Text

ME8189 - G20120172/EDATS: OEDO-2012-0147 - e-mail from Additional Co-Petitioner, (25 Co-Petitioners)
	ML12163A226
Person / Time
Site:	FitzPatrick
Issue date:	05/09/2012
From:	Matthews C, Rogers T, Rosa E; - No Known Affiliation
To:	Borchardt R, Bhalchandra Vaidya; NRC/EDO, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
	2.206, EDATS: OEDO-2012-0147, G20120172, OEDO-2012-0147, TAC ME8189
	Download: ML12163A226 (25)
	v • d • e

Mr. James Borchardt Executive Director for Operations U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington. DC 20555-0001 Attn: Bhalchandra K. Vaidya, NRC Petition Manager In the Matter of the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Plant in Scriba, New York

Dear Mr. Borchardt:

I wish to co-petition with the Alliance for a Green Economy and Beyond Nuclear's. March 9, 2012 emergency enforcement petition to suspend the operation of the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Plant.

The FitzPatrick plant is the only GE Mark I boiling water reactor in the US that did not install a Direct Torus Vent System as requested by the NRC in 1989 and instead, to save money, relies upon a "pre-existing" venting system that is not fully hardened against a severe accident.

In deciding not to install such a vent, the FitzPatrick operator and the NRC relied upon assumptions that now place public health and safety at an undue risk. I The hydrogen explosions at the Fukushima reactors show the dangers and ,unacceptable consequences posed by the current FitzPatrick severe accident venting plan, since the plan was approved on the assumptions that venting would prevent containment failure, and that there are "no likely" ignition sources along the vent path. Neither of these assumptions was correct during the Fukushima nuclear catastrophe.

Subsequent to the Fukushima accident, the NRC inspected FitzPatrick and ildentified a "vulnerability, in that current procedures do not address hydrogen considerations" during a severe accident.

Therefore, I request NRC immediately suspend the FitzPatrick operating license until the following emergency enforcement actions are approved by the NRC:

1) Public hearings should be held on the continued operation of Entergy Nuclear Operations' Fitzpatrick plant and the adequacy of its plan to vent through a pre-existing path into the adjacent Standby Gas Treatment System building, blowing off the double doors to release a radiological accident to the outside environment at ground level. The public must be afforded due process to address the unacceptable risks to public health and safety posedby the FitzPatrick severe accident plan.

2) Entergy Nuclear Operations should publicly document for independent review its post-Fukushima re-analysis for the reliability and capability of the FitzPatrick pre-existing containment vent system.

The analysis should include the reassessment of all assumptions regarding the reliability of the pre-existing containment venting and specifically address non-conservative assumptions behind the cost-benefit analysis used to justify not installing a fully hardened vent system.

It should also include a reassessment of the assumption of 'no likely ignition points" during emergency venting that would otherwise present catastrophic consequences. associated with the detonation of hydrogen gas and the release of radioactivity generated during a severe accident.

I wish the NRC to process my request using the 2.206 process, and I understand that under this process, the contents of this message and my identity will be made public. The Alliance for a Green Economy is my point of contact for this petition, and their organizer, Jessica Azulay, will keep me informed about the developments of the petition and the opportunity to participate in a public meeting with the NRC Petition Review Board, Thank you, .,i Name (print): *-T i:-1.i, i -* * . ' - Signature . .

Date Email: C:,,,' o * ,... EC-..L" a(I. t. ,.

Address:

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Mr. James Borchardt Executive Director for Operations U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington. DC 20555-0001 Attn: Bhalchandra K. Vaidya, NRC Petition Manager In the Matter of the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Plant in Scriba, New York

Dear Mr. Borchardt:

I wish to co-petition with the Alliance for a Green Economy and Beyond Nuclear's March 9, 2012 emergency enforcement petition to suspend the operation of the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Plant.

The FitzPatrick plant is the only GE Mark I boiling water reactor in the US that did not install a Direct Torus Vent System as requested by the NRC in 1989 and instead, to save money, relies upon a "pre-existing" venting system that is not fully hardened against a severe accident.

In deciding not to install such a vent, the FitzPatrick operator and the NRC relied upon assumptions that now place public health and safety at an undue risk.

The hydrogen explosions at the Fukushima reactors show the dangers and Unacceptable consequences posed by the current FitzPatrick severe accident venting plan, since the plan was approved on the assumptions that venting would prevent containment failure, and that there are

.no likely" ignition sources along the vent path. Neither of these assumptions. was correct during the Fukushima nuclear catastrophe.

Subsequent to the Fukushima accident, the NRC inspected FitzPatrick and identified a

'vulnerability, in that current procedures do not address hydrogen considerations" during a severe accident.

Therefore, I request NRC immediately suspend the FitzPatrick operating license until the following emergency enforcement actions are approved by the NRC:

1) Public hearings should be held on the continued operation of Entergy Nuclear Operations' Fitzpatrick plant and the adequacy of its plan to vent through a pre-existing path into the adjacent Standby Gas Treatment System building, blowing off the double doors to release a radiological accident to the outside environment at ground level. The public must be afforded due process to address the unacceptable risks to public health and safety posed'by the FitzPatrick severe accident plan.

