ML092610708

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Revisions to Technical Specification Bases Unit 1 Manual
ML092610708
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Issue date: 08/21/2009
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TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES UNIT 1 MANUAL REMOVE MANUAL TABLE OF CONTENTS ADD MANUAL TABLE OF CONTENTS DATE:

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SSES MANTJA-L Manual Name:

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TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES UNIT 1 MANUAL Table Of Contents Issue Date:

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CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS PRIMARY CONTAINMENT OXYGEN CONCENTRATION TEXT 3.6.4.1 7

10/04/2007

Title:

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SSES MANUAL Manual Name:

TSB1 Manual

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TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES UNIT 1 MANUAL TEXT 3.6.4.2 2

01/03/2005

Title:

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09/21/2006

Title:

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TSB1 Manual

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01/03/2005

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Title:

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11/15/2002

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11/15/2002

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04/12/2006

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11/15/2002

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04/12/2006

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SPECIAL OPERATIONS SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM) TEST -

REFUELING Page.a of.a Report Date: 08/20/09

TABLE OF CONTENTS (TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES)

B2.0 SA FETY LIM ITS (S Ls)..................................................................................

B2.0-1 B 2.1.1 R eactor C ore S Ls...........................................................................

B2.0-1 B2.1.2 Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Pressure SL...........................

TS/B2.0-7 B3.0 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) APPLICABILITY........ TS/B3.0-1 B3.0 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT (SR) APPLICABILITY......................

TS/B3.0-10 B3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS...................................................

B3.1-1 B3.1.1 Shutdow n M argin (S DM )................................................................

B3.1-1 B3.1.2 Reactivity Anom alies..................................................................

B3. 1-8 B3.1.3 Control Rod OPERABILITY............................................................

B3.1-13 B3.1.4 Control Rod Scram Times........................................................

TS/B3.1-22 B3.1.5 Control Rod Scram Accumulators............................................

TS/B3.1-29 B3.1.6 Rod Pattern C ontrol..................................................................

TS/B3.1-34 B3.1.7 Standby Liquid Control (SLC) System......................................

TS/B3.1-39 B3.1.8 Scram Discharge Volume (SDV) Vent and Drain Valves......... TS/B3.1-47 B3.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS...................................................

TS/B3.2-1 B3.2.1 Average Planar Linear Heat Generation Rate (APLHGR)........ TS/B3.2-1 B3.2.2 Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR).....................................

TS/B3.2-5 B3.2.3 Linear Heat Generation Rate (LHGR).......................................

TS/B3.2-10 B3.3 INSTRUMENTATION.....................................................................

TS/B3.3-1 B3.3.1.1 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation................... TS/B3.3-1 B3.3.1.2 Source Range Monitor (SRM) Instrumentation.........................

TS/B3.3-35 B3.3.2.1 Control Rod Block Instrumentation...........................................

TS/B3.3-44 B3.3.2.2 Feedwater - Main Turbine High Water Level Trip Instrum entation.........................................................................

B 3.3-55 B3.3.3.1 Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation..................... TS/B3.3-64 B3.3.3.2 Remote Shutdown System.............................................................

B3.3-76 B3.3.4.1 End of Cycle Recirculation Pump Trip (EOC-RPT)

Instrum e ntatio n.........................................................................

B 3.3-8 1 B3.3.4.2 Anticipated Transient Without Scram Recirculation Pump Trip (ATWS-RPT) Instrumentation.............................. TS/B3.3-92 B3.3.5.1 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)

Instrum entation...................................................................

TS/B3.3-1Q01 B3.3.5.2 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System Instrum e ntation.........................................................................

B 3.3-135 B3.3.6.1 Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation..............................

B3.3-147 B3.3.6.2 Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation...................

TS/B3.3-180 B3.3.7.1 Control Room Emergency Outside Air Supply (CREOAS)

System Instrumentation......................................................

TS/B3. 3-192 (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B TOC - 1 Revision 17 TA8LE OF CONTENTS (TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 8ASES) 82.0 82.1.1 82.1.2 83.0 83.0 83.1 83.1.1 83.1.2 83.1.3 83.1.4 83.1.5 83.1.6 83.1.7 83.1.8 83.2 83.2.1 83.2.2 83.2.3 83.3 83.3.1.1 83.3.1.2 83.3.2.1 83.3.2.2 83.3.3.1 83.3.3.2 83.3.4.1 83.3.4.2 83.3.5.1 83.3.5.2 83.3.6.1 83.3.6.2 83.3.7.1 SAFETY LIMITS (SLs).................................................................................. 82.0-1 Reactor Core SLs........................................................................... 82.0-1 Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Pressure SL........................... TS/82.0-7 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) APPLlCA8IL1TY........ TS/83.0-1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT (SR) APPLlCA81L1TY...................... TS/83.0-10 REACTIVITY CONTROL SySTEMS................................................. ~.. 83.1-1 Shutdown Margin (SDM)................................................................ 83.1-1 Reactivity Anomalies...................................................................... 83.1-8 Control Rod OPERA81L1TY............................................................ 83.1-13 Control Rod Scram Times........................................................ TS/83.1-22 Control Rod Scram Accumulators............................................ TS/83.1-29 Rod Pattern Contro!.................................................................. TS/83.1-34 Standby Liquid Control (SLC) System...................................... TS/83.1-39 Scram Discharge Volume (SDV) Vent and Drain Valves.......... TS/83.1-47 POWER DISTRI8UTION LIMITS................................................... TS/83.2-1 Average Planar Linear Heat Generation Rate (APLHGR)........ TS/83.2-1 Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR)..................................... TS/83.2-5 Linear Heat Generation Rate (LHGR)....................................... TS/83.2-10 INSTRUMENTATION..................................................................... TS/83.3-1 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation................... TS/83.3-1 Source Range Monitor (SRM) Instrumentation......................... TS/83.3-35 Control Rod 810ck Instrumentation........................................... TS/83.3-44 Feedwater - Main Turbine High Water Level Trip Instrumentation......................................................................... 83.3-55 Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation..................... TS/83.3-64 Remote Shutdown System............................................................. 83.3-76 End of Cycle Recirculation Pump Trip (EOC-RPT)

Instrumentation......................................................................... 83.3-81 Anticipated Transient Without Scram Recirculation Pump Trip (A TWS-RPT) Instrumentation.............................. TS/83.3-92 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)

Instrumentation................................................................... TS/83.3-101 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System Instrumentation......................................................................... 83.3-135 Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation.............................. 83.3-147 Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation................... TS/83.3-180 Control Room Emergency Outside Air Supply (CREOAS)

System Instrumentation...................................................... TS/83.3-192

( continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS 18 TOC-1 Revision 17

TABLE OF CONTENTS (TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES)

B3.3 INSTRUMENTATION (continued)

B3.3.8.1 Loss of Power (LOP) Instrumentation.......................................

TS/B3.3-205 B3.3.8.2 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Electric Power M o n ito ring................................................................................

B 3.3-2 13 B3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)...............................................

B3.4-1 B3.4.1 Recirculation Loops Operating.......................................................

B3.4-1 B 3.4.2 Jet P um ps......................................................................................

B 3.4-10 B3.4.3 Safety/Relief Valves (S/RVs)....................................................

TS/B3.4-15 B3.4.4 RCS Operational LEAKAGE..........................................................

B3.4-19 B3.4.5 RCS Pressure Isolation Valve (PIV) Leakage.................................

B3.4-24 B3.4.6 RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation..................................

TS/B3.4-30 B3.4.7 RCS Specific Activity................................................................

TS/B3.4-35 B3.4.8 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling System - Hot Shutdown...........................................................

B3.4-39 B3.4.9 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling System - Cold Shutdown.........................................................

B3.4-44 B3.4.10 RCS Pressure and Temperature (P/T) Limits...........................

TS/B3.4-49 B3.4.11 Reactor Steam Dome Pressure................................................

TS/B3.4-58 B3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM..................................

B3.5-1 B3.5.1 EC C S - O perating.........................................................................

B3.5-1 B3.5.2 ECCS - Shutdown.........................................................................

B3.5-19 B3.5.3 R C IC System...........................................................................

TS/B3.5-25 B3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS...........................................................

TS/B3.6-1 B3.6.1.1 Primary Containment................................................................

TS/B3.6-1 B3.6.1.2 Primary Containment Air Lock........................................................

B3.6-7 B3.6.1.3 Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs).........................

TS/B3.6-15 B3.6.1.4 Containment Pressure....................................................................

B3.6-41 B3.6.1.5 Drywell Air Temperature...........................................................

TS/B3.6-44 B3.6.1.6 Suppression Chamber-to-Drywell Vacuum Breakers................ TS/B3.6-47 B3.6.2,1 Suppression Pool Average Temperature..................................

TS/B3.6-53 B3.6.2.2 Suppression Pool Water Level.......................................................

B3.6-59 B3.6.2.3 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Suppression Pool C o o lin g.....................................................................................

B 3.6 -6 2 B3.6.2.4 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Suppression Pool Spray................ B3.6-66 B 3.6.3.1 N ot U sed..................................................................................

T S /B3.6-70 B3.6.3.2 Drywell Air Flow System.................................................................

B3.6-76 B3.6.3.3 Primary Containment Oxygen Concentration...............

B3.6-81 B3.6.4.1 Secondary Containment...........................................................

TS/B3.6-84 B3.6.4.2 Secondary Containment Isolation Valves (SCIVs).................... TS/B3.6-91 B3.6.4.3 Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System...................................

