ML20276A205

SRO Exam

ML20276A205
Person / Time
Site:	Watts Bar
Issue date:	10/02/2020
From:	Donna Egelstad, Gita Samaddar Division of Reactor Safety II
To:
References
Download: ML20276A205 (157)

Text

ML20276A205

76. Given the following conditions:

Unit 1 is performing 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, after experiencing a Small Break LOCA The following conditions exist:

Containment Pressure - 3.0 psig and slowly LOWERING RCS Pressure - 1600 psig and STABLE RCS Subcooling - 70 ºF and STABLE RVLIS - 50% and STABLE RCPs are RUNNING Which ONE of the following completes the statements in accordance with 1-FR-0, Status Trees, and 0-TI-12.04, User's Guide for Abnormal and Emergency Operating Instructions?

A(n) ___(1)___ path exists on FR-C, Core Cooling.

The NUSO ___(2)___ REQUIRED to transition to appropriate FR-C procedure.

A. (1) ORANGE (2) is B. (1) ORANGE (2) is NOT C. (1) YELLOW (2) is D. (1) YELLOW (2) is NOT

CORRECT ANSWER: D DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:

A. Incorrect: Plausible because the applicant may incorrectly determine that an ORANGE path exists based upon the provided plant parameters. The second part is plausible because if a RED or ORANGE path was identified without the existence of any higher priority conditions, an immediate transition to the appropriate FR-C procedure would be required.

B. Incorrect: Plausible because the applicant may incorrectly determine that an ORANGE path exists based upon the provided plant parameters. The second part is correct. . The NUSO is not required to transition to appropriate FR-C (1-FR-C.3, Saturated Core Cooling) procedure immediately.

C. Incorrect: Plausible because the first part is correct. A YELLOW path exists on FR-C, Core Cooling. The second part is plausible because if a RED or ORANGE path was identified without the existence of any higher priority conditions, an immediate transition to the appropriate FR-C procedure would be required.

D. Correct: A YELLOW path exists on FR-C, Core Cooling. The NUSO is not required to transition to appropriate FR-C (1-FR-C.3, Saturated Core Cooling) procedure immediately.

Question Number: 76 Tier: 1 Group: 1 K/A: 009 Small Break LOCA EA2 Ability to determine or interpret the following as they apply to a small break LOCA:

EA2.39 Adequate core cooling Importance Rating: 4.7 10 CFR Part 55: CFR 43.5 / 45.13 10CFR55.43.b: (5) Assessment of facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations.

K/A Match: K/A is matched because the applicant is required to have the ability to interpret and determine the appropriate procedure to address inadequate core cooling following a small break LOCA.

SRO-Only Question is SRO-Only because the question requires the applicant have knowledge of administrative procedures that specify hierarchy, implementation, and/or coordination of plant normal, abnormal, and emergency procedures.

Technical

Reference:

1-FR-0, Status Trees 0-TI-12.04, User's Guide for Abnormal and Emergency Operating Instructions Proposed references to None be provided:

Learning Objective: 3-OT-TI1204, 0-TI-12.04, User's Guide for Abnormal and Emergency Operating Instructions

26. State the requirements for implementing YELLOW path Function Restoration Instructions.

Cognitive Level:

Higher X Lower Question Source:

New X Modified Bank Bank Question History: New Question Comments:

77. Given the following conditions:

Unit 1 has experienced a Large Break LOCA The crew has JUST ENTERED 1-ES-1.3, Transfer to Containment Sump Subsequently, The STA reports a RED path for FR-P, Pressurized Thermal Shock Which ONE of the following completes the statements in accordance with 1-ES-1.3, Transfer to Containment Sump, and 0-TI-12.04, User's Guide for Abnormal and Emergency Operating Instructions?

1-ES-1.3, Appendix A, 1-FCV-63-1 Breaker Operation, ___(1)___ REQUIRED to be completed to COMPLETE the transfer sequence.

The NUSO ___(2)___ REQUIRED to transition to 1-FR-P.1, Pressurized Thermal Shock, IMMEDIATELY.

A. (1) is (2) is B. (1) is (2) is NOT C. (1) is NOT (2) is D. (1) is NOT (2) is NOT

CORRECT ANSWER: B DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:

A. Incorrect: Plausible because the first part is correct. 1-ES-1.3, Appendix A, 1-FCV 1 Breaker Operation, is required to be completed to complete the transfer sequence. The second part is plausible because if 1-ES-1.3 was not in progress, transition to 1-FR-P.1 would be required immediately.

B. Correct: 1-ES-1.3, Appendix A, 1-FCV-63-1 Breaker Operation, is required to be completed to complete the transfer sequence. The NUSO is not required to transition to 1-FR-P.1, Pressurized, Thermal Shock, immediately because 1-ES-1.3 takes priority over the performance of Function Restoration procedures.

C. Incorrect: Plausible because all other valve manipulations to complete the transfer sequence do not require any breaker manipulations. The second part is plausible because if 1-ES-1.3 was not in progress, transition to 1-FR-P.1 would be required immediately.

D. Incorrect: Plausible because all other valve manipulations to complete the transfer sequence do not require any breaker manipulations. The second part is correct. The NUSO is not required to transition to 1-FR-P.1, Pressurized, Thermal Shock, immediately because 1-ES-1.3 takes priority over the performance of Function Restoration procedures.

Question Number: 77 Tier: 1 Group: 1 K/A: 011 Large Break LOCA 2.4.6 Knowledge of EOP mitigation strategies.

Importance Rating: 4.7 10 CFR Part 55: CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13 10CFR55.43.b: (5) Assessment of facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations.

K/A Match: K/A is matched because the applicant is required to have knowledge of EOP mitigation strategies during a Large Break LOCA.

SRO-Only Question is SRO-Only because the question requires the applicant have knowledge of when to implement appendices and administrative procedures that specify hierarchy, implementation, and coordination of plant normal, abnormal, and emergency procedures.

Technical

Reference:

1-ES-1.3, Transfer to Containment Sump 0-TI-12.04, User's Guide for Abnormal and Emergency Operating Instructions Proposed references to None be provided:

Learning Objective: 3-OT-TI1204, 0-TI-12.04, User's Guide for Abnormal and Emergency Operating Instructions

27. List the two procedures which have priority over any other procedures in the EOP package and as such are exceptions to the rules of usage (ECA-0.0 and ES-1.3).

Cognitive Level:

Higher X Lower Question Source:

New X Modified Bank Bank Question History: New Question Comments:

78. Given the following conditions:

Unit 1 has experienced a RHR Pump Trip During Midloop Operation 1-AOI-14, Loss of RHR Shutdown Cooling, is in progress Which ONE of the following completes the statements in accordance with 1-AOI-14, Loss of RHR Shutdown Cooling?

The NUSO ___(1)___ REQUIRED to direct the use of Appendix C, Approximate Time to Core Boil, to determine the time to restore core cooling before core boil.

IMMEDIATE EVACUATION of all non-essential personnel from containment ___(2)___

REQUIRED.

A. (1) is (2) is B. (1) is (2) is NOT C. (1) is NOT (2) is D. (1) is NOT (2) is NOT

CORRECT ANSWER: A DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:

A. Correct: Appendix C, Approximate Time to Core Boil, is required to be utilized to determine the time to restore core cooling before core boil. Immediate evacuation of all non-essential personnel from containment is required due to the possibility of degrading containment conditions.

B. Incorrect: Plausible because the first part is correct. Appendix C, Approximate Time to Core Boil, is required to be utilized to determine the time to restore core cooling before core boil. The second part is plausible containment evacuation is not directed for all sections of 1-AOI-14.

C. Incorrect: Plausible because Appendix C, Approximate Time to Core Boil, is not required to be utilized for all sections of 1-AOI-14. The second part is correct. Immediate evacuation of all non-essential personnel from containment is required due to the possibility of degrading containment conditions.

D. Incorrect: Plausible because Appendix C, Approximate Time to Core Boil, is not required to be utilized for all sections of 1-AOI-14. The second part is plausible containment evacuation is not directed for all sections of 1-AOI-14.

Question Number: 78 Tier: 1 Group: 1 K/A: 025 Loss of Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS) 2.4.20 Knowledge of the operational implications of EOP warnings, cautions, and notes.

Importance Rating: 4.3 10 CFR Part 55: CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13 10CFR55.43.b: (5) Assessment of facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations.

K/A Match: K/A is matched because the applicant is required to have knowledge of the operational implications of EOP warnings, cautions, and notes.

SRO-Only Question is SRO-Only because the question requires the applicant to have knowledge of when to implement attachments and appendices, including how to coordinate these items with procedure steps.

Technical

Reference:

1-AOI-14, Loss of RHR Shutdown Cooling Proposed references to None be provided:

Learning Objective: 3-OT-AOI1400, , Loss of RHR Shutdown Cooling

6. DESCRIBE the reasons and applicable conditions for the notes, cautions, and major actions of AOI-14, Loss of RHR Shutdown Cooling.

Cognitive Level:

Higher X Lower Question Source:

New X Modified Bank Bank Question History: New Question Comments:

79. Which ONE of the following completes the statements in accordance with the Technical Specifications Bases?

A Steam Line Break ___(1)___ the limiting Design Basis Accident for the MAXIMUM peak containment AIR TEMPERATURE.

A Steam Line Break ___(2)___ the limiting Design Basis Accident for the MAXIMUM peak containment INTERNAL PRESSURE.

