ML110070837

NRC Staff'S Answer in Opposition to Pilgrim Watch Request for Hearing on New Contention

ML110070837
Person / Time
Site:	Pilgrim
Issue date:	01/07/2011
From:	Uttal S NRC/OGC
To:	Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
SECY RAS
References
RAS 19401, 50-293-LR, ASLBP 06-848-02-LR
Download: ML110070837 (63)

Text

January 7, 2011 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of )

)

Entergy Nuclear Generation Co. and )

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. ) Docket No. 50-293-LR

)

) ASLBP No. 06-848-02-LR (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station) )

NRC STAFFS ANSWER IN OPPOSITION TO PILGRIM WATCH REQUEST FOR HEARING ON NEW CONTENTION INTRODUCTION Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. §§ 2.326, 2.323(c), and 2.309(h)(1), the NRC Staff (Staff) hereby files its response to Pilgrim Watch Request for Hearing on a New Contention: Inadequacy of Entergys Aging Management of Non-Environmentally Qualified (EQ) Inaccessible Cables (Splices) at Pilgrim Station (Request for Hearing), filed on December 13, 2010. Except for the pending hearing on Contention 3, as remanded by the Commission in CLI-10-11,1 the evidentiary record has been closed since the Boards decision terminating the proceeding in LBP-08-22.2 The requirements of 10 C.F.R. § 2.326 regarding reopening a closed record, therefore, apply to the Request for Hearing and the proposed contention. Pilgrim Watch did not file a motion to reopen and has not addressed or met the10 C.F.R § 2.326(a) criteria or 1

Entergy Nuclear Generation Company and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station), CLI-10-11, 71 NRC ___ (March 26, 2010) (slip op. at 39) (Commissions Order).

2 Entergy Nuclear Generation Co. and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station), LBP-08-22, 68 NRC 590, 593 (2008). The Commission remand of a portion of Contention 3 does not serve to keep the record open. The record remains open only to accept evidence related to the limited issue remanded. See e.g. Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, L.L.C. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant, LBP-10-19, 72 NRC __ (October 28, 2010)(slip op. at 4).

submitted an affidavit that meets the requirements of 10 C.F.R § 2.326(b). Furthermore, the Request for Hearing is not timely, and does not address a significant safety issue. Therefore, Pilgrim Watchs request to admit the proposed contention should be denied.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND This proceeding concerns the application by Entergy Nuclear Generation Co. and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (collectively Entergy) to renew the operating license for the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station. On May 25, 2006, Pilgrim Watch filed a petition to intervene in this matter, submitting five contentions for consideration by the Board.3 The Board granted the petition, admitting Pilgrim Watchs Contentions 1 and 3.4 As admitted, Contention 1 challenged the adequacy of the applicants aging management program (AMP) for buried pipes and tanks.

Contention 3, which challenged the applicants Severe Accident Mitigation Alternative (SAMA)

Analysis, however, was limited by the Board to input data concerning evacuation times, economic consequences, and meteorological patterns and the costs versus benefits of possible mitigation alternatives.5 On October 30, 2007, the Board granted Entergys motion for summary disposition of Contention 3; thus dismissing Contention 3 from further consideration by the Board.6 After an 3

Request for Hearing and Petition to Intervene by Pilgrim Watch (May 25, 2006)(ADAMS Accession No. ML061630125).

4 Entergy Nuclear Generation Co. and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station), LBP-06-23, 64 NRC 257, 341 (2006).

5 Id.

6 Entergy Nuclear Generation Co. and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station), LBP-07-13, 66 NRC 131 (2007). Judge Young dissented from the Boards Order. Id. at 156.

evidentiary hearing on the issues in Contention 1, the Board issued its decision on October 30, 2008 disposing of Contention 1 in favor of the applicant and terminated the proceeding.7 As a result of the Boards decision, the evidentiary record in the proceeding was closed.

On November 12, 2008, Pilgrim Watch filed its petition for review of LBP-08-22, LBP 13, LBP-06-23, and other interlocutory decisions before the Commission.8 On June 17, 2010, the Commission issued CLI-10-14 denying Pilgrim Watchs petition for review.9 On March 26, 2010, the Commission issued CLI-10-11, reversing in part, affirming in part, and remanding Contention 3, as limited by the Commissions Order, to the Board for further proceedings.10 The Commission strictly limited the scope of remanded Contention 3 to the SAMA meteorological patterns issue. The remand proceeding on Contention 3 as limited by the Commissions decision in CLI-10-11 is currently pending before the Board. A hearing date has been scheduled for March 9, 2011.11 On November 29, 2010, Pilgrim Watch filed a request for a hearing on a late-filed environmental clean-up contention,12 which is now pending before the Board. The Staff filed its 7

Pilgrim, LBP-08-22, 68 NRC at 593.

8 Pilgrim Watchs Petition for Review of LBP-08-22, LBP-07-13, LBP-06-23 and the Interlocutory Decisions in the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Proceeding (Nov. 12, 2008)(ADAMS Accession No. ML083240599) at 11. The Commission noted that Pilgrim Watchs challenge to LBP-07-13 was addressed in a separate decision, CLI-10-11.

9 Entergy Nuclear Generation Company and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station), CLI-10-14, 71 NRC ___ (June 17, 2010) (slip op. at 39).

10 Pilgrim, CLI-10-11, 71 NRC ___ (slip op. at 39). On April 5, 2010, Pilgrim Watch filed its Motion for Reconsideration of the Commissions Order, CLI-10-11 which was denied by the Commission in CLI-10-15. In CLI-10-15, the Commission further clarified its decision in CLI-10-11.

11 Order (Rescheduling Hearing and Oral Argument) (January 5, 2011) at 1.

12 Pilgrim Watch Request for Hearing on a New Contention (November 29, 2010).

response on December 23, 2010.13 The Applicant filed its response on December 27, 2010.14 On December 13, 2010, Pilgrim Watch filed the instant Request for Hearing, proffering a single late-filed contention:

Entergys Aging Management Plan for non-environmentally qualified (EQ) inaccessible cables and cable splices at Pilgrim Station is insufficient to provide reasonable assurance that these cables will be in compliance with NRC Regulations and public health and safety shall be protected during license renewal.

Request for Hearing at 1. (Hereinafter Cable Contention). For the reasons set forth below, the Staff opposes reopening the record and admitting the late-filed contention.

DISCUSSION I. Pilgrim Watchs Request for Hearing Does Not Satisfy the Commissions Requirements for Reopening the Record Pilgrim Watch did not file a motion to reopen the record to admit the late-filed Cable Contention. Nor has it addressed or met the requirements it must satisfy in order to reopen the record in this proceeding. Except for the pending hearing on limited Contention 3, the record has been closed since the issuance of the Boards decision in LBP-08-22.15 Pilgrim Watchs late-filed Cable Contention raises issues not previously in controversy between the parties. See 13 NRC Staffs Answer in Opposition to Pilgrim Watchs Request for Hearing on New Contention (December 23, 2010).

14 Entergy Answer Opposing Pilgrim Watch Request for Hearing on a New Contention (December 27, 2010).

15 In CLI-10-14, the Commission denied Pilgrim Watchs appeal of matters raised in its Initial Petition for Review which included Pilgrim Watchs challenge to the Boards decision in LBP-08-22. In CLI-10-11, however, the Commission reversed in part, and affirmed in part, Pilgrim Watchs appeal of the Boards summary disposition of Contention 3, remanding Contention 3 for hearing to the Board consistent with the Commissions Order. See CLI-10-11 at 39 and CLI-10-15 at 8-9.

10 C.F.R. § 2.326(d). Therefore, its request is subject to the criteria governing motions to reopen the record under 10 C.F.R. § 2.326(a).

Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 2.326(a), a motion or petition to reopen a closed record to consider additional evidence will not be granted unless all of the following criteria are satisfied:

(1) The motion must be timely, except that an exceptionally grave issue may be considered in the discretion of the presiding officer even if untimely presented.

(2) The motion must address a significant safety issue.

(3) The motion must demonstrate that a materially different result would be or would have been likely had the newly proffered evidence been considered initially.

10 C.F.R. § 2.326(a); AmerGen Energy Co., LLC. (Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station),

CLI-08-28, 68 NRC 658, 668 (2008) (Oyster Creek I). In addition to the standards of 10 C.F.R.

§ 2.326(a), the petition or the motion must be accompanied by one or more affidavitsgiven by competent individuals with knowledge of the facts alleged or by experts in the appropriate disciplines, which set forth the factual or technical bases, or both, for the movant's claim that the three criteria in (a) have been satisfied. 10 C.F.R. § 2.326(b). See also AmerGen Energy Co., LLC. (Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station), CLI-09-7, 69 NRC 235, 286, 291 (2009)

(Oyster Creek II). The affidavit must separately address each of the criteria in § 2.326(a) and provide a specific explanation of why each criteria is met. 10 C.F.R. § 2.326(b); Oyster Creek I, CLI-08-28, 68 NRC at 672. The moving party bears the heavy burden of demonstrating that it meets all of the requirements of § 2.326. Id. It is not the licensee or the Staffs burden to defeat the request to reopen. See Oyster Creek I, CLI-08-28, 68 NRC at 674.

The new material in support of a motion to reopen must be set forth with a degree of particularity in excess of the basis and specificity requirements contained in 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f) for admissible contentions. See Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power

Plant, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-775, 19 NRC 1361, 1366 (1984), aff'd sub. nom.; San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. NRC, 751 F.2d 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1984), aff'd on reh'g en banc, 789 F. 2d 26 (D.C. Cir. 1986). Neither speculation, a showing of a possible violation of a regulatory requirement, nor a showing that a component is safety-related, is enough to demonstrate a significant safety issue. See Oyster Creek I, CLI-08-28, 68 NRC at 672. The evidence supporting a motion to reopen must not only be new, it must satisfy the Commissions admissibility standards set forth in 10 C.F.R. § 2.337(a)it must be "relevant, material, and reliable. Id. See also 10 C.F.R. § 2.326(b). In other words, for a Board to grant a motion to reopen, the moving papers must be strong enough, in the light of any opposing filings, to avoid summary disposition. Private Fuel Storage, LLC. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), CLI-05-12, 61 NRC 345, 350 (2005). In determining whether the evidence presented warrants reopening, the Board properly evaluates the evidence submitted by the parties and weighs competing evidence to determine whether reopening of the record is warranted. AmerGen Energy Co., LLC. (Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station), LBP-08-12, 68 NRC 5, 16 (2008), affd Oyster Creek I, CLI-08-28, 68 NRC 658. Documents prepared by a third party, including the Staff, cannot serve as a substitute for the required affidavit. Id. at 672-73 and fn.55.

The standard for admitting a new contention after the record is closed is higher than the standard for ordinary late-filed contentions. Oyster Creek I, CLI-08-28, 68 NRC at 668.

Section 2.326(d) expressly requires that any motion to reopen that addresses a new contention must satisfy the requirements for nontimely contentions in 2.309(c). This heavy burden

created by the regulations is intentional. See Final Rule, Criteria for Reopening Records in Formal Licensing Proceedings, 51 Fed. Reg. 19,535, 19,538 (May 30, 1986).16 As a result, even if a contention meets the ordinary requirements for contention admissibility, that contention will be inadmissible if the proponent does not satisfy the stricter requirements for admission of new contentions after the record has closed. Private Fuel Storage, CLI-05-12, 61 NRC at 350.

In its Request for Hearing, Pilgrim Watch did not move to reopen the proceeding and did not address the requirements of 10 C.F.R. § 2.326. Nor did Pilgrim Watch attach an affidavit that addresses each of the criteria in § 2.326(a) and provides a specific explanation of why each criteria is met. 10 C.F.R. § 2.326(b); Oyster Creek I, CLI-08-28, 68 NRC at 672. Pilgrim Watch did produce a declaration by its witness stating that he fully supports all technical and regulatory aspects of the contention. But, the Request for Hearing contains no discussion of the criteria or requirements of 10 C.F.R. § 2.326. In any event, the declaration is insufficient to meet the regulatory requirements. The requirements of 10 C.F.R. § 2.326(b) are very specific and stringent: The motion must be accompanied by affidavits that set forth the factual and/or technical bases for the claim that the criteria of paragraph (a) have been met. The affidavits must be given by competent individuals with knowledge of the facts alleged, or by experts in the disciplines appropriate to the issues raised. Evidence presented in the affidavits must meet the 16 The Board and the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board (Appeal Board) have also noted that the reopening requirements apply to all issues for which reopening is sought, meaning that the reopened record is open solely to those matters which have been found to satisfy the § 2.326 reopening requirements. Houston Lighting and Power Co. (South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2), LBP-85-19, 21 NRC 1707, 1720 (1985) (citing Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2),

ALAB-486, 8 NRC 9, 22 (1978)). Thus, if the Board grants this motion, the record would only be reopened to allow additional evidence on the issue raised by NECs Motion. If NEC sought to raise any other issues, it would have to satisfy § 2.326 as to those issues as well.

admissibility standards for evidence at hearing. Each criterion must be separately addressed with a specific explanation of why the criterion has been met. 10 C.F.R. § 2.326(b). Pilgrim Watchs pleading meets none of these requirements. Therefore, Pilgrim Watchs Request for Hearing should be denied.

Even if Pilgrim Watch had addressed the requirements of the 10 C.F.R. § 2.326, the motion would have been insufficient to warrant reopening of the record.

A. Pilgrim Watchs Request for Hearing is Not Timely Pilgrim Watchs Request for Hearing and the proposed late-filed contention are not timely.

They are not based on previously unavailable information or information that is materially different from information that was previously available. [F]or a reopening motion to be timely presented, the movant must show that the issue sought to be raised could not have been raised earlier. Diablo Canyon, ALAB-775, 19 NRC at 1366. See also Public Serv. Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Stations Units 1 & 2), CLI-09-06, 31 NRC 483, 487 (1990) (stating that

[t]he Commission reasonably demands that contentions filed after the hearing is underwaylet alone concludedbe filed promptly after the receipt of information needed to frame these contentions). In addition, parties to NRC proceedings have an ironclad obligation to examine the application, and other publicly available documents, with sufficient care to uncover any information which could serve as the foundation for a contention. Duke Energy Corp. (Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3), CLI-99-11, 49 NRC 328, 338 (1999).