TS/B3.6-101 (continued)

SUSQU EHAN NA - U N IT 1 TS / B TOC - 2 Revision 17 TA8LE OF CONTENTS (TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 8ASES) 83.3 83.3.8.1 83.3.8.2 83.4 83.4.1 83.4.2 83.4.3 83.4.4 83.4.5 83.4.6 83.4.7 83.4.8 83.4.9 83.4.10 83.4.11 83.5 83.5.1 83.5.2 83.5.3 83.6 83.6.1.1 83.6.1.2 83.6.1.3 83.6.1.4 83.6.1.5 83.6.1.6 83.6.2.1 83.6.2.2 83.6.2.3 83.6.2.4 83.6.3.1 83.6.3.2 83.6.3.3 83.6.4.1 83.6.4.2 83.6.4.3 INSTRUMENTATION (continued)

Loss of Power (LOP) Instrumentation....................................... TS/83.3-205 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Electric Power Monitoring................................................................................ 83.3-213 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)............................................... 83.4-1 Recirculation Loops Operating....................................................... 83.4-1 Jet Pumps...................................................................................... 83.4-10 SafetylRelief Valves (S/RVs).................................................... TS/83.4-15 RCS Operational LEAKAGE.......................................................... 83.4-19 RCS Pressure Isolation Valve (PIV) Leakage................................. 83.4-24 RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation.................................. TS/83.4-30 RGS Specific Activity................................................................ TS/83.4-35 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling System - Hot Shutdown........................................................... 83.4-39 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Shutdown Cooling System - Cold Shutdown......................................................... 83.4-44 RCS Pressure and Temperature (PIT) Limits........................... TS/83.4-49 Reactor Steam Dome Pressure................................................ TS/83.4-58 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) AND REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING (RCIC) SYSTEM,................................. 83.5-1 EGCS - Operating......................................................................... 83.5-1 EGCS - Shutdown......................................................................... 83.5-19 RCIC System........................................................................... TS/83.5-25 CONTAINMENT SySTEMS........................................................... TS/83.6-1 Primary Containment................................................................ TS/83.6-1 Primary Containment Air Lock........................................................ 83.6-7 Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs)......................... TS/83.6-15 Containment Pressure.................................................................... 83.6-41 Drywell Air Temperature........................................................... TS/83.6-44 Suppression Chamber-to-Drywell Vacuum 8reakers................ TS/83.6-47 Suppression Pool Average Temperature.................................. TS/83.6-53 Suppression Pool Water Level....................................................... 83.6-59 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Suppression Pool Cooling..................................................................................... 83.6-62 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Suppression Pool Spray................ 83.6-66 Not Used.................................................................................. TS/83.6-70 Drywell Air Flow System................................................................. 83.6-76 Primary Containment Oxygen Concentration.................................. 83.6-81 Secondary Containment........................................................... TS/83.6-84 Secondary Containment Isolation Valves (SCIVs).................... TS/83.6-91 Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System................................... TS/83.6-101 (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS 1 8 TOC - 2 Revision 17

TABLE OF CONTENTS (TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES)

B3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS.............

TS/B3.7-1 B3.7.1 Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) System and the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS)......................................

TS/B3.7-1 B3.7.2 Emergency Service Water (ESW) System................................

TS/B3.7-7 B3.7.3 Control Room Emergency Outside Air Supply (C REO AS) System.............................................................

TS/B3.7-12 B3.7.4 Control Room Floor Cooling System........................................

TS/B3.7-19 B3.7.5 Main Condenser Offgas...........................................................

TS/B3.7-24 B3.7.6 Main Turbine Bypass System...................................................

TS/B3.7-27 B3.7.7 Spent Fuel Storage Pool Water Level......................................

TS/B3.7-31 B3.7.8 Main Turbine Pressure Regulation System..................

TS/B3.7-34 B3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM...................................................

TS/B3.8-1 B3.8.1 AC Sources - Operating..........................................................

TS/B3.8-1 B3.8.2 AC Sources - Shutdown................................................................

B3.8-38 B3.8.3 Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air................................

TS/B3.8-45 B3.8.4 DC Sources - Operating..........................................................

TS/B3.8-54 B3.8.5 DC Sources - Shutdown..........................................................

TS/B3.8-66 B3.8.6 Battery Cell Parameters...........................................................

TS/B3.8-71 B3.8.7 Distribution Systems - Operating...................................................

B3.8-78 B3.8.8 Distribution Systems - Shutdown....................................................

B3.8-86 B3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS..........................................................

TS/B3.9-1 B3.9.1 Refueling Equipment Interlocks................................................

TS/B3.9-1 B3.9.2 Refuel Position One-Rod-Out Interlock...................

B3.9-5 B3.9.3 C ontrol R od Position......................................................................

B3.9-9 B3.9.4 Control Rod Position Indication......................................................

B3.9-12 B3.9.5 Control Rod OPERABILITY-Refueling.........................................

B3.9-16 B3.9.6 Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Water Level...........................

TS/B3.9-19 B3.9.7 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) - High Water Level........................

B3.9-22 B3.9.8 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) - Low Water Level........................

B3.9-26 B3.10 SPECIAL OPERATIONS...............................................................

TS/B3.10-1 B3.10.1 Inservice Leak and Hydrostatic Testing Operation................... TS/B3.10-1 B3.10.2 Reactor Mode Switch Interlock Testing..........................................

B3.10-6 B3.10.3 Single Control Rod Withdrawal - Hot Shutdown.............................

B3.10-11 B3.10.4 Single Control Rod Withdrawal - Cold Shutdown...........................

B3.10-16 B3.10.5 Single Control Rod Drive (CRD) Removal - Refueling................... B3.10-21 B3.10.6 Multiple Control Rod Withdrawal - Refueling..................................

B3.10-26 B3.10.7 Control Rod Testing - Operating...................................................

B3.10-29 B3.10.8 SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM) Test - Refueling.............................

B3.10-33 TSB1 Text TOC 8/12/09 SUSQUEHANNA -

UNIT 1 TS / B TOC -3 Revision 17 SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B TOC - 3 Revision 17 TA8LE OF CONTENTS (TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 8ASES) 83.7 83.7.1 83.7.2 83.7.3 83.7.4 83.7.5 83.7.6 83.7.7 83.7.8 83.8 83.8.1 83.8.2 83.8.3 83.8.4 83.8.5 83.8.6 83.8.7 83.8.8 83.9 83.9.1 83.9.2 83.9.3 83.9.4 83.9.5 83.9.6 83.9.7 83.9.8 83.10 83.10.1 83.10.2 83.10.3 83.10.4 83.10.5 83.10.6 83.10.7 83.10.8 TSB1 Text TOe 8/12/09 PLANT SYSTEMS......................................................................... TS/83.7-1 Residual Heat Removal*Service Water (RHRSW) System and the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS)...................................... TS/83.7-1 Emergency Service Water (ESW) System................................ TS/83.7-7 Control Room Emergency Outside Air Supply (CREOAS) System............................................................. TS/83.7-12 Control Room Floor Cooling System........................................ TS/83. 7-19 Main Condenser Offgas........................................................... TS/83.7-24 Main Turbine 8ypass System................................................... TS/83.7-27 Spent Fuel Storage Pool Water Level...................................... TS/83.7-31 Main Turbine Pressure Regulation System... :.......................... TS/83.7-34 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM................................................... TS/83.8-1 AC Sources - Operating.......................................................... TS/83.8-1 AC Sources - Shutdown................................................................ 83.8-38 Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air................................ TS/83.8-45 DC Sources - Operating.......................................................... TS/83.8-54 DC Sources - Shutdown.......................................................... TS/83.8-66 8attery Cell Parameters........................................................... TS/83.8-71 Distribution Systems - Operating................................................... 83.8-78 Distribution Systems - Shutdown................................................... 83.8-86 REFUELING OPERATIONS.......................................,.................. TS/83.9-1 Refueling Equipment Interlocks................................................ TS/83.9-1 Refuel Position One-Rod-Out Interlock........................................... 83.9-5 Control Rod Position...................................................................... 83.9-9 Control Rod Position Indication...................................................... 83.9-12 Control Rod OPERA81L1TY - Refueling......................................... 83.9-16 Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Water Level........................... TS/83.9-19 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) - High Water Level........................ 83.9-22 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) - Low Water Level......................... 83.9-26 SPECIAL OPERATIONS............................................................... TS/83.10-1 Inservice Leak and Hydrostatic Testing Operation................... TS/83.10-1 Reactor Mode Switch Interlock Testing.......................................... 83.10-6 Single Control Rod Withdrawal-Hot Shutdown............................. 83.10-11 Single Control Rod Withdrawal - Cold Shutdown........................... 83.10-16 Single Control Rod Drive (CRD) Removal - Refueling................... 83.10-21 Multiple Control Rod Withdrawal - Refueling.................................. 83.10-26 Control Rod Testing - Operating.................................................... 83.10-29 SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM) Test-Refueling............................. 83.10-33 SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS 1 8 TOC - 3 Revision 17

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Section Title Revision TOC B 2.0 B 3.0 B 3.1 T able of Contents SAFETY LIMITS BASES Page B 2.0-1 Page TS I B 2.0-2 Page TS I B 2.0-3 Page TS I B 2.0-4 Page TS I B 2.0-5 Page TS I B 2.0-6 Pages TS I B 2.0-7 through TS I B 2.0-9 LCO AND SR APPLICABILITY BASES Page TS I B 3.0-1 Pages TS I B 3.0-2 through TS I B 3.0-4 Pages TS I B 3.0-5 through TS I B 3.0-7 Page TS I B 3.0-8 Pages TS I B 3.0-9 through TS I B 3.0-11 Page TS I B 3.0-11a Page TS I B 3.0-12 Pages TS I B 3.0-13 through TS I B 3.0-15 Pages TS I B 3.0-16 and TS I B 3.0-17 REACTIVITY CONTROL BASES Pages B 3.1-1 through B 3.1-4 Page TS I B 3.1-5.

