ML13164A219

from Andrea Russell to Samson Lee: G20120172

ML13164A219
Person / Time
Site:	FitzPatrick
Issue date:	08/23/2012
From:	Andrea Russell Division of Policy and Rulemaking
To:	Brice Bickett, Doerflein L, Samson Lee NRC/NRR/DRA, NRC Region 1, NRC/RGN-I/DRP/PB6
References
2.206, FOIA/PA-2013-0010, G20120172, TAC ME8189
Download: ML13164A219 (18)

Text

tAerfle in, Lawrence From: Russell, Andrea Sent: Thursday, August 23, 2012 8:29 AM To: Lee, Samson; Bickett, Brice; Doerflein, Lawren.- .1ponnrich Maehew; Dennig, Robert; Ulses, Anthony; MorganButler, Kimyata; Fretz, Roberti (b)(7)(C) a Eul, Ryan; Safford, Carrie; Monninger, John; McIntyre, David; Collins, Iioy;St, athef ne; Albert, Michelle; Cook, William; McCarver, Sammy Cc: Vaidya, Bhalchandra; Thadani, Mohan

Subject:

G20120172 (Fitzpatrick 2.206): PRB Internal Meeting Notes on Initial Recommendation based on 3rd meeting and comments from John and OGC (TAC ME8189)

Attachments: With comments from Monninger and OGC addressed-ME8189 (G20120172) Final PRB Notes 08-23-2012.docx Follow Up Flag: Follow up Flag Status: Flagged Good morning, On behalf of Bhalchandra, I am providing you with the revised Final PRB internal meeting notes on the initial recommendation, for your review. These meeting notes have been updated since the last meeting on July 19, 2012, to incorporate changes from OGC and John Monninger. The changes are shown in tracked format.

Please provide your comments/concurrence on the notes to myself and Bhalchandra by COB Thursday August 30th.

Thank you for your time, Andrea 2.206 Coordinator Andrea Russell Project Manager Nuclear Regulatory Commission NRRPDPRIPGCB Ph: 301-415-8553 1

C/35

10 CFR 2.206 PRB Closed Meeting Notes - 07/19/2012

SUBJECT:

GUNTER ET AL. 2.206 REQUESTING ENFORCEMENT ACTION AGAINST JAMES A. FITZPATRICK PLANT (G20120172) (TAC ME8189)

PETITIONER: Paul Gunter, et al DATE: March 9, 2012, the supplements dated March 13, and March 20, 2012, and Petitioners' Presentations to the PRB in the Public Meeting on April 17, 2012.

PRB MEMBERS & ADVISORS Samson Lee (PRB Chair - Deputy Director, NRR, Division of Risk Assessment)

Bhalchandra Vaidya (Petition Manager - NRR, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing)

Sam Miranda (Branch Chief(A) - NRR, Division of Safety Systems, Reactor Systems Branch)

Robert Dennig (Branch Chief- NRR, Division of Safety Systems, Containment and Ventilation Branch)

Robert Fretz (Senior Project Manager - NRR. Japan Lessons Learned Project Directorate, Projects Management Branch)

John Monninger (Associate Director - NRR, Japan Lessons Learned Project Directorate)

Andrea Russell (Agency 2.206 Coordinator - NRR, Division of Policy and Rulemaking)

David Pelton (Branch Chief - NRR, Division of Policy and Rulemaking, Generic Communications Branch)

Brice Bickett (Senior Project Manager - Region 1, Branch 2, Division of Reactor Projects)

Mathew Jennerich (Project Engineer - Region 1, Branch 2, Division of Reactor Projects)

Lawrence Doerflein (Branch Chief - Region 1. Branch 2, Division of Reactor Safety)

Ryan Eul (Enforcement Specialist - Office of Enforcement)

Mauri Lemoncelli (Senior Attorney - Assistant General Counsel - Materials Litigation and Enforcement - Office of General Counsel)

I LF~3'.§~zAuto.-.

SUMMARY

OF REQUEST:

On March 9, 2012, as supplemented March 13 and March 20, 2012, Mr. Paul Gunter, et. al.,

submitted a joint petition to the NRC, under Title 10 of the Code of FederalRegulations,Part 2.206, regarding James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (FitzPatrick).

The joint petitioners request that the FitzPatrick operating license be immediately suspended as the result of the undue risk to the public health and safety presented by the operator's reliance on non-conservative and wrong assumptions that went into the analysis of the capability of FitzPatrick's pre-existing ductwork containment vent system. The joint petitioners state that the risks and uncertainty presented by FitzPatrick's assumptions and decisions, in regard to NRC Generic Letter 89-16. as associated with the day-to-day operations of this nuclear power plant now constitute an undue risk to public health and safety. The joint petitioners request that the suspension of the operating license be in effect pending final resolution of a public challenge to the adequacy of the pre-existing vent line in light of the Fukushima PQaLiutDai-ichi nuclear accident. The joint petitioners do not seek or request that FitzPatrick operators now install the Direct Torus Vent System (DTVS) as it is demonstrated to have experienced multiple failures to mitigate the severe nuclear accidents at Fukushima Dai hiDai-ichi.

