ML13164A220
| ML13164A220 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 09/04/2012 |
| From: | Andrea Russell Division of Policy and Rulemaking |
| To: | Brice Bickett, Doerflein L, Samson Lee NRC/NRR/DRA, NRC Region 1, NRC/RGN-I/DRP/PB6 |
| References | |
| 2.206, FOIA/PA-2013-0010, G20120172, TAC ME8189 | |
| Download: ML13164A220 (19) | |
Text
Doerflein, Lawrence From:
Sent:
To:
Cc:
Subject:
Attachments:
Russell, Andrea Tuesday, September 04, 2012 7:11 AM Lee, Saon-Bickett, Brice; Doerflein, Lawrence; Jennerich, Matthew; Dennig, Robert; Fretz, Robert; (j)k7)(C)
Eul, Ryan; Monninger, John; McIntyre, David; Collins, Timothy; Cook, william; c a rammy; Lemoncelli, Mauri; Miranda, Samuel Vaidya, Bhalchandra; Thadani, Mohan; Pelton, David RE: G20120172 (Fitzpatrick 2.206): PRB Internal Meeting Notes on Initial Recommendation based on 3rd meeting and comments from John and OGC (TAC ME8189)
With comments from Monninger and OGC addressed-ME8189 (G20120172) Final PRB Notes 08-23-2012.docx Good morning, I have not received comments or concurrences from the majority of the PRB members. In order to move forward with the initial recommendation, we need consensus from the PRB. Please reply to Bhalchandra and myself stating that either you concur on the attached or that you have comments by COB Thursday September 6 "h.
- Thanks, Andrea 2.206 Coordinator From: Russell, Andrea Sent: Thursday, August 23, 2012 8:29 AM To: Lee, Samson; Bickett, Brice; Doe,r=n rneennerich, Matthew; Dennig, Robert; Ulses, Anthony; MorganButler, Kimyata; Fretz, Robertf (b)(7)(C)
JEul, Ryan; Safford, Carrie; Monninger, John; McIntyre, David; Collins, Timothy; Scott, Catherine; Albert, icee;
, William; McCarver, Sammy Cc: Vaidya, Bhalchandra; Thadani, Mohan
Subject:
G20120172 (Fitzpatrick 2.206): PRB Internal Meeting Notes on Initial Recommendation based on 3rd meeting and comments from John and OGC (TAC ME8189)
Good morning, On behalf of Bhalchandra, I am providing you with the revised Final PRB internal meeting notes on the initial recommendation, for your review. These meeting notes have been updated since the last meeting on July 19, 2012, to incorporate changes from OGC and John Monninger. The changes are shown in tracked format.
Please provide your comments/concurrence on the notes to myself and Bhalchandra by COB Thursday August 30'h.
Thank you for your time, Andrea 2.206 Coordinator Andrea Russell Project Manager Nuclear Regulatory Commission NRRIDPR/PGCB I
C/134
'?"h: 301-415-8553 2
10 CFR 2.206 PRB Closed Meeting Notes - 0711912012
SUBJECT:
GUNTER ET AL. 2.206 REQUESTING ENFORCEMENT ACTION AGAINST JAMES A. FITZPATRICK PLANT (G20120172) (TAC ME8189)
PETITIONER:
DATE:
Paul Gunter, et al March 9, 2012, the supplements dated March 13, and March 20, 2012, and Petitioners' Presentations to the PRB in the Public Meeting on April 17, 2012.
PRB MEMBERS & ADVISORS Samson Lee Bhalchandra Vaidya Sam Miranda Robert Dennig Robert Fretz John Monninger Andrea Russell David Pelton Brice Bickelt Mathew Jennerich Lawrence Doerftlein Ryan Eut Mauri Lemoncelli (PRB Chair - Deputy Director, NRR, Division of Risk Assessment)
(Petition Manager - NRR, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing)
(Branch Chief(A) - NRR, Division of Safety Systems, Reactor Systems Branch)
(Branch Chief - NRR, Division of Safety Systems, Containment and Ventilation Branch)
(Senior Project Manager-NRR, Japan Lessons Learned Project Directorate, Projects Management Branch)
(Associate Director - NRR, Japan Lessons Learned Project Directorate)
(Agency 2.206 Coordinator - NRR, Division of Policy and Rulemaking)
(Branch Chief - NRR, Division of Policy and Rulemaking, Generic Communications Branch)
(Senior Project Manager - Region 1, Branch 2, Division of Reactor Projects)
(Project Engineer - Region 1, Branch 2, Division of Reactor Projects)
(Branch Chief-Region 1, Branch 2, Division of Reactor Safety)
(Enforcement Specialist - Office of Enforcement)
(Senior Attorney - Assistant General Counsel - Materials Litigation and Enforcement - Office of General Counsel) formatted: Font colr:Auto
SUMMARY
OF REQUEST:
On March 9, 2012, as supplemented March 13 and March 20, 2012, Mr. Paul Gunter, et. al.,
submitted a joint petition to the NRC, under Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 2.206, regarding James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (FitzPatrick).