The Request for Hearing, in seeking to demonstrate good cause for the failure to file on time pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(c), contains a discuss of timeliness and alleges that the information upon which [the] contention is based did not become available to the public (including Pilgrim Watch) until December 6, 2010, . . . when Information Notice 2010-26 [,dated December 6, 2010,] was released. Request for Hearing at 34. Pilgrim Watch, however, has

had sufficient information to put it on notice of the issues it raises in the contention regarding the aging management program (AMP) for submerged electric cables and splices. The Cable Contention is, at best, a compilation of previously-existing information that was available prior to December 6, 2010. The instances of submerged cables discussed in the Information Notice (IN) occurred and were documented in publicly available NRC inspection reports issued between November 2008 and May 2010. See IN 2010-26 (Exhibit 1) at Appendix A (listing the inspection reports discussed in IN 2010-26). Thus, all of the allegedly new information in IN 2010-26 was available months, if not years, before Pilgrim Watch filed its Motion to reopen on December 13, 2010. The statements in the discussion section of IN 2010-26 are the same as or similar to statements in prior NRC documents, such as Generic Letter (GL) 2007-01 (Exhibit 2)17; GL 2007-01 Summary Report,18 NUREG/CR 7000.19 For example, IN 2010-26 states:

Cable failures have a variety of causes, including manufacturing, damage caused by shipping and installation, and exposure to electrical transients or abnormal conditions during operation. . .

. The likelihood of failure from any of these factors increases over time as the cable insulation degrades and/or is exposed to water Id. at 5. Almost identical language is found in GL 2007-01:

Cable failures have a variety of causes: manufacturing defects, damage caused by shipping and installation, and exposure to 17 Generic Letter (GL) 2007-01 Inaccessible or Underground Power Cable Failures That Disable Accident Mitigation Systems or Cause Plant Transients, (Feb. 7, 2007) (ADAMS Accession No. ML07360665).

18 GL 2007-01 Inaccessible or Underground Power Cable Failures That Disable Accident Mitigation Systems or Cause Plant Transient: Summary Report (Nov. 12, 2008) (ADAMS Accession No. ML082760385).

19 NUREG/CR 7000 Essential Elements of an Electric Cable Monitoring Program (January 2010) (available at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/contract/cr7000/cr7000.pdf).

electrical transients or abnormal environmental conditions during operation. The likelihood of failure from any of these causes increases overtime as the cable insulation degrades.

Electrical cables in nuclear power plants are usually located in dry environments, but some cables are exposed to moisture from condensation and wetting in inaccessible locations such as buried conduits, cable trenches, cable troughs, above ground and underground duct banks, underground vaults, and direct-buried installations. The cable insulation goes through gradual degradation due to a variety of reasons.

GL-2007-01 at 1. The GL goes on to state that: The NRC began a detailed review after observing that some of the cables qualified for 40 years, through the equipment qualification program, were failing at several nuclear sites prior to the end of qualified life. Id. at 2. The same statement is found in IN 2010-26. See IN 2010-26 at 6.20 Compilation of pre-existing, publicly available information into a single document does not make the information new. See Northern States Power Co. (Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI 10-27, 72 NRC __ (Sep. 30, 2010)(slip op. at 14-18)

(finding that a contention based on pre-existing information compiled in a safety evaluation report was untimely). Thus, the information in the IN is not new.

More importantly, Pilgrim Watch was well aware of the submerged cable issue months before it filed the Request for Hearing. On July 17, 2010, Pilgrim Watch filed a 10 C.F.R. § 20 Pilgrim Watch also claims that one of the reasons it was alerted to the issue was because IN 2010-26 specifically mentions Pilgrim. Request for Hearing at 10. But, the reference in IN 2010-26 was actually a reference to IN 2002-12 (Exhibit 3), which contained a discussion of a 2001 inspection at Pilgrim where submerged safety related cables were discovered. See IN 2002-12: Submerged Safety Related Electrical Cables (March 21, 2002) at 1. In fact, other than that reference, there was no mention of Pilgrim in IN 2010-26.

2.206 petition raising the same issues alleged in the Request for Hearing.21 In the Petition, Pilgrim Watch requested that the NRC certify that all cables (i) have been identified as to their location, age and repair history

. . . ; and (ii) monitored by the Licensee prior to continued operation to demonstrate that the cables can perform their design functions when called upon for their function. (iii) The monitoring program going forward incorporates at minimum: the recommendations of SAND 96-0344, Section 6 (Aging Management Guideline for Commercial Nuclear Power Plants-Electrical Cable and Termination, prepared by DOE and sponsored by DOE and EPRI, Sept. 1996); and Staff recommendations in NRC Handout, Regulatory Issue Resolution Protocol, Cable Performance Issues at Nuclear Power Plants, 2009-08-25 ( . . . Adams Accession No. ML092220419),

Attachment A, (iv) NRC commits to verifying during the license renewal period Entergys implementation through routine Baseline inspections, and commits to a timely upgrade of Regulatory Guidance to provide guidance for maintaining the cable qualifications and verification that the cables can perform their design functions when called upon.

2.206 Petition at 1-2. The petition then lists, in 22 numbered sections, its bases and conclusions in support of the 2.206 Petition. At least 15 of those paragraphs are repeated verbatim or in slightly amended form in the Request for Hearing.22 Although the relief requested 21 See Pilgrim Watch 2.206 Petition Regarding Inadequacy of Entergys Management of Non-Environmentally Qualified Cables & Wiring at Pilgrim Station, July 17, 2010 (Petition). The Petition is pending.

22 Compare 2.206 Petition § Request for Hearing §

§1 §1 2 5 3 3 4 6 11 23-25 12 25-27 13 28,26 (misnumbered in Request for Hearing at 17) 17 30-32 18 33

in the 2.206 petition differs slightly from that requested in the Request for Hearing,23 the issues and bases are the same.

On August 6, 2010, Pilgrim Watch filed a supplement to the 2.206 Petition that added two documents to the petition: NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000293/2010002, 1RO6 Flood Protection Measures, Underground Cable Inspection (Pilgrim, July 29, 2010) (Exhibit 5),

and NUREG/CR-7000 BNL-NUREG-90318-2009 (January 2010).24 As in the 2.206 Petition, statements made in the Supplement were repeated in the Request for Hearing.25 In addition, the Supplement makes numerous references to aging issues and aging management. See Supplement at 4, 6, 8-14.

In the recent licensing board decision in the Vermont Yankee case, a case remarkably similar to the case at hand, the Licensing Board rejected, as untimely, a contention raising similar issues relating to submerged cables as are being raised here.26 In the Vermont Yankee case, the Commission had reversed and remanded a contention. Vermont Yankee, LBP-10-19, 72 NRC __, slip op. at 4. In remanding, the Commission added that the intervenors could, if they wished, submit a motion to reopen the record to address any genuinely new issues that could not have been raised earlier. Id. An intervenor filed a motion to reopen to admit a contention alleging that the AMP for buried, below grade, underground, or hard to access safety-related electric cables subjected to moist or wet environments is inadequate. Id. at 5.

23 See Request for Hearing at 30-34.

24 Supplement (1) to Pilgrim Watch 2.206 Petition Regarding Inadequacy of Entergy Management of Non-environmentally Qualified Inaccessible Cables and Wiring at Pilgrim Station (August 2010) (Supplement).

25 Compare Request for Hearing at 17 and 32, with Supplement at 2 and 8.

26 Vermont Yankee, LBP-10-19, 72 NRC__, slip op. at 2.

The Board denied the motion to reopen based on a failure to meet two of the criteria in 10 C.F.R. § 2.236(a), to wit: timeliness (§ 2.236(a)(1)); and demonstration that a materially different result would have been likely (§ 2.236(a)(3). Id. at 27. The intervenor relied on the issuance of an inspection report which revealed that there were submerged cables found during the inspection, two of which were safety related as the date when it learned of the issue. Id. at

22. The Board noted that the inspectors found the incident to be of very low safety significance.

Id. at 22-23.

The Board rejected the proposition that the inspection report was the critical date, finding that the potential for such submergence [of safety related electrical cables], and the need to manage and address it, has been apparent for the outset of [the] proceeding. Id. at 23. The licensees license renewal application (LRA) contained an AMP for inspections, testing of cable insulation, and draining of water. Id. The same is true in the instant case. Pilgrims AMP contains provisions for testing the cable insulation, inspecting for submergence and deterioration of the cable surface, and draining of water. Request for Hearing at 19-21. As the Board in Vermont Yankee noted, if Entergys AMP suffers from the inadequacies enumerated by [the intervenor], then it has been inadequate since the beginning of this proceeding.

Vermont Yankee, LBP-10-19, 72 NRC __, slip op. at 23.

The Board enumerated the instances where the NRC has published or publicized the issue of aging management for safety-related cables and submergence: The 2005 GALL Report at XI.E-8; an EPRI report and numerous formal issuances by the NRC, including documents issued by the NRC in 1989, 2002, and 2007.27 27 e.g. GL 2007-01; GL 2007-01 Summary Report,; NUREG/CR 7000; N 2002-12; Information Notice 1989-63(September 1989)(Exhibit 4).

Clearly, the same reports and information were available to Pilgrim Watch. Further support for the proposition that Pilgrim Watch had sufficient information to submit this Request for Hearing and contention some time ago is the fact that the State of New York filed similar contentions challenging the adequacy of Indian Points aging management programs for electric cables in the Indian Point license renewal proceeding in 2007. See New York State Notice of Intent to Participate and Petition to Intervene (November 30, 2007) (ADAMS Accession No. ML073400187). IN 2010-26 contained no new information relating to the cable issues.28 Finally, there is the indisputable fact that Pilgrim Watch was most certainly aware of the issues when it filed its 2.206 petition in July of 2010. Thus, Pilgrim Watchs argument that it only recently became aware of the issues raised in the Cable Contention via the publication of IN-2010-26 must fall and Pilgrim Watch cannot demonstrate that the issue was raised in a timely manner.

Accordingly, the Request for Hearing fails to meet the requirements of 10 C.F.R.

§ 2.326(a)(1) and should be denied, unless the Board, in its discretion, finds that there is an exceptionally grave issue.

B. Pilgrim Watchs Request for Hearing Does Not Address a Significant Safety Issue Pilgrim Watch cannot satisfy the requirements of 10 C.F.R. §§ 2.326(a)(2) or (b) because the Request for Hearing doesnt raise a significant safety issue and is not 28 Moreover, IN 2010-26 is not relevant or material. It focuses on current operating issues, IN 2010-26 at 5-7, which as the Commission has plainly stated are outside the scope of license renewal.

See Entergy Nuclear Generation Co. and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station), CLI-10-14, 71 NRC __, __ (June 17, 2010) (slip op. at 8-10) (stating that license renewal is limited to age-related issues, not issues already monitored and reviewed in the ongoing regulatory oversight processes). Thus, the current operating issues the IN addresses are not relevant or material to this license renewal proceeding, which is narrowly focused on managing the effects of age-related degradation during the period of extended operation. 10 C.F.R. § 54.30.

accompanied by affidavits setting forth factual or technical bases supporting a claim that the issue raised by the Request for Hearing is a significant safety issue. Oyster Creek I, CLI-08-28, 68 NRC at 670. The Commissions standards are intentionally strict regarding re-opening under Section 2.326(b). See Private Fuel Storage, CLI-05-12, 61 NRC at 350.

In the Inspection Reports referenced in IN 2002-12 and IN 2010-26, the inspectors determined that the submergence of the cables was an event of very low safety significance-a Green finding. In the July 29, 2010 Pilgrim Inspection Report, the inspectors also found that the improper maintenance [submergence] of underground non-safety related medium voltage electric cables was of very low safety significance (Green). IR at 1.

The expert affidavit accompanying the motion must articulate the factual and/or technical basis for the claim that the motion raises a significant safety issue. Oyster Creek I, CLI-08-28, 68 NRC at 670. This is because the most important of the three [§ 2.326(a) elements] to be addressed is that the motion raises a safety (or environmental) issue that is significant. Public Service Company of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-940, 32 NRC 225, 243-44 (1990).

Mr. Blanchs declaration does not support a determination that the Request for Hearing raises a significant safety issue. Mr. Blanchs declaration and the Request for Hearing do not state or explain the factual/technical bases for a claim that the Request for Hearing raises a significant safety issue. Instead, the pleading focuses on the requirements of 10 C.F.R.

§ 2.309(f)(1). Thus, it appears that instead of providing an expert affidavit to present the factual and technical basis for a claim that it raises a significant safety issue, Pilgrim Watch relies upon the July 29, 2010 Inspection Report, IN 2010-26, GL 2007-01 and NUREG/CR 7000 Essential Elements of an Electric Cable Monitoring Program (January 2010) (available at

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doccollections/nuregs/contract/cr7000/cr7000.pdf) to demonstrate a significant safety issue. See Request for Hearing at 10-12, 17-19, 22, 23, 29-33.

These documents do not explain the factual/technical bases for Pilgrim Watchs claim i.e., that Pilgrims LRA is deficient because it lacks an adequate AMP for non-environmentally qualified inaccessible cables and cable splices susceptible to wetting or submergence, and this deficiency is a significant safety issue.29 Not only does the Request for Hearing fail to demonstrate a significant safety issue, the attached Affidavit of Roy K. Mathew (Mathew Affidavit) explains that submergence of safety-related electric cables at Pilgrim is not a significant safety issue. Mathew Affidavit at ¶4-5.

