ML13164A218
| ML13164A218 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 07/19/2012 |
| From: | - No Known Affiliation, Office of Information Services |
| To: | |
| References | |
| 2.206, FOIA/PA-2013-0010, G20120172, TAC ME8189 | |
| Download: ML13164A218 (17) | |
Text
Doerflein, Lawrence
Subject:
Notes Attached, Dial-in provided, Confirmed Date: G20120172 (Fitzpatrick 2.206) 3rd Internal PRB Meeting to Make Initial Recommendation (Gunter et. al.) (TAC ME8189)
Location: HQ-OWFN-16B04-25p Start: Thu 7/19/2012 8:00 AM End: Thu 7/19/2012 9:00 AM Show Time As: Tentative Recurrence: (none)
Meeting Status: Not yet responded Organizer: Russell, Andrea Lee, Samson; Vaidya, Bhalch ~ndraBickeLtt, Brice; Doerflein, Lawrence; Jennerich, Matthew; Required Attendees:
Dennig, Robert; Fretz, Robert (b)(7)(C) JEul, Ryan; Richards, Karen; Monninger, John; Collins, Timothy; Cook, William; McCarver, Sammy; Thadani, Mohan; Lemoncelli, Mauri; Nickell, Cimberly; Miranda, Samuel Optional Attendees: Wilson, George; Pelton, David Based on subsequent information provided by Amy Cubbage, Gary Holahan, and Mauri Lemoncelli, we will meet again to reach consensus on our initial recommendation. The key issue that will be discussed is how we will disposition the portions of the petition related to the NTTF Recommendations 5.1 (hardened vent) and 6 (hydrogen control).
Purpose:
The PRB will meet for a 3 rd time internally to make an initial recommendation to accept or reject the petition for review. Following this discussion, we will inform and request concurrence from Bruce Boger (via e-mail) of the PRB's initial recommendation. Once the PRB receives concurrence from Bruce, the petitioner will be informed of the PRB's initial recommendation and will be offered a 2nd opportunity to address the PRB, per MD 8.11.
Meeting Handout: Please bring a copy of the attached handout with you to the meeting. The handout shows the changes in our notes from our last meeting.
ME8189
)120172) PRB Notet Dial-InNumber;I1,-888-469-0504 Passcode: (b)(8) = ,
Conference Details (JUL 19, 20...
Meeting
Contact:
04 39q
10 CFR 2.206 Formetted; Top: 0.5', Bottom: 0..
5 PRB Closed Meeting Notes - 07/19/2012
SUBJECT:
GUNTER ET AL 2.206 REQUESTING ENFORCEMENT ACTION AGAINST JAMES A. FITZPATRICK PLANT (G201201172) (TAC ME8189)
LrormatWe; Not Highlight PETITIONER: Paul Gunter, et al D. Formatted: Not Highlight DATE:
March 9, 2012, the supplements dated March 13, and March 20, 2012, and Petitioners' Presentations to the PRB in the Public Meeting on April 17, 2012.
PRB MEMBERS & ADVISORS Samson Lee (PRB Chair - Deputy Director, NRR, Division of Risk Assessment)
Bhalchandra Vaidya (Petition Manager - NRR, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing)
I A-ntoe-UlsSam Miranda (Branch Chief(A) - NRR, Division of Safely Systems, Reactor Systems Branch)
Robert Dennig (Branch Chief - NRR, Division of Safety Systems, Containment and Ventilation Branch)
Robert Fretz (Senior Project Manager - NRR, Japan Lessons Learned Project Directorate, Projects Management Branch)
John Monninger (Associate Director - NRR, Japan Lessons Learned Project Directorate)
Andrea Russell (Agency 2.206 Coordinator - NRR, Division of Policy and Rulemaking)
Kim .&Fg...Bul.. David Pelton (Branch Chief(A) - NRR, Division of Policy and Rulemaking, Generic Communications Branch)
Brice Bickett (Senior Project Manager - Region 1, Branch 2, Division of Reactor Projects)
Mathew Jennerich (Project Engineer - Region 1, Branch 2, Division of Reactor Projects)
Lawrence Doerflein (Branch Chief - Region 1, Branch 2, Division of Reactor Safety)
Eu.Mato.... .Rya uty-,nktan* Ge eul Litig*tien and-C iutt r
-A.- - FPAF414A Ge 9 Ryan Eul (Enforcement Specialist - Office of Enforcement)
SathMMARe 66014 (Mauri Lemoncelli (Senior Attorney - Assistant General Counsel -
Materials Litigation and Enforcement - Office of General Counsel)_
tcolor:
SUMMARY
OF REQUI -ST:
On March 9, 2012, as supplemented March 13 and March 20, 2012, Mr. Paul Gunter, et. al.,
submitted a joint petition to the NRC, under Title 10 of the Code of FederalRegulations, Part 2.206, regarding James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (FitzPatrick).