The joint petitioners request that the FitzPatrick operating license be immediately suspended as the result of the undue risk to the public health and safety presented by the operator's reliance on non-conservative and wrong assumptions that went into the analysis of the capability of FitzPatrick's pre-existing ductwork containment vent system. The joint petitioners state that the risks and uncertainty presented by FitzPatnick's assumptions and decisions, in regard to NRC Generic Letter 89-16, as associated with the day-to-day operations of this nuclear power plant now constitute an undue risk to public health and safety. The joint petitioners request that the suspension of the operating license be in effect pending final resolution of a public challenge to the adequacy of the pre-existing vent line in light of the Fukushima Daii.
i-ichi nuclear accident. The joint petitioners do not seek or request that FitzPatrick operators now install the Direct Torus Vent System (DTVS) as it is demonstrated to have experienced multiple failures to mitigate the severe nuclear accidents at Fukushima Daliil;Dai-ichi.
The joint petitioners request that the NRC take action to suspend the FitzPatrick operating license immediately until the following emergency enforcement actions are enacted, completed,
reviewed, and approved by the NRC and informed by independent scientific analysis:
- 1) Entergy Nuclear Operations' FitzPatrick nuclear power plant shall be subject to public hearings with full hearing rights on the continued operation of the Mark I BWR and the adequacy and capability of a pre-existing containment vent which is not a fully hardened vent line as recommended by NRC Generic Letter 89-16. As such, the FitzPatrick operator uniquely did not make containment modifications and did not install the DTVS, otherwise known as "the hardened vent," as requested by NRC Generic Letter 89-16 and as installed on every other GE Mark I in the US;
- 2) Entergy Nuclear Operations shall publicly document for independent review its post-Fukushima re-analyses for the reliability and capability of the FitzPatrick pre-existing containment vent system as previously identified as "an acceptable deviation" from NRC Generic Letter 89-16 which recommended the installation of the Direct Torus Vent System and as outlined in the NRC Safety Evaluation Report dated September 28, 1992. The publicly documented post-Fukushima analysis shall include the reassessment of all assumptions regarding the capability and reliability of the pre-existing containment venting and specifically address non-conservative assumptions regarding:
a) the FitzPatrick cost-benefit analysis used to justify not installing a fully hardened vent system and; b) "unlikely ignition points" as claimed in the FitzPatrick pre-existing vent line system that would otherwise present increased risks and consequences associated with the detonation of hydrogen gas generated during a severe accident.
In the March 20, 2012, supplement to the petition, the joint petitioners state that the Temporary Instruction 2515/183 provides the NRC inspection results in the "Follow-up to the Fukushima DakiDai-ichi Nuclear Station Fuel Damage Event." The joint petitioners draw attention to what is described at page 8 of the enclosure as an "apparent beyond design and licensing basis vulnerability" involving the FitzPatrick operator's refusal to install the DTVS as recommended by NRC in Generic Letter 89-16.
To summarize the supplement, the joint petitioners state that:
The Commission's March 12, 2012, Order states that "Current regulatory requirement and existing plant capabilities allow the NRC to conclude that a sequence of events such as the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident is unlikely to occur in the US. Therefore, continued operation and continued licensed activities do not pose an imminent threat to public health and safety." The Order further states, "While not required, hardened vents have been in place in U.S. plants with BWR Mark I containments for many years but a wide variance exist with regard to the reliability of the vents."
" The NRC inspection report identifies that FitzPatrick's "existing plant capabilities" and "current procedures do not address hydrogen considerations during primary containment venting" which is further identified as a "current licensing basis vulnerability." The joint petitioners further reiterate that the NRC inspection finding that FitzPatrick's "existing plant capabilities" as assumed by the Order are in fact negated by the finding that
'FitzPatrick's current licensing basis did not require the plant to have a primary containment torus air space hardened vent system as part of their Mark I containment improvement program."
2
" The Commission Order timeline setting December 31, 2016, for installing the reliable hardened vent does not address in a timely way the unique condition of FitzPatrick.
" FitzPatrick uniquely does not have a fully hardened vent system on the vulnerable Mark I containment. As a result, FitzPatrick's current capability is identified with "a beyond design and licensing bases vulnerability, in that FitzPatrick's current licensing basis did not require the plant to have a primary containment torus air space hardened vent system as part of their Mark I containment improvement program.' Given that the FitzPatrick unit willfully refused to install the DTVS, the documented discovery of the
'licensing basis vulnerability" of its chosen pre-existing vent now uniquely warrants the suspension of operations pending closer scrutiny, public hearings, and full disclosure for its adequacy and capability in the event of a severe accident. The additional identified "vulnerability" and the relatively remote and uncertain mitigation strategy places the public health and safety unduly and unacceptably at risk by the continued day-to-day operations where "current procedures do not address hydrogen considerations during primary containment venting" and will not for nearly five (5) more years.
