person Notified: ______________________________

Time and Date of Notification: ______________________________

[4] RETURN the completed Appendix B and Appendix A to the SED.

WBN Site Area Emergency EPIP-4 Unit 0 Rev. 0034 Page 13 of 26 Appendix A (Page 1 of 1)

Site Area Emergency Initial Notification Form

1. This is a Drill This is an Actual Event - Repeat - This is an Actual Event
2. ____________________ the SED at Watts Bar has declared a Site Area Emergency
3. EAL Designator: ________________________________
4. Brief Description of the Event:
5. Radiological Conditions: (Check one under both Airborne and Liquid column.)

Airborne Releases Offsite Liquid Releases Offsite Minor releases within federally approved limits1 Minor releases within federally approved limits1 Releases above federally approved limits1 Releases above federally approved limits1 Release information not known Release information not known (1Tech Specs/ODCM) (1Tech Specs/ODCM)

6. Event Declared: Time:________________ Date:__________________

Eastern Time

7. Provide Protective Action Recommendation: None Completed By: _______________________________________

Approved By: _______________________________________

WBN Site Area Emergency EPIP-4 Unit 0 Rev. 0034 Page 14 of 26 Appendix B (Page 1 of 1)

State of Tennessee Notification 1.0 State Notification CAUTION Notification of the State of Tennessee is required to be completed as soon as possible not to exceed 15 minutes from the time of emergency classification declaration.

[1] FAX a copy of completed Appendix A to the State of Tennessee at 9-1-615-242-9635

[2] REPORT to the State of Tennessee the information on Appendix A utilizing:

24 Hours Primary: 9-1-800-262-3300 Backup: 9-1-615-741-0001 Backup: 9-1-800-262-3400 NOTE The Time of the notification is when the State Representative answers the phone.

[3] RECORD Information from the notification Name of Person Notified: ____________________________

Time and Date of Notification: _________________________

[4] RETURN the completed Appendix B and Appendix A to the SED

WBN General Emergency EPIP-5 Unit 0 Rev. 0040 Page 14 of 31 Appendix A (Page 1 of 1)

General Emergency Initial Notification Form

1. This is a Drill This is an Actual Event - Repeat - This is an Actual Event
2. ___________________,the SED at Watts Bar has declared a GENERAL EMERGENCY
3. EAL Designator(s):_______________________(Use three EAL designators when using the Fission Product Barrier Matrix.)
4. Brief Description of the Event:_____________________________________________________________
5. Radiological Conditions: (Check one under both Airborne and Liquid column.)

Airborne Releases Offsite Liquid Releases Offsite Minor releases within federally approved limits1 Minor releases within federally approved Releases above federally approved limits1 limits1 Release information not known Releases above federally approved limits1 (1Tech Specs/ODCM) Release information not known (1Tech Specs/ODCM)

6. Event Declared: Time:__________________ Date:_____________________
7. The Meteorological Conditions are: (Use 46 meter data from the Met Tower. IF data is NOT available from the MET tower, contact the National Weather Service by dialing 9-1-423-586-8400. The National Weather Service will provide wind direction and wind speed.)

Wind Direction is FROM:_____________degrees Wind Speed: ______________m.p.h (15 minute average) (15 minute average)

8. Provide Protective Action Recommendation utilizing Appendix H: (Check either 1 or 2 or 3)

Recommendation 1 WIND Recommendation 2 RECOMENDATION 1 RECOMENDATION 2 FROM DEGREES EVACUATE LISTED SECTORS (Mark wind EVACUATE LISTED SECTORS (2 mile Radius and 10 miles downwind) direction (2 mile Radius and 5 miles from step 7) downwind)

SHELTER remainder of 10 mile EPZ SHELTER remainder of 10 mile EPZ CONSIDER issuance of POTASSIUM CONSIDER issuance of IODIDE in accordance with the State Plan POTASSIUM IODIDE in accordance with the State Plan A1, B1, C1, D1, C7, C9, D2, D4, D5, D6, D7, D8, D9 From 26-68 A1, B1, C1, D1, C7, D2, D4, D5 A1, B1, C1, D1, A3, A4, D2, D3, D4, D5, D6, D7, D8, D9 From 69-110 A1, B1, C1, D1, A3, D2, D4, D5 A1, B1, C1, D1, A2, A3, A4, A5, A6, A7, D2, D3, D5, D6 From 111-170 A1, B1, C1, D1, A2, A3, D2, D5 A1, B1, C1, D1, A2, A3, A5, A6, A7, B2, B3, B4, B5, C2 From 171-230 A1, B1, C1, D1, A2, A3, B2, B4, C2 A1, B1, C1, D1, B2, B3, B4, B5, C2, C3, From 231-270 A1, B1, C1, D1, B2, B4, C2 A1, B1, C1, D1, B2, B3, C2, C3, C4, C5, C6, C11 From 271-325 A1, B1, C1, D1, B2, C2, C4, C5, A1, B1, C1, D1, C2, C4, C5, C6, C7, C8, C9, C10, C11, D4, D9 From 326-25 A1, B1, C1, D1, C2, C4, C5, C7, C8, D4 Recommendation 3 SHELTER all sectors CONSIDER issuance of POTASSIUM IODIDE in accordance with the State Plan Completed by ______________ Approved by (SED)________________

WBN General Emergency EPIP-5 Unit 0 Rev. 0040 Page 15 of 31 Appendix B (Page 1 of 1)

State of Tennessee Notification 1.0 State Notification CAUTION Notification of the Risk Counties / State of Tennessee is required to be completed within 15 minutes from the time of emergency declaration.

[1] REPORT the information recorded on completed Appendix A to the WBN Risk Counties A. Rhea County 9-775-2505 Person (Alternate number) 9-775-7828 Contacted ___________

B. Meigs County 9-1-423-334-3211 Person (Alternate number) 9-1-423-334-5268 Contacted ___________

C. McMinn County 9-1-423-744-5256 Person (Alternate number) 9-1-423-745-3222 Contacted ___________

[2] FAX a copy of completed Appendix A to the State of Tennessee at 9-1-615-242-9635

[3] REPORT to the State of Tennessee the information on Appendix A utilizing:

24 Hours Primary: 9-1-800-262-3300 Backup: 9-1-615-741-0001 NOTE The Time of the notification is when the State Representative answers the phone.

[4] RECORD information from the notification Name of Person Notified ____________________________

Time and Date of Notification _________________________

[5] RETURN the completed Appendix B and Appendix A to the SED.

WBN General Emergency EPIP-5 Unit 0 Rev. 0040 Page 27 of 31 Appendix H (Page 1 of 2)

Initial - Protective Action Recommendations

WBN General Emergency EPIP-5 Unit 0 Rev. 0040 Page 28 of 31 Appendix H (Page 2 of 2)

Initial - Protective Action Recommendations

5S Handout Package for Applicant

APPLICANT CUE SHEET (RETURN TO EXAMINER UPON COMPLETION OF TASK)

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

TREAT THIS AS A RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY DRILL.

Unit 1 is cooling down to support outage work. RCS temperature is 285°F and RCS pressure is 350 psig. 1A-A 6.9kV Shutdown Board is de-energized and tagged for inspection of lugs, repairs will take 90 minutes.

At 1600, the following occur:

1. A tornado touched down in the Watts Bar Hydroelectric Switchyard, severely damaging both 161kv lines to the plant which resulted in the lines being lost.
2. The 1B-B DG tripped when started. The AUO at the DG Bldg reports that the 1B-B DG Engine 2 is severely damaged.

At 1615 the AUO at the DG Bldg reports that another tornado caused damage to the C-S Diesel Building.

INITIATING CUES:

1. Assuming the listed conditions have not changed at 1618, classify the event.
2. RAISE YOUR HAND when your classification is complete.
3. Complete the associated TVA Initial Classification form.
4. Determine what, if any, Protective Action Recommendations are required.
5. RAISE YOUR HAND when you have completed the notification form.

Element(s) of this task is/are time critical.

5S

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 0 Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure EPIP-1 Emergency Plan Classification Logic Revision 0037 Quality Related Level of Use: Continuous Use Effective Date: 10-05-2012 Responsible Organization: REP, Radiological Emer. Prep.

Prepared By: Michael White Approved By: Thomas Detchemendy

WBN Emergency Plan Classification Logic EPIP-1 Unit 0 Rev. 0037 Page 2 of 53 Revision Log Revision Affected or Change Effective Page Number Date Numbers Description of Revision/Change 27 07/13/07 1, 5, 27 Plan effectiveness determination review indicate the following revisions so not reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP.

Added Turbine Building to Table 4.1 per NUMARC/NESP-007 revision 2 for PER 121163 28 12/18/2007 1, 12 13, Plan effectiveness determination review indicate the following revision does not reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP.

Added instruction note for containment high range radiation monitors for PER #100095.

29 02/13/2008 2, 9B Plan effectiveness determination review indicate the following revision does not reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP.

Revised instruction Note 5 for containment high range radiation monitors as the result of TVA testing for PER #100095.

Removed old Revision Log items.

30 09/03/2008 4 Clarified the actions to be taken in the event a plant condition occurs that meets EAL conditions but is completely resolved prior to being classified as an emergency.

31 04/01/2009 2, 7, 10, Plan effectiveness determination review 21, 29, 36, indicates the following revision does not reduce 39, 40 the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP.

Removed a duplicate EAL (6.4 Fuel Handling) from the Shutdown System Degradation section as the EAL is covered in Section 7.4 (Fuel Handling) of the procedure. PER 142875 Corrected page numbering and formatting.

WBN Emergency Plan Classification Logic EPIP-1 Unit 0 Rev. 0037 Page 3 of 53 Revision Log Revision Affected or Change Effective Page Number Date Numbers Description of Revision/Change 32 02/01/2010 1, 2, 9B, Changed to Continuous Use procedure.

34, 45 Changed O to zero 0 on EAL 5.6 Pressure Indicator nomenclature and changed 0-RE-90-101 to 0-RE-90-101B to align with the REP (PER 173367).

Revised note #5 on page 9B to include statement regarding insulation resistance.

(PER 162319)

Removed BP-236, Event Critique and Root Cause Analysis from reference and replaced with PIDP-6 Root Cause Analysis and SPP-3.1 Corrective Action Program.

33 03/30/2010 1,2, 3, 7, Revised all security EALs in Section 4.6 to align 11, 18, 22, with NEI 03-12 revision 6, Appendix C.

27, 28, 30, Appendix C details Security Regulations that 37, 41 are to be implemented by March 31, 2010.

Revised Section 2.0 clarifying non-delegatable shift manager/SED duties. (PER 179269).

Added Definition for Security Condition.

WBN Emergency Plan Classification Logic EPIP-1 Unit 0 Rev. 0037 Page 4 of 53 Revision Log Revision Affected or Change Effective Page Number Date Numbers Description of Revision/Change 34 09/30/10 All Procedure converted from W95 to W2007 using Rev. 33. Performed line by line validation.

Changed procedure title to Emergency Plan Classification Logic in accordance with the REP Appendix C (PER 226527)

Changed the values in table 7.1 (pg 46) to align with those found in the REP Appendix C from calculation WBNTSR115.

Changed definition for explosion to align with definition found in the REP Appendix C (PER 217025)

Changed the values for EAL 1.1.5 and EAL 1.3.5 (pg 11-12) to align with those found in the REP Appendix C from calculation TI-RPS-162 (PER 226777)

Updated References (pg 7-8) to the new NPG procedures.

35 05/06/2011 pg 17 Revised EAL 2.4 Unusual Event Dose Equivalent Iodine (DEI) activity from 21uCi/g to 14UCi/g (PER 360041).

36 07/17/12 Pg 7 Removed the reference to the Operations Duty Specialist (ODS) in Step 3.0 C.8. Notifications to the State of Tennessee are made directly to the state and not through the ODS.

37 10/05/12 Pg 6,7,9 Plan Effectiveness Determination reviews indicate the following revisions do not reduce the level of effectiveness of the procedure or REP.

Adds additional guidance in section 3.1 for EALs that have a timed clock associated with the classification. Adds section 3.2 Initial Classification as part of fleet initiative to standardize procedures. (PER 591076)

WBN Emergency Plan Classification Logic EPIP-1 Unit 0 Rev. 0037 Page 5 of 53 Table of Contents 1.0 PURPOSE4 .................................................................................................................. 6 2.0 RESPONSIBILITY2,4 ................................................................................................... 6 3.0 INSTRUCTIONS4 ......................................................................................................... 6 3.1 Precautions and Limitations .......................................................................................... 6 3.2 Initial Classification ....................................................................................................... 9 4.0 RECORDS .................................................................................................................... 9 4.1 Non-QA Records .......................................................................................................... 9 4.2 QA Records .................................................................................................................. 9

5.0 REFERENCES

........................................................................................................... 10 5.1 Interfacing References ................................................................................................ 10 5.2 Other Documents ........................................................................................................ 10 : Fission Product Barrier Matrix (Modes 1-4)............................................ 12 : System Degradation ................................................................................. 16 : Loss of Power ........................................................................................... 23 : Hazards and SED Judgment .................................................................... 27 : Destructive Phenomenon......................................................................... 35 : Shutdown System Degradation ............................................................... 42 : Radiological .............................................................................................. 46 Source Notes............................................................................................. 53

WBN Emergency Plan Classification Logic EPIP-1 Unit 0 Rev. 0037 Page 6 of 53 1.0 PURPOSE4 This Procedure provides guidance in determining the classification and declaration of an emergency based on plant conditions.