The joint petitioners request that the FitzPatrick operating license be immediately suspended as the result of the undue risk to the public health and safety presented by the operator's reliance on non-conservative and wrong assumptions that went into the analysis of the capability of FitzPatrick's pre-existing ductwork containment vent system. The joint petitioners state that the risks and uncertainty presented by FitzPatrick's assumptions and decisions, in regard to NRC Generic Letter 89-16, as associated with the day-to-day operations of this nuclear power plant now constitute an undue risk to public health and safety. The joint petitioners request that the suspension of the operating license be in effect pending final resolution of a public challenge to the adequacy of the pre-existing vent line in light of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident.
The joint petitioners do not seek or request that FitzPatrick operators now install the Direct Torus Vent System (DTVS) as it Is demonstrated to have experienced multiple failures to mitigate the severe nuclear accidents at Fukushima Dafichi.
. I I -
The joint petitioners request that the NRC lake action to suspend the FitzPatrick operating license immediately until the following emergency enforcement actions are enacted, completed, reviewed, and approved by the NRC and informed by independent scientific analysis:
- 1) Entergy Nuclear Operations' FitzPatrick nuclear power plant shall be subject to public hearings with full hearing rights on the continued operation of the Mark I BWR and the adequacy and capability of a pre-existing containment vent which is not a fully hardened vent line as recommended by NRC Generic Letter 89-16. As such, the FitzPatrick operator uniquely did not make containment modifications and did not install the DTVS, otherwise known as "the hardened vent," as requested by NRC Generic Letter 89-16 and as installed on every other GE Mark I in the US;
- 2) Entergy Nuclear Operations shall publicly document for independent review its post-Fukushima re-analyses for the reliability and capability of the FitzPatrick pre-existing containment vent system as previously identified as "an acceptable deviation" from NRC Generic Letter 89-16 which recommended the installation of the Direct Torus Vent System and as outlined in the NRC Safety Evaluation Report dated September 28, 1992. The publicly documented post-Fukushima analysis shall include the reassessment of all assumptions regarding the capability and reliability of the pre-existing containment venting and specifically address non-conservative assumptions regarding:
a) the FitzPatrick cost-benefit analysis used 1o justify not installing a fully hardened vent system and:
b) "unlikely ignition points" as claimed in the FitzPatrick pre-existing vent line system that would otherwise present increased risks and consequences associated with the detonation of hydrogen gas generated during a severe accident.
In the March 20, 2012, supplement to the petition, the joint petitioners state that the Temporary Instruction 2515/183 provides the NRC inspection results in the "Follow-up to the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Station Fuel Damage Event." The joint petitioners draw attention to what is described at page 8 of the enclosure as an "apparent beyond design and licensing basis vulnerability"involving the FitzPatrick operator's refusal to install the DTVS as recommended by NRC in Generic Letter 89-16.
To summarize the supplement, the joint petitioners state that:
" The Commission's March 12, 2012, Order states that "Current regulatory requirement and existing plant capabilities allow the NRC to conclude that a sequence of events such as the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident is unlikely to occur in the US. Therefore, continued operation and continued licensed activities do not pose an imminent threat to public health and safety." The Order further states, 'While not required, hardened vents have been in place in U.S. plants with BWR Mark I containments for many years but a wide variance exist with regard to the reliability of the vents."
" The NRC inspection report identifies that FitzPatrick's "existing plant capabilities" and "current procedures do not address hydrogen considerations during primary containment venting" which is further identified as a "current licensing basis vulnerability." The joint petitioners further reiterate that the NRC inspection finding that FitzPatrick's "existing plant capabilities" as assumed by the Order are in fact negated by the finding that "FitzPatrick's current licensing basis did not require the plant to have a primary containment torus air space hardened vent system as part of their Mark I containment improvement program."
2
" The Commission Order timeline setting December 31, 2016, for installing the reliable hardened vent does not address in a timely way the unique condition of FitzPatnck.
" FitzPatrick uniquely does not have a fully hardened vent system on the vulnerable Mark I containment. As a result, FitzPatrick's current capability is identified with "a beyond design and licensing bases vulnerability, in that FitzPatrick's current licensing basis did not require the plant to have a primary containment torus air space hardened vent system as part of their Mark I containment improvement program." Given that the FitzPatrick unit willfully refused to install the DTVS, the documented discovery of the "licensing basis vulnerability" of its chosen pre-existing vent now uniquely warrants the suspension of operations pending closer scrutiny, public hearings, and full disclosure for its adequacy and capability in the event of a severe accident. The additional identified
.vulnerability' and the relatively remote and uncertain mitigation strategy places the public health and safety unduly and unacceptably at risk by the continued day-to-day operations where "current procedures do not address hydrogen considerations during primary containment venting" and will not for nearly five (5) more years.