2) Entergy Nuclear Operations should publicly document for independent review its post-Fukushima re-analysis for the reliability and capability of the FitzPatrick pre-existing containment vent system, The analysis should include the reassessment of all assumptions regarding the reliability of the pre-existing containment venting and specifically address non-conservative assumptions behind the cost-benefit analysis used to justify not installing a fully hardened vent sy'stem.

It should also include a reassessment of the assumption of "no likely ignition :points" during emergency venting that would otherwise present catastrophic consequences associated with the detonation of hydrogen gas and the release of radioactivity generated during a severe accident.

I wish the NRC to process my request using the 2.206 process, and I understand that under this process, the contents of this message and my identity will be made public. The Alliance for a Green Economy is my point of contact for this petition, and their organizer, Jessica Azulay, will keep me informed about the developments of the petition and the opportunity to participate in a public meeting with the NRC Petition Review Board.

Thank you, Name (print): I 4t* , '-'-.", Signature Date q 1 .-

Email: -I -, C t-i I C Address: c~ ~e

Mr. James Borchardt Executive Director for Operations U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 Attn: Bhalchandra K. Vaidya, NRC Petition Manager In the Matter of the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Plant in Scriba, New York

Dear Mr. Borchardt:

I wish to co-petition with the Alliance for a Green Economy and Beyond Nuclear's. March 9, 2012 emergency enforcement petition to suspend the operation of the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Plant.

The FitzPatrick plant is the only GE Mark I boiling water reactor in the US that did not install a Direct Torus Vent System as requested by the NRC in 1939 and instead, to save money, relies upon a "pre-existing" venting system that is not fully hardened against a severe accident.

In deciding not to install such a vent, the FitzPatrick operator and the NRC relied upon assumptions that now place public health and safety at an undue risk.

The hydrogen explosions at the Fukushima reactors show the dangers and unacceptable consequences posed by the current FitzPatrick severe accident venting plan, since the plan was approved on the assumptions that venting would prevent containment failure, and that there are "no likely" ignition sources along the vent path. Neither of these assumptions was correct during the Fukushima nuclear catastrophe.

Subsequent to the Fukushima accident, the NRC inspected FitzPatrick and identified a

'vulnerability, in that current procedures do not address hydrogen considerations" during a severe accident.

Therefore. I request NRC immediately suspend the FitzPatrick operating license until the following emergency enforcement actions are approved by the NRC:

1) Public hearings should be held on the continued operation of Entergy Nuclear Operations' Fitzpatrick plant and the adequacy of its plan to vent through a pre-existing path into the adjacent Standby Gas Treatment System building, blowing off the double doors to release a radiological accident to the outside environment at ground level. The public must be afforded due process to address the unacceptable risks to public health and safety posedby the FitzPatrick severe accident plan.

2) Entergy Nuclear Operations should publicly document for independent rev~iew its post-Fukushima re-analysis for the reliability and capability of the FitzPatrick pre-existing containment vent system.

The analysis should include the reassessment of all assumptions regarding the reliability of the pre-existing containment venting and specifically address non-conservative assumptions behind the cost-benefit analysis used to justify not installing a fully hardened vent system.

It should also include a reassessment of the assumption of "no likely ignition points" during emergency venting that would otherwise present catastrophic consequences associated with the detonation of hydrogen gas and the release of radioactivity generated during a severe accident.

i I wish the NRC to process my request using the 2.206 process, and I understand that under this process, the contents of this message and my identity will be made public. Tthe Alliance for a Green Economy is my point of contact for this petition, and their organizer, Jessica Azulay, will keep me informed about the developments of the petition and the opportunity to participate in a public meeting with the NRC Petition Review Board.

Thank you, c.. V- AYý Name (print): *-* /j ' :: '"

Date .

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Email: C"

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Address:~ /9LkQS (lJ i ._,.J -

Mr. James Borchardt Executive Director for Operations U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 Attn: Bhalchandra K. Vaidya, NRC Petition Manager In the Matter of the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Plant in Scriba, New York

Dear Mr. Borchardt:

I wish to co-petition with the Alliance for a Green Economy and Beyond Nuclear's March 9, 2012 emergency enforcement petition to suspend the operation of the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Plant.

The FitzPatrick plant is the only GE Mark I boiling water reactor in the US that did not install a Direct Torus Vent System as requested by the NRC in 1989 and instead, to save money, relies upon a "pre-existing" venting system that is not fully hardened against a severe accident.

In deciding not to install such a vent, the FitzPatrick operator and the NRC relied upon assumptions that now place public health and safety at an undue risk.

The hydrogen explosions at the Fukushima reactors show the dangers and Unacceptable consequences posed by the current FitzPatrick severe accident venting plan, since the plan was approved on the assumptions that venting would prevent containment failure, and that there are

'no likely" ignition sources along the vent path. Neither of these assumptions! was correct during the Fukushima nuclear catastrophe.

Subsequent to the Fukushima accident, the NRC inspected FitzPatrick and identified a

.vulnerability, in that current procedures do not address hydrogen considerations" during a severe accident.