The joint petitioners request that the NRC take action to suspend the FitzPatrick operating license immediately until the following emergency enforcement actions are enacted, completed,

reviewed, and approved by the NRC and informed by independent scientific analysis:

1) Entergy Nuclear Operations' FitzPatrick nuclear power plant shall be subject to public hearings with full hearing rights on the continued operation of the Mark I BWR and the adequacy and capability of a pre-existing containment vent which is not a fully hardened vent line as recommended by NRC Generic Letter 89-16. As such, the FitzPatrick operator uniquely did not make containment modifications and did not install the DTVS, otherwise known as 'the hardened vent," as requested by NRC Generic Letter 89-16 and as installed on every other GE Mark I in the US;

2) Entergy Nuclear Operations shall publicly document for independent review its post-Fukushima re-analyses for the reliability and capability of the FitzPatrick pre-existing containment vent system as previously identified as "an acceptable deviation" from NRC Generic Letter 89-16 which recommended the installation of the Direct Torus Vent System and as outlined in the NRC Safety Evaluation Report dated September 28, 1992. The publicly documented post-Fukushima analysis shall include the reassessment of all assumptions regarding the capability and reliability of the pre-existing containment venting and specifically address non-conservative assumptions regarding:

a) the FitzPatrick cost-benefit analysis used to justify not installing a fully hardened vent system and; b) 'unlikely ignition points" as claimed in the FitzPatrick pre-existing vent line system that would otherwise present increased risks and consequences associated with the detonation of hydrogen gas generated during a severe accident.

In the March 20, 2012, supplement to the petition, the joint petitioners state that the Temporary Instruction 2515/183 provides the NRC inspection results in the "Follow-up to the Fukushima SDaih Dai-ichi Nuclear Station Fuel Damage Event." The joint petitioners draw attention to what is described at page 8 of the enclosure as an "apparentbeyond design and licensing basis vulnerability"involving the FitzPatrick operator's refusal to install the DTVS as recommended by NRC in Generic Letter 89-16.

To summarize the supplement, the joint petitioners state that:

• The Commission's March 12, 2012, Order states that "Current regulatory requirement and existing plant capabilities allow the NRC to conclude that a sequence of events such as the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident is unlikely to occur in the US. Therefore, continued operation and continued licensed activities do not pose an imminent threat to public health and safety." The Order further states, "While not required, hardened vents have been in place in U.S. plants with BWR Mark I containments for many years but a wide variance exist with regard to the reliability of the vents."

• The NRC inspection report identifies that FitzPatrck's "existing plant capabilities" and

.current procedures do not address hydrogen considerations during primary containment venting" which is further identified as a "current licensing basis vulnerability." The joint petitioners further reiterate that the NRC inspection finding that FitzPatrick's "existing plant capabilities" as assumed by the Order are in fact negated by the finding that "FitzPatrick's current licensing basis did not require the plant to have a primary containment torus air space hardened vent system as part of their Mark Icontainment improvement program."

2

" The Commission Order timeline setting December 31, 2016, for installing the reliable hardened vent does not address in a timely way the unique condition of FitzPatrick.

" FitzPatrick uniquely does not have a fully hardened vent system on the vulnerable Mark I containment. As a result, FitzPatrick's current capability is identified with "a beyond design and licensing bases vulnerability, in that FitzPatrick's current licensing basis did not require the plant to have a primary containment torus air space hardened vent system as part of their Mark I containment improvement program.' Given that the FitzPatrick unit willfully refused to install the DTVS, the documented discovery of the "licensing basis vulnerability" of its chosen pre-existing vent now uniquely warrants the suspension of operations pending closer scrutiny, public hearings, and full disclosure for its adequacy and capability in the event of a severe accident. The additional identified "vulnerability" and the relatively remote and uncertain mitigation strategy places the public health and safety unduly and unacceptably at risk by the continued day-to-day operations where "current procedures do not address hydrogen considerations during primary containment venting" and will not for nearly five (5) more years.

BASIS FOR THE REQUEST:

As a basis for the request, the joint petitioners' state that in light of the multiple failures of the GE Mark I containment and hardened vent systems at the Fukushima al iDai-ichi nuclear power station in the days following the March 11, 2011, station black out event, the joint petitions seek the prompt and immediate suspension of the FitzPatrick operations because:

" The GE Mark I BWR pressure suppression containment system is identified as inherently unreliable and likely to fail during a severe accident.

• The capability of FitzPatrick's pre-existing containment vent as approved for severe accident mitigation is not a fully "hardened vent" system.