BASIS FOR THE REQUEST:
As a basis for the request, the joint petitioners' state that in light of the multiple failures of the GE Mark I containment and hardened vent systems at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station in the days following the March 11, 2011, station black out event, the joint petitions seek the prompt and immediate suspension of the FitzPatrick operations because:
" The GE Mark I BWR pressure suppression containment system is identified as inherently unreliable and likely to fail during a severe accident.
- The capability of FitzPatrick's pre-existing containment vent as approved for severe accident mitigation is not a fully "hardened vent" system.
" The capability of FitzPatrick's pre-existing containment vent as approved relies upon non-conservative and faulty assumptions.
" The capability of FitzPatrick's pre-existing containment vent system uniquely allows for a severe nuclear accident to be released at ground level.
" The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear catastrophe dramatically and exponentially changes the FitzPatrick cost-benefit analyses.
" The continued day-to-day reliance upon the significantly flawed pre-existing containment vent system as would be relied upon to mitigate a severe accident at the FitzPatrick Mark I reactor presents an undue risk to the public health and safety.
" The identified containment vulnerability, the non-conservative if not false assumption of "no likely ignition sources" in the pre-existing vent line and the unacceptable consequences of failure of the FitzPatrick pre-existing containment vent place both greater uncertainty and undue risk on public health and safety and are not reasonably justified by arbitrarily assigning a low probability of the occurrence of a severe accident, IS THERE A NEED FOR IMMEDIATE ACTION: (IfYes, describe)
NO.
In its internal meeting on March 20, 2012, the PRB found that there is no immediate safety concern to FitzPatrick, or to the health and safety of the public and therefore, denied the request for emergency enforcement action based on the following considerations:
- 1. The Near-Term Task Force (NTTF), established by the NRC in response to the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear event, concludes in its report dated July 12. 2011, that continued nuclear reactor operation and licensing activities do not pose an imminent risk to the public health and safety and are not inimical to the common defense because of the low likelihood of an 3
event beyond the design basis at a U.S. nuclear power plant and the current mitigation capabilities at those facilities; and,
- 2. On March 12, 2012, the NRC ordered licensees of BWR facilities with Mark I and Mark II containments to have reliable hardened containment vents (EA-1 2-050). This order was based on the Commission's direction provided by the Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM) to SECY-12-0025, dated March 9, 2012. The order stated that:
Current regulatory requirements and existing plant capabilities allow the NRC to conclude that a sequence of events such as the Fukushima Dai-ichl accident is unlikely to occur in the U.S. Therefore, continued operation and continued licensing activities do not pose an imminent threat to public health and safety. However, the importance of reliable operation of hardened vents during emergency conditions was already well established and this understanding has been reinforced by the clear lessons of Fukushima. While not required.
hardened vents have been in place in U.S. plants with BWR Mark I containments for many years but a wide variance exists with regard to the reliability of the vents. Additionally, hardened vents are not required on plants with BWR Mark II containments although as discussed above, Mark II containments are only slightly larger than Mark I. Reliable hardened venting systems in BWR facilities with Mark I and Mark 11containments are needed to ensure that adequate protection of public health and safety is maintained.
The NRC staff was aware of the conclusions presented in its Safety Evaluation (SE) dated September 28, 1992, for Fitzpatrick with respect to GL 89-16, and considered this information in its overall assessment on whether or not BWR facilities with Mark I and Mark IIcontainments were safe to operate following the events at Fukushima. In addition, the NRC staff was cognizant of and reviewed the results of inspections performed under TI 183 at FitzPatrick (Report dated May 13, 2011. ADAMS Accession No. ML111330455) following the events at Fukushima. The regional staff has communicated with NTTF regarding the Vent system Formatted; Font color: Auto configuration at FitzPatrick, including the differences from GL 89-16 recommendations (Larry Doerflein e-mail). The petition for emergency enforcement action provided no new additional information relating to the existing containment venting capability of the Fitzpatrick plant.
DOES IT MEET CRITERIA FOR REVIEW?
Criteria for Reviewingq Petitions Under 10 CFR 2.206:
- 1. The petition contains a request for enforcement-related action such as issuing an order modifying, suspending, or revoking a license, issuing a notice of violation, with or without a proposed civil penalty.
YES.
- 2. The facts that constitute the bases for taking the particular action are specified. The petitioner must provide some element of support beyond the bare essentials. The supporting facts must be credible and sufficient to warrant further inquiry.
