ML12297A152

15 North Anna 2012-301 Other Documents for Retention

ML12297A152
Person / Time
Site:	North Anna
Issue date:	10/23/2012
From:	NRC/RGN-II
To:	Virginia Electric & Power Co (VEPCO)
References
50-338/12-301, 50-339/12-301
Download: ML12297A152 (108)

Text

1. 001AA2.04 1 Given the following conditions:

A. Unit 1 is at 80% power B. Control bank "D" is at 190 steps with rods in AUTO C. Median-Hi Select Tave 1-RC-TI-1408A fails LOW As a result of this malfunction reactor power will (1) and the OTT setpoint will (2)

(Consider the initial plant response prior to any actions occurring to terminate the rod motion)

A. (1) increase (2) decrease B. (1) increase (2) increase C. (1) decrease (2) decrease D. (1) decrease (2) increase A. Correct; the rod control system will generate outward rod motion based on power m/m and Tave/tref error as a result of the malfunction. instantaneous reactor power (transient power) increases as a function of the increased fission rate. the resultant temperature increase will cause a slight pressure increase (pressure decreasing reduces OTDT setpoint, so increasing implies an opposite affect), however the overriding effect is a slight reduction in setpoint due to the increase in Tave.

B. Incorrect; first part is correct, but the OTDT setpoint which considers flux, pressure, and temperature will lower as discussed above; plausible because the candidate who doesn't know the formula for calculating the setpoint, or considers only the resultant transient pressure increase may think it increases and not worry because they may consider the event one for which OPDT provides the necessary protection and not OTDT.

C. Incorrect; first part is plasuible if candidate does not properly analyze FM&E of the malfucntion.

Second part goes hand-in-hand with first part; pressure decrease will tend to reduce setpoint.

D. Incorrect; first part plausible as discussed above. Second part plausible since the reduction in tave (given a faulted assumption that rods are moving in) tends to increase the setpoint.

Continuous Rod Withdrawal Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Continuous Rod Withdrawal :

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

Reactor power and its trend Tier: 1 Group: 2

Technical

Reference:

SDBD-NAPS-NC, DWG 5655D33 - Sh. 9, TRM Table 4.3-1, NAPS PLS Document Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: A

2. 002A4.08 2 Unit 1 was initially at 100% power.

Operators tripped the reactor due to decreasing Pressurizer pressure & level.

The crew is implementing 1-E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, and is at Step 12a, "Determine required core exit temperature based on SG pressure".

Plant conditions are as follows:

D. RCS pressure is 1270 psig and stable E. RCS Hot Leg Temperatures are 546°F and stable F. RCS Cold Leg Temperatures are 545°F and stable G. Core Exit TCs are 556°F and stable H. "A" train ICCM Subcooling is 20°F and stable I. "B" train ICCM Subcooling is 30°F and stable Based on these plant conditions, the OATC should inform the US that ______ train ICCM indication is INCORRECT and ______________.

A. "A" ; leave RCPs running B. "A" ; stop all RCPs C. "B" ; leave RCPs running D. "B" ; stop all RCPs A. Incorrect. First part is incorrect but plausible because candidate may read steam tables wrong or use incorrect temperature. Second part is incorrect but plausible because it would be true IF a controlled cooldown had been started.

B. Incorrect. First part is incorrect but plausible as discussed in "A". Second part is correct RCP trip criteria per 1-E-3 CAP is met.

C. Incorrect. First part is correct; Tsat for 1270 psig (1285 psia) is 576°F; 576-556=20°F, so "A" train is correct and "B" is wrong. Second part is incorrect but plausible as discussed in "A".

d. Correct. First part is correct; Tsat for 1270 psig (1285 psia) is 576°F; 576-556=20°F, so "A" train is correct and "B" is wrong. Second part is also correct; per 1-E-3 CAP.

Reactor Coolant System (RCS)

Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8)

Safety parameter display systems Tier: 2 Group: 2 Technical

Reference:

1-E-3 and Steam Tables Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: D

3. 003A4.06 3 Unit 1 is at 100% power.

The OATC receives annunciator C-G7, RCP 1A-B-C Seal Leak Hi Flow, and determines that seal leak-off flow for 1-RC-P-1A is pegged high.

The crew enters 1-AP-33.1, Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Failure.

Which ONE of the following 1-RC-P-1A indications is used to validate this condition in accordance with 1-AP-33.1 and states a correct required action in accordance with 1-AP-33.1?

A. Seal Injection flow ; begin an orderly shutdown and stop 1-RC-P-1A B. Seal Injection flow ; trip the reactor and stop 1-RC-P-1A C. Thermal Barrier temperature; begin an orderly shutdown and stop 1-RC-P-1A D. Thermal Barrier temperature; trip the reactor and stop 1-RC-P-1A A. Incorrect. First part is plausible since the candidate may rationalize that increased seal gap would mean that injection flow would have to go up. Second part is plausible because this is the required action for low seal leakoff.

B. Incorrect. First part is plausible as discussed above. Second part is correct as seen in the attached Technical Reference (1-AP-33.1).

C. Incorrect. First part is correct; Thermal Barrier temperature can be trended on the plant computer and was recently added to AP-33.1 as a confirmatory indication. Second part incorrect but plausible as discussed in "A".

D. Correct. First part is correct;Thermal Barrier temperature can be trended on the plant computer and was recently added to AP-33.1 as a confirmatory indication. Second part is also correct as seen in the attached Technical Reference (1-AP-33.1).

Reactor Coolant Pump System (RCPS)

Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8)

RCP parameters Tier: 2 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

1-AP-33.1 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info: the addition of thermal barrier temperature is a recent addition to the AP Answer: D

4. 003K5.04 4 Operators have just finished synchronizing Unit 1 to the grid following a scheduled refueling outage.

1-RC-P-1B, "B" Reactor Coolant Pump trips.

Which ONE of the following identifies how B SG level will initially respond to this transient, and also correctly states whether a manual reactor trip is required?

A. decrease ; manual Reactor trip is NOT required B. decrease ; manual Reactor trip is required C. increase ; manual Reactor trip is NOT required D. increase ; manual Reactor trip is required A. Incorrect. First part correct, the INITIAL repsonse (as solicited in the stem) is a "shrink" in SG level due to the reduction in boiling in the tube bundle. Second part is incorrect but plausible since this would be correct under most circumstance including an instrument ATWS.

B. Correct. First part is correct as discussed above. Second part is correct as seen in the attached Technical Reference (AR C-H6).

C. Incorrect. First part is incorrect but plausible since if the candidate does not recognize the overriding effect of "shrink" (discussed above) they may conclude that steaming rate will decrease which means Feed will be greater than Steam and level will initially increase as a result. Second part incorrect but plausible as discussed in "A".

D. Incorrect. First part is incorrect as discussed in "C". Second part is correct as seen in the attached Technical Reference (AR C-H6).

Reactor Coolant Pump System (RCPS)

Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the RCPS:

(CFR: 41.5 / 45.7)

Effects of RCP shutdown on secondary parameters, such as steam pressure, steam flow, and feed flow

Tier: 2 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

AR F-C2, AR C-H6 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: B

5. 004K2.07 5 Which ONE of the following identifies the sources of power to the "A" Boric Acid Storage Tank heaters and includes how the heaters respond in the event of a loss of offsite power?

A. 1H and 1J emergency Busses ; automatically restored when the EDG energizes its associated Emergency Bus B. 1H and 1J emergency Busses ; must be manually reset after the EDG energizes its associated Emergency Bus C. 2H and 1J emergency Busses ; automatically restored when the EDG energizes its associated Emergency Bus D. 2H and 1J emergency Busses ; must be manually reset after the EDG energizes its associated Emergency Bus A. Incorrect. First part correct as seen on attached Technical References (AR & 0-AP-10). Second part incorrect but plausible since these are a small load; the candidate that lacks detailed knowledge may conclude that it would make sense for them to come back after power is restored.

B. Correct. Both parts correct as seen on attached Technical References (AR & 0-AP-10).

C. Incorrect. First part incorrect but plausible since one of our BATs does have heaters with opposite unit power supply. Second part also incorrect but plausible as discussed in "A".

D. Incorrect. First part incorrect but plausible as discussed in "C". Second part is correct as seen on attached Technical References (AR & 0-AP-10).

Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS)

Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following:

(CFR: 41.7)

Heat tracing Tier: 2 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

AR B-C5, AR B-D5, DWG 11715-CH-044, DWG 11715-ESK-6HP Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None

Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: B

6. 004K5.15 6 Both Units are at 100%.

Burnup on Unit 1 is 3,000 MWD/MTU Burnup on Unit 2 is 12,500 MWD/MTU Which one of the following correctly completes the following statement?

The moderator temperature coefficient is more negative on (1) , and if power is lowered to 90% on both units by boration only, then (2) will require a larger boration than the other unit.

A. (1) Unit 1 (2) Unit 1 B. (1) Unit 1 (2) Unit 2 C. (1) Unit 2 (2) Unit 1 D. (1) Unit 2 (2) Unit 2 A. Incorrect. First part incorrect but plausible since there are several reactivity coefficients, with several factors that effect them, and the candidate may be unsure of, or not relate the difference based on the limited information provided in them stem. Second part also incorrect but plausible since it supports a faulted conclusion in the first part of the question.

B. Incorrect. First part incorrect but plausible as discussed above. Second part is true, but since first part is wrong, this choice is wrong.

C. Incorrect. First part is correct as discussed in "D". Second part incorrect but plausible, since as noted above if candidate focuses soley on the difference in differential boron worth, they will select this choice.

D. Correct. First part is correct; since both units are at 100% for the given time in core life there is a discernable difference in MTC attributable primarily because of the lower RCS boron concentration.

Second part is also correct and although boron worth is greater the reactivity feedback from the power reduction outweighs the greater differential boron worth.

Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS)

Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the CVCS:

(CFR: 41.5/45.7)

Boron and control rod reactivity effects as they relate to MTC

Tier: 2 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

1-PT-13, plant curves 1-SC-3.1 & 1-SC-3.8 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: D

7. 005A2.03 7 Initial Conditions:

J. Unit 1 is in Mode 6 following a refueling outage.

K. All 157 fuel assemblies were replaced with new assemblies L. Reactor vessel level is 74" above centerline and head bolt tensioning is in progress.

M. VCT float is in service.

The running RHR pump trips.

Which of the following choices (1) identifies the effect, if any, this malfunction will have on Reactor Vessel level and (2) whether or not pump venting is required in accordance with 1-AP-11, Loss of RHR prior to placing the standby RHR pump in service?

A. (1) reactor vessel level remains constant (2) RHR pump venting IS required prior to placing the standby RHR pump in service B. (1) reactor vessel level remains constant (2) RHR pump venting IS NOT required prior to placing the standby RHR pump in service C. (1) reactor vessel level increases (2) RHR pump venting IS required prior to placing the standby RHR pump in service D. (1) reactor vessel level increases (2) RHR pump venting IS NOT required prior to placing the standby RHR pump in service D. Correct. Since letdown flow comes from 1142 for the plant configuration given in the stem letdown flow will decrease, and although makeup flow may decrease due to decrease in VCT level (increase in VCT gas space volume) the initial upset will result in an increase in Rx vessel level. the candidate must have a solid understanding of the system alignments and interactions in this infrequent configuration in order to possitively answer correctly. Although pump venting would be a normal course of action (good practice), in this case is outweighed by the concern for restoration of RHR flow and thus NOT required by AP-11 unless there is evidence that supports a need for it.

All distractors are incorrect but plausible because the candidate must clearly know the inter-relationship between the RCS, RHR, and CVCS, in order to arrive at the correct answer. To the candidate who has a knowledge gap in either integrated plant knowledge or specific procedural requirements all of these choices are credible; further distractor plausibility is increased because the event takes place at the end of the outage when there is no urgency to restore shutdown cooling

(from the standpoint of time to core boiling).

Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS)

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the RHRS, and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

(CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)

RHR pump/motor malfunction Tier: 2 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

1-OP-8.1, SDBD-NAPS-RH, 1-AP-11 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: D

8. 005K5.05 8 Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

N. The RCS is solid O. RCS pressure is stable at 350 psig P. RCS temperature is stable Q. RHR is in service and supplying letdown R. Letdown orifice HCVs are closed S. Charging flow control valve 1-CH-FCV-1122 is set at 30% demand in MANUAL T. RHR to letdown isolation valve 1-CH-HCV-1142 is set at 50% demand U. Letdown pressure control valve 1-CH-PCV-1145 is set at 50% demand in MANUAL Which of the choices below correctly completes the following statements?

If the air line separates from the 1-CH-HCV-1142 actuator, RCS pressure will ______(1)_____.

AND If the air line separates from the 1-CH-FCV-1122 actuator, RCS pressure will ______(2)_____.

(Consider each failure independently)

A. Increase ; Increase B. Increase ; Decrease C. Decrease ; Increase D. Decrease ; Decrease A. Correct. 1142 is at the RHR pump discharge this valve will fail in the closed direction if air is removed and stop letdown flow. As a result 1145 which normally controls RCS pressure will not be

able to affect it and thus pressure will rise. The second part is correct, 1122 fails open on a loss of air which would allow maximum charging flow and since letsown flow will not change, RCS pressure will increase.

All distractors are incorrect but plausible because the candidate must clearly know the inter-relationship between the RCS, RHR, and CVCS, as well as valve failure mode/direction and the details of operation of the subject components in order to arrive at the correct answer. To the candidate who has a knowledge gap (i.e. is unsure of the failure mode or physical location of the subject valve) all of these choices are credible.

Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS)

Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply the RHRS:

(CFR: 41.5 / 45.7)

Plant response during "solid plant": pressure change due to the relative incompressibility of water Tier: 2 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

1-AP-28, DWG 11715-CH-078, 1-AR-E-B7, SDBD-NAPS-RH Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: A

9. 006A3.03 9 Operators are responding to a large break LOCA.

RWST level is 40% and decreasing.

Which ONE of the following identifies the setpoint at which automatic swap-over to the Containment sump should occur, and describes how a failure of 1-SI-MOV-1885A, Low-Head SI Pump Recirc Valve, to reposition would effect the swapover?

(1-SI-MOV-1885B, C and D repositioned as designed)

A. 16% ; 1-SI-MOV-1860A, Low-Head SI Pump Suction from Containment Sump WILL NOT automatically open B. 16% ; 1-SI-MOV-1860A, Low-Head SI Pump Suction from Containment Sump WILL automatically open C. 23% ; 1-SI-MOV-1860A, Low-Head SI Pump Suction from Containment Sump WILL NOT automatically open D. 23% ; 1-SI-MOV-1860A, Low-Head SI Pump Suction from Containment Sump WILL automatically open A. Incorrect. Setpoint is correct; second part is incorrect but plausible since there are 2 valves in series,

so one could rationalize that ensuring RWST isolation - release concerns - takes precedence, especially since an entire train not swapping is enveloped by single failure.

B. Correct. Setpoint is correct; valve operation correct as seen on attached Technical Reference.

C. Incorrect. Setpoint incorrect but plausible since this is when E-1 directs the operator to go to ES-1.3; second part is incorrect but plausible as discussed in "A".

D. Incorrect. Setpoint incorrect but plausible since this is when E-1 directs the operator to go to ES-1.3; second part is correct as discussed in "A".

Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)

Ability to monitor automatic operation of the ECCS, including:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5)

ESFAS-operated valves Tier: 2 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

1-ICP-QS-L-100C, Setpoint Document, 1-E-1, AR J-A2, DWG 11715-ESK-6ET Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: B

10. 006A4.08 10 Unit 1 tripped from 100% power due to a spurious Safety Injection signal.

The Crew is implementing 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection and the OATC has just taken the SI RESET switches to RESET.

Which ONE of the following identifies the effect that Train "A" Safety Injection failing to reset would have on subsequent recovery actions?

A. Placing 1-CH-P-1A in P-T-L will stop the pump ; Train "A" of Phase "A" CANNOT be reset B. Placing 1-CH-P-1A in P-T-L will stop the pump ; Train "A" of Phase "A" CAN be reset C. Placing 1-CH-P-1A in P-T-L will NOT stop the pump ; Train "A" of Phase "A" CAN be reset D. Placing 1-CH-P-1A in P-T-L will NOT stop the pump ; Train "A" of Phase "A" CANNOT be reset A. Incorrect but plausible since the candidate may select this distractor if they have the misconception that going to P-T-L will always stop a pump (being in P-T-L will prevent breaker from closing on an SI signal so this is a subtle difference). Also candidate who lacks detailed knowledge of SSPS may default to this choice since EOP always reset SI prior to resetting Phase "A" (on the surface this implies Phase "A" can't be reset with SI present).

B. Incorrect but plausible as discussed above. Also as noted Phase "A" will reset with an SI signal present C. Correct. As previously discussed with a failure of the "train" to reset only otherprotective features (86 lockout) will open the breaker. Second part is correct as discussed in "B".

D. Incorrect but plausible; first part correct as discussed above, second part incorrect but plausible as discussed in "A".

Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)

Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8)

ESF system, including reset Tier: 2 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

1-GIP-3A, 11715-ESK-5AL, 1-PT-57.4, DWG 11715-LSK-32-1A Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: C

11. 007A3.01 11 Given the following:

Unit 1 was initially at 100% power.

Bistables for 1-RC-PT-1455, PRZR Pressure Protection Channel I, are in trip for the PT.

A loss of 1-III Vital AC Bus occurs.

The Crew has just completed the Immediate Actions of 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

Based on these plant conditions 1-CH-MOV-1381, RCP Seal Return Isolation, remained open because of the loss of ____________ and RCP # 1 Seal Return is flowing to the ____________.

A. power to the MOV ; PDTT B. power to the MOV ; PRT C. power to Train "B" Safeguards slave relays ; PDTT D. power to Train "B" Safeguards slave relays ; PRT A. Incorrect. First part incorrect but plausible; the candidate who doesn't know, or confuses power

supplies may erroneously conclude that this would explain why it is open. Second part is also incorrect but plausible; even though seal leak-off (return) is relatively cool water, implying it could be routed to the PDTT similar to #2 seal leak-off, the relief discharges to the PRT.

B. Incorrect. First part incorrect but plausible as discussed above. Second part is correct; 1-CH-MOV-1380 which is in series with the subject valve will close causing the relief to lift and flow to the PRT as shown on the print listed in the technical reference.

C. Incorrect. First part correct as discussed in "D" below. Second part is incorrect but plausible as discussed in "A" above.

D. Correct. First part is correct; the subject valve has power and would normally close on a safety injection, however for this case the slave relays (powered from 1-III Vital AC Bus exclusively - note this is different than the logic bays which have 2 power supplies) has no power so although the logic is made up, the valve doesn't receive an automatic signal so it won't reposition.. Second part is also correct as discussed in "B" above.

Pressurizer Relief Tank/Quench Tank System (PRTS)

Ability to monitor automatic operation of the PRTS, including:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5)

Components which discharge to the PRT Tier: 2 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

DWG 11715-FM-095C-Sh.2, 1-OP-26A, 1-GIP-3B Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: D

12. 008AA1.02 12 Given the following conditions:

Operators tripped Unit 1 from 100% power due to a stuck open PRZR Safety Valve.

• The crew is performing the actions of 1-ES-1.2, Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization.

• Both LHSI pumps have been stopped.

• One charging pump has been stopped.

• Normal charging has been re-aligned.

• RCPs are OFF.

• The crew is on Step 21, "Depressurize RCS to minimize break flow".

• The depressurization was stopped when subcooling reached 35°F The following conditions exist:

• RCS subcooling is 23°F and trending DOWN.

Based on these indications, what action will be taken in accordance with 1-ES-1.2?

A. Manually start charging pumps and align the BIT B. Start one RCP C. Manually actuate SI D. Increase RCS cooldown rate A. Correct per attached technical reference (ES-1.2)

B. Incorrect but plausible; given that RCPs are off candidate may choose this action to colapse Head voids, on the surface it appears like a logical solution to address head void (and is in fact employed in the EOP network), so the candidate who doesn't have a detailed understanding of the step sequencing of the procedure may select this choice.

c. Incorrect but plausible the candidate who lacks a firm understanding of the procedure may default to this selection solely based other procedures like ES-0.1 which direct manually actuating SI.

d. Incorrect but plausible because this is a strategy to restore subcooling that is employed at an earlier stage of the procedure.

Pressurizer (PZR) Vapor Space Accident (Relief Valve Stuck Open)

Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident:

(CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

HPI pump to control PZR level/pressure Tier: 1 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

1-ES-1.2 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: A

13. 008G2.1.27 13 Both Units are at 100%.

• 1-CC-P-1A is tagged and uncoupled for maintenance

• 2B CC Hx has been valved out for temperature control due to colder weather conditions The CC System is required by Tech Specs _________________________________; based on these plant conditions the LCO is _________.

A. to provide accident mitigation for a Steam the Generator Tube Rupture ; MET

B. to provide accident mitigation for a Steam the Generator Tube Rupture ; NOT MET C. to cooldown one unit quickly while the other unit is operating should the need arise ; MET D. to cooldown one unit quickly while the other unit is operating should the need arise ; NOT MET V. Incorrect. CC supports equipment such as RCPs and most notably RHR cooling. Unlike the LOCA (which uses long term recirc cooling via RSHXs and SW system) to maintain cold shutdown, the SGTR event looks to place RHR in service, but this is not required for accident analysis purposes. Second part is correct the subject HX can be valved in manually so it can be taken credit for, so the LCO which requires three sub-systems is met.