A. (1) is (2) is B. (1) is (2) is NOT C. (1) is NOT (2) is D. (1) is NOT (2) is NOT

CORRECT ANSWER: B DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:

A. Incorrect: Plausible because the first part is correct. A Steam Line Break is the limiting Design Basis Accident for the maximum peak containment air temperature.

The second part is plausible because a SLB results in a large containment pressure increase, but not as much as a DB LOCA.

B. Correct: A Steam Line Break is the limiting Design Basis Accident for the maximum peak containment air temperature. A Steam Line Break is not the limiting Design Basis Accident for the maximum peak containment internal pressure.

C. Incorrect: Plausible because a DB LOCA is also a limiting DBA for containment operability. The second part is plausible because a SLB results in a large containment pressure increase, but not as much as a DB LOCA.

D. Incorrect: Plausible because a DB LOCA is also a limiting DBA for containment operability. The second part is correct. A Steam Line Break is not the limiting Design Basis Accident for the maximum peak containment internal pressure.

Question Number: 79 Tier: 1 Group: 1 K/A: 040 Steam Line Rupture 2.2.22 Knowledge of limiting conditions for operations and safety limits Importance Rating: 4.7 10 CFR Part 55: CFR: 41.5 / 43.2 / 45.2 10CFR55.43.b: (2) Facility operating limitations in the technical specifications and their bases K/A Match: K/A is matched because the applicant is required to have knowledge of the limiting conditions for operations bases for a Steam Line Rupture.

SRO-Only Question is SRO-Only because the question requires the applicant to have knowledge of TS bases that are required to analyze TS required actions and terminology.

Technical

Reference:

Unit 1 Technical Specifications Bases Proposed references to None be provided:

Learning Objective: 3-OT-T/S0306, Containment Systems

1. DESCRIBE the following aspects of Technical Specifications and Technical Requirements for Containment Systems:

a. The Limiting Conditions for Operation, Applicability, and Bases for the LCO Cognitive Level:

Higher Lower X Question Source:

New X Modified Bank Bank Question History: New Question Comments:

80. Given the following conditions:

Unit 1 is performing 1-GO-4, Section 5.2, Unit Startup from 30% to 100% Reactor Power TDMFPs 1A and 1B are IN SERVICE Permissive P-8 LO PWR-FLOW TRIP BLOCKED [70-C], has just CLEARED Subsequently, TDMFP 1A TRIPS The NUSO enters 1-AOI-16, Loss of Normal Feedwater Which ONE of the following completes the statements in accordance with 1-AOI-16, Loss of Normal Feedwater?

To address the LOSS of TDMFP 1A, the NUSO is required to enter 1-AOI-16, ___(1)___.

To address a subsequent LOSS of ALL MFW, 1-AOI-16 directs a TRANSITION to

___(2)___.

A. (1) Section 3.3, Loss of TDMFP LESS Than 800 MWe (67% Turbine Load)

(2) 1-AOI-17, Turbine Trip B. (1) Section 3.3, Loss of TDMFP LESS Than 800 MWe (67% Turbine Load)

(2) 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection C. (1) Section 3.4, Loss of TDMFP Greater Than or Equal To 800 MWe (67%

Turbine Load)

(2) 1-AOI-17, Turbine Trip D. (1) Section 3.4, Loss of TDMFP Greater Than or Equal To 800 MWe (67%

Turbine Load)

(2) 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection

CORRECT ANSWER: B DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:

A. Incorrect: Plausible because the first part is correct. To address the loss of the TDMFP 1A, the NUSO will enter 1-AOI-16, Section 3.3, Loss of TDMFP LESS Than 800 MWe (67% Turbine Load). The second part is plausible because if both TDMFPs were lost at less than 50% power (P-9), the Turbine Trip would not result in a reactor trip, and it would be plausible to go to 1-AOI-17, Turbine Trip.

B. Correct: To address the loss of the TDMFP 1A, the NUSO will enter 1-AOI-16, Section 3.3, Loss of TDMFP LESS Than 800 MWe (67% Turbine Load). To address the loss of both TDMFPs, the NUSO will transition to 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

C. Incorrect: Plausible because if power was greater than 67% Turbine Load, it would be correct for the NUSO to enter Section 3.4, Loss of TDMFP Greater Than or Equal To 800 MWe (67% Turbine Load). The second part is plausible because if both TDMFPs were lost at less than 50% power (P-9), the Turbine Trip would not result in a reactor trip, and it would be plausible to go to 1-AOI-17, Turbine Trip.

D. Incorrect: Plausible because if power was greater than 67% Turbine Load, it would be correct for the NUSO to enter Section 3.4, Loss of TDMFP Greater Than or Equal To 800 MWe (67% Turbine Load). The second part is correct. ). To address the loss of both TDMFPs, the NUSO will transition to 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

Question Number: 80 Tier: 1 Group: 1 K/A: 054 Loss of Main Feedwater (MFW)

AA2. Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Main Feedwater (MFW):

AA2.02 Differentiation between loss of all MFW and trip of one MFW pump Importance Rating: 4.4 10 CFR Part 55: CFR: 43.5 / 45.13 10CFR55.43.b: (5) Assessment of facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations.

K/A Match: K/A is matched because the applicant is required to determine the different required procedural selection between loss of all MFW and trip of one MFW pump.

SRO-Only Question is SRO-Only because the question requires the applicant to assess abnormal plant conditions, and then select a procedure, or section of a procedure, to mitigate, recover, or with which to proceed.

Technical

Reference:

1-AOI-16, Loss of Normal Feedwater 1-ARI-71-75, Turbine Trip First Out 1-ARI-64-70, Bypass, Intlk, & Permissive Proposed references to None be provided:

Learning Objective: 3-OT-AOI1600, Loss of Normal Feedwater

4. Given a set of plant conditions, DESCRIBE operator actions required in response to the following per 1-AOI-16, Loss of Normal Feedwater:

b. TDMFP Trip or Loss of Flow with LESS than 800 MWe (67%

Turbine Load)

Cognitive Level:

Higher X Lower Question Source:

New X Modified Bank Bank Question History: New Question Comments:

81. Given the following conditions:

2-ECA-1.2, LOCA Outside Containment, is in progress on Unit 2 The crew has completed ALL directed valve manipulations The following MCR indications are observed:

RCS Pressure is STABLE PZR level is 10% and STABLE Safety Injection flow is STABLE Which ONE of the following completes the statements in accordance with 2-ECA-1.2, LOCA Outside Containment?

___(1)___ is the PRIMARY indication used to determine if the leak has been isolated.

The NUSO will transition to ___(2)___.

A. (1) PZR level (2) 2-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant B. (1) PZR level (2) 2-ECA-1.1, Loss of RHR Sump Recirculation C. (1) RCS Pressure (2) 2-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant D. (1) RCS Pressure (2) 2-ECA-1.1, Loss of RHR Sump Recirculation

CORRECT ANSWER: D DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:

A. Incorrect: Plausible because PZR Level is a parameter that is monitored during an RCS leak. The second part is plausible because all procedural actions have been taken, and the procedure directs a transition to 1-E-1, if the leak has been isolated.

B. Incorrect: Plausible because PZR Level is a parameter that is monitored during an RCS leak. The second part is correct. The NUSO will transition to 2-ECA-1.1, Loss of RHR Sump Recirculation.

C. Incorrect: Plausible because the first part is correct. RCS Pressure is the primary parameter used to determine if the leak is isolated. The second part is plausible because all procedural actions have been taken, and the procedure directs a transition to 1-E-1, if the leak has been isolated.

D. Correct: RCS Pressure is the primary parameter used to determine if the leak is isolated. The NUSO will transition to 2-ECA-1.1, Loss of RHR Sump Recirculation, because they were unable to isolate the leak.

Question Number: 81 Tier: 1 Group: 1 K/A: E04 LOCA Outside Containment EA2. Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (LOCA Outside Containment)

EA2.1 Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations.

Importance Rating: 4.3 10 CFR Part 55: CFR: 43.5 / 45.13 10CFR55.43.b: (5) Assessment of facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations.

K/A Match: K/A is matched because the applicant is required to have the ability to interpret plant conditions due to a LOCA Outside Containment and determine if the leak has been isolated and determine the correct procedural transition.

SRO-Only Question is SRO-Only because the question requires the applicant to have knowledge of diagnostic steps and decision points in the EOPs that involve transitions to event specific sub-procedures or emergency contingency procedures.

Technical

Reference:

2-ECA-1.2, LOCA Outside Containment Proposed references to None be provided:

Learning Objective: 3-OT-ECA0101, ECA-1.1 AND ECA-1.2 Loss Of RHR Recirc, LOCA Outside Containment

8. Explain the purpose and basis of each step in ECA-1.1 and 1.2.

Cognitive Level:

Higher X Lower Question Source:

New X Modified Bank Bank Question History: New Question Comments:

82. Given the following conditions:

Unit 1 has experienced a Reactor Trip 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, is in progress Subsequently, It is reported that 3 Control Rods are NOT fully inserted Which ONE of the following completes the statement in accordance with Emergency Operating Procedures and 0-TI-12.04, User's Guide for Abnormal and Emergency Operating Instructions?

The NUSO will direct the ___(1)___ to perform 1-AOI-34, Immediate Boration, ___(2)___.