BASIS FOR THE REQUEST:
As a basis for the request, the joint petitioners' state that in light of the multiple failures of the GE Mark I containment and hardened vent systems at the Fukushima Qa"Dai-ichi nuclear power station in the days following the March 11, 2011, station black out event, the joint petitions seek the prompt and immediate suspension of the FitzPatrick operations because:
" The GE Mark I BWR pressure suppression containment system is identified as inherently unreliable and likely to fail during a severe accident.
" The capability of FitzPatrick's pre-existing containment vent as approved for severe accident mitigation is not a fully 'hardened vent" system.
The capability of FitzPatrick's pre-existing containment vent as approved relies upon non-conservative and faulty assumptions.
" The capability of FitzPatrick's pre-existing containment vent system uniquely allows for a severe nuclear accident to be released at ground level.
- The Fukushima Dai4-hiDai-ichi nuclear catastrophe dramatically and exponentially changes the FitzPatrick cost-benefit analyses.
" The continued day-to-day reliance upon the significantly flawed pre-existing containment vent system as would be relied upon to mitigate a severe accident at the FitzPatrick Mark I reactor presents an undue risk to the public health and safety.
" The identified containment vulnerability, the non-conservative if not false assumption of "no likely ignition sources" in the pre-existing vent line and the unacceptable consequences of failure of the FitzPatrick pre-existing containment vent place both greater uncertainty and undue risk on public health and safety and are not reasonably justified by arbitrarily assigning a low probability of the occurrence of a severe accident.
IS THERE A NEED FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION: (If Yes, describe)
NO, In its internal meeting on March 20, 2012, the PRB found that there is no immediate safety concern to FitzPatrick, or to the health and safety of the public and therefore, denied the request for emergency enforcement action based on the following considerations:
1, The Near-Term Task Force (NTTF), established by the NRC in response to the Fukushima Dai;Gh Dai-ichi nuclear event, concludes in its report dated July 12, 2011, that continued nuclear reactor operation and licensing activities do not pose an imminent risk to the public 3
health and safety and are not inimical to the common defense and security because of the low likelihood of an event beyond the design basis at a U.S. nuclear power plant and the current mitigation capabilities at those facilities;,the Commission has endorsed the NTTF Report, including its conclusions as evident by the Commission Voting Record for Decision Item SECY-11-0093, dated August 19, 2011: and, Formatted: Font: Not Bold, Not Highlight i
- 2. On March 12, 2012, the NRC ordered licensees of BWR facilities with Mark I and Mark II containments to have reliable hardened containment vents (EA-1 2-050). This order was based on the Commission's direction provided by the Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM) to SECY-12-0025, dated March 9, 2012. The order stated that:
Current regulatory requirements and existing plant capabilities allow the NRC to conclude that a sequence of events such as the Fukushima Dal-ichi accident is unlikely to occur in the U.S. Therefore, continued operation and continued licensing activities do not pose an imminent threat to public health and safety. However, the importance of reliable operation of hardened vents during emergency conditions was already well established and this understanding has been reinforced by the clear lessons of Fukushima. While not required, hardened vents have been in place in U.S. plants with BWR Mark I containments for many years but a wide variance exists with regard to the reliability of the vents. Additionally, hardened vents are not required on plants with BWR Mark I1 containments although as discussed above, Mark II containments are only slightly larger than Mark 1. Reliable hardened venting systems in BWR facilities with Mark I and Mark II containments are needed to ensure that adequate protection of public health and safety is maintained.
3._The NRC staff was aware of the conclusions presented in its Safety Evaluation (SE) dated September 28, 1992, for Fitzpatrick with respect to GL 89-16, and considered this information in its overall assessment on whether or not BWR facilities with Mark I and Mark II containments were safe to operate following the events at Fukushima. in a*,ditin, VheThe NRC inspected the design of the Fitzpatrick hardened wetwell vent system and documented the results in an inspection report (50-333/95-06) issued April 18, 1995. The NRC staff was cognizant of and reviewed the results of inspections performed under TI 183 at FitzPatrick (Report dated May 13, 2011, ADAMS Accession No. ML111330455) following the events at Fukushima. The regiona! staff has
.mmunicat.d wih NTTF regarding thc Veont ssstom configuration a! MitzMatrck, ncluding !he diffDOrenco froQ-m GLI 29-16
,nd,
[,M issuing the March 12, 2012. order, the NRC staff explicitly recognized the wide variance in the reliability of hardened vent designs amonq Mark I plants. The design at Fitzpatrick is one example of that variance. The petition for emergency enforcement action provided no new additional information relating to the existing containment venting capability of the Fitzpatrick plant.
