ML12290A022

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Technical Specification Bases Changes
ML12290A022
Person / Time
Site: Catawba  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 10/11/2012
From: Henderson K
Duke Energy Carolinas
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
Download: ML12290A022 (52)
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Text

Duke DCatawba KELVIN HENDERSON Nuclear Station Site Vice President Carolinas Duke Energy Carolinas,LLC 4800 Concord Rd.

York, SC 29745 803-701-4251 October 11, 2012 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001

Subject:

Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-413 and 50-414 Technical Specification Bases Changes Pursuant to 10CFR 50.4, please find attached changes to the Catawba Nuclear Station Technical Specification Bases. These Bases changes were made according to the provisions of Technical Specification 5.5.14, "Technical Specifications (TS) Bases Control Program.

Any questions regarding this information should be directed to L. J. Rudy, Regulatory Compliance, at (803)701-3084.

I certify that I am a duly authorized officer of Duke Energy Corporation and that the information contained herein accurately represents changes made to the Technical Specification Bases since the previous submittal.

Kelvin Henderson Attachment Soo/

www. duke-energy.com

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission October 11, 2012 Page 2 xc: V. M. McCree, Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II Marquis One Tower 245 Peachtree Center Ave., NE Suite 1200 Atlanta, GA 30303-1257 J. H. Thompson NRC Project Manager (CNS)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint North, Mail Stop 8-G9A 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852-2738 G. A. Hutto, Senior Resident Inspector Catawba Nuclear Station

DUKE ENERGY CORPORATION Catawba Nuclear Station 4 Energye 4800 Concord Rd.

York, SC 29745 October 11, 2012 Re: Catawba Nuclear Station Technical Specifications Bases Please replace the corresponding pages in your copy of the Catawba Technical Specifications Manual as follows:

REMOVE THESE PAGES INSERT THESE PAGES LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES Entire Section (19 pages) Entire Section (19 pages)

TAB 3.3.1 B 3.3.3-1 thru B 3.3.3-16 B 3.3.3.1 thru B 3.3.3-16 Revision 4 Revision 5 TAB 3.3.6 B 3.3.6-1 thru B 3.3.6-5 B 3.3.6-1 thru B 3.3.6-5 Revision 5 Revision 6 TAB 3.4.9 B 3.4.9-1 thru B 3.4.9-4 B 3.4.9-1 thru B 3.4.9-5 Revision 2 Revision 3 TAB 3.7.6 B 3.7.6-1 thru B 3.7.6-3 B 3.7.6-1 thru B 3.7.6-3 Revision 3 Revision 4 www. duke-energy. corn

October 11, 2012 Page 2 If you have any questions concerning the contents of this Technical Specification update, contact Kristi Byers at (803)701-3758.

Randy Hart Manager, Regulatory Compliance

Catawba Nuclear Station Technical Specifications List of Effective Pages Page Number Amendment Revision Date 177/169 4/08/99 iv iii 219/214 3/01/05 215/209 6/21/04 iv 173/165 9/30/98 1.1-1 173/165 9/30/98 1.1-2 173/165 9/30/98 1.1-3 197/190 4/22/02 1.1-4 258/253 8/02/10 1.1-5 257/252 6/28/10 1.1-6 263/259 3/29/11 1.1.7 179/171 8/13/99 1.2-1 173/165 9/30/98 1.2-2 173/165 9/30/98 1.2-3 173/165 9/30/98 1.3-1 173/165 9/30/98 1.3-2 173/165 9/30/98 1.3-3 173/165 9/30/98 1.3-4 173/165 9/30/98 1.3-5 173/165 9/30/98 1.3-6 173/165 9/30/98 1.3-7 173/165 9/30/98 1.3-8 173/165 9/30/98 1.3-9 173/165 9/30/98 1.3-10 173/165 9/30/98 1.3-11 173/165 9/30/98 1.3-12 173/165 9/30198 1.3-13 173/165 9/30/98 1.4-1 173/165 9/30/98 1.4-2 173/165 9/30/98 Catawba Units 1 and 2 Page 1 10/11/12

1.4-3 173/165 9/30/98 1.4-4 173/165 9/30/98 2.0-1 210/204 12/19/03 3.0-1 235/231 3/19/07 3.0-2 235/231 3/19/07 3.0-3 235/231 3/19/07 3.0-4 235/231 3/19/07 3.0-5 235/231 3/19/07 3.0-6 235/231 3/19/07 3.1.1-1 263/259 3/29/11 3.1.2-1 173/165 9/30/98 3.1.2-2 263/259 3/29/11 3.1.3-1 173/165 9/30/98 3.1.3-2 173/165 9/30/98 3.1.3-3 173/165 9/30/98 3.1.4-1 173/165 9/30/98 3.1.4-2 173/165 9/30/98 3.1.4-3 263/259 3/29/11 3.1.4-4 263/259 3/29/11 3.1.5-1 173/165 9/30/98 3.1,5-2 263/259 3/29/11 3.1.6-1 173/165 9/30/98 3.1.6-2 173/165 9/30/98 3.1.6-3 263/259 3/29/11 3.1.7-1 173/165 9/30/98 3.1.7-2 173/165 9/30/98 3.1.8-1 173/165 9/30/98 3.1.8-2 263/259 3/29/11 3.2.1-1 173/165 9/30/98 3.2.1-2 173/165 9/30/98 3.2.1-3 263/259 3/29/11 3.2.1-4 263/259 3/29/11 Catawba Units 1 and 2 Page 2 10/11/12

3.2.1-5 263/259 3/29/11 3.2.2-1 173/165 9/30/98 3.2.2-2 173/165 9/30/98 3.2.2-3 263/259 3/29/11 3.2.2-4 263/259 3/29/11 3.2.3-1 263/259 3/29/11 3.2.4-1 173/165 9/30/98 3.2.4-2 173/165 9/30/98 3.2.4-3 173/165 9/30/98 3.2.4-4 263/259 3/29/11 3.3.1-1 173/165 9/30/98 3.3.1-2 247/240 12/30/08 3.1-3 247/240 12/30/08 3.3.1-4 207/201 7/29/03 3.3.1-5 247/240 12/30/08 3.3.1-6 247/240 12/30/08 3.3.1-7 247/240 12/30/08 3.3.1-8 173/165 9/30/98 3.3.1-9 263/259 3/29/11 3.3.1-10 263/259 3/29/11 3.3.1-11 263/259 3/29/11 3.3.1-12 263/259 3/29/11 3.3.1-13 263/259 3/29/11 3.3.1-14 263/259 3/29/11 3.3.1-15 263/259 3/29/11 3.3.1-16 263/259 3/29/11 3.3.1-17 263/259 3/29/11 3.3.1-18 263/259 3/29/11 3.3.1-19 263/259 3/29/11 3.3.1-20 263/259 3/29/11 3.3.1-21 263/259 3/29/11 3.3.1-22 263/259 3/29/11 3.3.2-1 173/165 9/30/98 Catawba Units 1 and 2 Page 3 10/11/12

3.3.2-2 247/240 12/30/08 3.3.2-3 247/240 12/30/08 3.3.2-4 247/240 12/30/08 3.3.2-5 249/243 4/2/09 3.3.2-6 249/243 4/2/09 3.3.2-7 249/243 4/2/09 3.3.2-8 249/243 4/2/09 3.3.2-9 249/243 4/2/09 3.3.2-10 263/259 3/29/11 3.3.2-11 263/259 3/29/11 3.3.2-12 263/259 3/29/11 3.3.2-13 269/265 7/25/12 3.3.2-14 263/259 3/29/11 3.3.2-15 263/259 3/29/11 3.3.2-16 263/259 3/29/11 3.3.2-17 269/265 7/25/12 3.3.3-1 219/214 3/1/05 3.3.3-2 219/214 3/1/05 3.3.3-3 263/259 3/29/11 3.3.3-4 219/214 3/1/05 3.3.4-1 213/207 4/29/04 3.3.4-2 263/259 3/29/11 3.3.4-3 173/165 9/30/98 3.3.5-1 173/165 9/30/98 3.3.5-2 263/259 3/29/11 3.3.6-1 196/189 3/20/02 3.3.6-2 263/259 3/29/11 3.3.6-3 196/189 3/20/02 3.3.9-1 207/201 7/29/03 3.3.9-2 207/201 7/29/03 3.3.9-3 263/259 3/29/11 3.3.9-4 263/259 3/29/11 Catawba Units 1 and 2 Page 4 10/11/12