YES. _.....
- 3. There is no NRC proceeding available in which the petitioner is or could be party and through which the petitioner's concerns could be addressed.
,LFormattedt Font color: Auto YES.
4
Criteria for Rejecting Petitions Under 10 CFR 2.206:
I 1. The incoming correspondence does not ask for an enforc.ement-related action or fails to *Formatted: Indent: Hanging. 0.5" provide sufficient facts to support the petition, but simply alleges wrongdoing, violations of NRC regulations, or existence of safety concerns.
YES, In part.
- 2. The petitioner raises issues that have already been the subject of NRC staff review and F__m_ , Indent: Hanging: 0.5" evaluation either on that facility, other similar facilities, or on a generic basis, for which a resolution has been achieved, the issues have been resolved, and the resolution is applicable to the facility in question.
YES, in part.
On March 12, 2012, the NRC ordered licensees of BWR facilities with Mark I and Mark II containments to have reliable hardened containment vents (EA-12-050). This order was based on the Commission's direction provided by the Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM) to SECY-12-0025. dated March 9, 2012.
IA *L "*t A " I *b m11 L I* tl AL* SI * = b *lA IT-"innrn nfl i'tiiin rn rnninp' mu mnnri I -~ ~tf'"'nil ur inn iLl 'fiI'fl neNninnlno the-CesRnb6on-1Orl W-perfIr-!ed-a *eTa P aseW-ef-th- 1D;i- 19 witlh Frcpaccleto iterfusal (9 P840Fm thoe moediAcotionc rocomnF@dcd by GL 80 16.
Accept on the basis of NTTF Recommendation 5.1 and Recommendation 6.
Recommendation 5.1 orders licensees to include a reliable hardened vent in BWR Mark I and Mark II containments. This order included performance obiectives for the design of hardened vents to ensure reliable operation and ease of use (both opening and closing) during a prolonged SO. Recommendation 6 recommends, as part of the longer term review, that the NRC identify insights about hydrogen control and mitigation inside containment or in other buildings as additional information is revealed throuqh further study of the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident.
FitzPatrick's response to the GL 89-16 was also reviewed and approved by the NRC in September 1992, including the staff review of the licensee's processes and procedures, and inspections. The NRC staff evaluation stated, while approving FitzPatrick's positions with regard to GL-89-16, that FitzPatrick's containment vent system met the design bases and the design intent of GL 89-16.
With respect to Fukushima accident, the NTTF evaluation and the subsequent Commission Order have concluded that a sequence of events such as the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident is unlikely to occur in the U.S. Therefore, continued operation and continued licensino activities do not Dose an imminent threat to public health and safety.
- 3. The request is to deny a license application or amendment. NO.
- 4. The request addresses deficiencies within existing NRC rules. NO.
5
1I THERE A NEED FOR OE. 01, 01G, or OC INVOLVEMENT:
The petition does not contain any allegations of licensee or NRC staff wrongdoing. However, the PRB includes representatives from OE and OGC, RECOMMENDED APPROACH AND SCHEDULE (Next Steps):
Aqccept, in epart, and hold in abeyance the following parts of the petition (Issufe Nos. 5(b). 7. and rFortmtt~r: onNot Bold, Font color: Auto 11 in the Table).(see Table for ?ep.ainatieldetailed explanation). Formatted: Font: Not Bold, Fontcolor: Auto Formatted.
= Font: Not Bold, Font color: Auto Three of the issues in the petition, identified and discussed as Issue Nos. 5(b), 7, and 11 in the Table, will be accepted for review by the NRC staff. However. as indicated in the Table, the Formatted; Font: Not Bold, Font color: Auto 1 NRC staff notes that these concerns are undergoing NRC review as part of the lessons-learned from the Fukushima event. Even though the Commission has issued the Order concerninq Hardened Vent, the NRCtJLD staff is conducting further review of additional aspects of the Hardened Vent System, such as filtration. Since Issue Nos. 5(b). 7. and 11 in.the Table will take longer than the target timeframe for reaching a decision on a petition, the NRC glans on accepting those issues, and holdinq them in abeyance.
All the other issues in the petition, identified and discussed in the Ta~ble are denied for the reasons discussed in the Table The next steps would be to:
. Ensure management agrees with the PRB initial recommendation.
" Inform the petilIoners of the PRB's initial recommendation.
" Provide the second opportunity for the petitioners to address the PRB, and make the arrangements for an acceptable date and time.
6
Table (This table summarizes each issue for the following criteria).
ue .pecc Issue Raised Doeth seited Cells Formaftd Table criteriafor review underZ206 process?_.. . . . .
