Text

Initial Exam 2013-301 Draft Administrative Documents
	ML13210A021
Person / Time
Site:	Watts Bar
Issue date:	07/26/2013
From:	; NRC/RGN-II
To:	; Tennessee Valley Authority
References
	50-390/13-301, ES-401, ES-401-2
	Download: ML13210A021 (59)
	v • d • e

oaL 123-35-/7o1 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Facility: WATTS BAR Date of Exam: NOVEMBER 2012 SRO-Only_Points Tier Group 1 KKKIKKKAAAAG A2 G Total 1 2 3j4 5 6 1 2 3 4

Total

1. 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 18 3 3 6 Emergency &

Abnormal 2 j. j_ i N/A I I N/A ! 9 2 2 4 Evolutions Tier Totals 4 4 5 5 5 4 27 5 5 10 1 22333223233 28 3 2 5 2.

Plant 2 LJ2!!_L!L111 10 0 2 1 3 Systems Tier Totals 3 3 3

£ £ 3 3 4 3 4 4 38 5 3 8

3. Generic Knowledge and Abilities 1 2 3 4 10 1 2 3 4 7 Categories 3 3 2 2 2 2 1 2 Note: 1. Ensure that at least two topics from every applicable K/A category are sampled within each tier of the RO and SRO-only outlines (i.e., except for one category in Tier 3 of the SRO-only outline, the 9ler Totals in each K/A category shall not be less than two).

2. The point total for each group and tier in the proposed outline must match that specified in the table.

The final point total for each group and tier may deviate by +/-1 from that specified in the table based on NRC revisions.

The final RO exam must total 75 points and the SRO-only exam must total 25 points.

3. Systems/evolutions within each group are identified on the associated outline; systems or evolutions that do not apply at the facility should be deleted and justified; operationally important, site-specific systems/evolutions that are not included on the outline should be added. Refer to Section D.1 .b of ES-401 for guidance regarding the elimination of inappropriate K/A statements.

4. Select topics from as many systems and evolutions as possible; sample every system or evolution in the group before selecting a second topic for any system or evolution.

5. Absent a plant-specific priority, only those K/As having an importance rating (lR) of 2.5 or higher shall be selected.

Use the RO and SRO ratings for the RO and SRO-only portions, respectively.

6. Select SRO topics for Tiers 1 and 2 from the shaded systems and K/A categories.

7. The generic (G) K/As in Tiers 1 and 2 shall be selected from Section 2 of the K/A Catalog, but the topics must be relevant to the applicable evolution or system. Refer to Section D.1 .b of ES-401 for the applicable K/As.

8. On the following pages, enter the K/A numbers, a brief description of each topic, the topics importance ratings (IRS>

for the applicable license level, and the point totals (#) for each system and category. Enter the group and tier totals for each category in the table above; if fuel handling equipment is sampled in other than Category A2 or G on the SRO-only exam, enter it on the left side of Column A2 for Tier 2, Group 2 (Note #1 does not apply). Use duplicate pages for RO and SRO-only exams.

9. For Tier 3, select topics from Section 2 of the K/A catalog, and enter the K/A numbers, descriptions, IRs, and point totals (#) on Form ES-401-3. Limit SRO selections to K/As that are linked to 10 CFR 55.43.

ES-401, REV 9 T1G1 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-2 KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION: IR Kl K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 Al A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC:

fRO SRO OO7EK1 .06 - -

Ractor Trip Stabilization Recovery 3.7 4.1 LI LI Relationship of emergency feedwater flow to S/G and I1 decay heat removal following reactor trip 008AK3.03 Prssurizer Vapor Space Accident/ 3 4.1 4.6 Actions contained in EOP for PZR vapor space accident/

O11EG2.4.47 Large Break LOCA/3 4.2 4.2 Ability to diagnose and recognize trends in an accurate LI LI LI LI LI LI LI LI LI and timely manner utilizing the appropriate control room reference material.

015AK2.08 RCPMalfunctions/4 2.6 26 CCWS Li LI LI LILI LI Li LI LI [

026AA1 .06 Loss of Component Cooling Water! 8 2.9 2.9 Control of flow rates to components cooled by the CCWS LI LI LI [] LI LI LI LI LI [J 027AK2.03 Pressurizer Pressure Control System 2.6 2.8 Controllers and positioners Malfunction /3 LI LI LI LI LI LI [] LI LI LI 029EG2.4.20 ATWS! 1 3.8 4.3 Knowledge of operational implications of EOP warnings, LI LI LI LI LI LI LI LI LI LI cautions and notes.

O4OAA1 .23 Steam Line Rupture Excessive Heat 3.6 3.5 All pressure gauges per steam generator (for pressure Transfer! 4 LI LI LI LI LI LI LI LI LI LI drop) 054AA2.08 Lois of Main Feedwater / 4 2.9 3.3 LI LI LI LI LI LI LI LI LI LI Steam flow-feed trend recorder 055EA2.06 Station Blackout! 6 3.7 4.1 LI LI LI LI LI LI LI LI LI LI Faults and lockouts that must be cleared prior to re energizing buses 056AK1 .04 Loss of Off-site Power I 6 3.1 3.2 LI LI LI LI LILI LI LI LI LI Definition of saturation conditions implication for the systems Page 1 of 2 9/6/2011 9:02 AM

ES-401, REV T1G1 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-2 KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION: IR Ki K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 Al A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC:

RO SRO 058AK3.02 Loss of DC Power /6 4 4.2 Actions contained in EOP for loss of do power

[] LI LI LI Li LI LI Li []

062AA2.0l Loss of Nuclear Svc Water / 4 2.9 3.5 Location of a leak in the SWS LI Li Li Li C] Li C] Li LI 065AK3.08 Loss of Instrument Air / 8 3.7 3.9 Actions contained in EOP for loss of instrument air C] C] C] C] C] C] LI [] [ C]

077AG2.1 .7 Generator Voltage and Electric Grid 4.4 4.7 Ability to evaluate plant performance and make Disturbances / 6 C] C] C] C] C] C] []

operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior and instrument interpretation.

WEO4EA1 .3 LOCA Outside Containment! 3 3.8 4.0 Desired operating results during abnormal and C] C] Li Li Li LI C] C]

emergency situations.

WEO5EK2.1 -

Indequate Heat Transfer Loss of 3.7 3.9 Components and functions of control and safety systems, Secondary Heat Sink / 4 C] C] C] LI Li Li Li Li Li Li including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes and automatic and manual features.

WE1 1 EK1 .3 Lots of Emergency Coolant Recirc. / 4 3.6 4.0 Annunciators and conditions indicating signals, and C]C]LiLiLiLiLiC]LiLiLi remedial actions associated with the (Loss of Emergency Coolant Recir).

Page 2 of 2 9/6/2011 9:02AM

ES-401, REV 9 T1G2 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-2 KA N.kME I SAFETY FUNCTION: IR Kl K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 Al A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC:

RO SRO OOIAA2.02 ntinuous Rod Withdrawal! 1 4.2 4.2 j j Position of emergency boration valve 036AK2.0l Fuel Handling Accident I 8 2.9 35 Fuel handling equipment El El El 037AK1 .01 Steam Generator Tube Leak /3 2.9 3.3 Use of steam tables O51AA1.04 Loss of Condenser Vacuum /4 2.5 2.5 j j jj j Rod position 059AK3.02 Accidental Liquid RadWaste Rel. / 9 3.2 4.5 Implementation of E-plan El 074EA2.07 mad. Core Cooling /4 4.1 4.7 The difference between a LOCA and inadequate core

[] ] {] [] [] [] [] El []

cooling from trends and indicators weO3EG2.4.46 LOCA Cooldown Depress. / 4 4.2 4.2 Ability to verify that the alarms are consistent with the El El [] El El El El El El El plant conditions.