3.4.1-1 210/204 12/19/03 3.4.1-2 210/204 12/19/03 3.4.1-3 263/259 3/29/11 3.4.1-4 210/204 12/19/03 3.4.1-5 (deleted) 184/176 3/01/00 3.4.1-6 (deleted) 184/176 3/01/00 3.4.2-1 173/165 9/30/98 3.4.3-1 173/165 9/30/98 3.4.3-2 263/259 3/29/11 3.4.3-3 212/206 3/4/04 3.4.3-4 212/206 3/4/04 3.4.3-5 212/206 3/4/04 3.4.3-6 212/206 3/4/04 3.4.4-1 263/259 3/29/11 3.4.5-1 207/201 7129/03 3.4.5-2 207/201 7/29/03 3.4.5-3 263/259 3/29/11 3.4.6-1 212/206 3/4/04 3.4.6-2 263/259 3/29/11 3.4.6-3 263/259 3/29/11 3.4.7-1 212/206 3/4/04 3.4.7-2 263/259 3/29/11 3.4.7-3 263/259 3/29/11 3.4.8-1 207/201 7/29/03 3.4.8-2 263/259 3/29/11 3.4.9-1 173/165 9/30/98 3.4.9-2 263/259 3/29/11 3.4.10-1 212/206 3/4/04 3.4.10-2 173/165 9/30/98 3.4-11-1 213/207 4/29/04 3.4.11-2 173/165 9/30/98 3.4.11-3 2631259 3/29/11 Catawba Units 1 and 2 Page 5 10/11/12

3.4.11-4 263/259 3/29/11 3.4.12-1 212/206 3/4/04 3.4.12-2 213/207 4/29/04 3.4.12-3 212/206 3/4/04 3.4.12-4 212/206 3/4/04 3.4.12-5 263/259 3/29/11 3.4.12-6 263/259 3/29/11 3.4.12-7 263/259 3/29/11 3.4.12-8 263/259 3/29/11 3.4.13-1 218/212 1/13/05 3.4.13-2 263/259 3/29/11 3.4.14-1 173/165 9/30/98 3.4.14-2 173/165 9/30/98 3.4.14-3 263/259 3/29/11 3.4.14-4 263/259 3/29/11 3.4.15-1 234/230 9/30/06 3.4.15-2 234/230 9/30/06 3.4.15-3 234/230 9/30/06 3.4.15-4 263/259 3/29/11 3.4.16-1 213/207 4/29/04 3.4.16-2 263/259 3/29/11 3.4.16-3 263/259 3/29/11 3.4.16-4 173/165 9/30/98 3.4.17-1 263/259 3/29/11 3.4.18-1 218/212 1/13/05 3.4.18-2 218/212 1/13/05 3.5.1-1 211/205 12/23/03 3.5.1-2 263/259 3/29/11 3.5.1-3 263/259 3/29/11 3.5.2-1 253/248 10/30/09 3.5.2-2 263/259 3/29/11 3.5.2-3 263/259 3/29/11

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3.5.3-1 213/207 4/29/04 3.5.3-2 173/165 9/30/98 3.5.4-1 173/165 9/30/98 3.5.4-2 269/265 7/25/12 3.5.5-1 173/165 9/30/98 3.5.5-2 263/259 3/29/11 3.6.1-1 173/165 9/30/98 3.6.1-2 192/184 7/31/01 3.6.2-1 173/165 9/30/98 3.6.2-2 173/165 9/30/98 3.6.2-3 173/165 9/30/98 3.6.2-4 173/165 9/30/98 3.6.2-5 263/259 3/29/11 3.6.3-1 173/165 9/30/98 3.6.3-2 173/165 9/30/98 3.6.3-3 173/165 9/30/98 3.6.3-4 173/165 9/30/98 3.6.3-5 263/259 3/29/11 3.6.3-6 263/259 3/29/11 3.6.3-7 192/184 7/31/01 3.6.4-1 263/259 3/29/11 3.6.5-1 173/165 9/30/98 3.6.5-2 263/259 3/29/11 3.6.6-1 269/265 7/25/12 3.6.6-2 269/265 7/25/12 3.6.8-1 213/207 4/29/04 3.6.8-2 263/259 3/29/11 3.6.9-1 253/248 10/30/09 3.6.9-2 263/259 3/29/11 3.6.10-1 173/165 9/30/98 3.6.10-2 263/259 3/29/11 3.6.11-1 263/259 3/29/11 Catawba Units 1 and 2 Page 7 10/11/12

3.6.11-2 263/259 3/29/11 3.6.12-1 263/259 3/29/11 3.6.12-2 263/259 3/29/11 3.6.12-3 263/259 3/29/11 3.6.13-1 256/251 6/28/10 3.6.13-2 263/259 3/29/11 3.6.13-3 263/259 3/29/11 3.6.14-1 173/165 9/30/98 3.6.14-2 263/259 3/29/11 3.6.14-3 263/259 3/29/11 3.6.15-1 173/165 9/30/98 3.6.15-2 263/259 3/29/11 3.6.16-1 263/259 3/29/11 3.6.16-2 263/259 3/29/11 3.6.17-1 253/248 10/30/09 3.7.1-1 173/165 9/30/98 3.7.1-2 173/165 9/30/98 3.7.1-3 173/165 9/30/98 3.7.2-1 173/165 9/30/98 3.7.2-2 244/238 9/08/08 3.7.3-1 173/165 9/30/98 3.7.3-2 244/238 9/08/08 3.7.4-1 213/207 4/29/04 3.7.4-2 263/259 3/29/11' 3.7.5-1 253/248 10/30/09 3.7.5-2 173/165 9/30/98 3.7.5-3 263/259 3/29/11 3.7.5-4 263/259 3/29/11 3.7.6-1 173/165 9/30/98 3.7.6-2 263/259 3/29/11 3.7.7-1 253/248 10/30/09 3.7.7-2 263/259 3/29/11 Catawba Units 1 and 2 Page 8 10/11/12

3.7.8-1 243/237 07/30/08 3.7.8-2 243/237 07/30/08 3.7.8-3 263/259 3/29/11 3.7.9-1 263/259 3/29/11 3.7.9-2 263/259 3/29/11 3.7.10-1 250/245 7/30/09 3.7.10-2 260/255 8/9/10 3.7.10-3 263/259 3/29/11 3.7.11-1 198/191 4/23/02 3.7.11-2 263/259 3/29/11 3.7.12-1 253/248 10/30/09 3.7.12-2 263/259 3/29/11 3.7.13-1 198/191 4/23/02 3.7.13-2 263/259 3/29/11 3.7.14-1 263/259 3/29/11 3.7.15-1 263/259 3/29/11 3.7.16-1 233/229 9/27/06 3.7.16-2 233/229 9/27/06 3.7.16-3 233/229 9/27/06 3.7.17-1 263/259 3/29/11 3.8.1-1 253/248 10/30/09 3.8.1-2 173/165 9/30/98 3.8.1-3 253/248 10/30/09 3.8.1-4 173/165 9/30/98 3.8.1-5 263/259 3/29/11 3.8.1-6 263/259 3/29/11 3.8.1-7 263/259 3/29/11 3.8.1-8 263/259 3/29/11 3.8.1-9 263/259 3/29/11 3.8.1-10 263/259 3/29/11 3.8.1-11 263/259 3/29/11 3.8.1-12 263/259 3/29/11 Catawba Units 1 and 2 Page 9 10/11/12

3.8.1-13 263/259 3/29/11 3.8.1-14 263/259 3/29/11 3.8.1-15 263/259 3/29/11 3.8.2-1 173/165 9/30/98 3.8.2-2 207/201 7/29/03 3.8.2-3 173/165 9/30/98 3.8.3-1 175/167 1/15/99 3.8.3-2 263/259 3/29/11 3.8.3-3 263/259 3/29/11 3.8.4-1 173/165 9/30/98 3.8.4-2 263/259 3/29/11 3.8.4-3 263/259 3/29/11 3.8.4-4 263/259 3/29/11 3.8.4-5 262/258 12/20/10 3.8.5-1 173/165 9/30/98 3.8.5-2 207/201 7/29/03 3.8.6-1 253/248 10/30/09 3.8.6-2 253/248 10/30/09 3.8.6-3 253/248 10/30/09 3.8.6-4 263/259 3/29/11 3.8.6-5 223/218 4/27/05 3.8.7-1 173/165 9/30/98 3.8.7-2 263/259 3/29/11 3.8.8-1 173/165 9/30/98 3.8.8-2 263/259 3/29/11 3.8.9-1 173/165 9/30/98 3.8.9-2 173/165 9/30/98 3.8.9-3 263/259 3/29/11 3.8.10-1 207/201 7/29/03 3.8.10-2 263/259 3/29/11 3.9.1-1 263/259 3/29/11 3.9.2-1 215/209 6/21/04 Catawba Units 1 and 2 Page 10 10/11/12