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Section Title Revision B 3.2 B 3.3 Page TS / B 3.1.43 Page TS / B 3.1-44 Page TS / B 3.1-45 Pages TS / B 3.1-46 through TS / B 3.1 ~49 Page TS / B 3.1-50 Page TS / B 3.1-51 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS BASES Page TS / B 3.2-1 Pages TS / B 3.2-2 and TS / B 3.2-3 Pages TS / B 3.2-4 and TS / B 3.2-5 Page TS / B 3.2-6 Page B 3.2-7 Pages TS / B 3.2-8 and TS / B 3.2-9 Page TS / B 3.2.10 Page TS / B 3.2-11 Page TS / B 3.2-12 Page TS / B 3.2-13 INSTRUMENTATION Pages TS / B 3.3-1 through TS / B 3.3-4 Page TS / B 3.3-5 Page TS / B 3.3-6 Page TS / B 3.3-7 Page TS / B 3.3-7a Page TS / B 3.3-8 Pages T8 / B 3.3-9 through TS / B 3.3-12 Pages T8 / B 3.3-12a Pages T8/ B 3.3-12b and TS / B 3.3-12c Page TS / B 3.3-13 Page TS / B 3.3-14 Pages T8 / B 3.3-15 and TS / B 3.3-16 Pages T8/ B 3.3-17 and TS / B 3.3-18 Page TS / B 3.3-19 Pages TS / B 3.3-20 through TS / B 3.3-22 Page TS / B 3.3-22a Pages TS / B 3.3-23 and TS / B 3.3-24 Pages TS / B 3.3-24a and TS / B 3.3-24b Page TS / B 3.3-25 Page TS / B 3.3-26 Page TS / B 3.3-27 Pages TS / B 3.3-28 through TS / B 3.3-30 Page TS / B 3.3-30a SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS I B LOES-2 1 o 3

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Section Title Revision B3.4 Page TS / B 3.3-181 Page TS / B 3.3-182 Page TS / B 3.3-183 Page TS / B 3.3-184 Page TS / B 3.3-185 Page TS / B 3.3-186 Pages TS / B 3.3-187 and TS / B 3.3-188 Pages TS / B 3.3-189 through TS / B 3.3-191 Page TS / B 3.3-192 Page TS / B 3.3-193 Pages TS / B 3.3-194 and TS / B 3.3-195 Page TS / B 3.3-196 Pages TS / B 3.3-197 through TS / B 3.3-204 Page TS / B 3.3-205 Pages B 3.3-206 through B 3.3-209 Page TS / B 3.3-210 Pages B 3.3-211 through B 3.3-219 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BASES Pages B 3.4-1 and B 3.4-2 Pages TS / B 3.4-3 and Page TS / B 3.4-4 Pages TS / B 3.4-5 through TS / B 3.4-9 Pages B 3.4-10 through B 3.4-12 Page B 3.4-13 Page B 3.4-14 Page TS / B 3.4-15 Pages TS / B 3.4-16 and TS / B 3.4-17 Page TS / B 3.4-18 Pages B 3.4-19 through B 3.4-27 Pages TS / B 3.4-28 and TS / B 3.4-29 Pages TS / B 3.4-30 and TS / B 3.4-31 Pages TS / B 3.4-32 and TS / B 3.4-33 Page TS / B 3.4-34 Pages TS / B 3.4-35 and TS / B 3.4-36 Page TS / B 3.4-37 Page TS / B 3.4-38 Pages B 3.4-39 and B 3.4-40 Page TS / B 3.4-41 Pages B 3.4-42 through B 3.4-48 Page TS / B 3.4-49 Page TS / B 3.4-50 Page TS / B 3.4-51 Page TS / B 3.4-52 Page TS / B 3.4-53 SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS I B LOES-5 3

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Section Title Pages TS / B 3.4-54 through TS / B 3.4-56 Page TS / B 3.4-57 Pages TS / B 3.4-58 through TS / B 3.4-60 B 3.5 ECCS AND RCIC BASES B 3.6 Pages B 3.5-1 and B 3.5-2 Page TS / B 3.5-3 Page TS / B 3.5-4 Page TS I B 3.5-5 Page TS I B 3.5-6 Pages B 3.5-7 through B 3.5-10 Page TS I B 3.5-11 Page TS I B 3.5-12 Page TS I B 3.5-13 Pages TS / B 3.5-14 and TS I B 3.5-15 Pages TS / B 3.5-16 through TS / B 3.5-18 Pages B 3.5-19 through B 3.5-24 Page TS / B 3.5-25 Pages TS / B 3.5-26 and TS / B 3.5-27 Pages B 3.5-28 through B 3.5-31 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES Page TS / B 3.6-1 Page TS I B 3.6-1a Page TS I B 3.6-2 Page TS I B 3.6-3 Page TS / B 3.6-4 Pages TS / B 3.6-5 and TS I B 3.6-6 Pages TS / B 3.6-6a and TS / B 3.6-6b Page TS / B 3.6-6c Pages B 3.6-7 Page B 3.6-8 Pages B 3.6-9 through B 3.6-14 Page TS I B 3.6-15 Page TS I B 3.6-15a Page TS I B 3.6-15b Pages TS / B 3.6-16 and TS / B 3.6-17 Page TS / B 3.6-17a Pages TS / B 3.6-18 and TS / B 3.6-19 Page TS I B 3.6-20 Page TS / B 3.6-21 Page TS / B 3.6-22 Page TS I B 3.6-22a Page TS/ B 3.6-23 SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS I B LOES-6 Revision 2

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SUSQUEHANNA

- UNIT I TS I B LOES-7 Revision 93 SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B LOES-7 Revision 93 SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION LIST OF EFFECTIVE SECTIONS (TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES)

Section Title Revision Pages TS / B 3.6-24 and TS / B 3.6-25 0

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SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS I B LOES-7 Revision 93

SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION LIST OF EFFECTIVE SECTIONS (TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES)

Section Title Revision Pages TS / B 3.6-103 and TS / B 3.6-104 2

Page TS / B 3.6-105 3

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Page TS / B 3.6-107 3

B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS BASES Pages TS / B 3.7-1 3

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B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS BASES Page TS / B 3.8-1 3

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SUSQUEHANNA

- UNIT 1 TS / B LOES-8 Revision 93 SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B LOES-8 Revision 93 SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION LIST OF EFFECTIVE SECTIONS (TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES)

Section Title Revision 8 3.7 8 3.8 Pages TS / 8 3.6-103 and TS /83.6-104 Page TS / 8 3.6-105 Page TS / 8 3.6-106 Page TS / 8 3.6-107 PLANT SYSTEMS 8ASES Pages TS / 8 3.7-1 Page TS / 8 3.7-2 Pages TS /83.7-3 through TS / 8 3.7-5 Page TS / 8 3.7-5a Pages TS / 8 3.7-6 and TS /8 3.7-6a Page TS / 8 3.7-6b Page TS / 8 3.7-6c Page T8 /83.7-7 Page T8 /83.7-8 Pages TS / 8 3.7-9 through TS / 83.7-13 Pages TS / 8 3.7-14 through T8/ 8 3.7-18 Page T8 / 8 3.7-18a Pages TS / 8 3.7-19 through TS / 8 3.7-23 Page T8 /83.7-24 Pages TS / 8 3.7-25 and T8 / 8 3.7-26 Pages TS / 8 3.7-27 through T8 / 8 3.7-29 Page T8 / 8 3.7-30 Page T8 / 8 3.7-31 Page T8 / 8 3.7-32 Page T8 /83.7-33 Pages TS / 8 3.7-34 through T8 /83.7-37 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 8ASES Page T8 / 8 3.8-1 Pages TS / 8 3.8-2 and TS / 8 3.8-3 Page T8 / 8 3.8-4 Pages TS / 8 3.8-4a and T8 / 8 3.8-4b.