WE14EA1.1 Lobs of CTMT Integrity? 5 3.7 3.7 [] [] [] [ [] Components and functions of control and safety systems, Including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes and automatic and manual features.

WE15EK3.l Cohtainment Flooding / 5 2.7 2.9 Facility operating characteristics during transient El El El El El El El El El El conditions, including coolant chemistry and the effects of temperature, pressure and reactivity changes and operating limitations and reasons for these operating characteristics.

Page 1 of 1 9/6/2011 9:02 AM

ES-401, REV T2G1 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES4O1-2 KA NME I SAFETY FUNCTION: IR 1(1 1(2 1<3 K4 1(5 K6 Al A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC:

RO SRO 0031(6.04 Reactor Coolant Pump 2.8 3.1 Containment isolation valves affecting RCP operation LI LI LI LI LI LI LI LI LI LI 004A2.13 Chemical and Volume Control 3.6 3.9 Low RWST LI LI LI [] LI LI LI*LI 004K4.13 Chemical and Volume Control 3.2 3.5 Interlock between letdown isolation valve and flow control LI LI LI LI LI LI Li LI LI LI valve 005A 1.02 Residual Heat Removal 3.3 3 LI LI LI LI LI LI LI LI LI LI RHR flow rate 006K5.0l Emergency Core Cooling 2.8 3.3 LI LI LI LI LI LI LI LI LI LI Effects of temperatures on water level indications 007A2.02 Pressurizer Relief/Quench Tank 2.6 3.2 LI LI LI LI LI LI El LI Cl LI Abnormal pressure in the PRT 007G2.l .31 Pressurizer Relief/Quench Tank 4.64.3 LI LI LI LI LI LI LI LI LI LI Abihtyto locate control room switches, controls and indications and to determine that they are correctly reflecting the desired plant lineup.

008A3.05 Cob, ponent Cooling Water 3.0 3.1 LI LI LI LI LI LI LI LI LI LI Control of the electrically operated, automatic isolation valves in the CCWS 01 01(5.02 Pressurizer Pressure Control 2.6 3.0 LI LI LI LI LILILI LI LI LI Constant enthalpy expansion through a valve 010K6.01 Pressurizer Pressure Control 2.7 3.1 LI LI LI LI LI LI LI LI LI LI Pressure detection systems 012K3.02 Reactor Protection 3.2 3.3 LILI LILILILILILILILI T/G Page 1 of 3 9/6/2011 9:02AM

ES-401, REV 9 T2G1 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-2 KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION: IR Ki 1(2 K3 1(4 K5 K6 Al A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC:

RO SRO 013K4.22 Edgineered Safety Features Actuation 2.9 3.1 Reason for shut safety injection pump discharge valve of train to be tested 0221(2.02 Containment Cooling 2.5 2.4 LI [] [] [] LI LI LI [ Chillers 025A1 .03 Ice Condenser 2.5 2.5 j IJ [1 I Glycol flow to ice condenser air handling units 026A2.08 Containment Spray 3.2 3.7 LI LI LI LI LI LI LI LI [1 LI Sate securing of containment spray when it can be done) 026A4.01 Containment Spray 4.5 4.3 [] [] [] CSS controls 039A4.04 Main and Reheat Steam 3.8 3.9 J LI LI LI LI DLI [] LI Emergency feedwater pump turbines 0391(1.01 Man and Reheat Steam 3.1 3.2 J LI LI LI LI LI fl LI LI S/G ________________

059A3.06 Main Feedwater 3.2 3.3 LI LI LI LI LI [] LI LI [I [] LI Feedwater isolation 061 K5.05 Auxiliary/Emergency Feedwater 2.7 3.2 LI LI LI LI LI LI LI LI LI Feed line voiding and water hammer 062K4.03 AC 1 Electrical Distribution 2.8 3.1 LI LI LI LI Li LI LI LI LI LI Interlocks between automatic bus transfer and breakers 063G2.2.44 DC Electrical Distribution 4.2 4.4 LI LI LI LI LI LI LI LI LI LI II Ability to interpret control room indications to verify the status and operation of a system, and understand how operator actions and directives affect plant and system conditions Page 2 of 3 9/6/2011 9:02AM

ES-401, REV 9 T2G1 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-2 KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION: IR Ki 1(2 1(3 1(4 K5 K6 Al A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC:

RO SRO 063K2.O1 DC Electrical Distribution 2.9 3.1 Major DC loads U ] [] [] [] [] fl [] [] [] []

064K3.02 Energency Diesel Generator 4.2 4.4 ESFAS controlled or actuated systems J U U 073A4.03 Pr&ess Radiation Monitoring 3.1 3.2 Check source for operability demonstration U U U U U U U U 076K3.03 Service Water 3.5 3.9 j Reactor building closed cooling water Li LI U] Li LI LI Li LI 078K1.05 InstrumentAir 3.4 35 MSIVair LI Li LI LI LI LI LI LI LI Li 103G2.2.36 Cohtainment 3.1 4.2 U L1UILWLIIZLILiL1L Ability to analyze the effect of maintenance activities, such as degraded power sources, on the status of limiting conditions of operations Page 3 of 3 916/2011 9:02 AM

ES-401, REV 9 T2G2 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-2 KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION: IR Ki K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 Al A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC:

RO SFiO 001 K4.13 Control Rod Drive 3.4 3.4 Operation of CRDS controls for withdrawing lingering

[] [] [] [] LI Li Li Li LI Li rods and transferring rods and rod groups 002K1.12 Reactor Coolant 3.5 3.6 NIS j [] LI C] C] C] Li L] L] LI LI 015K2.0l Nuclear Instrumentation 3.3 3.7 NIS channels, components and interconnections LI [] C]

028K5.03 Hidrogen Recombiner and Purge 2.9 3.6 Sources of hydrogen within containment Control Li Li Li Li Li Li Li Li Li LI 033A3.02 Sjent Fuel Pool Cooling 2.9 3.1 Spent fuel leak or rupture LI Li Li Li Li Li Li Li ] Li Li 034A1.02 Fuel Handling Equipment 2.9 3.7 Water level in the refueling canal Li Li Li Li Li Li Li Li LI Li 041 A4.04 Steam Dump/Turbine Bypass Control 2.7 2.7 Pressure mode Li Li Li LI Li Li Li Li Li II C 072G2.2.39 Area Radiation Monitoring 3.9 4.5 Knowledge of less than one hour technical specification LI Li Li Li Li Li Li Li Li Li action statements for systems.

075A2.03 Circulating Water 2.5 2.7 Safety features and relationship between condenser Li Li Li C Li Li C] Li Li LI vacuum, turbine trip and steam dump 086K6.04 Fire Protection 2.6 2.9 Fire, smoke and heat detectors Li Li Li Li Li LI Li Li Li LI Page 1 of 1 9/6/2011 9:02 AM

ES-401, REV 9 T3 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-2 KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION: IR Ki K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 Al A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC:

RO SRO G2.1 .15 Cdnduct of operations 2.7 3.4 Knowledge of administrative requirements for temporary El El El El El El El El El []

management directives such as standing orders, night orders, Operations memos, etc.

G2.1.28 Conduct of operations 4.1 4.1 Knowledge of the purpose and function of major system El El El El El El LI El El [I components and controls.

