ML101110731

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Handout for Meeting with Florida Power & Light to Discuss the Status of Fpl'S Employee Concerns Program (ECP) Improvement Initiatives. FPL Presentation on Nuclear Safety Culture
ML101110731
Person / Time
Site: Saint Lucie, Turkey Point  NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 04/20/2010
From:
Florida Power & Light Co
To:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
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Download: ML101110731 (44)


Text

Nuclear Safety Culture Update April 20, 2010 Enclosure 2

Agenda

  • Opening Comments, Introductions M. Nazar Chief Nuclear Officer
  • Nuclear Safety Culture Program at FPL G. St. Pierre VP Fleet Support

- Fleet Program J. Schaffer Nuclear Safety Culture Project Lead

- St. Lucie Program R. Anderson VP St. Lucie

- Turkey Point Program M. Kiley VP Turkey Point

  • Human Resources Activities Supporting Nuclear M. Bryce Safety Culture VP Human Resources, Nuclear
  • Employee Concerns Program D. Lowens Director Nuclear Assurance
  • Future of Nuclear Safety Culture at FPL G. St. Pierre VP Fleet Support
  • Closing Comments M. Nazar Chief Nuclear Officer Enclosure 2 2

FPL Group Attendees Mano Nazar Chief Nuclear Officer Gene St. Pierre VP Fleet Support Jennifer Schaffer Nuclear Safety Culture Project Lead Rich Anderson VP St. Lucie Mike Kiley VP Turkey Point Mike Bryce VP Human Resources, Nuclear Dave Lowens Director Nuclear Assurance Larry Nicholson Director Licensing Mitch Ross VP General Counsel, Nuclear Enclosure 2 3

Nuclear Excellence Model Conduct allactlvnlos to MaDn~e t.e Ume splnton Prevell".

Un the Be a Setf-Improvlna: CultlJ'e & a.... Defection to ml.lmtta! Foster a work env~onment where demonstrate a deep respect I... Nuclear safety salety Guldlna: P~nclples L..mlna: Oraanlzatlon we are tho a..,myer 01 choice el....hate Correction actlvHles OperatJo..l~ Passion for ~a:ed Leaders Slandardtted Responsive to Enectlve Focused Excellence Processes stakeholders Wor1llon:e Pbmq Enactlve lontI-Rana:a strona: Ownership Eneetlve SupelY~ors w...klne Balance stmna:Teamwork Pbmq & Itcountablilly Effective Business &

Operational Excellence Organizational Effectiveness Generation Reliability Financial Performance Enclosure 2 4

I=I=IL.

I::RCUP.

Our Safety Guiding Principles Respect for Nuclear Safety SIC/LO We are committed to excelle nce and professionalism in the conduct of our activities ,

1. All injuries are preventable and we endorse the following principles :
  • Everyone is personally responsible for nuclear safety.
2. Leadership is responsible
  • Leaders demonstrate commitment to safety.
  • Trust permeates the organization .

for preventing injuries

  • Oecislon-maklng reflects safety first.
  • Nuclear technology is recognized as special
3. Plan safety into our work and unique.
  • A questioning attitude is cultivated .
4. Look out for each other
  • Organizational learning is embraced .
  • Nuclear safety undergoes constant 8;11amination .

~ NLlclear ACOl ~ Nuclear Reet ~ Nudear Ree1 AGreat Work Environment Our Five Outage Principles To help ensure that Fleet team members have pride In what they do, enjoy the people they work with, and trust leadersh ip. FPL Nuclear is

1. Respect Industrial and Nuclear Safety committed to: 2. No Short Cuts I Rushing

./ Frequent, timely and candid communications

.,;' Support for work-life balance 3. Be Deliberate

." Elimination of low-value work

.,;' Performance improvement to minimize crisis

4. Effective Communication response and Handoffs

./ leadership recognition of employees as our most valuable resource 5. Be Prepared

./ leadership empowering employees to engage, grow and reach their full potential