W. Incorrect. First part incorrect but plausible as discussed above. Second part is incorrect but plausible because 2 components are tagged, which under most circumstances in tech specs, such as Service Water, would mean they are OOS, so the LCO which requires three sub-systems would NOT be met. The candidate who lacks knowledge of the LCO basis for the CC system would likely default to this choice.

X. Correct. As described in the Bases, the CC system supports the capability to cooldown for whatever the need be. Second part is correct as discussed in the Tech Spec Bases.

Y. Incorrect. First part is correct as noted in "C". Second part incorrect but plausible as discussed in "B".

Component Cooling Water System (CCWS)

Knowledge of system purpose and/or function.

(CFR: 41.7)

Tier: 2 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

TS 3.7.19 and Bases Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info: goes above and beyond K/A in order to make a higher order question.

Answer: C

14. 009EK3.06 14 Unit 1 was initially at 100% power.

The OATC tripped the reactor due to decreasing PRZR Level and Pressure.

Offsite power was lost shortly after the trip.

The crew is currently preforming 1-ES-1.2, Post LOCA Cooldown and depressurization, Step 13, "depressurize the RCS to refill the PRZR" Plant conditions prior to starting depressurization were:

• PRZR Level 4% and stable

• RCS Subcooling 40°F and slowly increasing

• Core exit TCs 532°F and slowly decreasing While depressurizing, the OATC notes the following conditions:

• PRZR Level 40% and increasing rapidly

• RCS Subcooling -5°F and slowly decreasing

• Core exit TCs 530°F and slowly decreasing Given the current conditoins, which one of the choices below correctly answers the following questions?

(1) What is the method used for depressurization IAW 1-ES-1.2?

AND (2) Can depressurization continue IAW 1-ES-1.2?

A. (1) Auxilliary Spray (2) Depressurization can continue B. (1) Auxilliary Spray (2) Depressurization can NOT continue C. (1) PORV (2) Depressurization can continue D. (1) PORV (2) Depressurization can NOT continue A. Incorrect. First part incorrect but plausible since it makes sense that you would want to use aux spray to minimize further RCS inventory loss, however for this procedure the PORV is the alternative (RNO) since normal spray isn't available (offsite power lost). Some EOPs do use Auxiliary Spray as the first alternative to normal spray. Second part also incorrect but plausible, the candidate must know the procedure requirements for stopping depressurization which is based on Pzr level and/or subcooling and may think he should continue until 69% pzr level is reached B. Incorrect. First part incorrect but plausible as discussed above. Second part is correct.

C. Incorrect. First part is correct; the PORV is the alternative per ES-1.2 when normal spray isn't available. Second part incorrect but plausible as stated above.

D. Correct. First part is correct; the PORV is the alternative per ES-1.2 when normal spray isn't available. Second part is correct the depressurization must be stopped when subcooling is lost.

Small Break LOCA Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the small break LOCA:

(CFR 41.5 / 41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13)

RCS inventory balance Tier: 1 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

1-ES-1.2

Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: D

15. 010K2.02 15 Unit 1 is at 100% power.

1-RC-PT-1456, PRZR Pressure Protection Channel II, failed high and 1-MOP-55.73, Pressurizer Pressure Protection Instrumentation, has been implemented, but bistables have NOT been placed in trip yet.

A loss of 1-I Vital 120VAC Bus occurs.

Based on these plant conditions an automatic reactor trip ________________ occur and automatic Pressurizer Pressure Control is _________________________.

A. will not ; available B. will not ; NOT available C. will ; available D. will ; NOT available A. Incorrect. First part incorrect but plausible since the indication for CH.1 (1455) will fail in the low direction, so the candidate who does not know the protection bistable coincidence, logic, failure mode, or fails to take this into account may select this choice. Second part is correct; the Process Rack for the subject transmitter & controllers is powered from the vital bus that was lost, however there is a backup source that comes from the emergency bus so this instrumentation will have power.

B. Incorrect. First part incorrect but plausible as noted above. Second part also incorrect but plausible since as discussed the candidate who is unaware of source of power to process racks (or the fact that there is a seperate source for the internal rack backup supply) may default to this simply because so much other instrumentation is lost as a result of the 1-I loss.

C. Correct. First part is correct; as discussed earlier, an automatic reactor trip on 2/3 Hi RCS pressure will occur even though pressure is normal (2235 psig) as a result of the 1-I bus loss. Second part is also correct as discussed in "A".

D. Incorrect. First part is correct as mentioned above. Second part incorrect but plausible as discussed in "B".

Pressurizer Pressure Control System (PZR PCS)

Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following:

(CFR: 41.7)

Controller for PZR spray valve

Tier: 2 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

1-ICM-PRO-PW-001, 1-OP-26A, 1-AR-D-B1 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: C

16. 011A2.01 16 Given the following:

• Unit 1 is in Mode 3 following a scheduled refueling outage.

• 1-OP-1.4, Unit Startup from Mode 4 to Mode 3 is in progress

• The crew is heating up the RCS and raising RCS pressure

• RCS pressure is 700 psig

• RCS temperature is 375°F

• All letdown orifices isolation valves are open The following alarms are received:

• C-B3, REGEN HX LETDWN LINE HI TEMP

• C-B4, LO PRESS LETDWN LINE HI FLOW Which ONE of the following identifies the cause of these alarms and includes the corrective action the operator should take?

A. inadequate charging flow ; place 1-CH-FCV-1122, Charging Flow Control Valve in MANUAL and increase charging B. inadequate charging flow ; isolate Normal Letdown C. excessive letdown flow ; place 1-CH-PCV-1145, Letdown Pressure Control Valve in MANUAL and fully close the valve D. excessive letdown flow ; close one letdown orifice isolation valve A. Incorrect. Plausible because insufficient charging will result in C-B3; left uncorrected C-B4 would eventually result due to flashing in the line. Corrective action is a typical method to remedy condition.

B. Incorrect. Plausible because the corrective action given is one method to remedy condition; the cause, since both alarms come in at the same time does not adequately explain C-B4 however.

C. Incorrect. plausible because the alarms support cause as correct; corrective action given makes sense on the surface, but for these plant conditions it would not be effective in itself due to the relief valve would lift and the high flow condition would not be corrected.

D. Correct. As seen in the attached Technical References having both alarms confirms this as the cause. Closing a letdown orifice accomplishes the stated remedy "reduce letdown flow".

Pressurizer Level Control System (PZR LCS)

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the PZR LCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

(CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)

Excessive letdown Tier: 2 Group: 2 Technical

Reference:

1-AR-C-B3, 1-AR-C-B4, 1-OP-1.4 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: D

17. 011EA2.08 17 Unit 1 was operating at 100%.

A Large Break LOCA occurred at time 12:00.

The crew has completed 1-ES-1.3, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirc.

1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, will direct the crew to go to 1-ES-1.4, Transfer to Hot Leg Recirculation, ___________ after event initiation; the reason for this action is to A. 4.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> ; preclude boron precipitation which could potentially hinder core cooling B. 4.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> ; preclude accelerated localized corrosion of cladding in the upper regions of the core C. 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> ; preclude boron precipitation which could potentially hinder core cooling D. 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> ; preclude accelerated localized corrosion of cladding in the upper regions of the core A. Correct. Latest procedure revision 4.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> after EVENT INITIATION. reason provided is per E-1 background document.

B. Incorrect. First part correct; latest procedure revision 4.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> after EVENT INITIATION. Second part incorrect, but plausible because corrision and things like pH & chemistry are of concern. the EOPs check them and have you evaluate, but while this sounds good and could have benefits along those lines, it's not the reason for swapping given in the background document.

C. Incorrect. First part incorrect but plausible if the candidate is under the misconception that the swap time is 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> (this is the frequency that all subsequent swaps, back and forth, between cold and hot, are performed at). Second part is correct as noted in "A" above.

D. Incorrect. First part incorrect but plausible if the candidate is under the misconception that the swap

time is 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> (this is the frequency that all subsequent swaps, back and forth, between cold and hot, are performed at). Second part is also incorrect but plausible as discussed in "B" above.

Large Break LOCA Ability to determine or interpret the following as they apply to a Large Break LOCA:

(CFR 43.5 / 45.13)

Conditions necessary for recovery when accident reaches stable phase Tier: 1 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

1-E-1 and WOG Background Document Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info: similar questions used as k/a match found on turkey point 2005 exam and Vogtle 2005 exam Answer: A

18. 012A1.01 18 Unit 1 just cleared a Chemistry hold at 30% power and is ramping to 100% power following a scheduled refueling.

Which of the choices below completes the following statement?

As the Unit is ramped up the OATC should expect the _____(1)______SETPOINT to change, and

_____(2)_____ is the input that has the largest impact on this setpoint over the course of the ramp.

A. (1) OPT (2) axial flux B. (1) OPT (2)Tave C. (1)OTT (2)axial flux D. (1)OTT (2)Tave A. Incorrect. Plausible because this trip has a variable setpoint. Second part is also plausible because this is an input to the calculation and will change but has little to no effect since no penalties are applied unless the value of AFD is greater than -13 or +7.

B. Incorrect. Plausible as noted above. Second part is true Tave is the major contributor to this setpoint.

C. Incorrect. First part is correct this setpoint will decrease during the ramp becasue the change in Tave penalizes it. Second part is also plausible because this is an input to the calculation and will

change but has little to no effect since no penalties are applied unless the value of AFD is greater than -13 or +7.

D. Correct. First part correct as noted in "C". Second part also correct. Tave is the major contributor to the setpoint.

Reactor Protection System Ability to predict and/or monitor Changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the RPS controls including:

(CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)

Trip setpoint adjustment Tier: 2 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

TRM Section 4.3, RTS Instrumentation Trip Setpoints Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: D

19. 013K6.01 19 Unit 1 is at 100% power.

Containment Pressure Protection Channel II (1-LM-P-100B) failed on the previous shift and all bistables have been positioned in accordance with 1-MOP-55.75, Containment Pressure Protection Instrument.

Which ONE of the following is true concerning a subsequent Containment Pressure Channel failure?

A. If 1-LM-P-100A, Containment Pressure Protection Channel I, fails high, CDA will actuate. Safety Injection and Main Steam Line Isolation will NOT actuate.

B. If 1-LM-P-100C, Containment Pressure Protection Channel III, fails high, Safety Injection and Main Steam Line Isolation will actuate. CDA will NOT actuate.

C. If 1-LM-P-100D, Containment Pressure Protection Channel IV, fails high, CDA, Safety Injection and Main Steam Line Isolation will actuate.

D. A failure high of any one of the remaining Containment Pressure Protection Channels will NOT cause an ESF actuation.

A. Incorrest. Plausible since this channel goes to CDA only and if the candidate thinks that the signal is in trip instead of bypassed then a CDA only would occur.

B. Correct. bistables for 1-LM-P-100B are placed in trip per the MOP EXCEPT for CDA which is bypassed;the candidate who doesn't know the specific functions and logic of each channel along with the details of the MOP won't know this.

C. Incorrect. Plausible if the candidate thinks all signals are placed in trip instead of bypass for the CDA signal.

D. Incorrect. Plausible if the candidate thinks that all signals from the instrument are placed in bypass and therefore no ESF signal would be generated.

Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS)

Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the following will have on the ESFAS:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8)

Sensors and detectors Tier: 2 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

1-MOP-55.75, DWG 5655D33, Sh. 8 of 16 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: B

20. 014K1.02 20 A Reactor Startup is in progress on Unit 1.

Unit 1 is at 1.1E-8 AMPs and stable.

The OATC has just completed recording critical data.

Annunciator A-G2, RPI Rod Bot Rod Drop, is received and the OATC observes that Rod Bottom Lights are ON for Rods D4 and M12, and the IRPIs for both indicate 0 steps.

Based on the above, select the choice that,

1) identifies the parameter that is the best to use to differentiate between an actual dropped rod condition versus an IRPI malfunction, and

2) includes the required operator action assuming the parameter has changed?

A. 1) RCS Tave

2) manually insert all control banks B. 1) RCS Tave

2) trip the reactor C. 1) Intermediate Range SUR

2) manually insert all control banks D. 1) Intermediate Range SUR

2) trip the reactor

A. Incorrect. first part is plausible since this is true during a startup once you get above the POAH.

second part plausible since this would place you in Mode 3 where the TS no longer applies, based on the plant conditions there is no apparent need to trip the reactor, so this would seem like a logical choice between the 2 alternatives.

B. Incorrect. first part incorrect but plausible as discussed above. Second part is correct; although not needed for core protection 1-AP-1.2 for dropped rod requires a reactor trip (go to 1-E-0) Note: at NAPS step 1 of E-0 has you manually trip, EVEN if it already tripped on it's own, this is why we can just say "go to E-0", vice "manually trip the reactor and go to E-0" like some plants do.

C. Incorrect. first part is correct assuming the startup is conducted IAW procedures all rods would be high enough such that even a low worth rod dropping will be seen on startup rate since you are exactly critical with no rod motion occurring (i.e. if you were driving rods in to level power at 10E-8 a low worth single rod drop could be masked by an already significantly negative SUR). Second part is correct but plausible as discussed in "A".

D. Correct. First part correct as discussed in "C". Second part also correct as noted in "B" and seen in attached Technical Reference.

Rod Position Indication System (RPIS)

Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the RPIS and the followingsystems:

(CFR: 41.3 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8)

NIS Tier: 2 Group: 2 Technical

Reference:

AR A-G2, 1-AP-1.2 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info: Conferred with Chief Examineer (since there are no "physical" connections between NIS/IRPI). this question matches KA since the candidate must know how to use the one system (NIS) to validate the indication of the other system (IRPI); the cause-effect relationship is demonstrated by how an indicated change in a system control element effects the process variable (neutron flux).

Answer: D

21. 017K6.01 21 Select the choice that completes the following statement.

The instrumentation used to derive the Train "A" ICCM Subcooling display are RCS Wide Range Pressure and _____________________ ; assuming all temperature instruments are reading 550°F, if a single temperature element in that train fails low the subcooling indication will ______________.

A. core exit thermocouples ; decrease B. core exit thermocouples ; NOT change C. RCS Wide Range Hot Leg RTDs ; decrease

D. RCS Wide Range Hot Leg RTDs ; NOT change A. Incorrect. First part correct 5 highest per TS bases and the system design bases document.

Second part is incorrect but plausible because this is the failure mode for an RTD instrument; thus if the candidate confuses the FM&E for the different devices they may select this response.

B. Correct. First part correct as noted above. Second part is also correct. This is fundamentals; thermocouple generates millivolt (mV) potential proportional to temperature so open circuit means no mV potential & therefore lower indication.

C. Incorrect. First part incorrect but plausible if candidate has incorrect mental model (i.e. an average of the highestSecond part incorrect but plausible as discussed in "A".

D. Incorrect. First part incorrect but plausible as discussed in "C". Second part is correct per attached Technical Reference (TS 3.3.3, Table 3.3.3-1.

In-Core Temperature Monitor System (ITM)

Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction of the following ITM system components:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

Sensors and detectors Tier: 2 Group: 2 Technical

Reference:

TS 3.3.3 Bases, vendor tech man ICCM-86 NAPS Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: B

22. 022AK1.04 22 Unit 1 is at 50% power.

The crew is recovering from a failure of the selected Pressurizer Level Transmitter.

Operable PRZR level channels have been selected.

1-CH-FCV-1122, Charging Flow Control Valve, is in manual.

Current conditions are:

• PRZR level is 50% and stable

• RCS Tave is 564°F and stable

• 1-RC-LC-1459G, Pressurizer Level Controller, is in manual with output at 10%

Based on the currect conditions, which one of the following describes the system status and the action required by 1-AP-3, Loss of Vital Instrumentation, to restore PRZR level control to automatic?

A. PRZR level is below program; increase charging to restore PRZR level to program, adjustment of

1-RC-LC-1459G is required prior to placing 1-CH-FCV-1122 in automatic.

B. PRZR level is below program; increase charging to restore PRZR level to program, adjustment of 1-RC-LC-1459G is NOT required prior to placing 1-CH-FCV-1122 in automatic.

C. PRZR level is above program; decrease charging to restore PRZR level to program, adjustment of 1-RC-LC-1459G is required prior to placing 1-CH-FCV-1122 in automatic.

D. PRZR level is above program; decrease charging to restore PRZR level to program, adjustment of 1-RC-LC-1459G is NOT required prior to placing 1-CH-FCV-1122 in automatic.

A. Incorrect but plausible; candidate may select this choice if they do not know the PRZR level program, second part is also plausible since 1-CH-FCV-1122 is a slave to 1-RC-LC-1459G and the candidate might assume the only action needed is to just make sure it is in auto.

B. Incorrect but plausible; first part as discussed above, second part is the correct response if PRZR level was below program (which again for the current conditions it is not).

C. Correct; level is above program, second part is also correct based on the current conditions 1-RC-LC-1459G is required to be adjusted prior to transferring 1-CH-FCV-1122 back to auto.

D. Incorrect but plausible; level is above the candidate who does not fully understand the relationship between 1-RC-LC-1459G and 1-CH-FCV-1122 might assume that the only thing needed once level is back on program is to just make sure you are in auto.

Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup:

(CFR 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3)

Reason for changing from manual to automatic control of charging flow valve controller Tier: 1 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

1-AP-3, PLS Document, 1-GOP-1.0 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: C

23. 022G2.1.7 23 Unit 1 is at 100% power.

The Mechanical Chiller has tripped and cannot be re-started.

As a result the crew should expect that over time the indicated partial pressure will (1) and the crew will restore a source of cooling water in accordance with 1-AP-35, Loss of Containment Air

Recirculation Cooling, by aligning (2) to Containment Air Recirc Fans.

A. (1) increase (2) CC B. (1) increase (2) Service Water C. (1) decrease (2) CC D. (1) decrease (2) Service Water A. Incorrect. Plausible because the person who doesn't understand how partial pressure is derived would default to "indicated pressure" increasing because actual pressure will increase as containment temperature increases and since CC supplies other equipment in CNTMT like RCPs and RHR, it is plausible the the non-safety CC system would be used for non-safety CARFs.

B. Incorrect. As noted above indicated partial pressure response is incorrect but plausible. The given alternate source of cooling water is correct per 1-AP-35.

C. Incorrect. Indicated partial pressure response is correct. Alternate source of cooling (CC) incorrect but plausible as discussed in "A".

D. Correct. Indicated partial pressure response is correct. The given alternate source of cooling water is correct per 1-AP-35.

Containment Cooling System Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation.

(CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.12 / 45.13)

Tier: 2 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

1-AP-35, SDBD-NAPS-CV Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: D

24. 025AK1.04 24 Unit 1 is cooling down for a scheduled refueling.

The crew has just completed placing RHR in service.

1-RH-P-1B and 1-CC-P-1B are running.

1-RH-P-A and 1-CC-P-1A are in standby with the control switches in AUTO-AFTER-STOP.

A lightning strike results in a loss of the "A" RSST.

All remaining equipment functions as designed.

With no operator action, 1 minute after the loss of the "A" RSST the Unit 1 OATC should expect that there will be ________ RHR pump(s) running and __________ Unit 1 CC pump(s) running.

A. 0 ; 1 B. 0 ; 2 C. 1 ; 1 D. 1 ; 2 A. Incorrect. First part is true, some pumps (Charging pumps and LHSI pumps) ride the bus on a UV, but RHR does not. Second part is plausible since again, there are several interlocks, lockouts, sequencing & auto-start features that must be considered, along with knowledge of the electrical system.

B. Correct. As noted above first part is correct. Second part is also correct. 1-CC-P-1A will auto-start and since the question states " 1 minute after the loss of the "A" RSST" 1-CC-P-1B will sequence on after the EDG picks up the bus.

C. Incorrect but plausible because the candidate must know both the electrical line-up and know how the stub bus and RHR pump breakers respond to this transient. Second part incorrect but plausible as discussed in "A".

D. Incorrect. First part plausible as discussed in "C". Second part correct as discussed in "B".

Loss of Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS)

Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of Residual Heat Removal System:

(CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

Closed cooling water pumps Tier: 1 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

1-PT-83.4J Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: B

25. 026K4.01 25 Select the choice that completes the following description of the Recirc Spray Sub-systems.

In the event of a Design Basis Loss of Coolant Accident, when RWST level reaches 60%,

the (1) Recirc Spray Pumps will start following a two minute time delay; NPSH to these pumps is increased by the operation of the (2) pumps.

A. (1) Inside (2) Casing Cooling B. (1) Inside (2) Quench Spray C. (1) Outside (2) Casing Cooling D. (1) Outside (2) Quench Spray A. Incorrect. the insides start after the time delay. second part incorrect but plausible as this is the source to the outsides.

B. Correct. The insides start after time delay. Second part also correct. The design feature is a branch line with flow restriction to provide the right amount of water that can help out Inside recirc spray pumps while still maintaining CNTMT peak pressure requirements of the accident analysis.

C. Incorrect. plausible since candidate may reverse order. correct pumps for NPSH for these.

D. Incorrect plausible since candidate may reverse order. Incorrect but plausible since it does do this function for the insides.

Containment Spray System (CSS)

Knowledge of CSS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:

(CFR: 41.7)

Source of water for CSS, including recirculation phase after LOCA Tier: 2 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

1-E-0 and TS 3.6.7 Bases Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info: K/A is tested since these systems (quench spray & casing cooling) provide an additional source of water to the respective recirc spray pumps to ensure those pumps are able to perform their Design Basis function. Considered bank since this question is a combination of two bank questions.