G2.1 .42 Conduct of operations 2.5 3.4 Knowledge of new and spent fuel movement procedures El El LI El El El El El El El G2.2.1 Equipment Control 4.5 4.4 Ability to perform pre-startup procedures for the facility, El El [] El El [] [] El including operating those controls associated with plant equipment that could affect reactivity.

G2.2.20 Eqjipment Control 2.6 3.8 Knowledge of the process for managing troubleshooting El El El El El El El El El [

I activities.

G2.2.22 Equipment Control 4.0 4.7 jj Knowledge of limiting conditions for operations and safety El El El El El El El El El El limits.

G2.3.1 2 Radiation Control 3.2 3.7 Knowledge of radiological safety principles pertaining to El El El El El El El El El El licensed operator duties G2.3.13 Radiation Control 3.4 3.8 Knowledge of radiological safety procedures pertaining to El El El El El El El El El El EJ licensed operator duties G2.4.13 Emergency Procedures/Plans 4.0 4.6 El El El El. El El El LI El El J Knowledge of crew roles and responsibilities during EOP usage.

G2.4.49 Emergency Procedures/Plans 4.6 4 El DElElElElEl El El El Ability to perform without reference to procedures those actions that require immediate operation of system components and controls.

Page 1 of 1 9/6/2011 9:02AM

ES-401, REV 9 SRO T1G1 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-2 KA NAME I SAFETY FUNCTION: IR 1<1 1<2 K3 K4 1<5 K6 Al A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC:

RO SRO 007EA2.06 - -

R actor Trip Stabilization Recovery Occurrence of a reactor trip

/1 1L1L1EI1L1E1L1 009EA2.38 Srh all Break LOCA /3 Existence of head bubble 027AA2.04 Prssurizer Pressure Control System

DDDDDL1L1LE Tech-Spec limits for RCS pressure Malfunction / 3 040AG2.4.41 Steam Line Rupture - Excessive Heat 2.9 4.6 Knowledge of the emergency action level thresholds and Transfer / 4 classifications.

057AG2.4.1 1 Loss of Vital AC Inst. Bus / 6 4.0 4.2 Knowledge of abnormal condition procedures.

062AG2.4.45 Loss of Nuclear Svc Water /4 4.1 4.3 Ability to prioritize and interpret the significance of each annunciator or alarm.

Page 1 of 1 9/6/2011 9:02 AM

ES-401, REV 9 SRO T1G2 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES4O1-2 KA N!ME I SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1K2K3K4K5K6A1A2A3A4G TOPIC:

RO SRO 059AG2.4.21 Accidental Uquid RadWaste Rel. / 9 4.0 4.6 Knowledge of the parameters and logic used to assess the status of safety functions 067AA2.04 Plant Fire On-site / 8 3.1 4.3 The fires extent of potential operational damage to plant equipment weO7EG2.4.18 Saturated Core Cooling Core Cooling 3.3 4.0 DDDDDDLJLDLJ Knowledge of the specific bases for EOPs.

4 WE15EA2.2 Cântainment Flooding/5 2.9 3.3 Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facilitys license and amendments.

Page 1 of 1 9/6/2011 9:02 AM

ES-401, REV SRO T2G1 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-2 KA NME / SAFETY FUNCTION: IR Kl 1(2 K3 K4 1(5 1(6 Al A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC:

RO 004A2.23 1

Cemical and Volume Control 2.6 2.7 High filter DIP El El [] { El El [] [] El 006A2.13 Emergency Core Cooling 3.9 4.2 Inadvertent SIS actuation

[ El El El El ] { []

022A2.04 ContainmentCooling 2.9 3.2 Lossofservicewater El El El El El El El lj El El []

059G2.2.22 Main Feedwater 4.0 4.7 Knowledge of limiting conditions for operations and safety Cl El El El El Cl El El El El limits.

06402.2.25 Emergency Diesel Generator 3.2 4.2 Knowtedge of the bases in Technical Specifications for ElElElElElEElElEEll limiting conditions for operations and safety limits.

Page 1 of 1 9/6/2011 9:02AM

ES-401, REV 9 SRO T2G2 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES4O1-2 KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION: IR Ki K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 Al A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC:

RO SRO 001 A2.01 Cntrol Rod Drive 3.1 3.7 Loss of CCW or fan cooling 029G2.2.40 Cdntainment Purge 3.4 4.7 Ability to apply technical specifications for a system.

086A2.02 FWe Protection 3.0 3.3 Low FPS header pressure LI LI [1 LI Page lot 1 9/6/2011 9:02AM

ES-401, REV SRO T3 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-2 KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION: IR Ki K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 Al A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC:

Rb SRO G2. 1.17 Cónduct of operations 3.9 4.0 Ability to make accurate, clear and concise verbal reports.

[] [] [] [] [] [] [] [ [J G2.l .3 Conduct of operations 3.7 3.9 Knowledge of shift or short term relief turnover practices.

i [1 LI LI LI LI []

G2.2.l 1 Euipment Control 2.3 3.3[] Knowledge of the process for controlling temporary

[] []

design changes.

G2.2.5 Ecuipment Control 2.2 3.2 Knowledge of the process for making design or operating changes to the facility G2.3.6 Radiation Control 2.0 3.8 Ability to aprove release permits LI LI Li LI LI LI LI LI LI LI G2.4.26 Emergency Procedures/Plans 3.1 3.6 [ILI LI U LI LI LI LI LI LI Knowledge of facility protection requirements including ire brigade and portable fire fighting equipment usage.

G2.4.40 Emergency Procedures/Plans 2.7 4.5 LI LI LI LI LI LI LI LI LI LI Knowledge of the SROs responsibilities in emergency plan implementation.

Page 1 of 1 9/6/2011 9:02 AM

ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Reactor Operator

ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Facility: Watts Bar Date of Examination: March 2013 Examination Level: RO SRO Operating Test Number: 1 Administrative Topic Type Describe activity to be performed (See Note) Code*

1. Calculate Target Boron Concentration for Load Escalation.

Conduct of Operations M,R 2.1.25 Ability to interpret reference materials, such as graphs, curves, tables, etc. (3.9 / 4.2) (CFR 41.10

/ 45.12 / 43.5)

2. Evaluate Critical Safety Function Status Trees.

2.1.7 Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating Conduct of Operations M,R characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation. (4.4/4.7) (CFR 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.12 /

45.13)

3. Perform a Clearance Without Use Of eSOMS Computer.

Equipment Control M,R 2.2.13 Knowledge of tagging and clearance procedures.

(4.1/4.3) (CFR: 41.10 / 45.13)

4. Determine requirements for Locked High Radiation Area.

Radiation Control M,R 2.3.4 Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under normal or emergency conditions. (3.2/3.7) (CFR 41.12 / 43.4 / 45.10)

Emergency Procedures /

N/A N/A Plan NOTE: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when all 5 are required.

Type Codes & Criteria: (C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank (< 3 for ROs; < 4 for SROs & RO retakes)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank (> 1)

(P)revious 2 exams (< 1; randomly selected)

ES 301, Page 22 of 27

ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 RO Admin JPM Summary 1 Task/KA/Safety Function:

Calculate Target Boron Concentration for Load Escalation / 2.1.25 Ability to interpret reference materials, such as graphs, curves, tables, etc. (3.9 / 4.2) (CFR 41.10 / 45.12 /43.5)/ Safety Function N/A Task Standard:

The applicant completes the calculations required by SOI-62.02, Appendix E REACTIVITY BALANCE CALCULATION, The target RCS Boron Concentration is determined to be 572.5 ppm (acceptable range 563 to 580.5 ppm).