Pilgrim took corrective action to identify underground cables and to identify which manholes were in need of dewatering. Id. at ¶5. Mr. Mathew explains that 10 C.F.R. Part 50 requires licensees to test and maintain safety-related electric cables to ensure that they can perform their intended functions, and the NRCs ongoing oversight of licensee operations verifies licensee compliance. Id. at ¶ 6-7. He states that the NRC has taken actions to better ensure licensee compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50 for inspection/maintenance and testing of electric cables, including issuance of NUREG/CR 7000, inspection procedures, and a draft regulatory guide. Id. at ¶7.

Thus, Pilgrim Watchs Request for Hearing does not raise a significant safety issue and should thus be denied.

29 On January 7, 2010, Entergy submitted to the NRC supplemental information relating to Pilgrims LRA. The supplemental information includes an enhancement to the AMP for non-EQ inaccessible medium voltage cables to include low voltage cables; testing for degradation will be performed every six years; and, inspections for water in manholes will be performed annually.

C. Pilgrim Watchs Request for Hearing Does Not Demonstrate that There Would be a Materially Different Result Pilgrim Watchs request cannot satisfy § 2.326(b) because it fails to demonstrate via affidavit that the proposed contention would likely lead to a materially different result in the license renewal proceeding, as is required under § 2.326(a)(3). To satisfy § 2.326(a)(3), the evidence supporting Pilgrim Watchs new contention must show a likelihood that the contention would be resolved in Pilgrim Watchs favor such that the applicants license renewal application would be conditioned or denied. Oyster Creek, LBP-08-12, 68 NRC at 22, affd Oyster Creek I, CLI-08-28, 68 NRC at 658. As discussed above, there is little or no likelihood that the contention will be resolved in Pilgrim Watchs favor because the contention is untimely and does not raise a significant safety issue. Pilgrim Watchs Request for Hearing does not put forth evidence that demonstrates that Pilgrim Watch would likely prevail on its proposed late-filed contention. Accordingly, the Request for Hearing does not meet the requirements for re-opening the record and should be denied.

II. The Cable Contention Does Not Meet the Requirements for Admission of a Late-Filed Contention 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(2)

The Commission does not look with favor on contentions filed after the initial filing period has passed. Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3), CLI-04-36, 60 NRC 631, 636 (2004). Thus, a petitioner may file a late contention only upon a showing that - (i) [t]he information upon which the amended or new contention is based was not previously available; (ii) [t]he information upon which the amended or new contention is based is materially different than information previously available; and (iii) [t]he amended or new contention has been submitted in a timely fashion based on the availability of the subsequent information. Id. (quoting 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(2)(i)-(iii) (alterations in original)).

In this case, the initial filing period passed long ago, in 2006, and the petitioner, Pilgrim

Watch, is a current party to this proceeding. Accordingly, the provisions of 10 C.F.R.

§ 2.309(f)(2) governing late-filed contentions apply. The Cable Contention is only admissible if it is based on previously unavailable information or information that is materially different than what was previously available and the contention was filed in a timely fashion based on the availability of the new information. As discussed above, the contention is not based on new information and was not filed in a timely manner.

While the Cable Contention was filed after publication of IN 2010-23, the information upon which the contention is based is not new. Pilgrim Watchs reliance on the date of publication of the IN alone does not justify this late filing. The test is not when the intervenor learned the information; it is whether the information is new or different from information previously available. As one Licensing Board recently observed, in denying admissibility of a proposed new contention, an intervenor cannot satisfy the previously unavailable information standard by showing that, as a subjective matter, he or she only recently became aware of, or realized the significance of, public information that was previously available to all. The previously unavailable standard is not a subjective one. Progress Energy Florida, Inc. (Levy County Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP-09-10, 70 NRC 51, 142 (2009), (reversed on other grounds), CLI-10-02, 71 NRC __ (Jan. 7, 2010)(slip op.).30 As discussed above, a careful examination of the factual assertions that serve as the bases for the Cable Contention reveals that they are, at best, a compilation of previously-existing information and thus do not constitute the new information or materially different information that would justify a late-filed contention.

30 See also Tennessee Valley Authority (Bellefonte Nuclear Power Units 3 and 4), Memorandum and Order (Ruling on Request to Admit New Contention), (unpublished) slip op. at 8 (Apr. 29, 2008)

(holding that a newly-created document that is a compilation or repackaging of previously-existing information is not equivalent to, and does not provide, information that is materially different under 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(2)(ii)).

Pilgrim Watch has not shown that this is a new issue. It has claimed that it recently became aware that this might be an issue. This subjective standard, rejected in Levy County, LBP-09-10, 70 NRC at 142, will not support the filing of a contention at this late date.

CONCLUSION Because the Request for Hearing is impermissibly late, does not raise a significant safety issue, does not demonstrate that a materially different result would be likely and is not supported by affidavits that meet the requirements of 10 C.F.R. § 2.326(b), the late-filed Cable Contention is inadmissible. The Staff submits that the Board need look no further regarding admissibility. The proposed Cable Contention in Pilgrim Watchs Request for Hearing is inadmissible because it fails to meet the requirements for re-opening the record. Accordingly, Pilgrim Watchs Request for Hearing on New Contention should be denied.

Respectfully submitted, Electronically Signed by Susan Uttal Counsel for NRC Staff U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of the General Counsel Mail Stop - O-15D21 Washington, DC 20555 Telephone: (301) 415-1582 E-mail: Susan.Uttal@nrc.gov Date of signature: January 7, 2011

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of )

)

Entergy Nuclear Generation Co. and )

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. ) Docket No. 50-293-LR

)

) ASLBP No. 06-848-02-LR (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station) )

AFFIDAVIT OF ROY K. MATHEW I do hereby declare under penalty of perjury that the following statements are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief:

1. My name is Roy K. Mathew. I am employed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) as a Team Leader, Electrical Engineering Branch in the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulations Division of Engineering. A statement of my professional qualifications is attached.

2. I have read Pilgrim Watchs request for hearing on a late-filed contention dated December 13, 2010, Pilgrim Watch Request for Hearing on a New Contention:

Inadequacy of Entergys Aging Management of Non- Environmentally Qualified (EQ)

Inaccessible Cables (Splices) at Pilgrim Station, (Motion) and the attached Declaration of Paul Blanch (Blanch Declaration).

3. The purpose of this affidavit is to respond to the Pilgrim Watch Motion and the attached Blanch Declaration. In this affidavit, I will explain why cable submergence is not a significant safety issue either currently or during the period of extended operations. Specifically, I will address the following topics:

A. Why cable submergence issues identified in NRC inspection report (05000293/2010003) for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (Pilgrim) and Information Notice 2010-26 are not significant safety issues.

B The requirements in 10 CFR Part 50 for the inspection, maintenance, and testing of safety-related electric cables apply to operating plants regardless of license renewal status.

C. Current NRC actions to improve licensee compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50 for inspection, maintenance, and testing of electric cables. In explaining these actions, I will address Pilgrim Watchs claims based on NUREG/CR-7000 Essential Elements of an Electric Cable Condition Monitoring Program (January 2010), and Sandia report (SAND96-0344).

4. On December 2, 2010, the NRC issued "lnformation Notice 2010-26: Submerged Electrical Cables." lnformation Notices (INs) are one type of generic communication issued by the NRC. They are routinely issued by the NRC staff to inform the nuclear industry of a significant operating experience that may have generic applicability to all plants. Unlike Bulletins and Generic Letters, lNs do not convey urgent information, require a licensee response , request information, or require any action by the licensee.

The NRC issued IN 2010-26 to inform all Part 50 licensees, including Pilgrim, that recent NRC inspections had observed instances of protracted cable submergence in water, and included the results of licensees responses to Generic Letter (GL) 2007-01, Inaccessible or Underground Power Cable Failures That Disable Accident Mitigation Systems or Cause Plant Transients, dated February 7, 2007 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML070360665). IN 2010-26provided additional clarification to the previously issued IN 2002-12, Submerged Safety-Related Electrical Cables, dated March 21, 2002 (ADAMS Accession No. ML020790238), based on the NRCs observations of submerged electrical cables that feed safety-related equipment at certain facilities.

These instances of submerged cables discussed in the IN were discussed in publicly available NRC inspection reports issued between September 2007 and May 2010.

5. The Green finding identified in Integrated Inspection Report 05000293/2010003, issued on July 29, 2010, memorializing an inspection at Pilgrim, does not demonstrate a significant safety issue with respect to aging management of nonsafety-related offsite power cables at Pilgrim. The significance of an inspection finding is determined by the NRC Reactor Oversight Significance Determination Process. The levels of findings are: Green (very low safety significance), White (moderate safety significance), Yellow (substantial safety significance) and Red (high safety significance) based on NRC Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Significance Determination Process (ADAMS Accession No. ML080730040). As discussed in the Inspection Report, the inspectors determined the significance of the finding regarding submergence of nonsafety-related offsite power cables at Pilgrim in accordance with IMC 0609.04, "Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings" (ADAMS Accession No. ML063060347). The inspectors determined that allowing medium voltage cables to remain submerged for extended periods of time was a performance deficiency. These cables are not designed for submergence. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the condition did not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the unavailability of mitigating systems equipment.

Entergy entered this issue into their Corrective Action Program (CAP), and specified corrective actions to identify all underground medium voltage cables included under the Cable Reliability Program, and to identify which manholes should have dewatering capability.

Similarly, the significance of cable submergence issues, for non-environmentally qualified, safety and non-safety related cables, mentioned in IN 2010-26 is, as reported in the inspection reports (IR) referenced therein, also very low (Green finding). See inspection reports, IR 05000263/2008-009 (Monticello, Sept. 11, 2008);

IR 05000301/2008-007 (Point Beach, April 21, 2008; IR 05000341/2007-003 (Fermi, Unit 2, Sept. 11, 2007); IR 05000334/2009-003 and 5000412/2009-003 (Beaver Valley Units 1 and 2, August 4, 2009; IR 05000482/2008-004 (Wolf Creek, November 7, 2008); IR 05000483/2009-004 (Callaway, October, 21, 2009); IR 05000277/2009-005 (Peach Bottom, Units 2 and 3, February 8, 2010); IR 5000289/2009-003 (Three Mile Island, July 31, 2009).

6. In 10 CFR Part 50, the requirements for the maintenance and testing of electric cables at operating reactors regardless of license renewal status are detailed. The regulations require that inaccessible or undergroundcables be capable of performing their intended function when subjected to anticipated environmental conditions, such as moisture or flooding. The regulations also require that the reactors design should minimize the probability of power interruption when transferring power between sources. Licensees are expected to demonstrate that cables whose failures could disable risk-significant equipment can perform their safety function when needed during the current operating period and during the period of extended operation in accordance with 10 CFR 54.33.

In 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1), the regulation states that [e]ach holder of a license to operate a nuclear power plantshall monitor the performance or condition of structures, systems, or componentsin a manner sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that such structures, systems, and componentsare capable of fulfilling their intended functions.

Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 contains several applicable criteria. Criterion XI, Test Control,states that [a] test program shall be established to assure that all testing required to demonstrate thatcomponents will perform satisfactorily in service is identified and performed.

Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 states that:

measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to qualityare promptly identified and corrected. In the case of significant conditions adverse to quality, the measures shall assure that the cause of the condition is determined and corrective action taken to preclude repetition.

The design of Pilgrim on-site and off-site power systems meets the 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix A, General Design Criterion (GDC) 17. GDC requires that an onsite electric power system and an offsite electric power system shall be provided to permit functioning of structures, systems, and components important to safety. It also states

that [p]rovisions shall be included to minimize the probability of losing electric power from any of the remaining [power]supplies...[a] loss of power from the transmission network, or the loss of power from the onsite electric power supplies. (Refer PBNPS FSAR, Chapter 8)

In summary, these requirements mandate that operating reactors, regardless of licensee renewal status, inspect/maintain and test of electric cables to ensure that cables can perform their intended functions.

7. The NRCs ongoing and continuous oversight of nuclear reactor operations includes actions to ensure licensee compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50 for the maintenance, inspection, and testing of electric cables. Under the Reactor Oversight Process (ROP), he NRC inspection program verifies each licensees compliance with applicable regulations during the current operating period and will continue to verify compliance during the period of extended operation. Under 10 CFR Part 50, the regulations require licensees to assess the condition and monitor the performance of their components, such as cables in a manner sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that they are capable of fulfilling their intended functions. In order to fulfill their obligations under the regulations, the licensees must establish test programs to ensure that the testing required to demonstrate that each component will perform satisfactorily is identified and performed. The diagnostic cable testing programs to assess each applicable cables condition and performance should be established during the current operating period under the maintenance rule.

Based on information provided in response to Generic Letter (GL) 2007-01 and operating experience, cables do not fail immediately, even when they are subjected to a wet or submerged environment. Cables that are subjected to these types of adverse conditions should be monitored for degradation (loss of dielectric or insulation property).

As part of its ongoing efforts to improve licensee compliance with the requirements of 10 C.F.R. Part 50, the NRC sponsored the research documented in NUREG/CR 7000.

The objective of the NUREG/CR-7000 research study referenced by Pilgrim Watch was to identify a comprehensive electric cable condition monitoring (CM) program

that will consolidate a core program of periodic CM inspections and tests, together with the results of in-service testing, environmental monitoring and management activities, and the incorporation of cable-related operating experience. The NUREG does not contain any regulatory requirements and implementation of NUREG/CR 7000s recommendations is not a requirement for license renewal. The NUREG discusses a program for compliance with 10 CFR Part 50 requirements. The NRC staff is currently developing a Regulatory Guide that will describe methods that the staff considers acceptable for use in implementing the regulatory requirements regard to monitoring the performance of electric cables used in nuclear power plants. As such, the NUREGs and Regulatory Guide may be used by a licensee to meet the NRCs regulatory requirements. Licensees are free to seek alternative programs and methods for complying with the regulations.

The recommendations from the Sandia Aging Management Guideline Report (SAND96-0344), referenced by Pilgrim Watch are not regulatory requirements.