FitzPatick operating license be immediately No. The NTTF nd JLD inth4 Com";sin Oedor havc suspended as the result of the undue risk to the eeNeludedlhaThe NTTF and JLD inthe public health and safety presented by the operatacs Commission Order have concluded that asequence reliance on non-conservative and wrong / of events like the Fukushima accident isunlikely to assumptions that went into the analysis of the occur inthe United States and some appropriate capability of FitzPatrick's pre-existinq ductwork mitigation measures have been implemented, containment vent system, The risks and uncertaoity reducing the likelihood of core damaqe and presented by FitzPatnck's assumptions and radiological releases. Therefore, continued decisions, inregard to NRC Generic Letter 89-16, as operation and continued licensing activities do not associated with the day-to-day operations of this l pose an imminent risk to public health and safety nuclear power plant now constitute an undue rsk.to and, there isno immediate safety concern to public health and safety. FitzPatrick, or to the health and safety of the public, and therefore, the request for immediate action should be rejected. The Petitioners have not provided adequate basis for the-their argument regarding,the operator's reliance on non- Eormattad; No undeftn conservative and wrong assumptions that went into the analysis of the capability of FitzPatrick's pre.
existing ductwork containment vent system-,
The petitioner's concerns regarding this issue do not require immediate shutdown of FitzPatrck based on the conclusions reached by NTTF and the Commission Order regarding Reliable Hardened Vent for the US GE Mark IBWRs.
U.S.plants have implemented "beyond-design-basis' requirements such as ATWS, SBO, combustible gas control, airmaft impact assessmenk'
//
/1 7
N -
ksue Specific Issue Raised ---- ----- oesffis Recom mendation-No. meet,- r"i criteriafor review under 2.206 .. "
Process? "
-- mitigation of major fires or explosins, and extensive
/ damage mitgaton guidelines, thereby reducing the likelihood of core damage and radiological releases.
Asequence of events like those oc-curring inthe (~rmatted: No un~rhnej33J Fukushima accident isunlikely to occur at US GE Mark IBWRs.
The NRC NTTF report on July 12, 2011, based on review of insights from the Fukushima Dai~ichi accident, made arecommendation to the Commission to include areliable hardened vent system, The suspension of the operating license be ineffect No. This ismerely astatement to support the petition in pending Mnal resolution of a public challenge to the general, This isnot an enforcement related action adequacy of the pre-existing vent line inlight of the and isoutside the scope of the 2.206 process and Fukushima Oaiichi nuclear accident. therefore, this request should be rejected, pursuant to Criterion 1for reiectino apetition under 10 CFR 2.206.
2 The joint petitioners do not seek or request that No. This ismerely astatement to support the petition in FitzPatrick operators now install the Direct Torus general. This isnot an enforcement related action Vent System (DIVS) Recommended by GL89-16, and isoutside the scope of the 2.206 process and as itisdemonstrated to have experienced multiple therefore, this request should be ritjursuant failures to mitigate the severe nuclear accidents at to Criterion 1for reiectinq apetition under 10 CFR Fukushima Daiichi. 2,206.
4 FitzPatrick be subject to public hearings with full No, The petitioner raises issues that have already been hearing rights on the continued operation of the the subject of NRC staff review and evaluation either:
Mark IBWR and the adequacy and capability of a on that facility, other similar facilities, or on ageneric pre-existing containment vent which isnot afully basis, for which aresolution has been achieved, the hardened vent line as recommended by NRC issues have been resolved, and the resolution is Generic Letter 89-16. As such, the FitzPatrick applicable to the facilit inquestion, The SE dated
I S pecific issue Raised Does this Recommendatgon No. meet criteda for review under 2.206 process? color:
Fomta:Font Auo operator uniquely did not make containment *1 September28, 1992 shows that modifications and did not install the DTVS, otherwise -T-tzPatrick met the BWROG criteria recommended known as the hardened vent," as requested by NRC " by GL 89-16, Therefore, this issue should be Generic Letter 89.16 and as installed on every other rejected, pursuant to Criterion 2for rejecting a GE Mark.I inthe US; __ petition under 10 CFR 2.206.
5 FitzPatrick shall publicly document for independent The licensee's response to the Order will be publicly review its post-Fukushima re-analyses for the available. Subsequent NRC documentation reliability and capability of the FitzPathck pre- regarding additional efforts i.e., hydrogen control, existing containment vent system as previously / would also be publicly available, identified as 'an acceptable deviation' from NRC Generic Letter 89-16 which recommended the installation of the Direct Torus Vent System and as.
outlined inthe NRC Safety Evaluation Report. dated September 28,1992. The publicly documented post-Fukushima analysis shall include the reassessment of all assumptions regarding the capability and reliability of the pre-existing containment venting and specifically address non-conservative assumptions regarding:
a) the FitzPatrick cost-benefit analysis used to No. FitzPatrick's response to the GL 89-16 was justify not installing afully hardened vent reviewed and approved by the NRC inSeptember system and; 1992, including the staff review of the licensee's processes and procedures, and inspections. The NRC staff evaluation stated, while approvinq FitzPatrick's positions with regard to GL-89-16, that FitzPatrick's containment vent system met the design bases and the design intent of GL 89-16.