Therefore. I request NRC immediately suspend the FitzPatrick operating license until the following emergency enforcement actions are approved by the NRC:

1) Public hearings should be held on the continued operation of Entergy Nuclear Operations' Fitzpatrick plant and the adequacy of its plan to vent through a pre-existing 'Path into the adjacent Standby Gas Treatment System building, blowing off the double doors to release a radiological accident to the outside environment at ground level. The public must be afforded due process to address the unacceptable risks to public health and safety posed:by the FitzPatrick severe accident plan.

2) Entergy Nuclear Operations should publicly document for independent review its post-Fukushima re-analysis for the reliability and capability of the FitzPatrick pre-existing containment vent system.

The analysis, should include the reassessment of all assumptions regarding the reliability of the pre-existing containment venting and specifically address non-conservative assumptions behind the cost-benefit analysis used to justify not installing a fully hardened vent system.

It should also include a reassessment of the assumption of "no likely ignition points" during emergency venting that would otherwise present catastrophic consequences associated with the detonation of hydrogen gas and the release of radioactivity generated during a severe accident.

I wish the NRC to process my request using the 2.206 process, and I understand that under this process, the contents of this message and my identity will be made public. The Alliance for a Green Economy is my point of contact for this petition, and their organizer, Jessica Azulay, will keep me informed about the developments of the petition and the opportunity to participate in a public meeting with the NRC Petition Review Board.

Thank you, .. , ; .*.

Name ipp.): , ,Signature Date 0 - 0/2 Email: 4:5,,"

Address: i 2 . 7 (Z ",6 2-..

5 Z V1

Mr. James Borchardt Executive Director for Operations U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 Attn: Bhalchandra K. Vaidya, NRC Petition Manager In the Matter of the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Plant in Scriba, New York

Dear Mr. Borchardt:

I wish to co-petition with the Alliance for a Green Economy and Beyond Nuc!ear's March 9, 2012 emergency enforcement petition to suspend the operation of the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Plant.

The FitzPatrick plant is the only GE Mark I boiling water reactor in the US that did not install a Direct Torus Vent System as requested by the NRC in 1989 and instead, to save money, relies upon a "pre-existing" venting system that is not fu~ly hardened against a severe accident.

!n deciding not to .nsta!l such ? vent the FitzPrntrick np.rantor and the NRC reiied upon assumptions that now place public health and safety at an undue risk.

The hydrogen explosions at the Fukushima reactors show the dangers and unacceptable

, consequences posed by the current FitzPatrick severe accident venting plan, since the plan was approved on the assumptions that venting would prevent containment failure, and that there are "0mnolikely" ignition sources along the vent path. Neither of these assumptions' was correct during 41W the Fukushima nuclear catastrophe. i Subsequent to the Fukushima accident, the NRC inspected FitzPatrick and identified a "vulnerability, in that current procedures do not address hydrogen considerations" during a severe accident.

Therefore, I request NRC immediately suspend the FitzPatrick operating license until the following emergency enforcement actions are approved by the NRC:

1) Public hearings should be held on the continued operation of Entergy Nuclear Operations' Fitzpatrick plant and the adequacy of its plan to vent through a pre-existing path into the adjacent Standby Gas Treatment System building, blowing off the double ddors to release a radiological accident to the outside environment at ground level. The public must be afforded due process to address the unacceptable risks to public health and safety posed by the FitzPatrick severe accident plan.

2) Entergy Nuclear Operations should publicly document for independent review its post-Fukushima re-analysis for the reliability and capability of the FitzPatrick pre-ejisting containment vent system.

The analysis should include the reassessment of all assumptions regarding the reliability of the pre-existing containment venting and specifically address non-conservative assumptions behind the cost-benefit analysis used to tusdify not ir:staiing a fuiiy hardeneG ver., system.

It should also include a reassessment of the assumption of "no likely ignition !points" during emergency venting that would otherwise present catastrophic consequences! associated with the detonation of hydrogen gas and the release of radioactivity generated during a severe accident.

I wish the NRC to process my request using the 2.206 process, and I understand that under this process, the contents of this message and my identity will be made public. The Alliance for a Green Economy is my point of contact for this petition, and their organizer, Jessica Azulay, will keep me informed about the developments of the petition and the opportunity to participate in a public meeting with the NRC Petition Review Board.

Thank you, Name (print): _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -Signature Date " ____,"__-

Email:

Address. t70 0 .z-

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Mr. James Borchardt Executive Director for Operations U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 Attn: Bhalchandra K. Vaidya, NRC Petition Manager In the Matter of the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Plant in Scriba, New York

Dear Mr. Borchardt:

i I wish to co-petition with the Alliance for a Green Economy and Beyond Nuclear's March 9, 2012 emergency enforcement petition to suspend the operation of the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Plant.

The FitzPatrick plant is the only GE Mark I boiling water reactor in the US that did not install a Direct Torus Vent System as requested by the NRC in 1989 and instead, to save money, relies upon a "pre-existing" venting system that is not fully hardened against a severe accident.

In deciding not to install such a vent, the FitzPatrick operator and the NRC relied upon assumptions that now place public health and safety at an undue risk.