" The capability of FitzPatrick's pre-existing containment vent as approved relies upon non-conservative and faulty assumptions.

" The capability of FitzPatrick's pre-existing containment vent system uniquely allows for a severe nuclear accident to be released at ground level.

6 The Fukushima Dal' Dai-ichi nuclear catastrophe dramatically and exponentially changes the FitzPatrick cost-benefit analyses.

• The continued day-to-day reliance upon the significantly flawed pre-existing containment vent system as would be relied upon to mitigate a severe accident at the FitzPatrick Mark I reactor presents an undue risk to the public health and safety.

• The identified containment vulnerability, the non-conservative if not false assumption of "no likely ignition sources" in the pre-existing vent line and the unacceptable consequences of failure of the FitzPatrick pre-existing containment vent place both greater uncertainty and undue risk on public health and safety and are not reasonably justified by arbitrarily assigning a low probability of the occurrence of a severe accident.

IS THERE A NEED FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION: (If Yes, describe)

NO.

In its internal meeting on March 20, 2012, the PRB found that there is no immediate safety concern to FitzPatrick, or to the health and safety of the public and therefore, denied the request for emergency enforcement action based on the following considerations:

1. The Near-Term Task Force (NTTF), established by the NRC in response to the Fukushima Da~irh Dai-ichi nuclear event, concludes in its report dated July 12, 2011, that continued nuclear reactor operation and licensing activities do not pose an imminent risk to the public 3

health and safety and are not inimical to the common defense and security because of the low likelihood of an event beyond the design basis at a U.S, nuclear power plant and the current mitigation capabilities at those facilities:jhe Commission has endorsed the NTTF Formatted: Font: Not Bold, NlotHighlight Report, including its conclusions as evident by the Commission Voting Record for Decision Item SECY-11-0093, dated August 19, 2011: and,

2. On March 12, 2012, the NRC ordered licensees of BWR facilities with Mark I and Mark II containments to have reliable hardened containment vents (EA-12-050). This order was based on the Commission's direction provided by the Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM) to SECY-12-0025, dated March 9, 2012. The order stated that:

Current regulatory requirements and existing plant capabilities allow the NRC to conclude that a sequence of events such as the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident is unlikely to occur in the U.S. Therefore, continued operation and continued licensing activities do not pose an imminent threat to public health and safety. However, the importance of reliable operation of hardened vents during emergency conditions was already well established and this understanding has been reinforced by the clear lessons of Fukushima. While not required, hardened vents have been in place in U.S. plants with BWR Mark I containments for many years but a wide variance exists with regard to the reliability of the vents. Additionally, hardened vents are not required on plants with BWR Mark 11containments although as discussed above, Mark I1containments are only slightly larger than Mark I. Reliable hardened venting systems in BWR facilities with Mark I and Mark 11containments are needed to ensure that adequate protection of public health and safety is maintained.

3._The NRC staff was aware of the conclusions presented in its Safety Evaluation (SE) dated September 28, 1992, for Fitzpatrick with respect to GL 89-16, and considered this information in its overall assessment on whether or not BWR facilities with Mark I and Mark L

Formatte; List Paragraph, Numbered Level: I + Numbering Style; 1, 2, 3, ... + Start at: I + Alignment: Left + Aligned at: 0.06" +

Indent at: 0.31" 11containments were safe to operate following the events at Fukushima. ln addition.

theThe NRC inspected the design of the Fitzpatrick hardened wetwell vent system and documented the results in an inspection report (50-333195-06) issued April 18, 1995. The NRC staff was cognizant of and reviewed the results of inspections performed under TI 183 at FitzPatrick (Report dated May 13, 2011, ADAMS Accession No. ML111330455) following the events at Fukushima. The r*,.ginal Gtoff h26 ampii.mnited with NTTF regarding the Vent G)ySA cOnfiguat Oil at F~iL2Patrick, including lth diffr-oncoc from -CJ869 reGMmmcndat cns (Larry Doe"f,6A 6 Hladlý..In issuing the March 12, 2012, order, the NRC staff explicitly recognized the wide variance in the reliability of hardened vent designs among Markll plants. The design at Fitzpatrick is one example of that variance. The

'petition for emergency enforcement action provided no new additional information relating to the existing containment venting capability of the Fitzpatrick plant.

DOES IT MEET CRITERIA FOR REVIEW?

Criteria for Reviewing Petitions Under 10 CFR 2.206:

1. The petition contains a request for enforcement-related action such as issuing an order modifying, suspending, or revoking a license, issuing a notice of violation, with or without a proposed civil penalty.

YES.

2. The facts that constitute the bases for taking the particular action are specified. The petitioner must provide some element of support beyond the bare essentials. The supporting facts must be credible and sufficient to warrant further inquiry.