Therefore, Pilgrim is not obligated to comply with its recommendations. The report describes recommended methods for effective detection and mitigation of aging mechanisms in commercial nuclear power plant electrical cables and terminations within the scope of license renewal and maintenance rule activities.

This affidavit was executed this 7th day of January, 2011, at Rockville, Maryland.

Executed in Accordance with 10 CFR § 2.304(d)

Roy K Mathew, Team Leader Electrical Engineering Branch Division of Engineering Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mailstop O-12H2 Washington, DC 20555-0001 (301) 415-2965 Roy.Mathew@nrc.gov

Roy K. Mathew Statement of Professional Qualifications Current Position:

Team Leader Electrical Engineering Branch, Division of Engineering, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Education:

B.S. Electrical Engineering, University of Kerala, India Summary:

Mr. Mathew has 29 years of experience in the nuclear power industry, including 22 years at the NRC. Through his educational experience, training, and years of work experience in the nuclear power industry, Mr. Mathew has acquired extensive knowledge and experience in several engineering disciplines, particularly in electrical engineering (including nuclear reactor theory, principles and practices); reactor design, construction, testing, startup and operations; regulation of the nuclear power industry; maintenance; inspection; and licensing. In the course of his NRC career, Mr. Mathew has working both in the NRCs Region I Office, where he worked as a Qualified Reactor Engineer performing various inspections, and NRC Headquarters where he has worked as an Operations Engineer in the Special Inspections Branch and Inspection Program Branch (IIPB) conducting various engineering and design inspections, as a Team Leader, as a Senior Reactor Systems Engineer, and as a Senior Electrical Engineer in the Division of Engineering (DE) and Division of License Renewal (DLR).

As a Team Leader in DE and DLR, Mr. Mathew has been responsible for various significant reviews and programs, including: developing Interim Staff Guidance for License Renewal programs; performing safety reviews for license renewal applications; leading NRC audit teams conducting license renewal safety reviews at several facilities; reviewing operating experience issues and issuing appropriate generic communications; and supporting review of license amendment requests. He has an extensive knowledge of NRC regulations and guidance documents, as well as industry codes and standards.

Mr. Mathew is presently the Acting Chief of Electrical Engineering Branch, Division of Engineering, Nuclear Reactor Regulation. His Branch is responsible for the following:

reviews of design and operation of offsite power grid systems with regard to interrelationships between the nuclear unit, the utility grid, and interconnecting grids; reviews and evaluations of functional performance requirements, design, and operation of onsite power systems and the interface between the offsite and onsite power systems under the full range of normal operation, transient and accident conditions; reviews of environmental qualification of electrical equipment important to safety.

Experience:

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1988-Present 2005-Present Electrical Engineering Branch, Division of Engineering, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Reviewed and approved several staff safety evaluations for license amendment requests and license renewal applications.

Responsible for reviewing operating experience in the electrical area annually and issuing a summary report and appropriate generic communications.

Reviewed large power transformer failures in the industry for the last several years and issued an Information Notice 2009-010, Transformer Failures - Recent Operating Experience, to inform the licensees to review the information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems.

Led audit teams and conducted safety review audits consisting of nine technical reviewers including contractors for preparing the safety evaluation inputs for the license renewal applications submitted by the applicants for Oyster Creek, Fitzpatrick, Vogtle, and Shearon Harris power plants. Conducted public exit briefing for staff's safety audits for Oyster Creek. Participated in the staff presentations at the ACRS sub-committee and full committee meetings on license renewal applications.

Developed interim staff guidance for certain aging management programs and prepared safety review audit guidance.

Provided inputs and participated in International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) technical meetings on Electric Grid Reliability and Interface with Nuclear Power Plants on August 4-6, 2009. Participated in the

development of an IAEA Safety Guide for Electrical Power Systems Important to Safety on August 3-7, 2009, at IAEA Headquarters, Vienna, Austria.

Reviewed and issued summary report for Generic Letter 2007-01, Inaccessible or Underground Power Cable Failures That Disable Accident Mitigation Systems or Cause Plant Transients, and participated in public workshops and meetings to discuss the results of the cable performance and degradation issues and proposed NRC actions with the industry.

Led the NRC team in addressing the cable submergence issue with the industry through the Regulatory Issue Resolution Protocol.

Coordinating the effort for publishing a Regulatory Guide that provides guidance for monitoring the performance of cables during their installed life.

1993-2005 Operations Engineer, USNRC Headquarters Developed and monitored implementation of Reactor Safety Strategic Performance Area inspection procedures such as Surveillance Testing; Maintenance Effectiveness; Inservice Testing; Heat Sink Operability; Equipment Alignment; Maintenance Risk Assessment and Risk Management; Temporary Modification; Evaluation of Changes, Tests, or Experiments; Permanent Plant Modifications; and Safety System Design and Performance Capability.

Responsible for updating various Inspection Manual Chapters (IMC),

and providing policy direction to NEC regional staff. Performed annual assessment of inspection program and provided inspection program assessment inputs to the annual Reactor Oversight Process (ROP)

Commission paper. Developed and issued Significance Determination Process (IMC 0609, Appendix K) and technical basis document for assessing significance of performance issues associated with licensees implementation of maintenance rule (10 CFR 50.65 (a)(4)). In addition, prepared and provided the required training for implementing the Significance Determination Process.

Developed policy and program guidance for providing inspection credit for IAEAs Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) inspections.

Provided several briefings to international agency representatives regarding the NRCs inspection oversight and inspection practices.

Coordinated and provided responses to several IAEA Committee on Nuclear Regulatory Activities (CNRA) Working Group on Inspection Practices (WGIP) questionnaires and requests. Participated in and represented NRC at the CNRA/ WGIP seminar in Veracruz, Mexico.

As a Project Manager, responsible for the review, upkeep and maintenance of various technical guidance documents such as Part 9900 for 10 CFRs, Technical Specifications, Codes and Standards, and Regulatory Guides.

As a Technical Lead, interfaced with several NRR technical branches and issued Temporary Instructions (TIs) to verify implementation of NRC Orders, Bulletins, and Generic Letters. TI issued include: Performance Indicator Data Collection, Follow up of Generic Letter 89-13: Service Water System Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equipment, Reactor Pressure Vessel Head and Vessel Head Penetration Nozzles, Reactor Pressure Vessel Lower Head Penetration Nozzles, Reactor Containment Sump Blockage, Offsite Power System Operational Readiness, and Pressurizer Penetration Nozzles and Steam Space Piping Connections.

Coordinated with NRR technical branches to resolve policy and program issues associated with Generic Safety Issues. Resolved several high priority Davis-Besse lessons learned action items pertaining to barrier integrity, boric acid corrosion, surveillance, RCS leakage monitoring, and inservice inspections. Developed a statistical tool to aid inspectors in independently determining whether an adverse trend exists with licensees RCS unidentified leakage rate data obtained during steady state power operation and action level criteria to assess licensee actions in response to increasing levels of unidentified RCS leakage that could indicate RCPB degradation. Lead IIPB technical reviewer for 10 CFR 50.69 rule making effort and Risk Management Technical Specifications Activities.

As Reactor Oversight Program (ROP) Inspection Report Audit Team Leader: Established procedure for auditing inspection reports to ensure that inspection reports are written in accordance with NRR program

documents. Conducted annual audits of inspection reports, and managed several audit team members to complete the audits in calendar years 2001, 2002, and 2003. The results of the audits were communicated to the regional management and also captured in the annual ROP self-assessment Commission paper.

As Region III Coordinator, resolved regional questions on program implementation, performed periodic site visits to monitor implementation of the ROP, and observed regional assessment and planning meetings and provided feedback to the Regional management. Solicited NRC staff and licensee management feedback on program effectiveness and incorporated those comments in ROP initial implementation program Commission paper and applicable ROP program documents. Resolved several ROP pilot and initial implementation issues.

As Technical Assistant, Coordinated resolution of technical issues, prepared presentation materials for NRR Executive Team (ET),

monitored Davis-Besse lessons learned action items, provided project management support, coordinated research activities, coordinated NRR action items with Executive Director of Operations (EDO's) office, and provided status to ET regarding the resolution of significant NRR action items. Developed various report inputs such as monthly congressional report, plan of the week, EDO daily, two-week look ahead items, Research user-needs, and monthly ET Significant Items. Provided responses to intra-government inquiries.

Worked as a Team Leader for several Architect Engineering (AE) inspections for BWR and PWR plants to review design and licensing bases issues. Supervised 6-8 contractor engineers and conducted several public exit meetings. Identified numerous complex design and licensing bases issues during these inspections.

Responsible for Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC) review of Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR) and CE System 80+ electrical/ system design. Team leader for station blackout team inspections at Palo Verde Stations (Units 1, 2, and 3) and Beaver Valley. Worked as a group lead for integrated design inspection (IDI),

operational readiness assessment team inspection (ORAT) and led Engineering and Maintenance team inspections at numerous operating plants. Identified several design and licensing bases issues.

Participated/developed IPAP inspections to review licensees performance issues. Responsible for developing inspection procedures to implement inspection requirements for station black out (SBO),

anticipated transient without scram (ATWS), safety parameter display (SPDS) and Regulatory Guide 1.97 instruments. Responsible for publishing a final information notice to identify all significant electrical issues for Electrical Distribution Functional Inspections. Conducted Fundamentals of Inspections training course, provided presentations for the Atomic Energy Control Board of Canada regarding NRC Electrical Inspections, and participated as a panel member for the Regulatory Information Conference for AE inspections.

1988-1993: Reactor Engineer, USNRC Region 1 Worked as a team leader for the Electrical Distribution System Functional Inspection (EDSFI) team inspections at various plants.

Participated in many EDSFI and safety system functional inspection (SSFI) inspections. Responsible for writing the engineering/technical support areas for the Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) of several licensees. Performed several motor operated valve inspections for the implementation of NRC Inspection and Enforcement Bulletin 85-03 "Motor-Operated Valve Common Mode Failures During Plant Transients Due To Improper Switch Settings" that resulted in identifying many safety significant concerns. Responded to plant events to address concerns in electrical and plant systems including Augmented Inspection Teams (AITs) at Pilgrim, Susquehanna, and Salem.

Conducted engineering inspections to assess the licensee performance in the engineering/technical support area for SALP data. Conducted a team inspection at Nine Mile Unit 1 to resolve Regulatory Guide 1.97 "Instrumentation For Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants To Assess Plant And Environs Conditions During And Following An Accident" restart issues. Participated in the special I&C inspection at Indian Point 3 to review the design basis, set points, logic control systems and maintenance of instruments. Assumed lead responsibility for engineering, fire protection and environmental qualification inspections at sites including Calvert Cliffs and Main Yankee.

1987-1988 Field Engineer/Design Engineer, Bechtel Construction, Inc.

(Limerick Nuclear Generating Station)

Responsible for implementing design modifications to safety related equipment to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements and safety analysis commitments. Performed design changes to Nuclear Steam Supply System (NSSS) elementary, schematic and connection drawings and prepared design specifications for control room and remote shutdown panels for Limerick Unit 2. Coordinated with General Electric and the utility to resolve engineering design conflicts. Performed design reviews and implemented electrical separation commitments in accordance with Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) standards and the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) for all safety related equipment at Limerick 2.

1981-1987 Field Engineer/Design Engineer, Bechtel Construction, Inc.

(Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station)

Responsible for the design changes, installation and inspection of cables, transformers, switchgears, and electrical terminations for nuclear steam supply systems, and safety related systems. Reviewed design drawings and specifications for instrumentation systems and provided technical support to resolve construction problems for instrument installations. Coordinated implementation of Three Mile Island Task Action items and human factor study modifications for the control room per NRC requirements. Performed design review and implementation of design changes and modifications for reactor coolant systems, safety injection systems and 4.16kV Class 1E power systems. Performed design review to verify electrical protection and coordination, load growth and electrical system stability analysis for Palo Verde 3. As Start-up Group Supervisor, completed startup modifications on electrical and nuclear steam supply systems for Palo Verde Unit 3. Responsible for the installation and pre-operational testing of major electrical equipment at Palo Verde 3. Prepared several surveillance, maintenance and operating procedures for safety-related systems. Provided support for startup testing of 500kV switchyard protective equipment, transformers, and relays and also onsite major components like MCC, load centers, and 125Vdc Class 1E systems.

Exhibit 1 Pilgrim License Renewal Information Notice IN 2010-26 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION OFFICE OF NEW REACTORS WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001 December 2, 2010 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2010-26: SUBMERGED ELECTRICAL CABLES ADDRESSEES All holders of an operating license or construction permit for a nuclear power reactor issued under Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities, except those who have permanently ceased operations and have certified that fuel has been permanently removed from the reactor vessel.

All current and potential applicants for a combined license or standard design certification for a nuclear power plant under the provisions of 10 CFR Part 52, Licenses, Certifications, and Approvals for Nuclear Power Plants. All current and potential applicants for a construction permit under the provisions of 10 CFR Part 50.

PURPOSE The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice (IN) to inform addressees of observations of protracted cable submergence in water, recent NRC inspection findings, and the results of licensees responses to Generic Letter (GL) 2007-01, Inaccessible or Underground Power Cable Failures That Disable Accident Mitigation Systems or Cause Plant Transients, dated February 7, 2007 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML070360665). Furthermore, this IN provides additional clarification to IN 2002-12, Submerged Safety-Related Electrical Cables, dated March 21, 2002 (ADAMS Accession No. ML020790238), through the NRCs observations of the submergence in water of electrical cables that feed safety-related equipment at certain facilities. The NRC expects recipients to review the information for applicability to their facilities and consider taking action, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. The suggestions that appear in this IN are not NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required.