The hydrogen explosions at the Fukushima reactors show the dangers and unacceptable consequences posed by the current FitzPatrick severe accident venting plan, since the plan was approved on the assumptions that venting would prevent containment failure, and that there are "no likely" ignition sources along the vent path. Neither of these assumptions was correct during the Fukushima nuclear catastrophe.

Subsequent to the Fukushima accident, the NRC inspected FitzPatrick and identified a "vulnerability, in that current procedures do not address hydrogen considerations" during a severe accident.

Therefore, I request NRC immediately suspend the FitzPatrick operating license until the following emergency enforcement actions are approved by the NRC:

1) Public hearings should be held on the continued operation of Entergy Nuclear Operations' Fitzpatrick plant and the adequacy of its plan to vent through a pre-existing path into the adjacent Standby Gas Treatment System building, blowing off the double doors to release a radiological accident to the outside environment at ground level. The public must be afforded due process to address the unacceptable risks to public health and safety posed by the FitzPatrick severe accident plan.

2) Entergy Nuclear Operations should publicly document for independent review its post-Fukushima re-analysis for the reliability and capability of the FitzPatrick pre-existing containment vent system.

The analysis should include the reassessment of all assumptions regarding the reliability of the pre-existing containment venting and specifically address non-conservative assumptions behind the cost-benefit analysis used to justify not installing a fully hardened vent system.

It should also include a reassessment of the assumption of "no likely ignition points' during emergency venting that would otherwise present catastrophic consequences associated with the detonation of hydrogen gas and the release of radioactivity generated during a severe accident.

I wish the NRC to process my request using the 2.206 process, and I understand that under this process, the contents of this message and my identity will be made public. The Alliance for a Green Economy is my point of contact for this petition, and their organizer, Jessica Azulay, will keep me informed about the developments of the petition and the opportunity to participate in a public meeting with the NRC Petition Review Board.

Thank you, Namn (print): * (._( .Y - , Signature Date / 5

/*/

Emaild : Z 11,,*0 . '(lc (. 0..

Address: sL Ir' '-

Mr. James Borchardt Executive Director for Operations U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 Attn: Bhalchandra K. Vaidya, NRC Petition Manager In the Matter of the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Plant in Scriba, New York

Dear Mr. Borchardt:

I wish to co-petition with the Alliance for a Green Economy and Beyond Nuclear's March 9, 2012 emergency enforcement petition to suspend the operation of the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Plant..

The FitzPatrick plant is the only GE Mark I boiling water reactor in the US that did not install a Direct Torus Vent System as requested by the NRC in 1989 and instead, to save money, relies upon a "pre-existing" venting system that is not fully hardened against a severe accident.

In deciding not to install such a vent, the FitzPatrick operator and the NRC relied upon assumptions that now place public health and safety at an undue risk.

The hydrogen explosions at the Fukushima reactors show the dangers and unacceptable consequences posed by the current FitzPatrick severe accident venting plan, since the plan was approved on the assumptions that venting would prevent containment failure, and that there are "no likely" ignition sources along the vent path. Neither of these assumption, was correct during the Fukushima nuclear catastrophe.

Subsequent to the Fukushima accident, the NRC inspected FitzPatrick and identified a

'vulnerability, in that current procedures do not address hydrogen considerations" during a severe accident.

Therefore, I request NRC immediately suspend the FitzPatrick operating license until the following emergency enforcement actions are approved by the NRC:

1) Public hearings should be held on the continued operation of Entergy Nuc!ear Operations' Fitzpatrick plant and the adequacy of its plan to vent through a pre-existing!path into the adjacent Standby Gas Treatment System building, blowing off the double doors to release a radiological accident to the outside environment at ground level. The public must be afforded due process to address the unacceptable risks to public health and safety posed by the FitzPatrick severe accident plan.

2) Entergy Nuclear Operations should publicly document for independent review its post-Fukushima re-analysis for the reliability and capability of the FitzPatrick pre-existing containment vent system.

The analysis should include the reassessment of all assumptions regarding the reliability of the pre-existing containment venting and specifically address non-conservative assumptions behind the cost-benefit analysis used to justify not installing a fully hardened vent system.

It should also include a reassessment of the assumption of "no likely ignition points" during emergency venting that would otherwise present catastrophic consequences associated with the detonation of hydrogen gas and the release of radioactivity generated during a severe accident.

I wish the NRC to process my request using the 2.206 process, and I understand that under this process, the contents of this message and my identity will be made public. The Alliance for a Green Economy is my point of contact for this petition, and their organizer, Jessica Azulay, will keep me informed about the developments of the petition and the opportunity to participate in a public meeting with the NRC Petition Review Board.

Thank you, N~ame (prirnt): e Signature*

Dateignatu Email:

Address: 1J /fr 3 ,f a94L

Mr. James Borchardt Executive Director for Operations U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 Attn: Bhalchandra K. Vaidya, NRC Petition Manager In the Matter of the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Plant in Scriba, New York

Dear Mr. Borchardt:

I wish to co-petition with the Alliance for a Green Economy and Beyond Nuclear's March 9, 2012 emergency enforcement petition to suspend the operation of the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Plant.