Critical Steps:

Calculates Total Reactor Power change.

Determines Power Defect.

Determines Xenon.

Determines rods.

Determines .

Converts to PPM .

Determines TARGET PPM.

The applicant will perform actions of the following procedures:

SOI-62.02, Boron Concentration Control.

2 Task/KA/Safety Function:

Evaluate Critical Safety Function Status Trees / 2.1.7 Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation. (4.4/4.7) (CFR 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.12 /

45.13) / Safety Function N/A Task Standard:

The applicant evaluates parameters supplied in Table 1 of the JPM and determines the following:

1. Status Tree Priority:

FR-S - ORANGE FR-C - GREEN FR-H - YELLOW FR-P - ORANGE FR-Z - GREEN FR-I - GREEN

2. 1-FR-S.1, Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS, is the highest priority CSFST.

Critical Steps:

The applicant determines the Status Tree Priority to be:

FR-S - ORANGE FR-C - GREEN FR-H - YELLOW FR-P - ORANGE FR-Z - GREEN FR-I - GREEN The applicant will perform actions of the following procedures:

FR-0, Status Trees.

3 Task/KA/Safety Function:

Perform a Clearance Without Use Of eSOMS Computer / 2.2.13 Knowledge of tagging and clearance procedures (4.1/4.3) (CFR: 41.10 / 45.13)/ Safety Function N/A Task Standard:

The applicant:

1.) Identifies the handswitches, breakers and their required positions to electrically clear the 1B-B SI pump in preparation for relay replacement.

2.) Identifies the components and positions required to isolate the correct section of piping in preparation for lubrication and oil sample collection of the 1B SI pump.

3.) Identifies the proper sequence of isolation of components.

Critical Steps:

The applicant:

1.) Identifies the handswitches, breakers and their required positions to electrically clear the 1B-B SI pump in preparation for relay replacement.

2.) Identifies the components and positions required to isolate the correct section of piping in preparation for lubrication and oil sample collection of the 1B SI pump.

3.) Identifies the proper sequence of isolation of components.

The applicant will perform actions of the following procedures:

NPG-SPP-10.2, Clearance Procedure to Safely Control Energy.

TVA 17984 [11-2005]. CLEARANCE TAG LIST AND OPERATIONAL STEPS.

4 Task/KA/Safety Function:

Determine requirements for Locked High Radiation Area / 2.3.4 Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under normal or emergency conditions (3.2/3.7) (CFR 41.12 / 43.4 / 45.10) / Safety Function N/A Task Standard:

Applicant determines:

1.) C-zone protective clothing (Dressout), RP coverage, and radiological briefing requirements from the provided Radiation Work Permit.

2.) The maximum inspection time without exceeding the administrative dose level is 35 min (0.58) (OR 30 min (0.5 hrs) based on RCI-100.)

3.) That the LHRA key can only be issued to RP personnel in this situation and that only the RP Shift Supervisor can issue LHRA key.

Critical Steps:

Applicant determines:

1.) C-Zone protective clothing (Dressout), RP coverage, and radiological briefing requirements from the provided Radiation Work Permit.

2.) The maximum inspection time without exceeding the administrative dose level is 35 min (0.58) (OR 30 min (0.5 hrs) based on RCI-100.)

3.) That the LHRA key can only be issued to RP personnel in this situation and that only the RP Shift Supervisor can issue LHRA key.

The applicant will perform actions of the following procedures:

RCI-100, "Control of Radiological Work."

RCI-153, "Radiation Work Permits."

NPG-SPP-05.1, "Radiological Controls."

5 Not Applicable

ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Senior Reactor Operator

ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Facility: Watts Bar Date of Examination: March 2013 Examination Level: RO SRO Operating Test Number: 1 Administrative Topic Type Describe activity to be performed (See Note) Code*

1. Perform FR-I.3, Voids in the Reactor Vessel, Appendix D, Maximum Vent Time Calculation.

Conduct of Operations M,R 2.1.23 Ability to perform specific system and integrated plant procedures during all modes of plant operation.(4.3/4.4) (41.10 / 43.5 / 45.2 / 45.6)

2. Evaluate Critical Safety Function Status Trees.

2.1.7 Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating Conduct of Operations M,R characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation. (4.4/4.7) (CFR 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.12 /

45.13)

3. Perform a Clearance Without Use Of eSOMS Computer.

Equipment Control N,R 2.2.13 Knowledge of tagging and clearance procedures.

(4.1/4.3) (CFR: 41.10 / 45.13)

4. Determine requirements for Locked High Radiation Area.

Radiation Control M,R 2.3.4 Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under normal or emergency conditions. (3.2/3.7) (CFR 41.12 / 43.4 / 45.10)

5. Classify the Event, per the REP.

Emergency Procedures / 2.4.40 Knowledge of SRO responsibilities in emergency M,R Plan plan implementation.(2.7/4.5)(CFR 41.10 / 43.5 /

45.11)

NOTE: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when all 5 are required.

Type Codes & Criteria: (C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank (< 3 for ROs; < 4 for SROs & RO retakes)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank (> 1)

(P)revious 2 exams (< 1; randomly selected)

ES 301, Page 22 of 27

ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 SRO Admin JPM Summary

1. Task/KA/Safety Function:

Perform FR-I.3, Voids In The Reactor Vessel, Appendix D, Maximum Vent Time Calculation. / 2.1.23 Ability to perform specific system and integrated plant procedures during all modes of plant operation.(4.3/4.4) (CFR 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.2 /

45.6) / Safety Function N/A Task Standard:

The applicant performs the calculations contained in FR-I.3, Voids in the Reactor Vessel, and determines the vent time to be 2.3937 minutes (acceptable range 2.2 to 2.55 minutes).

Critical Steps:

CALCULATE available lower cntmt air volume based on current cntmt temperature.

CALCULATE max hydrogen volume that can be vented and maintain cntmt hydrogen less than 3%.

DETERMINE hydrogen flow rate from Figure 1 and Item 6.

CALCULATE maximum venting time.

The applicant will perform actions of the following procedures:

FR-I.3, Voids in the Reactor Vessel.

2. Task/KA/Safety Function:

Evaluate Critical Safety Function Status Trees / 2.1.7 Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation. (4.4/4.7) (CFR 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.12 /

45.13) / Safety Function N/A Task Standard:

The applicant evaluates parameters supplied in Table 1 of the JPM and determines the following:

1. Status Tree Priority:

FR-S - ORANGE FR-C - GREEN FR-H - YELLOW FR-P - ORANGE FR-Z - GREEN FR-I - GREEN

2. 1-FR-S.1, Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS, is the highest priority CSFST.

Critical Steps:

The applicant determines the Status Tree Priority to be:

FR-S - ORANGE FR-C - GREEN FR-H - YELLOW FR-P - ORANGE FR-Z - GREEN FR-I - GREEN FR-S.1, Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS, is the highest priority CSFST.

The applicant will perform actions of the following procedures:

FR-0, Status Trees.

3. Task/KA/Safety Function:

Perform a Clearance Without Use Of eSOMS Computer / 2.2.13 Knowledge of tagging and clearance procedures. (4.1/4.3)(CFR 41.10 / 45.13) / Safety Function N/A Task Standard:

The applicant:

1.) Identifies the handswitches, breakers and their required positions to electrically clear the 1B-B SI pump in preparation for relay replacement.

2.) Identifies the components and positions required to isolate the correct section of piping in preparation for cleaning and lubrication of the 1B SI pump.

3.) Identifies the proper sequence of isolation of components.