2.0 RESPONSIBILITY2,4 The responsibility of declaring an Emergency based on the guidance within this procedure belongs to the Shift Manager/Site Emergency Director (SM/SED) or designated Unit Supervisor (US) when acting as the SM or the TSC Site Emergency Director (SED). The following duties CAN NOT be delegated:

Emergency Classification, Emergency Dose Approval and PAR development prior to CECC Director ownership for PAR development.

3.0 INSTRUCTIONS4 3.1 Precautions and Limitations A. The criteria in WBN EPIP-1 are given for GUIDANCE ONLY: knowledge of actual plant conditions or the extent of the emergency may require that additional steps be taken. In all cases, this logic procedure should be combined with the sound judgment of the SM/SED and/or the TSC SED to arrive at a classification for a particular set of circumstances.

B. The Nuclear Power (NP) Radiological Emergency Plan (REP) will be activated when any one of the conditions listed in this logic is detected.

C. The SM/SED shall assess, classify, and declare an emergency condition within 15 minutes after information is first available to plant operators to recognize that an EAL has been exceeded and to make the declaration promptly upon identification of the appropriate Emergency Classification Level (ECL).

1. For EAL thresholds that specify duration of the off-normal condition, the emergency declaration process runs concurrently with the specified threshold duration.
a. Consider as an example, the EAL fire which is not extinguished within 15 minutes of detection. On receipt of a fire alarm, the plant fire brigade is dispatched to the scene to begin fire suppression efforts.
b. If the fire is still burning after the specified duration has elapsed, the EAL is exceeded, no further assessment is necessary, and the emergency declaration would be made promptly.

WBN Emergency Plan Classification Logic EPIP-1 Unit 0 Rev. 0037 Page 7 of 53 3.1 Precautions and Limitations (continued)

c. If, for example, the fire brigade notifies shift supervision 5 minutes after detection that the brigade itself cannot extinguish the fire such that the EAL will be met imminently and cannot be avoided, it is not a violation of the licensees emergency plan to declare the event before the EAL is met (e.g., the 15-minute duration has elapsed). While a prompt declaration would be beneficial to public health and safety and is encouraged, it is not required by regulation.
2. Once the off-normal condition has existed for the duration specified in the EAL, no further effort on this declaration is necessarythe EAL has been exceeded.

D. The 15-minute criterion commences when plant instrumentation, plant alarms, computer displays, or incoming verbal reports that correspond to an EAL first become available to any plant operator.

E. As used here, plant operator means any member of the plant staff who, by virtue of training and experience, is qualified to assess the indications or reports for validity and to compare the same to the EALs in the licensees emergency classification scheme.

F. Validation or confirmation of plant indications, or reports to the plant operators, is to be accomplished within the 15-minute period as part of the assessment.

Since this validation or confirmation is being performed to determine the veracity of an alarm, indication, or report, the 15-minute period starts with the availability of the alarm, indication, or report, and not the completion of the validation or confirmation, because the former is the time that the information was first available.

G. As used here, promptly means the next available opportunity unimpeded by activities not related to the emergency declaration, unless such activities are necessary for protecting health and safety.

H. This 15-minute criterion ends as soon as the nuclear power reactor licensee determines that an EAL has been exceeded and upon identification of the appropriate ECL and when the licensee makes the emergency declaration.

I. If a Critical Safety Function (CSF) is listed as an Initiating Condition: the respective status tree criteria will be monitored and used to determine the Event classification for the modes listed on the classification flowchart.

J. The highest classification for which an Emergency Action level (EAL) currently exists shall be declared.

K. After an Event classification, if the following investigation shows that Initiating Conditions were met that dictate a higher Event classification, the new event classification shall be declared at the clock time of the determination.

WBN Emergency Plan Classification Logic EPIP-1 Unit 0 Rev. 0037 Page 8 of 53 3.1 Precautions and Limitations (continued)

L. IF an EAL for a higher classification was exceeded but the present situation indicates a lower classification, the fact that the higher classification occurred SHALL be reported to the NRC and Central Emergency Control Center (CECC), but should not be declared. (Refer to NPG-SPP-03.5, Regulatory Reporting Requirements)

M. IF the Parameter is indeterminate due to instrument malfunction and the existence of the condition CAN NOT be reasonably discounted (i.e., spurious or false alarm that can be substantiated within 15 minutes) the condition is considered MET and the SM/SED SHALL follow the indications provided until such time as the alarm is verified to be false.

NOTE IF an EAL was exceeded, but the emergency has been totally resolved prior to declaration, then EPIP 2, 3, 4 and 5 are not applicable.

N. IF an EAL was exceeded, but the emergency has been totally resolved (prior to declaration), the emergency condition that was appropriate shall not be declared but reported to the NRC and Operations Duty Specialist (ODS) within one hour using NPG-SPP-03.5, Regulatory Reporting Requirements.

O. The ACCEPTABLE time frame for notification to the State of Tennessee is fifteen (15) minutes.

WBN Emergency Plan Classification Logic EPIP-1 Unit 0 Rev. 0037 Page 9 of 53 3.2 Initial Classification NOTE The Shift Manager shall be solely responsible for classification and declaration of the event.

A. Classify the Event (To determine the classification of the emergency, the responsible individual shall review the Initiating Conditions of the Events described in this procedure with the known or suspected conditions and classify the event. Declaration of the event shall occur promptly after the Shift Manager classification.)

B. Declare the Event C. If the event is determined to be one of the four emergency classifications, the Shift Manager assumes the responsibility of SED until relieved by the Plant Manager or designee.

D. Implement the applicable procedure:

EPIP-2 Notification of Unusual Event EPIP-3 Alert EPIP-4 Site Area Emergency EPIP-5 General Emergency E. Continue to review the emergency conditions in the event classification matrix and escalate, terminate, or implement recovery as appropriate. Refer To EPIP-16, Termination and Recovery.

4.0 RECORDS 4.1 Non-QA Records None 4.2 QA Records None

WBN Emergency Plan Classification Logic EPIP-1 Unit 0 Rev. 0037 Page 10 of 53 5.1 Interfacing References (continued)

5.0 REFERENCES

5.1 Interfacing References SPP-3.1.6, Root Cause Analysis NPG-SPP-03.1, Corrective Action Program NPG-SPP-03.5, Regulatory Reporting Requirements WBN-EPIP-2, Unusual Event WBN-EPIP-3, Alert WBN-EPIP-4, Site Area Emergency WBN-EPIP-5, General Emergency WBN-EPIP-9, Loss of Meteorological Data (Canceled see EPIP-13)

WBN-EPIP-13, Initial Dose Assessment for Radiological Emergencies WBN-EPIP-14, Radiological Control Response WBN-EPIP-16, Termination of the Emergency and Recovery CECC-EPIP-9, Emergency Environmental Radiological Monitoring Procedures 1-SI-68-34, Reactor Coolant System Water Inventory Balance 5.2 Other Documents 10 CFR 50, Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities 10 CFR 20, Standards for Protection from Radiation REG GUIDE-1.101, Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Nuclear Power Reactors endorsing NUMARC NESP-007 Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels.

Site Technical Specifications (Tech Specs), Abnormal Operating Instructions (AOIs),

Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs), Set Point Verification documents, Chemistry Technical documents (CTDs), and the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) are also referenced in Appendix C of the Radiological Emergency Plan.

ICS Operators Manual

WBN Emergency Plan Classification Logic EPIP-1 Unit 0 Rev. 0037 Page 11 of 53 EPPOS #2, NRC EP Position on Timeliness of Classification of Emergency Conditions EPRI Report 6695 Guidelines for Nuclear Power Plant Response to Earthquakes.

WBN Emergency Plan Classification Logic EPIP-1 Unit 0 Rev. 0037 Page 12 of 53 Attachment 1 (Page 1 of 4)

Fission Product Barrier Matrix (Modes 1-4)

FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad 1.2 RCS 1.3 Containment SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.6 RCS Identified Leakage 2.2 Loss of Function/Communication 2.7 Uncontrolled Cool Down 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection 2.8 Turbine Failure 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.9 Technical Specification 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage 2.10 Safety Limit LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3.3 Loss of DC HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT 4.1 Fire 4.3 Flammable Gas 4.5 Control Room 4.2 Explosion 4.4 Toxic Gas Evacuation Table 4-1 Table 4-2 4.6 Security Figure 4-A Figure 4-B 4.7 SED Judgment DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.4 River Level High 5.2 Tornado 5.5 River Level Low 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile 5.6 Watercraft Crash Crash Figure 5-A Table 5-1 SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 6.3 Loss of DC (Shutdown)

RADIOLOGICAL 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.2 Liquid Effluent 7.4 Fuel Handling Table 7-1 Table 7-2 Figure 7-A

WBN Emergency Plan Classification Logic EPIP-1 Unit 0 Rev. 0037 Page 13 of 53 Attachment 1 (Page 2 of 4)

UNUSUAL EVENT, ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY and GENERAL INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a protected EMERGENCY: (see SED Judgment 4.7). area without authorization.

BOMB: An explosive device (See EXPLOSION). ODCM: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual.

CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons violently ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates protesting station operations or activities at the site. that the CSF(s) is under severe challenge.

CREDIBLE SITE-SPECIFIC -The determination is made by WBN senior plant PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant management through use of information found in the Safeguards structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Damage is Contingency Plan. sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein.

CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are PROTECTED AREA: Encompasses all owner controlled areas within the six CSFs: Sub-criticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal security protected area fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

Shock, Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the FR-0 which indicates EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition is made that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator action is that one or more of the conditions associated with the event exist. Implicit in required.

this definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e. within 15 minutes.

RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): The demarcation of the area of a magnitude greater than charging pump capacity.

surrounding the WBN units in which postulated FSAR accidents will not result SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or mis-operation of plant in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable.

Figure 7-A.

SECURITY CONDITION- Any Security Event as listed in the approved EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion or a catastrophic security contingency plan that constitutes a threat/compromise to site failure of pressurized equipment that potentially imparts significant energy to security, threat/risk to site personnel, or a potential degradation to the level of near-by structures and materials.

safety of the plant. A SECURITY CONDITION does not involve a HOSTILE EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force. ACTION.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e., SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam of the following: (1) An automatic turbine runback > 15% thermal reactor generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized. power; (2) Electrical load rejection > 25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip or (4) Safety Injection System Activation.

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Source of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not SITE PERIMETER: Encompasses all owner controlled areas in the constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large immediate site environs as shown on Figures 4-A and 7-A.

quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases maintained at concentrations less body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA. The than the LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL) will not explode due to ignition. STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations.

HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or demands will be met by the station. skin contact (e.g., chlorine).

HOSTILE ACTION: An act toward a nuclear power plant or its personnel that UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of normal includes the use of violent force to destroy equipment, take hostages, and/or operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or intimidates the licensee to achieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency or water; using guns, explosives, projectiles, vehicles, or other devices used procedures are UNPLANNED.

to deliver destructive force. Other acts that satisfy the overall intent may be UNPLANNED: (With specific regard to radioactivity releases) A release of included. HOSTILE ACTION should NOT be construed to include acts of civil radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been authorized by a disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of a concerted attack on the Discharge Permit (DP). Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, nuclear power plant. Non-terrorism-based EALs should be used to address unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified such activities, (e.g., violent acts between individuals in the owner controlled on the DP, e.g., alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release area.)

times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank.

HOSTILE FORCE: Individual(s) involved with a HOSTILE ACTION. One or VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it more individuals who are engaged in a determined assault, overtly or by is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications stealth and deception, equipped with suitable weapons capable of killing, on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant maiming, or causing destruction.

personnel. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e.,

INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a within 15 minutes.

reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observable without from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH.

measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is sufficient enough to cause A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety parameters, e.g., Increasing Trend in Reactor Vessel Water Level (Full structure, system, or component. Example damage includes: deformation RVLIS) and/or Decreasing Trend on Core Thermocouple Temperatures.

due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, and/or paint INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches) should NOT be personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes of Emergency included.

Plan Classification.

VITAL AREA: Is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.

WBN Emergency Plan Classification Logic EPIP-1 Unit 0 Rev. 0037 Page 14 of 53 Attachment 1 (Page 3 of 4) 1.1. _ Fuel Clad Barrier 1.2. _ RCS Barrier

1. Critical Safety Function Status 1. Critical Safety Function Status LOSS Potential LOSS LOSS Potential LOSS Core Cooling Red (FR-C.1) Core Cooling Orange Not Applicable Pressurized Thermal Shock (FR-C.2) Red (FR-P.1)

OR OR Heat Sink Red (FR-H.1) Heat Sink Red (FR-H.1)

(RHR Not in Service) (RHR Not in Service)

-OR- -OR-

2. Primary Coolant Activity Level 2. RCS Leakage/LOCA LOSS Potential LOSS LOSS Potential LOSS RCS sample activity is Not applicable RCS Leak results in Loss of Non Isolatable RCS Leak Greater Than 300 Ci/gm subcooling (<65°F Exceeding The Capacity of dose equivalent iodine-131 Indicated), [85°F ADV] One Charging Pump (CCP)

In the Normal Charging Alignment.