DESCRIPTION OF CIRCUMSTANCES Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant On September 11, 2008, a double phase-to-ground fault occurred on the underground feeder cables (offsite power) routed from the 2RS (345-kilovolt (kV)/34.5-kV) transformer to the 2R (34.5-kV/4.16-kV) transformer at the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant. On December 16, 2008, the NRC issued Inspection Report 05000263/2008-009 (ADAMS Accession No. ML083510254), which documented the results of a special inspection that it performed at the plant. The special inspection evaluated the facts and circumstances surrounding the loss of normal offsite power and resultant reactor trip and other complications that occurred on September 11, 2008. The inspectors identified a violation for the licensees failure to establish an effective monitoring and corrective action plan that included the 34.5-kV underground feeder cables in the scope of a monitoring program that met the requirements of ML102800456

Exhibit 1 Pilgrim License Renewal Information Notice IN 2010-26 IN 2010-26 Page 2 of 8 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1). This cable was found submerged, as the manhole was full of water above the level of the conduits. The licensees evaluation of the cable failure determined that the faults did not occur in the section of cable that was found submerged.

The inspectors determined that the licensees preventive maintenance and testing methodology for the 34.5-kV cables was not sufficient to establish the condition of the cables, and, therefore, the exemption of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(2) was not applicable. Additionally, the preventive maintenance and testing methodology implemented by the licensee for the 34.5-kV cables did not provide the information necessary to ensure that the 2R transformer was capable of fulfilling its intended function. Therefore, the licensee had not effectively assessed the performance goal before the failure. Thus, the exemption of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(2) was not applicable. Following the cable failure, the licensee performed tan-delta and partial discharge (PD) cable performance monitoring tests to identify the extent of the cable degradation. The tan-delta testing indicated that the A2 phase conductor (which failed on September 11, 2008) had a severe fault at a second splice location, and, therefore, the licensee needed to replace the splice. The PD testing identified termination problems in the B2 and C2 cable conductor splices and at the stress cones. To address these deficiencies, the licensee repaired or replaced the faulted cable. The licensee is implementing a cable monitoring and testing program to monitor the performance of the cables.

Fermi Power Plant, Unit 2 On September 11, 2007, the NRC issued Inspection Report 05000341/2007-003 (DRS)

(ADAMS Accession No. ML072540412), which documented the results of a component design bases inspection that it performed at the Fermi Power Plant, Unit 2. The emergency diesel generator cables installed between the residual heat removal complex and the reactor building, which were located below the maximum ground water level, were not designed for continuous underwater service. The inspectors identified a violation of Criterion III, Design Control, of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50, for the licensees failure to implement licensing and design-basis requirements when the licensee specified and purchased safety-related and nonsafety-related cables. The inspectors noted that the licensee failed to ensure that the cables were designed for continuous underwater service, which is contrary to statements made in the licensees updated final safety analysis report. The licensee entered the finding into its corrective action program to investigate the design of the cables and to institute a cable management program.

Point Beach Nuclear Plant On April 21, 2008, the NRC issued Inspection Reports 05000266/2008-007 and 05000301/2008-007 (ADAMS Accession No. ML081130194), which documented the results of the agencys special inspection. The purpose of the special inspection was to review the circumstances surrounding the loss of the Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit 1, 1X-04 transformer that resulted in the loss of safety bus 1B-04 at the plant. One of three violations identified during the inspection dealt with the licensees failure to establish a test program that would adequately demonstrate that medium-voltage cables subjected to submergence in water would perform satisfactorily in service. Specifically, the online, energized PD testing methodology that the licensee had adopted in approximately 2001 to periodically assess the condition of submerged power cables failed to provide any indication of declining cable performance or an indication of an imminent failure of the transformer cables before the actual failure on January 15, 2008.

Exhibit 1 Pilgrim License Renewal Information Notice IN 2010-26 IN 2010-26 Page 3 of 8 On May 11, 2010, the NRC issued Inspection Reports 05000266/2010-002 and 05000301/2010-002 (ADAMS Accession No. ML101310428), which documented a violation of the requirements in Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, of Appendix B, Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Reprocessing Plants, to 10 CFR Part 50 because of the licensees failure to implement timely corrective actions to address the longstanding issue of submerged, medium-voltage underground cables at the Point Beach Nuclear Plant.

Specifically, the NRC first identified this issue in 1997, with numerous condition reports written by the licensee since that time. The licensee entered this issue into its corrective action program. The licensees corrective actions included the increased monitoring and pumping of manholes, and its proposed actions include design changes to support the automatic monitoring and removal of water from the manholes.

The medium-voltage cable condition monitoring program at the Point Beach Nuclear Plant was subsequently inspected during the Post-Approval Phase 2 License Renewal inspection. The inspection was documented in NRC Inspection Report 05000266/2010-011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML102850469). Inspections of commitments associated with the cable condition monitoring program were concluded to be acceptable.

Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 and 2 On August 4, 2009, the NRC issued Inspection Reports 05000334/2009-003 and 5000412/2009-003 (ADAMS Accession No. ML092160021), which documented the results of an inspection at the Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 and 2. The inspectors identified a violation of Criterion III, Design Control, of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50, whereby First Energy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC), the licensee for the Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 and 2, failed to maintain safety-related cables in an environment for which these cables were designed. Since the NRC issued IN 2002-12, FENOC has had several opportunities to trend as-found data, implement effective maintenance programs, and identify and thoroughly evaluate long-term adverse conditions for underground safety-related cables exposed to continuous submerged environments. The cables affected include those for Unit 1 river water and Unit 2 service water. FENOC entered the issue into its corrective action program to initiate a review of the current manhole and cable monitoring programs, as well as long-term corrective actions.

Wolf Creek Generating Station On November 7, 2008, the NRC issued Inspection Report 05000482/2008-004 (ADAMS Accession No. ML083120336), which documented the results of an inspection at the Wolf Creek Generating Station. The inspectors identified a violation of Criterion III, Design Control, of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 because the licensee failed to adequately demonstrate that submerged 4,160-volt cables are designed or qualified for such service and that they would continue to remain operable. These cables include those of residual heat removal, containment spray, and essential service water. The licensee has subsequently written a condition report and work orders to inspect cables and dewater cable vaults and has conducted tests to monitor the performance of the cables.

Exhibit 1 Pilgrim License Renewal Information Notice IN 2010-26 IN 2010-26 Page 4 of 8 Callaway Plant On October 21, 2009, the NRC issued Inspection Report 05000483/2009-004 (ADAMS Accession No. ML092940774), which documented the results of an inspection at the Callaway Plant. The inspectors identified a violation of Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 because the licensee failed to take prompt corrective actions to prevent continuous submergence of essential service water pump power cables. The licensee initially identified this submergence issue in its corrective action program (action request) in 2002, but it did not complete the corrective actions. The continuously submerged environment for these cables existed because the two vaults containing these cables (MH-01N and MH-01S) had inadequate seals that are needed to protect the vaults from incoming surface water. These cables were not designed to be continuously submerged and could fail over time based on the operating experience examples in GL 2007-01 and IN 2002-12. The licensee failed to correct an inadequate and degraded seal design for underground cable vaults MH-01N and MH-01S and failed to adequately demonstrate operability for the 4.16-kV essential service water pump cables through adequate testing and analysis for a continuously submerged condition. This violation was determined to be of very low safety significance because the degraded seals were a design or qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss of operability. The licensee has subsequently taken measures to improve the seals and has created a Callaway corrective action document to further evaluate and correct this issue.

Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3 On February 8, 2010, the NRC issued Inspection Reports 05000277/2009-005 and 05000278/2009-005 (ADAMS Accession No. ML100390108), which documented the results of a routine inspection at the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station (PBAPS), Units 2 and 3. The inspectors identified a violation of Criterion III, Design Control, of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 because the licensee failed to maintain safety-related power cables (including low-voltage cables) in an environment for which they were designed and tested. Specifically, the licensee did not adequately select and review a 480-volt alternating current power cable for suitability of application of materials. The cable feeds a safety-related motor control center that has been in a submerged environment in a manhole for an extended period of time (at least since 2002). Additionally, PBAPS personnel did not take actions to properly evaluate and mitigate the effects of long-term submergence of these safety-related electrical power cables.

To address this issue, the licensee entered it into its corrective action program.

Three Mile Island Nuclear Station On July 31, 2009, the NRC issued Inspection Report 5000289/2009-003 (ADAMS Accession No. ML092120364), which documented the results of a routine inspection at the Three Mile Island (TMI) Nuclear Station, Unit 1. The inspectors identified a violation of Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 because the licensee failed to establish and accomplish appropriate work instructions and procedures to inspect underground electrical cables, vaults, and supports for degradation or adverse effects caused by long-term repetitive submergence in water. TMI personnel had not entered the cable vaults, and TMI procedures did not require the actual visual inspection of the cables, supports, or vaults sufficient to determine operability. Furthermore, the licensee did not take action to identify or remediate the cause of the repetitive flooding and to restore the function of the designed cable vault drain systems. The inspectors observed corroded cable tray supports, damaged galvanized armor protective sleeves on cables, and indications of repetitive long-term cable submergence in water. The licensee entered, inspected, and dewatered all affected

Exhibit 1 Pilgrim License Renewal Information Notice IN 2010-26 IN 2010-26 Page 5 of 8 vaults. The licensee initiated work orders to correct all identified discrepancies. Some of the licensees proposed corrective actions included the implementation of a cable vault improvement initiative such as preventing rainwater intrusion, lid repair, installing lid gaskets, applying sealant to the lids, concrete repair, cable support repair, improving the grading/surrounding environment to prevent water runoff into the vaults, and restoring and maintaining French drains and other drains between vaults.

Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station On May 10, 2010, the NRC issued Inspection Report 05000271/2010-002 (ADAMS Accession No. ML101300363), which documented the results of an inspection at the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station. The inspectors identified a violation of Criterion III, Design Control, of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 because Entergy (the licensee for the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station) did not select and review safety-related cables suitable for application in the environment in which they were found. Specifically, Entergy allowed the continuous submergence of safety-related cables that were not designed or qualified for continuous submergence and failed to demonstrate that the cables would remain operable. Entergy initiated condition reports to address the issues, commenced the dewatering of the affected manholes, and initiated a preventive maintenance plan to ensure proper design conditions. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because it was a design or qualification deficiency which was confirmed to have not resulted in a loss of operability or functionality. Specifically, the continuously submerged cables were not designed or qualified for that environment but were still fully capable of performing their design functions.

BACKGROUND Cable failures have a variety of causes, including manufacturing defects, damage caused by shipping and installation, and exposure to electrical transients or abnormal environmental conditions during operation. Latent shield or insulation damage could result from errors during cable installation, which could be caused by cable jamming, cable pull-bys, cable sidewall bearing pressure, pulling cables through conduits and flexible conduit, or computerized cable routing system software routing cables through the wrong raceway. The likelihood of failure from any of these factors increases over time as the cable insulation degrades and/or is exposed to water.

During the license renewal and routine baseline inspections, NRC inspectors identified numerous inspection findings that indicate that some licensees are not maintaining cables important to safety in an environment for which they were designed.

On March 21, 2002, the NRC staff issued IN 2002-12, which described medium-voltage cable failures at the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station and the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station. The cable failures resulted from submerged safety-related cables in manholes and duct banks that were subjected to long-term flooding problems. Based on the operating experience described in IN 2002-12, several licensees began manhole restoration projects, replaced faulty dewatering equipment and cable supports, and made other modifications.

During a meeting on the license renewal application for the St. Lucie Plant in April 2003, members of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards questioned whether cable issues were also applicable in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50. The NRC staff responded that the staff of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) would evaluate the Committees concerns. The NRR staff reviewed the available operating experience of cable failures and

Exhibit 1 Pilgrim License Renewal Information Notice IN 2010-26 IN 2010-26 Page 6 of 8 observed that some cables at nuclear power plants, which were qualified for 40 years through licensees equipment qualification programs, were failing before the end of the qualified life of the cables. The staff identified 23 licensee event reports and two morning reports from 1988 to 2004 that described failures of buried medium-voltage alternating current and low-voltage direct current power cables that resulted from insulation failure. In most of the reported cases, the failed cables had been in service for 10 years or more. The NRR staff confirmed that the subject issue was applicable in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50 for operating reactors.

In 2006, the NRC began a detailed review of underground electrical power cables after moisture-induced cable failures were identified at some plants. The cables were exposed to submergence in water, condensation, wetting, and other environmental stresses. Because these cables are not designed or qualified for submerged or moist environments, the possibility that more than one cable could fail has increased; this failure could disable safety-related accident mitigation systems. On February 7, 2007, the NRC issued GL 2007-01 to gather information on inaccessible or underground power cable failures for all cables that are within the scope of the Maintenance Rule (10 CFR 50.65, Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants).

DISCUSSION Based on the above, the NRC expects licensees to identify conditions that are adverse to quality for cables, such as long-term submergence in water. Upon discovery of a submerged condition, the licensee should take prompt corrective actions to restore the environment to within the cables design specifications, immediately determine the operability of the cable(s) to perform its intended design function, and determine the impact of the adverse environment on the design life of the cable. These corrective actions typically involve the removal of water, the installation of a sump pump or the repair of the drainage conditions, and evaluation of the operability of the cable(s) including testing where appropriate. The long-term corrective actions could involve establishment of a condition monitoring program for all cables which are inaccessible and underground and under the maintenance rule, including testing of cables to verify the cables are not degraded and visual inspection of manholes for water accumulation to ensure continued operability.

Cables are not typically designed or qualified for submergence unless they are procured as submarine cables. Demonstration that a cable is designed or qualified for long-term submergence (i.e., submerged in water continuously or for extended periods of time) requires a qualification test report or certification from the cable vendor. The industrys previously conducted post-loss-of-coolant accident cable submergence tests do not demonstrate qualification for long-term cable submergence, and the use of the Arrhenius methodology by some licensees to demonstrate qualification for long-term cable submergence is invalid. For areas in which cables could be submerged, the licensee should identify and demonstrate that these cables are designed or qualified by documented testing for the required duration.