Page T8 / 8 3.8-5 Page T8 1 8 3.8-6 Pages TS 1 8 3.8-7 through T8/8 3.8-8 Page T8 / 8 3.8-9 Page T8 /83.8-10 Pages TS / 8 3.8-11 and T8 / 8 3.8-17 Page T8 /83.8-18 Pages TS /83.8-19 through T8 / 8 3.8-21 Pages TS 1 8 3.8-22 and T8 1 8 3.8-23 Pages TS 1 8 3.8-24 through T8 / 8 3.8-37 Pages B 3.8-38 through 8 3.8-44 SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS I B LOES-8 2

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Section Title Revision Page TS / B 3.8-45 1

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Pages TS / B 3.8-62 and TS I B 3.8-63 5

Page TS / B 3.8-64 4

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B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS BASES Pages TS / B 3.9-1 and TS / B 3.9-1a 1

Pages TS / B 3.9-2 through TS / B 3.9-4 1

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TSB1 Text LOES.doc 8/12/09 SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS I B LOES-9 Revision 93 SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS I B LOES-9 Revision 93 SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION LIST OF EFFECTIVE SECTIONS (TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES)

Section Title Page TS / B 3.8-45 Pages TS / B 3.8-46 through B 3.8-48 Page TS / B 3.8-49 Pages B 3.8-50 through B 3.8-53 Pages TS / B 3.8-54 through TS / B 3.8-57 Pages TS / B 3.8-58 through TS / B 3.8-61 Pages TS / B 3.8-62 and TS / B 3.8-63 Page TS / B 3.8-64 Page TS / B 3.8-65 Pages TS / B 3.8-66 through TS / B 3.8-77 Pages TS / B 3.8-77A through TS / B 3.8-77C Pages B 3.8-78 through B 3.8-80 Page TS / B 3.8-81 Pages B 3.8-82 through B 3.8-90 B 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS BASES Pages TS / B 3.9-1 and TS / B 3.9-1a Pages TS / B 3.9-2 through TS / B 3.9-4 Pages B 3.9-5 through B 3.9-18 Pages TS / B 3.9-19 through TS / B 3.9-21 Pages B 3.9-22 through B 3.9-30 B 3.10 SPECIAL OPERATIONS BASES Page TS / B 3.10-1 Pages TS / B 3.10-2 through TS / B 3.10-5 Pages B 3.10-6 through B 3.10-31 Page TS / B 3.10-32 Page B 3.10-33 Page TS / B 3.10-34 Pages B 3.10-35 and B 3.10-36 Page TS / B 3.10-37 Page TS / B 3.10-38 TSB1 Text LOES.doc 8/12/09 SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS I B LOES-9 Revision 1

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PPL Rev. 3 LCO APPLICABILITY B 3.0 B 3.0 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) APPLICABILITY BASES LCOs LCO 3.0.1 through LCO 3.0.8 establish the general requirements applicable to all Specifications and apply at all times, unless otherwise stated.

LCO 3.0.1 LCO 3.0.1 establishes the Applicability statement within each individual Specification as the requirement for when the LCO is required to be met (i.e.,

when the unit is in the MODES or other specified conditions of the Applicability statement of each Specification).

LCO 3.0.2 LCO 3.0.2 establishes that upon discovery of a failure to meet an LCO, the associated ACTIONS shall be met. The Completion Time of each Required Action for an ACTIONS Condition is applicable from the point in time that an ACTIONS Condition is entered. The Required Actions establish those remedial measures that must be taken within specified Completion Times when the requirements of an LCO are not met. This Specification establishes that:

a.

Completion of the Required Actions within the specified Completion Times constitutes compliance with a Specification; and

b.

Completion of the Required Actions is not required when an LCO is met within the specified Completion Time, unless otherwise specified.

There are two basic types of Required Actions. The first type of Required Action specifies a time limit in which the LCO must be met. This time limit is the Completion Time to restore an inoperable system or component to OPERABLE status or to restore variables to within specified limits. If this type of Required Action is not completed within the specified Completion Time, a shutdown may be required to place the unit in a MODE or condition in which the Specification is not applicable. (Whether stated as a Required Action or not, correction of the entered Condition is an action that may always be considered upon entering (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.0-1 Revision 1 PPL Rev. 3.

LCO APPLICABILITY B 3.0 B 3:0 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) APPLICABILITY BASES LCOs LCO 3.0.1 LCO 3.0.2 LCO 3.0.1 through LCO 3.0.8 establish the general requirements applicable to all Specifications and apply at all times, unless otherwise stated.

LCO 3.0.1 establishes the Applicability statement within each individual Specification as the requirement for when the LCO is required to be met (Le.,

when the unit is in the MODES or other specified conditions of the Applicability statement of each Specification).

LCO 3.0.2 establishes that upon discovery of a failure to meet an LCO, the associated ACTIONS shall be met. The Completion Time of each Required Action for an ACTIONS Condition is applicable from the point in time that an ACTIONS Condition is entered. The Required Actions establish those remedial measures that must be taken within specified Completion Times when the requirements of an LCO are not met. This Specification establishes that:

a.

Completion of the Required Actions within the specified Completion Times constitutes compliance with a Specification; and

b.

Completion of the Required Actions is not required when an LCO is met within the specified Completion Time, unless otherwise specified.

There are two basic types of Required Actions. The first type of Required Action specifies a time limit in which the LCO must be met. This time limit is the Completion Time to restore an inoperable system or component to OPERABLE status or to restore variables to within specified limits. If this type of Required Action is not completed within the specified Completion Time, a shutdown may be required to place the unit in a MODE or condition in which the Specification is not applicable. (Whether stated as a Required Action or not, correction of the entered Condition is an action that may always be considered upon entering (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.0-1 Revision 1

PPL Rev. 3 LCO APPLICABILITY B 3.0 B 3.0 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) APPLICABILITY LCO 3.0.2 ACTIONS.) The second type of Required Action specifies the remedial (continued) measures that permit continued operation of the unit that is not further restricted by the Completion Time. In this case, compliance with the Required Actions provides an acceptable level of safety for continued operation.

Completing the Required Actions is not required when an LCO is met or is no longer applicable, unless otherwise stated in the individual Specifications.

The nature of some Required Actions of some Conditions necessitates that, once the Condition is entered, the Required Actions must be completed even though the associated Conditions no longer exist. The individual LCOs ACTIONS specify the Required Actions where this is the case. An example of this is in LCO 3.4.10, "RCS Pressure and Temperature (P/T) Limits."

The Completion Times of the Required Actions are also applicable when a system or component is removed from service intentionally. The reasons for intentionally relying on the ACTIONS include, but are not limited to, performance of Surveillances, preventive maintenance, corrective maintenance, or investigation of operational problems. Entering ACTIONS for these reasons must be done in a manner that does not compromise safety.

Intentional entry into ACTIONS should not be made for operational convenience. Additionally, if intentional entry into actions would result in.

redundant equipment being inoperable, alternatives should be used instead.

Doing so limits the time both subsystems/divisions of a safety function are inoperable and limits the time conditions exist which may result in LCO 3.0.3 being entered. Individual Specifications may specify a time limit for performing an SR when equipment is removed from service or bypassed for testing. In this case, the Completion Times of the Required Actions are applicable when this time limit expires; if the equipment remains removed from service or bypassed.

When a change in MODE or other specified condition is required to comply with Required Actions, the unit may enter a MODE or other specified condition in which another Specification becomes applicable. In this case, the Completion Times of the associated Required Actions would apply from the point in time that the new Specification becomes applicable and the ACTIONS Condition(s) are entered.

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.0-2 Revision 0 PPL Rev. 3 LCO APPLICABILITY B 3.0 B 3.0 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) APPLICABILITY LCO 3.0.2 (continued)

ACTIONS.) The second type of Required Action specifies the remedial measures that permit continued operation of the unit that is not further restricted by the Completion Time. In this case, compliance with the Required Actions provides an acceptable level of safety for continued operation.

Completing the Required Actions is not required when an LCO is met or is no longer applicable, unless otherwise stated in the individual Specifications.

The nature of some Required Actions of some Conditions necessitates that, once the Condition is entered, the Required Actions must be completed even though the associated Conditions no longer exist. The individual LCOs ACTIONS specify the Required Actions where this is the case. An example of this is in LCO 3.4.10, "RCS Pressure and Temperature (PIT) Limits."

The Completion Times of the Required Actions are also applicable when a system or component is removed from service intentionally. The reasons for intentionally relying on the ACTIONS include, but are not limited to, performance of Surveillances, preventive maintenance, corrective maintenance, or investigation of operational problems. Entering ACTIONS for these reasons must be done in a manner that does not compromise safety.

Intentional entry into ACTIONS should not be made for operational convenience. Additionally, if intentional entry into actions would result in, redundant equipment being inoperable, alternatives should be used instead.

Doing so limits the time both subsystems/divisions of a safety function are inoperable and limits the time conditions exist which may result in LCO 3.0.3 being entered. Individual Specifications may specify a time limit for performing an SR when equipment is removed from service or bypassed for testing. In this case, the Completion Times of the Required Actions are applicable when this time limit expires; if the eqUipment remains removed from service or bypassed.

When a change in MODE or other specified condition is required to comply with Required Actions, the unit may enter a MODE or other specified condition in which another Specification becomes applicable. In this case, the Completion Times of the associated Required Actions would apply from the point in time that the new Specification becomes applicable and the ACTIONS Condition(s) are entered, (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.0-2 Revision 0

PPL Rev. 3 LCO APPLICABILITY B 3.0 B 3.0 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) APPLICABILITY LCO 3.0.3 LCO 3.0.3 establishes the actions that must be implemented when an LCO is not met and:

a.

An associated Required Action and Completion Time is not met and no other Condition applies; or

b.

The condition of the unit is not specifically addressed by the associated ACTIONS. This means that no combination of Conditions stated in the ACTIONS can be made that exactly corresponds to the actual condition of the unit. Sometimes, possible combinations of Conditions are such that entering LCO 3.0.3 is warranted; in such cases, the ACTIONS specifically state a Condition corresponding to such combinations and also that LCO 3.0.3 be entered immediately.

This Specification delineates the time limits for placing the unit in a safe MODE or other specified condition when operation cannot be maintained within the limits for safe operation as defined by the LCO and its ACTIONS. It is not intended to be used as an operational convenience that permits routine voluntary removal of redundant systems or components from service in lieu of other alternatives that would not result in redundant systems or components being inoperable.