OR RCS Leakage Results In Entry Into E-1

-OR- -OR-

3. Incore TCs Hi Quad Average 3. Steam Generator Tube Rupture LOSS Potential LOSS LOSS Potential LOSS Greater Than 1200°F Greater Than 727°F SGTR that results in a Not Applicable safety injection actuation OR Entry into E-3

-OR- -OR-

4. Reactor Vessel Water Level 4. Reactor Vessel Water Level LOSS Potential LOSS LOSS Potential LOSS Not Applicable VALID RVLIS level <33% VALID RVLIS level <33% Not Applicable (No RCP running) (No RCP Running)

-OR-

5. Containment Radiation Monitors LOSS Potential LOSS VALID reading increase of Not Applicable Greater Than:

293 R/hr On 1-RM-90-271 -OR-and 272 OR 261 R/hr On 1-RM-90-273 and 274 (see instruction note 5)

-OR-

6. Site Emergency Director Judgment 5. Site Emergency Director Judgment Any condition that, in the Judgment of the SM/SED, Any condition that, in the Judgment of the SM/SED, Indicates Loss or Potential Loss of the Fuel Clad Barrier Indicates Loss or Potential Loss of the RCS Barrier Comparable to the Conditions Listed Above. Comparable to the Conditions Listed Above.

WBN Emergency Plan Classification Logic EPIP-1 Unit 0 Rev. 0037 Page 15 of 53 Attachment 1 (Page 4 of 4) 1.3. _ CNTMT Barrier Modes: 1, 2, 3, 4

1. Critical Safety Function Status INSTRUCTIONS LOSS Potential LOSS NOTE:

Not Applicable Containment (FR-Z.1) Red A condition is considered to be MET if, in the OR judgment of the Site Emergency Director, the F

Actions of FR-C.1 (Red condition will be MET imminently (i.e., within 1 to I

Path) are INEFFECTIVE 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, in the absence of a viable success path).

S (i.e.: core TCs trending up) The classification shall be made a soon as this S

determination is made.

I

-OR- 1. In the matrix to the left, review the INITIATING O

2. Containment Pressure/Hydrogen CONDITIONS in all columns and identify which, N if any, INITIATING CONDITIONS are MET.

LOSS Potential LOSS Circle these CONDITIONS. P Rapid unexplained Containment Hydrogen 2. For each of the three barriers, identify if any R decrease following initial Increases to >4% by LOSS or Potential LOSS INITIATING O increase volume CONDITIONS have been MET. D OR OR 3. If a CSF is listed as an INITIATING U Containment pressure or Pressure >2.8 PSIG CONDITION; the respective status tree criteria C Sump level Not increasing (Phase B) with < One full will be monitored and used to determine the T (with LOCA in progress) train of Containment spray EVENT classification for the Modes listed on the

-OR- B classification flowchart.

A

3. Containment Isolation Status 4. Compare the barrier losses and potential losses R

LOSS Potential LOSS to the EVENTS below and make the appropriate R

declaration.

Containment Isolation is Not Applicable I

5. Containment High Range Radiation Monitors Incomplete (when required) E (HRRMs) are temperature sensitive and can be AND a Release Path to the R affected by both temperature induced currents Environment Exists and insulation resistance temperature effects. M

-OR- Following the initial increase in containment A

4. Containment Bypass temperature the HRRM monitors can give T LOSS Potential LOSS erratic indication for up to 1 minute. Steady R RUPTURED S/G is also Unexplained VALID state temperature effects on cable insulation I FAULTED outside CNTMT increase in area or resistance for the HRRM signal cable is X OR ventilation RAD monitors in dependent on containment temperature and could result in a shift in monitor output U Prolonged (>4 Hours) areas adjacent to CNTMT 1 Secondary Side release (with LOCA in progress) indication. With a containment excursion outside CNTMT from a S/G temperature to 327 °F (HELB), the output of with a SGTL > T/S Limits the HRRMs could potentially have up to a 25 R/hr indicated offset for duration of 10 minutes

-OR-until the containment air return fans are started

5. Significant Radioactivity in Containment and temperature starts to reduce. (Caution:

LOSS Potential LOSS Should the containment air return fans not Not Applicable VALID Reading increase of start, containment temperatures could Greater Than: remain elevated resulting in potential 5290 R/hr on 1-RM-90-271 false HRRM indicated readings).

and 1-RM-90-272 EVENTS OR UNUSUAL EVENT ALERT 4710 R/hr on 1-RM-90-273 Loss or Potential LOSS of Any LOSS or Potential and 1-RM-90-274 Containment Barrier LOSS of Fuel Clad barrier OR (see instruction note 5) Any LOSS or Potential

-OR- LOSS of RCS barrier

6. Site Emergency Director Judgment Any condition that, in the Judgment of the SM/SED, SITE AREA EMERGENCY GENERAL EMERGENCY Indicates Loss or Potential Loss of the CNTMT Barrier LOSS or Potential LOSS of LOSS of any two barriers Comparable to the Conditions Listed Above. any two barriers and Potential LOSS of third barrier

WBN Emergency Plan Classification Logic EPIP-1 Unit 0 Rev. 0037 Page 16 of 53 Attachment 2 (Page 1 of 7)

System Degradation FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad 1.2 RCS 1.3 Containment SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.6 RCS Identified Leakage 2.2 Loss of Function/Communication 2.7 Uncontrolled Cool Down 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection 2.8 Turbine Failure 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.9 Technical Specification 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage 2.10 Safety Limit LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3.3 Loss of DC HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT 4.1 Fire 4.3 Flammable Gas 4.5 Control Room 4.2 Explosion 4.4 Toxic Gas Evacuation Table 4-1 Table 4-2 4.6 Security Figure 4-A Figure 4-B 4.7 SED Judgment DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.4 River Level High 5.2 Tornado 5.5 River Level Low 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile 5.6 Watercraft Crash Crash Figure 5-A Table 5-1 SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 6.3 Loss of DC (Shutdown)

RADIOLOGICAL 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.2 Liquid Effluent 7.4 Fuel Handling Table 7-1 Table 7-2 Figure 7-A

WBN Emergency Plan Classification Logic EPIP-1 Unit 0 Rev. 0037 Page 17 of 53 Attachment 2 (Page 2 of 7)

UNUSUAL EVENT, ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY and GENERAL INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a protected EMERGENCY: (see SED Judgment 4.7). area without authorization.

BOMB: An explosive device (See EXPLOSION). ODCM: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual.

CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons violently ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates protesting station operations or activities at the site. that the CSF(s) is under severe challenge.

CREDIBLE SITE-SPECIFIC -The determination is made by WBN senior plant PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant management through use of information found in the Safeguards structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Damage is Contingency Plan. sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein.

CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are PROTECTED AREA: Encompasses all owner controlled areas within the six CSFs: Sub-criticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal security protected area fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

Shock, Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the FR-0 which indicates EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition is made that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator action is that one or more of the conditions associated with the event exist. Implicit in required.

this definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e. within 15 minutes.

RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): The demarcation of the area of a magnitude greater than charging pump capacity.

surrounding the WBN units in which postulated FSAR accidents will not result SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or mis-operation of plant in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable.

Figure 7-A.

SECURITY CONDITION- Any Security Event as listed in the approved EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion or a catastrophic security contingency plan that constitutes a threat/compromise to site failure of pressurized equipment that potentially imparts significant energy to security, threat/risk to site personnel, or a potential degradation to the level of near-by structures and materials.

safety of the plant. A SECURITY CONDITION does not involve a HOSTILE EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force. ACTION.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e., SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam of the following: (1) An automatic turbine runback > 15% thermal reactor generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized. power; (2) Electrical load rejection > 25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip or (4) Safety Injection System Activation.

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Source of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not SITE PERIMETER: Encompasses all owner controlled areas in the constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large immediate site environs as shown on Figures 4-A and 7-A.

quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases maintained at concentrations less body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA. The than the LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL) will not explode due to ignition. STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations.

HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or demands will be met by the station. skin contact (e.g., chlorine).

HOSTILE ACTION: An act toward a nuclear power plant or its personnel that UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of normal includes the use of violent force to destroy equipment, take hostages, and/or operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or intimidates the licensee to achieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency or water; using guns, explosives, projectiles, vehicles, or other devices used procedures are UNPLANNED.

to deliver destructive force. Other acts that satisfy the overall intent may be UNPLANNED: (With specific regard to radioactivity releases) A release of included. HOSTILE ACTION should NOT be construed to include acts of civil radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been authorized by a disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of a concerted attack on the Discharge Permit (DP). Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, nuclear power plant. Non-terrorism-based EALs should be used to address unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified such activities, (e.g., violent acts between individuals in the owner controlled on the DP, e.g., alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release area.)

times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank.

HOSTILE FORCE: Individual(s) involved with a HOSTILE ACTION. One or VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it more individuals who are engaged in a determined assault, overtly or by is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications stealth and deception, equipped with suitable weapons capable of killing, on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant maiming, or causing destruction.

personnel. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e.,

INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a within 15 minutes.

reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observable without from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH.

measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is sufficient enough to cause A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety parameters, e.g., Increasing Trend in Reactor Vessel Water Level (Full structure, system, or component. Example damage includes: deformation RVLIS) and/or Decreasing Trend on Core Thermocouple Temperatures.

due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, and/or paint INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches) should NOT be personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes of Emergency included.

Plan Classification.

VITAL AREA: Is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.

WBN Emergency Plan Classification Logic EPIP-1 Unit 0 Rev. 0037 Page 18 of 53 Attachment 2 (Page 3 of 7) 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.2 Loss of Function Mode Initiating/Condition Mode Initiating/Condition G

E N

Refer to Fission Product Barrier Matrix and E Refer to Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Radiological Effluents (Section 7)

R A

L 1,2 Inability to monitor a SIGNIFICANT 1,2 Complete loss of function needed to achieve 3,4 TRANSIENT in progress (1 and 2 and 3 and 4) 3,4 or maintain Hot Shutdown (1 or 2)

1. Loss of most (>75%) of MCR annunciators 1. CSF status tree indicates Core Cooling Red (and Annunciator Monitor) or indications 2. CSF status tree indicates Heat Sink Red S 2. SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress (RHR not in service)

I

3. Loss of ICS Computer and SPDS Note: Also Refer to Failure of Rx Protection T
4. Inability to directly monitor any of the (2.3) and Fission Product Barrier Matrix E

following CSFs:

Sub-criticality PTS Core Cooling Containment Heat Sink Inventory 1,2 UNPLANNED loss of most (>75%) MCR 4 Complete loss of function needed to achieve 3,4 annunciators (and Annunciator Printer) or Cold Shutdown when Shutdown required by indications for >15 minutes with either a Tech Specs (1 and 2 and 3)

SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in progress or ICS 1. Shutdown is required computer and SPDS Unavailable (1 and 2 2. Loss of RHR capability and 3) 3. Loss of secondary heat sink and condenser A 1. UNPLANNED loss of most (>75%) MCR L annunciators (and Annunciator Monitor) or E indications for >15 minutes.

R

2. SM/SED Judgment that increased T

surveillance is required to Safely operate the unit (beyond Shift compliment)

3. (a or b)
a. SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT in Progress
b. Loss of ICS Computer and SPDS 1,2 UNPLANNED loss of most or All Safety ALL A. Unplanned loss of all In-Plant 3,4 System annunciators or indications in the Communication capability (1 and 2 and 3)

Control Room for >15 Minutes (1 and 2 and 3) 1. UNPLANNED loss of EPABX (PAX)

U 1. UNPLANNED loss of most (>75%) MCR phones N annunciators (and Annunciator Monitor) or 2. UNPLANNED loss of all sound U indications for >15 minutes. powered phones S 2. SM/SED Judgment that increased 3. UNPLANNED loss of all radios or U surveillance is required to Safely operate the B. UNPLANNED loss of all Offsite A unit (beyond Shift compliment) Communication capability (1 and 2 and 3 L 3. ICS Computer or SPDS is in service and and 4 and 5) capable of displaying data requested. 1. UNPLANNED loss of all EPABX (PAX)

E phones V 2. UNPLANNED loss of all Radio E frequencies N 3. UNPLANNED loss of all OPX T (Microwave) system

4. UNPLANNED loss of all 1 FB-Bell lines
5. UNPLANNED loss of all FTS 2000 (NRC) system

WBN Emergency Plan Classification Logic EPIP-1 Unit 0 Rev. 0037 Page 19 of 53 Attachment 2 (Page 4 of 7) 2.3 Failure of Rx Protection 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation Mode Initiating/Condition Mode Initiating/Condition 1,2 Loss of Core cooling capability and VALID Refer to Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Trip Signals did not result in a reduction of Rx power to <5% and decreasing (1 and 2)

G 1. (a or b)

E N a. CSF status tree indicates Core Cooling E Red R

A b. CSF status tree indicates Heat Sink Red S L Y

2. FR-S.1 entered and subsequent actions S Did Not result in a Rx Power of <5% and T decreasing E M

1,2 Rx power Not <5% and decreasing after Refer to Fission Product Barrier Matrix" D VALID Auto and Manual trip signals E G

(1 and 2 and 3)

S R I 1. VALID Rx Auto Trip signal received or A T required D E A

2. Manual Rx Trip from the MCR was Not T successful. I O
3. FR-S.1 has been entered.

N 1,2 Automatic Rx trip did not occur after VALID Refer to Fission Product Barrier Matrix" U Trip signal and manual trip from MCR was 1 successful A (1 and 2)

L E 1. VALID Rx Auto Trip signal received or R required T

2. Manual Rx Trip from the MCR was successful and power is <5% and decreasing.

U Not Applicable 1, 2, Reactor Coolant System specific activity N

3, 4, exceeds LCO (Refer to WBN U

5 Tech. Spec. 3.4.16)

S U 1. Radiochemistry analysis indicates (a or b)

A L a. Dose equivalent Iodine (I-131) >0.265 Ci/gm for >48 Hours or E >14 Ci/gm.