The FitzPatrick plant is the only GE Mark I boiling water reactor in the US that did not install a Direct Torus Vent System as requested by the NRC in 1989 and instead, tosave money, relies upon a "pre-oxistin*g" venting system that is not fully hardened against a severe accident.

In deciding not to install such a vent, the FitzPatrick operator and the NRC relied upon assumptions that now place public health and safety at an undue risk.

The hydrogen explosions at the Fukushima reactors show the dangers and! unacceptable consequences posed by the current FitzPatrick severe accident venting plah, since the plan was approved on the assumptions that venting would prevent containment failuie, and that there are

'no likely" ignition sources along the vent path. Neither of these assumptions was correct during the Fukushima nuclear catastrophe.

Subsequent to the Fukushima accident, the NRC inspected FitzPatrick and identified a "vulnerability, in that current procedures do not address hydrogen considerations" during a severe accident.

Therefore, I request NRC immediately suspend the FitzPatrick operating lice nse until the following emergency enforcement actions are approved by the NRC:

1) Public hearings should be held on the continued operation of Entergy Nuclear Operations' Fitzpatrick plant and the adequacy of its plan to vent through a pre-existing .path into the adjacent Standby Gas Treatment System building, blowing off the double doors to release a radiological accident to the outside environment at ground level. The public must be afforded due process to address the unacceptable risks to public health and safety posed by the FitzPatrick severe accident plan.1

2) Entergy Nuclear Operations should publicly document for independent review its post-Fukushima re-analysis for the reliability and capability of the FitzPatrick pre-existing containment vent system.

The analysis should include the reassessment of all assumptions regarding fthe reliability of the pre-existing containment venting and specifically address non-conservative assumptions behind the cost-benefit analysis used to justify not installing a fully hardened vent system.

It should also include a reassessment of the assumption of "no likely ignition. points" during emergency venting that would otherwise present catastrophic consequences associated with the detonation of hydrogen gas and the release of radioactivity generated duringI a severe accident.

I wish the NRC to process my request using the 2.206 process, and I understand that under this process, the contents of this message and my identity will be made public. The Alliance for a Green Economy is my point of contact for this petition, and their organizer, Jessica Azulay, will keep me informed about the developments of the petition and the opportunity to participate in a public meeting with the NRC Petition Review Board.

Thank you. 1__ t/k Li- Sinaur Name (print): Pi

_t_.___ _ __ _ __ _ __ _ _ _ Signature.

Date / / ' "

Email: 0 q -70 . cg Address:

Mr. James Borchardt Executive Director for Operations U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 Attn: Bhalchandra K. Vaidya, NRC Petition Manager In the Matter of the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Plant in Scriba, New York

Dear Mr. Borchardt:

I wish to co-petition with the Alliance for a Green Economy and Beyond Nudlear's March 9, 2012 emergency enforcement petition to suspend the operation of the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Plant.

The FitzPatrick plant is the only GE Mark I boiling water reactor in the US that did not install a Direct Torus Vent System as requested by the NRC in 1989 and instead, tolsave money, relies upon a "pre-'xistfing" venting system that is not fully hardened against a severe accident.

In deciding not to install such a vent, the FitzPatrick operator and the NRC iielied upon assumptions that now place public health and safety at an undue risk. I The hydrogen explosions at the Fukushima reactors show the dangers and unacceptable consequences posed by the current FitzPatrick severe accident venting plan, since the plan was approved on the assumptions that venting would prevent containment failure, and that there are "no likely" ignition sources along the vent path. Neither of these assumptions was correct during the Fukushima nuclear catastrophe.

Subsequent to the Fukushima accident, the NRC inspected FitzPatrick and identified a vulnerability, in that current procedures do not address hydrogen consideraotions" during a severe accident.

Therefore, I request NRC immediately suspend the FitzPatrick operating license until the following emergency enforcement actions are approved by the NRC:

1) Public hearings should be held on the continued operation of Entergy Nu'clear Operations' Fitzpatrick plant and the adequacy of its plan to vent through a pre-existing!path into the adjacent Standby Gas Treatment System building, blowing off the double doors to release a radiological accident to the outside environment at ground level. The pubiicimust be afforded due process to address the unacceptable risks to public health and safety posed by the FitzPatrick severe accident plan.

2) Entergy Nuclear Operations should publicly document for independent review its post-Fukushima re-analysis for the reliability and capability of the FitzPatrick pre-existing containment vent system.

The analysis should include the reassessment of all assumptions regarding the reliability of the pre-existing containment venting and specifically address non-conservative assumptions behind tne cost-benefit analysis used to justify not installing a fully hardened vent system.

It should also include a reassessment of the assumption of "no likely ignition points" during emergency venting that would otherwise present catastrophic consequences associated with the detonation of hydrogen gas and the release of radioactivity generated during a severe accident.

I wish the NRC to process my request using the 2.206 process, and I understand that under this process, the contents of this message and my identity will be made public. T he Alliance for a Green Economy is my point of contact for this petition, and their organizer, Jessica Azulay, will keep me informed about the developments of the petition and the opportunity to participate in a public meeting with the NRC Petition Review Board.