Upon entering LCO 3.0.3, 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> is allowed to prepare for an orderly shutdown before initiating a change in unit operation. This includes time to permit the operator to coordinate the reduction in electrical generation with the load dispatcher to ensure the stability and availability of the electrical grid. The time limits specified to reach lower MODES of operation permit the shutdown to proceed in a controlled and orderly manner that is well within the specified maximum cooldown rate and within the capabilities of the unit, assuming that only the minimum required equipment is OPERABLE. This reduces thermal stresses on components of the Reactor Coolant System and the potential for a plant upset that could challenge safety systems under conditions to which this Specification applies. The use and interpretation of specified times to complete the actions of LCO 3.0.3 are consistent with the discussion of Section 1.3, Completion Times.

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.0-3 Revision 0 PPL Rev. 3 LCO APPLICABILITY B 3.0 B 3.0 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) APPLICABILITY LCO 3.0.3 LCO 3.0.3 establishes the actions that must be implemented when an LCO is not met and:

a.

An associated Required Action and Completion Time is not met and no other Condition applies; or

b.

The condition of the unit is not specifically addressed by the associated ACTIONS. This means that no combination of Conditions stated in the ACTIONS can be made that exactly corresponds to the actual condition of the unit. Sometimes, possible combinations of Conditions are such that entering LCO 3.0.3 is warranted; in such cases, the ACTIONS specifically state a Condition corresponding to such combinations and also that LCO 3.0.3 be entered immediately.

This Specification delineates the time limits for placing the unit in a safe MODE or other specified condition when operation cannot be maintained within the limits for safe operation as defined by the LCO and its ACTIONS. It is not intended to be used as an operational convenience that permits routine voluntary removal of redundant systems or components from seNice in lieu of other altematives that would not result in redundant systems or components being inoperable.

Upon entering LCO 3.0.3, 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> is allowed to prepare for an orderly shutdown before initiating a change in unit operation. This includes time to permit the operator to coordinate the reduction in electrical generation with the load dispatcher to ensure the stability and availability of the electrical grid. The time limits specified to reach lower MODES of operation permit the shutdown to proceed in a controlled and orderly manner that is well within the specified maximum cooldown rate and within the capabilities of the unit, assuming that only the minimum required equipment is OPERABLE. This reduces thermal stresses on components of the Reactor Coolant System and the potential for a plant upset that could challenge safety systems under conditions to which this Specification applies. The use and interpretation of specified times to complete the actions of LCO 3.0.3 are consistent with the discussion of Section 1.3, Completion Times.

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.0-3 Revision 0

PPL Rev. 3 LCO APPLICABILITY B 3.0 B 3.0 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) APPLICABILITY LCO 3.0.3 A unit shutdown required in accordance with LCO 3.0.3 may be terminated (continued) and LCO 3.0.3 exited if any of the following occurs:

a.

The LCO is now met.

b.

A Condition exists for which the Required Actions have now been performed

c.

ACTIONS exist that do not have expired Completion Times. These Completion Times are applicable from the point in time that the Condition is initially entered and not from the time LCO 3.0.3 is exited.

The time limits of Specification 3.0.3 allow 37 hours4.282407e-4 days <br />0.0103 hours <br />6.117725e-5 weeks <br />1.40785e-5 months <br /> for the unit to be in MODE 4 when a shutdown is required during MODE 1 operation. If the unit is in a lower MODE of operation when a shutdown is required, the time limit for reaching the next lower MODE applies. If a lower MODE is reached in less time than allowed, however, the total allowable time to reach MODE 4, or other applicable MODE, is not reduced. For example, if MODE 2 is reached in 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, then the time allowed for reaching MODE 3 is the next 11 hours1.273148e-4 days <br />0.00306 hours <br />1.818783e-5 weeks <br />4.1855e-6 months <br />, because the total time for reaching MODE 3 is not reduced from the allowable limit of 13 hours1.50463e-4 days <br />0.00361 hours <br />2.149471e-5 weeks <br />4.9465e-6 months <br />. Therefore, if remedial measures are completed that would permit a return to MODE 1, a penalty is not incurred by having to reach a lower MODE of operation in less than the total time allowed.

In MODES 1, 2, and 3, LCO 3.0.3 provides actions for Conditions not covered in other Specifications. The requirements of LCO 3.0.3 do not apply in MODES 4 and 5 because the unit is already in the most restrictive Condition required by LCO 3.0.3. The requirements of LCO 3.0.3 do not apply in other specified conditions of the Applicability (unless in MODE 1, 2, or 3) because the ACTIONS of individual Specifications sufficiently define the remedial measures to be taken.

Exceptions to LCO 3.0.3 are provided in instances where requiring a unit shutdown, in accordance with LCO 3.0.3, would not provide appropriate remedial measures for the associated condition of the unit. An example of this is in LCO 3.7.7, "Spent Fuel Storage Pool Water Level." LCO 3.7.7 has an Applicability of "During movement of irradiated fuel (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA-UNIT 1 TS / B 3.0-4 Revision 0 PPL Rev. 3 LCO APPLICABILITY B 3.0 B 3.0 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) APPLICABILITY LCO 3.0.3 (continued)

A unit shutdown required in accordance with LCO 3.0.3 may be terminated and LCO 3.0.3 exited if any of the following occurs:

a.

The LCO is now met.

b.

A Condition exists for which the Required Actions have now been performed

c.

ACTIONS exist that do not have expired Completion Times. These Completion Times are applicable from the point in time that the Condition is initially entered and not from the time LCO 3.0.3 is exited.

The time limits of Specification 3.0.3 allow 37 hours4.282407e-4 days <br />0.0103 hours <br />6.117725e-5 weeks <br />1.40785e-5 months <br /> for the unit to be in MODE 4 when a shutdown is required during MODE 1 operation. If the unit is in a lower MODE of operation when a shutdown is required, the time limit for reaching the next lower MODE applies. If a lower MODE is reached in less time than allowed, however, the total allowable time to reach MODE 4, or other applicable MODE, is not reduced. For example, if MODE 2 is reached in 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, then the time allowed for reaching MODE 3 is the next 11 hours1.273148e-4 days <br />0.00306 hours <br />1.818783e-5 weeks <br />4.1855e-6 months <br />, because the total time for reaching MODE 3 is not reduced from the allowable limit of 13 hours1.50463e-4 days <br />0.00361 hours <br />2.149471e-5 weeks <br />4.9465e-6 months <br />. Therefore, if remedial measures are completed that would permit a retum to MODE 1, a penalty is not incurred by having to reach a lower MODE of operation in less than the total time allowed.

In MODES 1, 2, and 3, LCO 3.0.3 provides actions for Conditions not covered in other Specifications. The requirements of LCO 3.0.3 do not apply in MODES 4 and 5 because the unit is already in the most restrictive Condition required by LCO 3.0.3. The requirements of LCO 3.0.3 do not apply in other specified conditions of the Applicability (unless in MODE 1, 2, or 3) because the ACTIONS of individual Specifications sufficiently define the remedial measures to be taken.

Exceptions to LCO 3.0.3 are provided in instances where requiring a unit shutdown, in accordance with LCO 3.0.3, would not provide appropriate remedial measures for the associated condition of the unit. An example of this is in LCO 3,7.7, "Spent Fuel Storage Pool Water Level." LCO 3.7.7 has an Applicability of "During movement of irradiated fuel (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS I B 3.0-4 Revision 0

PPL Rev. 3 LCO APPLICABILITY B 3.0 B 3.0 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) APPLICABILITY LCO 3.0.3 assemblies in the spent fuel storage pool." Therefore, this LCO can be (continued) applicable in any or all MODES. If the LCO and the Required Actions of LCO 3.7.7 are not met while in MODE 1, 2, or 3, there is no safety benefit to be gained by placing the unit in a shutdown condition. The Required Action of LCO 3.7.7 of "Suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the spent fuel storage pool" is the appropriate Required Action to complete in lieu of the actions of LCO 3.0.3. These exceptions are addressed in the individual Specifications.

LCO 3.0.4 LCO 3.0.4 establishes limitations on changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability when an LCO is not met. It allows placing the unit in a MODE or other specified condition stated in that Applicability (e.g., the Applicability desired to be entered) when unit conditions are such that the requirements of the LCO would not be met, in accordance with LCO 3.0.4.a, LCO 3.0.4.b, or LCO 3.0.4.c.

LCO 3.0.4.a allows entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability with the LCO not met when the associated ACTIONS to be entered permit continued operation in the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability for an unlimited period of time. Compliance with Required Actions that permit continued operation of the unit for an unlimited period of time in a MODE or other specified condition provides an acceptable level of safety for continued operation. This is without regard to the status of the unit before or after the MODE change.

Therefore, in such cases, entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability may be made in accordance with the provisions of the Required Actions.

LCO 3.0.4.b allows entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability with the LCO not met after performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, consideration of the results, determination of the acceptability of entering the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability, and establishment of risk management actions, if appropriate.

The risk assessment may use quantitative, qualitative, or blended approaches, and the risk assessment will be conducted using the plant program, procedures, and criteria in place to implement 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4), which requires that risk impacts of maintenance activities to be assessed and managed. The risk assessment, for the (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.0-5 Revision 1 PPL Rev. 3 LCO APPLICABILITY B 3.0 B 3.0 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) APPLICABILITY LCO 3.0.3 (continued)

LCO 3.0.4 assemblies in the spent fuel storage pool." Therefore, this LCO can be applicable in any or all MODES. If the LCO and the Required Actions of LCO 3.7.7 are not met while in MODE 1,2, or 3, there is no safety benefit to be gained by placing the unit in a shutdown condition. The Required Action of LCO 3.7.7 of "Suspend movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the spent fuel storage pool" is the appropriate Required Action to complete in lieu of the actions of LCO 3.0.3. These exceptions are addressed in the individual Specifications.