V b. Specific activity >100/E Ci/gm E

N T

WBN Emergency Plan Classification Logic EPIP-1 Unit 0 Rev. 0037 Page 20 of 53 Attachment 2 (Page 5 of 7) 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage 2.6 RCS Identified Leakage Mode Initiating/Condition Mode Initiating/Condition G

Refer to Fission Product Barrier Matrix Refer to Fission Product Barrier Matrix" E

N E

R A

L S

Refer to Fission Product Barrier Matrix Refer to Fission Product Barrier Matrix I

T E

A Refer to Fission Product Barrier Matrix Refer to Fission Product Barrier Matrix L

E R

T U

1,2 Unidentified or pressure boundary RCS 1,2, Identified RCS leakage >25 GPM N

3,4, *5 leakage >10 GPM 3,4, *5 U 1. Identified RCS leakage (as defined by S 1. Unidentified or pressure boundary leakage Tech. Spec.) >25 GPM (a or b)

U (as defined by Tech. Spec.) >10 GPM as A indicated below (a or b) a. 1-SI-68-32 results L

a. 1-SI-68-32 results b. Level rise in excess of 25 GPM total into PRT, RCDT or CVCS Holdup Tank
b. With RCS Temperature and PZR Level E Stable, VCT Level Dropping at a Rate *Note: Applies to Mode 5 if RCS Pressurized V >10 GPM E

N *Note: Applies to Mode 5 if RCS Pressurized T

WBN Emergency Plan Classification Logic EPIP-1 Unit 0 Rev. 0037 Page 21 of 53 Attachment 2 (Page 6 of 7) 2.7 Uncontrolled Cool down 2.8 Turbine Failure Mode Initiating/Condition Mode Initiating/Condition G

Refer to Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Refer to Fission Product Barrier Matrix" S E

N Y E S R T A E L M S

Refer to Fission Product Barrier Matrix" Refer to Fission Product Barrier Matrix" I

D T

E E

G 1,2,3 Turbine Failure has generated PROJECTILES R Refer to Fission Product Barrier Matrix" A that cause VISIBLE DAMAGE to any area A L containing Safety Related equipment D E A R 1. Turbine PROJECTILES has resulted in T T VISIBLE DAMAGE in any of the following I areas: O N

Control Building Diesel Generator Bldg.

Auxiliary Building RWST Unit #1 Containment Intake Pumping Station U 1

CST U

1,2,3 UNPLANNED rapid depressurization of the 1,2,3 Turbine Failure results in Casing penetration N

Main Steam System resulting in a rapid RCS U 1. Turbine Failure which results in penetration cooldown and Safety Injection Initiation S of the Turbine Casing or Damage to Main (1 and 2)

U Generator Seals A 1. Rapid de-pressurization of Main Steam L System (<675 psig)

2. Safety Injection has initiated or is required E

V E

N T

WBN Emergency Plan Classification Logic EPIP-1 Unit 0 Rev. 0037 Page 22 of 53 Attachment 2 (Page 7 of 7) 2.9 Technical Specification 2.10 Safety Limit Mode Initiating/Condition Mode Initiating/Condition G

Not Applicable Not Applicable E

N E

R A

L S

Not Applicable Not Applicable I

T E

A Not Applicable Not Applicable L

E R

T U

1,2 Inability to reach required Shutdown within 1,2, Safety Limits have been Exceeded (1 or 2)

N Tech. Spec. limits (1 and 2) 3,4, 5 U 3,4 1. The combination of thermal power, RCS S 1. Any Tech. Spec. LCO Statement, requiring a temperature, and RCS pressure > safety U Mode reduction, has been entered limits as indicated by WBN Tech.

A Spec. Figure 2.1.1-1 Reactor Core Safety L 2. The Unit has not been placed in the required Limits Mode within the time prescribed by the LCO Action Statement 2. RCS/Pressurizer pressure exceeds safety limit (>2735 psig)

E V

E N

T

WBN Emergency Plan Classification Logic EPIP-1 Unit 0 Rev. 0037 Page 23 of 53 Attachment 3 (Page 1 of 4)

Loss of Power FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad 1.2 RCS 1.3 Containment SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.6 RCS Identified Leakage 2.2 Loss of Function/Communication 2.7 Uncontrolled Cool Down 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection 2.8 Turbine Failure 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.9 Technical Specification 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage 2.10 Safety Limit LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3.3 Loss of DC HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT 4.1 Fire 4.3 Flammable Gas 4.5 Control Room 4.2 Explosion 4.4 Toxic Gas Evacuation Table 4-1 Table 4-2 4.6 Security Figure 4-A Figure 4-B 4.7 SED Judgment DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.4 River Level High 5.2 Tornado 5.5 River Level Low 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile 5.6 Watercraft Crash Crash Figure 5-A Table 5-1 SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 6.3 Loss of DC (Shutdown)

RADIOLOGICAL 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.2 Liquid Effluent 7.4 Fuel Handling Table 7-1 Table 7-2 Figure 7-A

WBN Emergency Plan Classification Logic EPIP-1 Unit 0 Rev. 0037 Page 24 of 53 Attachment 3 (Page 2 of 4)

UNUSUAL EVENT, ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY and GENERAL INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a protected EMERGENCY: (see SED Judgment 4.7). area without authorization.

BOMB: An explosive device (See EXPLOSION). ODCM: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual.

CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons violently ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates protesting station operations or activities at the site. that the CSF(s) is under severe challenge.

CREDIBLE SITE-SPECIFIC -The determination is made by WBN senior plant PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant management through use of information found in the Safeguards structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Damage is Contingency Plan. sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein.

CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are PROTECTED AREA: Encompasses all owner controlled areas within the six CSFs: Sub-criticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal security protected area fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

Shock, Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the FR-0 which indicates EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition is made that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator action is that one or more of the conditions associated with the event exist. Implicit in required.

this definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e. within 15 minutes.

RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): The demarcation of the area of a magnitude greater than charging pump capacity.

surrounding the WBN units in which postulated FSAR accidents will not result SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or mis-operation of plant in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable.

Figure 7-A.

SECURITY CONDITION- Any Security Event as listed in the approved EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion or a catastrophic security contingency plan that constitutes a threat/compromise to site failure of pressurized equipment that potentially imparts significant energy to security, threat/risk to site personnel, or a potential degradation to the level of near-by structures and materials.

safety of the plant. A SECURITY CONDITION does not involve a HOSTILE EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force. ACTION.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e., SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam of the following: (1) An automatic turbine runback > 15% thermal reactor generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized. power; (2) Electrical load rejection > 25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip or (4) Safety Injection System Activation.

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Source of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not SITE PERIMETER: Encompasses all owner controlled areas in the constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large immediate site environs as shown on Figures 4-A and 7-A.

quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases maintained at concentrations less body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA. The than the LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL) will not explode due to ignition. STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations.

HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or demands will be met by the station. skin contact (e.g., chlorine).

HOSTILE ACTION: An act toward a nuclear power plant or its personnel that UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of normal includes the use of violent force to destroy equipment, take hostages, and/or operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or intimidates the licensee to achieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency or water; using guns, explosives, projectiles, vehicles, or other devices used procedures are UNPLANNED.

to deliver destructive force. Other acts that satisfy the overall intent may be UNPLANNED: (With specific regard to radioactivity releases) A release of included. HOSTILE ACTION should NOT be construed to include acts of civil radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been authorized by a disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of a concerted attack on the Discharge Permit (DP). Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, nuclear power plant. Non-terrorism-based EALs should be used to address unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified such activities, (e.g., violent acts between individuals in the owner controlled on the DP, e.g., alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release area.)

times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank.

HOSTILE FORCE: Individual(s) involved with a HOSTILE ACTION. One or VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it more individuals who are engaged in a determined assault, overtly or by is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications stealth and deception, equipped with suitable weapons capable of killing, on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant maiming, or causing destruction.

personnel. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e.,

INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a within 15 minutes.

reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observable without from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH.

measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is sufficient enough to cause A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety parameters, e.g., Increasing Trend in Reactor Vessel Water Level (Full structure, system, or component. Example damage includes: deformation RVLIS) and/or Decreasing Trend on Core Thermocouple Temperatures.

due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, and/or paint INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches) should NOT be personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes of Emergency included.

Plan Classification.

VITAL AREA: Is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.

WBN Emergency Plan Classification Logic EPIP-1 Unit 0 Rev. 0037 Page 25 of 53 Attachment 3 (Page 3 of 4) 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown)

Mode Initiating/Condition Mode Initiating/Condition 1,2, Prolonged loss of Offsite and Onsite AC Not Applicable 3,4 power (1 and 2)

G 1. 1A and 1B 6.9KV Shutdown Boards E de-energized for >15 minutes N

E 2. (a or b)

R A a. Core Cooling Red or Orange L b. Restoration of Either 1A or 1B 6.9KV Shutdown Board(s) is not likely within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> of loss.

S 1,2, Loss of Offsite and Onsite AC Power Not Applicable I 3,4 > 15 minutes T 1. 1A and 1B 6.9KV Shutdown Boards E de-energized for >15 minutes 1,2, Loss of Offsite Power for >15 minutes 5,6, or UNPLANNED loss of Offsite and Onsite AC A 3,4 Defuel power for >15 minutes L (1 and 2)

E 1. 1A and 1B 6.9KV Shutdown Boards

1. C and D CSSTs are not available for de-energized for >15 minutes R >15 minutes T Also Refer to Loss of Shutdown Systems (6.1)
2. 1A or 1B Diesel Generator not available U

1,2 Loss of Offsite Power for >15 minutes 5,6, or UNPLANNED loss of Offsite Power for N

3,4 Defuel >15 minutes (1 and 2)

U (1 and 2)

S 1. C and D CSSTs not available for U 1. C and D CSSTs not available for >15 minutes A >15 minutes L 2. Either Diesel Generator is supplying power

2. Each Diesel Generator is supplying power to to its respective Shutdown Board its respective Shutdown Board E

V E

N T

WBN Emergency Plan Classification Logic EPIP-1 Unit 0 Rev. 0037 Page 26 of 53 Attachment 3 (Page 4 of 4) 3.3 Loss of DC Power Mode Initiating/Condition G

Refer to Fission Product Barrier Matrix and E

Loss of Function (2.2)

N E

R L A O L S S

1,2, Loss of All Vital DC Power for >15 minutes O 3,4 F

1. Voltage <105V DC on 125V DC Vital Battery S

Buses 1-I and 1-II and 1-III and 1-IV for P I

>15 minutes O T

E Also Refer to Fission Product Barrier Matrix, W Loss of Function (2.2), and Loss of E Instrumentation (2.1) R U

A 1 Also Refer to Fission Product Barrier Matrix, L

Loss of Function (2.2), and Loss of E

Instrumentation (2.1)

R T

U 5,6, or UNPLANNED Loss of the Required Train of N

Defuel DC power for >15 minutes (1 or 2)

U S 1. Voltage <105V DC on 125V DC Vital Battery U Buses 1-I and 1-III for >15 minutes A

L 2. Voltage <105V DC on 125V DC Vital Battery Buses 1-II and 1-IV for >15 minutes E

V E

N T

WBN Emergency Plan Classification Logic EPIP-1 Unit 0 Rev. 0037 Page 27 of 53 Attachment 4 (Page 1 of 8)

Hazards and SED Judgment FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad 1.2 RCS 1.3 Containment SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.6 RCS Identified Leakage 2.2 Loss of Function/Communication 2.7 Uncontrolled Cool Down 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection 2.8 Turbine Failure 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.9 Technical Specification 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage 2.10 Safety Limit LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3.3 Loss of DC HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT 4.1 Fire 4.3 Flammable Gas 4.5 Control Room 4.2 Explosion 4.4 Toxic Gas Evacuation Table 4-1 Table 4-2 4.6 Security Figure 4-A Figure 4-B 4.7 SED Judgment DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.4 River Level High 5.2 Tornado 5.5 River Level Low 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile 5.6 Watercraft Crash Crash Figure 5-A Table 5-1 SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 6.3 Loss of DC (Shutdown)

RADIOLOGICAL 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.2 Liquid Effluent 7.4 Fuel Handling Table 7-1 Table 7-2 Figure 7-A

WBN Emergency Plan Classification Logic EPIP-1 Unit 0 Rev. 0037 Page 28 of 53 Attachment 4 (Page 2 of 8)

UNUSUAL EVENT, ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY and GENERAL INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a protected EMERGENCY: (see SED Judgment 4.7). area without authorization.