./ Building tr ust and acting with Integ rity Enclosure 2

~ Nl.ClearReet

~ Nuclear Ree1 ~ NudellrAeel 5

2010 Top 5 Fleet Priorities

1. Enhance Nuclear Safety CUlture
2. Achieve Reet Breakthrough Goals
3. Execute Successful RelUeling Outages
4. SuccesslUlly Implement Extended Power Uprates and Major Projects
5. Internalize the Nuclear Excellence ModeVContlnue Fleet Standardization through NAMS 2010 Site Breakthrough Goals Turkey Point Duane Arnold
1. 10 percent of the employee population participating 1. Incorporate performance Improvement processes and In the Low Value Work Reduction program principles In the day-to-day execution of business
2. Improve external Interaction score to greater than 75 2. Encourage and promote understanding of human
3. Leadership and employee ownership that supports a strong perfonmance behaviors Nuclear safety Cunure 3. Implement performance models and conSistently communicate the behavioral changes needed In support St Lucie of the Nuclear Excellence Model
1. Rx the Plant Achieve breakthrough In station material condition by Improving outage and online backlogs Point Beach
2. Improve workllrre balance: Achieve breaKthrough In EQUipment 1. Achieve breaKthrough In lateral Integration Rellabllny and employee qualny of life by Improving forced loss by Improving work management rate and unplanned outages 2. Ensure right picture of excellence exists In key areas
3. Be an Internally driven organization: Achieve breaKthrough In 3. Engage the workforce to achieve breakthrough In self-Identnlcatlon and resolution of Issues by Improving Low Value Work Reduction teamworl<, lowering threshold and CAP Juno Beach Seabrook 1. Internalize and ViSibly demonstrate the "PrinCiples
1. Achieve excellence In work management of an Effective Nuclear Fleet"
2. Be recognized as a leader In outage preparation 2. Aheanhy nuclear safety culture 6
3. Internalize and visibly demonstrate "Principles for a Strong Nuclear safety Cunure" at all organizational levels Enclosure 2
3. We are recognized as a superior Fleet In the nuclear Industry I::RCUP. -

Nuclear Safety Culture Program at FPL

  • Values and Core Principles Approach
  • Established Project Lead/Juno Beach Committee
  • Nuclear Safety Culture Oversight Committee Meetings
  • Internal Communications Strategy
  • Improve Communications on Nuclear Safety Culture with NRC
  • Planning Culture Survey for August/September Strengthening Nuclear Safety Culture is Fleet Priority #1 Enclosure 2 7

Outage Core Values and Principles Complete Planned Work Improved Equipment Reliability (Do What We Said We Were Going To Do)

Prevent Job Stoppage Prevent Prevent Job Rework Delays No Rushing /

No Short Cuts Respect for Nuclear/

Effective Prevent Outage Core Industry Safety Prevent Communication Events Values &

Misunderstandings Hand-offs Principles

/ Inaccuracies Turnovers Be Deliberate Be Prepared (Look Ahead & Risk Prevent Support Prevent Making Management) Activities from Inappropriate Becoming Decisions Crisis Prevent Injuries Improved Teamwork Increased Safety Margin Lateral Integration Aligning Nuclear Safety Culture with Existing Values and Principles Enclosure 2 8

Nuclear Safety Culture - Fleet Program Jennifer Schaffer Nuclear Safety Culture Project Lead Enclosure 2

Current Status of Nuclear Safety Culture Root Cause

  • Summary of Key Corrective Actions (October 2009 Meeting)

- Define essential elements of a comprehensive, integrated nuclear safety culture process (Schaffer)

- Enhance operational decision making process (Schaffer)

- Review major initiatives to align resources (Schaffer)

- Aggressive close-out of St. Lucie personnel safety work (Anderson)

- Re-evaluate current reward system to ensure consistency with health of NSC (Bryce)

- Use surveys and focus groups to monitor NSC (Bryce)

- Reinvigorating ECP by increasing program visibility (Lowens)

  • Timeline of actions

- 86 Total Actions

- 85% Complete (71 Actions)