3.9.2-2 263/259 3/29/11 3.9.3-1 227/222 9/30/05 3.9.3-2 263/259 3/29/11 3.9.4-1 207/201 7/29/03 3.9.4-2 263/259 3/29/11 3.9.5-1 207/201 7/29/03 3.9.5-2 263/259 3/29/11 3.9.6-1 263/259 3/29/11 3.9.7-1 263/259 3/29/11 4.0-1 220/215 3/03/05 4.0-2 233/229 9/27/06 5.1-1 173/165 9/30/98 5.2-1 253/248 10/30/09 5.2-2 251/246 9/21/09 5.2-3 Deleted 9/21/09 5.3-1 181/173 11/02/99 5.4-1 173/165 9/30/98 5.5-1 205/198 3/12/03 5.5-2 205/198 3/12/03 5.5-3 173/165 9/30/98 5.5-4 173/165 9/30/98 5.5-5 216/210 8/5/04 5.5-6 252/247 10/30/09 5.5-7 218/212 1/13/05 5.5-7a ---/257 9/27/10 5.5-8 ---/257 9/27/10 5.5-9 218/212 1/13/05 5.5-10 227/222 9/30/05 5.5-11 227/222 9/30/05 5.5-12 218/212 1/13/05 5.5-13 218/212 1/13/05 5.5-14 218/212 1/13/05 Catawba Units 1 and 2 Page 11 10/11/12

5.5-15 263/259 3/29/11 5.5-16 263/259 3/29/11 5.6-1 222/217 3/31/05 5.6-2 253/248 10/30/09 5.6-3 222/217 3/31/05 5.6-4 222/217 3/31/05 5.6-5 ---/257 9/27/10 5.6-6 ---/257 4/13/09 5.7-1 173/165 9/30/98 5.7-2 173/165 9/30/98 Catawba Units 1 and 2 Page 12 10/11/12

BASES Revision 1 4/08/99 ii 3101105 Revision 2 i.i 6/21/04 Revision I 9/30/98 Revision 0 B 2.1.1-1 12/19/03 Revision 1 B 2.1.1-2 12/19/03 Revision 1 B 2.1.1-3 9/30/98 Revision 0 B 2.1.2-1 9/30/98 Revision 0 B 2.1.2-2 9/30/98 Revision 0 B 2.1.2-3 3/19/07 Revision 1 B 3.0-1 3/19/07 Revision 1 B 3.0-2 3/19/07 Revision 2 B 3.0-3 3/19/07 Revision 3 B 3.0-4 3/19/07 Revision 3 B 3.0-5 3/19/07 Revision 2 B 3.0-6 3/19/07 Revision 2 B 3.0-7 3/19/07 Revision 3 B 3.0-8 3/19/07 Revision 2 B 3.0-9 3/19/07 Revision 3 B 3.0-10 3/19/07 Revision 3 B 3.0-11 3/19/07 Revision 3 B 3.0-12 3/19/07 Revision 3 B 3.0-13 3/19/07 Revision 3 B 3.0-14 3/19/07 Revision 1 B 3.0-15 3/19/07 Revision I B 3.0-16 3/19/07 Revision 0 B 3.0-17 3/19/07 Revision 0 B 3.0-18 3/19/07 B 3.0-19 Revision 0 5/05/11 Revision 3 B 3.1.1-1 thru B 3.1.1-6 10/11/12 Catawba Units 1 and 2 Page 13

5/05/11 Revision 2 B 3.1.2-1 thru 4/26/00 B 3.1.2-5 Revision 1 4/26/00 B 3.1.3-1 Revision 1 4/26100 B 3.1.3-2 Revision 1 4/26/00 B 3.1.3-3 Revision 1 4/26/00 B 3.1.3-4 Revision 1 4/26/00 B 3.1.3-5 Revision I 5/051 I B 3.1.3-6 Revision 1 B 3.1.4-1 thru B 3.1.4-9 Revision 2 5105/11 B 3.1.5-1 thru B 3.1.5-4 Revision 1 5/05/11 B 3.1.6-I thru 9/30/98 B 3.1.6-6 Revision 0 1/08/04 B 3.1.7-1 Revision 2 1/08/04 B 3.1.7-2 Revision 2 1108/04 B 3.1 .7-3 Revision 2 1/08104 B 3.1.7-4 Revision 2 1/08/04 B 3.1.7-5 Revision 2 5/05/11 B 3.1.7-6 Revision 2 B 3.1.8-1 thru 5/05/11 B 3.1,8-6 Revision 4 B 3.2.1-1 thru 5/05/11 B 3.2.1.-AI Revision 3 B 3.2.2-1 thru 5/05/11 B 3.2.2-10 Revision 2 B 3.2.3-1 thru 5/05/11 B 3.2.3-4 Revision 2 B 3.2.4-1 thru 5/26/11 B 3.2.4-7 Revision 6 B 3.3.1-1 thru 5105111 B.3.3.1-55 Revision 9 B 3.3.2-1 thru 08/02/12 B 3.3.2-49 Revision 5 B 3.3.3-1 thru 5/05/11 16 B.3.3.3- Revision 2 B 3.3.4-1 thru B 3.3.4-5 10/11/12 Page 14 and 2 Catawba Units I

B 3.3.5-1 thru Revision 2 5/05/11 B 3.3.5-6 B 3.3.6-1 thru Revision 6 08/02/12 B 3.3.6-5 B 3.3.9-1 thru Revision 2 5/05/11 B 3.3.9-5 B 3.4.1-1 thru Revision 3 5/05/11 B 3.4.1-5 B 3.4.2-1 Revision 0 9/30/98 B 3.4.2-2 Revision 0 9/30/98 B 3.4.2-3 Revision 0 9/30/98 B 3.4.3-1 thru Revision 2 5/05/11 B 3.4.3-6 B 3.4.4-1 thru Revision 2 5/05/11 B 3.4.4-3 B 3.4.4-2 Revision 1 1/13/05 B 3.4.4-3 Revision 0 9/30/98 B 3.4.5-1 thru Revision 3 5/05/11 B 3.4.5-6 B 3.4.6-1 thru Revision 4 5/05/11 B 3.4.6-5 B 3.4.7-1 thru Revision 5 5/05/11 B 3.4.7-5 B 3.4.8-1 thru Revision 3 5/05/11 B 3.4.8-3 B 3.4.9-1 thru Revision 3 08/02112 B 3.4.9-5 B 3.4.10-1 Revision 1 3/4/04 B 3.4.10-2 Revision 0 9/30/98 B 3.4.10-3 Revision 1 3/4/04 B 3.4.10-4 Revision 2 10/30/09 B 3.4.11-1 thru Revision 4 5/05/11 B 3.4.11-7 B 3.4.12-1 thru Revision 4 5/05/11 B 3.4.12-13 B 3.4.13-1 thru Revision 6 5/05/11 B 3.4.13-7 B 3.4.14-1 thru Revision 3 5/05111 B 3.4.14-6 Catawba Units 1 and 2 Page 15 10/11/12

B 3.4.15-1 thru Revision 6 5/05/11 B 3.4.15-10 B 3.4.16-1 thru Revision 3 5/05/11 B 3.4.16-6 B 3.4.17-1 thru Revision 2 5/05/11 B 3.4.17-3 B 3.4.18-1 Revision 0 1/13/05 B 3.4.18-2 Revision 0 1/13/05 B 3.4.18-3 Revision 1 3/18/08 B 3.4.18-4 Revision 0 1/13/05 B 3.4.18-5 Revision 0 1/13/05 B 3.4.18-6 Revision 0 1/13/05 B 3.4.18-7 Revision 0 1/13/05 B 3.4.18-8 Revision 1 3/18/08 B 3.5.1-1 thru Revision 3 5/05/11 B 3.5.1-8 B 3.5.2-1 thru Revision 3 5/05/11 B 3.5.2-10 B 3.5.3-1 Revision 0 9/30/98 B 3.5.3-2 Revision 1 4/29/04 B 3.5.3-3 Revision 1 4/29/04 B 3.5.4-1 thru Revision 4 5/05/11 B. 3.5.4-6 B 3.5.5-1 thru Revision 1 5/05/11 B 3.5.5-4 B 3.6.1-1 Revision 1 7/31/01 B 3.6.1-2 Revision 1 7/31/01 B 3.6.1-3 Revision 1 7/31/01 B 3.6.1-4 Revision 1 7131/01 B 3.6.1-5 Revision 1 7/31/01 B 3.6.2-1 thru Revision 2 5/05/11 B 3.6.2-8 B 3.6.3-1 thru Revision 4 5/05/11 B 3.6.3-14 B 3.6.4-1 thru Revision 2 5/05/11 B 3.6.4-4 Catawba Units 1 and 2 Page 16 10/11/12