BOMB: An explosive device (See EXPLOSION). ODCM: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual.

CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons violently ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates protesting station operations or activities at the site. that the CSF(s) is under severe challenge.

CREDIBLE SITE-SPECIFIC -The determination is made by WBN senior plant PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant management through use of information found in the Safeguards structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Damage is Contingency Plan. sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein.

CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are PROTECTED AREA: Encompasses all owner controlled areas within the six CSFs: Sub-criticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal security protected area fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

Shock, Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the FR-0 which indicates EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition is made that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator action is that one or more of the conditions associated with the event exist. Implicit in required.

this definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e. within 15 minutes.

RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): The demarcation of the area of a magnitude greater than charging pump capacity.

surrounding the WBN units in which postulated FSAR accidents will not result SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or mis-operation of plant in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable.

Figure 7-A.

SECURITY CONDITION- Any Security Event as listed in the approved EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion or a catastrophic security contingency plan that constitutes a threat/compromise to site failure of pressurized equipment that potentially imparts significant energy to security, threat/risk to site personnel, or a potential degradation to the level of near-by structures and materials.

safety of the plant. A SECURITY CONDITION does not involve a HOSTILE EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force. ACTION.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e., SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam of the following: (1) An automatic turbine runback > 15% thermal reactor generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized. power; (2) Electrical load rejection > 25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip or (4) Safety Injection System Activation.

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Source of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not SITE PERIMETER: Encompasses all owner controlled areas in the constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large immediate site environs as shown on Figures 4-A and 7-A.

quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases maintained at concentrations less body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA. The than the LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL) will not explode due to ignition. STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations.

HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or demands will be met by the station. skin contact (e.g., chlorine).

HOSTILE ACTION: An act toward a nuclear power plant or its personnel that UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of normal includes the use of violent force to destroy equipment, take hostages, and/or operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or intimidates the licensee to achieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency or water; using guns, explosives, projectiles, vehicles, or other devices used procedures are UNPLANNED.

to deliver destructive force. Other acts that satisfy the overall intent may be UNPLANNED: (With specific regard to radioactivity releases) A release of included. HOSTILE ACTION should NOT be construed to include acts of civil radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been authorized by a disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of a concerted attack on the Discharge Permit (DP). Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, nuclear power plant. Non-terrorism-based EALs should be used to address unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified such activities, (e.g., violent acts between individuals in the owner controlled on the DP, e.g., alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release area.)

times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank.

HOSTILE FORCE: Individual(s) involved with a HOSTILE ACTION. One or VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it more individuals who are engaged in a determined assault, overtly or by is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications stealth and deception, equipped with suitable weapons capable of killing, on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant maiming, or causing destruction.

personnel. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e.,

INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a within 15 minutes.

reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observable without from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH.

measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is sufficient enough to cause A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety parameters, e.g., Increasing Trend in Reactor Vessel Water Level (Full structure, system, or component. Example damage includes: deformation RVLIS) and/or Decreasing Trend on Core Thermocouple Temperatures.

due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, and/or paint INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches) should NOT be personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes of Emergency included.

Plan Classification.

VITAL AREA: Is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.

WBN Emergency Plan Classification Logic EPIP-1 Unit 0 Rev. 0037 Page 29 of 53 Attachment 4 (Page 3 of 8) 4.1 FIRE 4.2 Explosions Mode Initiating/Condition Mode Initiating/Condition G

Refer to Fission Product Barrier Matrix Refer to Fission Product Barrier Matrix E

N E

R A

L S

Refer to Control Room Evacuation, (4.5) or Refer to Fission Product Barrier Matrix I

Fission Product Barrier Matrix T

E All FIRE in any of the areas listed in Table 4-1 All EXPLOSION in any of the areas listed in that is affecting Safety Related equipment Table 4-1 that is affecting Safety Related equipment (1 and 2)

(1 and 2)

1. EXPLOSION in any of the areas listed in
1. FIRE in any of the areas listed in Table 4-1 Table 4-1 A

L 2. (a or b) 2. (a or b)

E

a. VISIBLE DAMAGE to permanent a. An EXPLOSION has caused VISIBLE R

structure or Safety Related equipment DAMAGE to Safety Related equipment T

in the specified area is observed due to the FIRE b. Control Room indication of degraded Safety System or component response

b. Control Room indication of degraded due to the EXPLOSION Safety System or component response due to the FIRE Refer to Security (4.6)

U All FIRE in the PROTECTED AREA threatening All UNPLANNED EXPLOSION within the N

any of the areas listed in Table 4-1 that is Not PROTECTED AREA resulting in VISIBLE U

extinguished within 15 minutes from the Time DAMAGE to any permanent structure or S

of Control Room notification or verification of equipment (Figure 4-A)

U Control Room Alarm (Figure 4-A)

A Refer to Security (4.6)

L E

V E

N T

WBN Emergency Plan Classification Logic EPIP-1 Unit 0 Rev. 0037 Page 30 of 53 Attachment 4 (Page 4 of 8)

TABLE 4-1 H PLANT AREAS ASSOCIATED WITH FIRE AND EXPLOSION EALS A Z

Unit #1 Reactor Building Additional Diesel Generator Building A R

Auxiliary Building Intake Pumping Station D Control Building Additional Equipment Buildings (Unit 1&2) S

/

Diesel Generator Building RWST S CST Turbine Building E D

Figure 4-A J PROTECTED AREA/SITE PERIMETER U D

G M

E N

T U

1

WBN Emergency Plan Classification Logic EPIP-1 Unit 0 Rev. 0037 Page 31 of 53 Attachment 4 (Page 5 of 8) 4.3 Flammable Gas 4.4 Toxic Gas Mode Initiating/Condition Mode Initiating/Condition G

Refer to Fission Product Barrier Matrix Refer to Fission Product Barrier Matrix E

N E

R A

L S

Refer to Fission Product Barrier Matrix Refer to Fission Product Barrier Matrix I

T E

All UNPLANNED release of Flammable Gas All Release of TOXIC GAS within a facility within a facility structure containing Safety structure which Prohibits Safe Operation of Related equipment or associated with Power systems required to establish or maintain production Cold S/D (1 and 2 and 3)

1. Plant personnel report the average of three 1. Plant personnel report TOXIC GAS within readings taken in a ~10 ft triangular Area is any building listed in Table 4-2

>25% Lower Explosive Limit (LEL), as A indicated on the monitoring instrument within 2. (a or b)

L any building listed in Table 4-2. a. Plant personnel report Severe Adverse E Health Reactions due to TOXIC GAS R (i.e., burning eyes, nose, throat, T dizziness)

b. Sampling indications > Permissible Exposure Limit (PEL)
3. Plant personnel would be unable to perform actions necessary to establish and maintain Cold Shutdown while utilizing appropriate personnel protection equipment.

All A. UNPLANNED release of Flammable Gas All A. Normal Operations impeded due to access within the SITE PERIMETER restrictions caused by TOXIC GAS U concentrations within a Facility Structure

1. Plant personnel report the average of listed in Table 4-2 N three readings taken in a ~10 ft U Triangular Area is >25% Lower OR S Explosive Limit (LEL), as indicated on U the monitoring instrument within the B. Confirmed report by Local, County, or A SITE PERIMETER (Refer to State Officials that a Large Offsite TOXIC L Figure 4-B) GAS release has occurred within One Mile of the Site with potential to enter the OR Site Perimeter in concentrations greater E than the (PEL) Permissible Exposure B. Confirmed report by Local, County, or Limit thus causing an Evacuation V State Officials that a Large Offsite E (Figure 4-B)

Flammable Gas release has occurred N within One Mile of the Site with potential T to enter the SITE PERIMETER in concentrations >25% of LEL Lower Explosive Limit (Refer to Figure 4-B)

WBN Emergency Plan Classification Logic EPIP-1 Unit 0 Rev. 0037 Page 32 of 53 Attachment 4 (Page 6 of 8)

TABLE 4-2 H A

Plant Structures Associated With TOXIC or Flammable Gas EALs Z A

Unit #1 & 2 Reactor Buildings Additional Diesel Generator Building R D

Auxiliary Building Intake Pumping Station S

/

Control Building Additional Equipment Bldgs (Unit 1&2) S E

Diesel Generator Building CDWE Building D Turbine Building J U

D Figure 4-B G ONE MILE RADIUS/SITE PERIMETER M E

N T

U 1

WBN Emergency Plan Classification Logic EPIP-1 Unit 0 Rev. 0037 Page 33 of 53 Attachment 4 (Page 7 of 8) 4.5 Control Room Evacuation 4.6 Security Mode Initiating/Condition Mode Initiating/Condition Refer to Fission Product Barrier Matrix All HOSTILE ACTION resulting in loss of physical control of the facility: (1 or 2)

G

1. A HOSTILE ACTION has occurred such that E

plant personnel are unable to operate N

equipment required to maintain CRITICAL E

SAFETY FUNCTIONs.

R A 2. A HOSTILE ACTION has caused failure of L Spent Fuel Cooling Systems and IMMINENT fuel damage is likely for a freshly off-loaded reactor core in pool.

All Evacuation of the Control Room has been All HOSTILE ACTION within the PROTECTED initiated and Control of all necessary AREA:

equipment Has Not been established within A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has occurred 15 minutes of manning the Auxiliary Control within the PROTECTED AREA as reported by the Room (1 and 2 and 3)

Security Shift Supervisor.

1. (a or b)

Refer to Figure 4-A for a drawing of S a. AOI-30.2 Fire Safety Shutdown PROTECTED AREA and SITE PERIMETER.

I entered T b. AOI-27 Main Control Room E Inaccessibility entered

2. SM/SED Orders Control Room evacuation
3. Control has Not been established at the Remote Shutdown Panel within 15 minutes of manning the Auxiliary Control Room and transfer of switches on Panels L11A and L11B All Evacuation of the Control Room is Required All HOSTILE ACTION within the OWNER (1 and 2) CONTROLLED AREA or airborne attack
1. (a or b) threat: (1 or 2)

A

a. AOI-30.2 Fire Safe Shutdown entered 1. A HOSTILE ACTION is occurring or has L

occurred within the OWNER CONTROLED E b. AOI-27 Main Control Room AREA as reported by the Security Shift R Inaccessibility entered Supervisor.

T

2. SM/SED Orders Control Room evacuation 2. A validated notification from NRC of an airliner attack threat within 30 minutes of the site.

U Not Applicable All Confirmed SECURITY CONDITION or threat N Which Indicates a Potential Degradation in the U Level of Safety of the plant: (1 or 2 or 3)

S

1. A SECURITY CONDITION that does NOT U involve a HOSTILE ACTION as reported by A the Security Shift Supervisor.

L

2. A site specific credible threat notification.
3. A validated notification from NRC providing E information of an aircraft threat.

V E

N T

WBN Emergency Plan Classification Logic EPIP-1 Unit 0 Rev. 0037 Page 34 of 53 Attachment 4 (Page 8 of 8) 4.7 Emergency Director Judgment Mode Initiating/Condition All Events are in process or have occurred H which involve Actual or Imminent Substantial A G

Core Degradation or Melting With Potential for Z E

Loss of Containment Integrity or HOSTILE A N

ACTION that results in an actual loss of R E

physical control of the facility. Releases can D R

be reasonably expected to exceed EPA S A

Protective Action Guideline Exposure Levels /

L outside the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY. S Refer to Figure 7-A. E D

All Events are in process or have occurred J which involve an Actual or Likely Major U Failures of Plant Functions needed for D Protection of the Public or HOSTILE ACTION G that results in intentional damage or M malicious acts; E S

(1) toward site personnel or equipment that N I

could lead to the likely failure of or; T T

(2) that prevent effective access to equipment E U needed for the Protection of the Public. Any releases are not expected to result in 1 Exposure Levels which Exceed EPA Protective Action Guideline Exposure Levels outside the EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY.

Refer to Figure 7-A.

All Events are in process or have occurred which involve an Actual or Potential A Substantial Degradation of the Level of Safety L of the Plant or a Security Event that involves E probable life threatening risk to site personnel R or damage to site equipment because of T HOSTILE ACTION. Any releases are expected to be limited to small fractions of the EPA Protective Action Guideline Exposure Levels.