A. (1) BOP (2) IMMEDIATELY B. (1) BOP (2) AFTER transitioning to 1-ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response C. (1) OAC (2) IMMEDIATELY D. (1) OAC (2) AFTER transitioning to 1-ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response

CORRECT ANSWER: B DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:

A. Incorrect: Plausible because the first part is correct. When running an AOI concurrently with an EOI the SRO will assign the BOP/CRO operator responsibility for the AOI. The second part is plausible because the condition would be identified by the OAC during the performance of 1-E-0, Step 1.

B. Correct: The NUSO will direct the BOP to perform 1-AOI-34, Immediate Boration, after transitioning to 1-ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response.

C. Incorrect: Plausible because the OAC is primarily responsible for board manipulations on MCR control panels 1-M-1 through 1-M-6. The second part is plausible because the condition would be identified by the OAC during the performance of 1-E-0, Step 1.

D. Incorrect: Plausible because the OAC is primarily responsible for board manipulations on MCR control panels 1-M-1 through 1-M-6. The second part is correct.

The NUSO will direct the performance of 1-AOI-34, Immediate Boration, after transitioning to 1-ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response.

Question Number: 82 Tier: 1 Group: 2 K/A: 024 Emergency Boration 2.4.8 Knowledge of how abnormal operating procedures are used in conjunction with EOPs Importance Rating: 4.5 10 CFR Part 55: CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13 10CFR55.43.b: (5) Assessment of facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations.

K/A Match: K/A is matched because the applicant is required to have knowledge of how abnormal operating procedures are used in conjunction with EOPs.

SRO-Only Question is SRO-Only because the question requires the applicant to have knowledge of administrative procedures that specify hierarchy, implementation, and/or coordination of plant normal, abnormal, and emergency procedures Technical

Reference:

1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection 1-ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response 0-TI-12.04, User's Guide for Abnormal and Emergency Operating Instructions OPDP-1, Conduct of Operations Proposed references to None be provided:

Learning Objective: 3-OT-TI1204, 0-TI-12.04, User's Guide for Abnormal and Emergency Operating Instructions

19. Describe how REFER TO another procedure should be applied when using the EOPs Cognitive Level:

Higher X Lower Question Source:

New X Modified Bank Bank Question History: New Question Comments:

83. Given the following conditions:

12:00 Unit 1 is at 40% power 1-AOI-33, Steam Generator Tube Leak, is in progress on Unit 1 12:03 A Unit Shutdown is being performed at 5%/minute PZR Level is being maintained ON PROGRAM Charging flow is MAXIMIZED 12:05 PZR Level begins to LOWER rapidly Which ONE of the following completes the statements in accordance with 1-AOI-33, Steam Generator Tube Leak?

The Unit Shutdown is required to be performed using ___(1)___.

At 12:05, the NUSO will DIRECT the OAC to Trip the Reactor, and ___(2)___.

A. (1) 1-AOI-39, Rapid Load Reduction (2) IMMEDIATELY initiate Safety Injection B. (1) 1-AOI-39, Rapid Load Reduction (2) initiate Safety Injection AFTER Reactor Trip is VERIFIED C. (1) 1-GO-5, Unit Shutdown From 30% Reactor Power To Hot Standby (2) IMMEDIATELY initiate Safety Injection D. (1) 1-GO-5, Unit Shutdown From 30% Reactor Power To Hot Standby (2) initiate Safety Injection AFTER Reactor Trip is VERIFIED

CORRECT ANSWER: B DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:

A. Incorrect: Plausible because the first part is correct. 1-AOI-39, Rapid Load Reduction, is required to be performed because Unit load is greater than 30% when the Unit Shutdown is commenced. The second part is plausible because the given conditions require a Reactor Trip and Safety Injection, however 1-AOI-33 directs the verification of the Reactor Trip prior to initiating SI.

B. Correct: 1-AOI-39, Rapid Load Reduction, is required to be performed because Unit load is greater than 30% when the Unit Shutdown is commenced. If PZR level is not able to be maintained, the NUSO will direct a Reactor Trip, and the initiation of Safety Injection following the verification of the Reactor Trip.

C. Incorrect: Plausible because 1-GO-5 is the normal procedure used for conducting a Unit Shutdown and is directed to be used if the Unit Shutdown was initiated from less than 30% load. The second part is plausible because the given conditions require a Reactor Trip and Safety Injection, however 1-AOI-33 directs the verification of the Reactor Trip prior to initiating SI.

D. Incorrect: Plausible because 1-GO-5 is the normal procedure used for conducting a Unit Shutdown and is directed to be used if the Unit Shutdown was initiated from less than 30% load. The second part is correct. If PZR level is not able to be maintained, the NUSO will direct a Reactor Trip, and the initiation of Safety Injection following the verification of the Reactor Trip.

Question Number: 83 Tier: 1 Group: 2 K/A: 037 Steam Generator (S/G) Tube Leak AA2. Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Steam Generator Tube Leak:

AA2.06 S/G tube failure Importance Rating: 4.5 10 CFR Part 55: CFR: 43.5 / 45.13 10CFR55.43.b: (5) Assessment of facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations.

K/A Match: K/A is matched because the applicant is required to have the ability to interpret and determine the required actions when a SG Tube Leak progresses to a SGTR.

SRO-Only Question is SRO-Only because the question requires the applicant to have knowledge of when to implement attachments and appendices, including how to coordinate these items with procedure steps.

Technical

Reference:

1-AOI-33, Steam Generator Tube Leak Proposed references to None be provided:

Learning Objective: 3-OT-AOI3300, AOI-33, Steam Generator Tube Leak

5. Given a set of plant conditions, DESCRIBE operator actions required in response to AOI-33, Steam Generator Tube Leak Cognitive Level:

Higher X Lower Question Source:

New X Modified Bank Bank Question History: New Question Comments:

84. Given the following conditions:

A reactor trip occurred on Unit 1 A loss of Control Air occurred 1-FR-H.2, Steam Generator Overpressure, is in progress The following conditions exist:

RCS temperature - 570 °F SG parameters:

SG 1 SG 2 SG 3 SG 4 Pressure 1200 psig 1190 psig 1230 psig 1210 psig Level (NR) 43% 56% 91% 61%

Which ONE of the following completes the statement describing the required actions in accordance with 1-FR-H.2, Steam Generator Overpressure?

___(1)___ SG3 PORV and ___(2)___.

A. (1) OPEN (2) continue with 1-FR-H.2 B. (1) OPEN (2) transition to 1-FR-H.3, Steam Generator High Level C. (1) Do NOT OPEN (2) continue with 1-FR-H.2 D. (1) Do NOT OPEN (2) transition to 1-FR-H.3, Steam Generator High Level

CORRECT ANSWER: A DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:

A. Correct: Conditions require SG 3 PORV to be opened to reduce the pressure in the steam generator and 1-FR-H.2 to be continued.

B. Incorrect: Plausible because opening the PORV is correct for the stated conditions and a transition to 1-FR-H.3 would be correct if SG 3 narrow range level had been higher.

C. Incorrect: Plausible because if SG 3 narrow range level had been higher, the PORV would not be opened and continuing with 1-FR-H.2 is correct for the conditions.

D. Incorrect: Plausible because if SG 3 narrow range level had been higher, the PORV would not be opened and a transition to 1-FR-H.3 would be correct.

Question Number: 84 Tier: 1 Group: 2 K/A: E13 Steam Generator Overpressure EA2. Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (Steam Generator Overpressure)

EA2.2 Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facilitys license and amendments Importance Rating: 3.4 10 CFR Part 55: CFR: 43.5 / 45.13 10CFR55.43.b: (5) Assessment of facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations K/A Match: K/A is matched because the applicant is required to interpret SG conditions and determine the appropriate procedural actions and procedure selection.

SRO-Only Question is SRO-Only because the question requires the applicant to have knowledge of diagnostic steps and decision points in the EOPs that involve transitions to event specific sub-procedures or emergency contingency procedures.

Technical

Reference:

FR-H.2, Steam Generator Overpressure Proposed references to None be provided:

Learning Objective: 3-OT-FRH0001, FUNCTIONAL RESTORATION GUIDES FR-H.1, FR-H.2, FR-H.3, FR-H.4 and FR-H.5

6. Given a set of plant conditions, use procedures FR-H.1, FR-H.2, H.3, H.4, & FR-H.5 to correctly IDENTIFY any required procedure transition.

Cognitive Level:

Higher X Lower Question Source:

New Modified Bank Bank X Question History: 2016 WBN NRC Exam Comments:

85. Given the following conditions:

FR-Z.2, Containment Flooding, is in progress on Unit 1 following a LB LOCA The TSC has requested the crew to transfer the excess water in the Containment Sump to the RWST using Containment Spray Subsequently, The STA reports that an ORANGE path exists for FR-C, Core Cooling Which ONE of the following completes the statements in accordance with FR-Z.2, Containment Flooding, and 0-TI-12.04, User's Guide for Abnormal and Emergency Operating Instructions?

The basis for transferring the Containment Sump water to the RWST is to minimize the potential for ___(1)___.

The ORANGE path for FR-C, Core Cooling, is a ___(2)___ priority than FR-Z.2, Containment Flooding.