LCO 3.0.4 establishes limitations on changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability when an LCO is not met. It allows placing the unit in a MODE or other specified condition stated in that Applicability (e.g., the Applicability desired to be entered) when unit conditions are such that the requirements of the LCO would not be met, in accordance with LCO 3.0.4.a, LCO 3.0.4.b, or LCO 3.0.4.c.

LCO 3.0.4.a allows entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability with the LCO not met when the associated ACTIONS to be entered permit continued operation in the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability for an unlimited period of time. Compliance with Required Actions that permit continued operation of the unit for an unlimited period of time in a MODE or other specified condition provides an acceptable level of safety for continued operation. This is without regard to the status of the unit before or after the MODE change.

Therefore, in such cases, entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability may be made in accordance with the provisions of the Required Actions.

LCO 3.0.4.b allows entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability with the LCO not met after performance of a risk assessment addressing inoperable systems and components, consideration of the results, determination of the acceptability of entering the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability, and establishment of risk management actions, if appropriate.

The risk assessment may use quantitative, qualitative, or blended approaches, and the risk assessment will be conducted using the plant program, procedures, and criteria in place to implement 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4), which requires that risk impacts of maintenance activities to be assessed and managed. The risk assessment, for the (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.0-5 Revision 1

PPL Rev. 3 LCO APPLICABILITY B 3.0 B 3.0 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) APPLICABILITY LCO 3.0.4 (continued) purposes of LCO 3.0.4 (b), must take into account all inoperable Technical Specification equipment regardless of whether the equipment is included in the normal 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) risk assessment scope. The risk assessments will be conducted using the procedures and guidance endorsed by Regulatory Guide 1.182, "Assessing and Managing Risk Before Maintenance Activities at Nuclear Power Plants." Regulatory Guide 1.182 endorses the guidance in Section 11 of NUMARC 93-01, "Industry Guideline for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants." These documents address general guidance for conduct of the risk assessment, quantitative and qualitative guidelines for establishing risk management actions, and example risk management actions. These include actions to plan and conduct other activities in a manner that controls overall risk, increased risk awareness by shift and management personnel, actions to reduce the duration of the condition, actions to minimize the magnitude of risk increases (establishment of backup success paths or compensatory measures), and determination that the proposed MODE change is acceptable. Consideration should also be given to the probability of completing restoration such that the requirements of the LCO would be met prior to the expiration of ACTIONS Completion Times that would require exiting the Applicability.

LCO 3.0.4.b may be used with single, or multiple systems and components unavailable. NUMARC 93-01 provides guidance relative to consideration of simultaneous unavailability of multiple systems and components.

The results of the risk assessment shall be considered in determining the acceptability of entering the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability, and any corresponding risk management actions. The LCO 3.0.4.b risk assessments do not have to be documented.

The Technical Specifications allow continued operation with equipment unavailable in MODE 1 for the duration of the Completion Time. Since this is allowable, and since in general the risk impact in that particular MODE bounds the risk of transitioning into and through the applicable MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability of the LCO, the use of the LCO 3.0.4.b allowance should be generally acceptable, as long as the risk is assessed and managed as stated above. However, there is a small subset of systems and components that have been determined to be more important to risk and use of the LCO 3.0.4.b allowance is prohibited. The LCOs governing these systems and components contain Notes prohibiting the use of LCO 3.0.4.b by stating that LCO 3.0.4.b is not applicable.

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.0-6 Revision 1 PPL Rev. 3 LCO APPLICABILITY B 3.0 B 3.0 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) APPLICABILITY LCO 3.0.4 (continued) purposes of LCO 3.0.4 (b), must take into account all inoperable Technical Specification equipment regardless of whether the equipment is included in the normal 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) risk assessment scope. The risk assessments will be conducted using the procedures and guidance endorsed by Regulatory Guide 1.182, "Assessing and Managing Risk Before Maintenance Activities at Nuclear Power Plants." Regulatory Guide 1.182 endorses the guidance in Section 11 of NUMARC 93-01, "Industry Guideline for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants." These documents address general guidance for conduct of the risk assessment, quantitative and qualitative guidelines for establishing risk management actions, and example risk management actions. These include actions to plan and conduct other activities in a manner that controls overall risk, increased risk awareness by shift and management personnel, actions to reduce the duration of the condition, actions to minimize the magnitude of risk increases (establishment of backup success paths or compensatory measures), and determination that the proposed MODE change is acceptable. Consideration should also be given to the probability of completing restoration such that the requirements of the LCO would be met prior to the expiration of ACTIONS Completion Times that would require exiting the Applicability.

LCO 3.0A.b may be used with single, or multiple systems and components unavailable. NUMARC 93-01 provides guidance relative to consideration of simultaneous unavailability of multiple systems and components.

The results of the risk assessment shall be considered in determining the acceptability of entering the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability, and any corresponding risk management actions. The LCO 3.0.4.b risk assessments do not have to be documented.

The Technical Specifications allow continued operation with equipment unavailable in MODE 1 for the duration of the Completion Time. Since this is allowable, and since in general the risk impact in that particular MODE bounds the risk of transitioning into and through the applicable MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability of the LCO, the use of the LCO 3.0.4.b allowance should be generally acceptable, as long as the risk is assessed and managed as stated above. However, there is a small subset of systems and components that have been determined to be more important to risk and use of the LCO 3.0.4.b allowance is prohibited. The LCOs governing these systems and components contain Notes prohibiting the use of LCO 3.0.4.b by stating that LCO 3.0.4.b is not applicable.

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.0-6 Revision 1

PPL Rev. 3 LCO APPLICABILITY B 3.0 B 3.0 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) APPLICABILITY LCO 3.0.4 (continued)

LCO 3.0.4.c allows entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability with the LCO not met based on a Note in the Specification which states LCO 3.0.4.c is applicable. These specific allowances permit entry into MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability when the associated ACTIONS to be entered do not provide for continued operation for an unlimited period of time and a risk assessment has not been performed. This allowance may apply to all the ACTIONS or to a specific Required Action of a Specification. The risk assessments performed to justify the use of LCO 3.0.4.b usually only consider systems and components. For this reason, LCO 3.0.4.c is typically applied to Specifications which describe values and parameters (e.g., [Containment Air Temperature, Containment Pressure, MCPR, Moderator Temperature Coefficient]) and may be applied to other Specifications based on NRC plant-specific approval.

The provisions of this Specification should not be interpreted as endorsing the failure to exercise the good practice of restoring systems or components to OPERABLE status before entering an associated MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability.

The provisions of LCO 3.0.4 shall not prevent changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS. In addition, the provisions of LCO 3.0.4 shall not prevent changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that result from any unit shutdown. In this context, a unit shutdown is defined as a change in MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability associated with transitioning from MODE 1 to MODE 2 or MODE 3, MODE 2 to MODE 3, and MODE 3 to MODE 4.

Upon entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability with the LCO not met, LCO 3.0.1 and LCO 3.0.2 require entry into the applicable Conditions and Required Actions until the Condition is resolved, until the LCO is met, or until the unit is not within the Applicability of the Technical Specification.

Surveillances do not have to be performed on the associated inoperable equipment (or on variables outside the specified limits), as permitted by SR 3.0.1. Therefore, utilizing LCO 3.0.4 is not a violation of SR 3.0.1 or (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA-UNIT 1 TS / B 3.0-7 Revision 1 PPL Rev. 3 LCO APPLICABILITY B 3.0 B 3.0 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) APPLICABILITY LCO 3.0.4 (continued)

LCO 3.0.4.c allows entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability with the LCO not met based on a Note in the Specification which states LCO 3.0.4.c is applicable. These specific allowances permit entry into MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability when the associated ACTIONS to be entered do not provide for continued operation for an unlimited period of time and a risk assessment has not been performed. This allowance may apply to all the ACTIONS or to a specific Required Action of a Specification. The risk assessments performed to justify the use of LCO 3.0.4.b usually only consider systems and components. For this reason, LCO 3.0.4.c is typically applied to Specifications which describe values and parameters (e.g., [Containment Air Temperature, Containment Pressure, MCPR, Moderator Temperature Coefficient]) and may be applied to other Specifications based on NRC plant-specific approval.

The provisions of this Specification should not be interpreted as endorsing the failure to exercise the good practice of restoring systems or components to OPERABLE status before entering an associated MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability.

The provisions of LCO 3.0.4 shall not prevent changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS. In addition, the provisions of LCO 3.0.4 shall not prevent changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that

. result from any unit shutdown. In this context, a unit shutdown is defined as a change in MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability associated with transitioning from MODE 1 to MODE 2 or MODE 3, MODE 2 to MODE 3, and MODE 3 to MODE 4.

Upon entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability with the LCO not met, LCO 3.0.1 and LCO 3.0.2 require entry into the applicable Conditions and Required Actions until the Condition is resolved, until the LCO is met, or until the unit is not within the Applicability of the Technical Specification.

Surveillances do not have to be performed on the associated inoperable equipment (or on variables outside the specified limits), as permitted by SR 3.0.1. Therefore, utilizing LCO 3.0.4 is not a violation of SR 3.0.1 or (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS I B 3.0-7 Revision 1

PPL Rev. 3 LCO APPLICABILITY B 3.0 B 3.0 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) APPLICABILITY LCO 3.0.4 SR 3.0.4 for any Surveillances that have not been performed on (continued) inoperable equipment. However, SRs must be met to ensure OPERABILITY prior to declaring the associated equipment OPERABLE (or variable within limits) and restoring compliance with the affected LCO.