B 3.6.5-1 thru Revision 2 5/05/11 B 3.6.5-4 B 3.6.6-1 thru Revision 6 5/05/11 B 3.6.6-7 B 3.6.8-1 thru Revision 3 5/05/11 B 3.6.8-5 B 3.6.9-1 thru Revision 6 5/05/11 B 3.6.9-5 B 3.6.10-1 thru Revision 2 5/05/11 B 3.6.10-6 B 3.6.11-1 thru Revision 5 5/05/11 B 3.6.11-6 B 3.6.12-1 thru Revision 5 5/05/11 B 3.6.12-11 B 3.6.13-1 thru Revision 4 5/05/11 B 3.6.13-9 B 3.6.14-1 thru Revision 1 5/05/11 B 3.6.14-5 B 3.6.15-1 thru Revision 1 5/05/11 B 3.6.15-4 B 3.6.16-1 thru Revision 3 5/05/11 B 3.6.16-4 B 3.6.17-1 Revision 1 3/13/08 B 3.6.17-2 Revision 0 9/30/98 B 3.6.17-3 Revision 0 9/30/98 B 3.6.17-4 Revision 0 9/30/98 B 3.6.17-5 Revision 1 3/13/08 B 3.7.1-1 Revision 0 9/30/98 B 3.7.1-2 Revision 0 9/30/98 B 3.7.1-3 Revision 0 9/30/98 B 3.7.1-4 Revision 1 10/30/09 B 3.7.1-5 Revision I 10/30/09 B 3.7.2-1 Revision 0 9/30/98 B 3.7.2-2 Revision 0 9/30/98 B 3.7.2-3 Revision 2 6/23/10 B 3.7.2-4 Revision 1 9/08/08 B 3.7.2-5 Revision 3 10/30/09 Catawba Units 1 and 2 Page 17 10/11/12

B 3.7.3-1 Revision 0 9/30/98 B 3.7.3-2 Revision 0 9/30/98 B 3.7.3-3 Revision 0 9/30/98 B 3.7.3-4 Revision 0 9/30/98 B 3.7.3-5 Revision 1 9/08/08 B 3.7.3-6 Revision 2 10/30/09 B 3.7.4-1 thru Revision 2 5/05/11 B 3.7.4-4 B 3.7.5-1 thru Revision 3 5/05/11 B 3.7.5-9 B 3.7.6-1 thru Revision 4 08/02/12 B 3.7.6-3 B 3.7.7-1 thru Revision 2 5/05/11 B 3.7.7-5 B 3.7.8-1 thru Revision 3 5/05/11 B 3.7.8-7 B 3.7.9-1 thru Revision 3 5/05/11 B 3.7.9-4 B 3.7.10-1 thru Revision 9 5/05/11 B 3.7.10-9 B 3.7.11-1 thru Revision 2 5/05/11 B 3.7.11-4 B 3.7.12-1 thru Revision 4 5/05/11 B 3.7.12-7 B 3.7.13-1 thru Revision 4 5/05/11 B 3.7.13-5 B 3.7.14-1 thru Revision 2 5/05/11 B 3.7.14-3 B 3.7.15-1 thru Revision 2 5/05/11 B 3.7.15-4 B 3.7.16-1 Revision 2 9/27/06 B 3.7.16-2 Revision 2 9/27/06 B 3.7.16-3 Revision 2 9/27/06 B 3.7.16-4 Revision 0 9/27/06 B 3.7.17-1 thru Revision 2 5105/11 B 3.7.17-3 B 3.8.1-1 thru Revision 4 5/05/11 B.3.8.1-29 Catawba Units I and 2 Page 18 10/11/12

B 3.8.2-1 Revision 0 9/30/98 B 3.8.2-2 Revision 0 9/30/98 B 3.8.2-3 Revision 0 9/30/98 B 3.8.2-4 Revision 1 5/10/05 B 3.8.2-5 Revision 2 5/10/05 B 3.8.2-6 Revision 1 5/10/05 B 3.8.3-1 thru Revision 4 5/05/11 B 3.8.3-8 B 3.8.4-1 thru Revision 10 5/05/11 B3.8.4.10 B 3.8.5-1 Revision 0 9/30/98 B 3.8.5-2 Revision 2 7/29/03 B 3.8.5-3 Revision 1 7/29/03 B 3.8.6-1 thru Revision 4 5/05/11 B 3.8.6-7 B 3.8.7-1 thru Revision 3 5/05/11 B 3.8.7-4 B 3.8.8-1 thru Revision 3 5/05/11 B 3.8.8-4 B 3.8.9-1 thru Revision 2 5/05/11 B 3.8.9-10 B 3.8.10-1 thru Revision 3 5/05/11 B 3.8.10-4 B 3.9.1-1 thru Revision 3 5/05/11 B 3.9.1-4 B 3.9.2-1 thru Revision 4 5/05/11 B 3.9.2.4 B 3.9.3-1 thru Revision 4 5/05/11 B 3.9.3-5 B 3.9.4-1 thru Revision 4 5/05/11 B 3.9.4-4 B 3.9.5-1 thru Revision 3 5/05/11 B 3.9.5-4 B 3.9.6-1 thru Revision 2 5/05/11 B 3.9.6-3 B 3.9.7-1 thru Revision 1 5/05/11 B 3.9.7-3 Catawba Units 1 and 2 Page 19 10/11/12

PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.3 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.3 Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation BASES BACKGROUND The primary purpose of the PAM instrumentation is to display unit variables that provide information required by the control room operators during accident situations. This information provides the necessary support for the operator to take the manual actions for which no automatic control is provided and that are required for safety systems to accomplish their safety functions for Design Basis Accidents (DBAs).

The OPERABILITY of the accident monitoring instrumentation ensures that there is sufficient information available on selected unit parameters to monitor and to assess unit status and behavior following an accident.

The availability of accident monitoring instrumentation is important so that responses to corrective actions can be observed and the need for, and magnitude of, further actions can be determined. These essential instruments are identified by unit specific documents (Ref. 1) addressing the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.97 (Ref. 2) as required by Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737 (Ref. 3).

The instrument channels required to be OPERABLE by this LCO include two classes of parameters identified during unit specific implementation of Regulatory Guide 1.97 as Type A and Category I variables.

Type A variables are included in this LCO because they provide the primary information required for the control room operator to take specific manually controlled actions for which no automatic control is provided, and that are required for safety systems to accomplish their safety functions for DBAs.

Category I variables are the key variables deemed risk significant because they are needed to:

Catawba Units 1 and 2 B 3.3.3-1 Revision No. 5

PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.3 BASES BACKGROUND (continued)

  • Determine whether other systems important to safety are performing their intended functions;

" Provide information to the operators that will enable them to determine the likelihood of a gross breach of the barriers to radioactivity release; and

  • Provide information regarding the release of radioactive materials to allow for early indication of the need to initiate action necessary to protect the public, and to estimate the magnitude of any impending threat.

These key variables are identified by the unit specific Regulatory Guide 1.97 analyses (Ref. 1). These analyses identify the unit specific Type A and Category I variables and provide justification for deviating from the NRC proposed list of Category I variables.

The specific instrument Functions listed in Table 3.3.3-1 are discussed in the LCO section.

APPLICABLE The PAM instrumentation ensures the operability of Regulatory SAFETY ANALYSES Guide 1.97 Type A and Category I variables so that the control room operating staff can:

  • Perform the diagnosis specified in the emergency operating procedures (these variables are restricted to preplanned actions for the primary success path of DBAs), e.g., loss of coolant accident (LOCA);
  • Take the specified, pre-planned, manually controlled actions, for which no automatic control is provided, and that are required for safety systems to accomplish their safety function;
  • Determine whether systems important to safety are performing their intended functions;
  • Determine the likelihood of a gross breach of the barriers to radioactivity release; Catawba Units 1 and 2 B 3.3.3-2 Revision No. 5

PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.3 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES (continued)

  • Determine if a gross breach of a barrier has occurred; and

" Initiate action necessary to protect the public and to estimate the magnitude of any impending threat.

PAM instrumentation that meets the definition of Type A in Regulatory Guide 1.97 satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36 (Ref. 4). Category I, non-Type A, instrumentation must be retained in TS because it is intended to assist operators in minimizing the consequences of accidents. Therefore, Category I, non-Type A, variables are important for reducing public risk.

LCO The PAM instrumentation LCO provides OPERABILITY requirements for Regulatory Guide 1.97 Type A monitors, which provide information required by the control room operators to perform certain manual actions specified in the unit Emergency Operating Procedures. These manual actions ensure that a system can accomplish its safety function, and are credited in the safety analyses. Additionally, this LCO addresses Regulatory Guide 1.97 instruments that have been designated Category I, non-Type A.

The OPERABILITY of the PAM instrumentation ensures there is sufficient information available on selected unit parameters to monitor and assess unit status following an accident. This capability is consistent with the recommendations of Reference 1.

LCO 3.3.3 requires two OPERABLE channels for most Functions. Two OPERABLE channels ensure no single failure prevents operators from getting the information necessary for them to determine the safety status of the unit, and to bring the unit to and maintain it in a safe condition following an accident.

Furthermore, OPERABILITY of two channels allows a CHANNEL CHECK during the post accident phase to confirm the validity of displayed information.