A. (1) dilution of containment sump boron concentration (2) LOWER B. (1) dilution of containment sump boron concentration (2) HIGHER C. (1) flooding of critical plant components inside the containment (2) LOWER D. (1) flooding of critical plant components inside the containment (2) HIGHER

CORRECT ANSWER: D DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:

A. Incorrect: Plausible because the majority of stated likely sources for Containment Flooding to occur are non-borated water sources (ERCW, CCS, HPFP, Primary Water, DI Water), with SFP water being the exception. This additional non-borated water would reduce the boron concentration of the containment sump. The second part is plausible because there are Containment (FR-Z.1) Safety Functions which are higher than ORANGE path for FR-C, Core Cooling (FR-C.2)

B. Incorrect: Plausible because the majority of stated likely sources for Containment Flooding to occur are non-borated water sources (ERCW, CCS, HPFP, Primary Water, DI Water), with SFP water being the exception. This additional non-borated water would reduce the boron concentration of the containment sump. The second part is correct. The ORANGE path for FR-C, Core Cooling, is a higher priority than FR-Z.2, Containment Flooding.

C. Incorrect: Plausible because the first part is correct. The basis for transferring the Containment Sump water to the RWST is to minimize the potential for flooding of critical plant components inside the containment. The second part is plausible because there are Containment (FR-Z.1) Safety Functions which are higher than ORANGE path for FR-C, Core Cooling (FR-C.2)

D. Correct: The basis for transferring the Containment Sump water to the RWST is to minimize the potential for flooding of critical plant components inside the containment. The ORANGE path for FR-C, Core Cooling, is a higher priority than FR-Z.2, Containment Flooding.

Question Number: 85 Tier: 1 Group: 2 K/A: E15 Containment Flooding 2.4.18 Knowledge of the specific bases for EOPs Importance Rating: 4.0 10 CFR Part 55: CFR: 41.10 / 43.1 / 45.13 10CFR55.43.b: (5) Assessment of facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations.

K/A Match: K/A is matched because the applicant is required to have knowledge of the basis for FR-Z.2, Containment Flooding.

SRO-Only Question is SRO-Only because the question requires the applicant to have knowledge of administrative procedures that specify hierarchy, implementation, and/or coordination of plant normal, abnormal, and emergency procedures.

Technical

Reference:

FR-Z.2 Background Document 0-TI-12.04, User's Guide for Abnormal and Emergency Operating Instructions 1-FR-0, Status Trees Proposed references to None be provided:

Learning Objective: 3-OT-FRZ0001, Function Restoration Guidelines FR-Z.1, .2 & .3

9. EXPLAIN the purpose for and basis of each step in FR-Z.1, FR-Z.2, and FR-Z.3.

Cognitive Level:

Higher X Lower Question Source:

New Modified Bank X Bank Question History: Modified from Q25 on 2019 RO NRC Examination Comments:

Original Question:

86. Given the following conditions:

Unit 1 is at 100% power Subsequently, 1-LI-63-52, RWST Level, Channel III, fails LOW The following indications are observed:

Which ONE of the following completes the statements in accordance with Technical Specifications and OPDP-8, Operability Determination Process and Limiting Conditions for Operation Tracking?

LCO 3.3.2, ESFAS Instrumentation, Function 7. Automatic Switchover to Containment Sump, b. RWST Level - Low ___(1)___ MET.

The Automatic Switchover to Containment Sump function ___(2)___ CAPABLE of performing its specified SAFETY FUNCTION.

A. (1) is (2) is B. (1) is (2) is NOT C. (1) is NOT (2) is D. (1) is NOT (2) is NOT

CORRECT ANSWER: C DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:

A. Incorrect: Plausible because the bistable for 1-LS-63-52A is already in its required state, and the required action for the failed condition is to place the failed channel in bypass. The second part is correct. The Automatic Switchover to Containment Sump function is capable of performing its specified Safety Function.

B. Incorrect: Plausible because the bistable for 1-LS-63-52A is already in its required state, and the required action for the failed condition is to place the failed channel in bypass. The second part is plausible because the applicant may incorrectly determine that the required logic cannot be met for the automatic switchover to occur.

C. Correct: LCO 3.3.2, ESFAS Instrumentation, Function 7. Automatic Switchover to Containment Sump, b. RWST Level - Low is not met because all 4 required channels are not operable. The Automatic Switchover to Containment Sump function is capable of performing its specified Safety Function.

D. Incorrect: Plausible because the first part is correct. LCO 3.3.2, ESFAS Instrumentation, Function 7. Automatic Switchover to Containment Sump, b.

RWST Level - Low is not met because all 4 required channels are not operable. The second part is plausible because the applicant may incorrectly determine that the required logic cannot be met for the automatic switchover to occur.

Question Number: 86 Tier: 2 Group: 1 K/A: 006 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) 2.2.37 Ability to determine operability and/or availability of safety related equipment.

Importance Rating: 4.6 10 CFR Part 55: CFR: 41.7 / 43.5 / 45.12 10CFR55.43.b: (2) Facility operating limitations in the technical specifications and their bases.

K/A Match: K/A is matched because the applicant is required to determine the operability and evaluate the availability of the RWST Level -Low function for Automatic Switchover to the Containment Sump.

SRO-Only Question is SRO-Only because the question requires the applicant to evaluate Technical Specifications for the Automatic Switchover to the Containment Sump function in Table 3.3.2-1 for ESFAS Instrumentation.

Technical

Reference:

Unit 1 Technical Specifications OPDP-8, Operability Determination Process and Limiting Conditions for Operation Tracking Proposed references to None be provided:

Learning Objective: 3-OT-TS0303, TS 3.3 Instrumentation

4. Given a set of plant conditions, DETERMINE the following for Instrumentation Tech Specs:

c. The appropriate actions to be taken per the Technical Specifications or TRM Cognitive Level:

Higher X Lower Question Source:

New X Modified Bank Bank Question History: New Question Comments:

87. Which ONE of the following completes the statements regarding Auxiliary Feedwater ESFAS Instrumentation in accordance with Technical Specifications Bases?

The TURBINE Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump will AUTOMATICALLY start upon a

___(1)___.

The Auxiliary Feedwater Auto Start function is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that a MINIMUM of ___(2)___ SG(s) is/are provided with feedwater.

A. (1) Safety Injection signal actuation (2) ONE B. (1) Safety Injection signal actuation (2) TWO C. (1) SG Water Level - Low Low condition in ONE SG (2) ONE D. (1) SG Water Level - Low Low condition in ONE SG (2) TWO

CORRECT ANSWER: A DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:

A. Correct: The Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump will automatically start upon a SI signal actuation. The Auxiliary Feedwater Auto Start function is required to be operable to ensure that at least 1 SG is provided with feedwater to remove decay heat.

B. Incorrect: Plausible because the first part is correct. The Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump will automatically start upon a SI signal actuation. The second part is plausible because the applicant may incorrectly determine that a minimum of 2 SGs are required to have feedwater to remove decay heat.

C. Incorrect: Plausible because the AFW pumps have an automatic start function on low SG water level that is required by Technical Specifications. The MDAFW pumps will automatically start upon a SG Water Level - Low Low condition in one SG, however the TDAFW pump requires a SG Water Level - Low Low condition in two SGs. The second part is correct. The Auxiliary Feedwater Auto Start function is required to be operable to ensure that at least 1 SG is provided with feedwater to remove decay heat.

D. Incorrect: Plausible because the AFW pumps have an automatic start function on low SG water level that is required by Technical Specifications. The MDAFW pumps will automatically start upon a SG Water Level - Low Low condition in one SG, however the TDAFW pump requires a SG Water Level - Low Low condition in two SGs. The second part is plausible because the applicant may incorrectly determine that a minimum of 2 SGs are required to have feedwater to remove decay heat.

Question Number: 87 Tier: 2 Group: 1 K/A: 013 Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) 2.2.25 Knowledge of the bases in Technical Specifications for limiting conditions for operations and safety limits Importance Rating: 4.2 10 CFR Part 55: CFR: 41.5 / 41.7 / 43.2 10CFR55.43.b: (2) Facility operating limitations in the technical specifications and their bases K/A Match: K/A is matched because the applicant is required to have knowledge of the Technical Specification basis for the Auxiliary Feedwater automatic start function of the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS).

SRO-Only Question is SRO-Only because the question requires the applicant to have knowledge of the Technical Specification basis for the Auxiliary Feedwater automatic start function of the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS).

Technical

Reference:

Unit 1 Technical Specifications Unit 1 Technical Specifications Bases Proposed references to None be provided:

Learning Objective: 3-OT-TS0303, TS 3.3 Instrumentation

1. DESCRIBE the following aspects of Technical Specifications and Technical Requirements for Instrumentation Tech Specs:

a. The Limiting Conditions for Operation, Applicability, and Bases for the LCO.

Cognitive Level:

Higher Lower X Question Source:

New Modified Bank X Bank Question History: Modified from Q79 from 2018 WBN NRC Exam Comments:

Original Question:

88. Given the following conditions:

Units 1 and 2 are at 100% power Subsequently, A Loss of 125V DC Vital Battery Bd IV occurs Which ONE of the following completes the statements in accordance with 1-AOI-21.04, Loss of 125V DC Vital Battery Bd IV?

ALL FOUR Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) ___(1)___ START.

Performance of 1-AOI-21.04, Appendix A, Transfer of 125V DC Buses, ___(2)___

REQUIRED to RESTORE CONTROL POWER to the EDGs.

A. (1) will (2) is B. (1) will (2) is NOT C. (1) will NOT (2) is D. (1) will NOT (2) is NOT

CORRECT ANSWER: B DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:

A. Incorrect: Plausible because the first part is correct. All four Emergency Diesel Generators will start. The second part is plausible because the applicant may incorrectly determine that the performance of 1-AOI-21.04, Appendix A, Transfer of 125V DC Buses, is required to restore DG Control Power.