Thank you, Name (print)'. ,M R/R1,,A C..j .LAjA q Signature .

Date .5"/,,_:_-_ _ _

Email:

Address'. - , , ,s, 23o .Y _ _

Mr. James Borchardt Executive Director for Operations U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC. 20555-0001 Attn: Bhalchandra K. Vaidya, NRC Petition Manager In the Matter of the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Plant in Scriba, New York

Dear Mr. Borchardt:

I wish to co-petition with the Alliance for a Green Economy and Beyond Nuclear's March 9, 2012 emergency enforcement petition to suspend the operation of the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Plant.

The FitzPatrick plant is the only GE Mark I boiling water reactor in the US that did not install a Direct Torus Vent System as requested by the NRC in 1989 and instead, to save money, relies upon a "pre-existing" venting system that is not fully hardened against a severe accident.

In deciding not to install such a vent, the FitzPatrick operator and the NRC relied upon assumptions that now place public health and safety at an undue risk.

The hydrogen explosions at the Fukushima reactors show the dangers and Unacceptable consequences posed by the current FitzPatrick severe accident venting plan, since the plan was approved on the assumptions that venting would prevent containment failure, and that there are "no likely" ignition sources along the vent path. Neither of these assumptions was correct during the Fukushima nuclear catastrophe.

Subsequent to the Fukushima accident, the NRC inspected FitzPatrick and identified a "vulnerability, in that current procedures do not address hydrogen considerations" during a severe accident.

Therefore, I request NRC immediately suspend the FitzPatrick operating license until the following emergency enforcement actions are approved by the NRC:

1) Public hearings should be held on the continued operation of Entergy Nuclear Operations' Fitzpatrick plant and the adequacy of its plan to vent through a pre-existing 'ath into the adjacent Standby Gas Treatment System building, blowing off the double doors to release a radiological accident to the outside environment at ground level. The public must be afforded due process to address the unacceptable risks to public health and safety posed by the FitzPatrick severe accident plan.

2) Entergy Nuclear Operations should publicly document for independent review its post-Fukushima re-analysis for the reliability and capability of the FitzPatrick pre-existing containment vent system.

The analysis should include the reassessment of all assumptions regarding the reliability of the pre-existing containment venting and specifically address non-conservative assumptions behind the cost-benefit analysis used to justify not installing a fully hardened vent system.

It should also include a reassessment of the assumption of "no likely ignition points" during emergency venting that would otherwise present catastrophic consequences associated with the detonation of hydrogen gas and the release of radioactivity generated during a severe accident.

I wish the NRC to process my request using the 2.206 process, and I understand that under this process, the contents of this message and my identity will be made public. Th'e Alliance for a Green Economy is my point of contact for this petition, and their organizer, Jessica Azulay, will keep me informed about the developments of the petition and the opportunity to participate in a public meeting with the NRC Petition Review Board.

Thank you.

Name (print): C, Q A crd Signature Date,: I a. -

Address:- ~ A i

Mr. James Borchardt Executive Director for Operations U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 Attn: Bhalchandra K. Vaidya, NRC Petition Manager In the Matter of the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Plant in Scriba, New York I

Dear Mr. Borchardt:

I wish to co-petition with the Alliance for a Green Economy and Beyond Nuclear's March 9, 2012 emergency enforcement petition to suspend the operation of the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Plant.

The FitzPatrick plant is the only GE Mark I boiling water reactor in the US that did not install a Direct Torus Vent System as requested by the NRC in 1989 and instead, to save money, relies upon a "pre-existing" venting system that is not fully hardened against a severe accident.

In deciding not to install such a vent, the FitzPatrick operator and the NRC relied upon assumptions that now place public health and safety at an undue risk. i The hydrogen explosions at the Fukushima reactors show the dangers and 6nacceptable consequences posed by the current FitzPatrick severe accident venting plan; since the plan was approved on the assumptions that venting would prevent containment failure, and that there are "no likely" ignition sources along the vent path. Neither of these assumptions was correct during the Fukushima nuclear catastrophe.

Subsequent to the Fukushima accident, the NRC inspected FitzPatrick and identified a "vulnerability, in that current procedures do not address hydrogen considerations" during a severe accident.

Therefore, I request NRC immediately suspend the FitzPatrick operating license until the following emergency enforcement actions are approved by the NRC:

1) Public hearings should be held on the continued operation of Entergy Nuclear Operations' Fitzpatrick plant and the adequacy of its plan to vent through a pre-existing Oath into the adjacent Standby Gas Treatment System building, blowing off the double doors to release a radiological accident to the outside environment at ground level. The public must be afforded due process to address the unacceptable risks to public health and safety posed by the FitzPatrick severe accident plan.

2) Entergy Nuclear Operations should publicly document for independent review its post-Fukushima re-analysis for the reliability and capability of the FitzPatrick pre-existing containment vent system.

The analysis should include the reassessment of all assumptions regarding the reliability of the pre-existing containment venting and specifically address non-conservative assumptions behind the cost-benefit analysis used to justify not installing a fully hardened vent system.