In some cases, the total number of channels exceeds the number of required channels, e.g., pressurizer level has a total of three Catawba Units 1 and 2 B 3.3.3-3 Revision No. 5

PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.3 BASES LCO (continued) channels, however only two channels are required OPERABLE. This provides additional redundancy beyond that required by this LCO, i.e.,

when one channel of pressurizer level is inoperable, the required number of two channels can still be met. The ACTIONS of this LCO are only entered when the required number of channels cannot be met.

Type A and Category I variables are required to meet Regulatory Guide 1.97 Category I (Ref. 2) design and qualification requirements for seismic and environmental qualification, single failure criterion, utilization of emergency standby power, immediately accessible display, continuous readout, and recording of display.

Performing the Neutron Flux Instrumentation and Containment Area Radiation (High-Range) surveillances meets the License Renewal Commitments for License Renewal Program for High-Range Radiation and Neutron Flux Instrumentation Circuits per UFSAR Chapter 18, Table 18-1 and License Renewal Commitments specification CNS-1274.00 0016.

Listed below are discussions of the specified instrument Functions listed in Table 3.3.3-1.

1, 2. Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Hot and Cold Leg Temperatures RCS Hot and Cold Leg Temperatures are Category I variables provided for verification of core cooling and long term surveillance.

RCS hot and cold leg temperatures are used to determine RCS subcooling margin. RCS subcooling margin will allow termination of safety injection (SI), if still in progress, or reinitiation of SI if it has been stopped. RCS subcooling margin is also used for unit stabilization and cooldown control.

In addition, RCS cold leg temperature is used in conjunction with RCS hot leg temperature to verify the unit conditions necessary to establish natural circulation in the RCS.

Reactor coolant hot and cold leg temperature inputs are provided by a fast response resistance element in each loop.

RCS Hot and Cold Leg Temperature are diverse indications of RCS temperature. Core exit thermocouples also provide diverse indication of RCS temperature.

Catawba Units 1 and 2 B 3.3.3-4 Revision No. 5

PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.3 BASES LCO (continued)

3. Reactor Coolant System Pressure (Wide Range)

RCS wide range pressure is a Category I variable provided for verification of core cooling and RCS integrity long term surveillance.

RCS pressure is used to verify delivery of SI flow to RCS from at least one train when the RCS pressure is below the pump shutoff head. RCS pressure is also used to verify closure of manually closed spray line valves and pressurizer power operated relief valves (PORVs).

In addition to these verifications, RCS pressure is used for determining RCS subcooling margin. RCS pressure can also be used:

  • to determine whether to terminate actuated SI or to reinitiate stopped SI;

.0 to determine when to reset SI and shut off low head SI;

  • to make a determination on the nature of the accident in progress and where to go next in the procedure.

RCS pressure is also related to three decisions about depressurization. They are:

  • to determine whether to proceed with primary system depressurization;
  • to verify termination of depressurization; and
  • to determine whether to close accumulator isolation valves during a controlled cooldown/depressurization.

Catawba Units 1 and 2 B 3.3.3-5 Revision No. 5

PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.3 BASES LCO (continued)

A final use of RCS pressure is to determine whether to operate the pressurizer heaters.

RCS pressure is a Type A variable because the operator uses this indication to monitor the cooldown of the RCS following a steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) or small break LOCA. Operator actions to maintain a controlled cooldown, such as adjusting steam generator (SG) pressure or level, would use this indication.

Furthermore, RCS pressure is one factor that may be used in decisions to terminate RCP operation.

Two channels of wide range RCS pressure are required OPERABLE.

4. Reactor Vessel Water Level Reactor Vessel Water Level is provided for verification and long term surveillance of core cooling. It is also used for accident diagnosis and to determine reactor coolant inventory adequacy.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level Monitoring System provides a direct measurement of the collapsed liquid level above the fuel alignment plate. The collapsed level represents the amount of liquid mass that is in the reactor vessel above the core.

Measurement of the collapsed water level is selected because it is a direct indication of the water inventory.

Two channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level are required with plasma displays in the unit control room. Each channel consists of three differential pressure transmitters and a micro processor to calculate true vessel level or relative void content of the primary coolant.

5. Containment Sump Water Level (Wide Ran-qe)

Containment Sump Water Level is provided for verification and long term surveillance of RCS integrity.

Catawba Units 1 and 2 B 3.3.3-6 Revision No. 5

PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.3 BASES LCO (continued)

Containment Sump Water Level is used to determine:

" containment sump level accident diagnosis;

" when to begin the recirculation procedure; and

" whether to terminate SI, if still in progress.

Two channels of Wide Range Containment Sump Water Level are required OPERABLE. Each channel consists of wide range containment sump level indication, and two level switches.

6. Containment Pressure (Wide Range.)

Containment Pressure (Wide Range) is provided for verification of RCS and containment OPERABILITY.

Containment pressure is used to verify closure of main steam isolation valves (MSIVs), containment spray operation, and Phase B containment isolation when Containment Pressure - High High is reached.

Two channels of wide range containment pressure are required OPERABLE.

7. Containment Area Radiation (High Ranqe)

Containment Area Radiation is provided to monitor for the potential of significant radiation releases and to provide release assessment for use by operators in determining the need to invoke site emergency plans. Containment radiation level is used to determine if a high energy line break (HELB) has occurred, and whether the event is inside or outside of containment.

Two channels of high range containment area radiation are provided. One channel is required OPERABLE. Diversity or backup information is provided by portable instrumentation or by sampling and analysis.

Catawba Units 1 and 2 B 3.3.3-7 Revision No. 5

PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.3 BASES LCO (continued)

8. Not Used
9. Pressurizer Level Pressurizer Level is used to determine whether to terminate SI, if still in progress, or to reinitiate SI if it has been stopped.

Knowledge of pressurizer water level is also used to verify the unit conditions necessary to establish natural circulation in the RCS and to verify that the unit is maintained in a safe shutdown condition.

Three channels of pressurizer level are provided. Two channels are required OPERABLE.

10. Steam Generator Water Level (Narrow Range)

SG Water Level is provided to monitor operation of decay heat removal via the SGs. The Category I indication of SG level is the narrow range level instrumentation.

SG Water Level (Narrow Range) is used to:

  • identify the faulted SG following a tube rupture;

" verify that the intact SGs are an adequate heat sink for the reactor;

  • determine the nature of the accident in progress (e.g., verify an SGTR); and
  • verify unit conditions for termination of SI during secondary unit HELBs outside containment.

Four channels per SG of narrow range water level are provided.

Only two channels are required OPERABLE by the LCO.

Catawba Units 1 and 2 B 3.3.3-8 Revision No. 5

PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.3 BASES LCO (continued) 11, 12,13,14. Core Exit Temperature Core Exit Temperature is provided for verification and long term surveillance of core cooling.

Adequate core cooling is ensured with two valid Core Exit Temperature channels per quadrant with two CETs per required channel. Core inlet temperature data is used with core exit temperature to give radial distribution of coolant enthalpy rise across the core. Core Exit Temperature is used to determine whether to terminate SI, if still in progress, or to reinitiate SI if it has been stopped. Core Exit Temperature is also used for unit stabilization and cooldown control.

Two OPERABLE channels of Core Exit Temperature are required in each quadrant to provide indication of radial distribution of the coolant temperature rise across representative regions of the core.

Two sets of two thermocouples (1 set per redundant power train) ensure a single failure will not disable the ability to determine the radial temperature gradient.

15. Auxiliary Feedwater Flow AFW Flow is provided to monitor operation of decay heat removal via the SGs.

The AFW flow to each SG is determined by flow indicators, pump operational status indicators, and NSWS and condensate supply valve indicators in the control room. The AFW flow indicators are category 1 variables which are used to demonstrate AFW assured source.

AFW flow is used three ways:

  • to verify delivery of AFW flow to the SGs;

" to determine whether to terminate SI if still in progress, in conjunction with SG water level (narrow range); and

  • to regulate AFW flow so that the SG tubes remain covered.

Catawba Units 1 and 2 B 3.3.3-9 Revision No. 5

PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.3 BASES LCO (continued)

One channel per SG of AFW flow is required to be OPERABLE.

Diverse indication of AFW flow is provided by SG level.

16. RCS Radiation Level The RCS radiation monitor provides indication of radiation levels within the primary coolant and alerts the operator to possible fuel clad failures.

One channel of RCS radiation level is required OPERABLE. This monitor was not installed to quantify accident conditions and cannot be assured flow following an accident. Diverse or backup information for this variable is provided by sampling and analysis of the primary coolant.

17. RCS Subcoolina Margin Monitor RCS subcooling margin monitoring indication is provided to allow unit stabilization and cooldown control. RCS subcooling margin monitoring indication will provide information to the operators to allow termination of SI, if still in progress, or reinitiation of SI if it has been stopped.