4

YES.

3. There is no NRC proceeding available in which the petitioner is or could be party and through which the petitioner's concerns could be addressed.

(FOniuated Font color: Auto YES. .IOn.May 9, 2012, Beyond Nuclear (P. Gunter) withdrew its April 3, 2012 Pleading " " o itted: Font: Not Bold, Font color: Auto, and Request to Co-Petition with the Pilgrim Watch on the Fukushima-related Orders ýOtý19hilht Subsequently, the pertaining to hardened vents and spent fuel pool instrumentation.

ASLB denied Pilgrim Watch's request for hearing), - ..... io.tted Fontcolor: Auto

.Criteria for Reiectino Petitions Under 10 CFR 2.206: Fot color: Auto Foned I. The incoming correspondence does not ask for an enforcement-related action or fails to provide sufficient facts to support the petition, but simply alleges wrongdoing, violations of NRC regulations, or existence of safety concerns.

YES, In part., .. orma o or: Ato

2. The petitioner raises issues that have already been the subject of NRC staff review and evaluation either on that facility, other similar facilities, or on a generic basis, for which a resolution has been achieved, the issues have been resolved, and the resolution is applicable to the facility in question, YES, in part.

On March 12, 2012, the NRC ordered licensees of BWR facilities with Mark I and Mark II containments to have reliable hardened containment vents (EA-12-050). This order was based on the Commission's direction provided by the Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM) to SECY-12-0025, dated March 9, 2012.

Accept on the basis of the staff's ongoing review of NTTF Recommendation 5.1 and Recommendation 6. Recommendation 5.1 orders licensees to include a reliable hardened vent in BWR Mark I and Mark IIcontainments7 for the prevention of core damage- This order included performance objectives for the design of hardened vents to ensure reliable operation and ease of use (both opening and closing) during a prolonged SBO. Roc..mme.daton 6 .... mmar.d., 16 part Of tho IOngor teFr. r'.e'iw,.

t*1a r-4deR-diy "nht boiAs discussed in SECY-12-0025, the staff determined that consideration of severe accident conditions in the design.and operation of the hardened vent involved policy matters that are still under consideration by the staff. As such, venting under severe accident conditions is currently being evaluated by the staff on a generic basis. The staff is also evaluating NTTF Recommendation 6 concerning hydrogen control and mitigation inside containment or in other buildings as additional information is revealed through further study of the Fukushima Dal-ichi accident.- As such, the design of hardened vent systems to handle hydrogen gas is currently being evaluated by the staff on a generic basis.

FitzPatrick's response to the GL 89-16 was-aiso reviewed and approved by the NRC in September 1992, including the staff review of the licensee's processes and procedures-aRd is..ee.e.. .. The NRC staff evaluation stated, while approving FitzPatrick's positions with regard to GL-89-16, that FitzPatrtck's containment vent system met the design bases and the design intent of GL 89-16. In addition, the NRC inspected the design of the Fitzoatrick hardened wetwell vent system and documented the results in an inspection report (50-333/95-06) issued APril 18, 1995.

5

With respect to Fukushima accident, the a

.............. dc. hay. NRC has concluded that a sequence of events such as the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident is unlikely to occur in the U.S. Therefore, continued operation and continued licensing activities do not pose an imminent threat to public health and safety,~ healh ad sfet. iFormatted; Font color: Auto

,3, The request is to deny a license application or amendment. NO*. Formtted; Font color: Auto_____

4. The request addresses deficiencies within existing NRC rules. NO, JR Font color: Auto..

he req

4. se.de icenes.adre ie... - ..-. --.......... ...............

IS THERE A NEED FOR OE, 1, O.1G, or OGC INVOLVEMENT:

The petition does not contain any allegations of licensee or NRC staff wrongdoing. However, the PRB includes representatives from OE and OGC.

RECOMMENDED APPROACH AND SCHEDULE (Next Stepsl:

Accept, in part, and hold in abeyance the fWowiw-parts of the petition addressing containment venting under severe accident conditions and the design of vent systems being able to accommodate hydrogen gas (Issue Nos. 5(b), 7, and 11 in the Table) (see Table for a detailed explanation).

Three of the issues in the petition, identified and discussed as Issue Nos. 5(b), 7, and 11 in the Table, will be accepted for review by the NRC staff. However, as indicated in the Table, the NRC staff notes that these concerns are undergoing NRC review as part of the lessons-learned from the Fukushima event. Even though the Commission has issued the Order concerning Hardened-Ventreliable hardened vent for accident prevention, the NRC/JLD staff is conducting further review of additional aspects of the Hardcncd Vc.t Sycltmhardened vent system, such as flltratiG venting under severe accident conditions. In addition, the staff is evaluating hydrogen control and mitigation measures. Since Issue Nos. 5(b), 7, and 11 in the Table will take longer than the target timeframe for reaching a decision on a petition, the NRC plans on accepting those issues, and holding them in abeyance.