Formatted: List Paragraph, Numbered +
Level: I + Numbering Style: 1, 2, 3,... + Start at: 1 + Alignment: Left + Aligned at: 0.06" +
Indent at: 0.31' DOES IT MEET CRITERIA FOR REVIEW?
Criteria for Reviewine Petitions Under V) CFR 2.206:
The petition contains a request for enforcement-related action such as issuing an order modifying, suspending, or revoking a license, issuing a notice of violation, with or without a proposed civil penalty.
YES.
- 2.
The facts that constitute the bases for taking the particular action are specified, The petitioner must provide some element of support beyond the bare essentials. The supporting facts must be credible and sufficient to warrant further inquiry.
4
YES.
- 3.
There is no NRC proceeding available in which the petitioner is or could be party and through which the petitioner's concerns could be addressed.
Formatted: Font color, Auto YES. (On May 9, 2012, Beyond Nuclear (P. Gunter) withdrew its April 3, 2012 pleading Forntted: Font" Not Bold, Fontcolr: Auto, and Request to Co-Petition with the Pilgrim Watch on the Fukushima-related Orders Nodingt
.J pertaining to hardened vents and spent fuel pool instrumentation. Subsequently, the ASLB denied Pilgrim Watch's request for hearing), -
.r.
atted:. Font color: Auto
_Criteria for Reiecting Petitions Under 10 CFR 2.206:
".--0,atted:
Font colr: Auto The Incoming correspondence does not ask for an enforcement-related action or fails to provide sufficient facts to support the petition, but simply alleges wrongdoing, violations of NRC regulations, or existence of safety concerns.
YES, in part.-
[or eotor Au to
- 2.
The petitioner raises issues that have already been the subject of NRC staff review and evaluation either on that facility, other similar facilities, or on a generic basis, for which a resolution has been achieved, the issues have been resolved, and the resolution is applicable to the facility in question.
YES, In part.
On March 12, 2012, the NRC ordered licensees of BWR facilities with Mark I and Mark II containments to have reliable hardened containment vents (EA-12-050). This order was based on the Commission's direction provided by the Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM) to SECY-12-0025, dated March 9, 2012.
Accept on the basis of the staffs onpoing review of NTTF Recommendation 5.1 and Recommendation 6. Recommendation 5.1 orders licensees to include a reliable hardened vent in BWR Mark I and Mark II containments-for the prevention of core damage, This order included performance objectives for the design of hardened vents to ensure reliable operation and ease of use (both opening and closing) during a prolonged SBO. R4......MMt9.d..Ati..
6.oommn,:,*,s a. part of theo
.ongrF W+1rm rwiowc.,
th*t 11h4 NRC ideRtify incights 3boutAs discussed in SECY-12-0025, the staff determined that consideration of severe accident conditions in the design and operation of the hardened vent involved golicy matters that are still under consideration by the staff. As such, venting under severe accident conditions is currently being evaluated by the staff on a generic basis. The staff is also evaluating NTTF Recommendation 6 concerning hydrogen control and mitigation inside containment or in other buildings as additional information is revealed through further study of the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident.- As such, the design of hardened vent systems to handle hydrogen -gas is currently being evaluated by the staff on a generic basis.
FitzPatrick's response to the GL 89-16 was-also reviewed and approved by the NRC in September 1992, including the staff review of the licensee's processes and proceduresT; a.,*d..... oA... The NRC staff evaluation stated, while approving FitzPatrick's positions with regard to GL-89-16, that FitzPatrick's containment vent system met the design bases and the design intent of GL 89-16. in additioni the NRC inspected the design of the Fitzpatrick hardened wetwell vent system and documented the results in an inspection report (50-333.95-06) issued April 18. 1995.
5
With respect to Fukushima accident, the N.TTF a.va-.uati.n and the subsequont Commice.. n Orde. hay NRC has concluded that a sequence of events such as the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident is unlikely to occur in the U.S. Therefore, continued operation and continued licensing activities do not pose an imminent threat to public health and safety.
,3.
The request is to deny a license application or amendment.
NO..
r,,te Font color Auto.
- 4.
The request addresses deficiencies within existing NRC rules.
NO,
" (FortMttea: Font co*or: AuIt IS THERE A NEED FOR OE, 01I. 01G or OGC INVOLVEMENT:
The petition does not contain any allegations of licensee or NRC staff wrongdoing. However, the PRB includes representatives from OE and OGC.