/
With respect to the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident, the
/
/
9
.ue . pecfflc~lssueRaised -- --- Does this Recommendation ....... . .Cels No. meet Formatte Talk criteriafor review under2.206 process? /
,WTF evaluation and the subsequent Commission I Order have concluded that a seouence of events that aseauence of events such ashave Order the concluded Fukushima Dai-ichi accident isunlikely
. ... . .. . . . =T= , I to onnmir inthe. II Ranrd qnme nnrnnriatte mitiaation measures have been imnlemented
...... il-"T; ;, " ................ T ...... r ............
reducina the likelihood of core damaoe and
........ i .............. .... . .. .... al . . ..
radiolocical releases, Therefore. continued ooeration and continued licensinQ activities do not I Ig nose an imminent threat to oublic health and safety.
b4-.'unlikely ignition points' as claimed inthe Yes. Accept on the basis of NTTF Recommendation 5.1 Fbma : Font color:Auto FitzPatrick pre-existing vent line system that and MRecommendation 6. Formdtte: Font color:Auto-would otherwise present increased risks and consequences assodated with the detonation Recommendation 5.1 orders licensees to include a of hydrogen gas generated during asevere reliable hardened vent inBWR Mark I and Mark II accident. containments. This order included performance obiectives for the desigqn of hardened vents to Format : ListParagraph, Indent: Left:
ensure reliable operation and ease of use (both 0.05", Hanging; 0.31", Space Before:8pt, Numbered +Level: I +Numbering Style:
a,b opening and closing) during aprolonged SBO. c,.. +Startat: 1+Alignment: Left+Aligned at:
_0.' +Indent at: 0.75' Recommendation 6 recommends, as pal of the Fornatted: Space Before: 0pt,After;0pit longer term review, that the NRC identify insights Nowidlowjorphan control about hydrogen control and mitigation inside containment or inother buildinQs as additional information isrevealed through further study of the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident The Temporary lnstruction 2515/183 provides the *eNo. Ackept on the bas's ofNTTF Recommendation 5.1 NRC inspection results inthe 'Follow-up to the ap"d-.The petitioner raises issues that have Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Station Fuel Damage already been the subiect of NRC staff review and Event.' The joint petitioners draw attention to what evaluation either on that facility, other similar 10
iss.ue Spcific Issue Raised Does this Recommendation Cells No. meet =Inserwe criteria for review underZ2206 Process? /
isdescribed at page 8 of the inspection report as an fa ties, or on ageneric basis, for which a "apparent beyond design and licensing basis r solution has been achieved, the issues have been vulnerability"involving the FitzPatrick operator's /--- resolved, and the resolution isapplicable to the refusal to install the DTVS as recommended by NRC / facility inguestion. The Order on hardened inGeneric Lelter 89-16. containment vents (EA-12-050) has atimeline of December 31. 2016, for installing the reliable hardened containment vent. Therefore, this issue should be reiected, pursuant to Criterion 2 for reiecting apelitibon under 10 CFR 2.206. Fomittedi Fontcolor:
Auto 7 The NRC inspection report [per TI.25151183] ,Yes. . Accept on the basis of NTTF Recommendation 5.1 Font Cfonnmatted, color:
AotD identifies that FitzPatrick's 'existing plant and 6Recommendabon 6.
capabilities" and 'current procedures do not address hydrogen considerations during primary containment Recommendation 5.1 orders licensees to include a venting' which isfurther identified as a 'current reliable hardened vent inBWR Mark l and Mark II licensing basis vulnerability." The joint petitioners containments. This order included Performance further reiterate that the NRC inspection finding that obiectives for the design of hardened vents to FitzPatrick's 'existing plant capabilities" as assumed ensure reliable operation and ease of use (both by the Order are infact negated by the finding that opening and closing) during a prolonged SBO.