All the other issues in the petition, identified and discussed in the Table are denied for the reasons discussed in the Table The next steps would be to:

" Ensure management agrees with the PR6 initial recommendation.

• Inform the petitioners of the PRB's initial recommendation.

" Provide the second opportunity for the petitioners to address the PRB, and make the arrangements for an acceptable date and time.

6

Table This table summarizes each Issue for the followin crtera.

Issue Specificlssue Raised Does this Recommendaion No. meet criteria for review ,

runder 2,206 FitzPatrick operating license be immediately . No-ess?

j,The NTTF andJLD inthe Commission.Orderhave.

\

suspended as the result of the undue risk to the concluded that the NR concluded that asequence attWW:

Forcobr:Auto public health and safety presented by the opera tor's of events like the Fukushima accident isunlikely to FormdWte Fort colr: Auto reliance on non-conservative and wrongq occur inthe United States and "fappropriate assumrtions that went into the analysis of the mitigation measures have been implemented, capabi&* of FitzPatrick's pre-existingdu__tw__,ork reducing the likelihood of core damage and containment vent system, The risks and uncerta inty radiological releases. Therefore, continued presented by FitzPatrick's assumptions and operation and continued licensing activities do not decisions, inregard to NRC Generic Letter 89-16 ,as pose an imminent risk to public health and safety color:

hmte:Fun? Auto 2 associated with the day-to-day operations of this and there isno immediate safety concem to nuclear power plant now constitute an undue risk to FitzPatrick, or to the health and safety of the public, public health and safety. and therefore, the request for immediate action should be rejected. The Petitioners have not provided aadequate basis for their argument regarding the operator's reliance on non-conservative and wrong assumptions that went into the analysis of the capability of FitzPatrick's pre-existing ductwork containment vent system, .

The petitioner's concerns rewarding this issue do not require immediate shutdown of FitzPatrrck based on the conclusions reached by.N;Wthe NRC and the Commission Order regarding Reliable Hardened Vent for the US GE Mark I8WRs, U.S.plants have implemented 'beyond-design-basis' requirements such as ATWS, $80, combustible gas control, aircraft impact assessment, mitigation of major fires or explosions, and extensive

/

7

Issue Specific Issue Raised Does this RecommendaUon No, meet criteria for review under2.206 process?

S.....- idamage mtgation guidelines, thereby reducing the likelihood of core damage and radiological releases.

Asequence of events like those occurring inthe Fukushima accident isunlikely to occur at US GE Mark ! BWRs.

The NRC based on the NTTF report on July 12, 2011, based on .evi.w of insigh"sfom the Fyukshima Dan ichi 86cident, made a recommendation to the Commission to include a reliable hardened vent system. ( Fonriat: Font color:

Auto 2 The suspension of the operating license be ineffect No, This ismerely astatement to support the petition in pending final resolution of a public challenge to the general. This isnot an enforcement related action adequacy of the pre-existing vent line inlight of the and isoutside the scope of the 2.206 process and Fukushima a-i Dai-ichi nuclear accident. therefore, this request should be rejected, Pursuant to Criterion 1for reiecting a petition under 10 CFR 2.206.

3 The joint petitioners do not seek or request that No. This ismerely a statement to support the petition in FitzPatrick operators now install the Direct Torus general. This isnot an enforcement related action Vent System (DTVS) Recommended by GL89-16, and isoutside the scope of the 2.206 process and as itisdemonstrated to have experienced multiple therefore, this request should be reectd, pursuant failures to mitigate the severe nuclear accidents at to Criterion 1for reiecting apetition under 10 CFR Fukushima Dai, hiDai-ichi. 2.206 FonnaW: Fontcolor:

Ato 4 FitzPatrick be subject to public hearings with full No. ,The pe~tioner raises issues that have -alreadybeen fotmatdi Font color:

Auto hearing rights on the continued operation of the the subject of NRC staff review and evaluation either Mark IBWR and the adequacy and capability of a on that facility, other similar facilities, or on ageneric pre-existing containment vent which isnot afully basis, for which aresolution has been achieved, the hardened vent line as recommended by NRC issues have been resolved, and the resolution is Generic Letter 89-16. As such, the FitzPatrick applicable to the facility inquestion. The SE dated operator uniquely did not make containment Se tember 28,1992 shows that FitzPatrick met t.ý

./

/

8

Does this IRecommendatin Meet cdteii for review under 2206 meet 2, review criteria under Does for 206 Recommendation this modificationsand did not install the DTVS, otherwise l/ BWROG criteria recommended by GL 89-16.