While the initial NRC inspection findings discussed in IN 2002-12 at Beaver Valley Power Station, Oyster Creek Nuclear Power Plant, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, and Millstone Power Station, Unit 2, did not identify any specific violations of NRC requirements, the NRC staff will evaluate future cable submergence issues to determine whether NRC regulations are being met.

Exhibit 1 Pilgrim License Renewal Information Notice IN 2010-26 IN 2010-26 Page 7 of 8 The NRC issued GL 2007-01 to gather information on inaccessible or underground power cable failures for all cables within the scope of the Maintenance Rule. The NRC staff identified 269 cable failures based on its review of responses from all licensees (65 sites and 104 reactor units). These failure data indicated an increasing trend in underground cable failures, and the predominant contributing factor was submergence or moisture intrusion that degraded the insulation. The staff noted that the cables are failing within the plants 40-year licensing periods.

Some of the cable failures have resulted in plant transients and shutdowns, loss of safety redundancy, entries into limiting conditions for operation, and challenges to plant operators.

The NRC staff published the summary report that captured the review of responses from all licensees on November 12, 2008 (ADAMS Accession No. ML082760385).

The NRC regulations require licensees to assess the condition of their components; monitor the performance or condition of structures, systems, and components in a manner sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that they are capable of fulfilling their intended functions; and establish a suitable test program to ensure that all testing necessary to demonstrate that components will perform satisfactorily in service is identified and performed. To date, NRC inspectors have identified various violations of NRC requirements at several facilities. Appendix A to this IN lists NRC inspection reports from 2008-2010 that identified inspection findings related to cable submergence.

Cables not designed or qualified for, but exposed to, wet or submerged environments have the potential to degrade. Cable degradation increases the probability that more than one cable will fail on demand because of a cable fault, lightning surge, or a switching transient. Although a single failure is within the plant design basis, multiple failures of this kind would be challenging for plant operators. Also, an increased potential exists for a common-mode failure of accident-mitigating system cables if they are subjected to the same environment and degradation mechanism for which they are not designed or qualified for. Some licensees have attempted to periodically drain the accumulated water from the cable surroundings to avoid cable failures. In some cases, the water quickly refilled the cavity in areas in which the water table was above the base level of a cable trench or underground vault. In other cases, water accumulated seasonally (e.g., because of snowfall or rain), filling the conduit or raceways. In both cases, periodic draining could slow the rate of insulation degradation, but it may not prevent cable degradation. Licensees should ensure that cables that could become submerged are adequately monitored.

Exhibit 1 Pilgrim License Renewal Information Notice IN 2010-26 IN 2010-26 Page 8 of 8 CONTACT This IN requires no specific action or written response. Please direct any questions about this matter to the technical contacts listed below or to the appropriate NRR project manager.

/RA by TBlount for/ /RA by JTappert for/

Timothy McGinty, Director Glenn Tracy, Director Division of Policy and Rulemaking Division of Construction Inspection and Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Operational Programs Office of New Reactors Technical Contacts: Matthew McConnell, NRR Amar Pal, NRO 301-415-1597 301-415-2760 E-mail: Matthew.McConnell@nrc.gov Amar.Pal@nrc.gov Note: NRC generic communications may be found on the NRC public Web site, http://www.nrc.gov, under Electronic Reading Room/Document Collections.

Exhibit 1 Pilgrim License Renewal Information Notice IN 2010-26 APPENDIX A LIST OF U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION INSPECTION REPORTS ON CABLE SUBMERGENCE ISSUES

1. Inspection Report 05000263/2008-009, December 16, 2008 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML083510254)

2. Inspection Reports 05000266/2008-007 and 05000301/2008-007, April 21, 2008 (ADAMS Accession No. ML081130194)

3. Inspection Report 05000416/2009-006, April 30, 2009 (ADAMS Accession No. ML091200372)

4. Inspection Reports 05000335/2008-004 and 05000389/2008-004, November 12, 2008 (ADAMS Accession No. ML083170830)

5. Inspection Report 05000482/2008-004, November 7, 2008 (ADAMS Accession No. ML083120336)

6. Inspection Report 05000331/2009-005, February 3, 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML100341068)

7. Inspection Reports 05000334/2009-003 and 05000412/2009-003, August 4, 2009 (ADAMS Accession No. ML092160021)

8. Inspection Report 05000483/2009-004, October 21, 2009 (ADAMS Accession No. ML092940774)

9. Inspection Reports 05000315/2009-005 and 05000316/2009-005, January 26, 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML100271609)

10. Inspection Report 05000285/2009-006, December 30, 2009 (ADAMS Accession No. ML093641134)

11. Inspection Report 05000354/2009-004, November 12, 2009 (ADAMS Accession No. ML093160532)

12. Inspection Report 05000219/2009-003, July 30, 2009 (ADAMS Accession No. ML092110491)

13. Inspection Reports 05000528/2009-008, 05000529/2009-008, and 05000530/2009-008, November 19, 2009 (ADAMS Accession No. ML093240524)

14. Inspection Report 05000289/2009-003, July 31, 2009 (ADAMS Accession No. ML092120364)

15. Inspection Report 05000271/2010-002, May 10, 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML101300363)

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Exhibit 1 Pilgrim License Renewal Information Notice IN 2010-26

16. Inspection Report 05000346/2010-002, April 27, 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML101170741)

17. Inspection Reports 05000266/2010-002 and 05000301/2010-002, May 11, 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML101310428)

18. Inspection Reports 05000315/2010-002 and 05000316/2010-002, May 5, 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML101250243)

19. Inspection Reports 05000237/2010-002 and 05000249/2010-002, May 10, 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML101300436)

20. Inspection Report 05000400/2010-002, April 30, 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML101200174)

21. Inspection Report 05000261/2010-002, April 30, 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML101200497)

22. Inspection Reports 05000277/2009-005 and 05000278/2009-005, February 8, 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML100390108)

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Exhibit 2 Pilgrim License Renewal NRC Generic Letter GL 2007-01 OMB Control No.: 3150-0011 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001 February 7, 2007 NRC GENERIC LETTER 2007-01: INACCESSIBLE OR UNDERGROUND POWER CABLE FAILURES THAT DISABLE ACCIDENT MITIGATION SYSTEMS OR CAUSE PLANT TRANSIENTS ADDRESSEES All holders of operating licenses for nuclear power reactors, except those who have permanently ceased operations and have certified that fuel has been permanently removed from the reactor vessel.

PURPOSE The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this generic letter to:

(1) Inform licensees that the failure of certain power cables can affect the functionality of multiple accident mitigation systems or cause plant transients.

(2) Inform licensees that in the absence of adequate monitoring of cable insulation, equipment could fail abruptly during service, causing plant transients or disabling accident mitigation systems.

(3) Ask licensees to provide information on the monitoring of inaccessible or underground electrical cables.

Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Section 50.54(f), addressees are required to submit a written response to this generic letter.

BACKGROUND Cable failures have a variety of causes: manufacturing defects, damage caused by shipping and installation, and exposure to electrical transients or abnormal environmental conditions during operation. The likelihood of failure from any of these causes increases over time as the cable insulation degrades.

Electrical cables in nuclear power plants are usually located in dry environments, but some cables are exposed to moisture from condensation and wetting in inaccessible locations such ML070360665

Exhibit 2 Pilgrim License Renewal NRC Generic Letter GL 2007-01 GL 2007- 01 Page 2 of 7 as buried conduits, cable trenches, cable troughs, above ground and underground duct banks, underground vaults, and direct-buried installations. The cable insulation goes through gradual degradation due to a variety of reasons.

In Information Notice (IN) 2002-12, Submerged Safety-Related Electrical Cables, NRC described medium-voltage cable failures at Oyster Creek, Davis-Besse, and several other plants as a result of safety-related cables submerged in manholes and duct banks subject to long-term flooding problems. In response to IN 2002-12, several licensees began manhole restoration projects, replaced faulty dewatering equipment and cable supports, and made other modifications. Several other licensees reported water removal problems, but have not begun a program for the early detection of potential failures.

The NRC began a detailed review after observing that some of the cables qualified for 40 years, through the equipment qualification program, were failing at several nuclear stations prior to the end of qualified life. At each nuclear station, there may be only a dozen or so power cables installed in locations susceptible to moisture-induced damage. The low number of cables notwithstanding, the staff identified 23 licensee event reports and 2 morning reports since 1988 regarding failures of buried medium-voltage, alternating current (AC) and direct current (DC) low voltage cables from insulation failure. The staff has knowledge of several other cable failures that were not required to be reported and therefore, these reported events are only a fraction of all failures. In most of the reported cases, the failed cables had been in service for 10 years or more. The rugged design of the electrical cables may prevent early failure even after extended immersion in water.

APPLICABLE REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS NRC regulations in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion (GDC) 4, state that

[s]tructures, systems, and components important to safety shall be designed to accommodate the effects of and to be compatible with the environmental conditions associated with normal operation.

NRC regulations in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, GDC 17, state that [p]rovisions shall be included to minimize the probability of losing electric power from any of the remaining [power]

supplies...[a] loss of power from the transmission network, or the loss of power from the onsite electric power supplies.

NRC regulations in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, GDC 18, state that [e]lectric power systems important to safety shall be designed to permit appropriate periodic inspection and testing of important...features, such as wiring, insulation and to assess the continuity of the systems and the condition of their components, the operability of the systems as a whole, and the transfer of power among the nuclear power unit, the offsite power system, and the onsite power system.

NRC regulations in 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) state that [e]ach holder of a license to operate a nuclear power plant...shall monitor the performance or condition of structures, systems, or components...in a manner sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that such structures, systems, and components...are capable of fulfilling their intended functions.

Exhibit 2 Pilgrim License Renewal NRC Generic Letter GL 2007-01 GL 2007- 01 Page 3 of 7 NRC regulations in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, state that [a] test program shall be established to assure that all testing required to demonstrate that...components will perform satisfactorily in service is identified and performed.

These design criteria require that cables, which are routed underground, be capable of performing their function when subjected to anticipated environmental conditions such as moisture or flooding. Further, the design should minimize the probability of power interruption when transferring power between sources. The cable failures that could disable risk-significant equipment are expected to have monitoring programs to demonstrate that the cables can perform their safety function when called on. However, the recent industry cable failure data indicates a trend in unanticipated failures of underground/inaccessible cables that are important to safety.

DISCUSSION Cables susceptible to moisture-induced failures may vary from plant to plant, and these cables are generally routed through underground conduits, concrete duct banks, cable trenches, cable troughs, underground vaults or directly buried. Although nuclear plant electrical systems are designed to be single-failure-proof, undetected degradation of cables due to preexisting manufacturing defects or other causes in wetted environments can result in multiple equipment failures:

• The failure of power cables that connect the offsite power to the safety bus can prevent offsite power recovery for far longer than the coping time originally considered for station blackout conditions. A licensee may not detect the incipient failure of these cables because in some plants these cables generally remain deenergized during power generation and are not periodically energized for testing.

• The failure of the power cables from an emergency diesel generator (EDG) to the safety bus (where the EDGs are in separate buildings) can prevent recovery of standby power from the EDG and result in the unavailability of a full train of accident mitigation systems during a loss-of-offsite-power event.

• The failure of the power cables to an emergency service water (ESW) or component cooling water pump can disable one train of emergency core cooling systems for long-term service unless the headers can be cross connected and the redundant pump(s) are capable and lined up to supply sufficient cooling for both trains. If the EDGs are cooled by ESW or service water, the cable failure can disable the EDG and cause the loss of one train of emergency standby power.

As an example of a reportable event, when Oyster Creek, Unit 1, was shutdown, the station lost power to a 4160-VAC bus due to a ground fault on an underground cable between the EDG and the safety bus. The loss of power led to a trip of reactor protection system channel 2, a full reactor scram signal, and main steam line isolation (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. 9612020214, LER 05000219/96-09).

As an example of multiple equipment failures, the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station had an underground cable insulation failure that resulted in the trip of the 13.8-kV circulating water pump breaker and a loss of power to two 4-kV substations affecting non-safety related loads.

Exhibit 2 Pilgrim License Renewal NRC Generic Letter GL 2007-01 GL 2007- 01 Page 4 of 7 The cable showed signs of insulation degradation caused by moisture intrusion (Inspection Report No: 05000346/2004017, ADAMS Accession No. ML050310426, issued on January 30, 2005).

Generally, these types of cable failure results in fault currents several orders of magnitude larger than the normal current. Until isolated by a breaker, the fault current or transient voltages would propagate on the immediate power systems and potentially fail other systems with degraded insulation systems.

Cables not qualified for but exposed to wet environments have the potential to degrade. Cable degradation increases the probability that more than one cable will fail on demand because of a cable fault or a switching transient. While a single failure is within the plant design basis, multiple failures of this kind would be challenging for the plant operators.

Some licensees have attempted to periodically drain the accumulated water from the cable surroundings to avoid cable failures. In some cases, the water quickly refilled the cavity in areas where the water table was above the base level of a cable trench or underground vault.

In other cases, the water accumulated seasonally during snowfall or rain, filling the conduit or raceways, with potential for the cables to dry out whenever the humidity drops. In both cases, periodic draining may decrease the rate of insulation degradation, but would not prevent cable failures.

Some licensees have detected cable degradation prior to failures through techniques for measuring and trending the condition of cable insulation. Licensees can assess the condition of cable insulation with reasonable confidence using one or more of the following testing techniques: partial discharge testing, time domain reflectometry, dissipation factor testing, and very low frequency AC testing. Licensees can replace faulty cables during scheduled refueling outages prior to cable failure that would challenge plant safety. The Oconee Nuclear Station relied on the partial discharge test to monitor the condition of the emergency power supply cable insulation and replaced the cable during a scheduled outage (Inspection Report No. 50-269/99-12, 50-270/99-12, ADAMS Accession No. ML003676749, issued on September 21, 1999).