The margin to saturation is calculated from RCS pressure and temperature measurements. The average of the five highest core exit thermocouples are used to represent core conditions and the wide range hot leg RTDs are used to measure loop hot leg temperatures. The ICCM System performs the calculations and comparisons to saturation curves. A graphic display over the required range gives the operator a representation of primary system conditions compared to various curves of importance (saturation, NDT, etc.). Two trains of RCS Subcooling Margin Monitor are provided and two trains are required to be OPERABLE.

A backup program exists to ensure the capability to accurately monitor RCS subcooling. The program includes training and a procedure to manually calculate subcooling margin, using control room pressure and temperature instruments.

18. Steam Line Pressure Steam Line Pressure is provided to monitor operation of decay heat removal via the SGs. Steam line pressure is also used to determine if a high energy secondary line rupture occurred and which SG is faulted.

Catawba Units 1 and 2 B 3.3.3-10 Revision No. 5

PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.3 BASES LCO (continued)

There are three channels of Steam Line Pressure provided for each SG. Two channels per SG are required OPERABLE by the LCO.

19. Refueling Water Storage Tank Level RWST level monitoring is provided to ensure an adequate supply of water to the ECCS pumps during the switchover to cold leg recirculation.

Four channels of RWST level are provided. Only two channels are required OPERABLE by the LCO.

20. Neutron Flux (Wide Range)

Wide Range Neutron Flux indication is provided to verify reactor shutdown.

Neutron flux is used for accident diagnosis, verification of subcriticality, and diagnosis of positive reactivity insertion.

Two channels of wide range neutron flux are required OPERABLE.

21. Steam Generator Water Level (Wide Range)

SG Water Level (Wide Range) is used to verify that the intact SGs are an adequate heat sink for the reactor. One channel per steam generator is required OPERABLE by the LCO. Diverse indication is provided by Steam Generator Water Level (Narrow Range).

APPLICABILITY The PAM instrumentation LCO is applicable in MODES 1, 2, and 3.

These variables are related to the diagnosis and pre-planned actions required to mitigate DBAs. The applicable DBAs are assumed to occur in MODES 1, 2, and 3. In MODES 4, 5, and 6, unit conditions are such that the likelihood of an event that would require PAM instrumentation is low; therefore, the PAM instrumentation is not required to be OPERABLE in these MODES.

Catawba Units 1 and 2 B 3.3.3-11 Revision No. 5

PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.3 BASES ACTIONS A Note has been added in the ACTIONS to clarify the application of Completion Time rules. The Conditions of this Specification may be entered independently for each Function listed on Table 3.3.3-1. When the Required Channels in Table 3.3.3-1 are specified (e.g., on a per steam line, per loop, per SG, etc., basis), then the Condition may be entered separately for each steam line, loop, SG, etc., as appropriate.

The Completion Time(s) of the inoperable channel(s) of a Function will be tracked separately for each Function starting from the time the Condition was entered for that Function.

A..I Condition A applies to all PAM instrument Functions. Condition A addresses the situation when one or more required channels for one or more Functions are inoperable. The Required Action is to refer to Table 3.3.3-1 and take the appropriate Required Actions for the PAM instrumentation affected. The Completion Times are those from the referenced Conditions and Required Actions.

B.1 Condition B applies when one or more Functions have one required channel that is inoperable. Required Action A.1 requires restoring the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 30 days. The 30 day Completion Time is based on operating experience and takes into account the remaining OPERABLE channel, the passive nature of the instrument (no critical automatic action is assumed to occur from these instruments), and the low probability of an event requiring PAM instrumentation during this interval.

Catawba Units 1 and 2 B 3.3.3-12 Revision No. 5

PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.3 BASES ACTIONS (continued)

C.1 Condition C applies to PAM Instrument Functions when a single required channel is inoperable and a diverse channel for the affected function remains OPERABLE. The Required Action requires the affected channel be restored to OPERABLE status within 30 days. The 30 day Completion Time is based on operating experience and takes into account the remaining OPERABLE diverse channel, the passive nature of the instrument (no critical automatic action is assumed to occur from these instruments), and the low probability of an event requiring PAM instrumentation during this interval.

D.1 Condition D applies when the Required Action and associated Completion Time for Condition B or C are not met. This Required Action specifies initiation of actions in Specification 5.6.7, which requires a written report to be submitted to the NRC immediately. This report discusses the results of the root cause evaluation of the inoperability and identifies proposed restorative actions. This action is appropriate in lieu of a shutdown requirement since alternative actions are identified before loss of functional capability, and given the likelihood of unit conditions that would require information provided by this instrumentation.

E.1 and E.2 Condition E applies when a single required channel is inoperable and no diverse channel is OPERABLE. Required Action E.1 and E.2 requires restoring the required channel or the diverse channel to OPERABLE status within 7 days. The Completion Time of 7 days is based on the relatively low probability of an event requiring PAM instrument operation and the availability of alternate means to obtain the required information.

Continuous operation with the required channel and the diverse channel inoperable is not acceptable. Therefore, requiring restoration of either the required or diverse channel to OPERABLE status limits the risk that the PAM function will be in a degraded condition should an event occur.

Catawba Units 1 and 2 B 3.3.3-13 Revision No. 5

PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.3 BASES ACTIONS (continued)

F. 1 Condition F applies when one or more Functions have two inoperable required channels (i.e., two channels inoperable in the same Function).

Required Action F.1 requires restoring one channel in the Function(s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days. The Completion Time of 7 days is based on the relatively low probability of an event requiring PAM instrument operation and the availability of alternate means to obtain the required information. Continuous operation with two required channels inoperable in a Function is not acceptable because the alternate indications may not fully meet all performance qualification requirements applied to the PAM instrumentation. Therefore, requiring restoration of one inoperable channel of the Function limits the risk that the PAM Function will be in a degraded condition should an accident occur.

G..1 Not Used H.1 and H.2 If the Required-Action and associated Completion Time of Conditions E or F are not met, the unit must be brought to a MODE where the requirements of this LCO do not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and MODE 4 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

Catawba Units 1 and 2 B 3.3.3-14 Revision No. 5

PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE A Note has been added to the SR Table to clarify that SR 3.3.3.1 and REQUIREMENTS SR 3.3.3.3 apply to each PAM instrumentation Function in Table 3.3.3-1.

SR 3.3.3.1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK ensures that a gross instrumentation failure has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the two instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or of something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK will detect gross channel failure; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION. The high radiation instrumentation should be compared to similar unit instruments located throughout the unit.

Agreement criteria are determined by the unit staff, based on a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, including isolation, indication, and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the sensor or the signal processing equipment has drifted outside its limit. If the channels are within the criteria, it is an indication that the channels are OPERABLE.

As specified in the SR, a CHANNEL CHECK is only required for those channels that are normally energized.

The Surveillance Frequency is based on operating experience, equipment reliability, and plant risk and is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

SR 3.3.3.2 Not Used Catawba Units 1 and 2 B 3.3.3-15 Revision No. 5

PAM Instrumentation B 3.3.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.3.3.3 CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check of the instrument loop, including the sensor. The test verifies that the channel responds to measured parameter with the necessary range and accuracy. This SR is modified by two Notes. Note 1 excludes neutron detectors. The calibration method for neutron detectors is specified in the Bases of LCO 3.3.1, "Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation." Note 2 describes the calibration methods for the Containment Area - High Range monitor.

The Surveillance Frequency is based on operating experience, equipment reliability, and plant risk and is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

REFERENCES 1. UFSAR Section 1.8.

2. Regulatory Guide 1.97, Rev. 2.
3. NUREG-0737, Supplement 1, "TMI Action Items."
4. 10 CFR 50.36, Technical Specifications, (c)(2Xii).

Catawba Units 1 and 2 B 3.3.3-16 Revision No. 5

Containment Air Release and Addition Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.6 Containment Air Release and Addition Isolation Instrumentation BASES BACKGROUND Containment air release and addition isolation instrumentation closes the containment isolation valves in the Containment Air Release and Addition System. This action isolates the containment atmosphere from the environment to minimize releases of radioactivity in the event of an accident.

Containment air release and addition isolation initiates on an automatic safety injection (SI) signal through the Containment Isolation-Phase A Function, or by manual actuation of Phase A Isolation. The Bases for LCO 3.3.2, "Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS)

Instrumentation," discuss these modes of initiation.

Each of the containment air release and addition penetrations has inner and outer containment isolation valves. A safety injection initiates containment isolation, which closes both inner and outer containment isolation valves. The Containment Air Release and Addition System is described in the Bases for LCO 3.6.3, "Containment Isolation Valves."