B. Correct: All four Emergency Diesel Generators will start. Performance of 1-AOI-21.04, Appendix A, Transfer of 125V DC Buses, is not required to restore DG Control Power. DG Control Power is supplied by the respective DG 125V DC Battery Distribution Panels, which are not affected by the loss of 125V DC Vital Battery Bd IV.

C. Incorrect: Plausible because 125V DC Vital Battery Bd IV supplies power for Unit 2 Train B equipment, therefore the applicant may incorrectly determine that only DG 2B-B will be affected. The second part is plausible because the applicant may incorrectly determine that the performance of 1-AOI-21.04, Appendix A, Transfer of 125V DC Buses, is required to restore DG Control Power.

D. Incorrect: Plausible because 125V DC Vital Battery Bd IV supplies power for Unit 2 Train B equipment, therefore the applicant may incorrectly determine that only DG 2B-B will be affected. The second part is correct. DG Control Power is supplied by the respective DG 125V DC Battery Distribution Panels, which are not affected by the loss of 125V DC Vital Battery Bd IV.

Question Number: 88 Tier: 2 Group: 1 K/A: 064 Emergency Diesel Generators (ED/G)

A2 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ED/G system; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

A2.13 Consequences of opening auxiliary feeder bus (ED/G sub supply)

Importance Rating: 2.8 10 CFR Part 55: CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13 10CFR55.43.b: (5) Assessment of facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations.

K/A Match: K/A is matched because the applicant is required to predict the impact of the loss of 125V DC Battery Bd IV on the ED/Gs, and based on those predictions, use procedures to correct the malfunction.

SRO-Only Question is SRO-Only because it requires the applicant to have knowledge of when to implement attachments and appendices, including how to coordinate these items with procedure steps.

Technical

Reference:

1-AOI-21.04, Loss of 125V DC Vital Battery Bd IV 0-SOI-82.04, Diesel Generator (DG) 2B-B Proposed references to None be provided:

Learning Objective: 3-OT-AOI2100, Loss of 125V DC Vital Battery Boards

5. Given a set of plant conditions, DETERMINE the operator actions required in AOI-21 during a loss of 125V DC Vital Battery Boards Cognitive Level:

Higher X Lower Question Source:

New X Modified Bank Bank Question History: New Question Comments:

89. Given the following conditions:

Unit 1 is at 100% power Subsequently, A Loss of ALL ERCW Flow occurs Which ONE of the following completes the statements in accordance with 0-AOI-13, Loss of Essential Raw Cooling Water and Emergency Operating Procedures?

0-AOI-13, Appendix E, Temporary Cooling (HPFP) to CCP 1A-A Oil Coolers, ___(1)___

REQUIRED to be performed.

After the reactor is shutdown, Unit 1 will be placed in Mode 4 in accordance with

___(2)___.

A. (1) is (2) 0-AOI-13, Section 3.7.1 Loss of All ERCW Flow - Unit 1 B. (1) is (2) 1-GO-6, Unit Shutdown From Hot Standby To Cold Shutdown C. (1) is NOT (2) 0-AOI-13, Section 3.7.1 Loss of All ERCW Flow - Unit 1 D. (1) is NOT (2) 1-GO-6, Unit Shutdown From Hot Standby To Cold Shutdown

CORRECT ANSWER: A DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:

A. Correct: 0-AOI-13, Appendix E, Temporary Cooling to CCP 1A-A Oil Coolers, is required to be performed. Unit 1 will be placed in Mode 4 in accordance with 0-AOI-13, Section 3.7.1 Loss of All ERCW Flow - Unit 1.

B. Incorrect: Plausible because the first part is correct. 0-AOI-13, Appendix E, Temporary Cooling to CCP 1A-A Oil Coolers, is required to be performed. The second part is plausible because if a loss of ERCW had not occurred, 1-GO-6 would be used to place the Unit in Mode 4.

C. Incorrect: Plausible because ERCW is the normal emergency cooling supply to CCP 1A-A, and ERCW flow has been lost. Appendix E aligns High Pressure Fire Protection water to cool CCP 1A-A. The second part is correct. Unit 1 will be placed in Mode 4 in accordance with 0-AOI-13, Section 3.7.1 Loss of All ERCW Flow - Unit 1.

D. Incorrect: Plausible because ERCW is the normal emergency cooling supply to CCP 1A-A, and ERCW flow has been lost. Appendix E aligns High Pressure Fire Protection water to cool CCP 1A-A. The second part is plausible because if a loss of ERCW had not occurred, 1-GO-6 would be used to place the Unit in Mode 4.

Question Number: 89 Tier: 2 Group: 1 K/A: 076 Service Water System (SWS)

A2 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the SWS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

A2.01 Loss of SWS Importance Rating: 3.7 10 CFR Part 55: CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45/3 / 45/13 10CFR55.43.b: 5) Assessment of facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations.

K/A Match: K/A is matched because the applicant is required to have the ability to predict the impacts of a loss of SWS on CCP 1A-A and based on those predictions, use procedures to mitigate the consequences of the malfunction.

SRO-Only Question is SRO-Only because the question requires the applicant to have knowledge of when to implement attachments and appendices, including how to coordinate these items with procedure steps.

Technical

Reference:

0-AOI-13, Loss of Essential Raw Cooling Water 1-ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response Proposed references to None be provided:

Learning Objective: 0-AOI-13 Loss of Essential Raw Cooling Water

4. Given a set of plant conditions, DESCRIBE operator actions required in response to the following per 0-AOI-13, Loss of Essential Raw Cooling Water:

g. Loss of flow on ALL ERCW supply headers Cognitive Level:

Higher X Lower Question Source:

New X Modified Bank Bank Question History: New Question

Comments:

90. Given the following conditions:

A Large Break LOCA has occurred on Unit 1 The following indications are observed:

Which ONE of the following completes the statements in accordance with Emergency Operating Procedures?

A FAILURE of Train A ___(1)___ Containment Isolation has occurred.

1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Appendix A, Equipment Verification, ___(2)___

DIRECT the operator to ACTUATE the failed Containment Isolation SIGNAL.

A. (1) ØA (2) will B. (1) ØA (2) will NOT C. (1) ØB (2) will D. (1) ØB (2) will NOT

CORRECT ANSWER: A DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:

A. Correct: A failure of Train A ØA Containment Isolation has occurred. 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Appendix A, Equipment Verification, will be used to mitigate the failure.

B. Incorrect: Plausible because the first part is correct. A failure of Train A ØA Containment Isolation has occurred. The second part is plausible because 1-E-0 contains specific attachments (Attachments 7-10) for Containment Isolation valve failures.

C. Incorrect: Plausible because a ØB Containment Isolation failure has occurred on Train B. The second part is correct. 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Appendix A, Equipment Verification, will be used to mitigate the failure.

D. Incorrect: Plausible because a ØB Containment Isolation failure has occurred on Train B. The second part is plausible because 1-E-0 contains specific attachments (Attachments 7-10) for Containment Isolation valve failures.

Question Number: 90 Tier: 2 Group: 1 K/A: 103 Containment System A2 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the containment system and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations A2 03 Phase A and B isolation Importance Rating: 3.8 10 CFR Part 55: CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13 10CFR55.43.b: (5) Assessment of facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations.

K/A Match: K/A is matched because the applicant is required to predict the impacts of a Phase A containment isolation malfunction and use procedures to correct the malfunction.

SRO-Only Question is SRO-Only because the question requires the applicant to have knowledge of when to implement attachments and appendices, including how to coordinate these items with procedure steps.

Technical

Reference:

1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection Proposed references to None be provided:

Learning Objective: 3-OT-EOP0000, Emergency Instructions Reactor Trip Or Safety Injection, E-0, E-0 Series

15. EXPLAIN the purpose for and basis of each step in E-0, ES-0.0, ES-0.1, ES-0.2, ES-0.3, and ES-0.4.

Cognitive Level:

Higher X Lower Question Source:

New X Modified Bank Bank Question History: New Question Comments:

91. Given the following conditions:

1-GO-2, Reactor Startup, is in progress on Unit 1 The crew is withdrawing control rods to criticality Subsequently, It is determined that criticality can NOT be achieved within the 750 pcm Upper and Lower rod position limits Which ONE of the following completes the statement in accordance with 1-GO-2, Reactor Startup?

The crew is REQUIRED to FULLY insert ___(1)___.

The basis for the 750 pcm Upper and Lower rod position limits is to ensure ___(2)___.

A. (1) Control Bank rods ONLY (2) that the reactor does NOT achieve criticality with the CONTROL banks BELOW their insertion limits B. (1) Control Bank rods ONLY (2) that when the reactor is critical, or being taken critical, the SHUTDOWN banks will be available to shut down the reactor, and the required SDM will be maintained following a reactor trip C. (1) Control AND Shutdown Bank rods (2) that the reactor does NOT achieve criticality with the CONTROL banks BELOW their insertion limits D. (1) Control AND Shutdown Bank rods (2) that when the reactor is critical, or being taken critical, the SHUTDOWN banks will be available to shut down the reactor, and the required SDM will be maintained following a reactor trip

CORRECT ANSWER: A DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:

A. Correct: The crew is required to fully insert all Control Bank rods. The TS basis for the SR 3.1.7.1 is to to ensure that the reactor does not achieve criticality with the control banks below their insertion limits.