Answer: B

26. 027AK2.03 26

Unit 1 is at 100% power.

1-RC-PT-1444, PRZR Pressure Control Transmitter fails HIGH As a result of the failure, the demand on 1-RC-PC-1444J, Master Pressure Controller, will ___________

and in accordance with 1-AP-44, Loss of Reactor Coolant System Pressure, the OATC will place 1-RC-PC-1444J in MANUAL and depress the _____________ pushbutton.

A. increase ; lower B. increase ; raise C. decrease ; raise D. decrease ; lower B. Correct answer. the controller is direct acting (PV increase = output (demand) increase). the M/A station is reverse acting (raise pushbutton lowers demand).

All distractors are plausible since the controller and M/A station within the same control loop act differently, the person who defaults to conventional wisdom or isn't sure of the difference will likely select an incorrect choice.

Pressurizer Pressure Control System (PZR PCS) Malfunction Knowledge of the interrelations between the Pressurizer Pressure Control Malfunctions and the following:

(CFR 41.7 / 45.7)

Controllers and positioners Tier: 1 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

1-AP-44, 1-AR-B-E6, SDBD-NAPS-RC, NAPS PLS Document Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info: This is important at NAPS since it is fairly unique with respect to most of the control loops we have. lack of understanding of controller and/or M/A station operation could result in a mis-diagnosis of the event, or mis-operation of the system thus aggravating the situation.

Answer: B

27. 027K2.01 27 According to the System Design Basis Document, the Containment Iodine Filtration Fans are powered from (1) and are placed in operation to (2) .

A. (1) Emergency Busses (2) reduce airborne radioactivity in Containment prior to opening Containment for a normal refueling outage.

B. (1) Emergency Busses

(2) minimize release during a postulated fuel handling accident inside Containment.

C. (1) Station Service Busses (2) reduce airborne radioactivity in Containment prior to opening Containment for a normal refueling outage.

D. (1) Station Service Busses (2) minimize release during a postulated fuel handling accident inside Containment.

A. Incorrect. First part incorrect but plausible since some things (like flux mapper drives) that aren't required to function during an accident do receive power from emergency busses because of the benefits that can be derived by using them if conditions permit. Second part is correct, these fans were supplied based on the potential for buildup of Iodine in Containment from minor RCS leakage.

B. Incorrect. First part incorrect as discussed above. Second part is incorrect but plausible since procedures such as FR-Z.3, Response to High Containment Radiation Level, mention the ability to use these based on recommendations from Health Physics and other members of plant staff; the candidate who lacks detailed knowledge of the design basis document may conclude that they are installed for the reason given in this distractor.

C. Correct. First part is correct there are 2 fans, each one receiving power from a seperate station service motor control center (MCC), one or both can be operated as a time. Second part is correct as discussed in "A".

D. Incorrect. First part is correct as noted above. Second part is incorrect but plausible as discussed in "B".

Containment Iodine Removal System (CIRS)

Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following:

(CFR: 41.7)

Fans Tier: 2 Group: 2 Technical

Reference:

System Desin Basis Document - Containment Ventilation System Station Load List Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective: System Design Basis Document additional info:

Answer: C

28. 028AK3.03 28 Unit 1 was initially at 100% power A load rejection occurred causing a PRZR Safety to lift and stick open.

The reactor tripped and SI actuated.

Current plant conditions are:

• Subcooling on Train "A" & Train "B" ICCMs is 50°F and decreasing

• The PRZR Safety is still stuck open

• PRT pressure is 80 psig and increasing Based on the current plant conditions, which of the following choices:

(1) identifies whether or not RCPs are required to be tripped IAW 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, AND (2) how PRZR level will respond during the performance of 1-E-0.

A. (1) tripping all RCPs is NOT required (2) PRZR level will decrease B. (1) tripping all RCPs is NOT required (2) PRZR level will increase C. (1) tripping all RCPs is required (2) PRZR level will decrease D. (1) tripping all RCPs is required (2) PRZR level will increase A. Incorrect. Plausible because candidate may be unsure of the relationship of SI flow to safety valve flow, or may confuse (equate) capacity to that of a PORV, especially since a substantial amount of time and material are devoted to the fact that 2 SI pumps injecting may exceed the capacity of a single PORV.

B. Correct. The WOG ERG, Generic Issue SI Termination/Reinitiation, discusses the scenario presented above (steam vent path is established from the pressurizer vapor space and where RCS subcooling is not indicated), however the candidate who lacks understanding of this phenomenon may likely discount the reason as rubbish created by the exam author.

C. Incorrect. Plausible because reference leg flashing and the adverse affect it has on level indication is trained on. The candidate who doesn't understand the cause-effect for the scenario presented may select this choice by default.

D. Incorrect. Plausible because this is an issue due to the rapid pressure drop presented in the scenario. This again gets back having a solid understanding of the scenario provided in the stem; the candidate who lacks that would be more likely to jump on a "key word/tricky phrase/hot topic" choice that they recognize, as opposed to a concept they can't quite get their head around.

Pressurizer (PZR) Level Control Malfunction Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Pressurizer Level Control Malfunctions:

(CFR 41.5,41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13)

False indication of PZR level when PORV or spray valve is open and RCS saturated Tier: 1 Group: 2

Technical

Reference:

WOG ERG, Generic Issue SI Termination/Reinitiation Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: B

29. 029A3.01 29 Given that Containment Purge is in-service on Unit 1.

Which ONE of the following identifies the two items that can cause automatic isolation of the Containment Purge?

A. 1-RM-RMS-159, Containment Particulate Radiation Monitor Hi-Hi alarm.

Manual Actuation of Containment Isolation Phase A.

B. 1-RM-RMS-162, Manipulator Crane Radiation Monitor Hi-Hi alarm.

1-VG-RI-180-1, MGP Vent Stack B Rad monitor Hi alarm.

C. 1-RM-RMS-159, Containment Particulate Radiation Monitor Hi-Hi alarm.

1-RM-RMS-162, Manipulator Crane Radiation Monitor Hi-Hi alarm.

D. Manual Actuation of Containment Isolation Phase A.

1-VG-RI-180-1, MGP Vent Stack B Rad monitor Hi alarm.

a. Incorrect. First one is correct. Second one is incorrect but plausible since this is a direct pathway from the containment to atmosphere and the candidate who lacks detailed systems knowledge might conclude that this would be logical (since phase A closes CNTMT penetrations) and default to this distactor.

b. Incorrect. First one is correct. Second part is is incorrect but plausible since this is where the CNTMT purge exhausts to, and if valid would indicate a release in progress. Again the candidate who lacks detailed systems knowledge might conclude that it would be logical for the purge system to isolate and default to this distactor. It should also be noted that one of the sister MGPs for process vents does cause automatic isolation of CNTMT vacuum TVs and this function could easily be confused with the CNTMT Purge System.

c. Correct. Either condition will result in Containment Ventilation Isolation.

d. Incorrect. Neither choice is correct, which is acceptable since as discussed above, both are plausible.

Containment Purge System (CPS)

Ability to monitor automatic operation of the Containment Purge System including:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5)

CPS isolation Tier: 2

Group: 2 Technical

Reference:

1-AP-5 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: C

30. 029EK2.06 30 Unit 1 was initially at 100% power when the following sequence of events occurred:

• "A" Main Steam Trip Valve drifted closed causing a Safety Injection

• The OATC notes that the Reactor Trip breakers failed to open and manually trips the reactor.

• All equipment functions as designed EXCEPT "B" Reactor Trip Breaker failed to open.

• The OATC momentarily places both SI reset switches in RESET per the applicable EOP Based on the above sequence of events, which of the following choices correctly states (1) the status of SI reset AND (2) the status of SI automatic initiation A. (1) ONLY the "A" train of SI is reset (2) ONLY the "A" train of SI automatic initiation is blocked B. (1) ONLY the "A" train of SI is reset (2) BOTH trains of SI automatic initiation are blocked C. (1) BOTH trains of SI are reset (2) ONLY the "A" train of SI automatic initiation is blocked D. (1) BOTH trains of SI are reset (2) BOTH trains of SI automatic initiation are blocked Z. Incorrect but plausible, P-4 is train dependent, thus the candidate who lacks detailed knowledge of the inter-relationship of the interlock with the SI block & reset functions (discussed in "C" below) would likely select this distractor.

AA. Incorrect but plausible since as discussed above a mis-conception of the logic or operation of P-4 could lead a candidate to select this response.

BB. Correct. The reset function will work since it doesn't rely on P-4 PROVIDED the initiating signal is CLEAR, the auto-block function only works on "A" train because the "B" RTB remained closed throughout the event.

CC. Incorrect but plausible since as discussed above a mis-conception of the logic or operation of P-4 could lead a candidate to select this response.

Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS)

Knowledge of the interrelations between the and the following an ATWS:

(CFR 41.7 / 45.7)

Breakers, relays, and disconnects Tier: 1 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

DWGs 5655D33-Sh.8, 5655D33-Sh.2, 1-OP-7.12 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: C

31. 035A1.02 31 Which ONE of the following identifies the correct differential pressure limit across the SG U-tubes?

A. 1600 psid primary-to-secondary B. 600 psid primary-to-secondary C. 670 psid secondary-to-primary D. 1085 psid secondary-to-primary DD. Correct. This is the limit prescribed in 1-OP-3.7 EE. Incorrect. Plausible since this is the DP limit for secondary to primary.

FF. Incorrect. Plausible this was the old limit, the actual WCAP limit now is 600 psid.

GG. Incorrect. Plausible since this is a SG safety valve setting.

Steam Generator System (S/GS)

Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the S/Gs controls including:

(CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)

S/G pressure Tier: 2 Group: 2 Technical

Reference:

1-OP-3.7 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None

Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: A

32. 038EK1.02 32 The following conditions exist:

HH. A SGTR has occurred on Unit 2 II. The RCS cooldown is complete and the crew is preparing to depressurize the RCS in accordance with 2-E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture.

Which ONE of the following describes the reason for the RCS depressurization?

Increases SI flow to increase RCS inventory while decreasing the amount of leakage to the ruptured A. SG.

B. Allows backflow of the ruptured steam generator into the RCS minimizing contamination levels in the generator.

C. Prevent lifting a SG safety valve.

D. Ensures there will be no release of radioactivity through the ruptured SG PORV for the duration of the event.

JJ. Correct. The depressurization is done to refill the pressurizer and reduce break flow prior to terminating safety injection.

KK. Incorrect. Backfill is the preferred method for getting rid of the water but it is not desired until ES-3.1. It has procedural steps that address reactivity control while performing this process.

LL. Incorrect. Plausible since the candidate may think if the SG is not isolated it may cause the safety to lift..

MM. Incorrect. Due to auxiliary feedwater supply and safety injection flow, a heat sink is provided that absorbs some of the decay heat. It is assumed that the PORV on the ruptured generator will not open > 30 minutes after the event.

Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR)

Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the SGTR:

(CFR 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3)

Leak rate vs. pressure drop Tier: 1 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

2-E-3 and WOG Background Document Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None

Learning Objective:

additional info: Originally came from INPO bank (Indian Point2)

Answer: A

33. 039A2.01 33 Unit 1 was initially at 100% when a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) occurred.

Subsequent to the LOCA a loss of offsite power occurred.

Unit 1 is now on Cold Leg Recirc and the crew is performing 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.

The crew is at 1-E-1, Step 24, "Check if intact SGs should be depressurized to RCS pressure" In accordance with 1-E-1 and it's background document, which one of the choices below correctly completes the following statement?

The depressurization will be performed using the ____(1)____

AND the depressurization ____(2)____ performed to aid in further cooldown and depressurization of the RCS.

A. (1) condenser Steam Dumps (2) is B. (1) condenser Steam Dumps (2) is NOT C. (1) SG PORVs (2) is D. (1) SG PORVs (2) is NOT A. Incorrect. plausible because the candidate may not consider the consequences that result from the DBA and this is the normal (preferred method) of performing the action; bases is correct IAW 1-E-1 Background document.

B. Incorrect. plausible as discussed above; bases is incorrect but plausible since there is a design limit on the maximum secondary-to-primary D/P (600 psid) which as implied would be exceeded under these conditions.

C. Correct. the candidate must be knowledgable of the accident analysis case for CNTMT response and couple that knowledge with the knowledge of ESF systems in order to determine that this is the correct choice ; bases is correct IAW 1-E-1 Background document.

D. Incorrect. correct as explained in "C" ; bases is incorrect but plausible as discussed in "B".

Main and Reheat Steam System (MRSS)

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the MRSS; and (b) based on predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

(CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)

Flow paths of steam during a LOCA Tier: 2 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

1-E-1 and WOG Background Document Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: C

34. 040AG2.4.20 34 Operators are performing 1-ECA-2.1, Uncontrolled Depressurization of ALL Steam Generators.

Containment pressure is 26 psia and slowly decreasing.

SG NR Levels are:

• SG "A" is 18%

• SG "B" is 19%

• SG "C" is 20%

Which of the choices below completes the following statements?

IAW the CAUTION prior to Step 2 of 1-ECA-2.1 and the current plant conditions. a MINIMUM AFW flow of 100 gpm ___(1)___ required to be supplied to each SG; the reason for this requirement is

___________(2)___________.

A. (1) is (2) preclude water hammer if feed flow is subsequently increased to control RCS temperature B. (1) is (2) minimize thermal stresses if feed flow is subsequently increased to control RCS temperature C. (1) is NOT (2) preclude water hammer if feed flow is subsequently increased to control RCS temperature D. (1) is NOT (2) minimize thermal stresses if feed flow is subsequently increased to control RCS temperature A. Incorrect. First part is correct. Second part is incorrect but plausible,water hammer is plausible because design changes such as J-tube installation on feed-rings have occurred over the years and water hammer is still a hot topic.

B. Correct. First part is correct. Second part is correct, background document for ECA-2.1 gives this as the reason, while it cannot be totally discounted that some water hammer may occur, the Bases clearly states that thermal stress is the driver for the requirement.

C. Incorrect. First part is incorrect but plausible because it would be correct under non-adverse

conditions. Second part incorrect but plausible as discussed above.

D. Incorrect. Both parts incorrect as stated above.

Steam Line Rupture Knowledge of the operational implications of EOP warnings, cautions, and notes.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13)

Tier: 1 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

1-ECA-2.1 and WOG Background Document Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: B

35. 045K5.17 35 Which ONE of the following identifies (1) how main steam header pressure responds as turbine load is raised from 25% to 65%, and (2) how Moderator Temperature Coefficient (MTC) will change as boron concentration is decreased during the ramp?

A. (1) Main steam header pressure rises.

(2) MTC becomes more negative.

B. (1) Main steam header pressure rises.

(2) MTC becomes less negative.

C. (1) Main steam header pressure lowers.

(2) MTC becomes more negative.

D. (1) Main steam header pressure lowers.

(2) MTC becomes less negative.

a. Incorrect. Plausible if candidate confuses it with other parameters such as power, Tave and first stage pressure which all go up during a ramp up. Second part is correct. .

b. Incorrect. Plausible as stated above. Second part incorrect but plausible since candidate must know effects of boron concentration on MTC.

c. CORRECT. Main Steam Header pressure lowers as turbine load is raised. Reduction of boron concentration results in more negative MTC.

d. Incorrect. Main Steam Header pressure lowers as turbine load is raised. Second part incorrect but plausible since candidate must know effects of boron concentration on MTC.

Main Turbine Generator (MT/G) System Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as the apply to the MT/B System:

(CFR: 41.5 / 45.7)

Relationship between moderator temperature coefficient and boron concentration in RCS as T/G load increases Tier: 2 Group: 2 Technical

Reference:

1-PT-13 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: C

36. 054AK3.04 36 Unit 1 was initially at 100% power with Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1-FW-P-3A tagged out.

A spurious Safety Injection occurred and all equipment functioned properly except:

• Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1-FW-P-2 oversped and tripped when starting up

• Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1-FW-P-3B shaft sheared when starting up Operators are implementing 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and are at step 7, "Verify AFW Flow" Current plant conditions are:

• "A" SG WR level - 45%, slowly lowering

• "B" SG WR level - 42%, slowly lowering

• "C" SG WR level - 44%, slowly lowering Based on the current plant conditions, transition to 1-FR-H.1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink, is

_________________ and __________________.

A. required ; bleed and feed criteria is NOT met B. required ; bleed and feed criteria is met C. NOT required ; Enter H.1 ONLY after exiting E-0 D. NOT required ; Enter H.1 ONLY when directed by E-0

a. Correct. based on the given conditions 1-E-0 step 7 RNO requires transition to H.1; feed and bleed criteria is not met.

b. Incorrect. Plausible since the candidate may not have the bleed & feed criteria memorized.

c. Incorrect. Plausible because this is a RULE OF USAGE (because in the process the ORP may start or align equipment and restore a "function", thus avoiding an unnecessary procedure transition that would unnecessarily delay EOP implementation); the candidate may not recognize this exception to the rule and default to conventional wisdom.

d. Incorrect. As stated above.

Loss of Main Feedwater (MFW)

Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of Main Feedwater (MFW):

(CFR 41.5,41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13)

Actions contained in EOPs for loss of MFW Tier: 1 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

1-E-0 and WOG Background Document, 1-fr-h.1 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: A

37. 055EA2.03 37 Given the following plant conditions:

• Unit 2 has experienced a Loss of All AC power.

• The crew has initiated 0-OP-6.4, Operation of the SBO Diesel (SBO Event)

• The US has directed the SBO operator to energize 2H Emergency Bus Based on the above plant conditions, the SBO operator will energize ________ and place the interlock defeat switch for the Feeder breaker to 2H Bus in SBO, in order to allow this Feeder breaker to be closed with breaker ___________________.

A. "L" 4160v Bus ; 05L1 closed B. "L" 4160v Bus ; 15E1 open C. "M" 4160v Bus ; 05L1 closed D. "M" 4160v Bus ; 15E1 open A. Incorrect. first part correct, to energize the given emergency bus the SBO operator has to energize the correct SBO bus first in order to then energize the correct one of the 3 transfer busses. Second part is incorrect but plausible because this is an abnormal alignment and mis-operation of these breakers can cause TS violation (inoperability of offsite sources) and violate GDC requirements. An interlock would be nice, and with that in mind the candidate who lacks detailed knowledge of the subject switch may default to this distractor because it sounds logical. Further the switch has more than one function and the candidate may think this is one of them.

B. Correct. first part correct as discussed above. Second part also correct. One of the functions of this switch is to permit closure regardless of 15E1 position along with permitting closure regardless of associated RSST lockouts that may be present.

C. Incorrect. Plausible because candidate may not have solid knowledge of SBO Busses. second part plausible as discussed in "A".

D. Incorrect. first part plausible as discussed in "C". Second part correct as discussed in "B".

Loss of Offsite and Onsite Power (Station Blackout)

Ability to determine or interpret the following as they apply to a Station Blackout:

(CFR 43.5 / 45.13)

Actions necessary to restore power Tier: 1 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

0-OP-6.4, DWG 11715-FE-1BB, DWG 11715-FE-21M Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: B

38. 055K3.01 38 Given the following conditions:

• Unit 1 is at 35% power ramping up following a scheduled refueling

• The Turbine Operator reports that one of the Condenser Air Ejector Loop Seal Drain lines feels hot to the touch

• The OATC notes that Condenser pressure is 3 in Hg abs and slowly degrading

• The crew has entered 1-AP-14, Loss of Condenser Vacuum, and commenced a ramp down at 2%/minute.

5 minutes after starting the 2%/minute ramp down the OATC reports the following:

• Condenser pressure is 4 in Hg abs and stable

• Tave is 557°F

• Tref is 556°F Based on the OATC report, which ONE of the following identifies the action required IAW 1-AP-14?

A. Trip the Turbine and go to 1-AP-2.1, Turbine Trip Without Reactor Trip.

B. Continue the ramp until condenser pressure is 3.5 in Hg abs or less.

C. Trip the Reactor and go to 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

D. Hold the ramp and place Rods in MANUAL.

A. Incorrect. Plausible since operator may feel that this would be the correct response based on the power reduction (at NAPS reactor trip by turbine trip is interlocked with P-8 as opposed to the more common place interlock with P-7).

B. Incorrect. Plausible since this would be correct for higher power levels.

C. Correct. Even though the stem indicates the conditions have improved the trip criteria of 1-AP-14 based on the change in power level is exceeded.

D. Incorrect. Plausible since based on the OATC report of ramp parameters the candidate might conclude that the vacuum loss has been mitigated, but the rod control system is not functioning as required because of the Tave/Tref mismatch.

Condenser Air Removal System (CARS)

Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the CARS will have on the following:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.6)

Main condenser Tier: 2 Group: 2 Technical

Reference:

1-AP-14 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: C

39. 056AA2.73 39 Unit 1 tripped from 100% due to a loss of offsite power.

Plant conditions are as follows:

• PRZR Pressure is 2100 psig and slowly increasing

• PRZR level is 38% and slowly increasing

• RCS Tavg is 552°F and stable The immediate actions of 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection have been completed, but no other operator actions have been taken.

Which of the choices below; (1) identifies the current status of Group 1 and Group 4 PRZR Heaters AND (2) correctly states the required capacity of Pressurizer Heaters IAW LCO 3.4.9, Pressurizer.