'FitzPatrick's current licensing basis did not require the plant to have aprimary containment torus air Recommendation 6recommends, as Dart of the F~~omwutNow/orlphancontw I space hardened vent system as pad of their Mark I longer term review, that the NRC identify insights containment improvement program.' about hydroen control and mitigation inside containment or inother buildings as additional information isrevealed through furher study of the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident,. Fotaft: Fontcolor; Auto 8 The Commission Order timeline setting December No. ,The petitoner raises.issues that have already been Fwate:c olor:Red o _
31,2016, for installing the hardened vent Order does the subject of NRC staff review and evaluation either Foimtte:
Fnt olo: Ato not address, ina timely way, the unique condition of on that facility, other similar facilities, or on ageneric the FitzPatrick nuclear power plant, basis, for which a resolution has been achieved, the issues have been resolved, and the resolution is
Nue Specific Issue Raised Does this Recom.mendation No. e--t-- -------- -
Criteria for review SFormatWl FOTol "
under 2.206 ap icable to the facility inquestion. The SE dated September 28, 1992 shows that Fmatted: Fort color:
Auto FitzPatrick met the BWROG criteria recommended by GL 89-16. Therefore, this issue should be r ed, pursuant to Criterion 2for reiecting a oetition under 10 CFR 2.206.
9 The FitzPatrick nuclear power plant uniquely does No. 'The petitioner raises.issues that. have a!ready been coorAuto Fo:Font not have afully hardened vent system on the the subject of NRC staff review and evaluation either vulnerable Mark Icontainment. As a result, on that facility, other similar facilities, or on a generic FitzPatdck's current capability isidentified with 'a i basis, for which a resolution has been achieved, the beyond design and licensinq bases vulnerability, inI issues have been resolved, and the resolution is that FitzPatdck's current licensing basis did not applicable to the facility inquestion. The SE dated require the plant to have a primary containment i ,pteierSe2tember ;8. 1992 shows that Formatted: Fontcolor:Auto torus air space hardened vent system as part of theiI FitzPatrick met the BWROG criteria recommended Mark Icontainment improvement program." by GL 89-16. Therefore, this issue should be rejected, pursuant to Criterion 2for reiecting a petition under 10 CFR 2.206.
10 Given that the FitzPatrick unit willfully refused to No. Fi'"pat"*' "'ontainmn Yent Gystem was r..iow.d install the DTVS, the documented discovery of the and approved by the NIRC at t!he of the
'licensing basis vulnerabilitv" of its chosen pre- iane of thk Fal.ty Ope.rating Li.ensc in1971.
existing vent now uniquely warrants the suspension .zPat.k's response to the Gl.80.16 waalso of operations pending doser scrutiny, public re.iewed and appro.ed by the NRC inSptebr*
hearings, and full disclosure for its adequacy and 1002, ncuding the StOf, review of the liens.. 's capability inthe event of asevere accident. processes and preceduc., . and n... i*.e.s. The NRC stAff evaluation tated, ile approvin its positions with regardi; to GL 80 16, thaI F~AWrisk' conainen vet Ystem mneets the design ases-A.!.e..es..n.. *.G.L89-16 urged the licensees to voluntarily install hardened vent capabilities at
_ their Mark Icontainments. Iflicensees chose not to 12
&sue Specific Issue Raised [ns-e IrtedCe[N No, igZmatW Table 11 ----- ------ ----
install the hardened vent caMabilitv. the NRC staff
......... ....... . --- ..... [ ... . II .... .,, .. .....
reauested
"'1 .......
the licensee to orovide
. .. I . .. . .
their olant-sMecific
- " - I - -
estimates of cost-s of installation of hardened vent capabilities. The licensees were informed that the NRC staff would use the cost data to oerform olant-
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( specific backflit analyses, and to determine, if i
.. i hardened vent installations could be imoosed as
- . ,i II backfits inaccordance with 10 CFR 50.109.
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Inresoonse to GL 89-16. FitzPatrick indicated that it
- . . .. ,, -- -T had decided not to commit to install hardened vent canabilitiem
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The NRC *tnff .....
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analysis and concluded that there will be substantial additional increase inprotection to public health and safety ifhardened vent capability isimplemented at FitzPatrick and thereforep the backfil is iustified. Bv letter dated June 15. 1990. the NRC staff uroed FitzPatrick to reconsider its decision and imolement
. . . . i. - i the hardened vent installation by January 1993.
Otherwise, the NRC staff intends to impose the backfit under 10 CFR 50.109.
By letters dated January 24, 2991, the NRC staff approved the licensee's request dated July 25, 1990, to integrate the results of its IPE program into its decision regarding making any modifications to existing vent system to implement GL 89-16 hardened vent design crteria. FitzPatdck provided By letters dated December 6,1991, and August 14.
-I 11992, FitzP atck provided its final position regarding 13/
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issue Speciflc Issue Raised Does this Recommendation s.rted~abl" No. meetFratdTbl criteriafor review under 2.206 process?
irementation of the hardened vent design criteria,
/use of IPE to re-examine the venting procedures
/ and training of operators, insights gained from Sperforming the IPE program, and the status of investigations into accident management strategies associated with severe accidents.