RECOMMENDED APPROACH AND SCHEDULE (Next Steps):
Accept, in part, and hold in abeyance the fe4owi-parts of the petition addressing containment venting under severe accident conditions and the design of vent systems being able to accommodate hydrogen gas (Issue Nos. 5(b), 7, and I1 in the Table) (see Table for a detailed explanation).
Three of the issues in the petition, identified and discussed as Issue Nos. 5(b), 7, and 11 in the Table, will be accepted for review by the NRC staff. However, as indicated in the Table, the NRC staff notes that these concerns are undergoing NRC review as part of the lessons-learned from the Fukushima event. Even though the Commission has issued the Order concerning Hardened.-Ventreliable hardened vent for accident prevention, the NRCDJL-0 staff is conducting further review of additional aspects of the Hadrfdd VeRt Syctomhardened vent system, such as filpra4 onventing under severe accident conditions. In addition, the staff is evaluating hydrogien control and mitigation measures. Since Issue Nos. 5(b), 7, and 11 in the Table will take longer than the target timeframe for reaching a decision on a petition, the NRC plans on accepting those issues, and holding them in abeyance.
All the other issues in the petition, identified and discussed in the Table are denied for the reasons discussed in the Table The next steps would be to:
" Ensure management agrees with the PRB initial recommendation.
, Inform the petitioners of the PRB's initial recommendation.
" Provide the second opportunity for the petitioners to address the PRB, and make the arrangements for an acceptable date and time.
6
Table his table summarzes each Issue Specific Issue Raised No.
on I
7 I
FitzPatfick operating license be immediately I
suspended as the result of the undue dsk to the I
public health and safety presented by the o rat 's reliance on nnservalive and wrong -
assumptions that went into the analysis of the capability of FitzPatrick's ore-existing dutwork containment vent syst. The risks and uncertaily presented by FitzPatrick's assumptions and I
decisions, in regard to NRC Generic Letter 89-16, is associated with the day-to-day operations of this nuclear power plant now constitute an undue risk tl public health and safety.
1The NTTF and JLD in the Commission Order have concluded that the NRC concluded that a sequence, of events like the Fukushima accident is unlikely to occur in the United States and,e4e-appopriate mitigation measures have been implemented, reducing the likelihood of core damage and radiological releases. Therefore, continued operation and continued licensing activities do not pose an imminent risk to public health and safety and there is no immediate safety concern to FitzPatrick, or to the health and safety of the public, and therefore, the request for immediate action should be reected. The Petitioners have not provided _adequate basis for their argument regarding the operators reliance on non-conservative and wrong assumptions that went into the analysis of the capability of FitzPatrick's pre-existing ductwork containment vent system, The Petitioner's concerns regardin this issue do not require immediate shutdown of FitzPatrick based on the conclusions reached by 449the NRC and the Commission Order regardinM Reliable Hardened Vent for the US GE Mark I BWRs.
LU.
S. plants have implemented 'beyond-design-basis" requirements such as ATlVS, SBO, combustible gas control, aircraft impact assessment,
.mitiqation of maior fires or explosions, and extensive FFowm at Won coko:
Auto Fo8matte Font color Adto FoTmat~d: Font color:
Auto I
//
I
/
1
Issue Specific Issue Raised Does this Recommendation No.
meet criteria for review under2,206 process?
damage mitigation guidelines, thereby reducing the likelihood of core damage and radiological releases, A sequence of events like those occurring in the Fukushima accident is unlikely to occur at US GE Mark I BWRs.
The NRC based on the NTTF report on July 12, 2011, 4oad o r
f i r9,I.h*o, F& 00a nai 4i*, aeof,o, made a recommendation to the Commission to include a reliable hardened vent system.
2 The suspension of the operating license be in effect No.
This is merely a statement to support the petition in pending inal resolution of a public challenge to the general. This is not an enforcement related action adequacy of the pre-existing vent line in light of the and is outside the scope of the 2.206 process and Fukushima 0 Daikichi nuclear accident.
therefore, this request should be r
seeLedPuruant to Criterion I for rejecting a atition under 10 CFR 2.206.
rnnaftd: Fort colr; Auto rmatted., Foil color.,
Auto 3-The joint petitioners do not seek or request that FitzPatrick operators now install the Direct Torus Vent System (DTVS) Recommended by GL89.16, as it is demonstrated to have experienced multiple failures to mitigate the severe nuclear accidents at Fukushima DaihDai-ichi.
FitzPatrick be subject to public hearings with full hearing rights on the continued operation of the Mark I 8WR and the adequacy and capability of a pre.existing containment vent which is not a fully hardened vent line as recommended by NRC Generic Leter 89-16. As such, the FitzPatrick operator uniquely did not make containment No.
This is merely a statement to support the pet general. This is not an enforcement related and is outside the scope of the 2.206 procest therefore, this request should be rejeted, pu to Criterion 1 for reiecting a petition under 10 2,206, No.