APPLICABLE The safety analyses assume that the containment remains SAFETY ANALYSES intact with penetrations unnecessary for core cooling isolated early in the event, within approximately 60 seconds. The Containment Air Release and Addition System isolation valves may be used in MODES 1-4 and their rapid isolation is assumed. Containment isolation ensures meeting the containment leakage rate assumptions, of the safety analyses, and ensures that the calculated accidental offsite radiological doses are below 10 CFR 50.67 (Ref. 1) limits.

The containment air release and addition isolation instrumentation satisfies Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36 (Ref. 2).

Catawba Units 1 and 2 B 3.3.6-1 Revision No. 6

Containment Air Release and Addition Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6 BASES LCO The LCO requirements ensure that the instrumentation necessary to initiate Containment Air Release and Addition Isolation, listed in Table 3.3.6-1, is OPERABLE.

1. Manual Initiation The LCO requires two trains OPERABLE. The operator can initiate containment isolation at any time by using either of two switches (manual Phase A actuation or manual spray actuation) in the control room. Either switch actuates its associated train. This action will cause actuation of all components in the same manner as any of the automatic actuation signals.

The LCO for Manual Initiation ensures the proper amount of redundancy is maintained in the manual actuation circuitry to ensure the operator has manual initiation capability.

Each train consists of one push button and the interconnecting wiring to the actuation logic cabinet.

2. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays The LCO requires two trains of Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays OPERABLE to ensure that no single random failure can prevent automatic actuation.

Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays consist of the same features and operate in the same manner as described for ESFAS Function 1.b, SI, and ESFAS Function 3.a, Containment Phase A Isolation. The applicable MODES and specified conditions for the containment air release and addition isolation portion of these Functions are different and less restrictive than those for their Phase A isolation and SI roles. If one or more of the SI or Phase A isolation Functions becomes inoperable in such a manner that only the containment air release and addition isolation Function is affected, the Conditions applicable to their SI and Phase A isolation Functions need not be entered. The less restrictive Actions specified for inoperability of the containment air release and addition isolation Functions specify sufficient compensatory measures for this case.

Catawba Units 1 and 2 B 3.3.6-2 Revision No. 6

Containment Air Release and Addition Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6 BASES LCO (continued)

3. Safety Iniection Refer to LCO 3.3.2, Function 1, for all initiating Functions and requirements.

APPLICABILITY The Manual Initiation, Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays, and Safety Injection Functions are required OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. Under these conditions, the potential exists for an accident that could release fission product radioactivity into containment. Therefore, the containment air release and addition isolation instrumentation must be OPERABLE in these MODES.

For other MODES and conditions, LCO 3.9.3, "Containment Penetrations", provides appropriate requirements, since the potential for radioactive releases is minimized and operator action is sufficient to ensure post accident offsite doses are maintained within the limits of Reference 1.

ACTIONS A Note has been added to the ACTIONS to clarify the application of Completion Time rules. The Conditions of this Specification may be entered independently for each Function listed in Table 3.3.6-1. The Completion Time(s) of the inoperable train(s) of a Function will be tracked separately for each Function starting from the time the Condition was entered for that Function.

A..1 Condition A applies to all containment air release and addition isolation Functions and addresses the train orientation of the Solid State Protection System (SSPS) and the master and slave relays for these Functions.

If a train is inoperable, operation may continue as long as the Required Action for the applicable Conditions of LCO 3.6.3 is met for each valve made inoperable by failure of isolation instrumentation.

Catawba Units 1 and 2 B 3.3.6-3 Revision No. 6

Containment Air Release and Addition Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6 BASES SURVEILLANCE A Note has been added to the SR Table to clarify that Table 3.3.6-1 REQUIREMENTS determines which SRs apply to which containment air release and addition isolation Functions.

SR 3.3.6.1 SR 3.3.6.1 is the performance of an ACTUATION LOGIC TEST. The train being tested is placed in the bypass condition, thus preventing inadvertent actuation. Through the semiautomatic tester, all possible logic combinations, with and without applicable permissives, are tested for each protection function. In addition, the master relay coil is pulse tested for continuity. This verifies that the logic modules are OPERABLE and there is an intact voltage signal path to the master relay coils. The Surveillance Frequency is based on operating experience, equipment reliability, and plant risk and is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

SR 3.3.6.2 SR 3.3.6.2 is the performance of a MASTER RELAY TEST. The MASTER RELAY TEST is the energizing of the master relay, verifying contact operation and a low voltage continuity check of the slave relay coil. Upon master relay contact operation, a low voltage is injected to the slave relay coil. This voltage is insufficient to pick up the slave relay, but large enough to demonstrate signal path continuity. The Surveillance Frequency is based on operating experience, equipment reliability, and plant risk and is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

SR 3.3.6.3 SR 3.3.6.3 is the performance of a SLAVE RELAY TEST. The SLAVE RELAY TEST is the energizing of the slave relays. Contact operation is verified in one of two ways. Actuation equipment that may be operated in the design mitigation mode is either allowed to function or is placed in a condition where the relay contact operation can be verified without operation of the equipment. Actuation equipment that may not be operated in the design mitigation mode is prevented from operation by the SLAVE RELAY TEST circuit. For this latter case, contact operation is verified by a continuity check of the circuit containing the slave relay. The Surveillance Frequency is based on operating experience, equipment reliability, and plant risk and is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

Catawba Units 1 and 2 B 3.3.6-4 Revision No. 6

Containment Air Release and Addition Isolation Instrumentation B 3.3.6 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

For slave relays or any auxiliary relays in the circuit that are of the type Westinghouse AR or Potter & Brumfield MDR, the SLAVE RELAY TEST Frequency is based on operating experience, equipment reliability, and plant risk and is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

SR 3.3.6.4 SR 3.3.6.4 is the performance of a TADOT. This test is a check of the Manual Actuation Functions. Each Manual Actuation Function is tested up to, and including, the master relay coils. In some instances, the test includes actuation of the end device (i.e., pump starts, valve cycles, etc.).

The test also includes trip devices that provide actuation signals directly to the SSPS, bypassing the analog process control equipment. The SR is modified by a Note that excludes verification of setpoints during the TADOT. The Functions tested have no setpoints associated with them.

The Surveillance Frequency is based on operating experience, equipment reliability, and plant risk and is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 50.67.

2. 10 CFR 50.36, Technical Specifications, (c)(2#ii).
3. Not used.
4. Not used.
5. Not used.
6. Not used.

Catawba Units 1 and 2 B 3.3.6-5 Revision No. 6

Pressurizer B 3.4.9 B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)

B 3.4.9 Pressurizer BASES BACKGROUND The pressurizer provides a point in the RCS where liquid and vapor are maintained in equilibrium under saturated conditions for pressure control purposes to prevent bulk boiling in the remainder of the RCS. Key functions include maintaining required primary system pressure during steady state operation, and limiting the pressure changes caused by reactor coolant thermal expansion and contraction during normal load transients.

The pressure control components addressed by this LCO include the pressurizer water level, the required heaters, and their controls and emergency power supplies. Pressurizer safety valves and pressurizer power operated relief valves are addressed by LCO 3.4.10, "Pressurizer Safety Valves," and LCO 3.4.11, "Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs)," respectively.

The intent of the LCO is to ensure that a steam bubble exists in the pressurizer prior to power operation to minimize the consequences of potential overpressure transients. The LCO also ensures that the initial pressurizer level assumed in the safety analysis remains valid. Relatively small amounts of noncondensible gases can inhibit the condensation heat transfer between the pressurizer spray and the steam, and diminish the spray effectiveness for pressure control.

Electrical immersion heaters, located in the lower section of the pressurizer vessel, keep the water in the pressurizer at saturation temperature and maintain a constant operating pressure. A minimum required available capacity of pressurizer heaters ensures that the RCS pressure can be maintained. The capability to maintain and control system pressure is important for maintaining subcooled conditions in the RCS and ensuring the capability to remove core decay heat by either forced or natural circulation of reactor coolant. Unless adequate heater capacity is available, the hot, high pressure condition cannot be maintained indefinitely and still provide the required subcooling margin in the primary system. Inability to control the system pressure and maintain subcooling under conditions of natural circulation flow in the primary system could lead to a loss of single phase natural circulation and decreased capability to remove core decay heat.

Catawba Units 1 and 2 B 3.4.9-1 Revision No. 3

Pressurizer B 3.4.9 BASES APPLICABLE In MODES 1, 2, and 3, the LCO requirement for pressurizer level to SAFETY ANALYSES remain within the required range is consistent with the accident analyses.

Safety analyses performed for lower MODES are not limiting. All analyses performed from a critical reactor condition assume the existence of a steam bubble and saturated conditions in the pressurizer. In making this assumption, the analyses neglect the small fraction of noncondensible gases normally present.

Safety analyses presented in the UFSAR (Ref. 1) do not take credit for pressurizer heater operation; however, an initial condition assumption of the safety analyses is that the RCS is operating at normal pressure.