REQUESTED INFORMATION Addressees are requested to submit the following information to NRC within 90 days of the date of this generic letter:

(1) Provide a history of inaccessible or underground power cable failures for all cables that are within the scope of 10 CFR 50.65 (the Maintenance Rule) and for all voltage levels.

Indicate the type, manufacturer, date of failure, type of service, voltage class, years of service, and the root causes for the failure.

(2) Describe inspection, testing and monitoring programs to detect the degradation of inaccessible or underground power cables that support EDGs, offsite power, ESW, service water, component cooling water and other systems that are within the scope of 10 CFR 50.65 (the Maintenance Rule).

Exhibit 2 Pilgrim License Renewal NRC Generic Letter GL 2007-01 GL 2007- 01 Page 5 of 7 REQUIRED RESPONSE In accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(f), the addressees are required to submit written responses to this generic letter. This information is sought to verify licensees compliance with the regulatory requirements listed in the Applicable Regulatory Requirements section of this generic letter. The addressees have two options:

(1) Addressees may choose to submit written response providing the information requested above within the requested time period.

(2) Addressees who choose not to provide information requested or cannot meet the requested completion dates are required to submit written responses within 30 days of the date of this generic letter. The responses must address any alternative course of action proposed, including the basis for the acceptability of the proposed alternative course of action.

The addressee should address the required written response to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD 20852, under oath or affirmation under the provisions of Section 182a of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and 10 CFR 50.54(f). In addition, the addressee should send a copy of the response to the appropriate regional administrator.

REASONS FOR INFORMATION REQUEST The requested information will enable the staff to determine whether the requirements in the Applicable Regulatory Requirements section are being met in regard to the operational readiness of critical systems that could cause a plant transient or mitigate accidents. The reported licensee events and regional reports have established an operating experience history that requires further information on cable failures be obtained.

RELATED GENERIC COMMUNICATIONS Information Notice 2002-12: Submerged Safety-Related Electrical Cables (ADAMS Accession No. ML020790238).

BACKFIT DISCUSSION Under the provisions of Section 182a of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and 10 CFR 50.54(f), this generic letter transmits an information request for the purpose of verifying compliance with applicable, existing requirements. Specifically, the requested information will enable the NRC staff to determine whether the applicable requirements are being met in regard to the operation readiness of the critical systems that could cause plant transient or mitigate accidents power system. No backfit is either intended or approved in the context of issuance of this generic letter. Therefore, the staff has not performed a backfit analysis.

Exhibit 2 Pilgrim License Renewal NRC Generic Letter GL 2007-01 GL 2007- 01 Page 6 of 7 FEDERAL REGISTER NOTIFICATION The staff published a notice of opportunity for public comment on this generic letter in the Federal Register on August 1, 2005 (70 FR44127). Comments were received from four nuclear electric utilities and one industry group (Nuclear Energy Institute), and two sets of cable-testing information were received from Imcorptech, a cable-testing vendor. The staff received a total of 198 comments. The staff considered all comments. The staffs evaluation of the comments is publicly available through the NRCs ADAMS under Accession No. ML060440150.

CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT This generic letter is not a rule as designated by the Congressional Review Act (5 U.S.C.

§§801-888) and, therefore, is not subject to the Act.

PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT STATEMENT This generic letter contains information collection requirements that are subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). These information collections were approved by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), approval No: 3150-0011, which expires on February 28, 2007.

The burden to the public for these mandatory information collections is estimated to average 60 hours6.944444e-4 days <br />0.0167 hours <br />9.920635e-5 weeks <br />2.283e-5 months <br /> per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the information collection.

Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of these information collections, including suggestions for reducing the burden, to the Records and FOIA/Privacy Services Branch (T-5 F52), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by Internet electronic mail to INFOCOLLECTS@NRC.GOV; and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0011), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503.

Public Protection Notification NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a request for information or an information collection requirement unless the requesting document displays a currently valid OMB control number.

Exhibit 2 Pilgrim License Renewal NRC Generic Letter GL 2007-01 GL 2007- 01 Page 7 of 7 CONTACTS Please direct any questions about this matter to the technical contact listed below.

/RA by TQuay for/

Michael J. Case, Director Division of Policy and Rulemaking Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Technical

Contact:

Kimberley Corp, NRR/DE (301) 415-1091 E-mail: kar1@nrc.gov Matthew McConnell, NRR/DE (301) 415-1597 E-mail: kim@nrc.gov

Exhibit 3 Pilgrim License Renewal Information Notice IN 2002-12 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001 March 21, 2002 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2002-12: SUBMERGED SAFETY-RELATED ELECTRICAL CABLES Addressees All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power reactors.

Purpose The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice to inform addressees of observed protracted submergence in water of electrical cables that feed safety-related equipment. It is expected that recipients will review the information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in this information notice are not NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required.

Description of Circumstances On November 11, 2001, at the Oyster Creek Nuclear Power Plant, a 4160-Vac cable failure deenergized a unit substation for the 480-Vac system, prompting unit shutdown. The licensee replaced the faulted Anaconda Unishield cable with a Cablec cable and conducted a root cause evaluation. On the basis of that evaluation, the licensee concluded that the cable failure resulted from a localized delamination of the cable jacket aggravated by water intrusion into the underground cable conduit, subsequent cable drying, and corona degradation of the insulation

[Licensee Event Report 50-219/2001-01, dated January 7, 2002].

NRC inspectors reviewed similar concerns at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (Inspection Report 50-293/01-05), Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 2 (no inspection report generated), and Beaver Valley Power Station (Inspection Report 50-334/01-09). At Pilgrim, the inspectors identified one issue of very low safety significance (Green), finding that safety-related cables located inside manholes were submerged in water for an extended period of time. Although not a specific violation of NRC requirements, this was a notable weakness given that the licensee did not have a routine monitoring and inspection program for these underground cables. At both Millstone Unit 2 and Beaver Valley, the inspectors observed submerged safety-related cables, but learned that the cables were designed to withstand such submergence.

On August 30, 2000, at the Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, NRC inspectors toured a system of underground manholes and found safety-related electrical cables, including electrical splices, submerged in water. In addition, the inspectors observed leaking ductbanks, corroded and ML020790238

Exhibit 3 Pilgrim License Renewal Information Notice IN 2002-12 IN 2002-12 Page 2 of 3 broken cable supports, cable jacket tears, inoperable sump pumps, and inoperable level control circuits. Prior to that inspection, on January 21, 1999, the Brunswick licensee inspected one of the manholes in this system, found adverse conditions, and classified the entire system of 57 manholes in Maintenance Rule (MR) a(1) status. That classification refers to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Section 50.65(a)(1), which requires monitoring of the performance or condition of a system against licensee-established goals to reasonably ensure that the system can satisfy its intended function (NRC Inspection Report 50-325/2000-04, dated October 27, 2000).

On October 2, 1999, at Davis-Besse, a component cooling water pump tripped as a result of a phase-to-ground fault on a medium-voltage 3-phase power cable. The specific cable in question was installed in a 4-inch polyvinyl chloride (PVC) conduit, which runs partially underground, and had been in service for 23 years.

Discussion Oyster Creek Nuclear Power Plant The licensee determined that the safety significance of this event was minimal because the redundant electrical power source remained operable and because no functional failure of any safety system occurred. After replacing the failed portion of the cable and making necessary repairs, the licensee brought the plant back up to power. In the long term, the licensee is evaluating replacement cables that are extruded and manufactured with modern techniques and the use of above-ground cable trays for its medium voltage electrical distribution system.

Brunswick Steam Electric Plant The licensee established a manhole restoration project to restore the material condition of the electrical manholes, including those with cabling addressed by the Maintenance Rule. Using risk assessment techniques to schedule the restorations, the licensee restored 52 manholes to varying degrees over a period of more than one year, satisfying the goals of (1) inspecting and repairing degraded cable and (2) minimizing water leakage into plant structures and manholes to prevent corrosion of cable supports and components.

Licensee corrective actions included (1) identifying and repairing degraded protective cable jackets, (2) cleaning or coating corroded cable supports or components, (3) addressing leakage of rainwater or groundwater by replacing the seals of duct banks entering manholes or plant structures and installing plastic inserts under manhole covers to divert accumulating rainwater away from the manholes, (4) replacing sump pumps and switch mechanisms as needed, and (5) adding check valves to sump pump discharge piping to prevent rainwater from backing up into manholes.

The licensee is currently evaluating the effectiveness of this project. To date, the licensee has not identified water leakage from manholes in plant buildings.

Exhibit 3 Pilgrim License Renewal Information Notice IN 2002-12 IN 2002-12 Page 3 of 3 Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station In determining the root cause of the medium-voltage cable failure, the licensee theorized that water in the conduit gradually penetrated the outer neoprene cable jacket, migrated through the cloth binder tape just inside the jacket and through the various layers of the cable construction, and finally penetrated the ethylene propylene rubber (EPR) insulation by osmosis. The water seeping into the cable layers likely contained impurities that precipitated in the outer region of the EPR. Because the conductor was off-centered, precipitation of these impurities presumably disturbed the electric field in the jacket material. The accompanying observed cracking and conversion of the jacket material to carbon may have released additional impurities that would have further degraded the cable. Breakdown of the insulation would be most concentrated in the regions of the highest electric field intensity produced by the current in the conductor.

However, this scenario has not been confirmed.

The licensee successfully tested the cables of the other two component cooling water pumps and the associated makeup pumps. On the basis of these tests, the licensee concluded that the ground was an isolated fault.

This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate project manager from the NRCs Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR).

/RA/

William D. Beckner, Program Director Operating Reactor Improvements Program Division of Regulatory Improvement Programs Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Technical contacts: V. Hodge, NRR Paul Shemanski, NRR 301-415-1861 301-415-1377 E-mail: cvh@nrc.gov E-mail: pcs@nrc.gov

Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

Exhibit 3 Pilgrim License Renewal Information Notice IN 2002-12 Attachment 1 IN 2002-12 Page 1 of 1 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED NRC INFORMATION NOTICES Information Date of Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to 2002-11 Recent Experience with 03/12/2002 All holders of operating licenses Degradation of Reactor for pressurized-water reactors Pressure Vessel Head (PWRs), except those who have permanently ceased operations and have certified that fuel has been permanently removed from the reactor.

2002-10 Nonconservative Water Level 03/07/2002 All holders of operating licenses Setpoints on Steam for nuclear power reactors, Generators except those who have permanently ceased operations and have certified that fuel has been permanently removed from the reactor.

2002-09 Potential for Top Nozzle 02/13/2002 All holders of operating licenses Separation and Dropping of for nuclear power reactors, and Certain Type of Westinghouse non-power reactors and holders Fuel Assembly of licenses for permanently shutdown facilities with fuel onsite.

2002-08 Pump Shaft Damage Due to 01/30/2002 All holders of operating licenses Excessive Hardness of Shaft for nuclear power reactors, Sleeve except those who have permanently ceased operations and have certified that fuel has been permanently removed from the reactor.

2002-07 Use of Sodium Hypochlorite for 01/28/2002 All holders of operating licenses Cleaning Diesel Fuel Oil for nuclear power except those Supply Tanks who have ceased operations and have certified that fuel has been permanently removed from the reactor vessel.

2002-06 Design Vulnerability in BWR 01/18/2002 All holders of operating licenses Reactor Vessel Level or construction permits for boiling Instrumentation Backfill water reactors (BWRs).

Modification OL = Operating License CP = Construction Permit

Exhibit 4 Pilgrim License Renewal Information Notice IN 89-63 Index l Site Map l FAQ l Facility Info l Reading Rm l New l Help l Glossary l Contact Us Protecting People and the Environment UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION About NRC Nuclear Nuclear Radioactive Nuclear Public Meetings Reactors Materials Waste Security & Involvement Home > Electronic Reading Room > Document Collections > General Communications > Information Notices > 1989 > IN 89-63 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 September 5, 1989 Information Notice No. 89-63: POSSIBLE SUBMERGENCE OF ELECTRICAL CIRCUITS LOCATED ABOVE THE FLOOD LEVEL BECAUSE OF WATER INTRUSION AND LACK OF DRAINAGE Addressees:

All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power reactors.

Purpose:

This information notice is being provided to alert addressees that electrical circuits located above the plant flood level within electrical enclosures may become submerged in water because appropriate drainage has not been provided.

Failure of electrical circuits during service conditions, including postulated accidents, can occur due to submergence if water enters these enclosures and there is no provision for drainage. The electrical enclosures addressed by this notice include terminal boxes, junction boxes, pull boxes, conduits, condulets, and other enclosures for end-use equipment (such as limit switches, motor operators, and electrical penetrations), the contents of which may include cables, terminal blocks, electrical splices and connectors. It is expected that recipients will review this information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in this information notice do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required.

Description of Circumstances:

On March 20, 1989, the Clinton Power Station experienced an unexpected ingress of water into the drywell. About 10 feet of water from the dryer pool drained into the reactor cavity pool causing about 4 inches of standing water in the drywell. Following the event, the licensee found evidence of water intrusion in several electrical enclosures located above the flood level. These enclosures did not have drain holes. The licensee corrected the problem by drilling holes in all appropriate junction boxes, terminal boxes, pull boxes, condulets, and end-use equipment enclosures inside the drywell and the containment.

The Monticello plant found that a junction box for RHR pump motor leads con-tained several inches of water (NRC Inspection Report 50-263/87-013-DRS). The box did not have a drain hole. The licensee initially determined that the as-sociated conduits were routed through humid areas, which could have resulted 8908290014

. IN 89-63 September 5, 1989 Page 2 of 3 in condensation from the conduits accumulating in the box. However, the licensee later postulated that hosing down of equipment in that area may have caused water to enter the box through unsealed openings. In this instance, the circuits were found wet but not yet submerged in the accumulating water.

The licensee drilled weep holes in all appropriate motor-lead junction boxes and other enclosures to correct the problem.