By letter dated September 28. 1992, based on the review of the information provided by FitzPatrick, and the results of the NRC inspection of the FitzPat.'ck hardened wetwell vent path, the NRC staff determined that the current vent path meets the hardened vent design criteria or their intent.
Furthermore, the NRC staff found that the plant procedures and training are adeguate to provide information and guidance necessary for operators to effectively use FitzPatrick hardened wetwell vent capability. Therefore, the NRC staff conduded that the existing wetwell vent capability at FitzPatrick is adequate, Temporary Instruction 2515/183.
'beyond design and licensing basis vulnerability [for beyond design basisaccidents]"was not a consideration during GL 89-16 inspections. it-I-Aet-mandaior; on the Liccnsoc to implement th Genek Lellrs.
The pe~tioner raise~sissue.s.that ha.ve already been F.ma. : Fort color:
- uo the subject of NRC staff review and evaluaton either on that facility, other similar facilities, or on ageneric basis, for which aresolution has been achieved, the 14 7
Does this Rcmedto meet critera for review under 2.206 process?
jisues have been resolved, and the resolution is applicable to the facility inquestion. ,he SE dated Foratted: Fort color: Auto SplemerSeotemberS 28,.1992 shows that .
FitzPatrick met the BWROG crteria recommended by GL 89-16. Therefore, this issue should be Sre'ected, pursuant to Criterion 2for reiectingq a 1petition under 10 CFR 2.206.
The additional identified 'vulnerability and the ,Yes. ,.Ae t on !the basis of NTTF Recmmendation 5.1. Formatted: Font color:Auto relatively remote and uncertain mitiqation strateqy and 6Recommendation 6. * .Fo atted: Font Auto color:
lc the public health and safety unduly and unacceptably at risk by the continued day-to-day Recommendation 5.1 orders licensees to include a operations where 'current procedures do not reliable hardened vent inBWR Mark Iand Mark II address hydrogen considerations during primary containments. This order included performance containment venting' and will not for nearly five (5) objeclives for the desiQn of hardened vents to more years. ensure reliable oneration and ease of use (both
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ooenino I "
and dosinal durino,3 a* arolonaed "J . . . ..... 31 -"
SBO... The..
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Commission has already considered and deliberated the issue of continued operation inestablishinQ the renuiremrents and due dates inthe order rather than
-3 ................................................
calling for immediate action.
Recommendation 6recommends,I as part I of the Formatted: No widow/orphan control lonaer term review, that the NRC identify insiahts about hvdrooen control and mitioation inside containment or inother buildinas as additional information isrevealed throuoh further study of the Fukushima Dai.ichi accident. F'rirmatted: Fort color:
Auto Formatted: Font colr Red 15
SUMMARY
(1) The petition and the supplements do not include any new or additional information or facts that were not known to the NRC staff with respect to FitzPatrick's Containment Vent System.
I (2) Fitzpatr!ck'6 ContRinmcnt-VEnt System was reviowod a-appo-v9d..by-the-NRc--a"t-limo Of th9 iSSuanco 9f tho Facility Operating Liconco i.n 174
'FitzPatrick response to the GL 89-16 was also reviewed and approved by the NRC in September 1992, including the staff review of the licensee's processes and procedures, and inspections.
The NRC staff evaluation had-stated, while approving 4&-FitzPatrick's positions with regafdsreoard to GL-89-16, that FitzPatrick's Gg iatAment Vent System-meetecontainment vent system met the design bases and the design intent.--t-it R9!
mandatory on the Lioon~coc to implomont Goncri-L-etter- of GL 89-16.
(3) Recommendation 5.1 orders licensees to include a reliable hardened vent in BWR Mark I and Mark IIcontainments. This order included performance obiectives for the design of hardened vents to ensure reliable operation and ease of use (both opening and closing) during a prolonged SBO.
Recommendation 6 recommends, as part of the longer term review, that the NRC identify insights about hydrogen control and mitigation inside containment or in other buildings as additional information is revealed through further study of the Fukushima Dai-ichi accident.
(3L4,_After the issuance of the Facility Operating License, the NRC has conducted its regular and necessary inspections and assessments of the licensee's performance. The Commission has not found it necessary to issue any generic communications, based on the industry operating experience, or the plant specific communications, based on the licensee's performance, to require any changes to the design and operating requirements of the Containment Vent System. The plant continues to meet all the requirements with respect to the regulations and the licensing bases, including those with respect to the design basis accidents and natural phenomena. Fukushima events have been characterized as "Beyond Design Basis Accidents." The design and operating requirements for "Beyond Design Basis Accidents" for Containment Vent System are being addressed through the Commission-Issued Order.