Enclosure 2 10

Current Status of Nuclear Safety Culture Root Cause

  • Significant Actions Status

- Employee Training Executives Completed Juno Beach Directors/CFAMs Scheduled Site Employee Training completed at 4 of 6 sites (Juno Beach, Point Beach scheduled)

- 8 Procedures Modified to Incorporate NSC Considerations Operational Decision Making (NAP-412)

Failure Investigation Process (PI-AA-100-1002)

Corrective Action Program & Screening(PI-AA-204/205)

Change Management (PI-AA-202)

Risk Management & Look Ahead (WM-AA-1000)

Integrated Project Prioritization (ER-AA-202-202)

Plant Readiness for Operations (OM-AA-04)

Enclosure 2 11

Current Status of Nuclear Safety Culture Root Cause

  • Significant Actions Status

- New Fleet wide Differing Professional Opinion Process

- Resource Alignment via Nuclear Integrated Resource Planning (NIRP)

- Developed and Institutionalized NSC Policy and Program Implemented in all Florida Locations Roll-out at Northern sites 3rd Quarter 2010 Enclosure 2 12

Fleet Program

  • Nuclear Safety Culture Policy and Program

- Define how the Fleet will Support a Healthy NSC Organizational Structure Clear Roles and Responsibilities Key Processes that will Drive the Program Measurement using Metrics Dashboard Establishes Ownership and Oversight at the Highest Levels Enclosure 2 13

Nuclear Safety Culture Organization CNO Nazar Nuclear Safety Culture Oversight Committee Responsibilities Project Lead Responsibilities NSC Oversight Overall project support Monitor Fleet NSC activities & actions Committee Project Lead Provide NSC oversight Project logistics and administration Schaffer Process and templates Propose / approve NSC actions Report-out at CNRB St. Pierre Status tracking and monitoring STANDARD QUORUM St. Pierre, VP Fleet Support Kiley, VP Turkey Point Anderson, VP St. Lucie Bryce, VP HR, Nuclear Ross, VP General Counsel, Nuclear Waldron, Nuclear Communications Lowens, Director Nuclear Assurance Schaffer, Nuclear Safety Culture Project Lead ROOT CAUSE TEAM MEMBERS Dryden, Licensing Supervisor, Nuclear Hollinger, Manager Spent Fuel Project Enclosure 2 14

Nuclear Safety Culture Organization CNO Nazar Nuclear Safety Culture Oversight Committee Responsibilities Project Lead Responsibilities NSC Oversight Overall project support Monitor Fleet NSC activities & actions Committee Project Lead Provide NSC oversight Project logistics and administration Schaffer Process and templates Propose / approve NSC actions Report-out at CNRB St. Pierre Status tracking and monitoring PSL NSC PTN NSC JB NSC SBK NSC DAEC NSC PB NSC Team Team Team Team Team Team Anderson Kiley Schaffer Freeman Costanzo Meyer Site Nuclear Safety Teams Responsibilities Future Implementation (Q3 2010)

Coordination of NSC initiatives at site Sponsor NSC implementation at sites Recommend actions to NSC Oversight Committee Enclosure 2 15

Measuring the Fleet Program and Improvements

  • Nuclear Safety Culture Metrics

- Benchmarked with Industry (i.e., Susquehanna, North Anna, Exelon, Entergy, FENOC, Hope Creek)

- Based around 8 INPO Safety Culture Attributes, including Addendum I Development has been evolutionary Revision 1 included 52 individual indicators Revision 2 dropped to 47 individual indicators Next Step Validation / Calibration Process

- What would it have looked like in spring 2009

- Site-to-Site comparisons

- Correlation of indicator results to attribute it supports Measuring our Progress Using Indicators that Align to the INPO Safety Culture Attributes Enclosure 2 16