JThe pe*tioner raises issues that have already the subject of NRC staff review and evaluation on that facility, other similar facilities, or on a 9 basis, for which a resolution has been achieve:
issues have been resolved, and the resolution' applicable to the facility in question. The SE da Se tember 28, 1992 shows that FitzPatrick met 8
ition in action s and rsuant CFR been
'either enefc d,
the is ted the F
Issue Specific Issue Raised Does this I Recommendaton No.
meet critera for review under 2.206 process?.
modifications and did not install the DTVS, otherwise-BWROG critena recommended by GL 89-16.
known as "he hardened vent," as requested by NRC
/heerln addition, the NRC inspected the design Generic Letter 89-16 and as installed on every other of the Fitzpatrick hardened wetwell vent system and GE Mark I in the US; documented the results in an inspection report (50-333/95-06) issued April18, 1995Therefore, this
.rAb: FN codor:
Mo issue should be refected, pursuant to Criteron 2 for reiectid a vetiton under 10 CFR 2.206,.
5 FitzPatnck shall publidly document for independent There is no reguirement for the licensee to conduct review its post-Fukushima re-analyses for the a re-analyss of their existing containment vent reliability and capability of the FitzPatrick pre-sysem, The licensee's response to the existing containment vent system as previously Or.erreliable hardened vent order will be publicly identified as 'an acceptable deviation" from NRC available. Subsquen R.do..m.n. tie.
Generic Letter 89-16 which recommended the feaR diipl4-9,64 /W9PGpl installation of the Direct Torus Vent System and as WOUl also be publicly o.. bb..
outlined in the NRC Safety Evaluaton Report dated oatte: F c*r: Auto September 28, 1992. The publicly documented post-Fukushima analysis shall inclde the reassessment of all assumptions regarding the capability and reliability of the pre-existing containment venting and specifically address non-conservative assumptions regarding:,;
a) the FitzPatrick cost-beneft analysis used to No.
justify not installing a fully hardened vent system and;/
FitzPatrick's response to the GL 89-16 was reviewed and approved by the NRC in September 1992, including the staff review of the licensee's processes and procedures, and inspectons. The NRC staff evaluation stated, while a rovin 9_
j
IIssue Specific Issue Raised No./
I I
b) 'unlikely ignition points' as claimed in the FitzPatrick pre-existing vent line system th would otherwse present increased risks an consequences associated with the detonat.
of hydrogen gas generated during a severe accident.
/
/
at atYes.
rd ion 1'
I Sthis Recommendafion FitzPatdck's positons with regard to GL-016, that FitzPatdck's containment vent system met the design bases and the design intent of GL 89-16, With respect to the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident, the NTTF evaluation and the subsequent Commission Order have concluded that a sequence of events such as the Fukushima Dai4chi accident is unlikely to occur in the U.S and some appropriate mitigation measures have been Implemented, reducing the likelihood of core damage and radiological releases. Therefore, contnued operation and continued licensing activities do not pose an imminent threat to public health and safety.
Accept on the basis of NTTF Recommendation 5.1 and Recommendaton 6, hydrogen control and mitigation. The staff is evaluating hydrogen control and mitigation on a weneric basis-The results of that evaluation will apply to the Fitzpatrick plant..
Recommendation 5.1 orders licensees to include a reliable hardened vent in BWR Mark I and Mark I1 containments for prevention of core damage. This order included performance objectives for the design of hardened vents to ensure reliable operaton and ease of use (both opening and dosing) during a prolonged SBO. The staft is continuing to evaluate venting under severe accident conditions.
10
L 6
The Temporary Instruction 2515/183 provides NRC inspection results in the 'Followup to the Fukushima 090Dai-ichi Nuclear Station Fue Damage Event.' The joint petitioners draw atte to what is described at page 8 of the inspection report as an 'apparent beyond design and licen bas/s vulnerabitity" involving the FitzPatrick operators refusal to install the DTVS as recommended by NRC in Generic Letter 89-16.
Does this IRecommendaton meet criteria for review under 2.206 wess?
" -ommendation 6 recommends, as part of the loner term review, that the NRC identify insights about hydrogen control and mitigation inside~d containment or in other buildings as additional information is revealed through further study of the Fukushima Dakichi accident, Font coor: Auto the
- No.
The petitioner raises issues that have already been the subject of NRC staff review and evaluation either on that facility, other similar facilities, or on a generic ntion:
basis, for which a resolution has been achieved, the issues have been resolved, and the resolution is sing applicable to the facility in question. The Order on hardened containment vents (FAo-2,.050) has a timeline of December 31, 2016, for installing the reliable hardened containment vent. Therefore, this issue should be rejected,-oursuant to Criterion 2 for reCectina a etition under 10 CFR 2.206.