U All Events are in process or have occurred N

which indicate a Potential Degradation of the U

Level of Safety of the Plant or indicate a S

Security Threat to facility protection has been U

initiated. No releases of Radioactive Material A

requiring Offsite Response or Monitoring are L

expected unless further degradation of Safety Systems occurs.

E V

E N

T

WBN Emergency Plan Classification Logic EPIP-1 Unit 0 Rev. 0037 Page 35 of 53 Attachment 5 (Page 1 of 7)

Destructive Phenomenon FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad 1.2 RCS 1.3 Containment SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.6 RCS Identified Leakage 2.2 Loss of Function/Communication 2.7 Uncontrolled Cool Down 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection 2.8 Turbine Failure 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.9 Technical Specification 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage 2.10 Safety Limit LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3.3 Loss of DC HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT 4.1 Fire 4.3 Flammable Gas 4.5 Control Room 4.2 Explosion 4.4 Toxic Gas Evacuation Table 4-1 Table 4-2 4.6 Security Figure 4-A Figure 4-B 4.7 SED Judgment DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.4 River Level High 5.2 Tornado 5.5 River Level Low 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile 5.6 Watercraft Crash Crash Figure 5-A Table 5-1 SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 6.3 Loss of DC (Shutdown)

RADIOLOGICAL 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.2 Liquid Effluent 7.4 Fuel Handling Table 7-1 Table 7-2 Figure 7-A

WBN Emergency Plan Classification Logic EPIP-1 Unit 0 Rev. 0037 Page 36 of 53 Attachment 5 (Page 2 of 7)

UNUSUAL EVENT, ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY and GENERAL INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a protected EMERGENCY: (see SED Judgment 4.7). area without authorization.

BOMB: An explosive device (See EXPLOSION). ODCM: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual.

CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons violently ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates protesting station operations or activities at the site. that the CSF(s) is under severe challenge.

CREDIBLE SITE-SPECIFIC -The determination is made by WBN senior plant PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant management through use of information found in the Safeguards structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Damage is Contingency Plan. sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein.

CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are PROTECTED AREA: Encompasses all owner controlled areas within the six CSFs: Sub-criticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal security protected area fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

Shock, Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the FR-0 which indicates EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition is made that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator action is that one or more of the conditions associated with the event exist. Implicit in required.

this definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e. within 15 minutes.

RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): The demarcation of the area of a magnitude greater than charging pump capacity.

surrounding the WBN units in which postulated FSAR accidents will not result SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or mis-operation of plant in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable.

Figure 7-A.

SECURITY CONDITION- Any Security Event as listed in the approved EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion or a catastrophic security contingency plan that constitutes a threat/compromise to site failure of pressurized equipment that potentially imparts significant energy to security, threat/risk to site personnel, or a potential degradation to the level of near-by structures and materials.

safety of the plant. A SECURITY CONDITION does not involve a HOSTILE EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force. ACTION.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e., SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam of the following: (1) An automatic turbine runback > 15% thermal reactor generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized. power; (2) Electrical load rejection > 25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip or (4) Safety Injection System Activation.

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Source of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not SITE PERIMETER: Encompasses all owner controlled areas in the constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large immediate site environs as shown on Figures 4-A and 7-A.

quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases maintained at concentrations less body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA. The than the LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL) will not explode due to ignition. STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations.

HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or demands will be met by the station. skin contact (e.g., chlorine).

HOSTILE ACTION: An act toward a nuclear power plant or its personnel that UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of normal includes the use of violent force to destroy equipment, take hostages, and/or operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or intimidates the licensee to achieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency or water; using guns, explosives, projectiles, vehicles, or other devices used procedures are UNPLANNED.

to deliver destructive force. Other acts that satisfy the overall intent may be UNPLANNED: (With specific regard to radioactivity releases) A release of included. HOSTILE ACTION should NOT be construed to include acts of civil radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been authorized by a disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of a concerted attack on the Discharge Permit (DP). Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, nuclear power plant. Non-terrorism-based EALs should be used to address unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified such activities, (e.g., violent acts between individuals in the owner controlled on the DP, e.g., alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release area.)

times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank.

HOSTILE FORCE: Individual(s) involved with a HOSTILE ACTION. One or VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it more individuals who are engaged in a determined assault, overtly or by is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications stealth and deception, equipped with suitable weapons capable of killing, on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant maiming, or causing destruction.

personnel. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e.,

INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a within 15 minutes.

reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observable without from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH.

measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is sufficient enough to cause A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety parameters, e.g., Increasing Trend in Reactor Vessel Water Level (Full structure, system, or component. Example damage includes: deformation RVLIS) and/or Decreasing Trend on Core Thermocouple Temperatures.

due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, and/or paint INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches) should NOT be personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes of Emergency included.

Plan Classification.

VITAL AREA: Is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.

WBN Emergency Plan Classification Logic EPIP-1 Unit 0 Rev. 0037 Page 37 of 53 Attachment 5 (Page 3 of 7) 5.1 Earthquake 5.2 Tornado Mode Initiating/Condition Mode Initiating/Condition G

Refer to Fission Product Barrier Matrix Refer to Fission Product Barrier Matrix" E

N E

R A

L S

Refer to Fission Product Barrier Matrix Refer to Fission Product Barrier Matrix I

T E

All Earthquake detected by site seismic All Tornado or High Winds strikes any structure instrumentation (1 and 2) listed in Table 5-1 and results in VISIBLE DAMAGE (1 and 2)

1. (a and b)
1. Tornado or High Winds (Sustained >80 mph
a. Ann.166 D indicates OBE Spectra > one minute) strikes any structure listed in Exceeded" Table 5-1 A b. Ann.166 E indicates Seismic 2. (a or b)

L Recording Initiated E a. Confirmed report of any VISIBLE

2. (a or b) DAMAGE R

T a. Ground motion sensed by Plant b. Control Room indications of degraded personnel Safety System or component response

b. National Earthquake Information due to event Center at 1-(303) 273-8500 can Note: Site Met Data Instrumentation fails to 0 at confirm the event. >100 mph. National Weather Service Morristown 1-(423) 586-8400 can provide additional information if needed.

U All Earthquake detected by site seismic All Tornado within the SITE PERIMETER N

instrumentation (1 and 2)

U 1. Plant personnel report a Tornado has been S 1. Ann. 166 E indicator Seismic Recording sighted within the SITE PERIMETER (Refer U Initiated to Figure 5-A)

A L 2. (a or b)

a. Ground motion sensed by Plant personnel E

V b. National Earthquake Information E Center at 1-(303) 273-8500 can N confirm the event.

T

WBN Emergency Plan Classification Logic EPIP-1 Unit 0 Rev. 0037 Page 38 of 53 Attachment 5 (Page 4 of 7) 5.3 Aircraft / Projectile Crash Mode Initiating/Condition G

Refer to Fission Product Barrier Matrix" E

N D E E R S A T L R S U Refer to Fission Product Barrier Matrix Table 5-1 C I

Plant Structures Associated With Tornado/Hi T T

Wind and Aircraft EALs I E

V Unit #1 and 2 Reactor Buildings All Aircraft or PROJECTILE impacts (Strikes) any E Plant structure listed in Table 5-1 resulting in Auxiliary Building P

VISIBLE DAMAGE (1 and 2) H Control Building

1. Plant personnel report aircraft or E PROJECTILE has impacted any structure Diesel Generator Building N A listed in Table 5-1 O L Additional Diesel Generator Building M

E 2. (a or b) Intake Pumping Station E R N T a. Confirmed report of any VISIBLE Additional Equipment Buildings (Units 1 & 2) O DAMAGE CDWE Building N

b. Control Room indications of degraded Turbine Building U Safety System or component response 1

due to the event within the specified RWST areas CST U

All Aircraft crash or PROJECTILE impact within N

the SITE PERIMETER U

S 1. Plant personnel report a Aircraft Crash or U PROJECTILE impact within the SITE A PERIMETER (Refer to Figure 5-A)

L E

V E

N T

WBN Emergency Plan Classification Logic EPIP-1 Unit 0 Rev. 0037 Page 39 of 53 Attachment 5 (Page 5 of 7) 5.4 River Level HIGH 5.5 River Level LOW Mode Initiating/Condition Mode Initiating/Condition G

Refer to Fission Product Barrier Matrix Refer to Fission Product Barrier Matrix" E

N E

R A

L S

Refer to Fission Product Barrier Matrix Refer to Fission Product Barrier Matrix I

T E

All River Reservoir level is at Stage II Flood All River Reservoir level is <668 Ft (AOI-22) as A Warning (1 or 2) reported by River Systems Operations L

E 1. River Reservoir level >727 Ft R

T 2. Stage II Flood Warning (AOI-7) has been issued by River Systems Operations U

All River Reservoir level is at Stage I Flood All River Reservoir level is 673 Ft (AOI-22) as N

Warning (1 or 2 or 3) reported by River Systems Operations U

S 1. River Reservoir level >726.5 Ft from April 16 U thru September 30 A

L 2. River Reservoir level >714.5 Ft from October 1 thru April 15

3. Stage I Flood Warning (AOI-7) has been E issued by River Systems Operations V

E N

T

WBN Emergency Plan Classification Logic EPIP-1 Unit 0 Rev. 0037 Page 40 of 53 Attachment 5 (Page 6 of 7) 5.6 Watercraft Crash Mode Initiating/Condition G

Refer to Fission Product Barrier Matrix" D E

E N

S E

T R

R A

U L

C S T Refer to Fission Product Barrier Matrix I I T V E E Refer to Fission Product Barrier Matrix P H

E N

A O L M E E R N T O N

U 1

All Watercraft Strikes the Intake Pumping Station U resulting in a reduction of Essential Raw N Cooling Water (ERCW) or Raw Cooling Water U (RCW) (1 and 2)

S U 1. Plant personnel report a Watercraft has A struck the Intake Pumping Station L 2. (a or b or c)

a. ERCW Supply Header Pressure E Train A 0-PI-67-18A is <15 psig V b. ERCW Supply Header Pressure E Train B 0-PI-67-17A is <15 psig N

T c. RCW Supply Header Pressure 0-PI-24-22 is <15 psig

WBN Emergency Plan Classification Logic EPIP-1 Unit 0 Rev. 0037 Page 41 of 53 Attachment 5 (Page 7 of 7)

Figure 5-A PROTECTED AREA/SITE PERIMETER

WBN Emergency Plan Classification Logic EPIP-1 Unit 0 Rev. 0037 Page 42 of 53 Attachment 6 (Page 1 of 4)

Shutdown System Degradation FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad 1.2 RCS 1.3 Containment SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.6 RCS Identified Leakage 2.2 Loss of Function/Communication 2.7 Uncontrolled Cool Down 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection 2.8 Turbine Failure 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.9 Technical Specification 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage 2.10 Safety Limit LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3.3 Loss of DC HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT 4.1 Fire 4.3 Flammable Gas 4.5 Control Room 4.2 Explosion 4.4 Toxic Gas Evacuation Table 4-1 Table 4-2 4.6 Security Figure 4-A Figure 4-B 4.7 SED Judgment DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.4 River Level High 5.2 Tornado 5.5 River Level Low 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile 5.6 Watercraft Crash Crash Figure 5-A Table 5-1 SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 6.3 Loss of DC (Shutdown)

RADIOLOGICAL 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.2 Liquid Effluent 7.4 Fuel Handling Table 7-1 Table 7-2 Figure 7-A

WBN Emergency Plan Classification Logic EPIP-1 Unit 0 Rev. 0037 Page 43 of 53 Attachment 6 (Page 2 of 4)

UNUSUAL EVENT, ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY and GENERAL INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a protected EMERGENCY: (see SED Judgment 4.7). area without authorization.

BOMB: An explosive device (See EXPLOSION). ODCM: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual.

CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons violently ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates protesting station operations or activities at the site. that the CSF(s) is under severe challenge.

CREDIBLE SITE-SPECIFIC -The determination is made by WBN senior plant PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant management through use of information found in the Safeguards structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Damage is Contingency Plan. sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein.

CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are PROTECTED AREA: Encompasses all owner controlled areas within the six CSFs: Sub-criticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal security protected area fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

Shock, Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the FR-0 which indicates EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition is made that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator action is that one or more of the conditions associated with the event exist. Implicit in required.

this definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e. within 15 minutes.

RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): The demarcation of the area of a magnitude greater than charging pump capacity.

surrounding the WBN units in which postulated FSAR accidents will not result SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or mis-operation of plant in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable.

Figure 7-A.

SECURITY CONDITION- Any Security Event as listed in the approved EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion or a catastrophic security contingency plan that constitutes a threat/compromise to site failure of pressurized equipment that potentially imparts significant energy to security, threat/risk to site personnel, or a potential degradation to the level of near-by structures and materials.

safety of the plant. A SECURITY CONDITION does not involve a HOSTILE EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force. ACTION.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e., SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam of the following: (1) An automatic turbine runback > 15% thermal reactor generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized. power; (2) Electrical load rejection > 25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip or (4) Safety Injection System Activation.