Nuclear Safety Culture - Metrics Dashboard Nuclear Safety Culture - Site Dashboard SAMPLE PLANT ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS Feb-2010 Site Nuclear Safety Culture Health Everyone is Personally Responsible for Leaders Demonstrate Commitment to Trust Permeates the Organization Decision-Making Reflects Safety First Nuclear Safety Safety Sa fe ty Wor ko rde r NR C A llega tions to N o.of ER O D r ill Pe rfor m anc e C lea r anc e Er ror s Inde x PWO Ope n >= 12 mont hs N R C A lle ga tions D isc iplina ry ac tion OS HA re cor da ble injur ies OD M P roc es s U tilize d B a ck log D POs subm itte d Pe r sonne l C onta mina tion Se cur it y loggable " Nuc lea r Sa fe ty C ulture "

MR FF S taf fing le ve ls Tota l # of EC P C onc e rns Grie va nce s TISA R E ve nts (P CE s) pe rs onnel e rro rs C Rs C om ponent # of Ris k Sig R ed & N umbe r of 2 C m e et ings N um ber of Anonym ous V olunta r y Se par a tions CA P Inde x Mis pos it ioning Index Ye llow Sy st em s held C Rs s ubm itte d Nuclear Safety A Questioning Undergoes Behaviors & Actions that Support a Nuclear Technology is Recognized as Special and Unique Attitude is Organizational Learning is Embraced Constant Strong Nuclear Safety Culture Cultivated Examination S it e Pr oce dure H ea lth N on-Outa ge C M B a ck log Ope n PMC R s MSP I- H e at R e mov a l C R initia tion r a te Tr aining Obse r va tions R e gula tor y H ea lth Inde x Inde x Equipme nt R elia bility MSP I - R e sidua l H ea t Fee dba ck re c eiv ed via Une xc us ed Tr aining Sta tion H um an R e ac tiv it y Ma nage m ent S AB M Inde x Inde x Re m ova l N SC Webs ite A bs enc es Pe rfor ma nc e Co nt rol Room Oper a ble but De gr ade d M SPI - Cooling Wa ter Ope ra ting Ex per ienc e Num ber of Ma jor C ha nge IN PO Ev a lua tion re sults De fic ie ncie s Sys te m s Sys te m Inde x Mng Pla ns Oper a tor Wor k M SPI - Em er genc y A C A rounds /Bur dens Powe r Ope n Tem por ar y Sy st em MS PI - High Pre s sur e Alte ra tions Injec tion NOTE: This dashboard is governed by AD-AA-103 Rev 0 Section 5.2 Based on INPO Principles for a Strong Nuclear Safety Culture Enclosure 2 17

Nuclear Safety Culture - St. Lucie Rich Anderson VP St. Lucie Enclosure 2

St. Lucie Nuclear Safety Culture

  • Employee Communications

- Small employee group communications meetings (2Cs) being conducted

- NSC expectations communicated site wide before April outage

- Site wide all hands meetings include NSC topics

- Station newsletters and leadership alerts include NSC topics

- CNO Breakthrough site wide meeting included NSC as a focused topic

  • Nuclear Safety Culture Site Team

- Implemented fleet NSC procedure

- Monthly meetings held with SVP as chair

- Quorum established with individual contributors and management members Enclosure 2 19

St. Lucie Nuclear Safety Culture

  • Outage Activities

- CNO Pre-job brief and timeout

- SVP published outage expectations for maintaining an open and collaborative work environment

- NSC oversight meetings are held weekly during the outage. Input includes data such as:

Observation data Operational Decision Making Differing Professional Opinions NSC and anonymous condition reports ECP trends Human resource issues Outage scope requests Enclosure 2 20

St. Lucie Nuclear Safety Culture

  • Key Site specific RCE Actions

- Dedicated station Director leading a backlog reduction team

- Station backlogs for PMCRs, WOs, CR and PCRs reviewed and risk prioritized

- Safety Work Order initiative established

- Increased the use of the ODMI process. Recent examples demonstrate a focus on long-term safe and reliable operation

- Designated station managers (i.e., Manager in the Field) are assigned daily to perform focused observations on plant activities

  • Survey Results

- Positive results from an employee survey in February 2010. The survey included five questions regarding station progress with communications, materiel condition, CAP, and safety work orders Enclosure 2 21