B. Incorrect: Plausible because the first part is correct. The crew is required to fully insert all Control Bank rods. The second part is plausible because it is the basis for SR 3.1.6.1.

C. Incorrect: Plausible because the procedure directs the insertion of control rods. The second part is correct. The TS basis for the SR 3.1.7.1 is to to ensure that the reactor does not achieve criticality with the control banks below their insertion limits.

D. Incorrect: Plausible because the procedure directs the insertion of control rods. The second part is plausible because it is the basis for SR 3.1.6.1.

Question Number: 91 Tier: 2 Group: 2 K/A: 001 Control Rod Drive System A2 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunction or operations on the CRDS- and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

A2.12 Erroneous ECP calculation Importance Rating: 4.2 10 CFR Part 55: CFR: 41.5/43.5/45.3/45.13 10CFR55.43.b: (2) Facility operating limitations in the technical specifications and their bases.

K/A Match: K/A is matched because the applicant is required to predict the impacts of an erroneous ECP calculation and based on those predictions, use procedures to mitigate the consequences.

SRO-Only Question is SRO-Only because the question requires the applicant to have knowledge of TS bases that are required to analyze TS-required actions and terminology.

Technical

Reference:

Reactor Startup 1-GO-2 1-SI-0-11, Estimated Critical Position Unit 1 Technical Specification Bases Proposed references to None be provided:

Learning Objective: 3-OT-GO0200, 1-GO-2, Reactor Startup

8. Given conditions indicative of an erroneous ECP calculation during the initial pull to critical, describe what steps should be taken b the operator and why Cognitive Level:

Higher Lower X Question Source:

New X Modified Bank Bank Question History: New Question Comments:

92. Given the following conditions:

12:00 Unit 1 is at 100% power CCP 1A-A is in service 12:05 CCP 1A-A begins to experience FLUCTUATING header PRESSURE, AMPS and FLOW The NUSO enters 1-AOI-20, Malfunction of Pressurizer Level Control System 12:15 CCP suction piping has been vented and CCP 1B-B has been started Which ONE of the following completes the statements in accordance with Abnormal Operating Instructions and System Operating Instructions?

At 12:05, ___(1)___ is/are REQUIRED to be placed in STOP PULL-TO-LOCK.

At 12:15, Charging and Letdown will be re-established ___(2)___ 1-AOI-20.

A. (1) BOTH CCPs (2) AFTER exiting B. (1) BOTH CCPs (2) DURING the performance of C. (1) ONLY CCP 1A-A (2) AFTER exiting D. (1) ONLY CCP 1A-A (2) DURING the performance of

CORRECT ANSWER: B DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:

A. Incorrect: Plausible because the first part is correct. At 12:05, both CCPs is/are required to be placed in STOP PULL-TO-LOCK. The second part is plausible because 1-SOI-62.01, CVCS - Charging and Letdown, 8.2 Reestablish Charging and Letdown, can also be used to restore charging and letdown, but 1-AOI-20 directs the performance of Attachment 1.

B. Correct: At 12:05, both CCPs is/are required to be placed in STOP PULL-TO-LOCK.

At 12:15, Charging and Letdown will be established using 1-AOI-20, Attachment 1, Alignment of Charging and Letdown.

C. Incorrect: Plausible because only CCP 1A-A is experiencing signs of cavitation. The second part is plausible because 1-SOI-62.01, CVCS - Charging and Letdown, 8.2 Reestablish Charging and Letdown, can also be used to restore charging and letdown, but 1-AOI-20 directs the performance of Attachment 1.

D. Incorrect: Plausible because only CCP 1A-A is experiencing signs of cavitation. The second part is correct. At 12:15, Charging and Letdown will be established using 1-AOI-20, Attachment 1, Alignment of Charging and Letdown.

Question Number: 92 Tier: 2 Group: 2 K/A: 011 Pressurizer Level Control System (PZR LCS) 2.1.7 Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation Importance Rating: 4.7 10 CFR Part 55: CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.12 / 45.13 10CFR55.43.b: (5) Assessment of facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations.

K/A Match: K/A is matched because the applicant is required to evaluate plant performance and make an operational judgment based on the CCP experiencing indications of cavitation.

SRO-Only Question is SRO-Only because the question requires the applicant to assess plant conditions (normal, abnormal, or emergency) and then select a procedure or section of a procedure to mitigate, recover, or with which to proceed.

Technical

Reference:

1-AOI-20, Malfunction of Pressurizer Level Control System 1-SOI-62.01, CVCS - Charging and Letdown Proposed references to None be provided:

Learning Objective: 3-OT-AOI2000, Malfunction Of Pressurizer Level Control System

5. Given a set of plant conditions, DESCRIBE operator actions required in response to the following per 1,2-AOI-20, Malfunction of PZR Level Control System:

b. Loss of charging.

Cognitive Level:

Higher X Lower Question Source:

New X Modified Bank Bank Question History: New Question Comments:

93. Given the following conditions:

Unit 1 is at 100% power Subsequently, 120VAC Vital Instrument Power Board 1-I is DE-ENERGIZED Which ONE of the following completes the statements in accordance with 1-AOI-25.01, Loss of 120V AC Vital Instrument Power Boards 1-I or 2-I?

CERPI Monitor ___(1)___ DARK.

Performance of 1-AOI-25.01, Appendix D, Restoration Following Return of 120V Vital Inst Bd. 1-1, ___(2)___ REQUIRED to RESTORE the affected CERPI Monitor to service.

A. (1) A (2) is B. (1) A (2) is NOT C. (1) B (2) is D. (1) B (2) is NOT

CORRECT ANSWER: B DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:

A. Incorrect: Plausible because the first part is correct. CERPI Monitor A has lost power.

The second part is plausible because other systems affected by the loss of 120VAC Vital Instrument Power Board 1-I require the performance of Appendix D to return those systems/functions to service.

B. Correct: CERPI Monitor A has lost power. Following the restoration of 120VAC Vital Instrument Power Board 1-I, the performance of 1-AOI-25.01, Appendix D, Restoration Following Return of 120V Vital Inst Bd. 1-1, is not required to restore CERPI Monitor A to service. It will restore automatically once power is restored.

C. Incorrect: Plausible because there are two CERPI Monitors, however CERPI Monitor B is powered from 120VAC Vital Instrument Power Board 1-IV. The second part is plausible because other systems affected by the loss of 120VAC Vital Instrument Power Board 1-I require the performance of Appendix D to return those systems/functions to service.

D. Incorrect: Plausible because there are two CERPI Monitors, however CERPI Monitor B is powered from 120VAC Vital Instrument Power Board 1-IV. The second part is correct. Following the restoration of 120VAC Vital Instrument Power Board 1-I, the performance of 1-AOI-25.01, Appendix D, Restoration Following Return of 120V Vital Inst Bd. 1-1, is not required to restore CERPI Monitor A to service. It will restore automatically once power is restored.

Question Number: 93 Tier: 2 Group: 2 K/A: 014 Rod Position Indication System (RPIS)

A2 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the RPIS; and (b) based on those on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

A2.02 Loss of power to the RPIS Importance Rating: 3.6 10 CFR Part 55: CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13 10CFR55.43.b: (5) Assessment of facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations.

K/A Match: K/A is matched because the applicant is required to predict the impacts of a loss of power to the RPIS and use procedures to mitigate the consequences of the malfunction.

SRO-Only Question is SRO-Only because the question requires the applicant assess plant conditions (normal, abnormal, or emergency) and then selecting a procedure or section of a procedure to mitigate, recover, or with which to proceed.

Technical

Reference:

1-AOI-25.01, Loss of 120V AC Vital Instrument Power Boards 1-I or 2-I Proposed references to None be provided:

Learning Objective: 3-OT-AOI2500, Loss of 125V AC Vital Instrument Power Boards

4. Given a set of plant conditions, DESCRIBE operator actions required in response to AOI-25, Loss of 120V AC Vital Instrument Power Boards Cognitive Level:

Higher X Lower Question Source:

New X Modified Bank Bank Question History: New Question Comments:

94. Which ONE of the following completes the statements regarding the Sequence of Procedure Step Performance in accordance with 0-TI-12.04, User's Guide for Abnormal and Emergency Operating Instructions?

Consider each statement separately BULLETED sub-steps ___(1)___ REQUIRED to be performed IN the ORDER listed.

FULL COMPLETION of a step ___(2)___ REQUIRED before continuing with the NEXT step.

A. (1) are (2) is B. (1) are (2) is NOT C. (1) are NOT (2) is D. (1) are NOT (2) is NOT

CORRECT ANSWER: D DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:

A. Incorrect: Plausible because lettered or numbered sub-steps are required to be performed in order. The second part is plausible because during the performance of non-emergency/abnormal procedures, full completion of a step is required prior to proceeding to the next step.

B. Incorrect: Plausible because lettered or numbered sub-steps are required to be performed in order. The second part is correct. Full completion of a step is not required before continuing with the next step.

C. Incorrect: Plausible because the first part is correct. Bulleted sub-steps are not required to be performed in the order listed. The second part is plausible because during the performance of non-emergency/abnormal procedures, full completion of a step is required prior to proceeding to the next step.

D. Correct: Bulleted sub-steps are not required to be performed in the order listed. Full completion of a step is not required before continuing with the next step.