4.) Determines that the failure of the 1A-A SI pump room cooler requires entry into LCO 3.0.3, and the plant needs to be in Mode 4 within 13 hours1.50463e-4 days 0.00361 hours 2.149471e-5 weeks 4.9465e-6 months .

Critical Steps:

Identifies the handswitches, breakers and their required positions to electrically clear the 1B-B SI pump in preparation for relay replacement.

Identifies the components and positions required to isolate the correct section of piping in preparation for cleaning and lubrication of the 1B SI pump.

Identifies the proper sequence of isolation of components.

Determines that the failure of the 1A-A SI pump room cooler requires entry into LCO 3.0.3, and the plant needs to be in Mode 4 within 13 hours1.50463e-4 days 0.00361 hours 2.149471e-5 weeks 4.9465e-6 months .

The applicant will perform actions of the following procedures:

NPG-SPP-10.2, Clearance Procedure to Safely Control Energy.

TVA 17984 [11-2005]. CLEARANCE TAG LIST AND OPERATIONAL STEPS.

4. Task/KA/Safety Function:

Determine requirements for Locked High Radiation Area / 2.3.4 Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under normal or emergency conditions (3.2/3.7) (CFR 41.12 / 43.4 / 45.10)/ Safety Function N/A Task Standard:

Applicant determines:

1.) C-Zone protective clothing (Dressout), RP coverage, and radiological briefing requirements from the provided Radiation Work Permit.

2.) The maximum inspection time without exceeding the administrative dose level is 35 min (0.58) (OR 30 min (0.5 hrs) based on RCI-100.)

3.) That the LHRA key can only be issued to RP personnel in this situation and that only the RP Shift Supervisor can issue LHRA key Critical Steps:

Applicant determines:

C-Zone protective clothing (Dressout), RP coverage, and radiological briefing requirements from the provided Radiation Work Permit.

The maximum inspection time without exceeding the administrative dose level is 35 min (0.58) (OR 30 min (0.5 hrs) based on RCI-100.)

That the LHRA key can only be issued to RP personnel in this situation and that only the RP Shift Supervisor can issue LHRA key The applicant will perform actions of the following procedures:

RCI-100, "Control of Radiological Work."

RCI-153, "Radiation Work Permits."

NPG-SPP-05.1, "Radiological Controls."

5. Task/KA/Safety Function:

Classify the Event, per the REP / 2.4.40 Knowledge of SRO responsibilities in emergency plan implementation. (2.7/4.5) (CFR 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.11) / Safety Function N/A Task Standard:

The applicant 1.) Classifies the event as a SITE AREA EMERGENCY, based on EAL 3.1 LOSS OF AC (Power Ops), within 15 minutes.

2.) Completes EPIP-4, Site Area Emergency, Appendix A, TVA Initial Notification Form For Site Area Emergency.

Critical Steps:

Classifies the event as a SITE AREA EMERGENCY, based on EAL 3.1 LOSS OF AC (Power Ops).

Completes EPIP-4, Site Area Emergency, Appendix A, TVA Initial Notification Form For Site Area Emergency.

The applicant will perform actions of the following procedures:

EPIP-1 Emergency Plan Classification Flowpath.

EPIP-4, Site Area Emergency.

ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Reactor Operator

ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: Watts Bar Date of Examination: March 2013 Exam Level: RO SRO-I SRO-U Operating Test Number: 1 Control Room Systems@ (8 for RO); (7 for SRO-I); (2 or 3 for SRO-U, including 1 ESF)

Safety System / JPM Title Type Code*

Function A. Respond to PRT High Level Alarm. A,M 5 007 Pressurizer Relief Tank (A4.10) (3.6/3.8) (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8)

B. Establish RCS Bleed and Feed. A,D,EN 4P E05 Loss of Secondary Heat Sink (EA1.1) (4.1/4.0) (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

C. Perform an Alternate Dilution to Flush the Blender. M 1 004 Chemical and Volume Control System (A4.07) ( 3.9/3.7) (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8)

D. Isolate Leaking Steam Generator. A,L,M 3 037 Steam Generator Tube Leak (AA2.11) ( 3.8/3.8) (CFR 43.5 / 45.13)

E. Transfer from Bypass Regulating to Main Feedwater Regulating Valve. N 4S 059 Main Feedwater(MFW)System (A4.08) (3.0/2.9) (CFR 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8)

F. Synchronize the DG from Main Control Room. A,M 6 064 Emergency Diesel Generators (A4.01) (4.0/4.3) (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8)

G. Return Failed RCS Temperature Channel to Service. A,M 7 016 Non-Nuclear Instrumentation System (A4.01) (2.9/2.8) (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8)

H. Start Upper Containment Purge. M 8 029 Containment Purge System (A2.03) (2.7/3.2) (CFR 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)

In-Plant Systems@ (3 for RO); (3 for SRO-I); (3 or 2 for SRO-U)

I. Remove a 120V AC Vital Inverter From Service per SOI-235.01. D 6 057.Loss of Vital AC Electrical Instrument Bus (AA1.01) (3.7/3.7) (CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

J. Local Operation of Turbine Driven AFW Pump. A,D,E,L,R 4S 061 Auxiliary Feedwater System (A2.04) (3.4/3.8) (CFR 41.5/43.5/45.3/45.13)

K. Align Upper Containment Monitor To Lower Containment Locally. M,R 7 073 Process Radiation Monitors (A4.02) (3.7/3.7) (CFR 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.6)

@ All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.

Type Codes Criteria for RO / SRO-I / SRO-U (A)lternate path 4-6 / 4-6 / 2-3 (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank <9 / <8 / <4 (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant >1 / >1 / >1 (EN)gineered safety feature - / - / >1 (L)ow-Power / Shutdown >1 / >1 / >1 (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A) >2 / >2 / >1 (P)revious 2 exams <3 < 3 / < 2 (randomly selected)

(R)CA >1 / >1 / >1 (S)imulator

ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Summary A. Task/KA/Safety Function:

Respond to PRT High Level Alarm / 007 Pressurizer Relief Tank (A4.10) (3.6/3.8)/

Safety Function 5 Task Standard:

The applicant:

1.) Performs actions of ARI 88-B, PRT LEVEL HI/LO for a high level and reduces level to clear the PRT high level alarm.

2.) Diagnoses the failure of PZR PORV 1-68-340 open, and terminates the depressurization by placing 1-HS-68-333A BLOCK VALVE FOR PORV 340 in the CLOSED position.

Critical Steps:

Open 1-HS-68-310A, PRT DRAIN TO RCDT to establish the proper water volume in the PRT.

Close 1-HS-68-333A BLOCK VALVE FOR PORV 340 to terminate the depressurization of the RCS.

Alternate Path:

During the PRT level reduction, PZR PORV 1-68-340 fails to a partially open position. This requires the applicant to place 1-HS-68-333A, BLOCK VALVE FOR PORV 340, in the CLOSED position to terminate the RCS depressurization.

If similar to an event in the Dynamic Scenario, then an explanation of how it is different.

Not Applicable The applicant will perform actions of the following procedures:

SOI-68.01, Reactor Coolant System Pressurizer Relief Tank Operations.

ARI 88-B, PRT LEVEL HI/LO.

AOI-18, Malfunction of Pressurizer Pressure Control System, Section 3.2 PZR Pressure Drop Due to Failed PORV/Safety or Spray Valve.

ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 B. Task/KA/Safety Function:

Establish RCS Bleed and Feed / E05 Loss of Secondary Heat Sink (EA1.1) (4.1/4.0)/

Safety Function 4P Task Standard:

The applicant performs the actions and contingency actions required to establish a bleed path by performing Steps 18 through 20 of 1-FR-H.1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink.

Critical Steps:

Actuation of Safety Injection.

Ensuring an adequate RCS bleed path by opening the one functional PORV and restoring power to and opening the Reactor Vessel Head vents.

Applicant locates 1-HS-1-6A, SG 1 PORV PCV-1-5, 1-HS-1-6, SG 2 PORV PCV 13, 1-HS-1-24, SG 3 PORV PCV-1-24, 1-HS-1-31, SG 4 PORV PCV-1-30, and rotates at least one handswitch to the RIGHT to the OPEN position.

Alternate Path:

Failure of 1-PCV-68-334, PZR PORV 334 to open requires use of the Reactor Vessel Head Vent System to create adequate bleed path for RCS heat removal.

If similar to an event in the Dynamic Scenario, then an explanation of how it is different.

2013-03 NRC Exam Scenario 3 deals with a loss of secondary heat sink, but does not result in bleed-and-feed actions. Actions taken during the scenario are related to the restoration of feedwater capabilities by restarting the Standby Main Feedwater Pump.

The applicant will perform actions of the following procedures:

1-FR-H.1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink.

Documentation justifying classification of Engineered Safety Function, when applicable:

JPM requires operation of safety related equipment to cool the core.

ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 C. Task/KA/Safety Function Perform an Alternate Dilution to Flush the Blender / 004 Chemical and Volume Control System (A4.07) (3.9/3.7) / Safety Function 1 Task Standard:

The applicant:

1.) Aligns the CVCS system to accomplish a 50 gallon flush of the boric acid lines using SOI-62.02, Boron Concentration Control, Section 6.3, Alternate Dilution or Flush.

2.) Aligns the VCT makeup controls to AUTO after the completion of the flush.

List of Critical Steps ADJUST 1-FQ-62-142, PW BATCH COUNTER [1-M-6], for required quantity of 50 gallons.

PLACE 1-HS-62-140B, VCT MAKEUP MODE [1-M-6], in ALT DIL.

TURN 1-HS-62-140A, VCT MAKEUP CONTROL [1-M-6], to START.

WHEN alternate dilution is COMPLETE, PLACE 1-HS-62-140B, VCT MAKEUP MODE, in AUTO.

TURN 1-HS-62-140A, VCT MAKEUP CONTROL, to START.

ENSURE 1-HS-62-128, MAKEUP to VCT INLET, in P-AUTO.

List of Steps that Constitute an Alternate Path Not Applicable If similar to an event in the Dynamic Scenario, then an explanation of how it is different.

Not Applicable Procedure Name/Number and Section pertaining to the task.

SOI-62.02, Boron Concentration Control, Section 6.3, Alternate Dilution or Flush.

ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 D. Task/KA/Safety Function:

Isolate Leaking Steam Generator / 037 Steam Generator Tube Leak (AA2.11)

(3.8/3.8) / Safety Function 3 Task Standard:

The applicant 1.) Determines that 1-HS-1-4A, MSIV SG 1 will not CLOSE.

2.) Performs actions of AOI-33, Steam Generator Tube Leak. Appendix B, Leaking S/G Isolation, to compensate for the failure of 1-HS-1-4A MSIV SG 1 to close.

List of Critical Steps:

CLOSE INTACT SG MSIVs, and bypass valves, to isolate Ruptured SG from intact SGs.

CLOSE HP steam main isolation valves to MSRs.

CLOSE HP steam bypass isolation valves to MSRs.

CLOSE HP steam warming valves to MSRs.

CLOSE Condenser steam dumps.

CLOSE Steam seal supply valves.

ISOLATE feedwater flow to leaking SG.

Alternate Path:

Applicant determines that SG 1 MSIV will not close, and performs Appendix B, Leaking S/G Isolation, actions in the Main Control Room.

If similar to an event in the Dynamic Scenario, then an explanation of how it is different:

Although a steam generator tube rupture is part of Scenario 5, the actions to isolate the SG using compensatory actions are not performed.

Procedure Name/Number and Section pertaining to the task:

AOI-33, Steam Generator Tube Leak, Appendix B, Leaking S/G Isolation.

ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 E. Task/KA/Safety Function Transfer from Bypass Regulating to Main Feedwater Regulating Valve / 059 Main Feedwater (MFW) System (A4.08) (3.0/2.9) / Safety Function 4S Task Standard:

The applicant performs the actions required to transfer feedwater supply from 1-LIC-3-103A, SG 4 MFW BYPASS REG CONTROL to 1-FIC-3-103, SG 4 MFW REG VLV.

List of Critical Steps ENSURE 1-FIC-3-103, SG 4 - MFW REG VLV valve in 3 ELEMENT CONTROL.

PLACE 1-FIC-3-103, SG 4 - MFW REG VLV in AUTO.

PLACE 1-LIC-3-103A, SG 4 MFW BYPASS REG CONTROL in MANUAL, AND SLOWLY REDUCE controller loading to 15%.

REDUCE 1-LIC-3-103A, SG 4 MFW BYPASS REG CONTROL loading to 0%.

List of Steps that Constitute an Alternate Path Not Applicable If similar to an event in the Dynamic Scenario, then an explanation of how it is different.

Not Applicable Procedure Name/Number and Section pertaining to the task.

1-SOI-2&3.01, "Condensate and Feedwater System," Section 5.6, "Bypass Reg to Main Reg Transfer (Method 1)."

ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 F. Task/KA/Safety Function Synchronize DG 1B-B from the MCR / 064 Emergency Diesel Generators (A4.01)

(4.0/4.3) / Safety Function 6 Task Standard:

The applicant:

1.) Synchronizes 1B-B Diesel Generator to the shutdown board from the MCR, per SOI-82.01 Section 8.1.4, and then loads the DG to 4 MW and 0.75-1.25 MVARs.

2.) Determines that an emergency stop of the diesel generator is required upon receipt of annunciator 205-B, DG LUBE OIL PRESS LO and performs an emergency stop of the 1B-B Diesel Generator.

List of Critical Steps PLACE 1-HS-82-48, DG MODE SELECTOR Switch, in PARALLEL [0-M-26].

PLACE 1-HS-57-74, DG SYNC SWITCH, in SYN [0-M-26].

WHEN TRAIN 1B-B SYNCHROSCOPE (1-XI-82-31) reaches 12 oclock, THEN TURN 1-HS-57-73A, 1914 - DG TO SD BD 1B-B, to CLOSE.

LOAD DG promptly using 1-HS-82-43, SPEED CONTROL to at least 1.1 Megawatts as indicated on 1-EI-82-40A, DG MEGAWATTS (0-M-26).

MAINTAIN DG MEGAVARS 0.75 to 1.25 OUTGOING on 1-EI-82-41A, with 1-HS 42, VOLTAGE REGULATOR.

When Window 205-B, DG LUBE OIL PRESS LO alarm is received, the applicant locates and depresses 1-HS-82-47A, EMERGENCY STOP pushbutton on 0-M-26 after receiving report from the field that oil pressure is 12 psig.

List of Steps that Constitute an Alternate Path During diesel generator synchronization, a low lube oil pressure alarm is received, requiring the applicant to initiate an emergency stop of the 1B-B Diesel Generator.

If similar to an event in the Dynamic Scenario, then an explanation of how it is different.

Not Applicable Procedure Name/Number and Section pertaining to the task.

SOI-82.02, Diesel Generator (DG) B-B, Section 8.1.4, Manual-Remote Synchronizing DG.