It should also include a reassessment of the assumption of "no likely ignition points' during emergency venting that would otherwise present catastrophic consequences'associated with the detonation of hydrogen gas and the release of radioactivity generated during a severe accident.

I wish the NRC to process my request using the 2.206 process, and I understand that under this process, the contents of this message and my identity will be made public. The Alliance for a Green Economy is my point of contact for this petition, and their organizer, Jessica Azulay, will keep me informed about the developments of the petition and the opportunity to participate in a public meeting with the NRC Petition Review Board.

Thank you, Name (print): Signature Date !Z// //,:

Email:

Address: & /; &772) J ( //

Mr. James Borchardt Executive Director for Operations U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 Attn: Bhalchandra K. Vaidya, NRC Petition Manager In the Matter of the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Plant in Scriba, New York

Dear Mr. Borchardt:

I wish to co-petition with the Alliance for a Green Economy and Beyond Nuclear's March 9, 2012 emergency enforcement petition to suspend the operation of the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Plant.

The FitzPatrick plant is the only GE Mark I boiling water reactor in the US that did not install a Direct Torus Vent System as requested by the NRC in 1989 and instead, to save money, relies upon a "pre-existing" venting system that is not fully hardened against a severe accident.

In deciding not to install such a vent, the FitzPatrick operator and the NRC re.lied upon assumptions that now place public health and safety at an undue risk.

The hydrogen explosions at the Fukushima reactors show the dangers and unacceptable consequences posed by the current FitzPatrick severe accident venting planJ since the plan was approved on the assumptions that venting would prevent containment failure', and that there are "no likely" ignition sources along the vent path. Neither of these assumptions was correct during the Fukushima nuclear catastrophe.

Subsequent to the Fukushima accident, the NRC inspected FitzPatrick and identified a

'vulnerability, in that current procedures do not address hydrogen consideratibns" during a severe accident.

Therefore, I request NRC immediately suspend the FitzPatrick operating license until the following emergency enforcement actions are approved by the NRC:

1) Public hearings should be held on the continued operation of Entergy Nuciear Operations' Fitzpatrick plant and the adequacy of its plan to vent through a pre-existing path into the adjacent Standby Gas Treatment System building, blowing off the double doors to release a radiological accident to the outside environment at ground level. The public must be afforded due process to address the unacceptable risks to public health and safety posed by the FitzPatrick severe accident plan.

2) Entergy Nuclear Operations should publicly document for independent review its post-Fukushima re-analysis for the reliability and capability of the FitzPatrick pre-existing containment vent system.

The analysis should include the reassessment of all assumptions regarding th'e reliability of the pre-existing containment venting and specifically address non-conservative assumptions behind the cost-benefit analysis used to justify not installing a fully hardened vent system.

It should also include a reassessment of the assumption of "no likely ignition points" during emergency venting that would otherwise present catastrophic consequences associated with the detonation of hydrogen gas and the release of radioactivity generated duringla severe accident.

I wish the NRC to process my request using the 2.206 process, and I understand that under this process. the contents of this message and my identity will be made public. The Alliance for a.

Green Economy is my point of contact for this petition, and their organizer, Jeisica Azulay, will keep me informed about the developments of the petition and the opportunity to participate in a public meeting with the NRC Petition Review Board.

Thank you, Name (print): 0

'12Q/gco 1 k*z-4t.Cd.dJ 09t' -/ I nt 6S' Date Email. G A Address: ft s 4 4

Mr. James Borchardt Executive Director for Operations U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 Attn: Bhalchandra K. Vaidya, NRC Petition Manager In the Matter of the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Plant in Scriba, New York

Dear Mr. Borchardt:

I wish to co-petition with the Alliance for a Green Economy and Beyond Nuclear's March 9, 2012 emergency enforcement petition to suspend the operation of the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Plant.

The FitzPatrick plant is the only GE Mark I boiling water reactor in the US that did not install a Direct Torus Vent System as requested by the NRC in 1989 and instead, to save money, relies upon a "pre-existing" venting system that is not fully hardened against a severe accident.

In deciding not to install such a vent, the FitzPatrick operator and the NRC relied upon assumptions that now place public health and safety at an undue risk.

The hydrogen explosions at the Fukushima reactors show the dangers and unacceptable consequences posed by the current FitzPatrick severe accident venting plan, since the plan was approved on the assumptions that venting would prevent containment failure, and that there are

.no likely" ignition sources along the vent path. Neither of these assumptions;was correct during the Fukushima nuclear catastrophe.

Subsequent to the Fukushima accident, the NRC inspected FitzPatrick and identified a vulnerability, in that current procedures do not address hydrogen considerations" during a severe accident.

Therefore, I request NRC immediately suspend the FitzPatrick operating license until the following emergency enforcement actions are approved by the NRC:

1) Public hearings should be held on the continued operation of Entergy Nuclear Operations' Fitzpatrick plant and the adequacy of its plan to vent through a pre-existing path Into the adjacent Standby Gas Treatment System building, blowing off the double doors to release a radiological accident to the outside environment at ground level. The public must be afforded due process to address the unacceptable risks to public health and safety posed by the FitzPatrick severe accident plan.