A. (1) energized (2) Two groups of pressurizer heaters with the capacity of each group > 125 KW B. (1) energized (2) Two groups of pressurizer heaters with the capacity of each group > 250 KW C. (1) de-energized (2) Two groups of pressurizer heaters with the capacity of each group > 125 KW D. (1) de-energized (2) Two groups of pressurizer heaters with the capacity of each group > 250 KW

A. Incorrect but plausible because since pressure is low they would be on, however because of the LOOP they won't come on until reset. Second part is correct, this is the LCO requirements.

B. Incorrect but plausible because since pressure is low they would be on, however because of the LOOP they won't come on until reset. Second part is plausible since the heaters typically draw more than this during normal ops; also the 18 month PT they run close to 300 KW each so the candidate who doesn't know the LCO would likely discount the correct choice because on the surface it does not seem adequate.

C. Correct. As noted above even though an auto signal exists and contactors are thus closed, the 480V breaker must still be reset to get them back so they would be on, however because of the LOOP they won't come on until reset. Second part is correct, they meet the LCO requirements.

D. Incorrect. first part correct as noted above. second part incorrect but plausible as discussed in "B".

Loss of Offsite Power Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Offsite Power:

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

PZR heater on/off Tier: 1 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

1-ES-0.1, 1-PT-83.4H, and TS 3.4.9 & Bases Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: C

40. 057AG2.1.31 40 Unit 1 is at 12% power preparing to go on-line.

Several annunciators are received and the BOP reports a loss of Vital 120VAC Bus 1-III.

Which ONE of the following identifies the immediate impact of the loss of Vital 120VAC Bus 1-III?

A. Condenser steam dumps will close but can be opened by placing the controller in MANUAL ;

outward rod motion is possible B. Condenser steam dumps will close but can be opened by placing the controller in MANUAL ;

outward rod motion is NOT possible C. Condenser steam dumps will close and CANNOT be opened from the control room ; outward rod motion is possible D. Condenser steam dumps will close and CANNOT be opened from the control room ; outward rod motion is NOT possible

A. Incorrect. plausible because the candidate may attribute the response to loss of power to 1-MS-PT-1464 in steam pressure mode; the candidate may not know either the logic or bistable failure mode for rod stop, or for that matter not even consider that N-43 was lost as a consequence of the failure, becuase the process rack is still powered by the backup power supply the rod control circuitry still has power.

B Incorrect. first part incorrect but plausible as discussed above ; second part the loss of N-43 will cause a rod stop bistable so rods can be moved in but not out.

C. Incorrect. First part is correct, this will cause a loss of power to the arming circuit, so although the arming solenoids (which are 125VDC) still have power, the dumps can only be operated locally (this is the reason for "opened from the control room" because without that qualifier a candidate could argue NO correct answer. Second part is incorrect but plausible since the candidate may not have solid knowledge of the logic, coincidence, or FME the loss of power to N-43 has.

D. Correct. First part is correct as discussed in "C". Second part is correct an over power rod stop (1/4 logic) due to N-43 loss of power (although this is a control and not a protection function and not all functions de-energize to actuate this one does); the capability for outward rod motion can not be restored until 1-AP-4.3 is implemented and the subsequent action step of selecting the appropriate rod stop bypass switch to N-43 is performed.

Loss of Vital AC Electrical Instrument Bus Ability to locate control room switches, controls, and indications, and to determine that they correctly reflect the desired plant lineup.

(CFR: 41.10 / 45.12)

Tier: 1 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

0-AP-10 and 1-AR-A-D8 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info: NAPS Condenser Steam dumps are equiped with manual override handwheels; this is the reason for the wording "cannot be opened from the control room" (they can always be opened locally, so merely saying "cannot be opened" would NOT be true).

Answer: D

41. 058AK3.01 41 Given the following conditions:

NN. Unit 1 is at 100% power OO. 125VDC bus 1-I is lost due to a grounded cable Which ONE of the following describes the effect of this malfunction on the 1H EDG?

A. The EDG excitation circuit is unaffected; The EDG output breaker can be closed from the control room B. The EDG excitation circuit is unaffected; The EDG output breaker CANNOT be closed from the control room

C. The EDG excitation circuit is de-energized; The EDG output breaker can be closed from the control room D. The EDG excitation circuit is de-energized; The EDG output breaker CANNOT be closed from the control room B. Correct. The excitation circuit will be carried by separate battery and thus will have power; there is vital & emergency system power supplied to the EDG local control panel, but it is from 1-1 120VAC bus which would be energized because although the associated inverter is lost, the bus will transfer to the CVT. The output breaker (H train) receives control power from 1-I 125VDC bus with no other alternate source; the candidate must know the source of control power to the subject breaker (the 1-II 125VDC bus is also H train) otherwise they would be guessing.

All distractors are valid since the candidate who lacks the knowledge of the different power supplies that support the ESF emergency power functions (or is unsure about supply to EDG local panel; i.e.

AC or DC?) would not be able to eliminate any of the choices as distractors.

Loss of DC Power Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of DC Power:

(CFR 41.5,41.10 / 45.6 / 45.1)

Use of dc control power by D/Gs Tier: 1 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

0-AP-10 and System Design Bases Document (SDBD-NAPS-EG)

Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: B

42. 059K1.02 42 Unit 1 is at 25% power.

Feed Control has been transfered to the Main FRVs and all 3 are in automatic.

Assuming NO operator action is taken, which ONE of the following malfunctions would result in AFW automatically starting PRIOR to the reactor automatically tripping?

A. "A" SG controlling level channel fails high B. "A" SG controlling steam pressure channel fails low C. Feed back arm falls off "A" Main FRV D. "A" Main FRV fails closed

A. Incorrect. plausible since candidate may not know the FM&E for this malfunction; since the system is level dominant level will decrease to the Lo-Lo trip setpoint which is same as that AFW auto start setpoint meaning the two occur simultaneously.

B. Incorrect. plausible as discussed above; in this case the pressure signal failed low results in a FF >

SF causing a cutback in FRV demand, which will result in a decrease in SG level as described above.

C. Correct. The effect for this failure mode is the FRV opening fully regardless of the demand signal from the controller. "A" SG level will increase continuously to the Hi-Hi level (P-14) setpoint. P-14 generates a trip of the turbine and trips all feed pumps which is an AFW auto-start signal. At NAPS the RXTRIP due to TURB TRIP is interlocked with P-8, vice P-7 which is typical for a lot of Westinghouse plants, so AFW will start before the loss of feed results in an auto Rx trip.

D. Incorrect. plausible since again the candidate may erroneously conclude that this is "the best choice" because the AFW start is generated prior to, or coincident with the reactor tripping.

Main Feedwater (MFW) System Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause effect relationships between the MFW and the following systems:

(CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8)

AFW system Tier: 2 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

DWGs 5655D33, Sheets 7, 13, and 14 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: C

43. 060AA1.01 43 Fuel movement is in progress in the Fuel Building and the fuel handlers report that an assembly has been dropped and appears to be damaged.

A Hi Alarm is received on 1-RM-RMS-153, Fuel Pit Bridge Radiation Monitor.

Which ONE of the following identifies the corrective action to be taken by the Control Room crew in accordance with 0-AP-5.1, Common Unit Radiation Monitoring System, and includes the recorder that is used to monitor the effectiveness of that action?

A. isolate fuel building ventilation to stop or reduce release ; 1-RM-RR-179, MGP Vent Stack A B. isolate fuel building ventilation to stop or reduce release ; 1-RM-RR-180, MGP Vent Stack B C. place fuel building exhaust through the charcoal filters ; 1-RM-RR-179, MGP Vent Stack A

D. place fuel building exhaust through the charcoal filters ; 1-RM-RR-180, MGP Vent Stack B A. Incorrect. plausible since the first step of AP-54 for accidental gaseous release is to "isolate the release". the intent of that step is to taken action at the source, but the candidate who does have knowledge of that intent along with knowledge of 0-AP-5.1 (1-RM-RMS-153) may erroneously conclude that this would be the best choice; second part is incorrect but plausible since there are 3 different vent monitors and the candidate who doesn't have solid knowledge of which areas would go to which ones would be flipping a coin.

B. Incorrect. First part incorrect but plausaible as discussed above; second part is correct.

C. Incorrect. corrective action is right per AP-5.1; second part incorrect but plausible as discussed in "A".

D. Correct. AP-5.1 will direct the operator to attachement 3 based on the RMS-153 alarm, attachment 3 will direct doing attachment 2 to put exhaust through filters based on validity of alarm. Second part is correct also and although not specifically directed to do this by 0-AP-5.1 it is expected that the opeator would know where to look to evaluate status, detect, validate, or monitor a release; this part of the question tests the candidates knowledge of how to monitor the event.

Accidental Gaseous-Waste Release Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Accidental Gaseous Radwaste:

(CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

Area radiation monitors Tier: 1 Group: 2 Technical

Reference:

0-AP-5.1, 0-AP-5.2, SDBD-NAPS-HA Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: D

44. 061K6.01 44 Unit 1 tripped spuriously from 100% power.

Operators have transitioned to 1-ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response.

The crew has just completed throttling AFW per 1-ES-0.1.

If the pressure sensing line for 1-FW-PCV-159B were inadvertently severed, AFW flow to the A. "B" SG will decrease B. "B" SG will increase

C. "C" SG will decrease D. "C" SG will increase A. Incorrect. plausible because NAPS has dedicated flowpaths and the nomenclature and header arrangements defy logic, thus the candidate who doesn't have solid knowledge would likely choose this because they would default to "B goes with B" logic. AFW will decrease because the function of the valve is to throttle in the closed direction if pressure in the line is low (sensing line blowing off would cause it to see 0 pressure so it will close regardless of the actual pressure which would be greater than 1000# based on the plant conditions.

B. Incorrect. affected SG is plausible as discussed above. increase in flow is plausible because the candidate may not know the correct valve operation or FM&E for this malfunction.

C. Correct. This PCV is associated with "A" pump and the HCV header which are aligned to "C" SG.

As discussed in "A", since the valve is in series with, and between the pump discharge and the HCV, the valve will close causing the flow to decrease.

D. Incorrect. affected SG is correct; flow response incorrect but plausible as discussed in "B".

Auxiliary / Emergency Feedwater (AFW) System Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the AFW components:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

Controllers and positioners Tier: 2 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

1-ES-0.1, 1-AP-22.1 (for normal lineup DWG), DWG 11715-FW-054, 1-PT-71.13B Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: C

45. 062K1.02 45 Unit 1 is in Mode 3.

Severe thunder storms are causing large swings in grid voltage and frequency.

Operators are responding to a spurious SI and have just completed Step 5 of 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

The 1J bus voltage has taken a step change from 4000 volts to 3700 volts.

The OATC should expect bus stripping to occur ________ after the degraded voltage condition occurs and as a result _____________________________________________.

A. 2 seconds ; 1-CH-P-1B breaker opens and then re-closes once the EDG restores power to the bus.

B. 2 seconds ; 1-CH-P-1B breaker remains closed throughout the event.

C. 7.5 seconds ; 1-CH-P-1B breaker opens and then re-closes once the EDG restores power to the bus.

D. 7.5 seconds ;1-CH-P-1B breaker remains closed throughout the event.

a. Incorrect but plausible if candidate is unsure of time delays of UV vs. degraded voltage and is unsure of breaker response (e.g. stub bus breaker response for this event is to open and then re-close after voltage is restore as stated in this distractor).

b. Incorrect but plausible; time is again incorrect but breaker response for this distractor is correct.

c. Incorrect but plausible; time is correct for this choice, but as discussed in distractor "A", breaker response is not.

d. Correct. Both time and breaker response are correct.

A.C. Electrical Distribution Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the ac distribution system and the following systems:

(CFR: 41.2 to 41.9)

ED/G Tier: 2 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

TS 3.3.5.2 (SR 3.3.5.2), 1-PT-83.4J, Att. 4 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: D

46. 063A4.01 46 Unit 1 is at 100% power.

The OATC receives FW < STM Flow alarms on all three SGs The OATC notes that both the red and green position indicator lights are OFF on all three MFRVs A possible cause of these indications is a breaker has tripped on the ________ .

A. 1-III AC Bus B. 1-IV AC Bus

C. 1-III DC Bus D. 1-IV DC Bus C. Correct. One train of FW isolation solenoid is powered from this bus. Although MSIV SOVs (for example) energize to close, these valves de-energize to perform the safety function of closing. Thus if the supply breaker on 1-III DC bus tripped, or for that matter were opened in error at 100% power, the indications listed in the stem would result.

All distractor are plausible since other failures can result in some of the indications (i.e. a loss of a first stage pressure, if selected from either 1-III or 1-IV would give the alarms). Also the candidate must deduce from the indication of insufficent feed flow, as to whether it is a process rack problem (those are powered from AC busses) or not. Further, most SR solenoids (i.e. CNTMT isolation valves) are powered from 120VAC busses so the candidate who does not have a solid knowledge of failure modes or power supplies for control & protection would likely choose one of the AC busses.

DC Electrical Distribution System Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8)

Major breakers and control power fuses Tier: 2 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

1-AR-F-D1, DWG 11715-ESK-6QJ, 1-OP-26A Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: C

47. 064A1.03 47 Unit 1 is at 100% power.

The crew is performing 1-PT-82H, 1H EDG Slow-Start Test and are slowly raising load on the EDG.

Current conditions are:

PP. EDG load is 800 KW.

QQ. Reactive load is 0 KVAR.

A loss of off-site power (LOOP) occurs.

Once all automatic actions have taken place, the EDG operator should expect to see that real load has

___________ and reactive load has ________________?

(Assume no actions are taken by the EDG operator in response to the transient)

A. increased ; remained the same

B. increased ; increased C. decreased ; remained the same D. decreased ; increased A. Incorrect. First part is correct the permenantly connected loads and LOOP loads are greater than the current valve ( total of about 1200kw or better ). Second part is plausible since the candidate may focus on reactive load as soley due to difference in terminal voltage of machines in parallel.

B. Correct. First part is correct as noted above. Second part is also correct since the permenantly connected loads and LOOP loads are primarily inductive.

C. Incorrect. Plausible becasue without SI there are very few loads, but the candidate needs to have a rough idea of what the load should be in order to have reasonable assurance that the expected response to the transient was obtained. Second part also incorrect but plausible as discussed in "A".

D. Incorrect. First part incorrect but plausible as discussed in "C". Second part is correct. This distractor could be correct for a situation where the Charging pump rode the bus, but sequencing didn't occur for example Emergency Diesel Generator (ED/G) System Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the ED/G system controls including:

(CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)

Operating voltages, currents, and temperatures Tier: 2 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective: 0-AP-10, 1-PT-83.4H, UFSAR Ch.8, Table 8.3-6 additional info:

Answer: B

48. 064K4.01 48 In accordance with Technical Specifications, for a Loss of Offsite Power the EDG shall energize its associated Emergency Bus in less than or equal to _____________ and all automatic trips are bypassed EXCEPT for ________________.

A. 10 seconds ; Overspeed ONLY B. 10 seconds ; Overspeed AND Generator Differential C. 12 seconds ; Overspeed ONLY D. 12 seconds ; Overspeed AND Generator Differential

a. Incorrect but plausible because time is correct and having it shutdown only to prevent a destructive overspeed condition is reasonable.

b. Correct. Time is correct and non-bypassed trips is also correct.

c. Incorrect but plausible because candidate might not be aware of time requirement or errroneously assume that it starts 2 seconds after the loss of power (UV time delay) and conclude that 12 seconds would be correct; second part incorrect but plausible as discussed in distractor "A".

d. Incorrect. Both parts incorrect but plausible as discussed in distractors "A" and "C".

Emergency Diesel Generator (ED/G) System Knowledge of ED/G system design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:

(CFR: 41.7)

Trips while loading the ED/G (frequency, voltage, speed)

Tier: 2 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

TS 3.8.1 (SR 3.8.1.10 and SR 3.8.1.12)

Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: B

49. 067AA2.13 49 Given both Units at 100% power.

A fire has been confirmed in the Unit 1 Cable Vault and the crew is implementing 1-FCA-3, Cable Vault and Tunnel Fire.

1-FCA-3, will direct the crew to ________________________________ AND the type of fire protection system in the cable vault is ___________.

A. Shutdown the Unit using 1-AP-2.2, Fast Load Reduction ; Halon B. Shutdown the Unit using 1-AP-2.2, Fast Load Reduction ; CO2 C. Manually trip the Unit ; Halon D. Manually trip the Unit ; CO2 A. Incorrect. First part is plausible because typically you'd rather do a controlled load reduction as opposed to a trip and AP-2.2 the fast load reduction procedure does have manual trip criteria that would be employed if conditions degraded. Second part also incorrect but plausible because this is the fire protection system used in the emergency switchgear adjacent to the cable vault.

B. Incorrect. First part incorrect but plausible as discussed above; second part correct.

C. Incorrect. First part is correct; once you branch from the initial fire response procedure to this one the procedure initiates a trip. Second part incorrect but plausible as discussed in "A".

D. Correct. First part correct as discussed above. Second part correct.

Plant Fire On Site Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Plant Fire on Site:

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

Need for emergency plant shutdown Tier: 1 Group: 2 Technical

Reference:

1-FCA-3, NAPS Appendix R Report, Rev.30 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: D

50. 068AK2.07 50 Consider the following EDG start signals:

1) Manual Start (Control Room)

2) Automatic Start (Bus Under Voltage Signal)

3) Automatic Start (Safety Injection Signal)

Select the choice that completes the following:

Placing the Control Room Emergency (CRE) switch for an EDG in the EMERG position will PREVENT EDG start from_______________________________.

A. 1 & 2 ONLY B. 2 & 3 ONLY C. 3 ONLY D. 1 ONLY A. Incorrect, plausible since the SI signal is blocked when a seperate switch, the mode selector switch, is in the MAN-LOCAL position; there is also a local ISOL switch for the EDG and the candidate who lacks knowledge of what all of these three switches do, could pick these functions of Manual and auto start on UV as being blocked, thinking one of the other two switches do other things (like blocking starts from the CR).

B. Incorrect, plausible because the candidate who doesn't know what all the specific functions of the various switches associated with the EDG are, might default to this choice because they go hand-in-hand.

C. Incorrect, plausible since candidate may think 1 and 2 are always available and you would want to prevent a spurious start signal from SI, you also might choose 3 if you don't know your EDG interlocks, you might think that this is how you would start it for something like a control room fire.

D. Correct, both of these starting functions are disabled when the CRE switch is taken to EMERG.

Control Room Evacuation Knowledge of the interrelations between the Control Room Evacuation and the following:

(CFR 41.7 / 45.7)

ED/G Tier: 1 Group: 2 Technical

Reference:

DWG 11715-ESK-11C, Sh.1 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: D

51. 068G2.1.23 51 Which ONE of the choices below correctly; (1) states whether the CLOSE pushbuttons for 1-DA-TV-100A & 1-DA-TV-100B, containment sump pump discharge trip valves, must be pushed after resetting phase A isolation in order to restore sump pumping capability AND (2) states the tanks to which the containment sump pumps normally discharge?

A. (1) Close pushbuttons are required to be pushed after phase A reset (2) Low Level Liquid Waste Tanks (LLLW Tanks)

B. (1) Close pushbuttons are required to be pushed after phase A reset (2) High Level Liquid Waste Tanks (HLLW Tanks)

C. (1) Close pushbuttons are NOT required to be pushed after phase A reset (2) Low Level Liquid Waste Tanks (LLLW Tanks)

D. (1) Close pushbuttons are NOT required to be pushed after phase A reset (2) High Level Liquid Waste Tanks (HLLW Tanks)

A. Incorrect. First part correct. Second part incorrect but plausible because they could be aligned to these, but the question solicits "normally".

B. Correct. First part correct. Second part is correct, this is the normal alignment.

C. Incorrect. Plausible because the candidate may not have detailed knowledge of how the valve is interlocked (control circuit); further if the candidate lacks detailed knowledge they would tend to eliminate A&B as choices (on the surface it doesn't make sense that pushing the close button for a valve that's closed would do anything) and thus default to distractor C or D. In order for the valves to open and allow pumping the close pushbutton must be momentarily depressed (as shown on Technical Reference DWG ESK-6M) in order to re-energize the permissive relay. Second part incorrect but plausible since as mentioned this is an alignment that could be used.

D. Incorrect. First part incorrect as discussed in "C". Second part correct as discussed in "B".

Liquid Radwaste System (LRS)

Ability to perform specific system and integrated plant procedures during all modes of plant operation.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.2 / 45.6)

Tier: 2 Group: 2 Technical

Reference:

1-OP-7.12 and 1-AR-J-A6 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: B

52. 073K3.01 52 Annunciators K-D2, RAD MONITOR SYSTEM HI RAD LEVEL, and K-D4, RAD MONITOR SYST HI-HI RAD LEVEL, were received due to 1-RM-LW-111, Clarifier Outlet, failing high.

IAW 0-AP-5.1, Common Unit Radiation Monitoring System, the operator verifies all of the following actions have occurred EXCEPT_________________?

A. Contaminated Drain Tank pumps tripped B. 1-LW-PCV-115 (Liquid Waste Tunnel lsol Control) closed C. Low-Capacity Steam Generator Blowdown pumps tripped D. 1-LW-FCV-100 (Holdup Tank Influent Valve) closed A. Correct. The contaminated drain tank pumps do NOT get a trip signal from either the Hi-Hi rad, or on the influent valve going closed. The pumps' discharge lines contain recirc lines back to the tank.