Question Number: 94 Tier: 3 Group: N/A K/A: 2.1 Conduct of Operations 2.1.23 Ability to perform specific system and integrated plant procedures during all modes of plant operation Importance Rating: 4.4 10 CFR Part 55: CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.2 / 45.6 10CFR55.43.b: (5) Assessment of facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations K/A Match: K/A is matched because the applicant is required to have the knowledge and ability to perform integrated plant procedures during all modes of operation in accordance with administrative procedures that specify the implementation of abnormal/emergency procedures.

SRO-Only Question is SRO-Only because the question requires the applicant to have knowledge of administrative procedures that specify hierarchy, implementation, and/or coordination of plant normal, abnormal, and emergency procedures.

Technical

Reference:

0-TI-12.04, User's Guide for Abnormal and Emergency Operating Instructions Proposed references to None be provided:

Learning Objective: 3-OT-TI1204, 0-TI-12.04, User's Guide for Abnormal and Emergency Operating Instructions Cognitive Level:

Higher Lower X Question Source:

New X Modified Bank Bank Question History: New Question Comments:

95. Given the following conditions:

Unit 1 has experienced a Reactor Trip 1-ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response, Step 3, MONITOR RCS temperature stable at or trending to 557 ºF, is in progress Subsequently, AFW flow is CONTROLLED RCS Tavg - 545 ºF and LOWERING Which ONE of the following completes the statements in accordance with 1-ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response?

MSIVs ___(1)___ REQUIRED to be CLOSED.

The NUSO will direct ___(2)___ to be performed.

A. (1) are (2) 1-AOI-34, Immediate Boration B. (1) are (2) 1-SOI-62.02, Boron Concentration Control, Section 6.7 Minor Boration C. (1) are NOT (2) 1-AOI-34, Immediate Boration D. (1) are NOT (2) 1-SOI-62.02, Boron Concentration Control, Section 6.7 Minor Boration

CORRECT ANSWER: A DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:

A. Correct: MSIVs are required to be closed. The NUSO will direct 1-AOI-34, Immediate Boration, to be performed.

B. Incorrect: Plausible because the first part is correct. MSIVs are required to be closed.

The second part is plausible because 1-SOI-62.02, Boron Concentration Control, Section 6.7 Minor Boration, also borates the RCS, but 1-AOI-34, Immediate Boration, is directed by 1-ES-0.1.

C. Incorrect: Plausible because MSIVs would not be required to be closed if RCS temperature was stable. The second part is correct. The NUSO will direct 1-AOI-34, Immediate Boration, to be performed.

D. Incorrect: Plausible because MSIVs would not be required to be closed if RCS temperature was stable. The second part is plausible because 1-SOI-62.02, Boron Concentration Control, Section 6.7 Minor Boration, also borates the RCS, but 1-AOI-34, Immediate Boration, is directed by 1-ES-0.1.

Question Number: 95 Tier: 3 Group: N/A K/A: 2.1 Conduct of Operations 2.1.43 Ability to use procedures to determine the effects on reactivity of plant changes, such as reactor coolant system temperature, secondary plant, fuel depletion, etc.

Importance Rating: 4.3 10 CFR Part 55: CFR: 41.10 / 43.6 / 45.6 10CFR55.43.b: (5) Assessment of facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations K/A Match: K/A is matched because the applicant is required to have the ability to use procedures to mitigate RCS cooldown, and subsequent effects on reactivity, due to the secondary plant.

SRO-Only Question is SRO-Only because the question requires the applicant to have knowledge of diagnostic steps and decision points in the EOPs that involve transitions to event specific sub-procedures or emergency contingency procedures.

Technical

Reference:

1-ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response Proposed references to None be provided:

Learning Objective: 3-OT-EOP0000, Emergency Instructions Reactor Trip Or Safety Injection, E-0, E-0 Series

15. EXPLAIN the purpose for and basis of each step in E-0, ES-0.0, ES-0.1, ES-0.2, ES-0.3, and ES-0.4 Cognitive Level:

Higher X Lower Question Source:

New X Modified Bank Bank Question History: New Question Comments:

96. Which ONE of the following completes the statements in accordance with NPG-SPP-10.1, System Status Control?

___(1)___ authorization is required to RELAX System Status Control WITHIN a CLEARANCE BOUNDARY.

Clearance Restoration Instructions ___(2)___ be used to RE-ESTABLISH System Status Control where status control was relaxed, PRIOR to returning the system to service.

A. (1) Operations Superintendent (2) CAN B. (1) Operations Superintendent (2) CAN NOT C. (1) Shift Manager (SM) or Senior Reactor Operator (SRO)

(2) CAN D. (1) Shift Manager (SM) or Senior Reactor Operator (SRO)

(2) CAN NOT

CORRECT ANSWER: D DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:

A. Incorrect: Plausible because Operations Superintendent authorization is required to relax status control when it is not controlled within a clearance. The second part is plausible because the Clearance Restoration Instructions would be used to restore the system to the expected plant configuration had System Status Control not been relaxed.

B. Incorrect: Plausible because Operations Superintendent authorization is required to relax status control when it is not controlled within a clearance. The second part is correct. An Equipment Alignment Checklist is required to be used to place the system in the expected plant configuration and re-establish System Status Control prior to returning the system to service.

C. Incorrect: Plausible because the first part is correct. Operations Shift Manager (SM) or Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) authorization is required to relax System Status Control within a clearance boundary. The second part is plausible because the Clearance Restoration Instructions would be used to restore the system to the expected plant configuration had System Status Control not been relaxed.

D. Correct: Shift Manager (SM) or Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) authorization is required to relax System Status Control within a clearance boundary. An Equipment Alignment Checklist is required to be used to place the system in the expected plant configuration and re-establish System Status Control prior to returning the system to service.

Question Number: 96 Tier: 3 Group: N/A K/A: 2.2 Equipment Control 2.2.15 Ability to determine the expected plant configuration using design and configuration control documentation, such as drawings, line-ups, tag-outs, etc.

Importance Rating: 4.3 10 CFR Part 55: CFR: 41.10 / 43.3 / 45.13 10CFR55.43.b: (5) Assessment of facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations K/A Match: K/A is matched because the applicant is required to have the ability to determine the requirements to return the plant to the expected plant configuration using an Equipment Alignment Checklist.

SRO-Only Question is SRO-Only because the question requires the applicant to have knowledge of the administrative procedure which governs System Status Control.

Technical

Reference:

NPG-SPP-10.1, System Status Control Proposed references to None be provided:

Learning Objective: 3-OT-SPP1001, NPG-SPP-10.1, System Status Control

07. Identify the requirements for maintaining Status Control as to:

a. How Status Control is initially established.

Cognitive Level:

Higher Lower X Question Source:

New X Modified Bank Bank Question History: New Question Comments:

97. Which ONE of the following completes the statements in accordance with NPG-SPP-07.2.11, Shutdown Risk Management?

A PLANNED entry into a ___(1)___ risk condition requires written guidance/contingency plans and Plant Manager authorization.

During outage execution, a Defense-In-Depth (DID) Checklist is REQUIRED to be completed ___(2)___.

A. (1) RED (2) DAILY B. (1) RED (2) EACH SHIFT C. (1) ORANGE (2) DAILY D. (1) ORANGE (2) EACH SHIFT

CORRECT ANSWER: D DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:

A. Incorrect: Plausible because Red is a risk condition identified in NPG-SPP-07.2.11, Shutdown Risk Management. The second part is plausible because the applicant may incorrectly determine that the DID Checklist is only required to be completed daily.

B. Incorrect: Plausible because Red is a risk condition identified in NPG-SPP-07.2.11, Shutdown Risk Management. The second part is correct. During outage execution, a Defense-In-Depth (DID) Checklist is required to be completed each shift.

C. Incorrect: Plausible because the first part is correct. A planned entry into an Orange risk condition requires written guidance/contingency plans and Plant Manager authorization. The second part is plausible because the applicant may incorrectly determine that the DID Checklist is only required to be completed daily.

D. Correct: A planned entry into an Orange risk condition requires written guidance/contingency plans and Plant Manager authorization. During outage execution, a Defense-In-Depth (DID) Checklist is required to be completed each shift.

Question Number: 97 Tier: 3 Group: N/A K/A: 2.2 Equipment Control 2.2.18 Knowledge of the process for managing maintenance activities during shutdown operations, such as risk assessments, work prioritization, etc.

Importance Rating: 3.9 10 CFR Part 55: CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13 10CFR55.43.b: (1) Conditions and limitations in the facility license K/A Match: K/A is matched because the applicant is required to have knowledge of the Shutdown Risk Management administrative procedures which manage maintenance activities during shutdown operations.

SRO-Only Question is SRO-Only because the question requires the applicant to have knowledge of the administrative requirements for implementing the risk management strategies specified in the Outage Safety Plan.

Technical

Reference:

NPG-SPP-07.2.11, Shutdown Risk Management Proposed references to None be provided:

Learning Objective: 3-OT-NPG-SPP0700, Online Work Activity and Risk Management

4. DESCRIBE the steps necessary to properly assess emergent work.

Cognitive Level:

Higher Lower X Question Source:

New X Modified Bank Bank Question History: New Question Comments:

98. Which ONE of the following completes the statements in accordance with 0-TI-12.07A, Containment Access Modes 1 - 4?

___(1)___ INCORE detectors must be DANGER Tagged and in an APPROVED storage location BEFORE and DURING containment entry.