I known as IN hardened vent,"as requested by NRC .. o

-deoefueelnaddition, the NRC insgeted the desicp Generic Letter 89-16 and as installed on every other of the FitzOatick hardened wetwell vent system and documented the results inan inspection re~po~rt(50-GE Mark Iinthe US; 333/95-06) issued April 18, 1995Therefore this issue should be LeLected, pursuant to Criteron 2for reiectina aDelition under 10 CFR 2.206.

5 IFitzPatrick shall publicly document for independent There isno recuirement for the licensee to conduct review its post-Fukushima re-analyses for the are-analyss of their existing containment vent reliability and capability of the FitzPatrickpre- syte.The licensee's response to the existing containment vent system as previously Pfdereliable hardened vent order will be publicly identified as "anacceptable deviation" from NRC available. .ubs..uel OICR doumo.. li.to Generic Letter 89-16 which recommended the ,,gi,g, ddi*ti,, l ef, fS ioe., h,,,gononrl installation of the Direct Torus Vent System and as would Aec be publicly availatile.

outlined inthe NRC Safety Evaluation Report dated  : Font color:

FonnatteW Auto September28, 1992. The publicly documented post-Fukushima analysis shall include the reassessment of all assumptions regarding the capability and reliability of the pre-existing containment venting and specifically address non-conservative assumptions regarding:

a) the FitzPatrick cost-benefit analysis used to ;,No.

justify not installing a fully hardened vent system and; FitzPatrick's response to the GL 89-16 was reviewed and approved by the NRC inSeptember 1992, including the staff review of the licensee's /

processes and procedures, and inspections. The NRC staff evaluation stated, while approving 9

Issue ISpecific IssueRaised Does this Recommendation meet criteriafor review under 2.206 ocess?

FitzPatrick's positions with regard to GL.89-16, that FitzPatfick's containment vent system met the design bases and the design intent of GL 89-16.

With respect to the Fukushima Dai~chi accident, te NTTF evaluation and the subsequent Commission Order have concluded that a sequence of events such as the Fukushima Dai-chi accident isunlikely to occur inthe U.S and some appropriate mitigation measures have been implemented, reducing the likelihood of core damage and radiological releases. Therefore, continued b) 'unlikely ignition points as claimed inthe Yes, operation and continued licensing activities do not FitzPatrick preexisting vent line system tha it pose an imminent threat to public health and safety.

would otherwise present increased risks and consequences associat4,dwith the detonatioon Accept on the basis of NTTF Recommendation 5.1 I

of hydrogen gas generaifed during asevere and Recommendation hydrgen g, controland accident, mitigation. The staff isevaluatinm hydrogen control and mitigation on ageneric basis. The results of that evaluation will apply to the Fitzpatrick plant..

Recommendation 5.1 orders licensees to include a reliable hardened vent inBWR Mark Iand Mark II containments- for prevention of core damage. This order included performance objectives for the design of hardened vents to ensure reliable operation and ease of use (both opening and dosing) during a prolonged $80. The staff iscontinuing to evaluate venting under severe accident conditions.

10

Does this Recommendation meet crteda for review ...... .. .

underZ2206 ....

proMMS?-......

• " Recommendation 6recommends, as pan of the longer term review, that the NRC identity insights about hydrogen control and mitigation inside Fb rM containment or inother buildings as additional information isrevealed through further study of the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident.

6 The Temporary Instruction 2515/183 provides the No, The pefttoner raises issues that have already been NRC inspection results inthe 'Follow-up to the the subject of NRC staff review and evaluation either Fukushima DaiehDai-ichi Nuclear Station Fuel on that facility, other similar facilities, or on a generic Damage Event.' The joint petitioners draw attention basis, for which a resolution has been achieved, the to what isdescribed at page 8of the inspection issues have been resolved, and the resolution is report as an 'apparent beyond design andlicensing applicable to the facility inquestion. The Order on basis vulnerabilit/lnvolvingthe FitzPalrick hardened containment vents (EA-12-050) has a operator's refusal to install the DT'VS as timeline of December 31, 2016, for installing the this reliable hardened containment vent. Therefore, recommended by NRC inGeneric Leter 8916.

issue should be reiected, pursuant to Criteron2for reiecting apetition under 10 CFR 2.206.

The NRC inspection report lper Ti-2515/1831 Yes, Acept on the basis of NTTF Recommendation 5.1 identifies that FitzPatrick's 'existing plant and Recommendation 6.

capabilities' and 'current procedures do not address hydrogen considerations during primaq containment Recommendation 5.1 orders licensees to include a

/ venting' which isfurther identiled as a'current licensina basis vulnerability.' The joint petitioners further reiterate that the NRC inspection inding that FitzPatrick's 'existing plant capabilities' as assumed reliable hardened vent inBWR Mark Iand Mark 11 containments, for prevention of core damaQe., This order included performance objectives for the design of hardened vents to ensure reliable operation and by the Order are infact negated by the finding that ease of use (both opening and closing) during a

'FitzPatrick's current licensing basis did not require prolonged SBO. The staff isstill evaluating on a the plant to have aprimary containment torus air generic basis ventinQ under severe accident space hardened vent system as part of their Mark I conditions.

containment improvement program.'