LCO 3.0.5 LCO 3.0.5 establishes the allowance for restoring equipment to service under administrative controls when it has been removed from service or declared inoperable to comply with ACTIONS. The sole purpose of this Specification is to provide an exception to LCO 3.0.2 (e.g., to not comply with the applicable Required Action(s)) to allow the performance of required testing to demonstrate:

a.

The OPERABILITY of the equipment being returned to service; or

b.

The OPERABILITY of other equipment.

The administrative controls ensure the time the equipment is returned to service in conflict with the requirements of the ACTIONS is limited to the time absolutely necessary to perform the required testing to demonstrate OPERABILITY. This Specification does not provide time to perform any other preventive or corrective maintenance.

An example of demonstrating the OPERABILITY of the equipment being returned to service is reopening a containment isolation valve that has been closed to comply with Required Actions and must be reopened to perform the required testing.

An example of demonstrating the OPERABILITY of other equipment is taking an inoperable channel or trip system out of the tripped condition to prevent the trip function from occurring during the performance of required testing on another channel in the other trip system. A similar example of demonstrating the OPERABILITY of other equipment is taking an inoperable channel or trip system out of the tripped condition to permit the logic to function and indicate the appropriate response during the performance of required testing on another channel in the same trip system.

LCO 3.0.6 LCO 3.0.6 establishes an exception to LCO 3.0.2 for supported systems that have a support system LCO specified in the Technical Specifications (TS).

This (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.0-8 Revision 3 PPL Rev. 3 LCO APPLICABILITY B 3.0 B 3.0 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) APPLICABILITY LCO 3.0.4 (continued)

LCO 3.0.5 LCO 3.0.6 SR 3.0.4 for any Surveillances that have not been performed on inoperable equipment. However, SRs must be met to ensure OPERABILITY prior to declaring the associated equipment OPERABLE (or variable within limits) and restoring compliance with the affected LCO.

LCO 3.0.5 establishes the allowance for restoring equipment to service under administrative controls when it has been removed from service or declared inoperable to comply with ACTIONS. The sole purpose of this Specification is to provide an exception to LCO 3.0.2 (e.g., to not comply with the applicable Required Action(s)) to allow the performance of required testing to demonstrate:

a.

The OPERABILITY of the equipment being returned to service; or

b.

The OPERABILITY of other equipment.

The administrative controls ensure the time the equipment is returned to service in conflict with the requirements of the ACTIONS is limited to the time absolutely necessary to perform the required testing to demonstrate OPERABILITY. This SpeCification does not provide time to perform any other preventive or corrective maintenance.

An example of demonstrating the OPERABILITY of the equipment being returned to service is reopening a containment isolation valve that has been closed to comply with Required Actions and must be reopened to perform the required testing.

An example of demonstrating the OPERABILITY of other equipment is taking an inoperable channel or trip system out of the tripped condition to prevent the trip function from occurring during the performance of required testing on another channel in the other trip system. A similar example of demonstrating the OPERABI LlTY of other equipment is taking an inoperable channel or trip system out of the tripped condition to permit the logic to function and indicate the appropriate response during the performance of required testing on another channel in the same trip system.

LCO 3.0.6 establishes an exception to LCO 3.0.2 for supported systems that have a support system LCO specified in the Technical Specifications (TS).

This (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS I B 3.0-8 Revision 3

PPL Rev. 3 LCO APPLICABILITY B 3.0 B 3.0 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) APPLICABILITY LCO 3.0.6 (continued) exception is provided because LCO 3.0.2 would require that the Conditions and Required Actions of the associated inoperable supported system LCO be entered solely due to the inoperability of the support system. This exception is justified because the actions that are required to ensure the plant is maintained in a safe condition are specified in the support system LCOs Required Actions. These Required Actions may include entering the supported system's Conditions and Required Actions or may specify, other Required Actions. When a support system is inoperable and there is an LCO specified for it in the TS, the supported system(s) are required to be declared inoperable if determined to be inoperable as a result of the support system inoperability. However, it is not necessary to enter into the supported systems' Conditions and Required Actions unless directed to do so by the support system's Required Actions. The potential confusion and inconsistency of requirements related to the entry into multiple support and supported systems' LCOs' Conditions and Required Actions are eliminated by providing all the actions that are necessary to ensure the plant is maintained in a safe condition in the support system's Required Actions.

However, there are instances where a support system's Required Action may either direct a supported system to be declared inoperable or direct entry into Conditions and Required Actions for the supported system. This may occur immediately or after some specified delay to perform some other Required Action. Regardless of whether it is immediate or after some delay, when a support system's Required Action directs a supported system to be declared inoperable or directs entry into Conditions and Required Actions for a supported system, the applicable Conditions and Required Actions shall be entered in accordance with LCO 3.0.2.

Specification 5.5.11, "Safety Function Determination Program (SFDP),"

ensures loss of safety function is detected and appropriate actions are taken.

Upon entry into LCO 3.0.6, an evaluation shall be made to determine if loss of safety function exists. Additionally, other limitations, remedial actions, or compensatory actions may be identified as a result of the support system inoperability and corresponding exception to entering supported system Conditions and Required Actions. The SFDP implements the requirements of LCO 3.0.6.

Cross division checks to identify a loss of safety function for those support systems that support safety systems are required. The cross division check verifies that the supported systems of the redundant OPERABLE support (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.0-9 Revision 2 PPL Rev. 3 LCO APPLICABILITY B 3.0 B 3.0 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) APPLICABILITY LCO 3.0.6 (continued) exception is provided because LCO 3.0.2 would require that the Conditions and Required Actions of the associated inoperable supported system LCO be entered solely due to the inoperability of the support system. This exception is justified because the actions that are required to ensure the plant is maintained in a safe condition are specified in the support system LCOs Required Actions. These Required Actions may include entering the supported system's Conditions and Required Actions or may specify, other Required Actions. When a support system is inoperable and there is an LCO specified for it in the TS, the supported system(s) are required to be declared inoperable if determined to be inoperable as a result of the support system inoperability. However, it is not necessary to enter into the supported systems' Conditions and Required Actions unless directed to do so by the support system's Required Actions. The potential confusion and inconsistency of requirements related to the entry into multiple support and supported systems' LCOs' Conditions and Required Actions are eliminated by providing all the actions that are necessary to ensure the plant is maintained in a safe condition in the support system's Required Actions.

However, there are instances where a support system's Required Action may either direct a supported system to be declared inoperable or direct entry into Conditions and Required Actions for the supported system. This may occur immediately or after some specified delay to perform some other Required Action. Regardless of whether it is immediate or after some delay, when a support system's Required Action directs a supported system to be declared inoperable or directs entry into Conditions and Required Actions for a supported system, the applicable Conditions and Required Actions shall be entered in accordance with LCO 3.0.2.

Specification 5.5.11, "Safety Function Determination Program (SFDP),"

ensures loss of safety function is detected and appropriate actions are taken.

Upon entry into LCO 3.0.6, an evaluation shall be made to determine if loss of safety fUnction exists. Additionally, other limitations, remedial actions, or compensatory actions may be identified as a result of the support system inoperability and corresponding exception to entering supported system Conditions and Required Actions. The SFDP implements the requirements of LCO 3.0.6.

Cross division checks to identify a loss of safety function for those support systems that support safety systems are required. The cross division check verifies that the supported systems of the redundant OPERABLE support (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS I B 3.0-9 Revision 2

PPL Rev. 3 LCO APPLICABILITY B 3.0 B 3.0 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) APPLICABILITY LCO 3.0.6 system are OPERABLE, thereby ensuring safety function is retained. If this (continued) evaluation determines that a loss of safety function exists, the appropriate Conditions and Required Actions of the LCO in which the loss of safety function exists are required to be entered.

This loss of safety function does not require the assumption of additional single failures or loss of offsite power or concurrent loss of emergency diesel generators. Since operation is being restricted in accordance with the ACTIONS of the support system, any resulting temporary loss of redundancy or single failure protection is taken into account. Similarly, the ACTIONS for inoperable offsite circuit(s) and inoperable diesel generator(s) provide the necessary restriction for cross train inoperabilities. This explicit cross train verification for inoperable AC electrical power sources also acknowledges that supported system(s) are not declared inoperable solely as a result of inoperability of a normal or emergency electrical power source (refer to the definition of OPERABILITY).

When a loss of safety function ýis determined to exist, and the SFDP requires entry into the appropriate Conditions and Required Actions of the LCO in which the loss of safety function exists, consideration must be given to the specific type of function affected. Where a loss of safety function is solely due to a single TS support system (e.g., loss of automatic start due to inoperable instrumentation, or loss of pump suction source due to low tank level) the appropriate LCO is the LCO for the support system. The ACTIONS for a support system LCO adequately address the inoperabilities of that system without reliance on entering its supported system LCO. When the loss of function is the result of multiple support systems, the appropriate LCO is the LCO for the supported system.

LCO 3.0.7 There are certain special tests and operations required to be performed at various times over the life of the unit. These special tests and operations are necessary to demonstrate select unit performance characteristics, to perform special maintenance activities, and to perform special evolutions. Special Operations LCOs in Section 3.10 allow specified TS requirements to be changed to permit performances of these special tests and operations, which otherwise could not be performed if required to comply with the requirements of these TS. Unless otherwise specified, all the other TS requirements remain unchanged. This will ensure all appropriate requirements of the MODE or other specified condition not directly associated with or required to be changed to perform the special test or operation will remain in effect.