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Source of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not SITE PERIMETER: Encompasses all owner controlled areas in the constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large immediate site environs as shown on Figures 4-A and 7-A.

quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases maintained at concentrations less body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA. The than the LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL) will not explode due to ignition. STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations.

HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or demands will be met by the station. skin contact (e.g., chlorine).

HOSTILE ACTION: An act toward a nuclear power plant or its personnel that UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of normal includes the use of violent force to destroy equipment, take hostages, and/or operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or intimidates the licensee to achieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency or water; using guns, explosives, projectiles, vehicles, or other devices used procedures are UNPLANNED.

to deliver destructive force. Other acts that satisfy the overall intent may be UNPLANNED: (With specific regard to radioactivity releases) A release of included. HOSTILE ACTION should NOT be construed to include acts of civil radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been authorized by a disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of a concerted attack on the Discharge Permit (DP). Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, nuclear power plant. Non-terrorism-based EALs should be used to address unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified such activities, (e.g., violent acts between individuals in the owner controlled on the DP, e.g., alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release area.)

times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank.

HOSTILE FORCE: Individual(s) involved with a HOSTILE ACTION. One or VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it more individuals who are engaged in a determined assault, overtly or by is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications stealth and deception, equipped with suitable weapons capable of killing, on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant maiming, or causing destruction.

personnel. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e.,

INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a within 15 minutes.

reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observable without from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH.

measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is sufficient enough to cause A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety parameters, e.g., Increasing Trend in Reactor Vessel Water Level (Full structure, system, or component. Example damage includes: deformation RVLIS) and/or Decreasing Trend on Core Thermocouple Temperatures.

due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, and/or paint INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches) should NOT be personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes of Emergency included.

Plan Classification.

VITAL AREA: Is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.

WBN Emergency Plan Classification Logic EPIP-1 Unit 0 Rev. 0037 Page 44 of 53 Attachment 6 (Page 3 of 4) 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown)

Mode Initiating/Condition Mode Initiating/Condition G

5,6 Note: Additional information will be provided later Not Applicable E

pending NRC Guidance on Shutdown EALs N

E Refer to Gaseous Effluents (7.1)

R A

L 5,6 Loss of water level in the Rx vessel that has Not Applicable or will uncover fuel in the Rx vessel (1 and 2 and 3 and 4)

1. Loss of RHR capability S

I 2. Rx vessel water level < el. 718 T

E 3. Incore TCs (if available) indicate RCS temp.

>200° F

4. RCS is vented/open to CNTMT Note: If CNTMT open, refer to Gaseous Effluents (7.1) 5,6 Inability to maintain Unit in Cold Shutdown 5,6 or UNPLANNED loss of Offsite and Onsite AC De- Power for >15 minutes (1 and 2) Fuel A 1. 1A and 1B 6.9 KV Shutdown Bds
1. RHR capability is not available for RCS de-energized for >15 minutes L

Cooling E

R 2. Incore TCs (if available) indicate RCS temp.

T >200° F Note: If CNTMT open, refer to Gaseous Effluents (7.1)

U 5,6 Note: Additional information will be provided later 5,6 or UNPLANNED loss of All Offsite Power for N

pending NRC Guidance on Shutdown EALs De- >15 minutes U

Fuel (1 and 2)

S U 1. C and D CSSTS not available For A >15 minutes.

L

2. Either Diesel Generator is supplying power to its respective Shutdown Board E

V E

N T

WBN Emergency Plan Classification Logic EPIP-1 Unit 0 Rev. 0037 Page 45 of 53 Attachment 6 (Page 4 of 4) 6.3 Loss of DC (Shutdown)

Mode Initiating/Condition G

Not Applicable S E

H N

U E

T R

D A

O L

W S N Not Applicable I

T S E Y S

A Not Applicable T L E E

M R

S T

D U 5,6 or UNPLANNED loss of the required Train of DC E N De- Power for >15 minutes (1 or 2) G U fuel R S 1. Voltage <105V DC on 125V DC Vital Battery E

U Buses 1-I and 1-III for >15 minutes D

A 2. Voltage <105V DC on 125V DC Vital Battery A L Buses 1-II and 1-IV for >15 minutes. T I

O E N V U E 1 N

T

WBN Emergency Plan Classification Logic EPIP-1 Unit 0 Rev. 0037 Page 46 of 53 Attachment 7 (Page 1 of 7)

Radiological FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER MATRIX (Modes 1-4) 1.1 Fuel Clad 1.2 RCS 1.3 Containment SYSTEM DEGRADATION 2.1 Loss of Instrumentation 2.6 RCS Identified Leakage 2.2 Loss of Function/Communication 2.7 Uncontrolled Cool Down 2.3 Failure of Reactor Protection 2.8 Turbine Failure 2.4 Fuel Clad Degradation 2.9 Technical Specification 2.5 RCS Unidentified Leakage 2.10 Safety Limit LOSS OF POWER 3.1 Loss of AC (Power Ops) 3.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 3.3 Loss of DC HAZARDS and SED JUDGMENT 4.1 Fire 4.3 Flammable Gas 4.5 Control Room 4.2 Explosion 4.4 Toxic Gas Evacuation Table 4-1 Table 4-2 4.6 Security Figure 4-A Figure 4-B 4.7 SED Judgment DESTRUCTIVE PHENOMENON 5.1 Earthquake 5.4 River Level High 5.2 Tornado 5.5 River Level Low 5.3 Aircraft/Projectile 5.6 Watercraft Crash Crash Figure 5-A Table 5-1 SHUTDOWN SYSTEM DEGRADATION 6.1 Loss of Shutdown Systems 6.2 Loss of AC (Shutdown) 6.3 Loss of DC (Shutdown)

RADIOLOGICAL 7.1 Gaseous Effluent 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.2 Liquid Effluent 7.4 Fuel Handling Table 7-1 Table 7-2 Figure 7-A

WBN Emergency Plan Classification Logic EPIP-1 Unit 0 Rev. 0037 Page 47 of 53 Attachment 7 (Page 2 of 7)

UNUSUAL EVENT, ALERT, SITE AREA EMERGENCY and GENERAL INTRUSION/INTRUDER: Suspected hostile individual present in a protected EMERGENCY: (see SED Judgment 4.7). area without authorization.

BOMB: An explosive device (See EXPLOSION). ODCM: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual.

CIVIL DISTURBANCE: A group of twenty (20) or more persons violently ORANGE PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by FR-0 which indicates protesting station operations or activities at the site. that the CSF(s) is under severe challenge.

CREDIBLE SITE-SPECIFIC -The determination is made by WBN senior plant PROJECTILE: An object ejected, thrown, or launched towards a plant management through use of information found in the Safeguards structure. The source of the projectile may be onsite or offsite. Damage is Contingency Plan. sufficient to cause concern regarding the integrity of the affected structure or the operability or reliability of safety equipment contained therein.

CRITICAL-SAFETY FUNCTION (CSFs): A plant safety function required to prevent significant release of core radioactivity to the environment. There are PROTECTED AREA: Encompasses all owner controlled areas within the six CSFs: Sub-criticality, Core Cooling, Heat Sink, Pressurized Thermal security protected area fence as shown on Figure 4-A.

Shock, Integrity (Containment) and Inventory (RCS).

RED PATH: Monitoring of one or more CSFs by the FR-0 which indicates EVENT: Assessment of an EVENT commences when recognition is made that the CSF(s) is under extreme challenge; prompt operator action is that one or more of the conditions associated with the event exist. Implicit in required.

this definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e. within 15 minutes.

RUPTURED: (Steam Generator) Existence of primary to secondary leakage EXCLUSION AREA BOUNDARY (EAB): The demarcation of the area of a magnitude greater than charging pump capacity.

surrounding the WBN units in which postulated FSAR accidents will not result SABOTAGE: Deliberate damage, misalignment, or mis-operation of plant in population doses exceeding the criteria of 10 CFR Part 100. Refer to equipment with the intent to render the equipment inoperable.

Figure 7-A.

SECURITY CONDITION- Any Security Event as listed in the approved EXPLOSION: A rapid, violent, unconfined combustion or a catastrophic security contingency plan that constitutes a threat/compromise to site failure of pressurized equipment that potentially imparts significant energy to security, threat/risk to site personnel, or a potential degradation to the level of near-by structures and materials.

safety of the plant. A SECURITY CONDITION does not involve a HOSTILE EXTORTION: An attempt to cause an action at the station by threat of force. ACTION.

FAULTED: (Steam Generator) Existence of secondary side leakage (i.e., SIGNIFICANT TRANSIENT: An UNPLANNED event involving one or more steam or feed line break) that results in an uncontrolled decrease in steam of the following: (1) An automatic turbine runback > 15% thermal reactor generator pressure or the steam generator being completely depressurized. power; (2) Electrical load rejection > 25% full electrical load; (3) Reactor Trip or (4) Safety Injection System Activation.

FIRE: Combustion characterized by heat and light. Source of smoke such as slipping drive belts or overheated electrical components do not SITE PERIMETER: Encompasses all owner controlled areas in the constitute fires. Observation of flame is preferred but is NOT required if large immediate site environs as shown on Figures 4-A and 7-A.

quantities of smoke and heat are observed.

STRIKE ACTION: A work stoppage within the PROTECTED AREA by a FLAMMABLE GAS: Combustible gases maintained at concentrations less body of workers to enforce compliance with demands made on TVA. The than the LOWER EXPLOSIVE LIMIT (LEL) will not explode due to ignition. STRIKE ACTION must threaten to interrupt normal plant operations.

HOSTAGE: A person(s) held as leverage against the station to ensure that TOXIC GAS: A gas that is dangerous to life or limb by reason of inhalation or demands will be met by the station. skin contact (e.g., chlorine).

HOSTILE ACTION: An act toward a nuclear power plant or its personnel that UNPLANNED: An event or action that is not the expected result of normal includes the use of violent force to destroy equipment, take hostages, and/or operations, testing, or maintenance. Events that result in corrective or intimidates the licensee to achieve an end. This includes attack by air, land, mitigative actions being taken in accordance with abnormal or emergency or water; using guns, explosives, projectiles, vehicles, or other devices used procedures are UNPLANNED.

to deliver destructive force. Other acts that satisfy the overall intent may be UNPLANNED: (With specific regard to radioactivity releases) A release of included. HOSTILE ACTION should NOT be construed to include acts of civil radioactivity is UNPLANNED if the release has not been authorized by a disobedience or felonious acts that are not part of a concerted attack on the Discharge Permit (DP). Implicit in this definition are unintentional releases, nuclear power plant. Non-terrorism-based EALs should be used to address unmonitored releases, or planned releases that exceed a condition specified such activities, (e.g., violent acts between individuals in the owner controlled on the DP, e.g., alarm setpoints, minimum dilution flow, minimum release area.)

times, maximum release rates, and/or discharge of incorrect tank.

HOSTILE FORCE: Individual(s) involved with a HOSTILE ACTION. One or VALID: An indication or report or condition is considered to be VALID when it more individuals who are engaged in a determined assault, overtly or by is conclusively verified by (1) an instrument channel check, or (2) indications stealth and deception, equipped with suitable weapons capable of killing, on related or redundant indicators, or (3) by direct observation by plant maiming, or causing destruction.

personnel. Implicit in this definition is the need for timely assessment, i.e.,

INEFFECTIVE: The specified restoration action(s) does not result in a within 15 minutes.

reduction in the level of severity of the RED PATH condition within 15 minutes VISIBLE DAMAGE: Damage to equipment that is readily observable without from identification of the Core Cooling CSF Status Tree RED PATH.

measurements, testing, or analyses. Damage is sufficient enough to cause A reduction in the level of severity is an improvement in the applicable concern regarding the continued operability or reliability of affected safety parameters, e.g., Increasing Trend in Reactor Vessel Water Level (Full structure, system, or component. Example damage includes: deformation RVLIS) and/or Decreasing Trend on Core Thermocouple Temperatures.

due to heat or impact, denting, penetration, rupture, cracking, and/or paint INITIATING CONDITIONS: Plant Parameters, radiation monitor readings or blistering. Surface blemishes (e.g., paint chipping, scratches) should NOT be personnel observations that identify an Event for purposes of Emergency included.

Plan Classification.

VITAL AREA: Is any area within the PROTECTED AREA which contains equipment, systems, devices, or material, the failure, destruction, or release of which could directly or indirectly endanger the public health and safety by exposure to radiation.

WBN Emergency Plan Classification Logic EPIP-1 Unit 0 Rev. 0037 Page 48 of 53 Attachment 7 (Page 3 of 7) 7.1 Gaseous Effluents 7.2 Liquid Effluents Mode Initiating/Condition Mode Initiating/Condition All EAB dose resulting from an actual or imminent Not Applicable release of Gaseous Radioactivity that exceeds 1000 mrem TEDE or 5000 mrem Thyroid CDE for the actual or projected duration of the release (1 or 2 or 3)

G 1. A VALID Rad monitor reading exceeds the values E under General in Table 7-1 for >15 minutes, unless N assessment within this time period confirms that the E Criterion is Not exceeded.