2) Entergy Nuclear Operations should publicly document for independent review its post-Fukushima re-analysis for the reliability and capability of the FitzPatrick pre-existing containment vent system.

The analysis should include the reassessment of all assumptions regarding the reliability of the pre-existing containment venting and specifically address non-conservative a~ssumptions behind the cost-benefit analysis used to justify not installing a fully hardened vent system.

It should also include a reassessment of the assumption of "no likely ignition 'points" during emergency venting that would otherwise present catastrophic consequences! associated with the detonation of hydrogen gas and the release of radioactivity generated during a severe accident.

I wish the NRC to process my request using the 2.206 process, and I understand that under this process, the contents of this message and my identity will be made public. The Alliance for a Green Economy is my point of contact for this petition, and their organizer, Jessica Azulay, will keep me informed about the developments of the petition and the opportunity to participate in a public meeting with the NRC Petition Review Board.

Thank you.

Name (print): Signature Date Email: 0, 14 jlV~9~ih,~t( Q, NV COYd Adodress: PA(4(ek(iI~~1V\(M (*

- .- .. , .- I -.

Mr. James Borchardt Executive Director for Operations U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 Attn: Bhalchandra K. Vaidya, NRC Petition Manager In the Matter of the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Plant in Scriba, New York

Dear Mr. Borchardt:

I wish to co-petition with the Alliance for a Green Economy and Beyond Nuclear's March 9, 2012 emergency enforcement petition to suspend the operation of the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Plant.

The FitzPatrick plant is the only GE Mark I boiling water reactor in the US thai did not install a Direct Torus Vent System as requested by the NRC in 1989 and instead, to save money, relies upon a "pre-existing" venting system that is not fully hardened against a severe accident.

In deciding not to install such a vent, the FitzPatrick operator and the NRC relied upon assumptions that now place public health and safety at an undue risk.

The hydrogen explosions at the Fukushima reactors show the dangers and unacceptable consequences posed by the current FitzPatrick severe accident venting plan,t since the plan was approved on the assumptions that venting would prevent containment failure, and that there are "no likely" ignition sources along the vent path. Neither of these assumptions Was correct during the Fukushima nuclear catastrophe. I Subsequent to the Fukushima accident, the NRC inspected FitzPatrick and identified a

'vulnerability, in that current procedures do not address hydrogen considerations" during a severe accident.

Therefore, I request NRC immediately suspend the FitzPatrick operating license until the following emergency enforcement actions are approved by 'he NRC:

1) Public hearings should be held on the continued operation of Entergy Nuclear Operations' Fitzpatrick plant and the adequacy of its plan to vent through a pre-existing path into the adjacent Standby Gas Treatment System building, blowing off the double doors to release a radiological accident to the outside environment at ground level. The public must be afforded due process to address the unacceptable risks to public health and safety posed by the FitzPatrick severe accident plan.

2) Entergy Nuclear Operations should publicly document for independent review its post-Fukushima re-analysis for the reliability and capability of the FitzPatrick pre-existing containment vent system.

The analysis should include the reassessment of all assumptions regarding.the reliability of the pre-existing containment venting and specifically address non-conservative assumptions behind the cost-benefit analysis used to justify not installing a fully hardened vent system.

It should also include a reassessment of the assumption of "no likely ignition points" during emergency venting that would otherwise present catastrophic consequences associated with the detonation of hydrogen gas and the release of radioactivity generated during'a severe accident.

I wish the NRC to process my request using the 2.206 process, and I understand that under this process, the contents of this message and my identity will be made public. The Alliance for a Green Economy is my point of contact for this petition, and their organizer, Jessica Azulay, will keep me informed about the developments of the petition and the opportunity to participate in a public meeting with the NRC Petition Review Board.

Thank you, Name (print): ,t-L)Ju L.tle)UCt Signature ;' "

Date 5iL(7Ž0 Email. ijJ A1 bnod o Address: 3S-23 WS(-ne ca Tpkt- S:rc-cus e. V /zi

Mr. James Borchardt Executive Director for Operations U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 Attn: Bhalchandra K, Vaidya, NRC Petition Manager In the Matter of the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Plant in Scriba, New York

Dear Mr. Borchardt:

I wish to co-petition with the Alliance for a Green Economy and Beyond Nuclear's March 9, 2012 emergency enforcement petition to suspend the operation of the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Plant.

The FitzPatrick plant is the only GE Mark I boiling water reactor in the US that did not install a Direct Torus Vent System as requested by the NRC in 1989 and instead, to save money, relies upon a "pre-existing" venting system that is not fully hardened against a severe accident.

In deciding not to install such a vent, the FitzPatrick operator and the NRC relied upon assumptions that now place public health and safety at an undue risk.

The hydrogen explosions at the Fukushima reactors show the dangers and unacceptable consequences posed by the current FitzPatrick severe accident venting plan, since the plan was approved on the assumptions that venting would prevent containment failure, and that there are no likely" ignition sources along the vent path. Neither of these assumptions:was correct during the Fukushima nuclear catastrophe.