)

SIssue Raised

/.me66mme longer term review, that the NRC identify insights about hydrogen control and mitigation 6recommends, insideof the as part containment or inother buildings as additional information isrevealed through further study of the N

Fukushima Dai-ichi accident.- The staff isalso

• aluatino hvdrnen r.nnf ml nd mitioatnon nn n Seneric basis Font.oc The Commission Order timeline setting December No. The petitioner raises issues that have already been 31, 2016, for installing the hardened vent Order does. the subjec of NRC staff review and evaluation either not address, ina timely way, the unique condition of on that facility, other similar facilities, or on ageneric the FitzPatdck nuclear power plant. basis, for which aresolution has been achieved, the issues have been resolved, and the resolution is applicable to the facility inquestion. The SE dated September 28,1992 shows that FitzPatrick met the BWROG criteria recommended by GL 89-16, In lissuing the March 12, 2012, order,the NRC staff explicitiy recognized the wide variance inthe reliability of hardened vent designs among Mark I plants. The design,atl Fitzp~atrick isone example of that variance, Therefore, this issue should be reiected,.pursuant to Nterieton 2 for reiecting a ip.tition under 10 CFR 2.206.

9 The FWatrick nuclJear power plant uniquely does No. !he petitioner raisesissues that have already been not have a fuly hardened vent system on the he subje of NRC stff review and evaluation either 1,

vulnerableMMr Icontainment. As aresult, on that facility, other similar facilities, or on ageneric FitzPatfick'scurrent capability isidentified with 'a basis, for which a resolutionhas been achieved, the beyond design and licensing bases vulnerabilitv, in issues have been resolved, and the resolution is that FitzPatrick's current licensing basis did not applicable to the faclt inquestion. The SE dated

_Sptember 28, 199_2.shows that FitzPatrick met te1 require the plant to have a primary containment

Issue ISpecific Issue Raised Does this IRecommendaton No. t meet criteriafor review under2.206 process?

torus air space hardened vent system as part of their - WRO ia recommended by GL 89-16. In Mark Icontainment improvement program.' . issuina the March 12, 2012, order, the NRC staff explicitlv recognized the wide variance inthe reliability of hardened vent designs among MAr I plants. The design at Fitzpatrick isone example of that variance, Therefore, this issue should be rejected, Pursuant to Crterion 2for rejecting a 10 1Given hat the FitzPatrick unit willfully refused to Detition under 10 CFR 2.206 (Iohaubd;Forl coiar Auto 9 No, GL 89-16 urged4le licensees to voluntarly install install the DTVS, the documented discovery of the hardened vent capabilities at their Mark I "licensing basis vulnerability of its chosen pre- containments. Iflicensees chose not to install the existing vent now uniquely warrants the suspension; hardened vent capability, the NRC staff requested of operations pending closer scrutiny, public the licensee to provide their plant-specific estimates hearngs, and full disclosure for its adequacy and of cost-s of installation of hardened vent capabilities.

capability inthe event of a severe accident. The licensees were informed that the NRC staff would use the cost data to perform plant-speci&

backfit analyses, and to determine, ifhardened vent installations could be imposed as backfls in accordance with 10 CFR 50.109.

Inresponse to GL 89-16, FitzPatrick indicated that it had decided not to commit to install hardened vent capabiliies. The NRC staff performed a backlit analysis and concluded that there will be substantial additional increase inprotection to public health and safety ifhardened vent capability isimplemented at Fil.Patnck and therefore, the backfit isjustified. By letter dated June 15, 1990, the NRC staff urged FitzPatrick to reconsider its decision and imptemen the hardened vent installation by January 1993.

13

Issue NO.

Specific Issue Raised No. ISpecific Issue Raised Recommendabon I Otherwise, the NRC staff intendsed to inpose the backet under 10 CFR 50,109.

By letters dated January 24, 21991, the NRC staff approved the licensee's request dated July 25, 1990, to integrate the results of its PE program into its decision regarding making any modifications to existing vent system to implement GL 89.16 hardened vent design criteria.-iFt"Pa*t kp,,ided.

By letters dated December 6,1991, and August 14, 1992, FitzPatrick provided its final position regarding implementation of the hardened vent design criteria, use of IPE to re-examine the venting procedures and training of operators, insights gained from performing the IPE program, and the status of investigations into accident management strategies associated with severe accidents.

By letter dated September 28, 1992, based on the review of the information provided by FitzPatrick, and the results of the NRC inspection of the FitzPatrick hardened wetwell vent path, the NRC staff determined that the current vent path meets the hardened vent design criteria or their intent.