The maximum pressurizer water level limit satisfies Criterion 2 of 10 CFR 50.36 (Ref. 2). Although the heaters are not specifically used in accident analysis, the need to maintain subcooling in the long term during loss of offsite power, as indicated in NUREG-0737 (Ref. 3), is the reason for providing an LCO.

LCO The LCO requirement for the pressurizer to be OPERABLE with a water volume _<1656 cubic feet, which is equivalent to 92%, ensures that a steam bubble exists. Limiting the LCO maximum operating water level preserves the steam space for pressure control. The LCO has been established to ensure the capability to establish and maintain pressure control for steady state operation and to minimize the consequences of potential overpressure transients. Requiring the presence of a steam bubble is also consistent with safety analysis analytical assumptions.

The LCO requires two groups of OPERABLE pressurizer heaters, each with a capacity _>150 kW, capable of being powered from the emergency power supply. Only heater groups A and B are capable of being powered from the emergency power supply. Each of these heater groups receives power from the emergency power supply by the transfer of that'train of the 4160 VAC Blackout Auxiliary Power System to be fed from the 4160 VAC Essential Auxiliary Power System. OPERABILITY of the associated diesel generator is not required to meet the LCO. The minimum heater capacity required is sufficient to maintain the RCS near normal operating pressure when accounting for heat losses through the pressurizer insulation. By maintaining the pressure near the operating conditions, a wide margin to subcooling can be obtained in the loops. The amount needed to maintain pressure is dependent on the heat losses.

Catawba Units 1 and 2 B 3.4.9-2 Revision No. 3

Pressurizer B 3.4.9 BASES APPLICABILITY The need for pressure control is most pertinent when core heat can cause the greatest effect on RCS temperature, resulting in the greatest effect on pressurizer level and RCS pressure control. Thus, applicability has been designated for MODES 1 and 2. The applicability is also provided for MODE 3. The purpose is to prevent solid water RCS operation during heatup and cooldown to avoid rapid pressure rises caused by normal operational perturbation, such as reactor coolant pump startup.

In MODES 1, 2, and 3, there is need to maintain the availability of pressurizer heaters, capable of being powered from an emergency power supply. In the event of a loss of offsite power, the initial conditions of these MODES give the greatest demand for maintaining the RCS in a hot pressurized condition with loop subcooling for an extended period. For MODE 4, 5, or 6, it is not necessary to control pressure (by heaters) to ensure loop subcooling for heat transfer when the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System is in service, and therefore, the LCO is not applicable.

ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 Pressurizer water level control malfunctions or other plant evolutions may result in a pressurizer water level above the nominal upper limit, even with the plant at steady state conditions. Normally the plant will trip in this event since the upper limit of this LCO is the same as the Pressurizer Water Level-High Trip.

If the pressurizer water level is not within the limit, action must be taken to restore the plant to operation within the bounds of the safety analyses. To achieve this status, the unit must be brought to MODE 31 with the reactor trip breakers open, within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and to MODE 4 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. This takes the unit out of the applicable MODES and restores the unit to operation within the bounds of the safety analyses.

The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

B.1 If one required group of pressurizer heaters is inoperable, restoration is required within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. The Completion Time of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> is reasonable considering the anticipation that a demand caused by loss of offsite power would be unlikely in this period. Pressure control may be maintained during this time using normal station powered heaters.

Catawba Units 1 and 2 B 3.4.9-3 Revision No. 3

Pressurizer B 3.4.9 BASES ACTIONS (continued)

C.1 and C.2 If one group of pressurizer heaters are inoperable and cannot be restored in the allowed Completion Time of Required Action B.1, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and to MODE 4 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.4.9.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR requires that during steady state operation, pressurizer level is maintained below the nominal upper limit to provide a minimum space for a steam bubble. The Surveillance is performed by observing the indicated level. The Surveillance Frequency is based on operating experience, equipment reliability, and plant risk and is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

SR 3.4.9.2 The SR is satisfied when the power supplies are demonstrated to be capable of producing the minimum power and the associated pressurizer heaters are verified to be at their design rating. This SR may be verified by energizing the heaters and measuring circuit current. The Surveillance Frequency is based on operating experience, equipment reliability, and plant risk and is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

SR 3.4.9.3 This Surveillance demonstrates that the heaters can be automatically transferred from the normal to the emergency power supply. The Surveillance Frequency is based on operating experience, equipment reliability, and plant risk and is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

Catawba Units 1 and 2 B 3.4.9-4 Revision No. 3

Pressurizer B 3.4.9 BASES REFERENCES 1. UFSAR, Section 15.

2. 10 CFR 50.36, Technical Specifications, (c)(2)(ii).
3. NUREG-0737, November 1980.

Catawba Units 1 and 2 B 3.4.9-5 Revision No. 3

CSS B 3.7.6 B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS B 3.7.6 Condensate Storage System (CSS)

BASES BACKGROUND The CSS provides a source of water to the steam generators for removing decay and sensible heat from the Reactor Coolant System (RCS). The CSS provides a passive flow of water, by gravity, to the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System (LCO 3.7.5). The steam produced is released to the atmosphere by the main steam safety valves, the steam generator PORVs, or to the turbine condenser. The CSS is formed from the Upper Surge Tanks (two 42,500 gallon tanks per unit) and the Condenser Hotwell (normal operating level of 170,000 gallons). The safety grade and seismically designed source of water for the AFW system, which serves as the ultimate long.-term safety related source is the Standby Nuclear Service Water Pond. This required source is covered in LCO 3.7.9, "Standby Nuclear Service Water Pond (SNSWP)"

and satisfies all short and long term water supply requirements for the AFW system except for Station Blackout (SBO) requirements.

When the main steam isolation valves are open, the preferred means of heat removal is to discharge steam to the condenser by the nonsafety grade path of the steam dumps to the condenser valves. The condensed steam is returned to the CSS by the condensate pump. This has the advantage of conserving condensate while minimizing releases to the environment.

A description of the CSS is found in the UFSAR, Section 10.4 (Ref. 1).

Note: The Auxiliary Feedwater Condensate Storage Tank (one 42,500 gallon tank per unit) is currently isolated as a normal suction source to the AFW pumps, when the AFW system is aligned for standby readiness, due to air entrainment concerns. This inventory is not available to meet the CSS requirement.

APPLICABLE The SNSWP provides cooling water to remove decay heat and to SAFETY ANALYSES cool down the unit following all events in the accident analysis as discussed in the UFSAR, Chapters 6 and 15 (Refs. 2 and 3, respectively). Because of the water quality, the SNSWP is not used for the normal source of water to the AFW system. The SNSWP serves as a backup source to supply only when the CSS can not supply AFW.

Catawba Units 1 and 2 B 3.7.6-1 Revision No. 4

CSS B 3.7.6 BASES LCO In order to satisfy recommendations made for the sizing of the system, the CSS contains sufficient cooling water to remove decay heat for 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> following a reactor trip from 100% RTP, and then to cool down the RCS to RHR entry conditions, assuming a natural circulation cooldown.

In doing this, it must retain sufficient water to ensure adequate net positive suction head for the AFW pumps during cooldown.

The CSS level required is equivalent to a capacity _>225,000 gallons, which is based on holding the unit in MODE 3 for 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, followed by a 5 hour5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> cooldown to RHR entry conditions at 50°F/hour. The OPERABILITY of the CSS is determined by maintaining the tanks' levels at or above the minimum required volume.

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, and in MODE 4, when steam generator is being relied upon for heat removal, the CSS is required to be OPERABLE.

In MODE 5 or 6, the CSS is not required because the AFW System is not required.

ACTIONS A.1 and A.2 If the CSS inventory is not within limits, the OPERABILITY of the assured supply should be verified by administrative means within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> and once every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> thereafter. The assured supply is considered the Nuclear Service Water System (NSWS) and ultimately the SNSWP.

OPERABILITY of the assured feedwater supply must include verification that the flow paths from the assured water supply to the AFW pumps are OPERABLE, and that the assured supply has the required volume of water available. The CSS must be restored to OPERABLE status within 7 days, because the assured supply may be performing this function in addition to its normal functions. The 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience, to verify the OPERABILITY of the assured water supply. The 7 day Completion Time is reasonable, based on an OPERABLE assured water supply being available, and the low probability of an event occurring during this time period requiring the CSS.

B.1 and B.2 If the CSS cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least Catawba Units 1 and 2 B 3.7.6-2 Revision No. 4

CSS B 3.7,6 BASES ACTIONS (continued)

MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, and in MODE 4, without reliance on the steam generator for heat removal, within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.6.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR verifies that the CSS contains the required inventory of cooling water. The Surveillance Frequency is based on operating experience, equipment reliability, and plant risk and is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

REFERENCES 1. UFSAR, Section 10.4.

2. UFSAR, Chapter 6.
3. UFSAR, Chapter 15.

Catawba Units 1 and 2 B 3.7.6-3 Revision No. 4

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