C Yes.
Accept on the basis of NTTF Recommendation 5.1 and Recommendation 6.
55 ent Recommendation 5.1 orders licensees to include a reliable hardened vent in BWR Maý l and Mark It containments for prevention of core damage.. This t!
order included performance objectives for the design d
of hardened vents to ensure reliable operation and ease of use (both opening and closing) during a prolonged SBO. The staff is still evaluating on a generic basis venting under severe accident conditions.
t 1 7
The NRC inspection report [per TI-2515/183) idenfles that FitzPatfick's 'existing plant capabilities' and 'current procedures do not addre hydrogen considerations during primaty containmr venting' which is further identified as a "current licensirg basis vulnerability.' The joint petitioners further reiterate that the NRC inspection finding tha Fitatrick's 'existing plant capabilities' as assumer by the Order are in fact negated by the finding that
'FitzPatrick's current licensing basis did not require the plant to have a primary containment torus air space hardened vent system as part of their Mark I containment improvement program."
4 Does this I Recommendation meet criteria for rview under Z 206 larrocess?
[
f I
/
8 The Commission Order timeline setting December 31, 2016, for installing the hardened vent Order does not address, in a timely way, the unique condition of the FitzPatrick nuclear power plant.
(No.
...
- ecommendation 6 recommends, as part of the longer term review, that the NRC identify insights about hydrogen control and mitigation inside containment or in other buildings as additional information is revealed through further study of the Fukushima Dai-ich accident,- The staff is also Ieneric basisL~
issues have been resolved, and the resolution is applicable to the faciliy in question. The SE dated September 28, 1992 shows that FitzPatrick met the BWROG crteda recommended by GL 89-16,1n issuing the March 12, 2012, order, the NRC staff explicitly reconized the wide variance inn the reliabilty of hardened vent designs amopg Mark I piants. The design at FiPiatrick is one example of that variance. Therefore, thisissue should be Lrei puedrsuant to Criteron 2 for reiectinq a tition under 10 CFR 2,206.
The petitioner raises issues that have already been Ssubject of NRC staff review and evaluation either on that facility, other similar facilities, or on a geneic /
basis, for which a resolution has been achieved, the j issues have been resolved, and the resolution is
/
applicable to the facility in question. The SE dated September 28,1992 shows that FitzPatrick met the
,,...i,,,-
No, The FitzPathck nuclear power plant uniquely does not have a fully hardened vent system on the vulnerable Mark I containment. As a result, FitzPatrick's current capability is identied with 'a beyond desirn and licensing bases vulnerability, in that FitzPatrick's current licensing basis did not require the plant to have a pimary containment No, 12
'I torus air space hardened vent system as pad of their Mark I containment improvement program,"
r Famiatted; Fori c~oW:
AM~t I 10 Given that the FitzPatric4 unit willfully refused to install the D'VS, the documented discovery of the licensing basis vulnerabilitN" of its chosen pre-existing vent now uniquely warrants the suspension of operations pending closer scrutiny, public hearings, and full disclosure for its adequacy and capability in the event of a severe accident.
No.
GL 89-16 urged-.he licensees to voluntarily install hardened vent capabilites at their Mark I containments. If licensees chose not to install the hardened vent capability, the NRC staff requested the licensee to provide their plant-specific estimates of cost-s of installation of hardened vent capabilities, The licensees were informed that the NRC staff would use the cost data to perform plant-specific backlit analyses, and to determine, if hardened vent installations could be imposed as backlits in accordance with 10 CFR 50.109.
In response to GL 89-16, FitzPatfick indicated that it had decided not to commit to install hardened vent capabilities. The NRC staff performed a backfd analysis and concluded that there will be substantial additional increase in protection to public health and safety if hardened vent capability is implemented at FitzPatrick and therefore, the backlit is justified. By letter dated June 15, 1990, the NRC staff urged FitzPatnck to reconsider ils decision and implement the hardened vent installation by January 1993.
Issue ISpecific Issue Raised NO.
/
SOtherwise, the NRC staff intende.d to impose the backlit under 10 CFR 50.109.
By letters dated January 24, 21991, the NRC staff approved the licensee's request dated July 25, 1990, to integrate the results of its IPE program into its decision regarding making any modificatons to existing vent system to implement GL 89-16 hardened vent design crteria.4
.444k proy By letters dated December 6,1991, and August 14, 1992, FitzPatrick provided its final position regarding implementation of the hardened vent design criteria, use of tPE to re-examine the venting procedures and training of operators, insights gained from performing the IPE program, and the status of investigations into accident management strategies associated with severe accidents.