B. Incorrect. The clarifier effluent valve PCV-115 does get a close signal from a Hi-Hi radiation signal on LW-RM-111. A candidate could choose this answer based on the thought that the influent valve is closed on the hi-hi radiation signal, so there would be no reason for the effluent valve to close.

C. Incorrect. The (low capacity) blowdown pumps do trip because the influent valve goes closed on the Hi-Hi radiation signal. The candidate may choose this answer if he forgets that the clarifier inlet valve being not full open is a trip signal to the blowdown pumps.

D Incorrect. The clarifier influent pump does trip on a Hi-Hi radiation signal from LW-RM-111. The candidate could choose this answer if he thinks that the clarifier effluent radiation monitor only affects the clarifier effluent valve (PCV-115).

Process Radiation Monitoring (PRM) System Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the PRM system will have on the following:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.6)

Radioactive effluent releases Tier: 2 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

0-AP-5.1, 1-AR-K-D2 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: A

53. 073K4.01 53 Given the following conditions:

• A WGDT release is in progress.

• 1-GW-RM-178-1, Process Vents Rad Monitor, indication is trending up.

As 1-GW-RM-178-1 continues to increase, 1-GW-FCV-101, WGDT to Process Vents, will remain open until the ______ alarm is received. Assuming the indication begins trending down at that point and returns to normal, 1-GW-FCV-101 _____________________.

A. Hi ; will automatically re-open B. Hi ; will NOT automatically re-open C. Alert ; will automatically re-open D. Alert ; will NOT automatically re-open A. Incorrect. First part is correct. Second part incorrect but plausible because the candidate may focus on the latching feature which is associated with the Hi-Hi alarm and discount (or not be cognizant of) the interlock feature of the control circuit, in which case they would select this choice.

Also there are other valves that do re-open when the rad monitor condition is cleared (i.e.

1-LW-FCV-100 and 1-LW-PCV-115).

B. Correct. First part is correct, although it might seem logical, since releases are calculated such that no alarms should be received (alert or Hi), to auto terminate at the alert level the interlock doesn't trip the valve until you reach the HI alarm condition. Second part also true because by virture of the SOV control circuit the "modulate" push button has to be depressed at which point the valve would re-open.

C. Incorrect. First part is plausible since as discussed above. Second part incorrect but plausible as discussed in "A".

D. Incorrect. First part is plausible since as discussed in "B" this is how most stuff works. Second part is correct as discussed in "B".

Process Radiation Monitoring (PRM) System Knowledge of PRM system design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:

(CFR: 41.7)

Release termination when radiation exceeds setpoint Tier: 2 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

0-AP-5.2 and 11715-ESK-6PZ Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: B

54. 076A1.02 54 Both Units are at 100% power.

1-SW-P-1A was tagged out yesterday for scheduled maintenance 2-SW-P-1B trips and the crew enters 0-AP-12, Loss of Service Water Based on these plant conditions, _________ will lose Service Water flow, and IAW 0-AP-12, the crew will perform ___________________________ .

A. Unit 1 CC HXs ; Attachment 6, Aligning One SW Pump per Supply Header when NO Pumps are Running on One Header B. Unit 1 CC HXs ; Attachment 10, Operation of Auxiliary Service Water Pumps C. Unit 2 CC HXs ; Attachment 6, Aligning One SW Pump per Supply Header when NO Pumps are Running on One Header D. Unit 2 CC HXs ; Attachment 10, Operation of Auxiliary Service Water Pumps A. Correct. Based on low probability of occurance, assumed time available to perform corrective actions, and weighing consequence of dual unit vice single unit impact we choose to align CC HXs to dedicated SW header vice "A" to "A", "B" to "B" type arrangement which could be used. For the scenario given in the stem the "A" header will not have a SW pump running so Unit 1 will be affected due to no SW flow to CC Hxs. This action is perfered over using Aux SW (AP-12, Step 3, RNO).

B. Incorrect. First part correct as discussed above. Second part incorrect but plausible; the aux SW

pumps seem like the most logical choice since they are powered from an Emergency Bus and are installed as a backup. The candidate who doesn't have detailed knowledge of the UFSAR design functions and accident analysis, along with 0-AP-12, may select this choice because it would seem like a more reliable & robust configuration.

C. Incorrect. First part is incorrect but plausible because again if they don't have solid knowledge of the normal alignment this part is a coin toss. Second part correct as discussed in "A".

D. Incorrect. First part incorrect but plausibe as discussed in "C". Second part incorrect but plausible as discussed in "B".

Service Water System (SWS)

Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the SWS controls including:

(CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)

Reactor and turbine building closed cooling water temperatures Tier: 2 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

0-AP-12, DWG 11715-FM-078A Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info: NAPS uses a cooling tower for Turbine Building Cooling Water (aka Bearing Cooling) so this KA can only be used for reactor building closed cooling system (Component Cooling).

This question also demonstrates candidates knowledge of differences between units.

Answer: A

55. 076AG2.2.12 55 Given the following:

12:00 - Unit 1, 100% power 12:20 - Unit 1, 82% power and stable following a fast ramp due to secondary issues Which of the choices below correctly completes the following statements?

(1) TS 3.4.16, RCS Specific Activity, requires sampling and analysis of the RCS __________(1)_______.

AND (2) Sampling is performed to verify reactor coolant Dose Equivalent ______(2)______ specific activity is less than the limit.

A. (1) anytime within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> of initiating the power change (2) I-131 B. (1) anytime within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> of initiating the power change (2) Xe-133 C. (1) between 2 and 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> after the power change

(2) I-131 D. (1) between 2 and 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> after the power change (2) Xe-133 A. Incorrect. First part incorrect but plausible since 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> is "in the window", TS requires a specific 2-6 hour time frame since as the Bases states Iodine levels will peak within that time frame. Second part is correct this is above the limit of 60 that would allow continued operation per TS.

B. Incorrect. First part incorrect but plausible as discussed above. Second part is also incorrect but plausible because exceeding Xe-133 requires a shutdown, and the candidate may not be aware of the limits (LCO only says "within limits" actual limits are found in the SR section).

C. Correct. First part correct as discussed in "A", and seen in the attached Technical Reference.

Second part is also correct this is above the limit of 60 that would allow continued operation per TS.

D. Incorrect. First part correct as discussed in "A", and seen in the attached Technical Reference.

Second part is incorrect; as discussed in "B".

High Reactor Coolant Activity Knowledge of surveillance procedures.

(CFR: 41.10 / 45.13)

Tier: 1 Group: 2 Technical

Reference:

1-PT-53.5, TS 3.4.16 & Bases Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info: Procedure for high activity 1-AP-5, Unit 1, Radiation Monitoring System, directs the operator to refer to TS 3.4.16; this question test both knowledge of the limit and the knowledge of the surveillance requirement.

Answer: C

56. 076K3.01 56 Both Units are at 100% power.

1-SW-P-1B and 2-SW-P-1B are running.

1-SW-P-1A and 2-SW-P-1A are in standby with the control switches in AUTO-AFTER-STOP.

A spurious Train A SI occurs on Unit 2.

Prior to any operator actions, there will be _________ SW pumps running and SW flow to Unit 2 CC HXs has ___________________ ?

A. 3 ; decreased B. 3 ; increased

C. 4 ; decreased D. 4 ; increased A. Incorrect. Plausible because candidate may assume Unit 2 event so only a unit 2 pump will start.

plausible since if the event was a CDA the sw inlets to the effected unit CC HXs would close causing flow to decrease.

B. Incorrect. first part plausible as discussed above; second part is correct since this is only an SI event even though the outlets of the CC HXs are throttled, the flow will increase because of the change in system resistance.

C. Incorrect. first part correct. the Unit 2 train A SI will start the opposite unit pumps therefore 4 will be running. second part incorrect but plausible as discussed in "A".

D. Correct. first part correct as discussed in "C". Second part correct as discussed in "B".

Service Water System (SWS)

Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the SWS will have on the following:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.6)

Closed cooling water Tier: 2 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

1-GIP-3A Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info: K/A met since "malfunction" can be either an increase or decrease that upsets the system, and can be due to a direct effect (i.e. pump tripping), or indirectly. In this case, it is a consequence of a spurious signal.

Answer: D

57. 077AK1.01 57 Unit 1 is at 100% power and Unit 2 is in refueling.

A Grid disturbance results in a 10 kV decrease in switchyard voltage.

The System Operator requests that you raise voltage back to the pre-event value.

Current conditions are:

• Switchyard Voltage 514 KV

• Generator MVARS -100 MVARS Based on the current conditions, the Offsite Power Source is (1) and assuming the OATC is using the "adjust and wait" method of raising Switchyard Voltage, after making the first adjustment he should expect Generator MVARS to be (2) .

(1) Inoperable A. (2) more negative B. (1) Inoperable (2) less negative C. (1) Operable (2) more negative D. (1) Operable (2) less negative A. Incorrect. First part plausible since this is way below normal and candidate may not know the exact limits. Second part plausible because although it may be apparent that you have to raise on the voltage regulator, candidate may not understand what -100 means (VARS In, or in the lead) and the effect the change in generator excitation.

B. Incorrect. First part is incorrect but plausible as discussed in "A". Second part is correct, as voltage is raised you will be (in this case) moving towards unity thus vars will be "less negative" until you pass through 0 vars after which they will increase (in the positive direction).

C. Incorrect. First part is correct; this value although significantly below normal doesn't render the SWYD inoperable. Second part incorrect but plausible as discussed in "A".

D. Correct. First part correct as discussed in "C". Second part is correct, as voltage is raised you will be (in this case) moving towards unity thus vars will be "less negative" until you pass through 0 vars after which they will increase (in the positive direction).

Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances:

(CFR: 41.4, 41.5, 41.7, 41.10 / 45.8)

Definition of terms: volts, watts, amps, VARs, power factor Tier: 1 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

1-OP-26.8, 1-SC-4.3, 0-AP-8 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info: considered bank because it combines a couple of bank questions Answer: D

58. 078K1.05 58 Select the choice that completes the description of how instrument air is provided for "B" Main Steam Trip Valve, 2-MS-TV-201B.

Instrument air is supplied to "B" Main Steam Trip Valve, 2-MS-TV-201B, via ________ solenoid operated valves (SOVs), ________________ any one of the SOVs will close 2-MS-TV-201B.

A. 2 ; energizing B. 2 ; de-energizing C. 6 ; energizing D. 6 ; de-energizing A. Incorrect. First part is plausible because the candidate who lacks detailed knowledge may assume that there is only ONE for each ESF train, thus only TWO total and select this choice. Second part is correct even though these are powered from highly reliable DC busses the energize to actuate function was chosen to provide a slight edge over an undesired MSTV closure while still meeting single failure criteria. Appendix R closure of each individual valve from manual operation is not single failure proof but it is not required to be either.

B. Incorrect. First part incorrect but plausible as discussed above. Second part incorrect but plausible since the failure mode of most components is to satisfy safety function; the candidate who lacks detailed knowledge or is uncertain could default to the de-energize choice.

C. Correct. First part is correct as discussed in "A" there are 2/esf trn as an added assurance that closure time is achieved within the assumed maximum time of the safety analysis, and two other ones dedicated for APP.R purposes for a total of 6. Second part also correct as discussed above the SOV energizes to vent air from the actuators which close via spring pressure; if flow exists in the line it will assist in closure also.

D. Incorrect. First part correct as discussed in "C". Second part incorrect but plausible as discusssed in "B".

Instrument Air System (IAS)

Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the IAS and the following systems:

(CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8)

MSIV air Tier: 2 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

DWGs 12050-FM-070B & 12050-ESK-6PN Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: C

59. 103K3.02 59 While at 100% power, which ONE of the following conditions represents a loss of containment integrity IAW Technical Specifications?

A. An operator discovers steam emitting from a pipe-to-body weld on the upstream side of 1-CH-TV-1204B, Reactor Coolant Letdown Line Isolation Valve.

B. An electrician opens the outer containment airlock door to perform maintenance activities without prior approval.

C. While performing an operability test of two normally open redundant containment isolation valves, one of the valves fails to close.

D. The LMC drain line upstream of the containment hogger isolation valve is discovered with the pipe cap missing and the drain valve closed.

A - Correct; B - Incorrect; One airlock door can be opened at a time, regardless of whether permission is granted or not. Plausible since candidate may think that the hatch being open unplanned will cause containment integrity to be lost.

C - Incorrect; Need only one operable isolation valve in series to retain containment integrity. Plausible if candidate does not realize the penetration only requires one valve to be closed and deenergized to maintain integrity.

D - Incorrect; Only need to have valve closed to satisfy integrity. Plausible if candidate thinks the penetration is inoperable with the pipe cap removed.

Containment System Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the containment system will have on the following:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.6)

Loss of containment integrity under normal operations Tier: 2 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

TS 3.6.1, 3.6.2, 3.6.3 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info: The 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> time frame cannot be excluded by the candidate because at NAPS we test operators on action times greater than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> dependent on safety significance and/or time constraints to complete that action. An example would be the 2 hr. action time of 3.1.6 if rods are below the insertion limits. Rods above RILs is an initial condition of the safety analysis and depending on plant conditions and other complications it may take time to restore the LCO. Also if they don't remember the 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> they will think it is a 4 because they "know" all the 1 hours1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

Answer: A

60. G2.1.26 60 Unit 1 is at 100% power.

Tags are being cleared on 1-SD-P-1A, A High Pressure Heater Drain Pump.

IAW OP-AA-200, Equipment Clearance, which of the choices below correctly completes the following

statements?

The ____(1)_____ pressure side of the pump shall be unisolated first AND

_____(2)_____ verification shall be used to clear the electrical tags.

A. (1) high (2) Independent B. (1) high (2) Concurrent C. (1) low (2) Independent D. (1) low (2) Concurrent RR. Incorrect. First part is incorrect but plausible since candidate may think a discharge path is required to be aligned first and the discharge check valve will keep water from back flowing.

Second part is incorrect but plausible because IV is used on all mechanical tags.

SS. Incorrect. First part is plausible as noted above. Second part is correct, electrical tags require CV to clear tags.

C. Incorrect. First part is correct, the low pressure side is unisolated first. Second part is incorrect but plausible as noted above.

D. Correct. First part is correct, the low pressure side is unisolated first. Second part is correct as noted above.

Conduct of Operations Knowledge of industrial safety procedures (such as rotating equipment, electrical, high temperature, high pressure, caustic, chlorine, oxygen and hydrogen).

(CFR: 41.10 / 45.12)

Tier: 3 Group: N/A Technical

Reference:

OP-AA-200 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info: This is a KA match because the subject procedure (OP-AA-200) is the procedure at NAPS that establishes & controls those boundaries needed to ensure personnel safety while working on rotating equipment, electrical equipment, etc.

Answer: D

61. G2.1.40 61 Preparations for core off-load are in progress IAW 1-OP-4.1, Controlling Procedure for Refueling.

Which ONE of the following conditions DOES NOT meet the requirements of 1-OP-4.1, Attachment 2,

Core Alterations Checklist?

A. Refueling Cavity Level is 290 feet B. "A" Containment Air Recirc Fan (CARF) running, "B" and "C" CARFs tagged out C. N-31 is operable and N-32 is tagged out D. Personnel Air Lock Emergency Escape doors are closed with the operating handles CAUTION tagged A. Plausible because it is lower than normal, but still above the minimum.

B. Plausible because it would be preferable to have at least one more available for redundancy but it is not required.

C. Correct even though 1 source range channels is operable both source ranges are required so this condition doesn't meet the requirements of step 4 of the attachment.

D. Plausible because the requirements for the different airlocks and hatch are different and these could be danger tagged to prevent ingress and still alow egress (danger tags were used in the past for control of other things too like penetration alignments).

Conduct of Operations Knowledge of refueling administrative requirements.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13)

Tier: 3 Group: N/A Technical

Reference:

1-OP-4.1, Attachment 2 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: C

62. G2.2.12 62 Unit 1 is at 95% power and stable.

The reactor operator is calculating core thermal power IAW 1-PT-24, Hand Calorimetric, but does not include the effects of reactor coolant pump heat or steam generator blowdown flow.

Which of the choices below correctly completes the following statements concerning the calculated core thermal power?

Not including reactor coolant pump heat will cause the calculated value to be ___(1)___ than actual power.

AND Not including steam generator blowdown flow will cause the calculated value to be ___(2)___ than actual

power.

A. (1) lower (2) lower (1) lower B. (2) higher C. (1) higher (2) higher D. (1) higher (2) lower TT. Incorrect. The first part is incorrect but plausible since the candidate may assume that not including RCP heat will cause a negative effect on total thermal output and therefore a negative effect on calculated core thermal power. The second part is incorrect but is plausible due to this is the effect on a steam flow calorimetric.

UU. Incorrect. The first part is incorrect but plausible as stated above. The second part is correct; blowdown has the opposite effect on a feedwater calorimetric versus a steam flow calorimetric.

VV. Correct. The first part is correct; RCP heat input is not counted as core thermal power. The second part is correct as discussed above.

WW. Incorrect. The first part is correct. The second part is incorrect but plausible as stated above.

Equipment Control Knowledge of surveillance procedures.

(CFR: 41.10 / 45.13)

Tier: 3 Group: N/A Technical

Reference:

1-PT-24 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info: Considered bank since this is essential 2 bank questions combined to form a single question Answer: C

63. G2.2.43 63 Unit 1 is at 100% power.

Operators have performed 1-MOP-31.6, Subsection 5.1, Removing 1-FW-P-1A, Main Feedwater Pump, from Service and Tagging the Pump for Maintenance, and have pulled the patch cords for the associated annunciators in accordance with the procedure.

The associated annunciators are ____________________ to be added to the Disabled Annunciator List and are ___________________ to be entered into the Temporary Modifications Log.

A. required ; NOT required B. required ; required C. NOT required ; NOT required D. NOT required ; required A. Correct. Entry in the Disabled Annunciator List is required regardless of duration, safety classification, or whether it is procedurally controlled or not. Second part is correct VPAP-1403 provides exception in allowing OP-AA-200 (the tagout procedure) to control status for this case.

B. Incorrect. First part is correct as discussed above. Second part is incorrect but plausible because the activity in general (lifting leads, installing/removing jumpers, etc.) falls under those things that are classified as temporary mods. The candidate who lacks detailed knowledge that VPAP-1403 provides exception in allowing OP-AA-200 (the tagout procedure) to control status for this case, would have a natural bias to select this choice.

C. Incorrect. First part incorrect but plausible because candidate may think that since it is being done by procedure for a work activity that a Cue (another form of operator aid used a NAPS to provide visual indication to the operator of things such as work orders, tagouts, abnormal status, etc.) would be used in lieu of the disabled annunciator list since the annunciator itself isn't broke. Second part correct as discussed in"A".

D. Incorrect. First part incorrect but plausible because candidate may think that since it is being done by procedure for a work activity that a Cue (another form of operator aid used a NAPS to provide visual indication to the operator of things such as work orders, tagouts, abnormal status, etc.) would be used in lieu of the disabled annunciator list since the annunciator itself isn't broke. Second part incorrect but plausible as discussed in "B".

Equipment Control Knowledge of the process used to track inoperable alarms.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13)

Tier: 3 Group: N/A Technical

Reference:

1-MOP-31.6, Subsection 5.1 & VPAP-1403 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: A

64. G2.3.13 64 Unit 1 core off-load is in progress.

SFP level and Reactor Cavity level begin decreasing.

IAW 0-AP-27, Malfunction of Spent Fuel Pit System, the Fuel Building is required to be evacuated A. if a high alarm is recieved on 1-RMS-RM-153, SFP Bridge Crane rad monitor B. as soon as all fuel assemblies are in a safe location C. if radiation levels in the Fuel Building reach 1 R/HR D. if level decreases more than 4 feet 2 inches below the "0" reference mark A. Incorrect but plausible as evacuation would be done per 0-AP-5.1, but the AP doesn't require the immediate evacuation of the area if fuel handling is in progress, the candidate who doesn't understand the idea behind a higher threshold for evac may default to this choice.

B. incorrect but plausible since again the candidate who isn't sure could rationalize that this is the conservative response (since arguably you could always re-enter later if needed) and select this choice based on that bias. Also this would be the correct response per AP-30 for fuel handling accident.

C. Correct this essentially the level that corresponds to a locked high radiaition level, the expected progression of an event involving a loss of level would be should be slow enough to allow mitigating actions such as leak isolation, alignment of make-up sources etc to be performed, however an upper level had to be chosen to pull the trigger and this is it.

D. Incorrect plausible because this corresponds to a level of less than 23 feet above the fuel and although that requirement is based on Iodine scrubbing in the event of a fuel handling accident there is a direct correlation between dose rates and level (shielding). The person who is unsure and examines all the distactors may equate "C" & "D" as "basically the same thing", and thus eliminate the correct answer based on the commonality between it and this distractor.

Radiation Control Knowledge of radiological safety procedures pertaining to licensed operator duties, such as response to radiation monitor alarms, containment entry requirements, fuel handling responsibilities, access to locked high-radiation areas, aligning filters, etc.

(CFR: 41.12 / 43.4 / 45.9 / 45.10)

Tier: 3 Group: N/A Technical

Reference:

0-AP-27 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info: modified some distractors but answer is still the same Answer: C

65. G2.3.14 65 Isolation of Service Water blowdown (close 1-SW-15, Service Water Supply Header #1 to Liquid Waste System Isolation Valve) is listed in 0-GOP-17, Time Critical Operations Actions.

Which ONE of the following identifies the upper time limit for closing this valve, and includes the reason for this upper time limit?

A. 29 minutes ; auxiliary building flooding B. 29 minutes ; auxiliary building radiation levels C. 59 minutes ; auxiliary building flooding D. 59 minutes ; auxiliary building radiation levels

a. Incorrect. Time is correct; second part is incorrect but plausible because the action is taken due to this concern, but the concern does not establish the time constraint associated with the action.

b. Correct. Time is correct; the reason is correct as seen in the attached Safety Evaluation summary.

c. Incorrect. Time is incorrect but plausible because there are 32 TCAs that range anywhere from a few minutes to a few hours (less the 60 minutes being a few of them); second part also incorrect but plausible as discussed in distractor "A".

d. Incorrect. Both parts incorrect but plausible as discussed in distractors "C" and "A".

Radiation Control Knowledge of radiation or contamination hazards that may arise during normal, abnormal, or emergency conditions or activities.

(CFR: 41.12 / 43.4 / 45.10)

Tier: 3 Group: N/A Technical

Reference:

0-GOP-17,00-SE-PROC-25, 1-E-0, Attachments 4 & 2 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: B

66. G2.3.4 66 IAW VPAP-2101, Radiation Protection Program, which of the choices below correctly completes the following statements?

A radiation worker can receive ___(1)___ Rem TEDE prior to exceeding the annual radiation worker administrative dose limit for their home site.

AND A radiation worker can receive ___(2)___ Rem TEDE prior to exceeding the annual radiation worker

10CFR20 Federal dose limit.

A. (1) 2 (2) 3 B. (1) 2 (2) 5 C. (1) 1.7 (2) 3 D. (1) 1.7 (2) 5 XX. Incorrect. First part correct. Second part incorrect but plausible, this is the admin limit for system workers YY. Correct.

C. Incorrect. First part incorrect but plausible, this is the limit prior to requiring administrative authorization prior to exceeding. Second part incorrect but plausible as noted above.

D. Incorrect. First part incorrect but plausible as noted above. Second part correct Radiation Control Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under normal or emergency conditions.

(CFR: 41.12 / 43.4 / 45.10)

Tier: 3 Group: N/A Technical

Reference:

VPAP-2101 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination:

Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: B

67. G2.4.23 67 Given the following:

• A Large break LOCA occurred on Unit 1.

• The crew has transitioned to 1-ES-1.3, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation, and are in the process of verifying proper Service Water System Operation IAW Step 3 of 1-ES-1.3.

The STA reports Critical Safety Function Status Trees (CSFSTs) are as follows:

Subcriticality - Green

Core Cooling - Orange Heat Sink - Red RCS Integrity - Red Containment - Yellow Inventory - Yellow Which ONE of the following correctly identifies the crew response?

A. Immediately transition to 1-FR-P.1, Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock Condition B. Immediately transition to 1-FR-C.1, Response to Inadequate Core Cooling C. Immediately transition to 1-FR-H.1, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink D. Continue with ES-1.3, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation A. Incorrect. Plausible because since this is a LBLOCA, FR-H.1 will kick the operator out based on SGs not required as a heat sink; P.1 is the next priority per F-0 rules of usage.

B. Incorrect. plausible because C.1 needs to be done without delay and other orange paths (i.e.

subcriticality and Integrity) use the 1 series FR procedure, so candidate who lacks detailed knowledge of FRs might think this is the place to go.

C. Incorrect. Plausible because in some cases it is true; further for some activities in C series procedures, like starting an idle RCP, you have to have adequate level in the associated SG to do it.

D. Correct. Since you are at step 3 you can't leave yet until you've verified/made the swap. the basis is from the knowledge subsection of the WOG ES-1.3 Background document Emergency Procedures / Plan Knowledge of the bases for prioritizing emergency procedure implementation during emergency operations.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13)

Tier: 3 Group: N/A Technical

Reference:

1-ES-1.3 and WOG Background Document, OP-AP-104 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: D

68. G2.4.29 68 Assume the EPIPs are entered and a Notification of Unusual Event is declared at 12:00.

IAW the applicable Emergency Plan procedures, the State must be notified no later than

_____________ and activation of the TSC is ___________.

A. 12:15 ; Required B. 12:15 ; NOT Required C. 13:00 ; Required D. 13:00 ; NOT Required A. Incorrect. Plausible, notification time is correct and since the E-plan has been entered the candidate who lacks the appropriate knowledge level may default to facility activation any time E-plan is entered.

B. Correct. Notification time is correct & TSC activation is required for alert or higher so NOUE may be done discretionary, but it is not required.

C. Incorrect. Plausible because this is the upper limit for NRC notification; activation of facilities anytime E-plan is entered is also plausible.

D. Incorrect. Plausible as discussed above; facility activation not required for NOUE is correct.

Emergency Procedures / Plan Knowledge of the emergency plan.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.11)

Tier: 3 Group: N/A Technical

Reference:

EPIP-1.02, North Anna Power Station Emergency Plan (NAEP), EPIP-3.02, EPIP-3.05 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: B

69. G2.4.43 69 Assume the initial notification of state and local governments of an ALERT Classification has been made.

Select the choice that correctly completes the following:

IAW EPIP-2.01, Notification of State and Local Governments, a follow-up report (update) should be provided to state and local governments approximately every (1) (unless otherwise agreed upon with the State); changing the Emergency Classification to Notification of Unusual Event (2) one of the update criteria of EPIP-2.01.

A. 60 minutes ; is NOT B. 60 minutes ; is

C. 30 minutes ; is NOT D. 30 minutes ; is A. Incorrect. correct time and plausible because this is required for NRC notifications.

B. Correct. correct time and this (changes to classification including termination of event) is listed as an update condition in 2.01.

C. Incorrect. Plausible because updates take only a few minutes and with a dedicated communicator this could be achieved; the candidate who is unsure, or thinks they are "recalling the notification time for the NRC" may select this choice.

D. Incorrect. Plausible as discussed above.

Emergency Procedures / Plan Knowledge of emergency communications systems and techniques.

(CFR: 41.10 / 45.13)

Tier: 3 Group: N/A Technical

Reference:

EPIP-2.01, EPIP-2.02 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: B

70. WE04EA1.1 70 Unit 1 is at 100% power with all equipment in a normal configuration.

A LOCA occurs and the crew enters 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

Which of the choices below correctly completes the following:

____(1)___ is an indication of RCS leakage into the Safeguards building AND

____(2)___ will have to be closed by the operator to isolate the leak IAW 1-ECA-1.2, LOCA Outside Containment.

A. (1) High alarm on 1-VG-RI-180-1, (MGP) Vent Stack B Noble Gas Normal Range (2) 1-SI-MOV-1890C & 1890D, Low Head SI Pumps Cold Leg Injection Valves B. (1) High alarm on 1-VG-RI-180-1, (MGP) Vent Stack B Noble Gas Normal Range (2) 1-SI-MOV-1890A & 1890B, Low Head SI Pumps Hot Leg Injection Valves

C. (1) High alarm on 1-VG-RI-179-1, (MGP) Vent Stack A Noble Gas Normal Range (2) 1-SI-MOV-1890C & 1890D, Low Head SI Pumps Cold Leg Injection Valves D. (1) High alarm on 1-VG-RI-179-1, (MGP) Vent Stack A Noble Gas Normal Range (2) 1-SI-MOV-1890A & 1890B, Low Head SI Pumps Hot Leg Injection Valves ZZ. Correct. The safeguards exhaust is directed to the "B" vent stack. The Low Head SI pumps are maintained aligned to the cold leg through 1-SI-MOV-1890C & D which would have to be closed by the operator to isolate the postulated leakage from the LHSI pump discharge relief valve.

AAA. Incorrect. The first part is correct as noted above. The second part is incorrect due to the LHSI pump discharge to the hot leg MOVs are maintained closed in Mode 1 - 4 and would not have to be closed by the operator but is plausible if the candidate does not know the normal line up and flow path of the LHSI pumps or is unfamiliar with 1-ECA-1.2.

BBB. Incorrect. The first part is incorrect due to the safeguards exhaust does not go to Vent stack "A" and would not be an indication of leakage into safeguards but is plausible since this vent stack is one of the indications noted in 1-E-0 for transition to 1-ECA-1.2 and also if the candidate does not know the flow path of the safeguards exhaust. The second part is correct as noted above.

CCC. Incorrect. Both parts incorrect as noted above.

LOCA Outside Containment Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the (LOCA Outside Containment)

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

Tier: 1 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

1-ECA-1.2 and 11715-ESK-6DY Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: A

71. WE05EK2.2 71 Unit 1 was tripped from 100% power due a Condensate System header rupture.

Subsequently a Tornado struck damaging the Unit 1 ECST.

Current status is:

• The Shift Manager directed securing Unit 1 AFW pumps to prevent them from operating without a suction source

• Operators have transitioned to 1-FR-H.1, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink.

• Wide Range SG levels are approximatley 50% and slowly decreasing.

• Operators are at Step 2 of 1-FR-H.1 "Try to Establish AFW Flow to at Least One SG".

Which of the following choices identifies (1) the action required by 1-FR-H.1 with respect to the RCPs and (2) the preferred source of alternate makeup water for the AFW pumps?

A. (1) Stop ALL RCP's (2) Fire Main Water from the lake B. (1) Stop ALL RCP's (2) Service Water C. (1) Stop ALL but ONE RCP (2) Fire Main Water from the lake D. (1) Stop ALL but ONE RCP (2) Service Water DDD. Correct. Unlike AP-22 series procedure H.1 will stop all of the RCPs (this is also no typical of the EOP network which prefers forced circulation and normal spray for pressure control.

Correct two back-ups are available for redundancy, this one is preferred.

EEE. Incorrect. First part correct as discussed above. Second part incorrect but plausible since this is a valid source; further the candidate may think a Safety Related system (SW) would take precidence.

FFF. Incorrect. First part incorrect but plausible as previously discussed and as mentioned this is the way the AP-22 series of procedures work. Second part correct as discussed in "A".

GGG. Incorrect. First part incorrect but plausible as discussed above. Second part incorrect, but plausible as discussed in "B".

Loss of Secondary Heat Sink Knowledge of the interrelations between the (Loss of Secondary Heat Sink) and the following:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

Facility's heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.

Tier: 1 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

1-FR-H.1 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info: considered bank since question essentially combines two seperate bank questions Answer: A

72. WE08EK1.3 72 Given the following:

• A Large steam break occurred outside CNTMT on the "A" Main Steamline

• Offsite power was subsequently lost

• The crew has transitioned to 1-FR-P.1, Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock Condition

• SI has been terminated

• Letdown is NOT in-service

• The crew is at step 17 "Depressurize RCS to Decrease RCS Subcooling" Based on the above, the OATC will depressurize using _______________, and stop the depressurization at 69% PRZR LEVEL in order to

______________________________________________?

A. ONE PRZR PORV ; ensure the PRZR has a substantial steam bubble for pressure control B. ONE PRZR PORV ; limit reactor vessel head voiding for core cooling C. Auxiliary spray ; ensure the PRZR has a substantial steam bubble for pressure control D. Auxiliary spray ; limit reactor vessel head voiding for core cooling A. Correct. Auxiliary spray is the alternative that would be used if the PORV wasn't available. The ERG background document provides this reason for limiting depressurization based on PRZR level.

B. Incorrect. First part is correct. Second part is plausible because there is a note before this step alerting the operator to the possibility of upper head voiding, thus the operator may key on that as the primary concern. Other procedures (e.g. ECA-1.1) will direct use of Aux spray regardless of the status of letdown.

C. Incorrect. As previously discussed this is an alternative so the operator may feel that this is the method of choice since aux. spray can be somewhat more controllable and wouldn't cause a loss of RCS inventory. Second part is correct as discussed above.

D. Incorrect. Aux Spray plausible as discussed in "C"; second part plausible as discussed in "B".

Pressurized Thermal Shock Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (Pressurized Thermal Shock)

(CFR: 41.8 / 41.10, 45.3)

Annunciators and conditions indicating signals, and remedial actions associated with the (Pressurized Thermal Shock).

Tier: 1 Group: 2 Technical

Reference:

1-FR-P.1 and WOG Background Document Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info: similar to calloway NRC exam, question meets the KA because the operator must know the method of accomplishing a Major Action Category to remedy the condition (PTS) and demonstrate knowledge of the reason for stopping depressurization based on the condition (indication) of PRZR level.

Answer: A

73. WE10EK2.2 73 Given the following:

• The reactor was tripped 45 minutes ago.

• All RCPs were tripped.

• The plant cooldown is being performed in accordance with 1-ES-0.3, Natural Circulation Cooldown With Steam Void in Vessel (With RVLIS).

• The crew is preparing to start a RCP Current plant conditions are:

• RVLlS Upper Range indication is 80% and stable.

• PRZR level 30% and stable

• RCS Subcooling based on core exit TCs 60°F and stable Which ONE of the following describes the relationship of the current plant conditions to those required by 1-ES-0.3 for starting the RCP?

A. Current plant conditions are acceptable for RCP start B. PRZR level is acceptable for RCP start ; RCS Subcooling is NOT acceptable for RCP start C. PRZR level is NOT acceptable for RCP start ; RCS Subcooling is acceptable for RCP start D. PRZR level is NOT acceptable for RCP start ; RCS Subcooling is NOT acceptable for RCP start A. Incorrect but plausible since under most other circumstances the plant conditions would seem ideal.

B. Incorrect but plausible because the candidate may expect subcooling to drop and you can raise level a lot faster than you can raise pressure, even if all the heaters are on.

C. Correct. Although this is significantly higher than the no-load program of 28%, the procedure requires more for RCP start to provide for some margin and uncertainties.

D. Incorrect but plausible; "A" & "B" discuss plausibility of each condition.

Natural Circulation with Steam Void in Vessel with/without RVLIS Knowledge of the interrelations between the (Natural Circulation with Steam Void in Vessel with/without RVLIS) and the following:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

Facility's heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.

Tier: 1 Group: 2 Technical

Reference:

1-ES-0.3 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None

Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: C

74. WE11EG2.4.6 74 Given the following:

• A LOCA has occurred.

• NO LHSI pumps could be started and the crew has transitioned from 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, to 1-ECA-1.1, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation

• Containment pressure has been slowly increasing throughout the event and is 21 psia and still slowly increasing.

• RWST level is 86% and lowering.

• The Recirc Spray sump level is 2 feet.

• The crew is at step 8, Determine Containment Spray Requirements.

IAW 1-ECA-1.1, which of the choices below identifies:

(1) how many Recirc Spray pumps are required to be operating AND (2) how many Quench Spray pumps are required to be operating?

(Reference Provided)

A. (1) 0 recirc spray pumps are required (2) 2 quench spray pumps are required B. (1) 0 recirc spray pumps are required (2) 0 quench spray pumps are required C. (1) 2 recirc spray pumps are required (2) 2 quench spray pumps are required D. (1) 2 recirc spray pumps are required (2) 0 quench spray pumps are required HHH. Correct; the candidate must have detailed knowledge of the procedure and analyze the plant conditions to arrive at the correct method of operating both of these systems.

III. Incorrect plausible since as noted above the candidate who lacks detailed knowledge may erroneously conclude that recirc spray is in operation and thus select this choice.

JJJ.Incorrect plausible because as noted above, under different circumstances (e.g. LHSI pumps stopped because of CNTMT sump blockage) this would be the correct choice.

KKK. Incorrect plausible because as noted above both parts although incorrect are plausible since they are alternatives given in the procedure, a lack of detailed knowledge and/or erroneous assumption could lead a candidate to select this distractor.

Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation Knowledge of EOP mitigation strategies.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13)

Tier: 1 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

1-ECA-1.1 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: 1-ECA-1.1 Page 8 of 36 Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: A

75. WE15EK3.1 75 Unit 1 is on Cold Leg Recirculation following a LOCA and Loss of Offsite Power.

The following Containment conditions exist:

• CNTMT Pressure 22 psia and slowly increasing

• CNTMT Sump Level 12 feet and slowly increasing Based on the Containment conditions the crew is required to implement _________________________

in order to mitigate the potential for__________________________________.

A. 1-FR-Z.1, Response to High Containment Pressure; accident doses to exceed acceptable limits B. 1-FR-Z.1, Response to High Containment Pressure; equipment qualification limits to be exceeded C. 1-FR-Z.2, Response to High Containment Sump Level; plant components/indications to be damaged by flooding D. 1-FR-Z.2, Response to High Containment Sump Level; excessive depletion of Service Water Reservoir inventory A. Incorrect. plausible because the candidate may confuse or be unsure of F-0 (20 psig is adverse CNTMT, 28 psia is Orange path, only if no QS). second part also plausible since being sub-atmospheric is an assumption for the accident analysis dose.

B. Incorrect. first part incorrect but plausible as discussed above. Second part incorrect but plausible since EQ is in part based on cumulative exposure and the candidate who knows that this the EQ envelope is a basis for TS CNTMT temperature LCO may default to this since the orange path pressure is less than half that of the red path pressure.

C. Correct. This is the correct procedure (orange path criteria is 11 feet). Second part is also correct the goal of identifying and isolating the source is protection of the equipment due to flooding the CNTMT above the design basis level.

D. Incorrect. Procedure is correct as discussed above. Second part is incorrect but plausible since Service water reservoir level is a design limit necessary to ensure cooling for 30 days following a DBA; putting SW in CNTMT implies that the required capability would be challenged, while this is arguable, it is not the reason that F-0 requires the procedure to be implemented.

Containment Flooding Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the (Containment Flooding)

(CFR: 41.5 / 41.10, 45.6, 45.13)

Facility operating characteristics during transient conditions, including coolant chemistry and the effects of temperature, pressure, and reactivity changes and operating limitations and reasons for these operating characteristics.

Tier: 1 Group: 2 Technical

Reference:

1-F-0 and WOG Background Document for FR-Z.2, NAPS Accident Analysis Design Basis Document cases for LBLOCA dose & EQ, TS 3.7.9 Bases Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: C

1. 001A2.12 76 Unit 2 is performing a startup following a mid-cycle maintenance outage.

RCS boron concentration value used in the ECP calculation is 1000 ppm.

Actual current RCS boron concentration is 1100 ppm.

Which of the choices below identifies:

(1) The impact this error will have on the actual critical rod position.

AND (2) The actions that the Unit Supervisor is required to direct the crew to perform if criticality is NOT reached within the ECP limits IAW 2-OP-1.5, Unit Startup from Mode 3 to Mode 2.

A. (1) Actual critical rod position will be LOWER than the ECP.

(2) Start a boration of 10 gpm, insert D control bank to 5 steps and manually trip the reactor.

B. (1) Actual critical rod position will be LOWER than the ECP.

(2) Insert D control bank to 5 steps and manually trip the reactor.

C. (1) Actual critical rod position will be HIGHER than the ECP.

(2) Insert D control bank to 5 steps and manually trip the reactor.

D. (1) Actual critical rod position will be HIGHER than the ECP.

(2) Insert all control banks to 0 steps and recalculate the ECP.

a. Incorrect. First part incorrect but plausible since the candidate must know the effects of boron on rod position. Second part plausible since these are the actions for reaching criticality below the insertion limits.

b. Incorrect. First part incorrect but plausible since the candidate must know the effects of boron on rod position. Second part plausible since these are the actions for reaching criticality below the lower ECP admin limits.

c. Correct. First part is correct. Second part is correct actions to criticality not reached below the upper ECP admin limit.

d. Incorrect. First part is correct. Second part is incorrect but plausible since these actions would correct the condition. An ECP would have to be performed and leaving shutdown banks out makes sense due to the dilution that will be required prior to start up.

Control Rod Drive System Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunction or operations on the CRDS and (b) based on those predictions use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

Erroneous ECP calculation (CFR: 41.7/45.13)

Tier: 2 Group: 2

Technical

Reference:

2-OP-1.5 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: C

2. 001AA2.04 77 Unit 1 is exiting a scheduled refueling outage and is currently at 29% and stable, holding for chemistry.

All controls are in auto.

Selected First Stage Pressure channel fails high Which of the following choices:

(1) identifies the initial reactor power response AND (2) includes the procedure that contains the operator actions to address the failed instrument?

A. decrease; 1-AP-1.1, Continuous Uncontrolled Rod Motion B. decrease; 1-AP-3, Loss of Vital Instrumentation C. increase; 1-AP-1.1, Continuous Uncontrolled Rod Motion D. increase; 1-AP-3, Loss of Vital Instrumentation A. Incorrect. Plausible. The candidate who does not consider, or is not aware of the full cause-effect response of a Selected First Stage Pressure channel failing high and the indications that would result would likely default to choices "A" or "B". Second part is plausible since rods will be automatically stepping due to the failure.

B. Incorrect. First part incorrect but plausible as stated above. Second part correct.

C. Incorrect. First part correct. Second part is plausible since rods will be automatically stepping due to the failure.

D. Correct. A high failure of the selected first stage pressure channel would cause a power mismatch with indicated turbine power increasing greater than reactor power, rods will step out resulting in NI power increasing. 1-AP-3 is the procedure that will be implemented based on the failure.

Continuous Rod Withdrawal Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Continuous Rod Withdrawal :

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

Reactor power and its trend Tier: 1 Group: 2 Technical

Reference:

AR B-A7 & 1-AP-3 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info: Considered a KA match because the candidate must identify a failure that would generate outward rod motion (to explain the increase in power); futher the candidate must demonstrate full knowledge of the cause-effect relationship of the various instruments to eliminate the distractors.

Answer: D

3. 005AG2.1.19 78 Unit 1 reactor is being started up following a mid-cycle outage.

After inserting control rods to stabilize power, annunciator A-F1, CMPTR ALARM ROD DEV/SEQ, alarms.

Control Rod H-2 did not change from it's initial value and is now 16 steps different than the associated group position indication because of a blown lift coil fuse.

Intermediate Ranges NIs indicate 8E-9 amps and stable.

Based on the above, which of the following choices identifies:

(1) the status of the Control Rod H-2 AND (2) whether or not a reactor trip is required IAW 1-AP-1.3, Control Rod Out of Alignment?

A. (1) Control Rod H-2 is inoperable (2) Reactor Trip is NOT required B. (1) Control Rod H-2 is inoperable (2) Reactor Trip is required C. (1) Control Rod H-2 is operable (2) Reactor Trip is NOT required D. (1) Control Rod H-2 is operable (2) Reactor Trip is required

a. Incorrect. First part incorrect but plausible, since the rod did not move the candidate may asssume it is inoperable but Tech Specs only require the rod to be trippable to be operable. Second part is incorrect but plausible if the candidate believes the rod can be recovered while critical below the POAH.

b. Incorrect. First part incorrect but plausible as stated above. Second part is correct,

c. Incorrect. First part correct. Second part incorrect but plausible as stated above.

d. Correct. 1-AP-1.3, Step 3, checks rx critical AND above the POAH, the RNO is implemented since for the stated conditions you are not above the POAH, however by the stated conditions you are critical and with that the procedure requires a trip.

Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod Ability to use plant computers to evaluate system or component status.

(CFR: 41.10 / 45.12)

Tier: 1 Group: 2 Technical

Reference:

1-AP-1.3, TS 3.1.4, TS 3.1.9 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: D

4. 008AG2.4.6 79 Given the following sequence of events:

• Unit 1 was initially at 100% power when a spurious Safety Injection occurred.

• The crew has progressed through 1-ES-1.1, SI Termination, and is in the process of establishing Letdown.

• 1-RC-PCV-1456, PRZR PORV, opens and cannot be closed or isolated.

• RCS pressure is 1100 psig and decreasing.

• All steam generators are stable at 1000 psig.

Which ONE of the following identifies the direction the SRO is required to provide to the crew?

A. Manually initiate SI and go to 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

B. Manually initiate SI and go to 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.

C. Manually start Charging Pumps, align BIT and go to 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.

D. Manually start Charging Pumps, align BIT and go to 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

A. Incorrect but plausible. This is the guidance on the ES-0.1 foldout page for the plant conditions and would also be correct after exiting ES-1.1; the fact that the initiating event was a spurious event and plant conditions now REQUIRE SI further enhances the plausibility.

B. Incorrect but plausible. Similar to "A" above, but with the correct procedure transition.

C. Correct. The candidate must realize that plant conditions require SI (subcooling < 25°F due to the

RCS pressure drop), know the foldout page requirement for these plant conditions, and have in depth knowledge of ES-1.1 to know the stated action & procdure transition is correct.

D. Incorrect but plausible. As noted earlier for this EOP procedure SI is manually aligned vice actuating the switch; the procedure transition would be correct had the stated plant conditions occured at an earlier point (e.g. Step 3, 6, or 7); the fact that ES-1.2 is the procedure that ultimately copes with this event further enhances plausibility of this distractor.

Pressurizer (PZR) Vapor Space Accident (Relief Valve Stuck Open)

Knowledge of EOP mitigation strategies.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13)

Tier: 1 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

1-ES-1.1 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: C

5. 010G2.4.20 80 Unit 1 initial conditions:

• Reactor power = 100%

• SGTR = 275 gpm on 1A SG

• Reactor is manually tripped

• 1C RCP trips Current conditions:

• 1-E-3 (STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE) is in progress

• It is determined that Pzr spray is not adequately reducing RCS pressure and the decision is made to use the Pressurizer PORV to reduce RCS pressure.

Based on the above conditions, which ONE of the following states: (1) the reason for minimizing the cycling of the Pressurizer PORV and (2) the procedure that 1-E-3 directs you to perform if, during the depressurization, the Pressurizer PORV and its associated block valve CAN NOT be CLOSED?

A. (1) To reduce the chance of Pressurizer PORV failure.

(2) 1-ECA 3.3, SGTR WITHOUT PRESSURIZER PRESSURE CONTROL.

B. (1) To reduce the chance of Pressurizer PORV failure.

(2) 1-ECA 3.1, SGTR WITH LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT - SUBCOOLED RECOVERY.

C. (1) To prevent the Tube rupture from degrading.

(2) 1-ECA 3.3, SGTR WITHOUT PRESSURIZER PRESSURE CONTROL.

D. (1) To prevent the Tube rupture from degrading.

(2) 1-ECA 3.1, SGTR WITH LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT - SUBCOOLED RECOVERY.

A Incorrect: 1st part is correct. 2nd part is plausible because it is criteria for closing the PORV if Pzr level is > 22%.

B Correct: The PORV relieves to the PRT so using the PORV will eventually cause the PRT rupture disk to rupture. Criteria for securing from using the PORV are:

Pzr level>69%

RCS subcooling < 30°F RCS press < Ruptured SG press AND Pzr level > 22%

C Incorrect: 1st part is plausible because the PORVs have failed to reseat (TMI) which constitutes a SBLOCA. 2nd part is plausible because it is criteria for closing the PORV if Pzr level is >

22%.

D Incorrect: 1st part is plausible because the PORVs have failed to reseat (TMI) which constitutes a SBLOCA. 2nd part is correct.

Pressurizer pressure control system Knowledge of the operational implications of EOP warnings, cautions, and notes.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13)

Tier: 2 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

1-E-3 Steam Generator Tube Rupture Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

Answer: B

6. 012A2.01 81 Unit 1 is at 4% following a scheduled refueling outage.

Intermediate Range N-35 spiked low once on the previous shift and was placed in Level Trip Bypass.

Technicians from the Instrument Shop are in the Control Room to begin troubleshooting.

The Technicians report that although their work package stated to remove the Instrument Power fuses from the N-35 drawer they have removed the Control Power fuses in error.

The OATC reports the unit is stable at 4% power.

Which ONE of the following identifies the required action based on these plant conditions?

A. Manually trip the reactor and enter 1-E-0.

B. Begin an orderly shutdown of the reactor.

C. Enter 1-AP-4.2, Malfunction of Nuclear Instrumentation (Intermediate Range), reactor trip or shutdown is NOT required.

D. Enter 1-AP-4.1, Malfunction of Source Range Nuclear Instrumentation, reactor trip or shutdown is NOT required.

A. Incorrect but plausible, an automatic reactor trip signal is generated however since the cause is solely due to a mis-operation of the subject instrument resulting in generation of the trip signal, there is no guidance to intitate a manual trip.

B. Correct. Even with the channel bypassed a trip signal is generated, the lack of an automatic trip indicates BOTH trains of SSPS have failed therfore TS 3.0.3 applies and an orderly shutdown is required.

C. Incorrect but plausible. The candidate who erroneously concludes that the bypassed channel would not generate a trip signal as a result may conclude that the P-6 permissive would be lost and AP-4.2 would be used to cope with this.

D. Incorrect but plausible. Similar to "C", AP-4.1 also has guidance for coping with SR high voltage energized when it shouldn't be, so if this erroneous conclusion is drawn, the candidate may chose this distractor.

Reactor Protection System (RPS)

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the RPS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

(CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.5)

Faulty bistable operation Tier: 2 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

AR D-C3, 1-AP-4.1, 1-AP-4.2 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: B

7. 016A2.01 82 Unit 1 is at 100 % power.

1-FW-L-1475, A SG level channel II, develops a leak on the reference leg.

Which of the choices below correctly identifies:

(1) The impact of this malfunction on the affected channel.

AND

(2) The most limiting action (REQUIRED ACTION with the shortest COMPLETION TIME) that applies to Unit 1.

A. (1) 1-FW-L-1475 indication will INCREASE (2) Verify interlock is in required state for existing unit condition within 1 hr.

B. (1) 1-FW-L-1475 indication will INCREASE (2) Place channel in trip within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

C. (1)1-FW-L-1475 indication will DECREASE (2) Verify interlock is in required state for existing unit condition within 1 hr.

D. (1)1-FW-L-1475 indication will DECREASE (2) Place channel in trip within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

A. Incorrect. First part is correct, a leak on the reference leg will cause the DP to decrease which causes an increase in level indication. The second part is incorrect but plausible since the candidate must know which interlocks are fed from the failed channel and determine the correct action. Typical interlocks (i.e.

P-7, P-10 etc.) require verification within 1 hr.

B. Correct. Both parts correct.

C. Incorrect. First part is incorrect but plausible, as stated above the candidate must determine the failure mechanism and mode. Second part is incorrect but plausible as discussed above.

D. Incorrect. First part incorrect as discussed above. Second part is correct.

Non-Nuclear Instrumentation System (NNIS)

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the NNIS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

Detector failure (CFR: 41.5/43.5/45.3/45.5)

Tier: 2 Group: 2 Technical

Reference:

TS 3.3.2 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: B

8. 025AA2.02 83 Given the following:

• Unit 1 is in Mode 5.

• RHR is in service.

• RCS temperature is stable at 190°F.

• RCS pressure is 320 psig and lowering slowly.

• Containment sump level is rising slowly.

• Containment Gaseous & Particulate Radiation Monitors are both trending up.

• The OATC has 1-CH-FCV-1122 in MANUAL with 100% demand and 1-CH-HCV-1142 at 0%

demand.

• Pressurizer level is 24% and slowly lowering.

Which ONE of the following identifies the procedure used to address the event in progress and the mitigation actions this procedure will require?

A. 1-AP-11, Loss of RHR ; manually initiate SI B. 1-AP-11, Loss of RHR ; manually align cold leg injection C. 1-AP-17, Shutdown LOCA ; manually initiate SI D. 1-AP-17, Shutdown LOCA ; manually align cold leg injection A. Incorrect but plausible. AP-11 has steps that address RCS leakage and contains attachments that are essentially the same as AP-17 (i.e. they align injection flow to the RCS), however they are provided in the context of AP-11 for coping with a loss of decay removal related to system malfunctions vice system breach. For this case (large amount of leakage) AP-11, although it would provide makeup and assure core cooling, directs the operator to AP-17. SI actuation would seem logical under the circumstances since the SI system is available and actuation would result in RCS makeup and CNTMT isolation (both of which are required), for these plant conditions although Phase "A" isolation is actuated, SI is aligned manually.

B. Incorrect but plausible. Similar reasoning as above, only for this case the mitigation (method of refilling the RCS) is correct.

C. Incorrect but plausible. First part is correct; as explained in "A", for a leak this large AP-11 will transition the operator to AP-17. Second part is incorrect but plausible as discussed in "A".

D. Correct. As previously discussed even though AP-11 may be initially entered mitigating actions are driven in this case by AP-17. As seen in the attached technical reference (applicable pages of 1-AP-17) based on the conditions given the RCS will be refilled by manually aligning cold leg injection.

Loss of Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS)

Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Residual Heat Removal System:

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

Leakage of reactor coolant from RHR into closed cooling water system or into reactor building atmosphere Tier: 1

Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

1-AP-17 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: D

9. 035G2.1.23 84 In accordance with Technical Specifications, which of the choices below correctly completes the following statements:

Primary to Secondary leakage is _____(1)_____ leakage.

The limit of 150 gallons per day is based on _________(2)_________.

A. (1) IDENTIFIED (2) minimize the frequency (occurrence) of SG tube ruptures B. (1) IDENTIFIED (2) ensuring control room and offsite doses do not exceed limits C. (1) UNIDENTIFIED (2) minimize the frequency (occurrence) of SG tube ruptures D. (1) UNIDENTIFIED (2) ensuring control room and offsite doses do not exceed limits

• Correct. The TS definition of identified leakage includes primary to secondary leakage. The bases state that the purpose of the limit is an effective measure to minimize the frequency of SG tube ruptures.

• Incorrect. First part is correct. Second part is plausible since the candidate may not realize this is the bases for the specific activity limits in both primary and secondary sides.

• Incorrect. First part is plausible because the candidate may think it is unidentified due to not being able to accurately quantify the leakage. Second part is correct.

• Incorrect. See explanations above Steam Generator System (S/Gs)

Ability to perform specific system and integrated plant procedures during all modes of plant operation.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.2 / 45.6)

Tier: 2 Group: 2 Technical

Reference:

TS 3.4.13, bases and definitions Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None

Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: A

10. 039A2.03 85 Unit 1 was operating at 100% power when the following sequence of events occurred:

• Annunciator K-G6, N-16 RAD DET, alarms

• RO reports N-16 modules for "C" SG AND Main Steam Header are in alarm and trending up

• BOP reports 1-SV-RM-121, Condenser Air Ejector Radiation Monitor, indication has not changed

• RO reports PRZR level rapidly decreasing

• The crew trips the reactor and initiates SI Current Status:

• The immediate actions of 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, have just been completed.

• All SGs are below the Narrow Range.

• The BOP recommends isolating AFW flow to the "C" SG.

Based on the above, which ONE of the following identifies how the US is required to proceed?

A. allow the BOP to isolate AFW to "C" SG; contact HP & Chemistry for confirmation of the affected SG prior to initiating 1-E-0, Attachment 8, Ruptured SG Isolation.

B. allow the BOP to isolate AFW to "C" SG; have the RO initiate 1-E-0, Attachment 8, Ruptured SG Isolation.

C. DO NOT allow the BOP to isolate AFW to "C" SG; contact HP & Chemistry for confirmation of the affected SG prior to initiating 1-E-0, Attachment 8, Ruptured SG Isolation.

D. DO NOTallow the BOP to isolate AFW to "C" SG; have the RO initiate 1-E-0, Attachment 8, Ruptured SG Isolation.

a. incorrect. First part is plausible because on the surface it sounds ok; knowledge of the EOP bases is required to eliminate this part of the distractor. Second part also plausible 1-RM-SV-121 should be showing something but it is not (malfunction); the candidate who doesn't feel the N-16 is enough to go on may delay actions that are important to limiting offsite dose (attachment 8 isolates steam supply to the terry turbine, this is a local action).

b. Incorrect. First part is plausible as noted above. Second part correct, even though they are not independent on a process basis (i.e. a deviation in SG LEVEL could be confirmed by comparing steam FLOW and feed FLOW) both show expected indication based on the conditions given, so they would be enough confirmation.

c. incorrect. First part is correct; EOP basis wants SG U-tubes covered to insulate steam space, so you will isolate AFW, but you need to wait until level is higher. Second part incorrect but plausible as discussed in "a".

d. correct. First part is correct as noted in "c". Second part also correct as discussed above the malfunction of 1-RM-SV-121 should not detour the SRO from implementing attachment 8.

Main and Reheat Steam System (MRSS)

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the MRSS; and (b) based on predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

(CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)

Indications and alarms for main steam and area radiation monitors (during SGTR)

Tier: 2 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

1-E-0, 1-E-3 WOG Background document, 1-AP-5 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: D

11. 056AG2.2.40 86 Unit 1 was initially at 100% power.

A loss of offsite power (LOOP) occurs and the only operator actions taken thus far are the immediate operator actions of 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

Which ONE of the following identifies the most limiting action (REQUIRED ACTION with the shortest COMPLETION TIME) that applies to Unit 1?

A. Enter TS 3.0.3 immediately B. Restore one EDG to operable status within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> C. Restore one offsite circuit or one EDG to operable status within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> D. Restore one offsite circuit to operable status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> A. Correct. Based on current status of the event action k. applies since EDGs are the sole source for the busses. The EDGs are not considered operable until loading is verified to be withn limits of 0-AP-10 Attachment 21. The EDGs are not operable, even though they are powering their emergency buses, until loading is verified to be acceptable. Since it applies for both EDGs you are in action m. (3.0.3) because the LOOP rendered two of your offsite circuit inoperable.

B. Incorrect but plausible if the candidate overlooks the STRs discussed in "A".

C. Incorrect but plausible since the candidate may overlook the two hour action.

D. Incorrect but plausible because the candidate may ignore the status of the STRs, conclude that the EDGs are operable and select this distractor which is TRUE, but only AFTER the EDGs have been configured per AP-10.

Loss of Offsite Power

Ability to apply Technical Specifications for a system.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.2 / 43.5 / 45.3)

Tier: 1 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

TS 3.8.1 & Bases Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: A

12. 061AA2.03 87 Unit 1 is at 20% power and ramping up following a scheduled refueling outage.

Annuciator K-D2, Rad Monitor System Hi Rad Level, alarms.

The Backboards operator reports 1-SV-RM-121, Condenser Air Ejector Radiation Monitor, HIGH alarm light is LIT.

Based on the above 1-SV-RM-121 is (1) and 1-SV-TV-102-2, Condenser Air Ejector Discharge to Vent Stack A, is (2) .

A. (1) FUNCTIONAL (2) closed B. (1) FUNCTIONAL (2) open C. (1) NON-FUNCTIONAL (2) closed D. (1) NON-FUNCTIONAL (2) open

a. Incorrect. First part plausible because the monitor is required by TRM in Modes 1 and 2; second part is also plausible since some components reposition on high alarm while others don't reposition until hi-hi is received.

b. Incorrect. First part plausible as discussed above. Second part is correct based on the information provided in the stem.

c. Incorrect. First part is correct; although the monitor will indicate and trend below 30% power, per TRM 3.4.5 Bases there is insufficient Ar-41 to "declare" it functional below this power level. Second part also incorrect but plausible since candidate may erroneously conclude that the function to divert the air ejector to containment would occur at the high alarm threshold in order to minimize any release.

d. Correct. First part is correct; as noted above per TRM Bases, at the given power level the monitor can not be "declared" functional. Second part is also correct; the automatic actuation (closing of the subject valve) will not occur until the hi-hi alarm is received, so based on the information provided in the stem the valve will remain in its normal position (open) for the given plant status.

Area Radiation Monitoring (ARM) System Alarms Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Area Radiation Monitoring (ARM)

System Alarms:

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

Setpoints for alert and high alarms Tier: 1 Group: 2 Technical

Reference:

TRM 3.4.5 Bases, 1-AP-5, DWG 11715-ESK-6MN Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info: considered bank since question is essentially two seperate bank questions that have been combined to form one question.

Answer: D

13. 062A2.15 88 Unit 1 is at 100% power.

On the previous shift when attempting to transfer 120v vital AC Bus 1-I from its associated Constant Voltage Transformer to Inverter 1-I the Sync light failed to light and the procedure was halted.

120v vital AC Bus 1-I is being powered from its associated Constant Voltage Transformer with Inverter 1-I tagged out for corrective maintenance.

The POD has the following item scheduled:

• Tagout 1J EDG to allow Engineering to inspect various panels.

IAW Technical Specifications, which of the following choices identifies:

(1) the status of the 1-I VITAL AC BUS AND (2) whether tagout of 1J EDG is allowed or not A. (1) The 1-I VITAL AC BUS is inoperable (2) Tagout of 1J EDG is allowed B. (1) The 1-I VITAL AC BUS is operable (2) Tagout of 1J EDG is allowed C. (1) The 1-I VITAL AC BUS is inoperable (2) Tagout of 1J EDG is NOT allowed

D. (1) The 1-I VITAL AC BUS is operable (2) Tagout of 1J EDG is NOT allowed A. Incorrect. The first part is incorrect but plausible since the candidate may think the vital AC bus is inoperable with the inverter inoperable. The second part is incorrect but plausible because there is no obvious correlation between the bus, which is energized, and these activities.

B. Incorrect. First part is correct. Second part plausible because again there is no obvious correlation between the EDG which is a seperate TS and the vital bus which is operable, although the inverter isn't.

C. Incorrect. The first part is incorrect but plausible since the candidate may think the vital AC bus is inoperable with the inverter inoperable. The second part is plausible because again the vital bus and associated instruments are all operable, so to the average Joe (and to 7300 process instrumentation, for that matter) where the voltage is coming from doesn't matter.

D. Correct. The TS 3.8.7 Bases requires no EDG planned maintenance and no planned maintenance on another RPS channel that places that channel in trip (candidate must know the bases and know that doing the subject PT will place the channel in trip).

AC Electrical Distribution System Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ac distribution system; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

(CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)

Consequence of paralleling out-of-phase/mismatch in volts Tier: 2 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

TS 3.8.1, 3.8.9 & 3.8.7 & Bases Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info: K/A intent met since Inverters are part of the AC distribution system Answer: D

14. 065AA2.02 89 Unit 1 is at 100%.

• 1-MS-PCV-101A ("A" SG PORV) has been isolated by closing the inlet isolation valve due to leak by.

• 1-MS-PCV-101B ("B" SG PORV) has developed an air leak and instrument air has been isolated to the PORV.

IAW TS 3.7.4, Steam Generator Power Operated Relief Valves, and TS 3.7.4 Bases, which of the choices below correctly completes the following statements?

• The "A" SG PORV is ___________.

• The "B" SG PORV is ___________.

A. (1) operable (2) operable B. (1) operable (2) inoperable C. (1) inoperable (2) operable D. (1) inoperable (2) inoperable

• Correct. TS bases state that the SG PORVs are operable as long as they can be manually unisolated and operated.

• Incorrect. Plausible if the candidate does not know the bases for the SG PORVs. They may also think that manual means from the control room and not locally. For our procedure usage rules, manual means controlled from the control room and local means in the field and may therefore think the PORV cannot be "manually" operated from the control room.

• Incorrect. See above.

• Incorrect. See above.

Loss of Instrument Air Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Instrument Air:

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

Relationship of flow readings to system operation Tier: 1 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

TS 3.7.4 and bases Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info: KA is met since candidate must have SRO level of TS Bases to correctly determine the impact that the loss of instrument air to the subject component has on operability.

Answer: A

15. 069AG2.1.31 90 Unit 1 is heating up following a scheduled refueling outage and is currently at 310°F and slowly increasing.

You are the oncoming SRO and in the process of walking down the boards observe that the Containment Purge Supply and Purge Exhaust valves, (1-HV-MOV-100A, B, C & D), all have green lights ON and red lights OFF.

With respect to your observation, this configuration is _____________ with 1-OP-1E, Containment Integrity Checklist; according to the Applicable Safety Analysis of TS 3.6.3, Containment Isolation Valves, Bases, the DBA analysis assumes that the Purge Valves are ______________________?

A. in compliance ; open and will isolate within 60 seconds after the accident B. in compliance ; in the closed position at the onset of the accident C. NOT in compliance ; open and will isolate within 60 seconds after the accident D. NOT in compliance ; in the closed position at the onset of the accident A. Incorrect. First part is incorrect but plausible because at first glance the bases says only that the valves need to be closed, 1-OP-1E verifies the breakers for the valves are locked off prior to entry into Mode 4 so although the valves being closed appears to satisy the TS minimum at first glance, it doesn't meet procedural requirements to go to mode 4 per the controlling procedure (1-OP-1.1 does this before it lets you get permission to move on to 1-OP-1.3 to change modes) . Second part incorrect but plausible because this is a basis for other valves listed in 3.6.3; candidate may not know detail of what is assumed by the accident analysis.

B. Incorrect. First part is incorrect but plausible as discussed above. Second part is correct per the TS bases.

C. Incorrect. First part is correct, based on the light indication one should conclude that the MCC breakers are closed (ON), but are required to be "locked off" (as an administrative control) for this Mode (see "A" above; note they also appear on the station administrative lock list). So again although the requirement of TS 3.6.3 may appear to be met, the procedural requirement is not.

Second part incorrect but plausible as discussed in "A".

D. Correct. First part correct as discussed in "C". Second part correct per attached Technical Reference (TS 3.6.3 Bases).

Loss of Containment Integrity Ability to locate control room switches, controls, and indications, and to determine that they correctly reflect the desired plant lineup.

(CFR: 41.10 / 45.12)

Tier: 1 Group: 2 Technical

Reference:

1-OP-1E, 1-OP-1.1, TS 3.6.3 Bases Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info: Considered bank because it combines a couple of bank questions.

Answer: D

16. 103G2.4.31 91 Unit 1 is at 29% holding for chemistry following a scheduled refueling outage.

Annunciator J-F2, Containment Partial Press +0.1 PSI CH I-II, alarms The OATC reports the following:

• Containment Sump Level - increasing

• PRZR Level - stable

• Charging Flow - stable

• Reactor power - stable Several minutes later Annunciator J-G1, Containment Partial Press +0.25 PSI CH I-II, alarms and the OATC reports there are no changes in the parameters reported above.

Which of the following choices:

(1) identifies the cause of these plant conditions AND (2) correctly states the Technical Specification Bases for the TS 3.6.4 Containment Pressure LCO ?

A. (1) Leakage from a Main Feed Line (2) ensure the Containment structure will depressurize to less than 2.0 psig within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> following a DBA B. (1) Leakage from a Main Feed Line (2) ensure the Containment structure will depressurize to subatmospheric pressure within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> following a DBA C. (1) Leakage from a Main Steam Line (2) ensure the Containment structure will depressurize to less than 2.0 psig within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> following a DBA D. (1) Leakage from a Main Steam Line (2) ensure the Containment structure will depressurize to subatmospheric pressure within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> following a DBA A. Incorrect. Plausible because (1) is correct, indications support a high energy source of leakage and (2) because there is a 2.0 psig requirement, but that has to be met within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> not 6 as stated in the distractor.

B. Correct. (1) is correct as stated above and (2) is also correct per the Tech Spec Bases C. Incorrect. Plausible because (1) could be correct if the turbine were in IMP-OUT or on the limiter in which case you would be trading steam from the turbine to the CNTMT so power would be relatively constant and (2) because there is a 2.0 psig requirement, but that has to be met within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> not 6 as stated in the distractor.

D. Incorrect. Plausible because (1) clould be correct if the turbine were in IMP-OUT or on the limiter in which case you would be trading steam from the turbine to the CNTMT so power would be relatively constant and (2) because this is correct per the Tech Spec Bases.

Containment System

Knowledge of annunciator alarms, indications, or response procedures.

(CFR: 41.10 / 45.3)

Tier: 2 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

1-AR-J-F2, J-G1, TS 3.6.4 Bases Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: B

17. G2.1.15 92 IAW OP-AA-100, Conduct of Operations, a Standing Order can be used to address Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) requirements that are determined to be improper or inadequate.

Which of the choices below correctly completes the following statements?

The Standing Order (1) required to be presented to the Facility Safety Review Committee (FSRC) prior to implementation.

AND The Standing Order (2) be issued to impose less restrictive requirements.

A. (1) is (2) can B. (1) is (2) can NOT C. (1) is NOT (2) can D. (1) is NOT (2) can NOT A. Incorrect. First part is correct; standing orders can clarify, or impose additional/more restrictive requirements but are not a vehicle used to relax or relieve any requirements. Second part is incorrect but plausible; the candidate who lacks detailed knowledge in this area may default to this choice as it would be a logical (although erroneous) conclusion that since the subject is TRM changes may be made to make the limits less restrictive.

B. Correct. First part is correct as noted above. Second part is also correct as seen in the attached Technical Reference.

C. Incorrect. First part is incorrect but plausible; the candidate who lacks detailed knowledge in this area may select this choice as they would feel there must be a provision to cope with the subject condition. As noted above there is indeed, but a different process is used for the case where relief is needed from a TS requirement. Second part is incorrect but plausible as discussed in "A".

D. Incorrect. First part is incorrect but plausible as discussed in "C". Second part is correct as seen in the attached Technical Reference.

Conduct of Operations Knowledge of administrative requirements for temporary management directives, such as standing orders, night orders, Operations memos, etc.

(CFR: 41.10 / 45.12)

Tier: 3 Group: N/A Technical

Reference:

OP-AA-100, Attachment 7 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: B

18. G2.2.18 93 Unit 2 is shutting down for a normal refueling outage.

Sequence of events:

Sunday 2000: All RCPs are secured Tuesday 0200: Commenced isolating RCS loops Wednesday 0800: PRZR drained less than 5% level Thursday 0200: Commenced detensioning the reactor vessel head IAW operating procedures, which of the above is the first activity that requires the containment closure team to be established?

A. All RCPs are secured B. Commenced isolating RCS loops C. PRZR drained less than 5% level D. Commenced detensioning the reactor vessel head

• Incorrect. Plausible since securing RCPs removes the ability to use forced circulation cooling IAW GOP-13, shutdown alternate core cooling assessment, and the candidate may believe this would require the closure team to be established.

• Correct. Isolating any RCS loop requires the closure team to be establishes per the MOPs and this is the first item in the sequence of events that has this requirement.

• Incorrect. Plausible since draining the RCS below 5% PZR level does require the closure team to be established but this is not the first item in the sequence of events that has this requirement.

• Incorrect. Plausible since detensioning the reactor vessel head does require the closure team to

be established but this is not the first item in the sequence of events that has this requirement.

Equipment Control Knowledge of the process for managing maintenance activities during shutdown operations, such as risk assessments, work prioritization, etc.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13)

Tier: 3 Group: N/A Technical

Reference:

1-OP-4.1, 1-OP-3.7, 1-GOP-13 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: B

19. G2.2.7 94 Which ONE of the following describes the personnel requirements of OP-AA-106, Infrequently Conducted or Complex Evolutions (ICCE), for conducting a Category I ICCE ?

A. a Senior Operations Manager is not required, a test coordinator is not required B. a Senior Operations Manager is required, a test coordinator is not required C. a Senior Operations Manager is not required, a test coordinator is required D. a Senior Operations Manager is required, a test coordinator is required

a. Incorrect but plausible since the candidate may not be knowledgeable of the hierarchy of categories and may not be sure of the requirements as to whether a specific position must be filled. The catergory hierarchy for other events such as personnel contamination events go from category 1 being the least severe to category 3 being most severe and also weather events (i.e. hurricanes and tornadoes) go from category 1 as least severe to category 5 being the most severe. Chemistry action levels also run from level 1 being the least severe to level 3 being most severe.

b. incorrect but plausible since it would be true for a Cat III evolution

c. incorrect; as discussed, to the person who isn't sure of the requirements (or just recalls they are not the same), any of the choices is plausible.

d. Correct. Both of these positions are required.

Equipment Control Knowledge of the process for conducting special or infrequent tests.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.3 / 45.13)

Tier: 3 Group: N/A Technical

Reference:

OP-AA-106 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: D

20. G2.3.15 95 Initial Conditions:

• Unit 1 is shutting down for a scheduled refueling.

• CRDM fans are tagged out.

• CARFs are all running.

• Operators are preparing to place RHR in service.

Current Conditions:

• A loss of offsite power occurs.

• No operator actions have occurred.

Based on the above, select the choice that correctly completes the following statement.

1-RM-RMS-159/160, Containment Atmosphere Radiation Monitor (gaseous and particulate) (1) and the Digital Containment Partial Air Pressure Indicators (2) .

A. (1) are required to be declared inoperable (2) are required to be declared inoperable B. (1) are required to be declared inoperable (2) are NOT required to be declared inoperable C. (1) are NOT required to be declared inoperable (2) are required to be declared inoperable D. (1) are NOT required to be declared inoperable (2) are NOT required to be declared inoperable A. Correct. The LOOP causes a loss of Containment Air Recirc Fans (CARFs) which are required by TS Bases (at least 1) to support 159/160 operability. The loss of the CARFs also requires (by AP-35) declaring partial air pressure indicators inoperable. Since the stem states "preparing to place RHR in service" the candidate must have knowledge that this means the Unit is in Mode 4 and that

the Spec is applicable in Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4.

B. Incorrect. First part is correct as discussed above. Second part incorrect but plausible since candidate may not correlate the cause and effect relationship between the CARFs and the partial pressure indicators.

C. Incorrect. First part is plausible since their is not a physical correlation between the CARFs & the subject rad monitors and the candidate may not have knowledge of the TRM Bases. Second part is correct as discussed in "A".

D. Incorrect. Both parts are incorrect but plausible as previously discussed.

Radiation Control Knowledge of radiation monitoring systems, such as fixed radiation monitors and alarms, portable survey instruments, personnel monitoring equipment, etc.

(CFR: 41.12 / 43.4 / 45.9)

Tier: 3 Group: N/A Technical

Reference:

1-AP-35, TS 3.4.15 & Bases Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info: Considered bank since this is essentially a combination of 2 bank questions Answer: A

21. G2.3.5 96 Given the following plant conditions:

• A General Emergency exists.

• The TSC is manned and functional.

• HP surveyed an area in which emergency repairs are needed and determined radiation levels are up to 100 Rem/Hr.

• The worker performing the repairs has received life threatening injuries and must be rescued.

• No one has volunteered to rescue the injured person and a rescuer has been chosen from a group of non-volunteer personnel.

Based on these plant conditions, select the choice below that correctly completes the following statement:

IAW EPIP-4.04, Emergency Personnel Radiation Exposure, the rescuer may receive up to __(1)__ Rem TEDE with authorization from the ___(2)___.

A. (1) 10 (2) Radiological Assessment Director B. (1) 10 (2)Station Emergency Manager C. (1) 25

(2) Radiological Assessment Director D. (1) 25 (2) Station Emergency Manager

• Incorrect. First part is incorrect but plausible since this is the emergency dose limit for protecting valuable property. The second part is incorrect but is plausible since with the TSC manned the candidate may assume that the rad assessment director will perform this duty.

• Incorrect. First part is incorrect but plausible as stated above. The second part is correct.

• Incorrect. First part is correct. Second part is plausible as described above.

• Correct. 25 Rem TEDE is the emergency dose limit for life saving activities by a non-volunteer and the SEM has the sole authority to authorize this dose. SEM duties are transferred to the TSC once it is functional.

Radiation Control Ability to use radiation monitoring systems, such as fixed radiation monitors and alarms, portable survey instruments, personnel monitoring equipment, etc.

(CFR: 41.11 / 41.12 / 43.4 / 45.9)

Tier: 3 Group: N/A Technical

Reference:

EPIP-4.04 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info: KA match since SROs do not physically use the subject equipment but rather, use the information obtained from it to make decisions such as prioritizing/authorizing.

Answer: D

22. G2.4.25 97 Given the following:

15:00 Both Units were at 100% power when the control room was evacuated due to a fire.

15:02 Offsite power is lost.

15:12 ROs have established control from the Aux Shutdown Panels and report unit conditions stable.

Based on these plant conditions, which of the following choices:

(1) identifies the Emergency Classification that is required to be declared AND (2) correctly states whether the cooldown of Units 1&2 is required to be conducted sequentially or simultaneously in accordance with 0-FCA-1, Control Room Fire.

(Reference Provided, Note: do not use EAL identifier H.6, SEM Judgement)

A. (1) Alert (2) sequential cooldown

B. (1) Alert (2) simultaneous cooldown C. (1) Site Area Emergency (2) sequential cooldown D. (1) Site Area Emergency (2) simultaneous cooldown A. Correct. first part correct; enough info proveided for candidate to conclude that safe shutdown requirements were met in required time frame. second part also correct procedure picks unit with highest PRZR level first (not specifically mentioned SM has latitude to choose either unit based on actual equipment availability, plant conditions, or other considerations).

B. Incorrect but plausible, since there is so much emphasis on limited ECST volume the candidate who lacks detailed knowledge of the procedure may default to this distractor.

C. Incorrect plausible because the control room was evacuated and there are complications (LOOP);

sequential cooldown part is correct.

D. Incorrect, both parts incorrect but plausible as previously discussed.

Emergency Procedures / Plan Knowledge of fire protection procedures.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13)

Tier: 3 Group: N/A Technical

Reference:

EAL technical Bases Document & 0-FCA-1 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: EAL Maitrix Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: A

23. G2.4.30 98 Unit 1 is at 100% power.

12:00 Excess Letdown is placed in service 12:01 OATC notes CC Head Tank level is increasing 12:04 Excess Letdown is removed from service, OATC reports CC head Tank level is stable 12:08 STA quantifies leakage into the CC head tank was 120 gallons Based on the above, Notification to the State within 15 minutes _________ required and Notification to the NRC within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> _________ required.

(Reference Provided, Note: do not use EAL identifier H.6, SEM Judgement)

A. is ; is B. is ; is NOT C. is NOT ; is D. is NOT ; is NOT A. Incorrect. plausible if candidate erroneously concludes that penetration however slight triggers the 15 minute clock. goes hand-in-hand with erroneous 15 minute assumption.

B. Plausible since a lot of things are 4 or 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> reports to the nrc C. Correct per EPIP-1.01 condition exceeded an EAL but no longer exists (at the time it was determined) so state isn't required to be notified within 15 minutes. NRC however still has to called within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> (See VPAP-2802).

D. Incorrect. plausible because candidate may assume that this is identified leakage (or for that matter CVCS vice RCS leakage and conclude that it is neither classifiable or reportable (or if it is reportable it would be at a lower threshold like an LER or have a less stringent time requirement, like 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />).

Emergency Procedures / Plan Knowledge of events related to system operation/status that must be reported to internal organizations or external agencies, such as the State, the NRC, or the transmission system operator.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.11)

Tier: 3 Group: N/A Technical

Reference:

VPAP-2802, EAL Technical Bases Document, EPIP-1.01 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: EAL Maitrix Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: C

24. WE04EG2.4.18 99 Unit 1 was at 100% power when the following sequence of events occurred:

• A LOCA outside of containment has occurred.

• Manual reactor trip and SI have been actuated.

• The crew has transitioned from 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection to 1-ECA-1.2, LOCA Outside Containment.

• Following isolation of the cold leg injection piping, RCS pressure has started to increase.

Which ONE of the following identifies the correct procedure transitions from 1-ECA-1.2?

A. 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection

B. 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant C. 1-ECA-1.1, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation Capability D. 1-ES-1.1, Safety Injection Termination A. Incorrect. 1-E-0 was the original procedure which directed entry into 1-ECA-1,2. Many procedures direct the operator to return to procedure and step in affect. It is plausable that the canidate would return to the procedure and step in affect given that the LOCA has been stopped by closing the cold leg injection isolation valves.

B. Correct. 1-E-1 is the correct transition from 1-ECA-1.2.

C. Incorrect. The candidate is given the fact that isolating the cold leg injection piping resulted in RCS pressure increasing. Isolating the cold leg injection flow path makes the LHSI pumps inoperable thus rendering the normal flow path for emergency coolant recirc. unavailable. Since the capability to use the emergency coolant cold leg recirc. path has been lost, it is plausable to select 1-ECA-1.1, Loss of Emergency Coolant Capability as the appropriate procedure transition.

D. Incorrect. The candidate is given the fact that isolating the cold leg injection piping resulted in RCS pressure increasing. This will allow all SI termination criteria to be met. Since SI criteria would be met, it is plausable to select 1-ES-1.1, Safety Injection termination, as the appropriate procedure transition.

LOCA Outside Containment Knowledge of the specific bases for EOPs.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.1 / 45.13)

Tier: 1 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

1-E-0, 1-E-1, 1-ECA-1.2, 1-ECA-1.1, 1-ES-1.1 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: B

25. WE05EA2.1 100 Unit 1 was initially at 100% power with the following equipment tagged out:

• 1-FW-P-3A, Motor-driven AFW pump A seismic event results in a loss of offsite power and damage to all main steam lines in the Main Steam Valve House.

Current status is:

• The crew is currently performing 1-ECA-2.1, Uncontrolled Depressurization of All Steam Generators.

• All SGs are 800 psig and slowly decreasing

• All SG levels below the Narrow Range

• 1-FW-P-2, Turbine-driven AFW, tripped shortly after starting up and operators are unable to reset it.

• The crew has just shutdown the 1J EDG due to a leak on the radiator.

Based on the current status, which of the following choices identifies:

(1) whether transition to 1-FR-H.1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink, is required or not AND (2) which procedure is required to be performed concurrently with the EOPs A. (1) Transition to 1-FR-H.1 is NOT required (2) perform 1-AP-22.6, Loss of 1-FW-P-2 Turbine-driven AFW Pump and One Motor-Driven AFW Pump, concurrently with the EOPs B. (1) Transition to 1-FR-H.1 is NOT required (2) perform 0-OP-6.4, Operation of the SBO Diesel (SBO Event), to re-energize 1J 4160v bus, concurrently with the EOPs C. (1) Transition to 1-FR-H.1 is required (2) perform 1-AP-22.6, Loss of 1-FW-P-2 Turbine-driven AFW Pump and One Motor-Driven AFW Pump, concurrently with the EOPs D. (1) Transition to 1-FR-H.1 is required (2) perform 0-OP-6.4, Operation of the SBO Diesel (SBO Event), to re-energize 1J 4160v bus,concurrently with the EOPs A. Incorrect. Plausible because ECA-2.1 intentionally reduces feed flow to less than H.1 entry requirement, and question stem supports that there is adequate inventory in SGs for heat removal (pressure indicative of smaller breaks & RCS cooling down - uncontrolled), thus on the surface fr-H.1 entry would not be warrented. 1-AP-22.6 entry conditions are met, but stem specificly solicites addressing the "current conditions" so 0-OP-6.4 needs to be done before AP-22.6 B. Incorrect but plausible as discussed above.

C. Incorrect but plausible; H.1 transition is correct, but as discussed above 0-OP-6.4 needs to be done before AP-22.6.

D. Correct. Current conditions warrent the transition to H.1 since AFW is no longer readily available (even though the unavailablity is due to 1J EDG being intentionally shutdown by the crew); as noted above the use of 0-OP-6.4 is appropriate based on the information provided (guidance to use 0-OP-6.4 is contained in 0-AP-10, Loss of Electrical Power. AP-10 would have initially been performed by the Non-accident unit (Unit 2) in response to the LOOP, but the action contained to use the SBO Diesel located in the RNO for checking 1J Bus would not have been addressed since the condition occurred subsequent to the initial procedure performance. The Unit 1 SRO needs to know that they should go back to that procedure and reference the step RNO that provides the option to use the SBO.

Loss of Secondary Heat Sink Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (Loss of Secondary Heat Sink)

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations.

Tier: 1 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

1-F-0,1-FR-H.1, WOG ERG background Documents, 0-AP-10, 1-OP-26A Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: D