ARI 205-B, DG LUBE OIL PRESS LO.

ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 G. Task/KA/Safety Function Return Failed RCS Temperature Channel to Service / 016 Non-Nuclear Instrumentation System (A4.01) (2.9/2.8)/ Safety Function 7 Task Standard:

The applicant:

1.) Returns Loop 4 RCS Tavg and T inputs to the rod control system using AOI-2, Malfunction of Reactor Control System.

2.) Initiates a manual reactor trip upon diagnosis of the continuous rod withdrawal of Control Bank D GROUP 1.

List of Critical Steps WHEN ready to restore repaired T and loop T-avg channels, THEN:

PUSH IN 1-XS-68-2D, T CHANNEL DEFEAT and SELECT AWAY from all channels.

PUSH IN 1-XS-68-2M, TAVG CHANNEL DEFEAT, and SELECT AWAY from all channels.

When continuous rod withdrawal begins, the applicant will:

STOP uncontrolled rod motion:

a. PLACE control rods in MAN.

b. CHECK control rod movement STOPPED.

Since rod motion continues, the applicant TRIPS the reactor.

List of Steps that Constitute an Alternate Path When rod control is returned to AUTO, Control Bank D GROUP 1 begins to continuously withdraw. This requires the applicant to trip the reactor.

If similar to an event in the Dynamic Scenario, then an explanation of how it is different.

Not Applicable Procedure Name/Number and Section pertaining to the task.

AOI-2, Malfunction of Reactor Control System, Section 3.2,Uncontrolled Rod Bank Movement.

ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 H. Task/KA/Safety Function Start Upper Containment Purge / 029 Containment Purge System (A2.03)

(2.7/3.2)/Safety Function 8 Task Standard:

The applicant places Train A Upper Containment Purge in service using SOI-30.02, Containment Purge System, Section 5.1, Start Up Upper Containment Purge, steps 10 through Step 18.

List of Critical Steps CLOSE Containment vent filter flowpath.

OPEN 1-HS-30-2, PURGE SUP FAN DISCH.

OPEN 1-HS-30-213, PURGE EXH FAN 1A TO SHIELD BDL VNT.

OPEN 1-HS-30-7, UPR CNTMT PURGE 1-FCV-30-7 & 51.

OPEN 1-HS-30-8, UPR CNTMT PURGE 1-FCV-30-8 & 50.

Place 1-HS-30-1A, CNTMT PURGE SUP & EXH FANS 1A AND FCO-30-1A & 1B in START.

OPEN 1-HS-30-61A, PURGE EXH FAN A SUCT.

List of Steps that Constitute an Alternate Path Not Applicable If similar to an event in the Dynamic Scenario, then an explanation of how it is different.

Not Applicable Procedure Name/Number and Section pertaining to the task.

SOI-30.02, Containment Purge System, Section 5.1, Start Up Upper Containment Purge.

ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 I. Task/KA/Safety Function Remove a 120V AC Vital Inverter From Service per SOI-235.01 / 057 Loss of Vital AC Electrical Instrument Bus (AA1.01) (3.7/3.7) / Safety Function 6 Task Standard:

The applicant completes SOI-235.01, 120V AC VITAL POWER SYSTEM 1-I, Section 7.1, Shutdown of 120V AC Vital Inverter 1-I, to remove the inverter from service.

List of Critical Steps PLACE 1-BKR-235-1/CB2, INVERTER OUTPUT, to OFF.

PLACE 1-BKR-235-1/CB1, BATTERY INPUT, to OFF.

PLACE 1-BKR-235-1/CB301, AC INPUT TO RECTIFIER, to OFF.

PLACE 1-BKR-235-1/CB4, BYPASS SOURCE AC INPUT, to OFF.

ENSURE 1-HS-235-1/SW2, AN1 ANNUNCIATOR DISABLE, in DISABLE.

PLACE 1-BKR-235-1/CB701, AC INPUT TO ISOLIMITER, to OFF.

ENSURE 1-HS-235-1/SW3, AN2 ANNUNCIATOR DISABLE, in DISABLE.

List of Steps that Constitute an Alternate Path Not Applicable If similar to an event in the Dynamic Scenario, then an explanation of how it is different.

Not Applicable Procedure Name/Number and Section pertaining to the task.

SOI-235.01, 120V AC VITAL POWER SYSTEM 1-I, Section 7.1, Shutdown of 120V AC Vital Inverter 1-I.

ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 J. Task/KA/Safety Function Local Operation of Turbine Driven AFW Pump / 061 Auxiliary Feedwater System (A2.04) (3.4/3.8)/ Safety Function 4S Task Standard:

The applicant:

1.) Transfers control power to the local control station.

2.) Resets the mechanical overspeed device.

3.) Locally latches 1-FCV-1-51 motor drive to the valve stem.

4.) Starts the AFW Pump A-S from the local station.

List of Critical Steps PLACE 1-XS-46-57, TD AFW PMP CONTROLS TRANSFER SWITCH to AUX.

PLACE 1-XS-46-57A, TD AFW PMP FW DISCH FLOW IND CNTLR XFER SW to AUX.

RELATCH the Mechanical Overspeed Trip Device locally.

DEPRESS 1-HS-46-56B, TD AFW PMP and TRIP/THV 1-FCV-1-51 POS CNTL, to CLOSE, AND HOLD for 30 seconds to latch 1-FCV-1-51 motor drive to the valve stem.

OPEN 1-FCV-1-51 using 1-HS-46-56B, TD AFW PMP TRIP/THV 1-FCV-1-51 POS CNTL.

List of Steps that Constitute an Alternate Path The applicant will have to reset trip and throttle per SOI-3.02, Auxiliary Feedwater System, Section 8.3, Resetting AFWT Overspeed Trip, to complete task.

If similar to an event in the Dynamic Scenario, then an explanation of how it is different.

Not Applicable Procedure Name/Number and Section pertaining to the task.

1-ECA-0.0, Loss of Shutdown Power.

SOI-3.02, Auxiliary Feedwater System, Section 8.4, Local Operation of Turbine Driven AFW Pump, and Section 8.3, Resetting AFWT Overspeed Trip.

ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 K. Task/KA/Safety Function Align Upper Containment Monitor To The Lower Containment Locally / 073 Process Radiation Monitors (A4.02) (3.7/3.7) / Safety Function 7 Task Standard:

The applicant:

1.) Identifies the running sample pumps, and stops the pumps using 1-HS-90-106A and 1-HS-90-112A.

2.) Locates and demonstrates how to opens 1-ISIV-90-112A, LOWER CONTAINMENT SUP TO 1-RE-90-112 CROSS TIE.

3.) Locates 1-RE-90-112 IODINE LOW FLOW ALARM and resets the alarm using 1-HS-90-112JB.

List of Critical Steps Applicant locates 1-HS-90-106A, and states that 1-HS-90-106A STOP pushbutton must be depressed.

Applicant locates 1-HS-90-112A, and states that 1-HS-90-112A STOP pushbutton must be depressed.

Applicant locates 1-ISIV-90-112A and states that the hand wheel must be rotated counter clockwise until valve is fully open.

Applicant contacts the Main Control Room to have the remaining valves placed in the correct positions.

Applicant locates 1-HS-90-112A, and states that 1-HS-90-112A START pushbutton must be depressed.

Applicant locates 1-HS-90-112JB, and states that 1-HS-90-112A RESET pushbutton must be depressed.

List of Steps that Constitute an Alternate Path Not Applicable If similar to an event in the Dynamic Scenario, then an explanation of how it is different.