Nuclear Safety Culture - Turkey Point Mike Kiley VP Turkey Point Enclosure 2

Turkey Point Nuclear Safety Culture

  • Site focused on involving individual contributors during the ODM process

- ROs, engineers, field operators, and crew supervisors involved during recent ODM to address heater drain system challenges

  • Operational Decision-Making Communications Examples

- 4C RCP #1 seal leak-off (March 2010)

- Unit 4 turbine trip header pressure (March 2010)

- Down power unit 4 for heater drain valve repair (January 2010)

- Unit 3 main generator hydrogen leakage (May 2009)

- 3A1 CWP motor rotation (February 2009)

Enclosure 2 23

Turkey Point Nuclear Safety Culture

  • Communications promoting an open and collaborative work environment:

- Weekly videos from SVP and PGM detailing ODMs and current issues

- Weekly breakfast employee meetings

- Weekly alignment packages

- Semi-monthly SNAP surveys

- Quarterly all hands meetings with time allotted for open discussion

- Quarterly SVP and PGM compliments and concerns meetings

  • Management in the Field Days

- Provide coaching

- Perform observations

- Model behaviors

- Answer questions Enclosure 2 24

Turkey Point Nuclear Safety Culture

  • 2010 breakthrough goal: Leadership and employee ownership of a strong nuclear safety culture

- Craft developing metric on measuring goal via breakthrough committee

  • Establishment of Nuclear Safety Culture Committee

- Monthly meetings held with SVP as the chairperson

  • Industrial Safety Work orders continue to be low

- 0 Priority A (Immediately safety significant)

- 0 Priority B (Scheduled within 4 weeks)

- 34 Priority C (Safety concern has been mitigated by a hardened barrier or other method)

- 20 Priority D (Safety enhancements)

Enclosure 2 25

Turkey Point Nuclear Safety Culture

  • Attrition Rate continues to lower

- In 2006 and 2007 our voluntary separations were 69 and 64 respectively

- In 2009 our voluntary separations decreased to only 22

  • Strong Improvement in INPOs Organizational Effectiveness Survey from 2008 to 2010 Enclosure 2 26

Human Resources Activities Supporting Nuclear Safety Culture Mike Bryce VP Human Resources, Nuclear Enclosure 2

Nuclear Safety Culture

  • NSC Executive Leadership Training - Authentic Leadership

- Self Awareness

- Relational Transparency

- Balanced Processing

- Personal Integrity

  • Leadership Behavior Monitoring

- Fleet Conclusions

- External Assessors

  • Revised current reward system to ensure consistent health of NSC
  • St. Lucie Outage Observation and Monitoring
  • Culture Surveys

- Organizational Cultural Inventory (OCI)

- Safety Conscious Work Environment Survey NSC Values and Principles are Being Applied Enclosure 2 28

Employee Concerns Dave Lowens Director Nuclear Assurance Enclosure 2

Corrective Actions Completed

  • Reinvigorating ECP

- Offices Relocated Inside Protected Area

- Upgraded Handling of Out-of-Scope Concerns

- Face to Face Debriefs With Concernees

- Three Month Follow-up on Effectiveness

- Centralized Database In Use

- Posters and Fliers Redesigned and Distributed

- Monthly Meetings with Site Vice Presidents and CNO

- Extensive Ongoing Outreach Activities Working to Gain Employee Trust and Respect Enclosure 2 30

Employee Concerns Outreach and Follow-up Outreach:

DATE SITE DEPT GROUP # OF PERSONNEL 11-Jan-10 PTN DOC CTRL 12 28-Jan-10 PSL TRNG TRAINING STAFF 35 28-Jan-10 PTN COMM COMMUNICATIONS 2 15-Feb-10 PSL SEC FOUR SECURITY SHIFTS 160 25-Feb-10 PSL ENG SYSTEM ENG. SUPERVISORS 4 09-Mar-10 PTN OTHER ALL-HANDS MEETING 160 10-Mar-10 PSL PROJ DEPT. MORNING MEETING 35 11-Mar-10 PSL WORK CTRL WORK CONTROL STAFF 20 23-Mar-10 PTN OTHER DZNPS 150 23-Mar-10 PSL PROJ WILLIAMS 100 24-Mar-10 PSL PROJ NPS 215 31-Mar-10 PSL PROJ NPS 125 02-Apr-10 PSL OTHER AMES 60 05-Apr-10 PTN MAINT 85 Follow-up: Completed: 23 Pending: 0 Enclosure 2 31