By letter dated September 28, 1992, based on the review of the informaton provided by FitzPatrick, and the results of the NRC inspection of the FitzPatfick hardened wetwell vent path, the NRC staff determined that the current vent path meets the hardened vent design criteria or their intent, Furthermore, the NRC staff found that the plant procedures and training are adequate to provide information and guidance necessary for operators to effectively use FitzPatrick hardened wetwell vent Icapabiity. Therefore, the NRC staff concluded that the existi wetwell vent cabily at FitzPatrick is 14
Issue Specific Issue Raised Does this IRecommendation No.
meet criteria for review under 2.206
.pOCess?
I,
/
1
-Th additional identifted"vulnerability' and the a relatively remote and uncertain mi~alion strategy Plcsthe public health and safety unduly and unacceptably at risk by the continued dayo-tay operations where 'current procedures do not address hydrogen considerations dunng primaq/
containment venting' and will not for nearly five (5) more years.
I/f
/
adequate. In addition, the NRC inspected the design of the Fitzpatrick hardened wetwel/ vent system and documented the results in an inspection ',
report 150-333195-06) issued April 18,1995.
Temporary Instruction 2515/183. 'beyond design and licensing basis vulnerability [for beyond design basis acddentsJfwas not a consideration during GL 89-16 inspections, The petitioner raises issues that have already been the subject of NRC staff review and evaluation either on that facility, other similar facilities, or on a genenc basis, for which a resolution has been achieved, the issues have been resolved, and the resolution is F-on:
Ft color:
Auto applicable to the facility in question. The SE dated September 28, 1992 shows that FitzPatrick met the BWROG criteria recommended by GL 89-16, 1
- i. tA-Font
..or: Auto Therefore, this issue should be reiected, pursuant to Criteron 2 for reLecting a petition under 10 CFR 2.206.
Yes.
Accept on the basis of NTTF Recommendation 5.1 I
and Recommendation 6, Rec:ommendation 5,1 orders licensees to include a reliable hardened vent in BWR Mark I and Mark !1 Scontainments, for revention of core d ama ee. This order included performance objectves for th design
,of hardened vents to ensure reliable operation and
, \\
ease of use (boA opening and dosing during a Fi a
- -o_.
dor: Uo
I I
issue Specific Issue Raised Does tfils Recommendation meet Criteda for review under 2. 206 process?
prolonged S0. The Commission has already considered and deliberated the issue of contnued operation in establishing the requirements and due dates in the order rather than calling for immediate action.- The staff is still evaluating on a -generic basis venting under severe accident conditions.
Recommendation 6 recommends, as pad of the longer term review, that the NRC identify insights about hydrogen control and mitigation inside containment or in other buildings as additional information is revealed through further study of the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident, The staff is also evaluating hydrogen control and mitigation on a generic basis.,
F~ma~ed~
Fon~aUed:
Font clor: A&to Font color:
Auto 16
4
SUMMARY
(1)
The petition-and the supplements do not include any new or additional information or facts that were not known to the NRC staff with respect to FitzPatrick's Containment Vent System.
(2)
FitzPatrick response to the GL 89-16 was also reviewed and approved by the NRC in September 1992, including the staff review of the licensee's processes and procedures, and inspections, The NRC staff evaluation stated, while approving FitzPatrick's positions with regard to GL-89-16. that FitzPatrick's containment vent system met the design bases and the design intent of GL 89-16. In addition, the NRC inspected the design of the Fitzpatrick hardened wetwell vent system and documented the results in an inspection report (50-333/95-061 issued April 18, 1995.
. c*
,,te
. to--t-
- , Auto (Formatted: Font color. Auto I
(3)
Recommendation 5.1 orders licensees to include a reliable hardened vent in BWR Mark I and Mark II containments-for prevention of core damage. This order included performance objectives for the design of hardened vents to ensure reliable operation and ease of use (both opening and closing) during a prolonged SBO. The staff is still evaluating on a generic basis venting under severe accident conditions.
II Recommendation 6 recommends, as part of the longer term review, that the NRC identify insights about hydrogen control and mitigation inside containment or in other buildings as additional information is revealed through further study of the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident. The staff is also evaluating hydroqen control and mitigation on a generic basis.
(4)
After the issuance of the Facility Operating License, the NRC has conducted its regular and necessary inspections and assessments of the licensee's performance. The Commission has not found it necessary to issue any gzrioric cemm-nui~catinc,. baeod on the ii*d., y p*.I...i*
XP9F84rocG, er the plant specific communications, based on the licensee's performance, to require any changes to the design and operating requirements of the G tawmef4teSyste. containment vent system. The plant continues to meet all the requirements with respect to the regulations and the licensing bases, including those with respect to the design basis accidents and natural phenomena, Fukushima events have been characterized as "Beyond Design Basis Accidents." The design and operating requirements for "Beyond Design Basis Accidents" for Containment Vent System are being addressed through the Commission-Issued Order.