• Furthermore, the NRC staff found that the plant procedures and training are adequate to provide information and guidance necessary for operators to

\ effectively use FitzPatrick hardened wetwell vent capability. Therefore, the NRC staff concluded that eexisting wetwell vent capability at FitzPatrick is 14

Issu~e Specific Issue Raised Does this Recommendaton No. meet c`t11a for review under2.206 adequate. Inaddition, the NRC inspected the design of the Fitzpatrick hardened wetwell vent system and documented the results inan insoectiop report (50-333/95.06) issued April 18, 1995.

Temporaryi nstruction 2515/183. "beyonddesign andlicensing basis vufnerabiuty[for beyond design basisaccidents]'was not aconsideration during GL 89-16 inspections. ".

The peitioner raises issues that have already been the subject of NRC staff review and evaluation either on that facility, other similar fadiities, or on ageneric basis, for which aresolution has been achieved, the issues have been resolved, and the resolution.is . oF :R Mn ot o: Auto applicable to the facility inquestion. The SE dated September 28,1992 shows that FitzPatrick met the 8WROG criteria recommended by GL 89-16, ... ._._atZ foi itlUuto Therefore, this issue should be reiected, oursuant to Criterion 2 for reiecting a petition under 10 CFR 2.206*

The additional identihd 'vunerability and the Yes, AAre )ton the basis of NTTF Recommendation 5.1 tvrelatively remote and uncertain mitigation strategy anId Recommendation 6.

&ýthe public health and safety unduly and unaccptably at risk by the continued day-to-day Recommendation 5,1 orders licensees to include a operations where 'current procedures do not reliable hardened vent inBWVR Mark Iand MAr 11 address hydrogen considerationsduring primary containments. f~or prevention of core damage, This containment venting' and will not for nearly five (5) orderincluded performance objectives for the design more years, of hardened vents to ensure reliable operation and

.. ease of use (botkl openiTg and dosing) during a i-FmW: font dor Auto

Raise#

Issue

NO. SpecificIssue Specific Issue Raised Does this RecommendaUon No. meet criteriafor review under2.206 process?

prolonged S*o, The Commission has already I: considered and deliberated the issue of contnued operation inestablishing the requirements and due dates inthe order ratherthan calling for immediate action,- The slaff isstill evaluating on a-eneric basis ventin under severe accident conditions.

i Recommendation 6recommends, as partof the longer term review, that the NRC identily insights about hydrogen control and mitigation inside containment or inother buildings as additional information isrevealed through further study of the I Fukushima Dai-ichi accident, The staff isalso evaluating hydrowen control and mitiQation on a mad:Foot door: Aut keneric basis, Foot Wfo.matwtr: A&t 16

SUMMARY

_ _IFra'ed otclr Auto- .....-----

(1) The petition and the supplements do not include any new-or additional information or facts that were not known to the NRC staff with respect to FitzPatrick's Containment Vent System.

(2) FitzPatrick response to the GL 89-16 was also reviewed and approved by the NRC in September 1992, including the staff review of the licensee's processes and procedures, . _o_,_ _.No_ ,._or*,,_ . . .. ... . .

and inspections. The NRC staff evaluation stated, while approving FitzPatrick's positions with regard to GL-89-16, that FitzPatrick's containment vent system met the design bases and the design intent of GL 89-16. In addition, the NRC inspected the design of the Fitzpatrick hardened wetwell vent system and documented the results in an inspection report (50-333/95-06) issued Api1 18, 1995.

1 (3) Recommendation 5.1 orders licensees to include a reliabie hardened vent in BWR Mark I I and Mark Itcontainments- for prevention of core damage. This order included performance objectives for the design of hardened vents to ensure reliable operation and ease of use (both opening and closing) during a prolonged SBO. The staff is still evaluating on a neneric basis venting under severe accident conditions Recommendation 6 recommends, as part of the longer term review, that the NRC identify insights about hydrogen control and mitigation inside containment or in other buildings as additional information is revealed through further study of the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident. The staff is also evaluatinQ hydrogen control and mitigation on a generic basis.

(4) After the issuance of the Facility Operating License, the NRC has conducted its regular and necessary inspections and assessments of the licensee's performance. The Commission has not found it necessary to issue any g1o,1c cmrMunicatiO~c, based on thd *dust., opd- tingexp... en..,

or !he plant specific communications, based on the licensee's performance, to require any changes to the design and operating requirements of the Centainmont Vent Sy.tcm:containment vent system. The plant continues to meet all the requirements with respect to the regulations and the licensing bases, including those with respect to the design basis accidents and natural phenomena. Fukushima events have been characterized as "Beyond Design Basis Accidents." The design and operating requirements for "Beyond Design Basis Accidents" for Containment Vent System are being addressed through the Commission-Issued Order.