R A 2. Field survey results indicate >1000 mrem/hr L gamma or an I-131 concentration of 3.9E-6 Ci/cc at SP

3. EP dose assessment results indicate EAB dose

>1000 mrem TEDE or >5000 mrem Thyroid CDE for the actual or projected duration of the release (Figure 7-A)

All EAB dose resulting from an actual or imminent Not Applicable release of Gaseous Radioactivity that exceeds 100 mrem TEDE or 500 mrem Thyroid CDE for the actual or projected duration of the release (1 or 2 or 3)

1. A VALID Rad monitor reading exceeds the values S under Site in Table 7-1 for >15 minutes, unless I assessment within this time period confirms that the T Criterion is Not exceeded E
2. Field survey results indicate >100 mrem/hr gamma or an I-131 concentration of 3.9E-7 Ci/cc at SP
3. EP dose assessment results indicate EAB dose

>100 mrem TEDE or >500 mrem Thyroid CDE for the actual or projected duration of the release (Figure 7-A)

All Any UNPLANNED release of Gaseous Radioactivity All Any UNPLANNED release of Liquid Radioactivity that exceeds 200 times the ODCM Limit for that exceeds 200 times the ODCM Limit for

>15 minutes (1 or 2 or 3) >15 minutes (1 or 2)

1. A VALID Rad monitor reading exceeds the values A under Alert in Table 7-1 for >15 minutes, unless 1. A VALID Rad monitor reading exceeds the values L assessment within this time period confirms that the under Alert in Table 7-1 for >15 minutes, unless E Criterion is Not exceeded assessment within this time period confirms that the R Criterion is Not exceeded.

T 2. Field survey results indicate >10 mrem/hr gamma at SP >15 minutes 2. Sample results exceed 200 times the ODCM limit value for an unmonitored release of liquid

3. EP dose assessment results indicate EAB dose radioactivity >15 minutes in duration

>10 mrem TEDE for the duration of the release (Figure 7-A)

U All Any UNPLANNED release of Gaseous Radioactivity All Any UNPLANNED release of Liquid Radioactivity to N that exceeds 2 times the ODCM Limit for the Environment that exceeds 2 times the ODCM U >60 minutes (1 or 2 or 3) Limit for >60 minutes (1 or 2)

S

1. A VALID Rad monitor reading exceeds the values 1. A VALID Rad monitor reading exceeds the values U

under UE in Table 7-1 for >60 minutes, unless under UE in Table 7-1 for >60 minutes, unless A assessment within this time period confirms that the assessment within this time period confirms that the L Criterion is Not exceeded Criterion is Not exceeded.

2. Field survey results indicate >0.1 mrem/hr gamma 2. Sample results exceed 2 times the ODCM limit at SP for >60 minutes value for an unmonitored release of liquid E

radioactivity >60 minutes in duration V 3. EP dose assessment results indicate EAB dose E >0.1 mrem TEDE for the duration of the release N (Figure 7-A)

T

WBN Emergency Plan Classification Logic EPIP-1 Unit 0 Rev. 0037 Page 49 of 53 Attachment 7 (Page 4 of 7)

TABLE 7-1 EFFLUENT RADIATION MONITOR EALS NOTE The values below, if exceeded, indicate the need to perform the specific assessment. If the assessment cannot be completed within 15 minute (60 minutes for NOUE), the declaration shall be made based on the VALID reading. As used here, the radiation monitor indications on ICS are the primary indicators. If ICS is unavailable, utilize the radiation monitor readings in the control room or local indication as necessary.

Monitor ICS Screen Units UE Alert Site General (2)

Total Site (GAS) EFF1 Ci/s 1.98E+05 1.98E+07 2.88E+07 2.88E+08 R U1 Shield Building EFF1 Ci/s 1.98E+05 1.98E+07 2.88E+07 2.88E+08 A 1-RE-90-400 D I

U2 Shield Building EFF1 Ci/s 1.98E+05 1.98E+07 2.88E+07 2.88E+08 O 2-RE-90-400 L O

Auxiliary Building 4RM1 cpm 4.77E+04 4.77E+06 6.93E+06 *****(1) G 0-RE-90-101B I Service Building 4RM1 cpm 1.09E+06 *****(1) *****(1) *****(1) C A

0-RE-90-132B L U1 Condenser 3PAM Ci/cc(3) 9.32E+00 9.32E+02 1.36E+03 1.36E+04 /

Vacuum F U

Exhaust E

1-RE-90-404 A&B L S/G Discharge 4RM2 mR/hr(4) NA 5.72E+02 8.31E+02 8.31E+03 H Monitors A 1-RE-90-421 thru 424 N Total Site (LIQUID) N/A (2) 1.01E-02 1.01E+00 N/A N/A D Ci/ml L

0-RE-90-122 4RM2 cpm 9.92E+05 *****(1) N/A N/A I 1-RE-90-120, 121 4RM2 cpm 5.68E+05 *****(1) N/A N/A N cpm G 0-RE-90-225 4RM2 9.92E+05 *****(1) N/A N/A 0-RE-90-212 4RM2 cpm 1.18E+04 1.18E+06 N/A N/A U 1

Release Duration Minutes 60 15 15 15 ASSESSMENT METHOD: ICS or radiation monitor (RM) readings in the MCR or local indication as necessary (1) Table values are calculated values. The ***** indicates the monitor is off scale, and other confirmatory data is required for event classification. The maximum output which can be read is 1E+07 cpm.

(2) These EALs are based on the assumption that an emergency release is restricted to one pathway from the plant. In all cases, the total site EAL is the limiting value. Therefore, in the case where there are multiple release paths from the plant, it is the total release EAL (obtained from ICS or other analysis) that will determine whether an emergency classification is warranted.

(3) This Eberline channel (1-RM-90-450) reads out in cpm in the MCR. Indications of a radioactivity release via this pathway would be S/G blowdown monitors or other indications of primary-to-secondary leakage such as S/G level increase or pressurizer level decrease. ICS calculates Ci/cc and has a visual indication of an alarm condition when the indications exceed 12.2 Ci/cc. This channel was included in the table to provide a means to further assess a release detected by other indications and to provide a path for possible escalation.

(4) These unit values are based on flow rates through one [1] PORV of 970,000 lb/hr at 1,185 psig, 600°F. Before using these values, ensure a release to the environment is ongoing (e.g. PORV).

WBN Emergency Plan Classification Logic EPIP-1 Unit 0 Rev. 0037 Page 50 of 53 Attachment 7 (Page 5 of 7)

Figure 7-A EXCLUSION AREA, SITE BOUNDARY and SITE PERIMETER NOTES

1) The Site Boundary used here is consistent with the definition in the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual. Do not confuse this boundary with the SITE PERIMETER defined in these EALs, or with other definitions of Site Boundary.
2) Numbered points are [SP] radiological survey point for all sectors.

WBN Emergency Plan Classification Logic EPIP-1 Unit 0 Rev. 0037 Page 51 of 53 Attachment 7 (Page 6 of 7) 7.3 Radiation Levels 7.4 Fuel Handling Mode Initiating/Condition Mode Initiating/Condition G

Refer to Fission Product Barrier Matrix or Refer to Gaseous Effluents" (7.1)

E Gaseous Effluents (7.1)

N E

R A

L S

Refer to Fission Product Barrier Matrix or Refer to Gaseous Effluents (7.1)

I Gaseous Effluents (7.1)

T E

All UNPLANNED increases in Radiation levels All Major damage to Irradiated Fuel, or Loss of within the Facility that impedes Safe water level that has or will uncover Irradiated Operations or establishment or maintenance Fuel outside the Reactor Vessel of Cold Shutdown (1 and 2)

(1 or 2)

1. VALID alarm on 0-RE-90-101B or
1. VALID area Radiation Monitor readings or 0-RE-90-102 or survey results exceed 15 mrem/hr in the A Control Room or CAS 0-RE-90-103 or 1-RE-90-130/131 or L 1-RE-90-112 or 1-RE-90-400 or
2. (a and b) 2-RE-90-400 E

R a. VALID area radiation monitor readings 2. (a or b)

T exceed values listed in Table 7-2

a. Plant personnel report damage of
b. Access restrictions impede operation of Irradiated Fuel sufficient to rupture Fuel systems necessary for Safe Operation Rods or the ability to establish Cold Shutdown b. Plant personnel report water level drop has or will exceed makeup capacity See UNUSUAL EVENT Note Below such that Irradiated Fuel will be uncovered U

All UNPLANNED increase in Radiation levels All UNPLANNED loss of water level in Spent Fuel N

within the Facility Pool or Reactor Cavity or Transfer Canal with U

fuel remaining covered (1 and 2 and 3)

S 1. VALID area Radiation Monitor readings U increase by a factor 1000 over normal levels 1. Plant personnel report water level drop in A Spent Fuel Pool, or Reactor Cavity, or L Note: In Either the UE or ALERT EAL, the SED Transfer Canal must determine the cause of Increase in Radiation Levels and Review Other 2. VALID alarm on 0-RE-90-102 or INITIATING/CONDITIONS for Applicability (e.g., 0-RE-90-103 or 1-RE-90-59 or 1-RE-90-60 E

a dose rate of 15 mrem/hr in the Control Room V 3. Fuel remains covered with water.

could be caused by a release associated with a E

DBA).

N T

WBN Emergency Plan Classification Logic EPIP-1 Unit 0 Rev. 0037 Page 52 of 53 Attachment 7 (Page 7 of 7)

Table 7-2 ALERT - RADIATION LEVELS Monitor No. Location Monitor Reading

  • Building and Elevation 1&2 RE-90-1 Auxiliary El. 757.0 2.5 x 103 mR/hr (spent fuel pool)

R 1-RE-90-2 Auxiliary El. 757.0 2.5 x 100 R/hr A (personnel air lock) D I

0-RE-90-3 Auxiliary El. 729.0 2.5 x 103 mR/hr O (waste pac. area) L O

0-RE-90-4 Auxiliary El. 713.0 1.5 x 103 mR/hr G (decon room) I C

0-RE-90-5 Auxiliary El. 737.0 1.5 x 103 mR/hr A (spt. fuel pool pmp. ar.) L

/

1&2-RE-90-6 Auxiliary El. 737.0 1.5 x 103 mR/hr F (comp. cl. wtr. ht. ex. ar.) U E

1&2-RE-90-7 Auxiliary El. 713.0 2 x 103 mR/hr L (sample room) H 3 A 1&2-RE-90-8 Auxiliary El. 713.0 1.5 x 10 mR/hr N (aux. feed pump area) D L

0-RE-90-9 Auxiliary El. 692.0 1.5 x 103 mR/hr I (wst. cond. evap. tk. ar.) N G

1&2-RE-90-10 Auxiliary El. 692.0 1.5 x 103 mR/hr U

(cvcs area) 1 0-RE-90-11 Auxiliary El. 676.0 1.5 x 103 mR/hr (ctmt. spry. & rhr pmp ar.)

1-RE-90-61 Auxiliary El. 736.0 2.5 x 103 mR/hr (RB low. cmpt. inst. rm.)

0-RE-90-230 Turbine El. 685.0 1.5 x 103 mR/hr (conden. demin.)

0-RE-90-231 Turbine El. 685.0 1.5 x 103 mR/hr (conden. demin.)

  • These monitors read out in mR/hr. It is assumed that this is equivalent to mrem/hr.

WBN Emergency Plan Classification Logic EPIP-1 Unit 0 Rev. 0037 Page 53 of 53 Source Notes (Page 1 of 1)

Implementing Requirements Statement Source Document Statement Monitor readings and challenges to NIR-0551, DV-847100 F00012, 1 barriers are provided in EPIP-1, and MC-850321 809004, Section 1 in (1.1 Fuel Clad 1.1.5 MSC-00956, NCO 920030366.

and 1.3 CNTMT Barrier 1.3.5),

Section 7 (7.1 Gaseous Effluents, 7.2 Liquid Effluents, Table 7-1, 7.3 Radiation Levels, 7.4 Fuel Handling and Table 7-2). Barriers are covered in Section 1, Fission Product Barrier Matrix. Monitor readings are also provided in EPIP-5, App. B, and Note 3.

SED duties that cannot be delegated. MC-84 0827 005 035A, 2 Section 2.0 Responsibility. MCS-2400 Rad Monitors used in conjunction with MC-8407 1900 3003, 3 a plant parameter to determine MSC-00701, NCO-920030222 emergency classifications. Monitor CNTMT readings are included with plant parameters for the purposes of emergency classifications. Section 1, Fission Product Barrier Matrix (1.1 Fuel Clad, 1.2 RCS, 1.3 Containment),

Section 7 (7.1 Gaseous Effluent, 7.2 Liquid Effluent and 7.3 Radiation Levels and 7.4 Fuel Handling).

EPIPs will contain the following ANSI Standard N.18.7-1976 Sub- 4 elements. Section 5.3.9.3: 01 POI Chemistry detection of failed fuel. MSC-02401, NCO-920030998 5 Emergency Preparedness Position EPPOS #2 6 (EPPOS) on timeliness of classification of emergency conditions.