0-TI-12.07A, Attachment 1, Containment Entry Authorization, REQUIRES a/an authorization signature(s) from ___(2)___.

A. (1) ONLY Unit 1 (2) the Unit SRO/SM ONLY B. (1) ONLY Unit 1 (2) Radiation Protection AND the Unit SRO/SM C. (1) Unit 1 AND Unit 2 (2) the Unit SRO/SM ONLY D. (1) Unit 1 AND Unit 2 (2) Radiation Protection AND the Unit SRO/SM

CORRECT ANSWER: B DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:

A. Incorrect: Plausible because the first part is correct. Before and during containment entry, incore detectors for Unit 1 must be danger Tagged and in an approved storage location. The second part is plausible because the applicant may incorrectly determine that Radiation Protection authorization is not also required.

B. Correct: Before and during containment entry, incore detectors for Unit 1 must be danger Tagged and in an approved storage location. 0-TI-12.07A, Attachment 1, Containment Entry Authorization, requires authorization signatures from Radiation Protection AND the Unit SRO/SM.

C. Incorrect: Plausible because 0-TI-12.07A applies to both Units. The second part is plausible because the applicant may incorrectly determine that Radiation Protection authorization is not also required.

D. Incorrect: Plausible because 0-TI-12.07A applies to both Units. The second part is correct. 0-TI-12.07A, Attachment 1, Containment Entry Authorization, requires authorization signatures from Radiation Protection AND the Unit SRO/SM.

Question Number: 98 Tier: 3 Group: N/A K/A: 2.3 Radiation Control 2.3.12 Knowledge of radiological safety principles pertaining to licensed operator duties, such as containment entry requirements, fuel handling responsibilities, access to locked high-radiation areas, aligning filters, etc.

Importance Rating: 3.7 10 CFR Part 55: CFR: 41.12 / 45.9 / 45.10 10CFR55.43.b: (4) Radiation hazards that may arise during normal and abnormal situations, including maintenance activities and various contamination conditions K/A Match: K/A is matched because the applicant is required to have knowledge of the radiological safety requirements for containment entry.

SRO-Only Question is SRO-Only because the question requires the applicant to have knowledge of the administrative requirements for containment entry due to radiation hazards that may arise during normal and abnormal situations, including maintenance activities and various contamination conditions.

Technical

Reference:

0-TI-12.07A, Containment Access Modes 1 - 4 Proposed references to None be provided:

Learning Objective: 3-OT-TI1207, Containment Access

6. State a general requirement for all containment entries.

Cognitive Level:

Higher Lower X Question Source:

New X Modified Bank Bank Question History: New Question Comments:

99. Which ONE of the following completes the statements regarding the Emergency Operating Procedure Layout and Performance of Action Steps in accordance with 0-TI-12.04, User's Guide for Abnormal and Emergency Operating Instructions?

Given Example Emergency Operating Procedure:

1. Action/Expected Response Step RNO Step

• RNO Substep

• RNO Substep

• RNO Substep

2. Action/Expected Response Step RNO Step

a. AER Substep a. RNO Substep

b. AER Substep b. RNO Substep If Action/Expected Response (AER) Step 1 is NOT satisfied, ALL RNO Step 1 Substep actions ___(1)___ required to be performed.

If Action/Expected Response (AER) Step 2.b. is NOT satisfied, ALL RNO Step 2 Substep actions ___(2)___ required to be performed.

A. (1) are (2) are B. (1) are (2) are NOT C. (1) are NOT (2) are D. (1) are NOT (2) are NOT

CORRECT ANSWER: B DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:

A. Incorrect: Plausible because the first part is correct. All RNO actions for Step 1 must be performed because they are bulleted, and bulleted substeps have an implied AND logic (i.e., all listed steps must be performed) UNLESS an OR conjunction is specifically used, or an implied OR logic is stated in the high level action (e.g., PERFORM one or more of the following, or IF any of the following are met, etc.). The second part is plausible because there are instances where all RNO substeps are required to be performed for given step (e.g., bulleted substeps)

B. Correct: All RNO actions for Step 1 must be performed because they are bulleted, and bulleted substeps have an implied AND logic (i.e., all listed steps must be performed) UNLESS an OR conjunction is specifically used, or an implied OR logic is stated in the high level action (e.g., PERFORM one or more of the following, or IF any of the following are met, etc.). All RNO steps for Step 2 are not required to be performed. Only Step 2.b. is required to be performed because contingency actions which are provided for a specific substep are designated with an identifier which matches the substep identifier (e.g., in steps containing three substeps (a, b, and c) b RNO is the contingency action for substep b).

C. Incorrect: Plausible because there are instances where all RNO substeps are not required to be performed for a given step (e.g., lettered or numbered substeps). The second part is plausible because there are instances where all RNO substeps are required to be performed for given step (e.g., bulleted substeps).

D. Incorrect: Plausible because there are instances where all RNO substeps are not required to be performed for a given step (e.g., lettered or numbered substeps). The second part is correct. All RNO steps for Step 2 are not required to be performed. Only Step 2.b. is required to be performed because contingency actions which are provided for a specific substep are designated with an identifier which matches the substep identifier (e.g., in steps containing three substeps (a, b, and c) b RNO is the contingency action for substep b).

Question Number: 99 Tier: 3 Group: N/A K/A: 2.4 Emergency Procedures / Plan 2.4.19 Knowledge of EOP layout, symbols, and icons Importance Rating: 4.1 10 CFR Part 55: CFR: 41.10 / 45.13 10CFR55.43.b: (5) Assessment of facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations K/A Match: K/A is matched because the applicant is required to have knowledge of the EOP layout and performance of action steps.

SRO-Only Question is SRO-Only because the question requires the applicant to have knowledge of the administrative procedure that specifies the coordination of plant emergency procedures.

Technical

Reference:

0-TI-12.04, User's Guide for Abnormal and Emergency Operating Instructions Proposed references to None be provided:

Learning Objective: 3-OT-TI1204, 0-TI-12.04, User's Guide for Abnormal and Emergency Operating Instructions

16. Use the two column format to identify the required actions in any given circumstance including:

a. Action required when AER is not satisfied Cognitive Level:

Higher X Lower Question Source:

New X Modified Bank Bank Question History: New Question Comments:

100. Which ONE of the following completes the statements regarding Rules of Priority in accordance with 0-TI-12.04, User's Guide for Abnormal and Emergency Operating Instructions?

When 1/2-ECA-0.0, Loss of Shutdown Power, is implemented, the Function Restoration procedures ___(1)___ be IMPLEMENTED.

1/2-ECA-1.1, Loss of RHR Sump Recirculation, ___(2)___ take PRIORITY over the guidance of 1/2-FR-Z.1, High Containment Pressure.

A. (1) can (2) does B. (1) can (2) does NOT C. (1) can NOT (2) does D. (1) can NOT (2) does NOT

CORRECT ANSWER: C DISTRACTOR ANALYSIS:

A. Incorrect: Plausible because conditions could be met in which a transition to the FR procedures would be required while performing 1/2-ECA-0.0. The second part is correct. 1/2-ECA-1.1, Loss of RHR Sump Recirculation, does take priority over the guidance of 1/2-FR-Z.1, High Containment Pressure.

B. Incorrect: Plausible because conditions could be met in which a transition to the FR procedures would be required while performing 1/2-ECA-0.0. The second part is plausible because the actions of 1/2 -FR-Z.1 exist to restore a critical safety function, therefore it is plausible that the actions of 1/2 -FR-Z.1 would take priority over 1/2-ECA-1.1.

C. Correct: When 1/2-ECA-0.0, Loss of Shutdown Power, is implemented, the Function Restoration procedures cannot be implemented. 1/2-ECA-1.1, Loss of RHR Sump Recirculation, does take priority over the guidance of 1/2-FR-Z.1, High Containment Pressure.

D. Incorrect: Plausible because the first part is correct. When 1/2-ECA-0.0, Loss of Shutdown Power, is implemented, the Function Restoration procedures cannot be implemented. The second part is plausible because the actions of 1/2 -FR-Z.1 exist to restore a critical safety function, therefore it is plausible that the actions of 1/2 -FR-Z.1 would take priority over 1/2-ECA-1.1.

Question Number: 100 Tier: 3 Group: N/A K/A: 2.4 Emergency Procedures / Plan 2.4.16 Knowledge of EOP implementation hierarchy and coordination with other support procedures or guidelines such as, operating procedures, abnormal operating procedures, and severe accident management guidelines Importance Rating: 4.4 10 CFR Part 55: CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13 10CFR55.43.b: (5) Assessment of facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during normal, abnormal, and emergency situations K/A Match: K/A is matched because the applicant is required to have knowledge of EOP implementation hierarchy and coordination with other EOP/FR procedures.

SRO-Only Question is SRO-Only because the question requires the applicant to have knowledge of the administrative procedure that specifies hierarchy, implementation, and/or coordination of plant normal, abnormal, and emergency procedures Technical

Reference:

0-TI-12.04, User's Guide for Abnormal and Emergency Operating Instructions Proposed references to None be provided:

Learning Objective: 3-OT-TI1204, 0-TI-12.04, User's Guide for Abnormal and Emergency Operating Instructions

27. List the two procedures which have priority over any other procedures in the EOP package and as such are exceptions to the rules of usage (ECA-0.0 and ES-1.3).

Cognitive Level:

Higher Lower X Question Source:

New X Modified Bank Bank Question History: New Question Comments: