ML12297A084

2 North Anna 2012-301 Draft RO Written Exam

ML12297A084
Person / Time
Site:	North Anna
Issue date:	10/23/2012
From:	NRC/RGN-II
To:	Virginia Electric & Power Co (VEPCO)
References
50-338/12-301, 50-339/12-301
Download: ML12297A084 (78)

Text

1. 001AA2.04 1 Given the following conditions:

A. Unit 1 is at 80% power B. Control bank "D" is at 190 steps with rods in AUTO C. Selected First Stage Pressure channel fails high As a result of this malfunction reactor power will (1) and the OTT setpoint will (2)

(Consider the initial plant response prior to any actions occurring to terminate the rod motion)

A. (1) increase (2) decrease B. (1) increase (2) increase C. (1) decrease (2) decrease D. (1) decrease (2) increase A. Correct; the rod control system will generate outward rod motion based on power m/m and Tave/tref error as a result of the malfunction. instantaneous reactor power (transient power) increases as a function of the increased fission rate. the resultant temperature increase will cause a slight pressure increase (pressure decreasing reduces OTDT setpoint, so increasing implies an opposite affect), however the overriding effect is a slight reduction in setpoint due to the increase in Tave.

B. Incorrect; first part is correct, but the OTDT setpoint which considers flux, pressure, and temperature will lower as discussed above; plausible because the candidate who doesn't know the formula for calculating the setpoint, or considers only the resultant transient pressure increase may think it increases and not worry because they may consider the event one for which OPDT provides the necessary protection and not OTDT.

C. Incorrect; first part is plasuible if candidate does not properly analyze FM&E of the malfucntion.

Second part goes hand-in-hand with first part; pressure decrease will tend to reduce setpoint.

D. Incorrect; first part plausible as discussed above. Second part plausible since the reduction in tave (given a faulted assumption that rods are moving in) tends to increase the setpoint.

Continuous Rod Withdrawal Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Continuous Rod Withdrawal :

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

Reactor power and its trend Tier: 1 Group: 2 Technical

Reference:

SDBD-NAPS-NC, DWG 5655D33 - Sh. 9, TRM Table 4.3-1, NAPS PLS Document

Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: A

2. 002A4.08 2 Unit 1 was initially at 100% power.

Operators tripped the reactor due to decreasing Pressurizer pressure & level.

The crew is implementing 1-E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, and is at Step 12a, "Determine required core exit temperature based on SG pressure".

Plant conditions are as follows:

D. RCS pressure is 1270 psig and stable E. RCS Hot Leg Temperatures are 546°F and stable F. RCS Cold Leg Temperatures are 545°F and stable G. Core Exit TCs are 556°F and stable H. "A" train ICCM Subcooling is 20°F and stable I. "B" train ICCM Subcooling is 30°F and stable Based on these plant conditions, the OATC should inform the US that ______ train ICCM indication is INCORRECT and ______________.

A. "A" ; leave RCPs running B. "A" ; stop all RCPs C. "B" ; leave RCPs running D. "B" ; stop all RCPs A. Incorrect. First part is incorrect but plausible because candidate may read steam tables wrong or use incorrect temperature. Second part is incorrect but plausible because it would be true IF a controlled cooldown had been started.

B. Incorrect. First part is incorrect but plausible as discussed in "A". Second part is correct RCP trip criteria per 1-E-3 CAP is met.

C. Incorrect. First part is correct; Tsat for 1270 psig (1285 psia) is 576°F; 576-556=20°F, so "A" train is correct and "B" is wrong. Second part is incorrect but plausible as discussed in "A".

d. Correct. First part is correct; Tsat for 1270 psig (1285 psia) is 576°F; 576-556=20°F, so "A" train is correct and "B" is wrong. Second part is also correct; per 1-E-3 CAP.

Reactor Coolant System (RCS)

Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8)

Safety parameter display systems Tier: 2 Group: 2 Technical

Reference:

1-E-3 and Steam Tables Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: D

3. 003A4.06 3 Unit 1 is at 100% power.

The OATC receives annunciator C-G7, RCP 1A-B-C Seal Leak Hi Flow, and determines that seal leak-off flow for 1-RC-P-1A is pegged high.

The crew enters 1-AP-33.1, Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Failure.

Which ONE of the following 1-RC-P-1A indications is used to validate this condition in accordance with 1-AP-33.1 and states a correct required action in accordance with 1-AP-33.1?

A. Seal Injection flow ; begin an orderly shutdown and stop 1-RC-P-1A B. Seal Injection flow ; trip the reactor and stop 1-RC-P-1A C. Thermal Barrier temperature; begin an orderly shutdown and stop 1-RC-P-1A D. Thermal Barrier temperature; trip the reactor and stop 1-RC-P-1A A. Incorrect. First part is plausible since the candidate may rationalize that increased seal gap would mean that injection flow would have to go up. Second part is plausible because this is the required action for low seal leakoff.

B. Incorrect. First part is plausible as discussed above. Second part is correct as seen in the attached Technical Reference (1-AP-33.1).

C. Incorrect. First part is correct; Thermal Barrier temperature can be trended on the plant computer and was recently added to AP-33.1 as a confirmatory indication. Second part incorrect but plausible as discussed in "A".

D. Correct. First part is correct;Thermal Barrier temperature can be trended on the plant computer and was recently added to AP-33.1 as a confirmatory indication. Second part is also correct as seen in the attached Technical Reference (1-AP-33.1).

Reactor Coolant Pump System (RCPS)

Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8)

RCP parameters Tier: 2 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

1-AP-33.1 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info: the addition of thermal barrier temperature is a recent addition to the AP Answer: D

4. 003K5.04 4 Operators have just finished syncing Unit 1 to the grid following a scheduled refueling outage.

1-RC-P-1B, "B" Reactor Coolant Pump trips.

Which ONE of the following identifies how B SG level will initially respond to this transient, and also correctly states whether a manual reactor trip is required?

A. decrease ; manual Reactor trip is NOT required B. decrease ; manual Reactor trip is required C. increase ; manual Reactor trip is NOT required D. increase ; manual Reactor trip is required A. Incorrect. First part correct, the INITIAL repsonse (as solicited in the stem) is a "shrink" in SG level due to the reduction in boiling in the tube bundle. Second part is incorrect but plausible since this would be correct under most circumstance including an instrument ATWS.

B. Correct. First part is correct as discussed above. Second part is correct as seen in the attached Technical Reference (AR C-H6).

C. Incorrect. First part is incorrect but plausible since if the candidate does not recognize the overriding effect of "shrink" (discussed above) they may conclude that steaming rate will decrease which means Feed will be greater than Steam and level will initially increase as a result. Second part incorrect but plausible as discussed in "A".

D. Incorrect. First part is incorrect as discussed in "C". Second part is correct as seen in the attached Technical Reference (AR C-H6).

Reactor Coolant Pump System (RCPS)

Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the RCPS:

(CFR: 41.5 / 45.7)

Effects of RCP shutdown on secondary parameters, such as steam pressure, steam flow, and feed flow Tier: 2

Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

AR F-C2, AR C-H6 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: B

5. 004K2.07 5 Which ONE of the following identifies the sources of power to the "A" Boric Acid Storage Tank heaters and includes how the heaters respond in the event of a loss of offsite power?

A. 1H and 1J emergency Busses ; automatically restored when the EDG energizes its associated Emergency Bus B. 1H and 1J emergency Busses ; must be manually reset after the EDG energizes its associated Emergency Bus C. 2H and 1J emergency Busses ; automatically restored when the EDG energizes its associated Emergency Bus D. 2H and 1J emergency Busses ; must be manually reset after the EDG energizes its associated Emergency Bus A. Incorrect. First part correct as seen on attached Technical References (AR & 0-AP-10). Second part incorrect but plausible since these are a small load; the candidate that lacks detailed knowledge may conclude that it would make sense for them to come back after power is restored.

B. Correct. Both parts correct as seen on attached Technical References (AR & 0-AP-10).

C. Incorrect. First part incorrect but plausible since one of our BATs does have heaters with opposite unit power supply. Second part also incorrect but plausible as discussed in "A".

D. Incorrect. First part incorrect but plausible as discussed in "C". Second part is correct as seen on attached Technical References (AR & 0-AP-10).

Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS)

Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following:

(CFR: 41.7)

Heat tracing Tier: 2 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

AR B-C5, AR B-D5, DWG 11715-CH-044, DWG 11715-ESK-6HP Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: B

6. 004K5.15 6 Both Units are at 100%.

Burnup on Unit 1 is 3,000 MWD/MTU Burnup on Unit 2 is 12,500 MWD/MTU Which one of the following correctly completes the following statement?

The moderator temperature coefficient is more negative on (1) , and if power is lowered to 90% on both units by boration only, then (2) will require a larger boration than the other unit.

A. (1) Unit 1 (2) Unit 1 B. (1) Unit 1 (2) Unit 2 C. (1) Unit 2 (2) Unit 1 D. (1) Unit 2 (2) Unit 2 A. Incorrect. First part incorrect but plausible since there are several reactivity coefficients, with several factors that effect them, and the candidate may be unsure of, or not relate the difference based on the limited information provided in them stem. Second part also incorrect but plausible since it supports a faulted conclusion in the first part of the question.

B. Incorrect. First part incorrect but plausible as discussed above. Second part is true, but since first part is wrong, this choice is wrong.

C. Incorrect. First part is correct as discussed in "D". Second part incorrect but plausible, since as noted above if candidate focuses soley on the difference in differential boron worth, they will select this choice.

D. Correct. First part is correct; since both units are at 100% for the given time in core life there is a discernable difference in MTC attributable primarily because of the lower RCS boron concentration.

Second part is also correct and although boron worth is greater the reactivity feedback from the power reduction outweighs the greater differential boron worth.

Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS)

Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the CVCS:

(CFR: 41.5/45.7)

Boron and control rod reactivity effects as they relate to MTC Tier: 2

Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

1-PT-13, plant curves 1-SC-3.1 & 1-SC-3.8 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: D

7. 005A2.03 7 Initial Conditions:

J. Unit 1 is in Mode 6 following a scheduled refueling outage.

K. Reactor vessel level is 74" above centerline and head bolt tensioning is in progress.

L. VCT float is in service.

The running RHR pump trips.

Which of the following choices (1) identifies the effect, if any, this malfunction will have on Reactor Vessel level and (2) whether or not pump venting is required in accordance with 1-AP-11, Loss of RHR prior to placing the standby RHR pump in service?

A. (1) reactor vessel level remains constant (2) RHR pump venting IS required prior to placing the standby RHR pump in service B. (1) reactor vessel level remains constant (2) RHR pump venting IS NOT required prior to placing the standby RHR pump in service C. (1) reactor vessel level increases (2) RHR pump venting IS required prior to placing the standby RHR pump in service D. (1) reactor vessel level increases (2) RHR pump venting IS NOT required prior to placing the standby RHR pump in service D. Correct. Since letdown flow comes from 1142 for the plant configuration given in the stem letdown flow will decrease, and although makeup flow may decrease due to decrease in VCT level (increase in VCT gas space volume) the initial upset will result in an increase in Rx vessel level. the candidate must have a solid understanding of the system alignments and interactions in this infrequent configuration in order to possitively answer correctly. Although pump venting would be a normal course of action (good practice), in this case is outweighed by the concern for restoration of RHR flow and thus NOT required by AP-11 unless there is evidence that supports a need for it.

All distractors are incorrect but plausible because the candidate must clearly know the inter-relationship between the RCS, RHR, and CVCS, in order to arrive at the correct answer. To the candidate who has a knowledge gap in either integrated plant knowledge or specific procedural requirements all of these choices are credible; further distractor plausibility is increased because the event takes place at the end of the outage when there is no urgency to restore shutdown cooling (from the standpoint of time to core boiling).

Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS)

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the RHRS, and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

(CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)

RHR pump/motor malfunction Tier: 2 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

1-OP-8.1, SDBD-NAPS-RH, 1-AP-11 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: D

8. 005K5.05 8 Given the following conditions on Unit 1:

M. The RCS is solid N. RCS pressure is stable at 350 psig O. RCS temperature is stable P. RHR is in service and supplying letdown Q. Letdown orifice HCVs are closed R. Charging flow control 1-CH-FCV-1122 is in MANUAL S. RHR to letdown isolation valve 1-CH-HCV-1142 is set at 50% demand T. Letdown pressure control valve 1-CH-PCV-1145 is in AUTO The air line blows off of 1-CH-HCV-1142.

As a result of this malfunction 1-CH-HCV-1142 will fail _______________ and RCS pressure will

___________________?

A. Closed ; Increase B. Closed ; Decrease C. Open ; Increase D. Open ; Decrease A. Correct. 1142 is at the RHR pump discharge this valve will fail in the closed direction if air is removed. As a result 1145 which normally controls RCS pressure will not be able to affect it and thus pressure will rise.

All distractors are incorrect but plausible because the candidate must clearly know the inter-relationship between the RCS, RHR, and CVCS, as well as the details of operation of the subject components in order to arrive at the correct answer. To the candidate who has a knowledge gap (i.e. is unsure of the failure mode or physical location of the subject valve) all of these choices are credible.

Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS)

Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply the RHRS:

(CFR: 41.5 / 45.7)

Plant response during "solid plant": pressure change due to the relative incompressibility of water Tier: 2 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

1-AP-28, DWG 11715-CH-078, 1-AR-E-B7, SDBD-NAPS-RH Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: A

9. 006A3.03 9 Operators are responding to a large break LOCA.

RWST level is 40% and decreasing.

Which ONE of the following identifies the setpoint at which automatic swap-over to the Containment sump should occur, and describes how a failure of 1-SI-MOV-1885A, Low-Head SI Pump Recirc Valve, to reposition would effect the swapover?

A. 16% ; 1-SI-MOV-1860A, Low-Head SI Pump Suction from Containment Sump WILL NOT automatically open B. 16% ; 1-SI-MOV-1860A, Low-Head SI Pump Suction from Containment Sump WILL automatically open C. 23% ; 1-SI-MOV-1860A, Low-Head SI Pump Suction from Containment Sump WILL NOT automatically open D. 23% ; 1-SI-MOV-1860A, Low-Head SI Pump Suction from Containment Sump WILL automatically open A. Incorrect. Setpoint is correct; second part is incorrect but plausible since there are 2 valves in series, so one could rationalize that ensuring RWST isolation - release concerns - takes precedence, especially since an entire train not swapping is enveloped by single failure.

B. Correct. Setpoint is correct; valve operation correct as seen on attached Technical Reference.

C. Incorrect. Setpoint incorrect but plausible since this is when E-1 directs the operator to go to ES-1.3; second part is incorrect but plausible as discussed in "A".

D. Incorrect. Setpoint incorrect but plausible since this is when E-1 directs the operator to go to ES-1.3; second part is correct as discussed in "A".

Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)

Ability to monitor automatic operation of the ECCS, including:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5)

ESFAS-operated valves Tier: 2 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

1-ICP-QS-L-100C, Setpoint Document, 1-E-1, AR J-A2, DWG 11715-ESK-6ET Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: B

10. 006A4.08 10 Unit 1 tripped from 100% power due to a spurious Safety Injection signal.

The Crew is implementing 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection and the OATC has just taken the SI RESET switches to RESET.

Which ONE of the following identifies the effect that Train "A" Safety Injection failing to reset would have on subsequent recovery actions?

A. Placing 1-CH-P-1A in P-T-L will stop the pump ; Train "A" of Phase "A" CANNOT be reset B. Placing 1-CH-P-1A in P-T-L will stop the pump ; Train "A" of Phase "A" CAN be reset C. Placing 1-CH-P-1A in P-T-L will NOT stop the pump ; Train "A" of Phase "A" CAN be reset D. Placing 1-CH-P-1A in P-T-L will NOT stop the pump ; Train "A" of Phase "A" CANNOT be reset A. Incorrect but plausible since the candidate may select this distractor if they have the misconception that going to P-T-L will always stop a pump (being in P-T-L will prevent breaker from closing on an SI signal so this is a subtle difference). Also candidate who lacks detailed knowledge of SSPS may default to this choice since EOP always reset SI prior to resetting Phase "A" (on the surface this implies Phase "A" can't be reset with SI present).

B. Incorrect but plausible as discussed above. Also as noted Phase "A" will reset with an SI signal present C. Correct. As previously discussed with a failure of the "train" to reset only otherprotective features (86 lockout) will open the breaker. Second part is correct as discussed in "B".

D. Incorrect but plausible; first part correct as discussed above, second part incorrect but plausible as discussed in "A".

Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)

Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8)

ESF system, including reset Tier: 2 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

1-GIP-3A, 11715-ESK-5AL, 1-PT-57.4, DWG 11715-LSK-32-1A Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: C

11. 007A3.01 11 Given the following:

Unit 1 was initially at 100% power.

Bistables for 1-RC-PT-1455, PRZR Pressure Protection Channel I, are in trip for the PT.

A loss of 1-III Vital AC Bus occurs.

The Crew has just completed the Immediate Actions of 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

Based on these plant conditions 1-CH-MOV-1381, RCP Seal Return Isolation, is open because of the loss of ____________ and RCP # 1 Seal Return is flowing to the ____________.

A. control power to the MOV ; PDDT B. control power to the MOV ; PRT C. power to Train "B" Safeguards slave relays ; PDDT D. power to Train "B" Safeguards slave relays ; PRT A. Incorrect. First part incorrect but plausible; the candidate who doesn't know, or confuses slave relay power supplies may erroneously conclude that this would explain why it is open. Some valves at NAPS have switches that enable/disable control power bt this is not one of them. Second part is also incorrect but plausible; even though seal leak-off (return) is relatively cool water (impling it could be routed to the PDDT, similar to #2 seal leak-off) the relief discharges to the PRT.

B. Incorrect. First part incorrect but plausible as discussed above. Second part is correct; 1-CH-MOV-1380 which is in series with the subject valve will close causing the relief to lift and flow to the PRT as shown on the print listed in the technical reference.

C. Incorrect. First part correct as discussed in "A" above. Second part is incorrect but plausible as discussed in "C" above.

D. Correct. First part is correct; the subject valve has power and would normally close on a safety injection, however for this case the slave relays (powered from 1-III Vital AC Bus exclusively - note this is different than the logic bays which have 2 power supplies) has no power so although the logic is made up, the valve doesn't receive an automatic signal so it won't reposition.. Second part is also correct as discussed in "B" above.

Pressurizer Relief Tank/Quench Tank System (PRTS)

Ability to monitor automatic operation of the PRTS, including:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5)

Components which discharge to the PRT Tier: 2 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

DWG 11715-FM-095C-Sh.2, 1-OP-26A, 1-GIP-3B Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: D

12. 008AA1.02 12 Given the following conditions:

Operators tripped Unit 1 from 100% power due to a stuck open PRZR Safety Valve.

• The crew is performing the actions of 1-ES-1.2, Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization.

• Both LHSI pumps have been stopped.

• One charging pump has been stopped.

• Normal charging has been re-aligned.

• RCPs are OFF.

• The crew is on Step 21, "Depressurize RCS to minimize break flow".

The depressurization has been stopped and the following conditions exist:

• RCS subcooling is 23°F and trending DOWN.

• PRZR level is 68% and trending UP.

Based on these indications, what action will be taken in accordance with 1-ES-1.2?

A. Manually start charging pumps and align the BIT B. Start one RCP C. Manually actuate SI D. Increase RCS cooldown rate

A. Correct per attached technical reference (ES-1.2)

B. Incorrect but plausible; given that RCPs are off candidate may choose this action to colapse Head voids, on the surface it appears like a logical solution to address head void (and is in fact employed in the EOP network), so the candidate who doesn't have a detailed understanding of the step sequencing of the procedure may select this choice.

c. Incorrect but plausible the candidate who lacks a firm understanding of the procedure may default to this selection solely based other procedures like ES-0.1 which direct manually actuating SI.

d. Incorrect but plausible because this is a strategy to restore subcooling that is employed at an earlier stage of the procedure.

Pressurizer (PZR) Vapor Space Accident (Relief Valve Stuck Open)

Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident:

(CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

HPI pump to control PZR level/pressure Tier: 1 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

1-ES-1.2 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: A

13. 008G2.1.27 13 Both Units are at 100%.

• 1-CC-P-1A is tagged and uncoupled for maintenance

• 2B CC Hx has been valved out for temperature control due to colder weather conditions The CC System is required by Tech Specs _________________________________; based on these plant conditions the LCO is _________.

A. to provide accident mitigation for a Steam the Generator Tube Rupture ; MET B. to provide accident mitigation for a Steam the Generator Tube Rupture ; NOT MET C. to cooldown one unit quickly while the other unit is operating should the need arise ; MET D. to cooldown one unit quickly while the other unit is operating should the need arise ; NOT MET U. Incorrect. CC supports equipment such as RCPs and most notably RHR cooling. Unlike the

LOCA (which uses long term recirc cooling via RSHXs and SW system) to maintain cold shutdown, the SGTR event looks to place RHR in service, but this is not required for accident analysis purposes. Second part is correct the subject HX can be valved in manually so it can be taken credit for, so the LCO which requires three sub-systems is met.

V. Incorrect. First part incorrect but plausible as discussed above. Second part is incorrect but plausible because 2 components are tagged, which under most circumstances in tech specs, such as Service Water, would mean they are OOS, so the LCO which requires three sub-systems would NOT be met. The candidate who lacks knowledge of the LCO basis for the CC system would likely default to this choice.

W. Correct. As described in the Bases, the CC system supports the capability to cooldown for whatever the need be. Second part is correct as discussed in the Tech Spec Bases.

X. Incorrect. First part is correct as noted in "C". Second part incorrect but plausible as discussed in "B".

Component Cooling Water System (CCWS)

Knowledge of system purpose and/or function.

(CFR: 41.7)

Tier: 2 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

TS 3.7.19 and Bases Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info: goes above and beyond K/A in order to make a higher order question.

Answer: C

14. 009EK3.06 14 Unit 1 was initially at 100% power.

The OATC tripped the reactor due to decreasing PRZR Level and Pressure.

Offsite power was lost shortly after the trip.

The crew is currently preforming 1-ES-1.2, Post LOCA Cooldown and depressurization, Step 13, "depressurize the RCS to refill the PRZR" Plant conditions prior to starting depressurization were:

• PRZR Level 4% and stable

• RCS Subcooling 40°F and slowly increasing

• Core exit TCs 532°F and slowly decreasing The depressurization begins and the OATC notes the following conditions:

• PRZR Level 40% and increasing rapidly

• RCS Subcooling -5°F and slowly decreasing

• Core exit TCs 530°F and slowly decreasing

Which ONE of the following identifies the reason for the OATC observation and includes the action the OATC will take?

A. accumulators are injecting ; close Auxiliary Spray Valve to stop depressurization B. accumulators are injecting ; close PRZR PORV to stop depressurization C. upper head is voiding ; close Auxiliary Spray Valve to stop depressurization D. upper head is voiding ; close PRZR PORV to stop depressurization A. Incorrect. First part incorrect but plausible because this would happen if pressure gets too low.

Second part also incorrect but plausible since it makes sense that you would want to use aux spray to minimize further RCS inventory loss, however for this procedure the PORV is the alternative (RNO) since normal spray isn't available (offsite power lost). Some EOPs do use Auxiliary Spray as the first alternative to normal spray.

B. Incorrect. First part incorrect but plausible as discussed above. Second part is correct.

C. Incorrect. First part is correct; the lack of forced circulation supports upper head voiding under these plant conditions. Second part incorrect but plausible since it makes sense that you would want to use aux spray to minimize further RCS inventory loss, however for this procedure the PORV is the alternative (RNO) since normal spray isn't available (offsite power lost).

D. Correct. First part is correct; the lack of forced circulation supports upper head voiding under these plant conditions. Second part is correct the PORV is the alternative per ES-1.2 when normal spray isn't available.

Small Break LOCA Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the small break LOCA:

(CFR 41.5 / 41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13)

RCS inventory balance Tier: 1 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

1-ES-1.2 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: D

15. 010K2.02 15 Unit 1 is at 100% power.

1-RC-PT-1456, PRZR Pressure Protection Channel II, failed high and 1-MOP-55.73, Pressurizer Pressure Protection Instrumentation, has been implemented, but bistables have NOT been placed in trip yet.

A loss of 1-I Vital 120VAC Bus occurs.

Based on these plant conditions an automatic reactor trip ________________ occur and automatic Pressurizer Pressure Control is _________________________.

A. will not ; available B. will not ; NOT available C. will ; available D. will ; NOT available A. Incorrect. First part incorrect but plausible since the indication for CH.1 (1455) will fail in the low direction, so the candidate who does not know the protection bistable coincidence, logic, failure mode, or fails to take this into account may select this choice. Second part is correct; the Process Rack for the subject transmitter & controllers is powered from the vital bus that was lost, however there is a backup source that comes from the emergency bus so this instrumentation will have power.

B. Incorrect. First part incorrect but plausible as noted above. Second part also incorrect but plausible since as discussed the candidate who is unaware of source of power to process racks (or the fact that there is a seperate source for the internal rack backup supply) may default to this simply because so much other instrumentation is lost as a result of the 1-I loss.

C. Correct. First part is correct; as discussed earlier, an automatic reactor trip on 2/3 Hi RCS pressure will occur even though pressure is normal (2235 psig) as a result of the 1-I bus loss. Second part is also correct as discussed in "A".

D. Incorrect. First part is correct as mentioned above. Second part incorrect but plausible as discussed in "B".

Pressurizer Pressure Control System (PZR PCS)

Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following:

(CFR: 41.7)

Controller for PZR spray valve Tier: 2 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

1-ICM-PRO-PW-001, 1-OP-26A, 1-AR-D-B1 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: C

16. 011A2.01 16 Given the following:

• Unit 1 is in Mode 3 following a scheduled refueling outage.

• 1-OP-1.4, Unit Startup from Mode 4 to Mode 3 is in progress

• The crew is heating up the RCS and raising RCS pressure The following alarms are received:

• C-B3, REGEN HX LETDWN LINE HI TEMP

• C-B4, LO PRESS LETDWN LINE HI FLOW Which ONE of the following identifies the cause of these alarms and includes the corrective action the operator should take?

A. inadequate charging flow ; place 1-CH-FCV-1122, Charging Flow Control Valve in MANUAL and increase charging B. inadequate charging flow ; isolate Normal Letdown C. excessive letdown flow ; place 1-CH-PCV-1145, Letdown Pressure Control Valve in MANUAL and control pressure D. excessive letdown flow ; close one letdown orifice isolation valve A. Incorrect. Plausible because insufficient charging will result in C-B3; left uncorrected C-B4 would eventually result due to flashing in the line. Corrective action is a typical method to remedy condition.

B. Incorrect. Plausible because the corrective action given is one method to remedy condition; the cause, since both alarms come in at the same time does not adequately explain C-B4 however.

C. Incorrect. plausible because the alarms support cause as correct; corrective action given makes sense on the surface, but for these plant conditions it would not be effective in itself.

D. Correct. As seen in the attached Technical References having both alarms confirms this as the cause. Closing a letdown orifice accomplishes the stated remedy "reduce letdown flow".

Pressurizer Level Control System (PZR LCS)

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the PZR LCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

(CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)

Excessive letdown Tier: 2 Group: 2 Technical

Reference:

1-AR-C-B3, 1-AR-C-B4, 1-OP-1.4 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: D

17. 011EA2.08 17 Unit 1 was operating at 100%.

A Large Break LOCA occurred at time 12:00.

The crew has completed 1-ES-1.3, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirc.

1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, will direct the crew to go to 1-ES-1.4, Transfer to Hot Leg Recirculation, ___________ after event initiation; the reason for this action is to A. 4.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> ; preclude boron precipitation which could potentially hinder core cooling B. 4.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> ; preclude accelerated localized corrosion of cladding in the upper regions of the core C. 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> ; preclude boron precipitation which could potentially hinder core cooling D. 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> ; preclude accelerated localized corrosion of cladding in the upper regions of the core A. Correct. Latest procedure revision 4.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> after EVENT INITIATION. reason provided is per E-1 background document.

B. Incorrect. First part correct; latest procedure revision 4.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> after EVENT INITIATION. Second part incorrect, but plausible because corrision and things like pH & chemistry are of concern. the EOPs check them and have you evaluate, but while this sounds good and could have benefits along those lines, it's not the reason for swapping given in the background document.

C. Incorrect. First part incorrect but plausible if the candidate is under the misconception that the swap time is 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> (this is the frequency that all subsequent swaps, back and forth, between cold and hot, are performed at). Second part is correct as noted in "A" above.

D. Incorrect. First part incorrect but plausible if the candidate is under the misconception that the swap time is 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> (this is the frequency that all subsequent swaps, back and forth, between cold and hot, are performed at). Second part is also incorrect but plausible as discussed in "B" above.

Large Break LOCA Ability to determine or interpret the following as they apply to a Large Break LOCA:

(CFR 43.5 / 45.13)

Conditions necessary for recovery when accident reaches stable phase Tier: 1 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

1-E-1 and WOG Background Document Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info: similar questions used as k/a match found on turkey point 2005 exam and Vogtle 2005 exam Answer: A

18. 012A1.01 18 Unit 1 just cleared a Chemistry hold at 30% power and is ramping to 100% power following a scheduled refueling.

As the Unit is ramped up the OATC should expect the _____________SETPOINT to change, this is due to the change in _______ that occurs over the course of the ramp.

A. OPT ; axial flux B. OPT ; Thot C. OTT ; axial flux D. OTT ; Thot A. Incorrect. plausible because this trip has a variable setpoint. second part is also plausible because this is an input to the calculation and will change.

B. Incorrect. plausible as noted above. second part is true for OT but not OP; for a transient like a significant load rejection a rapid changing Thot would cause a reduction in setpoint.

C. Incorrect. First part is correct this setpoint will decrease during the ramp becasue the change in Tave penalizes it. Second part in correct but plausible as discussed in "B".

D. Correct. First part correct as noted in "C". Second part also correct. tcold remains relatively constant but thot increases causing Tave to increase which penalizes the setpoint.

Reactor Protection System Ability to predict and/or monitor Changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the RPS controls including:

(CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)

Trip setpoint adjustment Tier: 2 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

TRM Section 4.3, RTS Instrumentation Trip Setpoints Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: D

19. 013K6.01 19 Unit 1 is at 100% power.

Containment Pressure Protection Channel II (1-LM-P-100B) failed on the previous shift and all bistables have been positioned in accordance with 1-MOP-55.75, Containment Pressure Protection Instrument.

Which ONE of the following is true concerning a subsequent Containment Pressure Channel failure?

A. If 1-LM-P-100A, Containment Pressure Protection Channel I, fails high ONLY CDA will actuate.

B. If 1-LM-P-100C, Containment Pressure Protection Channel III, fails high ONLY Main Steam Line Isolation and SI will actuate.

C. If 1-LM-P-100D, Containment Pressure Protection Channel IV, fails high CDA, Main Steam Line Isolation, and SI will actuate.

D. A failure high of any one of the remaining Containment Pressure Protection Channels WILL NOT cause an ESF actuation.

b. Correct. bistables for 1-LM-P-100B are placed in trip per the MOP EXCEPT for CDA which is bypassed;the candidate who doesn't know the specific functions and logic of each channel along with the details of the MOP won't know this.

Distactors:

All distractors plausible based on the depth of knowledge required to answer the question, (specific channel functions, logic, procedural knowledge of an infrequently used MOP). The candidate who is unsure may default to "C" soley based on fail safe mentality and the fact that it is true 99% of the time.

Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS)

Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the following will have on the ESFAS:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8)

Sensors and detectors Tier: 2 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

1-MOP-55.75, DWG 5655D33, Sh. 8 of 16 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: B

20. 014K1.02 20 A Reactor Startup is in progress on Unit 1.

The OATC has just completed recording critical data.

Annunciator A-G2, RPI Rod Bot Rod Drop, is received and the OATC observes that Rod Bottom Lights are ON for Rods D4 and M12, and the IRPIs for both indicate 0 steps.

Based on the above, select the choice that,

1) identifies the parameter that is the best to use to differentiate between an actual dropped rod condition versus an IRPI malfunction, and

2) includes the required operator action assuming the parameter has changed?

A. 1) RCS Tave

2) manually insert all control banks B. 1) RCS Tave

2) trip the reactor C. 1) Intermediate Range SUR

2) manually insert all control banks D. 1) Intermediate Range SUR

2) trip the reactor A. Incorrect. first part is plausible since this is true during a startup once you get above the POAH.

second part plausible since this would place you in Mode 3 where the TS no longer applies, based on the plant conditions there is no apparent need to trip the reactor, so this would seem like a logical choice between the 2 alternatives.

B. Incorrect. first part incorrect but plausible as discussed above. Second part is correct; although not needed for core protection 1-AP-1.2 for dropped rod requires a reactor trip (go to 1-E-0) Note: at NAPS step 1 of E-0 has you manually trip, EVEN if it already tripped on it's own, this is why we can just say "go to E-0", vice "manually trip the reactor and go to E-0" like some plants do.

C. Incorrect. first part is correct assuming the startup is conducted IAW procedures all rods would be high enough such that even a low worth rod dropping will be seen on startup rate since you are exactly critical with no rod motion occurring (i.e. if you were driving rods in to level power at 10E-8 a low worth single rod drop could be masked by an already significantly negative SUR). Second part in correct but plausible as discussed in "A".

D. Correct. First part correct as discussed in "C". Second part also correct as noted in "B" and seen in attached Technical Reference.

Rod Position Indication System (RPIS)

Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the RPIS and the followingsystems:

(CFR: 41.3 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8)

NIS Tier: 2 Group: 2 Technical

Reference:

AR A-G2, 1-AP-1.2

Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info: Conferred with Chief Examineer (since there are no "physical" connections between NIS/IRPI). this question matches KA since the candidate must know how to use the one system (NIS) to validate the indication of the other system (IRPI); the cause-effect relationship is demonstrated by how an indicated change in a system control element effects the process variable (neutron flux).

Answer: D

21. 017K6.01 21 Select the choice that completes the following statement.

Train "A" ICCM Subcooling display is derived from the average of the ___________________________ ;

if a Core Exit Thermocouple experiences an open circuit, then that thermocouple will indicate _______.

A. 5 highest reading thermocouples ; higher B. 5 highest reading thermocouples ; lower C. 4 highest reading thermocouples ; higher D. 4 highest reading thermocouples ; lower A. Incorrect. First part correct 5 highest per TS bases and the system design bases document.

Second part is incorrect but plausible because this is the failure mode for an RTD instrument; thus if the candidate confuses the FM&E for the different devices they may select this response.

b. Correct. First part correct as noted above. Second part is also correct. This is fundamentals; thermocouple generates millivolt (mV) potential proportional to temperature so open circuit means no mV potential & therefore lower indication.

C. Incorrect. First part incorrect but plausible if candidate has incorrect mental model (i.e. an average of the highestSecond part incorrect but plausible as discussed in "A".

D. Incorrect. First part incorrect but plausible as discussed in "C". Second part is correct per attached Technical Reference (TS 3.3.3, Table 3.3.3-1.

In-Core Temperature Monitor System (ITM)

Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction of the following ITM system components:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

Sensors and detectors Tier: 2 Group: 2 Technical

Reference:

TS 3.3.3 Bases, vendor tech man ICCM-86 NAPS Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None

Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: B

22. 022AK1.04 22 Unit 1 is at 50% power.

The crew is recovering from a failure of the selected Pressurizer Level Transmitter.

Operable PRZR level channels have been selected.

1-CH-FCV-1122 is in manual.

Current conditions are:

• PRZR level is 50% and stable

• RCS Tave is 564°F and stable

• 1-RC-LC-1459G demand is 10%

Based on the currect conditions, which one of the following describes the system status and the action OATC will take to restore PRZR level control to automatic?

A. PRZR level is below program; increase charging to restore PRZR level to program, ensure 1-RC-LC-1459G is in automatic, then place 1-CH-FCV-1122 in automatic.

B. PRZR level is below program; increase charging to restore PRZR level to program, adjust 1-RC-LC-1459G as required, then place 1-CH-FCV-1122 in automatic.

C. PRZR level is above program; decrease charging to restore PRZR level to program, ensure 1-RC-LC-1459G is in automatic, then place 1-CH-FCV-1122 in automatic.

D. PRZR level is above program; decrease charging to restore PRZR level to program, adjust 1-RC-LC-1459G as required, then place 1-CH-FCV-1122 in automatic.

A. Incorrect but plausible; candidate may select this choice if they do not know the PRZR level program, second part is also plausible since 1122 is a slave to 1459G and the candidate might assume the only action needed is to just make sure it is in auto.

b. Incorrect but plausible; first part as discussed above, second part is the correct response if PRZR level was below program (which again for the current conditions it is not).

c. Incorrect but plausible; level is above the candidate who does not fully understand the relationship between 1459G and 1122 might assume that the only thing needed once level is back on program is to just make sure you are in auto.

d. Correct; level is above program, second part is also correct based on the current conditions 1459G is required to be adjusted prior to transferring 1122 back to auto.

Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup:

(CFR 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3)

Reason for changing from manual to automatic control of charging flow valve controller Tier: 1 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

1-AP-3, PLS Document, 1-GOP-1.0 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: D

23. 022G2.1.7 23 Unit 1 is at 100% power.

The Mechanical Chiller has tripped and cannot be re-started.

As a result the crew should expect that over time the indicated partial pressure will (1) and the crew will restore a source of cooling water in accordance with 1-AP-35, Loss of Containment Air Recirculation Cooling, by aligning (2) to Containment Air Recirc Fans.

A. (1) increase (2) CC B. (1) increase (2) Service Water C. (1) decrease (2) CC D. (1) decrease (2) Service Water A. Incorrect. Plausible because the person who doesn't understand how partial pressure is derived would default to "indicated pressure" increasing because actual pressure will increase as containment temperature increases and since CC supplies other equipment in CNTMT like RCPs and RHR, it is plausible the the non-safety CC system would be used for non-safety CARFs.

B. Incorrect. As noted above indicated partial pressure response is incorrect but plausible. The given alternate source of cooling water is correct per 1-AP-35.

C. Incorrect. Indicated partial pressure response is correct. Alternate source of cooling (CC) incorrect but plausible as discussed in "A".

D. Correct. Indicated partial pressure response is correct. The given alternate source of cooling water is correct per 1-AP-35.

Containment Cooling System

Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation.

(CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.12 / 45.13)

Tier: 2 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

1-AP-35, SDBD-NAPS-CV Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: D

24. 025AK1.04 24 Unit 1 is cooling down for a scheduled refueling.

The crew has just completed placing RHR in service.

1-RH-P-1B and 1-CC-P-1B are running.

A lightning strike results in a loss of the "A" RSST.

With no operator action, 1 minute after the loss of the "A" RSST the Unit 1 OATC should expect that there will be ________ RHR pump(s) running and __________ Unit 1 CC pump(s) running.

A. 0 ; 1 B. 0 ; 2 C. 1 ; 1 D. 1 ; 2 A. Incorrect. First part is true, some pumps (Charging pumps and LHSI pumps) ride the bus on a UV, but RHR does not. Second part is plausible since again, there are several interlocks, lockouts, sequencing & auto-start features that must be considered, along with knowledge of the electrical system.

B. Correct. As noted above first part is correct. Second part is also correct. 1-CC-P-1A will auto-start and since the question states " 1 minute after the loss of the "A" RSST" 1-CC-P-1B will sequence on after the EDG picks up the bus.

C. Incorrect but plausible because the candidate must know both the electrical line-up and know how the stub bus and RHR pump breakers respond to this transient. Second part incorrect but plausible as discussed in "A".

D. Incorrect. First part plausible as discussed in "C". Second part correct as discussed in "B".

Loss of Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS)

Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of Residual Heat Removal System:

(CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

Closed cooling water pumps Tier: 1 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

1-PT-83.4J Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: B

25. 026K4.01 25 Select the choice that completes the following description of the Recirc Spray Sub-systems.

In the event of a Design Basis Loss of Coolant Accident, when RWST level reaches the setpoint, the (1) Recirc Spray Pumps will start following a two minute time delay; NPSH to these pumps is increased by the operation of the (2) pumps.

A. (1) Inside (2) Casing Cooling B. (1) Inside (2) Quench Spray C. (1) Outside (2) Casing Cooling D. (1) Outside (2) Quench Spray A. Incorrect. the insides start after the time delay. second part incorrect but plausible as this is the source to the outsides.

B. Correct. The insides start after time delay. Second part also correct. The design feature is a branch line with flow restriction to provide the right amount of water that can help out Inside recirc spray pumps while still maintaining CNTMT peak pressure requirements of the accident analysis.

C. Incorrect. plausible since candidate may reverse order. correct pumps for NPSH for these.

D. Incorrect plausible since candidate may reverse order. Incorrect but plausible since it does do this function for the insides.

Containment Spray System (CSS)

Knowledge of CSS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:

(CFR: 41.7)

Source of water for CSS, including recirculation phase after LOCA Tier: 2 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

1-E-0 and TS 3.6.7 Bases Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info: K/A is tested since these systems (quench spray & casing cooling) provide an additional source of water to the respective recirc spray pumps to ensure those pumps are able to perform their Design Basis function. Considered bank since this question is a combination of two bank questions.

Answer: B

26. 027AK2.03 26 Unit 1 is at 100% power.

1-RC-PT-1444, PRZR Pressure Control Transmitter fails HIGH As a result of the failure, the demand on 1-RC-PC-1444J, Master Pressure Controller, will ___________

and in accordance with 1-AP-44, Loss of Reactor Coolant System Pressure, the OATC will place 1-RC-PC-1444J in MANUAL and depress the _____________ pushbutton.

A. increase ; lower B. increase ; raise C. decrease ; raise D. decrease ; lower B. Correct answer. the controller is direct acting (PV increase = output (demand) increase). the M/A station is reverse acting (raise pushbutton lowers demand).

All distractors are plausible since the controller and M/A station within the same control loop act differently, the person who defaults to conventional wisdom or isn't sure of the difference will likely select an incorrect choice.

Pressurizer Pressure Control System (PZR PCS) Malfunction Knowledge of the interrelations between the Pressurizer Pressure Control Malfunctions and the following:

(CFR 41.7 / 45.7)

Controllers and positioners Tier: 1 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

1-AP-44, 1-AR-B-E6, SDBD-NAPS-RC, NAPS PLS Document

Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info: This is important at NAPS since it is fairly unique with respect to most of the control loops we have. lack of understanding of controller and/or M/A station operation could result in a mis-diagnosis of the event, or mis-operation of the system thus aggravating the situation.

Answer: B

27. 027K2.01 27 According to the System Design Basis Document, the Containment Iodine Filtration Fans are powered from (1) and are placed in operation to (2) .

A. (1) Emergency Busses (2) reduce airborne radioactivity in Containment prior to opening Containment for entry.

B. (1) Emergency Busses (2) minimize release during a postulated fuel handling accident inside Containment.

C. (1) Station Service Busses (2) reduce airborne radioactivity in Containment prior to opening Containment for entry.

D. (1) Station Service Busses (2) minimize release during a postulated fuel handling accident inside Containment.

A. Incorrect. First part incorrect but plausible since some things (like flux mapper drives) that aren't required to function during an accident do receive power from emergency busses because of the benefits that can be derived by using them if conditions permit. Second part is correct, these fans were supplied based on the potential for buildup of Iodine in Containment from minor RCS leakage.

B. Incorrect. First part incorrect as discussed above. Second part is incorrect but plausible since procedures such as FR-Z.3, Response to High Containment Radiation Level, mention the ability to use these based on recommendations from Health Physics and other members of plant staff; the candidate who lacks detailed knowledge of the design basis document may conclude that they are installed for the reason given in this distractor.

C. Correct. First part is correct there are 2 fans, each one receiving power from a seperate station service motor control center (MCC), one or both can be operated as a time. Second part is correct as discussed in "A".

D. Incorrect. First part is correct as noted above. Second part is incorrect but plausible as discussed in "B".

Containment Iodine Removal System (CIRS)

Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following:

(CFR: 41.7)

Fans Tier: 2 Group: 2

Technical

Reference:

System Desin Basis Document - Containment Ventilation System Station Load List Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective: System Design Basis Document additional info:

Answer: C

28. 028AK3.03 28 Unit 1 was initially at 100% power A load rejection occurred causing a PRZR Safety to lift and stick fully open.

The reactor tripped and SI actuated.

Current plant conditions are:

• RCS subcooling based on Core Exit TCs, -2°F and stable

• RCS pressure 950 psig and stable

• The PRZR Safety is still fully open Given the current plant conditions, as the crew responds in accordance with 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, the OATC should expect PRZR level indication to ___________________.

A. increase because SI flow is greater than the capacity of the stuck open PRZR Safety B. increase because steam generated in the reactor vessel is entering the PRZR through the surge line C. decrease because reference leg flashing will result in an indicated level that is lower than actual level D. decrease because dissolution of gases in the reference leg will result in an indicated level that is lower than actual level A. Incorrect. Plausible because candidate may be unsure of the relationship of SI flow to safety valve flow, or may confuse (equate) capacity to that of a PORV, especially since a substantial amount of time and material are devoted to the fact that 2 SI pumps injecting may exceed the capacity of a single PORV.

B. Correct. The WOG ERG, Generic Issue SI Termination/Reinitiation, discusses the scenario presented above (steam vent path is established from the pressurizer vapor space and where RCS subcooling is not indicated), however the candidate who lacks understanding of this phenomenon may likely discount the reason as rubbish created by the exam author.

C. Incorrect. Plausible because reference leg flashing and the adverse affect it has on level indication is trained on. The candidate who doesn't understand the cause-effect for the scenario presented may select this choice by default.

D. Incorrect. Plausible because this is an issue due to the rapid pressure drop presented in the scenario. This again gets back having a solid understanding of the scenario provided in the stem; the candidate who lacks that would be more likely to jump on a "key word/tricky phrase/hot topic" choice that they recognize, as opposed to a concept they can't quite get their head around.

Pressurizer (PZR) Level Control Malfunction Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Pressurizer Level Control Malfunctions:

(CFR 41.5,41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13)

False indication of PZR level when PORV or spray valve is open and RCS saturated Tier: 1 Group: 2 Technical

Reference:

WOG ERG, Generic Issue SI Termination/Reinitiation Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: B

29. 029A3.01 29 Given that Containment Purge is in-service on Unit 1.

Which ONE of the following identifies the two items that can cause automatic isolation of the Containment Purge?

A. 1-RM-RMS-159, Containment Particulate Radiation Monitor Hi-Hi alarm.

Manual Actuation of Containment Isolation Phase A.

B. 1-RM-RMS-162, Manipulator Crane Radiation Monitor Hi-Hi alarm.

1-VG-RI-180-1, MGP Vent Stack B Rad monitor Hi alarm.

C. 1-RM-RMS-159, Containment Particulate Radiation Monitor Hi-Hi alarm.

1-RM-RMS-162, Manipulator Crane Radiation Monitor Hi-Hi alarm.

D. Manual Actuation of Containment Isolation Phase A.

1-VG-RI-180-1, MGP Vent Stack B Rad monitor Hi alarm.

a. Incorrect. First one is correct. Second one is incorrect but plausible since this is a direct pathway from the containment to atmosphere and the candidate who lacks detailed systems knowledge might conclude that this would be logical (since phase A closes CNTMT penetrations) and default to this distactor.

b. Incorrect. First one is correct. Second part is is incorrect but plausible since this is where the CNTMT purge exhausts to, and if valid would indicate a release in progress. Again the candidate who lacks detailed systems knowledge might conclude that it would be logical for the purge system to isolate and default to this distactor. It should also be noted that one of the sister MGPs for process vents does cause automatic isolation of CNTMT vacuum TVs and this function could easily be confused with the CNTMT Purge System.

c. Correct. Either condition will result in Containment Ventilation Isolation.

d. Incorrect. Neither choice is correct, which is acceptable since as discussed above, both are plausible.

Containment Purge System (CPS)

Ability to monitor automatic operation of the Containment Purge System including:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5)

CPS isolation Tier: 2 Group: 2 Technical

Reference:

1-AP-5 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: C

30. 029EK2.06 30 Unit 1 was initially at 100% power when the following sequence of events occurred:

• "A" Main Steam Trip Valve drifted closed causing a Safety Injection

• The OATC notes that the Reactor Trip breakers failed to open and manually trips the reactor.

• All equipment functions as designed EXCEPT "B" Reactor Trip Breaker failed to open.

• The OATC momentarily places both SI reset switches in RESET per the applicable EOP Based on the above, _______________ AND __________________.

A. ONLY the "A" train of SI is reset ; ONLY the "A" train of SI automatic initiation is blocked B. ONLY the "A" train of SI is reset ; BOTH trains of SI automatic initiation are blocked C. BOTH trains of SI are reset ; ONLY the "A" train of SI automatic initiation is blocked D. BOTH trains of SI are reset ; BOTH trains of SI automatic initiation are blocked Y. Incorrect but plausible, P-4 is train dependent, thus the candidate who lacks detailed knowledge of the inter-relationship of the interlock with the SI block & reset functions (discussed in "C" below) would likely select this distractor.

Z. Incorrect but plausible since as discussed above a mis-conception of the logic or operation of P-4 could lead a candidate to select this response.

AA. Correct. The reset function will work since it doesn't rely on P-4 PROVIDED the initiating signal is CLEAR, the auto-block function only works on "A" train because the "B" RTB remained closed throughout the event.

BB. Incorrect but plausible since as discussed above a mis-conception of the logic or operation of P-4

could lead a candidate to select this response.

Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS)

Knowledge of the interrelations between the and the following an ATWS:

(CFR 41.7 / 45.7)

Breakers, relays, and disconnects Tier: 1 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

DWGs 5655D33-Sh.8, 5655D33-Sh.2, 1-OP-7.12 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: C

31. 035A1.02 31 Operators have been cooling down the RCS using 1-AP-49.1, Loss of Normal and Excess letdown.

The following data was taken during the cooldown:

TIME RCS PRESSURE RCS TEMPERATURE 16:00 2150psig 520°F 18:00 1950psig 460°F 20:00 1800psig 380°F Based on the above data, the primary to secondary differential pressure limit _____________________.

A. Was FIRST exceeded at 16:00 B. Was FIRST exceeded at 18:00 C. Was FIRST exceeded at 20:00 D. Was NOT exceeded CC. Incorrect but plausible if the candidate erroneously concluded that the D/P was controlled by a difference between the RCS PORV setpoint of 2335 psig and a nominal SG pressure of 1005 psig, this would equate to a D/P of 1330 psig. 520°F corresponds to 800 psig which would be a D/P of 1350 psi.

DD. Incorrect but plausible if the candidate erroneously concluded that the D/P was controlled by a difference between the RCS Safety valve setpoint of 2485 psig and a nominal SG pressure of 1005 psig. This would equate to a D/P of 1480 psig. 460°F corresponds to 450 psig which would be a D/P of 1500 psi EE. Correct the limit is a fixed value of 1600 psid as discussed in 1-AP-49.1 and WCAP-17186-P for

the given conditions, 380°F corresponds to 180psig for a D/P of 1620 psi.

FF. Incorrect but plausible, for events such as a faulted SG, the D/P may approach 2335 psig for certain event sequences, the candidate who does not know what the limit is may assume that they are designed for a D/P around this value and default to this distractor.

Steam Generator System (S/GS)

Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the S/Gs controls including:

(CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)

S/G pressure Tier: 2 Group: 2 Technical

Reference:

1-AP-49.1 and Steam Tables Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: C

32. 038EK1.02 32 The following conditions exist:

GG. A SGTR has occurred on Unit 2 HH. The RCS cooldown is complete and the crew is preparing to depressurize the RCS in accordance with 2-E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture.

Which ONE of the following describes the reason for the RCS depressurization?

A. Increases SI flow to increase RCS inventory while decreasing the amount of leakage to the ruptured SG.

B. Allows backflow of the ruptured steam generator into the RCS minimizing contamination levels in the generator.

C. Minimizes the probability of a pressurized thermal shock event when the RCS is cooled down in a recovery procedure.

D. Ensures there will be no release of radioactivity through the ruptured SG PORV for the duration of the event.

II. Correct. The depressurization is done to refill the pressurizer and reduce break flow prior to terminating safety injection.

JJ. Incorrect. Backfill is the preferred method for getting rid of the water but it is not desired until

ES-3.1. It has procedural steps that address reactivity control while performing this process.

KK. Incorrect. PTS is only a concern if ruptured SG pressure is low. A candidate could choose this answer based on the knowledge that pressurized thermal shock is often a concern after a cooldown has occurred.

LL. Incorrect. Due to auxiliary feedwater supply and safety injection flow, a heat sink is provided that absorbs some of the decay heat. It is assumed that the PORV on the ruptured generator will not open > 30 minutes after the event.

Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR)

Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the SGTR:

(CFR 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3)

Leak rate vs. pressure drop Tier: 1 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

1-E-3 and WOG Background Document Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info: Originally came from INPO bank (Indian Point2)

Answer: A

33. 039A2.01 33 Unit 1 was initially at 100% when a Design Basis Loss of Coolant Accident occurred.

Unit 1 is on Cold Leg Recirc and the crew is performing 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.

The crew is at 1-E-1, Step 24, "Check if intact SGs should be depressurized to RCS pressure" Which ONE of the following identifies the method for depressurizing Steam Generators and includes the Bases for that action?

A. Condenser Steam Dumps ; minimize heat input from the SGs to the RCS and remove heat from Containment B. Condenser Steam Dumps ; minimize the potential for SG tube failure C. SG PORVs ; minimize heat input from the SGs to the RCS and remove heat from Containment D. SG PORVs ; minimize the potential for SG tube failure A. Incorrect. plausible because the candidate may not consider the consequences that result from the DBA and this is the normal (preferred method) of performing the action; bases is correct IAW 1-E-1 Background document.

B. Incorrect. plausible as discussed above; bases is incorrect but plausible since there is a design limit on the maximum secondary-to-primary D/P (600 psid) which as implied would be exceeded under these conditions.

C. Correct. the candidate must be knowledgable of the accident analysis case for CNTMT response and couple that knowledge with the knowledge of ESF systems in order to determine that this is the correct choice ; bases is correct IAW 1-E-1 Background document.

D. Incorrect. correct as explained in "C" ; bases is incorrect but plausible as discussed in "B".

Main and Reheat Steam System (MRSS)

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the MRSS; and (b) based on predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

(CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)

Flow paths of steam during a LOCA Tier: 2 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

1-E-1 and WOG Background Document Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: C

34. 040AG2.4.20 34 Operators are performing 1-ECA-2.1, Uncontrolled Depressurization of ALL Steam Generators.

Operators are at Step 2, "Control Feed Flow to Minimize RCS Cooldown" The STA reports that cold leg temperatures are decreasing at 120°F/HR.

All SGs are below the Narrow Range.

Based on these plant conditions the BOP will adjust feed flow to ________ to each SG ; this minimum feed flow is supplied in order to _________________________________________________________.

A. 100 gpm ; preclude water hammer if feed flow is subsequently increased to control RCS temperature B. 100 gpm ; minimize thermal stresses if feed flow is subsequently increased to control RCS temperature C. 120 gpm ; preclude water hammer if feed flow is subsequently increased to control RCS temperature D. 120 gpm ; minimize thermal stresses if feed flow is subsequently increased to control RCS temperature

A. Incorrect. 100 gpm is right for NAPS (minimum verifiable for us); water hammer is plausible because design changes such as J-tube installation on feed-rings have occurred over the years and water hammer is still a hot topic.

B. Correct. 100 correct per 1-ECA-2.1; background document for ECA-2.1 gives this as the reason, while it cannot be totally discounted that some water hammer may occur, the Bases clearly states that thermal stress is the driver for the requirement.

C. Incorrect. plausible if candidate erroneously concludes that there is no relief provided regarding Heat Sink (minimum of 340 gpm OR at least 1 SG with a NR level >11%), so you would minimize by going to 120 each for 360 total thus staying above 340; water hammer incorrect but plausible as discussed in "A".

D. Incorrect. wrong number as discussed in "C"; correct Bases per ECA-2.1 Background document.

Steam Line Rupture Knowledge of the operational implications of EOP warnings, cautions, and notes.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13)

Tier: 1 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

1-ECA-2.1 and WOG Background Document Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: B

35. 045K5.17 35 Which ONE of the following identifies (1) how main steam header pressure responds as turbine load is raised from 25% to 65%, and (2) which method of maintaining Tavg matched with Tref results in the value of MTC being the MOST negative as turbine load is raised?

A. (1) Main steam header pressure lowers.

(2) Rods are withdrawn to maintain Tavg on program, with Boron concentration held constant.

B. (1) Main steam header pressure rises.

(2) Rods are withdrawn to maintain Tavg on program, with Boron concentration held constant.

C. (1) Main steam header pressure lowers.

(2) Rod position is held constant, while Boron concentration is lowered to maintain Tavg on program.

D. (1) Main steam header pressure rises.

(2) Rod position is held constant, while Boron concentration is lowered to maintain Tavg on program .

a. Incorrect. Main Steam Header pressure lowers as turbine load is raised. Plausible since candidate could conclude that withdrawing rods makes MTC more negative. It actually makes it less negative . However a competing effect of Tavg rising has a negative effect on MTC.

b. Incorr ect. Main Steam Header pressure lowers as turbine load is raised . Plausible since candidate could conclude that withdrawing rods makes MTC more negative . It actually makes it less negative. However, a competing effect of Tavg rising has a negative effect on MTC.

c. CORRECT. Main Steam Header pressure lowers as turbine load is raised. Reduction of boron concentration results in more negative MTC. Tavg rising has a negati ve effect on MTC.

This additiv e negative effect is the most negative of all choices given.

d. Incorrect. Main Steam Header pressure lowers as turbine load is raised. Reduction of boron concentration results in more negative MTC. Tavg rising has a negative effect on MTC. This additive negative effect is the most negative of all choices given.

Main Turbine Generator (MT/G) System Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as the apply to the MT/B System:

(CFR: 41.5 / 45.7)

Relationship between moderator temperature coefficient and boron concentration in RCS as T/G load increases Tier: 2 Group: 2 Technical

Reference:

1-PT-13 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: C

36. 054AK3.04 36 Unit 1 was initially at 100% power with Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1-FW-P-3A tagged out.

A spurious Safety Injection occurred and all equipment functioned properly except:

• Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1-FW-P-2 oversped and tripped when starting up

• Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1-FW-P-3B shaft sheared when starting up Operators are implementing 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and are at step 7, "Verify AFW Flow" Current plant conditions are:

• "A" SG WR level - 45%, slowly lowering

• "B" SG WR level - 42%, slowly lowering

• "C" SG WR level - 44%, slowly lowering Based on the current plant conditions, transition to 1-FR-H.1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink, is

_________________ because __________________.

A. required ; an alternate source of feed or alternate heat sink must be established for decay heat removal.

B. required ; bleed and feed criteria is met and must be established without delay to avoid potential core

uncovery.

C. NOT required ; FRs are not implemented until AFTER proper safeguards equipment alignment has been verified IAW 1-E-0.

D. NOT required ; an AP-22 series procedure is used in parrallel to restore a source of feed while continuing in 1-E-0.

a. Correct. based on the given conditions 1-E-0 step 7 RNO requires transition to H.1; the reason given (the because) is the stated reason in the WOG background document.

b. Incorrect. Plausible since the candidate may not have the bleed & feed criteria memorized.

c. Incorrect. Plausible because this is a RULE OF USAGE (because in the process the ORP may start or align equipment and restore a "function", thus avoiding an unnecessary procedure transition that would unnecessarily delay EOP implementation); the candidate may not recognize this exception to the rule and default to conventional wisdom.

d. Correct. Several procedures direct using APs in parallel.

Loss of Main Feedwater (MFW)

Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of Main Feedwater (MFW):

(CFR 41.5,41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13)

Actions contained in EOPs for loss of MFW Tier: 1 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

1-E-0 and WOG Background Document, 1-fr-h.1 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: A

37. 055EA2.03 37 Given the following plant conditions:

• Unit 2 has experienced a Loss of All AC power.

• The crew has initiated 0-OP-6.4, Operation of the SBO Diesel (SBO Event)

• The US has directed the SBO operator to energize 2H Emergency Bus Based on the above plant conditions, the SBO operator will energize ________ and place the interlock defeat switch for the Feeder breaker to 2H Bus in SBO, in order to allow this Feeder breaker to be closed with breaker ___________________.

A. "L" 4160v Bus ; 05L1 closed B. "L" 4160v Bus ; 15E1 open

C. "M" 4160v Bus ; 05L1 closed D. "M" 4160v Bus ; 15E1 open A. Incorrect. first part correct, to energize the given emergency bus the SBO operator has to energize the correct SBO bus first in order to then energize the correct one of the 3 transfer busses. Second part is incorrect but plausible because this is an abnormal alignment and mis-operation of these breakers can cause TS violation (inoperability of offsite sources) and violate GDC requirements. An interlock would be nice, and with that in mind the candidate who lacks detailed knowledge of the subject switch may default to this distractor because it sounds logical. Further the switch has more than one function and the candidate may think this is one of them.

B. Correct. first part correct as discussed above. Second part also correct. One of the functions of this switch is to permit closure regardless of 15E1 position along with permitting closure regardless of associated RSST lockouts that may be present.

C. Incorrect. Plausible because candidate may not have solid knowledge of SBO Busses. second part plausible as discussed in "A".

D. Incorrect. first part plausible as discussed in "C". Second part correct as discussed in "B".

Loss of Offsite and Onsite Power (Station Blackout)

Ability to determine or interpret the following as they apply to a Station Blackout:

(CFR 43.5 / 45.13)

Actions necessary to restore power Tier: 1 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

0-OP-6.4, DWG 11715-FE-1BB, DWG 11715-FE-21M Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: B

38. 055K3.01 38 Given the following conditions:

• Unit 1 is at 35% power ramping up following a scheduled refueling

• The Turbine Operator reports that one of the Condenser Air Ejector Loop Seal Drain lines feels hot to the touch

• The OATC notes that Condenser Vacuum is 3 in Hg abs and slowly degrading

• The crew has entered 1-AP-14, Loss of Condenser Vacuum, and commenced a ramp down at 2%/minute.

5 minutes after starting the ramp the OATC reports the following:

• Condenser vacuum is 4 in Hg abs and stable

• Tave is 563°F

• Tref is 559°F

Based on the OATC report, which ONE of the following identifies the action required IAW 1-AP-14?

A. Trip the Turbine and go to 1-AP-2.1, Turbine Trip Without Reactor Trip.

B. Continue the ramp until condenser vacuum is below 3.5 in Hg abs.

C. Trip the Reactor and go to 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

D. Hold the ramp and place Rods in MANUAL.

A. Incorrect. Plausible since operator may feel that this would be the correct response based on the power reduction (at NAPS reactor trip by turbine trip is interlocked with P-8 as opposed to the more common place interlock with P-7).

B. Incorrect. Plausible since this would be correct for higher power levels.

C. Correct. Even though the stem indicates the conditions have improved the trip criteria of 1-AP-14 based on the change in power level is exceeded.

D. Incorrect. Plausible since based on the OATC report of ramp parameters the candidate might conclude that the vacuum loss has been mitigated, but the rod control system is not functioning as required because of the Tave/Tref mismatch.

Condenser Air Removal System (CARS)

Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the CARS will have on the following:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.6)

Main condenser Tier: 2 Group: 2 Technical

Reference:

1-AP-14 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: C

39. 056AA2.73 39 Unit 1 tripped from 100% due to a loss of offsite power.

Plant conditions are as follows:

• PRZR Pressure is 2100 psig and slowly increasing

• PRZR level is 38% and slowly increasing

• RCS Tavg is 552°F and stable The immediate actions of 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection have been completed, but no other operator actions have been taken.

Which of the following choices (1) identifies the current status of Group 1 and Group 4 PRZR Heaters AND (2) correctly states the requirement of LCO 3.4.9, Pressurizer, as it relates to Pressurizer Heaters A. (1) energized (2) Two groups of pressurizer heaters with the capacity of each group > 125 KW B. (1) energized (2) Two groups of pressurizer heaters with the capacity of each group > 250 KW C. (1) de-energized (2) Two groups of pressurizer heaters with the capacity of each group > 125 KW D. (1) de-energized (2) Two groups of pressurizer heaters with the capacity of each group > 250 KW A. Incorrect but plausible because since pressure is low they would be on, however because of the LOOP they won't come on until reset. Second part is correct, this is the LCO requirements.

B. Incorrect but plausible because since pressure is low they would be on, however because of the LOOP they won't come on until reset. Second part is plausible since the heaters typically draw more than this during normal ops; also the 18 month PT they run close to 300 KW each so the candidate who doesn't know the LCO would likely discount the correct choice because on the surface it does not seem adequate.

C. Correct. As noted above even though an auto signal exists and contactors are thus closed, the 480V breaker must still be reset to get them back so they would be on, however because of the LOOP they won't come on until reset. Second part is correct, they meet the LCO requirements.

D. Incorrect. first part correct as noted above. second part incorrect but plausible as discussed in "B".

Loss of Offsite Power Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Offsite Power:

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

PZR heater on/off Tier: 1 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

1-ES-0.1, 1-PT-83.4H, and TS 3.4.9 & Bases Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: C

40. 057AG2.1.31 40 Unit 1 is at 12% power preparing to go on-line.

Several annunciators are received and the BOP reports a loss of Vital 120VAC Bus 1-III.

Which ONE of the following identifies the immediate impact of the loss of Vital 120VAC Bus 1-III?

A. Condenser steam dumps will close but can be opened by placing the controller in MANUAL ; rods can be moved in or out as needed B. Condenser steam dumps will close but can be opened by placing the controller in MANUAL ; ONLY inward rod motion is possible C. Condenser steam dumps will close and CANNOT be opened from the control room ; rods can be moved in or out as needed D. Condenser steam dumps will close and CANNOT be opened from the control room ; ONLY inward rod motion is possible A. Incorrect. plausible because the candidate may attribute the response to loss of power to 1-MS-PT-1464 in steam pressure mode; the candidate may not know either the logic or bistable failure mode for rod stop, or for that matter not even consider that N-43 was lost as a consequence of the failure, becuase the process rack is still powered by the backup power supply the rod control circuitry still has power.

B Incorrect. first part incorrect but plausible as discussed above ; second part the loss of N-43 will cause a rod stop bistable so rods can be moved in but not out.

C. Incorrect. First part is correct, this will cause a loss of power to the arming circuit, so although the arming solenoids (which are 125VDC) still have power, the dumps can only be operated locally (this is the reason for "opened from the control room" because without that qualifier a candidate could argue NO correct answer. Second part is incorrect but plausible since the candidate may not have solid knowledge of the logic, coincidence, or FME the loss of power to N-43 has.

D. Correct. First part is correct as discussed in "C". Second part is correct an over power rod stop (1/4 logic) due to N-43 loss of power (although this is a control and not a protection function and not all functions de-energize to actuate this one does); the capability for outward rod motion can not be restored until 1-AP-4.3 is implemented and the subsequent action step of selecting the appropriate rod stop bypass switch to N-43 is performed.

Loss of Vital AC Electrical Instrument Bus Ability to locate control room switches, controls, and indications, and to determine that they correctly reflect the desired plant lineup.

(CFR: 41.10 / 45.12)

Tier: 1 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

0-AP-10 and 1-AR-A-D8 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info: NAPS Condenser Steam dumps are equiped with manual override handwheels; this is the reason for the wording "cannot be opened from the control room" (they can always be opened locally, so merely saying "cannot be opened" would NOT be true).

Answer: D

41. 058AK3.01 41 Given the following conditions:

MM. Unit 1 is at 100% power NN. 125VDC bus 1-I is lost due to a grounded cable Which ONE of the following describes the effect of this malfunction on the 1H EDG?

A. The EDG excitation circuit is unaffected; The EDG output breaker can be closed from the control room B. The EDG excitation circuit is unaffected; The EDG output breaker CANNOT be closed from the control room C. The EDG excitation circuit is de-energized; The EDG output breaker can be closed from the control room D. The EDG excitation circuit is de-energized; The EDG output breaker CANNOT be closed from the control room B. Correct. The excitation circuit will be carried by separate battery and thus will have power; there is vital & emergency system power supplied to the EDG local control panel, but it is from 1-1 120VAC bus which would be energized because although the associated inverter is lost, the bus will transfer to the CVT. The output breaker (H train) receives control power from 1-I 125VDC bus with no other alternate source; the candidate must know the source of control power to the subject breaker (the 1-II 125VDC bus is also H train) otherwise they would be guessing.

All distractors are valid since the candidate who lacks the knowledge of the different power supplies that support the ESF emergency power functions (or is unsure about supply to EDG local panel; i.e.

AC or DC?) would not be able to eliminate any of the choices as distractors.

Loss of DC Power Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of DC Power:

(CFR 41.5,41.10 / 45.6 / 45.1)

Use of dc control power by D/Gs Tier: 1 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

0-AP-10 and System Design Bases Document (SDBD-NAPS-EG)

Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: B

42. 059K1.02 42 Unit 1 is at 25% power.

Feed Control has been transfered to the MFRVs and all 3 are in automatic.

Assuming NO operator action is taken, which ONE of the following malfunctions would result in AFW automatically starting PRIOR to the reactor automatically tripping?

A. "A" SG controlling level channel failing high B. "A" SG controlling steam pressure channel failing low C. Feed back arm falling off "A" MFRV D. "A" MFRV failing closed A. Incorrect. plausible since candidate may not know the FM&E for this malfunction; since the system is level dominant level will decrease to the Lo-Lo trip setpoint which is same as that AFW auto start setpoint meaning the two occur simultaneously.

B. Incorrect. plausible as discussed above; in this case the pressure signal failed low results in a FF >

SF causing a cutback in FRV demand, which will result in a decrease in SG level as described above.

C. Correct. The effect for this failure mode is the FRV opening fully regardless of the demand signal from the controller. "A" SG level will increase continuously to the Hi-Hi level (P-14) setpoint. P-14 generates a trip of the turbine and trips all feed pumps which is an AFW auto-start signal. At NAPS the RXTRIP due to TURB TRIP is interlocked with P-8, vice P-7 which is typical for a lot of Westinghouse plants, so AFW will start before the loss of feed results in an auto Rx trip.

D. Incorrect. plausible since again the candidate may erroneously conclude that this is "the best choice" because the AFW start is generated prior to, or coincident with the reactor tripping.

Main Feedwater (MFW) System Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause effect relationships between the MFW and the following systems:

(CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8)

AFW system Tier: 2 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

DWGs 5655D33, Sheets 7, 13, and 14 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: C

43. 060AA1.01 43 Fuel movement is in progress in the Fuel Building and the movers report that an assembly has been dropped and appears to be damaged.

A Hi Alarm is received on 1-RM-RMS-153, Fuel Pit Bridge Radiation Monitor.

Which ONE of the following identifies the corrective action to be taken by the Control Room crew, and includes the recorder that the crew will use to monitor the effectiveness of that action?

A. isolate fuel building ventilation to stop or reduce release ; 1-RM-RR-179, MGP Vent Stack A B. isolate fuel building ventilation to stop or reduce release ; 1-RM-RR-180, MGP Vent Stack B C. place fuel building exhaust through the charcoal filters ; 1-RM-RR-179, MGP Vent Stack A D. place fuel building exhaust through the charcoal filters ; 1-RM-RR-180, MGP Vent Stack B A. Incorrect. plausible since the first step of AP-54 for accidental gaseous release is to "isolate the release". the intent of that step is to taken action at the source, but the candidate who does have knowledge of that intent along with knowledge of 0-AP-5.1 (1-RM-RMS-153) may erroneously conclude that this would be the best choice; second part is incorrect but plausible since there are 3 different vent monitors and the candidate who doesn't have solid knowledge of which areas would go to which ones would be flipping a coin.

B. Incorrect. First part incorrect but plausaible as discussed above; second part is correct.

C. Incorrect. corrective action is right per AP-5.1; second part incorrect but plausible as discussed in "A".

D. Correct. AP-5.1 will direct the operator to attachement 3 based on the RMS-153 alarm, attachment 3 will direct doing attachment 2 to put exhaust through filters based on validity of alarm. Second part is correct also and although not specifically directed to do this by 0-AP-5.1 it is expected that the opeator would know where to look to evaluate status, detect, validate, or monitor a release; this part of the question tests the candidates knowledge of how to monitor the event.

Accidental Gaseous-Waste Release Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Accidental Gaseous Radwaste:

(CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

Area radiation monitors Tier: 1 Group: 2 Technical

Reference:

0-AP-5.1, 0-AP-5.2, SDBD-NAPS-HA Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None

Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: D

44. 061K6.01 44 Unit 1 tripped spuriously from 100% power.

Operators have transitioned to 1-ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response.

The crew has just completed throttling AFW per 1-ES-0.1.

If the pressure sensing line for 1-FW-PCV-159B were inadvertently severed, AFW flow to the A. B SG will decrease B. B SG will increase C. C SG will decrease D. C SG will increase A. Incorrect. plausible because NAPS has dedicated flowpaths and the nomenclature and header arrangements defy logic, thus the candidate who doesn't have solid knowledge would likely choose this because they would default to "B goes with B" logic. AFW will decrease because the function of the valve is to throttle in the closed direction if pressure in the line is low (sensing line blowing off would cause it to see 0 pressure so it will close regardless of the actual pressure which would be greater than 1000# based on the plant conditions.

B. Incorrect. affected SG is plausible as discussed above. increase in flow is plausible because the candidate may not know the correct valve operation or FM&E for this malfunction.

C. Correct. This PCV is associated with "A" pump and the HCV header which are aligned to "C" SG.

As discussed in "A", since the valve is in series with, and between the pump discharge and the HCV, the valve will close causing the flow to decrease.

D. Incorrect. affected SG is correct; flow response incorrect but plausible as discussed in "B".

Auxiliary / Emergency Feedwater (AFW) System Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the AFW components:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

Controllers and positioners Tier: 2 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

1-ES-0.1, 1-AP-22.1 (for normal lineup DWG), DWG 11715-FW-054, 1-PT-71.13B Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None

Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: C

45. 062K1.02 45 Unit 1 is in Mode 3.

Severe thunder storms are causing large swings in grid voltage and frequency.

Operators are responding to a spurious SI and have just completed Step 5 of 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

The backboards operator reports 1J bus voltage has taken a step change from 4000 volts to 3700 volts.

Assuming voltage does not change, the OATC should expect bus stripping to occur in the next ________

and as a result _____________________________________________

A. 2 seconds ; 1-CH-P-1B breaker opens and then re-closes once the EDG restores power to the bus.

B. 2 seconds ; 1-CH-P-1B breaker remains closed throughout the event.

C. 7.5 seconds ; 1-CH-P-1B breaker opens and then re-closes once the EDG restores power to the bus.

D. 7.5 seconds ;1-CH-P-1B breaker remains closed throughout the event.

a. Incorrect but plausible if candidate is unsure of time delays of UV vs. degraded voltage and is unsure of breaker response (e.g. stub bus breaker response for this event is to open and then re-close after voltage is restore as stated in this distractor).

b. Incorrect but plausible; time is again incorrect but breaker response for this distractor is correct.

c. Incorrect but plausible; time is correct for this choice, but as discussed in distractor "A", breaker response is not.

d. Correct. Both time and breaker response are correct.

A.C. Electrical Distribution Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the ac distribution system and the following systems:

(CFR: 41.2 to 41.9)

ED/G Tier: 2 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

TS 3.3.5.2 (SR 3.3.5.2), 1-PT-83.4J, Att. 4 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None

Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: D

46. 063A4.01 46 Unit 1 is at 100% power.

The OATC receives FW < STM Flow alarms on all three SGs The OATC notes that both the red and green position indicator lights are OFF on all three MFRVs A possible cause of these indications is a breaker has tripped on the ________ .

A. 1-III AC Bus B. 1-IV AC Bus C. 1-III DC Bus D. 1-IV DC Bus C. Correct. One train of FW isolation solenoid is powered from this bus. Although MSIV SOVs (for example) energize to close, these valves de-energize to perform the safety function of closing. Thus if the supply breaker on 1-III DC bus tripped, or for that matter were opened in error at 100% power, the indications listed in the stem would result.

All distractor are plausible since other failures can result in some of the indications (i.e. a loss of a first stage pressure, if selected from either 1-III or 1-IV would give the alarms). Also the candidate must deduce from the indication of insufficent feed flow, as to whether it is a process rack problem (those are powered from AC busses) or not. Further, most SR solenoids (i.e. CNTMT isolation valves) are powered from 120VAC busses so the candidate who does not have a solid knowledge of failure modes or power supplies for control & protection would likely choose one of the AC busses.

DC Electrical Distribution System Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8)

Major breakers and control power fuses Tier: 2 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

1-AR-F-D1, DWG 11715-ESK-6QJ, 1-OP-26A Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: C

47. 064A1.03 47 Unit 1 is at 100% power.

The crew is performing 1-PT-82H, 1H EDG Slow-Start Test and are slowly raising load on the EDG.

Current conditions are:

OO. EDG load is 800 KW.

PP. Reactive load is 0 KVAR.

A loss of off-site power (LOOP) occurs.

Once all automatic actions have taken place, the EDG operator should expect to see that real load has

___________ and reactive load has ________________?

(Assume no actions are taken by the EDG operator in response to the transient)

A. increased ; remained the same B. increased ; increased C. decreased ; remained the same D. decreased ; increased A. Incorrect. First part is correct the permenantly connected loads and LOOP loads are greater than the current valve ( total of about 1200kw or better ). Second part is plausible since the candidate may focus on reactive load as soley due to difference in terminal voltage of machines in parallel.

B. Correct. First part is correct as noted above. Second part is also correct since the permenantly connected loads and LOOP loads are primarily inductive.

C. Incorrect. Plausible becasue without SI there are very few loads, but the candidate needs to have a rough idea of what the load should be in order to have reasonable assurance that the expected response to the transient was obtained. Second part also incorrect but plausible as discussed in "A".

D. Incorrect. First part incorrect but plausible as discussed in "C". Second part is correct. This distractor could be correct for a situation where the Charging pump rode the bus, but sequencing didn't occur for example Emergency Diesel Generator (ED/G) System Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the ED/G system controls including:

(CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)

Operating voltages, currents, and temperatures Tier: 2 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective: 0-AP-10, 1-PT-83.4H, UFSAR Ch.8, Table 8.3-6 additional info:

Answer: B

48. 064K4.01 48 In accordance with Technical Specifications, for a Loss of Offsite Power the EDG shall energize its associated Emergency Bus in less than or equal to _____________ and all automatic trips are bypassed EXCEPT for ________________.

A. 10 seconds ; Overspeed ONLY B. 10 seconds ; Overspeed AND Generator Differential C. 15 seconds ; Overspeed ONLY D. 15 seconds ; Overspeed AND Generator Differential

a. Incorrect but plausible because time is correct and having it shutdown only to prevent a destructive overspeed condition is reasonable.

b. Correct. Time is correct and non-bypassed trips is also correct.

c. Incorrect but plausible because candidate might not be aware of time requirement or errroneously assume that it starts 2 seconds after the loss of power (UV time delay) and conclude that 12 seconds which is less than 15 would be correct; second part incorrect but plausible as discussed in distractor "A".

d. Incorrect. Both parts incorrect but plausible as discussed in distractors "A" and "C".

Emergency Diesel Generator (ED/G) System Knowledge of ED/G system design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:

(CFR: 41.7)

Trips while loading the ED/G (frequency, voltage, speed)

Tier: 2 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

TS 3.8.1 (SR 3.8.1.10 and SR 3.8.1.12)

Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: B

49. 067AA2.13 49

Given both Units at 100% power.

A fire has been confirmed in the Unit 1 Cable Vault and the crew is implementing 1-FCA-3, Cable Vault and Tunnel Fire.

1-FCA-3, will direct the crew to ________________________________ AND in order to meet Appendix R requirements, the unit must achieve cold shutdown within ___________.

A. Shutdown the Unit using 1-AP-2.2, Fast Load Reduction ; 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> B. Shutdown the Unit using 1-AP-2.2, Fast Load Reduction ; 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> C. Manually trip the Unit ; 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> D. Manually trip the Unit ; 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> A. Incorrect. First part is plausible because typically you'd rather do a controlled load reduction as opposed to a trip and AP-2.2 the fast load reduction procedure does have manual trip criteria that would be employed if conditions degraded. Second part also incorrect but plausible because this is the typical Tech Spec time for being in CSD when required; the candidate who lacks knowledge of Appendix R requirements may default to this value since it is easily achievable (even in natural circulation cooldown).

B. Incorrect. First part incorrect but plausible as discussed above; second part correct as solicited by the question this is an Appendix R requirement.

C. Incorrect. First part is correct; once you branch from the initial fire response procedure to this one the procedure initiates a trip. Second part incorrect but plausible as discussed in "A".

D. Correct. First part correct as discussed above. Second part correct as discussed in "B" and seen in attached Technical Reference.

Plant Fire On Site Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Plant Fire on Site:

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

Need for emergency plant shutdown Tier: 1 Group: 2 Technical

Reference:

1-FCA-3, NAPS Appendix R Report, Rev.30 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: D

50. 068AK2.07 50 Consider the following EDG start signals:

1) Manual Start (Control Room)

2) Automatic Start (Bus Under Volage Signal)

3) Automatic Start (Safety Injection Signal)

Select the choice that completes the following:

Placing the Control Room Emergency (CRE) switch for an EDG in the EMERG position will prevent EDG start from_______________________________.

A. 1 & 2 ONLY B. 2 & 3 ONLY C. 3 ONLY D. 1 ONLY A. Incorrect, plausible since this signal is defeated with the mode selector in MAN-LOCAL; there is also a local ISOL switch for the EDG and the candidate who lacks knowledge of what all of these three switches do, could pick this one function, thinking the other two switches do other things (like blocking starts from the CR).

B. Incorrect, plausible since this is one of the things from the three choices that it does do, but not the ONLY thing.

C. Incorrect, plausible since 2 is correct and you would think 1 is a good choice (prevent undesired start from spurious signal), you also might eliminate 3 as a choice since if you don't know your EDG, you might think that that is how you would start it for something like a control room fire.

D. Correct, both of these starting functions are disabled when the switch is taken to EMERG Control Room Evacuation Knowledge of the interrelations between the Control Room Evacuation and the following:

(CFR 41.7 / 45.7)

ED/G Tier: 1 Group: 2 Technical

Reference:

DWG 11715-ESK-11C, Sh.1 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: D

51. 068G2.1.23 51 Which ONE of the following identifies the MINIMUM actions required to restore CNTMT sump pumping

capability following a spurious SI, and includes the tanks that the CNTMT sump pumps normally discharge to?

A. Reset Phase A; Low Level Liquid Waste Tanks (LLLW Tanks)

B. Reset Phase A; High Level Liquid Waste Tanks (HLLW Tanks)

C. Reset Phase A AND then depress the CLOSE pushbuttons for CNTMT Sump pumps Discharge Trip Valves, 1-DA-TV-100A & 1-DA-TV-100B; Low Level Liquid Waste Tanks (LLLW Tanks)

D. Reset Phase A AND then depress the CLOSE pushbuttons for CNTMT Sump pumps Discharge Trip Valves, 1-DA-TV-100A & 1-DA-TV-100B; High Level Liquid Waste Tanks (HLLW Tanks)

A. Incorrect. Plausible because the candidate may not have detailed knowledge of how the valve is interlocked (control circuit); further if the candidate lacks detailed knowledge they would tend to eliminate C&D as choices (on the surface it doesn't make sense that pushing the close button for a valve that's closed would do anything) and thus default to distractor A or B. Second part also incorrect but plausible because they could be aligned to these, but the question solicits "normally".

B. Incorrect. First part incorrect but plausible as discussed above. Second part is correct, this is the normal alignment.

C. Incorrect. First part is correct. In order for the valves to open and allow pumping the close pushbutton must be momentarily depressed (as shown on Technical Reference DWG ESK-6M) in order to re-energize the permissive relay. Second part incorrect but plausible since as mentioned this is an alignment that could be used.

D. Correct. First part correct as discussed in "C". Second part correct as discussed in "B".

Liquid Radwaste System (LRS)

Ability to perform specific system and integrated plant procedures during all modes of plant operation.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.2 / 45.6)

Tier: 2 Group: 2 Technical

Reference:

1-OP-7.12 and 1-AR-J-A6 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: D

52. 073K3.01 52 Annunciators K-D2, RAD MONITOR SYSTEM HI RAD LEVEL, and K-D4, RAD MONITOR SYST HI-HI RAD LEVEL, were received due to 1-RM-LW-111, Clarifier Outlet, failing high.

IAW 0-AP-5.1, Common Unit Radiation Monitoring System, the operator verifies all of the following actions have occurred EXCEPT_________________?

A. Contaminated Drain Tank pumps tripped B. 1-LW-PCV-115 (Liquid Waste Tunnel lsol Control) closed C. Low-Capacity Steam Generator Blowdown pumps tripped D. 1-LW-FCV-100 (Holdup Tank Influent Valve) closed A. Correct. The contaminated drain tank pumps do NOT get a trip signal from either the Hi-Hi rad, or on the influent valve going closed. The pumps' discharge lines contain recirc lines back to the tank.

B. Incorrect. The clarifier effluent valve PCV-115 does get a close signal from a Hi-Hi radiation signal on LW-RM-111. A candidate could choose this answer based on the thought that the influent valve is closed on the hi-hi radiation signal, so there would be no reason for the effluent valve to close.

C. Incorrect. The (low capacity) blowdown pumps do trip because the influent valve goes closed on the Hi-Hi radiation signal. The candidate may choose this answer if he forgets that the clarifier inlet valve being not full open is a trip signal to the blowdown pumps.

D Incorrect. The clarifier influent pump does trip on a Hi-Hi radiation signal from LW-RM-111. The candidate could choose this answer if he thinks that the clarifier effluent radiation monitor only affects the clarifier effluent valve (PCV-115).

Process Radiation Monitoring (PRM) System Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the PRM system will have on the following:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.6)

Radioactive effluent releases Tier: 2 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

0-AP-5.1, 1-AR-K-D2 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: A

53. 073K4.01 53 Given the following conditions:

• A WGDT release is in progress.

• 1-GW-RM-178-1, Process Vents Rad Monitor, indication is trending up.

As 1-GW-RM-178-1 continues to increase, 1-GW-FCV-101, WGDT to Process Vents, will remain open until the ______ alarm is received. Assuming the indication begins trending down at that point and

returns to normal, 1-GW-FCV-101 _____________________.

A. Hi ; will automatically re-open B. Hi ; will NOT automatically re-open C. Alert ; will automatically re-open D. Alert ; will NOT automatically re-open A. Incorrect. First part is correct. Second part incorrect but plausible because the candidate may focus on the latching feature which is associated with the Hi-Hi alarm and discount (or not be cognizant of) the interlock feature of the control circuit, in which case they would select this choice.

B. Correct. First part is correct, although it might seem logical, since releases are calculated such that no alarms should be received (alert or Hi), to auto terminate at the alert level the interlock doesn't trip the valve until you reach the HI alarm condition. Second part also true because by virture of the SOV control circuit the "modulate" push button has to be depressed at which point the valve would re-open.

C. Incorrect. First part is plausible since as discussed above. Second part incorrect but plausible as discussed in "A".

D. Incorrect. First part is plausible since as discussed in "B" this is how most stuff works. Second part is correct as discussed in "B".

Process Radiation Monitoring (PRM) System Knowledge of PRM system design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following:

(CFR: 41.7)

Release termination when radiation exceeds setpoint Tier: 2 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

0-AP-5.2 and 11715-ESK-6PZ Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: B

54. 076A1.02 54 Both Units are at 100% power.

1-SW-P-1A was tagged out yesterday for scheduled maintenance 2-SW-P-1B trips and the crew enters 0-AP-12, Loss of Service Water Based on these plant conditions, _________ will lose Service Water flow, and IAW 0-AP-12, the crew will

perform ___________________________ .

A. Unit 1 CC HXs ; Attachment 6, Aligning One SW Pump per Supply Header when NO Pumps are Running on One Header B. Unit 1 CC HXs ; Attachment 10, Operation of Auxiliary Service Water Pumps C. Unit 2 CC HXs ; Attachment 6, Aligning One SW Pump per Supply Header when NO Pumps are Running on One Header D. Unit 2 CC HXs ; Attachment 10, Operation of Auxiliary Service Water Pumps A. Correct. Based on low probability of occurance, assumed time available to perform corrective actions, and weighing consequence of dual unit vice single unit impact we choose to align CC HXs to dedicated SW header vice "A" to "A", "B" to "B" type arrangement which could be used. For the scenario given in the stem the "A" header will not have a SW pump running so Unit 1 will be affected due to no SW flow to CC Hxs. This action is perfered over using Aux SW (AP-12, Step 3, RNO).

B. Incorrect. First part correct as discussed above. Second part incorrect but plausible; the aux SW pumps seem like the most logical choice since they are powered from an Emergency Bus and are installed as a backup. The candidate who doesn't have detailed knowledge of the UFSAR design functions and accident analysis, along with 0-AP-12, may select this choice because it would seem like a more reliable & robust configuration.

C. Incorrect. First part is incorrect but plausible because again if they don't have solid knowledge of the normal alignment this part is a coin toss. Second part correct as discussed in "A".

D. Incorrect. First part incorrect but plausibe as discussed in "C". Second part incorrect but plausible as discussed in "B".

Service Water System (SWS)

Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the SWS controls including:

(CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)

Reactor and turbine building closed cooling water temperatures Tier: 2 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

0-AP-12, DWG 11715-FM-078A Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info: NAPS uses a cooling tower for Turbine Building Cooling Water (aka Bearing Cooling) so this KA can only be used for reactor building closed cooling system (Component Cooling).

This question also demonstrates candidates knowledge of differences between units.

Answer: A

55. 076AG2.2.12 55 Given the following:

12:00 - Unit 1, 100% power 12:20 - Unit 1, 85% power and stable following a fast ramp due to secondary issues Which of the following choices (1) identifies the TS 3.4.16, RCS Specific Activity, Surveillance Requirement for sampling and analysis of the RCS and (2) identifies a sample result that would require a unit shutdown.

A. (1) anytime within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> of initiating the power change (2) Dose Equivalent I-131 is 80 µCi/gm B. (1) anytime within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> of initiating the power change (2) Dose Equivalent Xe-133 is 80 µCi/gm C. (1) between 2 and 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> after the power change (2) Dose Equivalent I-131 is 80 µCi/gm D. (1) between 2 and 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> after the power change (2) Dose Equivalent Xe-133 is 80 µCi/gm A. Incorrect. First part incorrect but plausible since 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> is "in the window", TS requires a specific 2-6 hour time frame since as the Bases states Iodine levels will peak within that time frame. Second part is correct this is above the limit of 60 that would allow continued operation per TS.

B. Incorrect. First part incorrect but plausible as discussed above. Second part is also incorrect but plausible because exceeding Xe-133 requires a shutdown, and the candidate may not be aware of the limits (LCO only says "within limits" actual limits are found in the SR section).

C. Correct. First part correct as discussed in "A", and seen in the attached Technical Reference.

Second part is also correct this is above the limit of 60 that would allow continued operation per TS.

D. Incorrect. First part correct as discussed in "A", and seen in the attached Technical Reference.

Second part is incorrect; as discussed in "B".

High Reactor Coolant Activity Knowledge of surveillance procedures.

(CFR: 41.10 / 45.13)

Tier: 1 Group: 2 Technical

Reference:

1-PT-53.5, TS 3.4.16 & Bases Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info: Procedure for high activity 1-AP-5, Unit 1, Radiation Monitoring System, directs the operator to refer to TS 3.4.16; this question test both knowledge of the limit and the knowledge of the surveillance requirement.

Answer: C

56. 076K3.01 56 Both Units are at 100% power.

1-SW-P-1B and 2-SW-P-1B are running.

A spurious Train A SI occurs on Unit 2.

Prior to any operator actions, there will be _________ SW pumps running and SW flow to CC HXs has

___________________ ?

A. 3 ; decreased B. 3 ; increased C. 4 ; decreased D. 4 ; increased A. Incorrect. Plausible because candidate may assume Unit 2 event so only a unit 2 pump will start.

plausible since if the event was a CDA the sw inlets to the HXs would close causing flow to decrease.

B. Incorrect. first part plausible as discussed above; second part is correct since this is an only an SI event even though the outlets of the CC HXs are throttled, the flow will increase because of the change in system resistance.

C. Incorrect. first part correct. the Unit 2 train A SI will start the opposite unit pump also so 4 will be running. second part incorrect but plausible as discussed in "A".

D. Correct. first part correct as discussed in "C". Second part correct as discussed in "B".

Service Water System (SWS)

Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the SWS will have on the following:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.6)

Closed cooling water Tier: 2 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

1-GIP-3A Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info: K/A met since "malfunction" can be either an increase or decrease that upsets the system, and can be due to a direct effect (i.e. pump tripping), or indirectly. In this case, it is a consequence of a spurious signal.

Answer: D

57. 077AK1.01 57 Unit 1 is at 100% power and Unit 2 is in refueling.

A Grid disturbance results in a 6kV decrease in switchyard voltage.

The System Operator requests that you raise voltage back to the pre-event value.

Current conditions are:

• Switchyard Voltage 510 KV

• Generator MVARS -100 MVARS Based on the current conditions, the Offsite Power Source is (1) and assuming the OATC is using the "adjust and wait" method of raising Switchyard Voltage, after making the first adjustment he should expect Generator MVARS to be (2) .

(1) Inoperable A. (2) more negative B. (1) Inoperable (2) less negative C. (1) Operable (2) more negative D. (1) Operable (2) less negative A. Incorrect. First part plausible since this is way below normal and candidate may not Know the exact limits. Second part plausible because although it may be apparent that you have to raise on the voltage regulator, candidate may not understand what -100 means (VARS In, or in the lead) and the effect the change in generator excitation.

B. Incorrect. First part is incorrect but plausible as discussed in "A". Second part is correct, as voltage is raised you will be (in this case) moving towards unity thus vars will be "less negative" until you pass through 0 vars after which they will increase (in the possitive direction).

C. Incorrect. First part is correct; this value although significantly below normal doesn't render the SWYD inoperable. Second part incorrect but plausible as discussed in "A".

D. Correct. First part correct as discussed in "C". Second part is correct, as voltage is raised you will be (in this case) moving towards unity thus vars will be "less negative" until you pass through 0 vars after which they will increase (in the possitive direction).

Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances:

(CFR: 41.4, 41.5, 41.7, 41.10 / 45.8)

Definition of terms: volts, watts, amps, VARs, power factor Tier: 1

Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

1-OP-26.8, 1-SC-4.3, 0-AP-8 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info: considered bank because it combines a couple of bank questions Answer: D

58. 078K1.05 58 Select the choice that completes the description of how instrument air is provided for "B" Main Steam Trip Valve, 2-MS-TV-201B.

Instrument air is supplied to "B" Main Steam Trip Valve, 2-MS-TV-201B, via ________ solenoid operated valves (SOVs), ________________ any one of the six SOVs will close 2-MS-TV-201B.

A. 2 ; energizing B. 2 ; de-energizing C. 6 ; energizing D. 6 ; de-energizing A. Incorrect. First part is plausible because the candidate who lacks detailed knowledge may assume that there is only ONE for each ESF train, thus only TWO total and select this choice. Second part is correct even though these are powered from highly reliable DC busses the energize to actuate function was chosen to provide a slight edge over an undesired MSTV closure while still meeting single failure criteria. Appendix R closure of each individual valve from manual operation is not single failure proof but it is not required to be either.

B. Incorrect. First part incorrect but plausible as discussed above. Second part incorrect but plausible since the failure mode of most components is to satisfy safety function; the candidate who lacks detailed knowledge or is uncertain could default to the de-energize choice.

C. Correct. First part is correct as discussed in "A" there are 2/esf trn as an added assurance that closure time is achieved within the assumed maximum time of the safety analysis, and two other ones dedicated for APP.R purposes for a total of 6. Second part also correct as discussed above the SOV energizes to vent air from the actuators which close via spring pressure; if flow exists in the line it will assist in closure also.

D. Incorrect. First part correct as discussed in "C". Second part incorrect but plausible as discusssed in "B".

Instrument Air System (IAS)

Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the IAS and the following systems:

(CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8)

MSIV air

Tier: 2 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

DWGs 12050-FM-070B & 12050-ESK-6PN Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: C

59. 103K3.02 59 Unit 1 is at 100% power.

While performing 1-PT-60.1, Containment Integrity, the operator reports that 1-SA-29, Unit 1 Reactor Containment Service Air Supply Header Isolation Valve, is in the OPEN position.

Based on this discovery, the most limiting action that applies to Unit 1 is a _______ action because LCO __________________ is not met.

A. 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> ; 3.6.1, Containment B. 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> ; 3.6.1, Containment C. 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> ; 3.6.3, Containment Isolation Valves D. 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> ; 3.6.3, Containment Isolation Valves A. Correct. The action time is correct per TS 3.6.1. The valve being in the open vice locked closed position constitutes a loss of containment integrity.

B. incorrect. plausible since the time is that of TS 3.6.3.

C. incorrect. the candidate may erroneously assume that since we are discussing a CTMNT isolation valve only that spec (3.6.3) would apply and thus eliminate "A" & "B" as distractors. If they don't have a solid knowledge of TS they may default to 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> based soley on the higher order requirement that they "know all action times of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> or less".

D. incorrect. the time is correct per TS 3.6.3 plausibility for limiting TS action correct as discussed in "C".

Containment System Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the containment system will have on the following:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.6)

Loss of containment integrity under normal operations Tier: 2 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

TS 3.6.1, 3.6.3, 1-PT-60.1

Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info: The 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> time frame cannot be excluded by the candidate because at NAPS we test operators on action times greater than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> dependent on safety significance and/or time constraints to complete that action. An example would be the 2 hr. action time of 3.1.6 if rods are below the insertion limits. Rods above RILs is an initial condition of the safety analysis and depending on plant conditions and other complications it may take time to restore the LCO. Also if they don't remember the 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> they will think it is a 4 because they "know" all the 1 hours1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

Answer: A

60. G2.1.26 60 A tagout has been hung for work on a system by Maintenance and the Electric Shop.

Maintenance has determined that they will need to manipulate one of the components on the tagout.

Select the choice that complies with the requirements of 0-AA-200, Equipment Clearance A. Issue a caution tag for the component to be manipulated; any of the Work Order Holders that are signed on the tagout can authorize manipulation of the component.

B. Issue a caution tag for the component to be manipulated; only the Maintenance work order holder that requested the caution tag can authorize manipulation of the component.

C. Issue an Operating Permit for the component to be manipulated; any of the Work Order Holders that are signed on the tagout can authorize manipulation of the component.

D. Issue an Operating Permit for the component to be manipulated; only one individual designated as the Operating Permit Holder can authorize manipulation of the component.

D. Correct per the attached Technical Reference.

All distractors are plausible since the candidate may not be knowledgable of the procedural process to address this activity (in the past the only method was to temp lift or boundary mod) or the associated limitations (one individual) required if it is employed.

Conduct of Operations Knowledge of industrial safety procedures (such as rotating equipment, electrical, high temperature, high pressure, caustic, chlorine, oxygen and hydrogen).

(CFR: 41.10 / 45.12)

Tier: 3 Group: N/A Technical

Reference:

OP-AA-200 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info: This is a KA match because the subject procedure (OP-AA-200) is the procedure at NAPS that establishes & controls those boundaries needed to ensure personnel safety while working on rotating equipment, electrical equipment, etc.

Answer: D

61. G2.1.40 61 Preperations for core off-load are in progress IAW 1-OP-4.1, Controlling Procedure for Refueling.

Which ONE of the following conditions DOES NOT meet the requirements of 1-OP-4.1, Attachment 2, Core Alterations Checklist?

A. Refueling Cavity Level is 290 feet B. "A" Containment Air Recirc Fan (CARF) running, "B" and "C" CARFs tagged out C. N-32 is tagged out but N-31 and both channels of excore NIS are operable D. Personnel Air Lock Emergency Escape doors are closed with the operating handles CAUTION tagged A. Plausible because it is lower than normal, but still above the minimum.

B. Plausible because it would be preferable to have at least one more available for redundancy but it is not required.

C. Correct even though 3 source range channels are operable both primaries are required so this condition doesn't meet the requirements of step 4 of the attachment.

D. Plausible because the requirements for the different airlocks and hatch are different and these could be danger tagged to prevent ingress and still alow egress (danger tags were used in the past for control of other things too like penetration alignments).

Conduct of Operations Knowledge of refueling administrative requirements.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13)

Tier: 3 Group: N/A Technical

Reference:

1-OP-4.1, Attachment 2 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: C

62. G2.2.12 62 At 12:02 the Unit enters TS 3.8.1 AC Sources - Operating, due to the loss of one Offsite Circuit.

The Required Action Completion Time is "1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> AND Once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> thereafter".

Which ONE of the following identifies the latest times that the crew can complete the activities and NOT be in violation of Tech Specs?

First performance Second performance A. 13:01 21:00 13:01 23:00 B.

C. 13:16 22:01 D. 13:16 23:16 A. Incorrect because question solicits "latest time"; plausible since candidate who has only rudimentary knowledge of TS may default to this because it is driven by a required action and not a routine surveillance.

B. Correct. per SR 3.0.2 Bases initial performance gets no grace, subsequent performance get 25% of interval so 8hr + 2hr = 10hr; so we get it in with a minute to spare.

C. Incorrect. plausible since a candidate may grab knowledge of routine surveillances and apply the 25% accross the board; the second performance plausible since they may erroneously conclude 8+2 from the time the action is initially entered.

D. Incorrect. plausible as noted above if you apply 25% accross the board.

Equipment Control Knowledge of surveillance procedures.

(CFR: 41.10 / 45.13)

Tier: 3 Group: N/A Technical

Reference:

TS SR 3.0.2 and Bases Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: B

63. G2.2.43 63 Unit 1 is at 100% power.

Operators have performed 1-MOP-31.6, Subsection 5.1, Removing 1-FW-P-1A, Main Feedwater Pump, from Service and Tagging the Pump for Maintenance, and have pulled the patch cords for the associated annunciators in accordance with the procedure.

The associated annunciators are ____________________ to be added to the Disabled Annunciator List and are ___________________ to be entered into the Temporary Modifications Log.

A. required ; NOT required B. required ; required C. NOT required ; NOT required D. NOT required ; required A. Correct. Entry in the Disabled Annunciator List is required regardless of duration, safety classification, or whether it is procedurally controlled or not. Second part is correct VPAP-1403 provides exception in allowing OP-AA-200 (the tagout procedure) to control status for this case.

B. Incorrect. First part is correct as discussed above. Second part is incorrect but plausible because the activity in general (lifting leads, installing/removing jumpers, etc.) falls under those things that are classified as temporary mods. The candidate who lacks detailed knowledge that VPAP-1403 provides exception in allowing OP-AA-200 (the tagout procedure) to control status for this case, would have a natural bias to select this choice.

C. Incorrect. First part incorrect but plausible because candidate may think that since it is being done by procedure for a work activity that a Cue (another form of operator aid used a NAPS to provide visual indication to the operator of things such as work orders, tagouts, abnormal status, etc.) would be used in lieu of the disabled annunciator list since the annunciator itself isn't broke. Second part correct as discussed in"A".

D. Incorrect. First part incorrect but plausible because candidate may think that since it is being done by procedure for a work activity that a Cue (another form of operator aid used a NAPS to provide visual indication to the operator of things such as work orders, tagouts, abnormal status, etc.) would be used in lieu of the disabled annunciator list since the annunciator itself isn't broke. Second part incorrect but plausible as discussed in "B".

Equipment Control Knowledge of the process used to track inoperable alarms.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13)

Tier: 3 Group: N/A Technical

Reference:

1-MOP-31.6, Subsection 5.1 & VPAP-1403 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: A

64. G2.3.13 64 Unit 1 core off-load is in progress.

SFP level and Reactor Cavity level begin decreasing.

IAW 0-AP-27, Malfunction of Spent Fuel Pit System, the Fuel Building is required to be evacuated A. if a high alarm is recieved on 1-RMS-RM-153, SFP Bridge Crane rad monitor B. as soon as all fuel assemblies are in a safe location C. if radiation levels in the Fuel Building reach 1R/HR D. if level decreases more than 4 feet 2 inches below the "0" reference mark A. Incorrect but plausible as evacuation would be done per 0-AP-5.1, but the AP doesn't require the immediate evacuation of the area if fuel handling is in progress, the candidate who doesn't understand the idea behind a higher threshold for evac may default to this choice.

B. incorrect but plausible since again the candidate who isn't sure could rationalize that this is the conservative response (since arguably you could always re-enter later if needed) and select this choice based on that bias. Also this would be the correct response per AP-30 for fuel handling accident.

C. Correct this essentially the level that corresponds to a locked high radiaition level, the expected progression of an event involving a loss of level would be should be slow enough to allow mitigating actions such as leak isolation, alignment of make-up sources etc to be performed, however an upper level had to be chosen to pull the trigger and this is it.

D. Incorrect plausible because this corresponds to a level of less than 23 feet above the fuel and although that requirement is based on Iodine scrubbing in the event of a fuel handling accident there is a direct correlation between dose rates and level (shielding). The person who is unsure and examines all the distactors may equate "C" & "D" as "basically the same thing", and thus eliminate the correct answer based on the commonality between it and this distractor.

Radiation Control Knowledge of radiological safety procedures pertaining to licensed operator duties, such as response to radiation monitor alarms, containment entry requirements, fuel handling responsibilities, access to locked high-radiation areas, aligning filters, etc.

(CFR: 41.12 / 43.4 / 45.9 / 45.10)

Tier: 3 Group: N/A Technical

Reference:

0-AP-27 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info: modified some distractors but answer is still the same Answer: C

65. G2.3.14 65

Isolation of Service Water blowdown (close 1-SW-15, Service Water Supply Header #1 to Liquid Waste System Isolation Valve) is listed in 0-GOP-17, Time Critical Operations Actions.

Which ONE of the following identifies the upper time limit for closing this valve, and includes the reason for this upper time limit?

A. 29 minutes ; auxiliary building flooding B. 29 minutes ; auxiliary building radiation levels C. 59 minutes ; auxiliary building flooding D. 59 minutes ; auxiliary building radiation levels

a. Incorrect. Time is correct; second part is incorrect but plausible because the action is taken due to this concern, but the concern does not establish the time constraint associated with the action.

b. Correct. Time is correct; the reason is correct as seen in the attached Safety Evaluation summary.

c. Incorrect. Time is incorrect but plausible because there are 32 TCAs that range anywhere from a few minutes to a few hours (less the 60 minutes being a few of them); second part also incorrect but plausible as discussed in distractor "A".

d. Incorrect. Both parts incorrect but plausible as discussed in distractors "C" and "A".

Radiation Control Knowledge of radiation or contamination hazards that may arise during normal, abnormal, or emergency conditions or activities.

(CFR: 41.12 / 43.4 / 45.10)

Tier: 3 Group: N/A Technical

Reference:

0-GOP-17,00-SE-PROC-25, 1-E-0, Attachments 4 & 2 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: B

66. G2.3.4 66 Given the following conditions:

• A General Emergency has been declared and an off-site release is in progress

• Field monitoring teams report that doses at the Site Boundary are less than 1 rem TEDE

• The TSC suspects that the release point is most likely from a Charging Pump that tripped earlier in the event, and want to send and Operator in to attempt to isolate it

• The Operator's accumulated dose for the year thus far (not related to this event) is 1 rem TEDE.

Which ONE of the following identifies the maximum amount of dose (TEDE) the operator may receive

while performing the activity WITHOUT exceeding the limit of EPIP-4.04, Emergency Exposure Limits?

(Reference provided)

A. 9 rem B. 10 rem C. 24 rem D. 25 rem A. Incorrect, plausible since the operator may think the limit is based on what he has so far + what he will get.

B. Correct per table 1 in EPIP-4.04 C. Incorrect, plausible since candidate may think stopping the release would qualify for limit of 25 (again

-1 for current dose accumulated)

D. incorrect, plausible since again the candidate may think this qualifies for the 25 rem limit Radiation Control Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under normal or emergency conditions.

(CFR: 41.12 / 43.4 / 45.10)

Tier: 3 Group: N/A Technical

Reference:

EPIP-4.04, North Anna Power Station Emergency Plan Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: EPIP-4.04, Attachment 1 Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: B

67. G2.4.23 67 Given the following:

• A Large break LOCA occurred on Unit 1.

• The crew has transitioned to 1-ES-1.3, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation, and are in the process of verifying proper Service Water System Operation IAW Step 3 of 1-ES-1.3.

The STA reports Critical Safety Function Status Trees (CSFSTs) are as follows:

Subcriticality - Green Core Cooling - Orange Heat Sink - Red RCS Integrity - Red Containment - Yellow Inventory - Yellow Which ONE of the following identifies the crew response and includes the Basis for this response?

A. Immediately transition to 1-FR-C.2, Response to Degraded Core Cooling, to preclude an extreme challenge to the Core Cooling Status Tree.

B. Immediately transition to 1-FR-C.1, Response to Inadequate Core Cooling, to establish an alternate means of core cooling without delay.

C. Immediately transition to 1-FR-H.1, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink, to establishing AFW as a means of restoring core cooling.

D. Continue with ES-1.3 to ensure a source of water to the SI pumps is aligned to provide core cooling.

A. Incorrect. Plausible because although this is why you'd go to C.2, ES-1.3 trakes precedence as discussed in "D".

B. Incorrect. plausible because C.1 needs to be done without delay and other orange paths (i.e.

subcriticality and Integrity) use the 1 series FR procedure, so candidate who lacks detailed knowledge of FRs might think this is the place to go.

C. Incorrect. Plausible because in some cases it is true; further for some activities in C series procedures, like starting an idle RCP, you have to have adequate level in the associated SG to do it.

D. Correct. Since you are at step 3 you can't leave yet until you've verified/made the swap. the basis is from the knowledge subsection of the WOG ES-1.3 Background document Emergency Procedures / Plan Knowledge of the bases for prioritizing emergency procedure implementation during emergency operations.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13)

Tier: 3 Group: N/A Technical

Reference:

1-ES-1.3 and WOG Background Document, OP-AP-104 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: D

68. G2.4.29 68 Assume the E-Plan is entered and a Notification of Unusual Event is declared at 12:00.

IAW the applicable E-Plan procedures, the State must be notified no later than _____________ and activation of the TSC is ___________.

A. 12:15 ; Required B. 12:15 ; NOT Required C. 13:00 ; Required

D. 13:00 ; NOT Required A. Incorrect. Plausible, notification time is correct and since the E-plan has been entered the candidate who lacks the appropriate knowledge level may default to facility activation any time E-plan is entered.

B. Correct. Notification time is correct & TSC activation is required for alert or higher so NOUE may be done discretionary, but it is not required.

C. Incorrect. Plausible because this is the upper limit for NRC notification; activation of facilities anytime E-plan is entered is also plausible.

D. Incorrect. Plausible as discussed above; facility activation not required for NOUE is correct.

Emergency Procedures / Plan Knowledge of the emergency plan.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.11)

Tier: 3 Group: N/A Technical

Reference:

EPIP-1.02, North Anna Power Station Emergency Plan (NAEP), EPIP-3.02, EPIP-3.05 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: B

69. G2.4.43 69 Assume the initial notification of state and local governments of an ALERT Classification has been made.

According to EPIP-2.01, Notification of State and Local Governments, a follow-up report (update) must be provided to state and local governments approximately every _____________ (unless otherwise agreed upon with the State), and sooner than that if an update condition such as __________________

exists.

A. 60 minutes ; issuance of a press release B. 60 minutes ; changing of the Emergency Classification to Notification of Unusual Event C. 30 minutes ; issuance of a press release D. 30 minutes ; changing of the Emergency Classification to Notification of Unusual Event A. Incorrect. correct time and plausible because this is required for NRC notifications.

B. Correct. correct time and this (changes to classification including termination of event) is listed as an

update condition in 2.01.

C. Incorrect. Plausible because updates take only a few minutes and with a dedicated communicator this could be achieved; the candidate who is unsure, or thinks they are "recalling the notification time for the NRC" may select this choice.

D. Incorrect. Plausible as discussed above.

Emergency Procedures / Plan Knowledge of emergency communications systems and techniques.

(CFR: 41.10 / 45.13)

Tier: 3 Group: N/A Technical

Reference:

EPIP-2.01, EPIP-2.02 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: B

70. WE04EA1.1 70 The Crew is performing 1-ECA-1.2, LOCA Outside Containment The BOP is directed to close 1-SI-MOV-1890C, Low-Head SI Pump Cold Leg Injection Valve The BOP momentarily depresses the close pushbutton for 1-SI-MOV-1890C and after pausing for several seconds reports that the indication did not change (RED light remained ON, GREEN light remained OFF) for 1-SI-MOV-1890C.

Based on the above report, which ONE of the following identifies a cause for the failure of 1-SI-MOV-1890C to close?

A. failure of 1-SI-MOV-1890C closed position limit switch B. failure of the close contactor of the breaker for 1-SI-MOV-1890C C. failure to turn on control power to 1-SI-MOV-1890C D. thermal overload of the breaker for 1-SI-MOV-1890C A. Incorrect but plausible since at face value the candidate who doesn't understand how the MOV position switches work could erroneously conclude that the stated failure implies that a portion of the circuit "thinks" the valve is closed already.

B. Correct, things like this don't happen very often but they do happen; given the light indication stated in the stem, this failure, or just dirty switch contacts are the primary culprits.

C. Incorrect but plausible because it would be true for a valve in the previous procedure step; if 1890A

were open, then to "manually close valve" control power must be turned on and the given indication RED light is LIT and the GREEN light is OFF is consistent since control power ON-OFF doesn't affect the indication portion of the circuit.

D. Incorrect but plausible because thermal overload would cause the valve not to stroke, but because of the location of the 49 contactor light indication would be lost also, however the breaker tripping on magnetic overload would also cause loss of light indication and the candidate who doesn't know the circuit might select this choice if they are unsure/don't recall the expected response to the different protective device actuations.

LOCA Outside Containment Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the (LOCA Outside Containment)

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.

Tier: 1 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

1-ECA-1.2 and 11715-ESK-6DY Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: B

71. WE05EK2.2 71 Unit 1 was tripped from 100% power due a Condesate System header rupture.

Subsequently a Tornado struck damaging the Unit 1 ECST.

Current status is:

• The Shift Manager directed securing Unit 1 AFW pumps to prevent them from operating without a suction source

• Operators have transitioned to 1-FR-H.1, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink.

• Wide Range SG levels are approximatley 50% and slowly decreasing.

• Operators are at Step 2 of 1-FR-H.1 "Try to Establish AFW Flow to at Least One SG".

Which of the following choices identifies (1) the action required by 1-FR-H.1 with respect to the RCPs and (2) the preferred source of alternate makeup water for the AFW pumps?

A. (1) Stop ALL RCP's (2) Fire Main Water from the lake B. (1) Stop ALL RCP's (2) Service Water C. (1) Stop ALL but ONE RCP (2) Fire Main Water from the lake D. (1) Stop ALL but ONE RCP

(2) Service Water QQ. Correct. Unlike AP-22 series procedure H.1 will stop all of the RCPs (this is also no typical of the EOP network which prefers forced circulation and normal spray for pressure control.

Correct two back-ups are available for redundancy, this one is preferred.

RR. Incorrect. First part correct as discussed above. Second part incorrect but plausible since this is a valid source; further the candidate may think a Safety Related system (SW) would take precidence.

SS. Incorrect. First part incorrect but plausible as previously discussed and as mentioned this is the way the AP-22 series of procedures work. Second part correct as discussed in "A".

TT. Incorrect. First part incorrect but plausible as discussed above. Second part incorrect, but plausible as discussed in "B".

Loss of Secondary Heat Sink Knowledge of the interrelations between the (Loss of Secondary Heat Sink) and the following:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

Facility's heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.

Tier: 1 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

1-FR-H.1 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info: considered bank since question essentially combines two seperate bank questions Answer: A

72. WE08EK1.3 72 Given the following:

• A Large steam break occurred outside CNTMT on the "A" Main Steamline

• Offsite power was subsequently lost

• The crew has transitioned to 1-FR-P.1, Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock Condition

• SI has been terminated

• Letdown is NOT in-service

• The crew is at step 17 "Depressurize RCS to Decrease RCS Subcooling" Based on the above, the OATC will depressurize using _______________, and stop the depressurization at 69% PRZR LEVEL in order to

______________________________________________?

A. ONE PRZR PORV ; ensure the PRZR has a substantial steam bubble for pressure control B. ONE PRZR PORV ; limit reactor vessel head voiding for core cooling

C. Auxiliary spray ; ensure the PRZR has a substantial steam bubble for pressure control D. Auxiliary spray ; limit reactor vessel head voiding for core cooling A. Correct. Auxiliary spray is the alternative that would be used if the PORV wasn't available. The ERG background document provides this reason for limiting depressurization based on PRZR level.

B. Incorrect. First part is correct. Second part is plausible because there is a note before this step alerting the operator to the possibility of upper head voiding, thus the operator may key on that as the primary concern. Other procedures (e.g. ECA-1.1) will direct use of Aux spray regardless of the status of letdown.

C. Incorrect. As previously discussed this is an alternative so the operator may feel that this is the method of choice since aux. spray can be somewhat more controllable and wouldn't cause a loss of RCS inventory. Second part is correct as discussed above.

D. Incorrect. Aux Spray plausible as discussed in "C"; second part plausible as discussed in "B".

Pressurized Thermal Shock Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (Pressurized Thermal Shock)

(CFR: 41.8 / 41.10, 45.3)

Annunciators and conditions indicating signals, and remedial actions associated with the (Pressurized Thermal Shock).

Tier: 1 Group: 2 Technical

Reference:

1-FR-P.1 and WOG Background Document Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info: similar to calloway NRC exam, question meets the KA because the operator must know the method of accomplishing a Major Action Category to remedy the condition (PTS) and demonstrate knowledge of the reason for stopping depressurization based on the condition (indication) of PRZR level.

Answer: A

73. WE10EK2.2 73 Given the following:

• The reactor was tripped 45 minutes ago.

• All RCPs were tripped.

• The plant cooldown is being performed in accordance with 1-ES-0.3, Natural Circulation Cooldown With Steam Void in Vessel (With RVLIS).

• The crew is preparing to start a RCP Current plant conditions are:

• RVLlS Upper Range indication is 80% and stable.

• PRZR level 40% and stable

• RCS Subcooling based on core exit TCs 60°F and stable Which ONE of the following describes the relationship of the current plant conditions to those required by 1-ES-0.3 for starting the RCP?

A. Current plant conditions are acceptable for RCP start B. PRZR level is acceptable for RCP start ; RCS Subcooling is NOT acceptable for RCP start C. PRZR level is NOT acceptable for RCP start ; RCS Subcooling is acceptable for RCP start D. PRZR level is NOT acceptable for RCP start ; RCS Subcooling is NOT acceptable for RCP start A. Incorrect but plausible since under most other circumstances the plant conditions would seem ideal.

B. Incorrect but plausible because the candidate may expect subcooling to drop and you can raise level a lot faster than you can raise pressure, even if all the heaters are on.

C. Correct. Although this is significantly higher than the no-load program of 28%, the procedure requires more for RCP start to provide for some margin and uncertainties.

D. Incorrect but plausible; "A" & "B" discuss plausibility of each condition.

Natural Circulation with Steam Void in Vessel with/without RVLIS Knowledge of the interrelations between the (Natural Circulation with Steam Void in Vessel with/without RVLIS) and the following:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

Facility's heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.

Tier: 1 Group: 2 Technical

Reference:

1-ES-0.3 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: C

74. WE11EG2.4.6 74 Given the following:

• A LOCA has occurred.

• NO LHSI pumps could be started and the crew has transitioned from 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, to 1-ECA-1.1, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation.

• Two charging pumps are running.

• Containment pressure has been slowly increasing throughout the event and is 21 psia and still slowly increasing.

• RWST level is 86% and lowering.

Based on the above, which of the following choices identifies (1) how Charging pumps will be operated IAW 1-ECA-1.1 and (2) how many Quench Spray pumps are required to be operating IAW 1-ECA-1.1 ?

(Reference Provided)

A. (1) establish only ONE Charging pump running (2) 2 quench spray pumps are required B. (1) establish only ONE Charging pump running (2) 0 quench spray pumps are required C. (1) maintain TWO Charging pumps running (2) 2 quench spray pumps are required D. (1) maintain TWO Charging pumps running (2) 0 quench spray pumps are required UU. Correct; the candidate must have detailed knowledge of the procedure and analyze the plant conditions to arrive at the correct method of operating both of these systems.

VV. Incorrect plausible since as noted above the candidate who lacks detailed knowledge may erroneously conclude that recirc spray is in operation and thus select this choice.

WW. Incorrect plausible because as noted above, under different circumstances (e.g. LHSI pumps stopped because of CNTMT sump blockage) this would be the correct choice.

XX. Incorrect plausible because as noted above both parts although incorrect are plausible since they are alternatives given in the procedure, a lack of detailed knowledge and/or erroneous assumption could lead a candidate to select this distractor.

Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation Knowledge of EOP mitigation strategies.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13)

Tier: 1 Group: 1 Technical

Reference:

1-ECA-1.1 Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: 1-ECA-1.1 Page 8 of 36 Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: A

75. WE15EK3.1 75 Unit 1 is on Cold Leg Recirculation following a LOCA and Loss of Offsite Power.

The following Containment conditions exist:

• CNTMT Pressure 22 psia and slowly increasing

• CNTMT Sump Level 12 feet and slowly increasing Based on the Containment conditions the crew is required to implement _________________________

in order to mitigate the potential for__________________________________.

A. 1-FR-Z.1, Response to High Containment Pressure; accident doses to exceed acceptable limits B. 1-FR-Z.1, Response to High Containment Pressure; equipment qualification limits to be exceeded C. 1-FR-Z.2, Response to High Containment Sump Level; plant components/indications to be damaged by flooding D. 1-FR-Z.2, Response to High Containment Sump Level; excessive depletion of Service Water Reservoir inventory A. Incorrect. plausible because the candidate may confuse or be unsure of F-0 (20 psig is adverse CNTMT, 28 psia is Orange path, only if no QS). second part also plausible since being sub-atmospheric is an assumption for the accident analysis dose.

B. Incorrect. first part incorrect but plausible as discussed above. Second part incorrect but plausible since EQ is in part based on cumulative exposure and the candidate who knows that this the EQ envelope is a basis for TS CNTMT temperature LCO may default to this since the orange path pressure is less than half that of the red path pressure.

C. Correct. This is the correct procedure (orange path criteria is 11 feet). Second part is also correct the goal of identifying and isolating the source is protection of the equipment due to flooding the CNTMT above the design basis level.

D. Incorrect. Procedure is correct as discussed above. Second part is incorrect but plausible since Service water reservoir level is a design limit necessary to ensure cooling for 30 days following a DBA; putting SW in CNTMT implies that the required capability would be challenged, while this is arguable, it is not the reason that F-0 requires the procedure to be implemented.

Containment Flooding Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the (Containment Flooding)

(CFR: 41.5 / 41.10, 45.6, 45.13)

Facility operating characteristics during transient conditions, including coolant chemistry and the effects of temperature, pressure, and reactivity changes and operating limitations and reasons for these operating characteristics.

Tier: 1 Group: 2 Technical

Reference:

1-F-0 and WOG Background Document for FR-Z.2, NAPS Accident Analysis Design Basis Document cases for LBLOCA dose & EQ, TS 3.7.9 Bases Proposed references to be provided to applicants during examination: None

Learning Objective:

additional info:

Answer: C