During an inspection performed at Clinton Power Station from August 17 through August 21, 1987, NRC inspectors identified a terminal box without drain holes.

The box was required to be environmentally qualified in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.49. Although the box was located above the postulated plant flood level, it was subject to possible water and moisture intrusion that could submerge the contents of the box in an accident.

Subsequently, the licensee identified 156 terminal boxes without drain holes, which could affect multiple safety systems. The licensee drilled drain holes in the affected terminal boxes. During a followup inspection performed from February 6 through February 24, 1989, the NRC identified six additional junction boxes requiring drain holes. Several of these boxes contained taped electrical splices which the licensee's environmental qualification program http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/gen-comm/info-notices/1989/in89063.html 1/7/2011

Exhibit 4 Pilgrim License Renewal had not demonstrated to be environmentally qualified to perform their required Information Notice IN 89-63 function for the required duration if they became submerged following a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA). Following this finding, the licensee identified numerous other enclosures with taped splices that required drain holes.

Discussion:

The NRC regulation pertaining to environmental qualification specifically regarding submergence is addressed in 10 CFR 50.49(e)(6), which states that the electrical equipment qualification program must consider submergence (if subject to being submerged). The regulation also makes reference to two guidance documents: "Guidelines for Evaluating Environmental Qualification of Class 1E Electrical Equipment in Operating Reactors," November 1979 (DOR Guidelines), and NUREG-0588, "Interim Staff Position on Environmental Quali-fication of Safety-Related Electrical Equipment." NUREG-0588, Paragraph 2.2(5) states that where equipment could be submerged, it should be identified and demonstrated to be qualified by test for the duration required.

DOR Guidelines, Section 6, state that particular emphasis should be placed on common problems, such as protective enclosures installed upside down with drain holes at the top and penetrations in equipment housings for electrical connections being left unsealed or susceptible to moisture intrusion through stranded conductors.

Water can enter and accumulate in electrical enclosures located above the flood level through various unsealed openings, including enclosure covers, conduits, and conduit fittings. Water may enter an enclosure through a run of conduit from an upper elevation or by directly impinging on unsealed openings.

Steam and humidity also may enter an enclosure through conduits and unsealed openings and then condense and accumulate at the bottom of the enclosure. The content of the enclosure may become submerged as a result. Proper drain holes will prevent this.

. IN 89-63 September 5, 1989 Page 3 of 3 Submergence could occur during service conditions, including accidents such as a LOCA or other high-energy line break. For clarity, a component is considered submerged if it is partially or completely immersed in water.

Submergence of components in electrical enclosures may occur even though the enclosures are located above the plant flood level because of inadequate drainage in the enclosure.

Water intrusion also may occur from hosing down the equipment during house-keeping. It is important to note that extreme care needs to be taken during such activities so that the water does not penetrate unsealed enclosure openings and travel through conduits to enclosures at lower elevations.

Information Notice 84-57, "Operating Experience Related to Moisture Intrusion on Safety-Related Electrical Equipment at Commercial Power Plants," addressed watertight sealing of all electrical conduits to junction boxes and conduit-to-terminal box connection points for safety-related equipment located in areas of the reactor building as well as for areas that are potentially subject to high temperature steam or water impingement. This notice further addressed the importance of ensuring that box drain holes and equipment interfaces are in conformance with the test setup established during equipment qualification testing and with the vendor's recommendations.

This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate NRR project manager.

Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational Events Assessment Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Technical Contacts: A. S. Gautam, NRR (301) 492-1376 H. Walker, NRR (301) 492-0867

Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

. Attachment IN 89-63 September 5, 1989 Page 1 of 1 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED NRC INFORMATION NOTICES Information Date of Notice No._____Subject_______________________Issuance_______Issued to_________

89-62 Malfunction of Borg-Warner 8/31/89 All holders of OLs Pressure Seal Bonnet Check or CPs for nuclear Valves Caused By Vertical power reactors.

Misalignment of Disk http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/gen-comm/info-notices/1989/in89063.html 1/7/2011

Exhibit 4 Pilgrim License Renewal Information Notice IN 89-63 89-61 Failure of Borg-Warner Gate 8/30/89 All holders of OLs Valves to Close Against or CPs for nuclear Differential Pressure power reactors.

88-48, Licensee Report of Defective 8/22/89 All holders of OLs Supp. 2 Refurbished Valves or CPs for nuclear power reactors.

89-60 Maintenance of Teletherapy 8/18/89 All NRC Medical Units Teletherapy Licensees.

89-59 Suppliers of Potentially 8/16/89 All holders of OLs Misrepresented Fasteners or CPs for nuclear power reactors.

89-58 Disablement of Turbine-Driven 8/3/89 All holders of OLs Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Due or CPs for PWRs.

to Closure of One of the Parallel Steam Supply Valves 89-57 Unqualified Electrical 7/26/89 All holders of OLs Splices in Vendor-Supplied or CPs for nuclear Environmentally Qualified power reactors.

Equipment 89-56 Questionable Certification 7/20/89 All holders of OLs of Material Supplied to the or CPs for nuclear Defense Department by Nuclear power reactors.

Suppliers 89-45, Metalclad, Low-Voltage 7/6/89 All holders of OLs Supp. 1 Power Circuit Breakers or CPs for nuclear Refurbished With Substandard power reactors.

Parts 89-55 Degradation of Containment 6/30/89 All holders of OLs Isolation Capability by a or CPs for nuclear High-Energy Line Break power reactors.

OL = Operating License CP = Construction Permit http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/gen-comm/info-notices/1989/in89063.html 1/7/2011

Exhibit 5 Pilgrim License Renewal July 29, 2010 Inspection Report UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I 475 ALLENDALE ROAD KING OF PRUSSIA, PA 19406-1415 July 29, 2010 Mr. Kevin Bronson Site Vice President Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc_

Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station 600 Rocky Hill Road Plymouth, MA 02360-5508

SUBJECT:

PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000293/2010003

Dear Mr. Bronson:

On June 30, 2010, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS). The enclosed inspection report documents the results, which were discussed on July 13, 2010, with you and members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations, and with the conditions of your license.

The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

The report documents one NRC identified finding of very low safety significance (Green).

Additionally, a licensee-identified violation, which was determined to be of very low safety significance, is listed in this report. However, because of the very low safety significance and because it is entered into your corrective action program (CAP), the NRC is treating this as a non-cited violation (NCV), consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC's Enforcement Policy. If you contest any NCV, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN.:

Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Senior Resident Inspector at PNPS.

In addition, if you disagree with the cross-cutting aspect assigned to the finding in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region I, and the NRC Senior Resident Inspector at PNPS.

Exhibit 5 Pilgrim License Renewal July 29, 2010 Inspection Report K. Bronson 2 In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html(the Public Electronic Reading Room).

JI;/fr Donald E. Jack 0 Projects Branc Division of Reactor Projects Docket No. 50-293 License No. DPR-35

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000293/2010003 w/

Attachment:

Supplemental Information cc w.encl: Distribution via ListServ

Exhibit 5 Pilgrim License Renewal July 29, 2010 Inspection Report 7

1R06 Flood Protection Measures (71111.06)

Underground Cable Inspection

a. Inspection Scope (1 sample)

The inspectors reviewed a sample of flood protection measures affecting cables located in underground manholes. The inspectors selected an inspection of cable pits 2A, 4, and 5 that contain underground non-safety related power cables (from the start-up transformer to electrical buses A2 and A4) near the main transformer and the south side of the switchyard near the start-up transformer. The inspectors monitored Entergy's maintenance inspection and dewatering activities associated with each manhole to evaluate the as-found condition and corrective actions. The inspectors assessed the condition of power cables, splices, and supports. The inspectors also reviewed Entergy's Cable Reliability Program and corrective actions taken for this issue and the Cable Reliability Program in general. The documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

Introduction:

The inspectors identified a finding (FIN) of very low safety significance (Green) for improper maintenance of underground non-safety related medium voltage electric cables. The inspectors observed partially and fully submerged medium voltage cables during the regularly scheduled monthly dewatering and inspection of three cable vaults.

Enclosure

Exhibit 5 Pilgrim License Renewal July 29, 2010 Inspection Report 8

Description:

The electric power distribution system provides electric power to safety and non-safety related distribution buses in the plant. Off-site power is provided to the system by two independent circuits through non-safety related, medium voltage (typically those rated from 2 kilovolts to 35 kilovolts), Kerite cables that are routed through underground vaults and ducts. These cables are not rated for continuous submergence in water.

On April 28, 2010, the inspectors observed water in each of the manholes and vaults listed above. The inspectors noted that no dewatering or drainage systems existed in the manholes. Entergy procedure EN-DC-346, Revision 0, "Cable Reliability Program," was issued and effective on December 31,2009. This procedure discusses manhole inspections and dewatering, and requires, in part, "If manual inspections and pumping are used to maintain a cable system dry, the intervals must be sufficient to keep the cables dry. Adjust intervals as necessary, based on inspection results." Discussions with Entergy personnel involved with these inspections indicated that cables in Manhole 2A were periodically found submerged or partially submerged, and that cables in Manholes 4 and 5 were always found submerged. The cables that were submerged included cables that were installed from the 4160V, non-safety related startup transformer and connected to the A2 and A4 non-safety related busses. The inspectors identified that Entergy had previously identified submerged cables in August and September of 2009, however, corrective actions were not sufficient to preclude these cables from being sUbmerged. The inspectors also determined that Entergy had not implemented the Cable Reliability Program guidance in a timely manner to ensure that the degrading effects of this environmental condition were minimized (Le., pumping intervals were not sufficient to maintain the cables dry).

Entergy generated Condition Report (CR) CR-PNP-201 0-1529, and specified actions to identify all underground medium voltage cables included in the Cable Reliability Program, and to identify which manholes should have dewatering capability. Entergy also created a corrective action to increase the frequency of the dewatering activities for these areas.

In addition, the Electric Power Research Institute has generated a cable testing database that will be used to compare the test results of cables that have been removed from service to evaluate the potential for degradation of in-service cables.

Analysis: The inspectors determined that allowing medium voltage cables to remain submerged for extended periods of time was a performance deficiency. The cause of the issue was within Entergy's ability to foresee and correct, and should have been prevented. Traditional Enforcement did not apply, as the issue did not have actual or potential safety consequence, had no willful aspects, nor did it impact the NRC's ability to perform its regulatory function.

A review of NRC Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0612, Appendix E, "Minor Examples,"

revealed that no minor examples were applicable to this finding. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the design control attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone, and affected the cornerstone objective of limiting the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, continued submergence of the non-safety related power cables (from the start-up transformer to electrical buses A2 and A4)

Enclosure

Exhibit 5 Pilgrim License Renewal July 29, 2010 Inspection Report 9

could lead to cable failure and cause an event that would affect plant stability. The inspectors performed a Phase 1 Significance Determination Process screening of the finding in accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 4, "Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings," and determined that the finding was of very low safety significance because the condition did not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the unavailability of mitigating systems equipment.

The inspectors determined that this finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the Problem Identification and Resolution cross-cutting area, Corrective Action Program component, because Entergy personnel did not thoroughly evaluate the problem when submerged cabling was initially identified P.1(c).

Enforcement: This finding does not involve enforcement action because no regulatory requirement violation was identified. Because this finding does not involve a violation and has very low safety significance, it is identified as FIN 05000293/2010003-01, Submerged Medium Voltage Cables.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of )

)

ENTERGY NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, INC. ) Docket No. 50-293-LR

)

(Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station) ) ASLBP No. 06-848-02-LR

)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of NRC STAFFS ANSWER IN OPPOSITION TO PILGRIM WATCH REQUEST FOR HEARING ON NEW CONTENTION INCLUDING THE AFFIDAVIT OF ROY K.

MATTHEW AND EXHIBITS 1 - 5 have been served upon the following, by the Electronic Information Exchange, on the following by this 7th day of January 2011.

Administrative Judge Administrative Judge Richard F. Cole Paul B. Abramson Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Mail Stop: T-3F23 Mail Stop: T-3F23 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 Washington, DC 20555-0001 E-mail: rfc1@nrc.gov E-mail: pba@nrc.gov Administrative Judge Office of Commission Appellate Ann Marshall Young, Chair Adjudication Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Mail Stop: O-16G4 Mail Stop: T-3F23 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 Washington, DC 20555-0001 E-mail: OCAAMail@nrc.gov E-mail: amy@nrc.gov Sheila Slocum Hollis Office of the Secretary Duane Morris LLP Attn: Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff 505 9th Street NW Mail Stop: O-16G4 Suite 1000 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20004-2166 Washington, DC 20555-0001 E-mail: sshollis@duanemorris.com E-mail: hearingdocket@nrc.gov

Atomic Safety and Licensing Board* Terence A. Burke, Esq.

Mail Stop: T-3F23 Entergy Nuclear U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1340 Echelon Parkway Washington, DC 20555-0001 Mail Stop: M-ECH-62 Jackson, MS 39213 Mary Lampert David R. Lewis, Esq.

148 Washington Street Paul A. Gaukler, Esq.

Duxbury, MA 02332 Pillsbury, Winthrop, Shaw, Pittman, LLP E- mail: mary.lampert@comcast.net 2300 N Street, NW Washington, DC 20037-1137 E-mail: david.lewis@pillsburylaw.com paul.gaukler@pillsburylaw.com Chief Kevin M. Nord Town Manager Fire Chief & Director Duxbury Emergency Town of Plymouth Management Agency 11 Lincoln St.

668 Tremont Street Plymouth, MA 02360 Duxbury, MA 02332 E-mail: msylvia@townhall.plymouth.ma.us E-mail: nord@town.duxbury.ma.us Fax: 781-934-6530 Signed (electronically) by Susan Uttal Counsel for NRC Staff U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of the General Counsel Mail Stop - O-15D21 Washington, DC 20555 Telephone: (301) 415-1582 E-mail: Susan.Uttal@nrc.gov Date of signature: January 7, 2011