Not Applicable Procedure Name/Number and Section pertaining to the task.

SOI-90.02, Gaseous Process Radiation Monitors, Section 8.1, Align Upper Containment Monitor to Lower Containment."

ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Instant Senior Reactor Operator

ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: Watts Bar Date of Examination: March 2013 Exam Level: RO SRO-I SRO-U Operating Test Number: 1 Control Room Systems@ (8 for RO); (7 for SRO-I); (2 or 3 for SRO-U, including 1 ESF)

Safety System / JPM Title Type Code*

Function A. Respond to PRT High Level Alarm. A,M 5 007 Pressurizer Relief Tank (A4.10) (3.6/3.8) (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8)

B. Establish RCS Bleed and Feed. A,D,EN 4P E05 Loss of Secondary Heat Sink (EA1.1) (4.1/4.0) (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

C. Perform an Alternate Dilution to Flush the Blender. M 1 004 Chemical and Volume Control System (A4.07) ( 3.9/3.7) (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8)

D. Isolate Leaking Steam Generator. A,L,M 3 037 Steam Generator Tube Leak (AA2.11) ( 3.8/3.8) (CFR 43.5 / 45.13)

E. Transfer from Bypass Regulating to Main Feedwater Regulating Valve. N 4S 059 Main Feedwater(MFW)System (A4.08) (3.0/2.9) (CFR 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8)

F. Synchronize the DG from Main Control Room. A,M 6 064 Emergency Diesel Generators (A4.01) (4.0/4.3) (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8)

G. Return Failed RCS Temperature Channel to Service. A,M 7 016 Non-Nuclear Instrumentation System (A4.01) (2.9/2.8) (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8)

H. Not Applicable In-Plant Systems@ (3 for RO); (3 for SRO-I); (3 or 2 for SRO-U)

I. Remove a 120V AC Vital Inverter From Service per SOI-235.01. D 6 057.Loss of Vital AC Electrical Instrument Bus (AA1.01) (3.7/3.7) (CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

J. Local Operation of Turbine Driven AFW Pump. A,D,E,L,R 4S 061 Auxiliary Feedwater System (A2.04) (3.4/3.8) (CFR 41.5/43.5/45.3/45.13)

K. Align Upper Containment Monitor To Lower Containment Locally. M,R 7 073 Process Radiation Monitors (A4.02) (3.7/3.7) (CFR 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.6)

@ All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.

Type Codes Criteria for RO / SRO-I / SRO-U (A)lternate path 4-6 / 4-6 / 2-3 (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank <9 / <8 / <4 (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant >1 / >1 / >1 (EN)gineered safety feature - / - / >1 (L)ow-Power / Shutdown >1 / >1 / >1 (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A) >2 / >2 / >1 (P)revious 2 exams <3 < 3 / < 2 (randomly selected)

(R)CA >1 / >1 / >1 (S)imulator

ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Summary A. Task/KA/Safety Function:

Respond to PRT High Level Alarm / 007 Pressurizer Relief Tank (A4.10) (3.6/3.8)/

Safety Function 5 Task Standard:

The applicant:

1.) Performs actions of ARI 88-B, PRT LEVEL HI/LO for a high level and reduces level to clear the PRT high level alarm.

2.) Diagnoses the failure of PZR PORV 1-68-340 open, and terminates the depressurization by placing 1-HS-68-333A BLOCK VALVE FOR PORV 340 in the CLOSED position.

Critical Steps:

Open 1-HS-68-310A, PRT DRAIN TO RCDT to establish the proper water volume in the PRT.

Close 1-HS-68-333A BLOCK VALVE FOR PORV 340 to terminate the depressurization of the RCS.

Alternate Path:

During the PRT level reduction, PZR PORV 1-68-340 fails to a partially open position. This requires the applicant to place 1-HS-68-333A, BLOCK VALVE FOR PORV 340, in the CLOSED position to terminate the RCS depressurization.

If similar to an event in the Dynamic Scenario, then an explanation of how it is different.

Not Applicable The applicant will perform actions of the following procedures:

SOI-68.01, Reactor Coolant System Pressurizer Relief Tank Operations.

ARI 88-B, PRT LEVEL HI/LO.

AOI-18, Malfunction of Pressurizer Pressure Control System, Section 3.2 PZR Pressure Drop Due to Failed PORV/Safety or Spray Valve.

ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 B. Task/KA/Safety Function:

Establish RCS Bleed and Feed / E05 Loss of Secondary Heat Sink (EA1.1) (4.1/4.0)/

Safety Function 4P Task Standard:

The applicant performs the actions and contingency actions required to establish a bleed path by performing Steps 18 through 20 of 1-FR-H.1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink.

Critical Steps:

Actuation of Safety Injection.

Ensuring an adequate RCS bleed path by opening the one functional PORV and restoring power to and opening the Reactor Vessel Head vents.

Applicant locates 1-HS-1-6A, SG 1 PORV PCV-1-5, 1-HS-1-6, SG 2 PORV PCV 13, 1-HS-1-24, SG 3 PORV PCV-1-24, 1-HS-1-31, SG 4 PORV PCV-1-30, and rotates at least one handswitch to the RIGHT to the OPEN position.

Alternate Path:

Failure of 1-PCV-68-334, PZR PORV 334 to open requires use of the Reactor Vessel Head Vent System to create adequate bleed path for RCS heat removal.

If similar to an event in the Dynamic Scenario, then an explanation of how it is different.

2013-03 NRC Exam Scenario 3 deals with a loss of secondary heat sink, but does not result in bleed-and-feed actions. Actions taken during the scenario are related to the restoration of feedwater capabilities by restarting the Standby Main Feedwater Pump.

The applicant will perform actions of the following procedures:

1-FR-H.1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink.

Documentation justifying classification of Engineered Safety Function, when applicable:

JPM requires operation of safety related equipment to cool the core.

ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 C. Task/KA/Safety Function Perform an Alternate Dilution to Flush the Blender / 004 Chemical and Volume Control System (A4.07) (3.9/3.7) / Safety Function 1 Task Standard:

The applicant:

1.) Aligns the CVCS system to accomplish a 50 gallon flush of the boric acid lines using SOI-62.02, Boron Concentration Control, Section 6.3, Alternate Dilution or Flush.

2.) Aligns the VCT makeup controls to AUTO after the completion of the flush.

List of Critical Steps ADJUST 1-FQ-62-142, PW BATCH COUNTER [1-M-6], for required quantity of 50 gallons.

PLACE 1-HS-62-140B, VCT MAKEUP MODE [1-M-6], in ALT DIL.

TURN 1-HS-62-140A, VCT MAKEUP CONTROL [1-M-6], to START.

WHEN alternate dilution is COMPLETE, PLACE 1-HS-62-140B, VCT MAKEUP MODE, in AUTO.

TURN 1-HS-62-140A, VCT MAKEUP CONTROL, to START.

ENSURE 1-HS-62-128, MAKEUP to VCT INLET, in P-AUTO.

List of Steps that Constitute an Alternate Path Not Applicable If similar to an event in the Dynamic Scenario, then an explanation of how it is different.

Not Applicable Procedure Name/Number and Section pertaining to the task.

SOI-62.02, Boron Concentration Control, Section 6.3, Alternate Dilution or Flush.

ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 D. Task/KA/Safety Function:

Isolate Leaking Steam Generator / 037 Steam Generator Tube Leak (AA2.11)

(3.8/3.8) / Safety Function 3 Task Standard:

The applicant 1.) Determines that 1-HS-1-4A, MSIV SG, will not CLOSE.