FPL Employee Concern Activity St. Lucie Turkey Point 20 20 18 18 16 Number of Instances 16 N u m b er o f In stan ces 14 14 12 12 10 8

10 6 8 4 6 2 4 0 2 J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A 0

2009-2010 J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A NRC Allegations ECP Concerns Contacts 2009-2010 Corporate Office 20 18 16 Note Number of Instances 14 12 NRC Allegation Data 10 through Feb 2010 8

6 Employee Concern 4

and Contact Data 2

through April 16,2010 0

J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A 2009-2010 Enclosure 2 32

Future of Nuclear Safety Culture at FPL

  • Program roll-out to Seabrook, Point Beach, and Duane Arnold
  • NEI Safety Culture Task Force participation and involvement
  • Application of learnings from Culture Survey and Employee Engagement Surveys Enclosure 2 33

Closing Comments Mano Nazar Chief Nuclear Officer Enclosure 2

FPL Nuclear Excellence Model Attributes Enclosure 2

Value Maximize the time spent on P reven ~on and Detection to minimize /ellmlnate Correction activities Enclosure 2 36 I=I=IL.

I::RCUP.

SIC/LO Enclosure 2 37 I=I=IL.

I::RCUP.

Respect for Nuclear Safety We are committed to excellence and professionalism in the conduct of our activities, and we endorse the following principles :

  • Everyone is personally responsible for nuclear safety.
  • Leaders demonstrate commitment to safety.
  • Trust permeates the organization .
  • Decision-making reflects safety first.
  • Nuclear technology is recognized as special and unique.
  • A questioning attitude is cultivated .
  • Organ izational learn ing is embraced.
  • Nuclear safety undergoes constant examination.

Conduct all activities to demonstrate a deep respect 'or Nuclear Salet~

~ N"clf!Rr FIf!F!I Enclosure 2 38 I=I=IL.

I::RCUP.

Our Safety Guiding Principles

1. All injuries are preventable
2. leadership is responsible for preventing injuries
3. Plan safety into our work
4. look out for each other Live the Safety Guiding Principles

~ N"de~rFl"",

Enclosure 2 39 I=I=IL.

I::RCUP.

AGreat Work Environment To help ensure that Fleet team members have pride in what they do , enjoy the people they work with , and trust leadership, FPL Nuclear is committed to:

./ Frequent, timely and candid communications

./ Support for work-life balance

./ Elimination of low-value work

./ Performance improvement to minimize crisis response

./ Leadership recognition of employees as our most valuable resource

./ Leadership empowering employees to engage, grow and reach their full potential

./ Build ing trust and acting with integrity Foster a work environment wbere we are the em ployer of choice Enclosure 2 40 I=I=IL.

I::RCUP.

Our Five Outage Principles

1. Respect Industrial and Nuclear Safety
2. No Short Cuts I Rushing
3. Be Deliberate
4. Effective Communication and Handoffs
5. Be Prepared

~. Nuclear Fleet Enclosure 2 41 I=I=IL.

I::RCUP.

Nuclear Safety Culture Root Causes CR2009-25563 Enclosure 2

Recurrence

  • Root Cause 1

- Management has missed opportunities to correct early indications of a decline in nuclear safety culture resulting in allegations made directly to the NRC where internal problem resolution processes have been bypassed. No comprehensive, integrated process for routine monitoring of all the essential elements for a healthy nuclear safety culture currently exists.

Enclosure 2 43

Recurrence

  • Root Cause 2

- Certain management actions have negatively impacted employee trust and resulted in a prevailing perception that production often takes precedence over safety.

Enclosure 2 44