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.0-10 Revision 2 PPL Rev. 3 LCO APPLICABILITY B 3.0 B 3.0 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) APPLICABILITY LCO 3.0.6 (continued)

LCO 3.0.7 system are OPERABLE, thereby ensuring safety function is retained. If this evaluation determines that a loss of safety function exists, the appropriate Conditions and Required Actions of the LCO in which the loss of safety function exists are required to be entered.

This loss of safety function does not require the assumption of additional single failures or loss of offsite power or concurrent loss of emergency diesel generators. Since operation is being restricted in accordance with the ACTIONS of the support system, any resulting temporary loss of redundancy or single failure protection is taken into account. Similarly, the ACTIONS for inoperable offsite circuit(s) and inoperable diesel generator(s) provide the necessary restriction for cross train inoperabilities. This explicit cross train verification for inoperable AC electrical power sources also acknowledges that supported system(s) are not declared inoperable solely as a result of inoperability of a normal or emergency electrical power source (refer to the definition of OPERABILITY).

When a loss of safety function is determined to exist, and the SFDP requires entry into the appropriate Conditions and Required Actions of the LCO in which the loss of safety function exists, consideration must be given to the specific type of function affected. Where a loss of safety function is solely due to a single TS support system (e.g., loss of automatic start due to inoperable instrumentation, or loss of pump suction source due to low tank level) the appropriate LCO is the LCO for the support system. The ACTIONS for a support system LCO adequately address the inoperabilities of that system without reliance on entering its supported system LCO. When the loss of function is the result of multiple support systems, the appropriate LCO is the LCO for the supported system.

There are certain special tests and operations required to be performed at various times over the life of the unit. These special tests and operations are necessary to demonstrate select unit performance characteristics, to perform special maintenance activities, and to perform special evolutions. Special Operations LCOs in Section 3.10 allow specified TS requirements to be changed to permit performances of these special tests and operations, which otherwise could not be performed if required to comply with the requirements of these TS. Unless otherwise specified, all the other TS requirements remain unchanged. This will ensure all appropriate requirements of the MODE or other specified condition not directly associated with or required to be changed to.

perform the special test or operation will remain in effect.

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.0-10 Revision 2

PPL Rev. 3 LCO APPLICABILITY B3.0 B 3.0 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) APPLICABILITY LCO 3.0.7 (continued)

The Applicability of a Special Operations LCO represents a condition not necessarily in compliance with the normal requirements of the TS.

Compliance with Special Operations LCOs is optional. A special operation may be performed either under the provisions of the appropriate Special Operations LCO or under the other applicable TS requirements. If it is desired to perform the special operation under the provisions of the Special Operations LCO, the requirements of the Special Operations LCO shall be followed. When a Special Operations LCO requires another LCO to be met, only the requirements of the LCO statement are required to be met regardless of that LCOs Applicability (i.e., should the requirements of this other LCO not be met, the ACTIONS of the Special Operations LCO apply, not the ACTIONS of the other LCO). However, there are instances where the Special Operations LCO ACTIONS may direct the other LCOs' ACTIONS be met.

The Surveillances of the other LCO are not required to be met, unless specified in the Special Operations LCO. If conditions exist such that the Applicability of any other LCO is met, all the other LCOs requirements (ACTIONS and SRs) are required to be met concurrent with the requirements of the Special Operations LCO.

LCO 3.0.8 LCO 3.0.8 establishes conditions under which systems are considered to remain capable of performing their intended safety function when associated snubbers are not capable of providing their associated support function(s).

This LCO states that the supported system is not considered to be inoperable solely due to one or more snubbers not capable of performing their associated support function(s). This is appropriate because a limited length of time is allowed for maintenance, testing, or repair of one or more snubbers not capable of performing their associated support function(s) and appropriate compensatory measures of TRO 3.7.8 are followed. The snubber requirements do not meet the criteria in 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii), and, as such, are appropriate for control within the Technical Requirements Manual.

If the allowed time expires and the snubber(s) are unable to perform their associated support function(s), the affected supported system's LCO(s) must be declared not met and the Conditions and Required Actions entered in accordance with LCO 3.0.2.

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.0-11 Revision 2 PPL Rev. 3 LCO APPLICABILITY B 3.0 B 3.0 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) APPLICABILITY LCO 3.0.7 (continued)

LCO 3.0.8 The Applicability of a Special Operations LCO represents a condition not necessarily in compliance with the normal requirements of the TS.

Compliance with Special Operations LCOs is optional. A special operation may be perfonned either under the provisions of the appropriate Special Operations LCO or under the other applicable TS requirements. If it is desired to perfonn the special operation under the provisions of the Special Operations LCO, the requirements of the Special Operations LCO shall be followed. When a Special Operations LCO requires another LCO to be met, only the requirements of the LCO statement are required to be met regardless of that LCOs Applicability (i.e., should the requirements of this other LCO not be met, the ACTIONS of the Special Operations LCO apply, not the ACTIONS of the other LCO). However, there are instances where the Special Operations LCO ACTIONS may direct the other LCOs' ACTIONS be met.

The Surveillances of the other LCO are not required to be met, unless specified in the Special Operations LCO. If conditions exist such that the Applicability of any other LeO is met, all the other LCOs requirements (ACTIONS and SRs) are required to be met concurrent with the requirements of the Special Operations LCO.

LCO 3.0.8 establishes conditions under which systems are considered to remain capable of perfonning their intended safety function when associated snubbers are not capable of providing their associated support function(s).

This LCO states that the supported system is not considered to be inoperable solely due to one or more snubbers not capable of performing their associated support function(s). This is appropriate because a limited length of time is allowed for maintenance, testing, or repair of one or more snubbers not capable of perfonning their associated support function(s) and appropriate compensatory measures of TRO 3.7.8 are followed. The snubber requirements do not meet the criteria in 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii), and, as such, are appropriate for control within the Technical Requirements Manual.

If the allowed time expires and the snubber(s) are unable to perform their associated support function(s), the affected supported system's LCO(s) must be declared not met and the Conditions and Required Actions entered in accordance with LCO 3.0.2.

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.0-11 Revision 2

PPL Rev. 3 LCO APPLICABILITY B 3.0 B 3.0 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) APPLICABILITY LCO 3.0.8 (continued)

LCO 3.0.8.a applies when one or more snubbers are not capable of providing their associated support function(s) to a single train or subsystem of a multiple train or subsystem supported system or to a single train or subsystem supported system. LCO 3.0.8.a allows 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to restore the snubber(s) before declaring the supported system inoperable. The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Completion Time is reasonable based on the low probability of a seismic event concurrent with an event that would require operation of the supported system occurring while the snubber(s) are not capable of performing their associated support function and due to the availability of the redundant train of the supported system.

LCO 3.0.8.b applies when one or more snubbers are not capable of providing their associated support function(s) to more than one train or subsystem of a multiple train or subsystem supported system. LCO 3.0.8.b allows 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> to restore the snubber(s) before declaring the supported system inoperable. The 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> Completion Time is reasonable based on the low probability of a seismic event concurrent with an event that would require operation of the supported system occurring while the snubber(s) are not capable of performing their associated support function.

LCO 3.0.8 requires that risk be assessed and managed. Industry and NRC guidance on the implementation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) (the Maintenance Rule) does not address seismic risk. However, use of LCO 3.0.8 should be considered with respect to other plant maintenance activities, and integrated into the existing Maintenance Rule process to the extent possible so that maintenance on any unaffected train or subsystem is properly controlled, and emergent issues are properly addressed. The risk assessment need not be quantified, but may be a qualitative awareness of the vulnerability of systems and components when one or more snubbers are not able to perform their associated support function.

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.0-11la Revision 0 PPL Rev. 3 LCO APPLICABILITY B 3.0 B 3.0 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) APPLICABILITY LC03.0.8 (continued)

LCO 3.0.8.a applies when one or more snubbers are not capable of providing their associated support function(s) to a single train or subsystem of a multiple train or subsystem supported system or to a single train or subsystem supported system. LCO 3.0.8.a allows 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to restore the snubber(s) before declaring the supported system inoperable. The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Completion Time is reasonable based on the low probability of a seismic event concurrent with an event that would require operation of the supported system occurring while the snubber(s} are not capable of performing their associated support function and due to the availability of the redundant train of the supported system.

LCO 3.0.8.b applies when one or more snubbers are not capable of providing their associated support function(s) to more than one train or subsystem of a multiple train or subsystem supported system. LCO 3.0.8.b allows 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> to restore the snubber(s) before declaring the supported system inoperable. The 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> Completion Time is reasonable based on the low probability of a seismic event concurrent with an event that would require operation of the supported system occurring while the snubber(s) are not capable of performing their associated support function.

LCO 3.0.8 requires that risk be assessed and managed. Industry and NRC guidance on the implementation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) (the Maintenance Rule) does not address seismic risk. However, use of LCO 3.0.8 should be considered with respect to other plant maintenance activities, and integrated into the existing Maintenance Rule process to the extent possible so that maintenance on any unaffected train or subsystem is properly controlled, and emergent issues are properly addressed. The risk assessment need not be quantified, but may be a qualitative awareness of the vulnerability of systems and components when one or more snubbers are not able to perform their associated support function.

( continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS/B3.0-11a Revision 0

PPL Rev. 3 LCO APPLICABILITY B 3.0 B 3.0 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) APPLICABILITY BASES SRs SR 3.0.1 through SR 3.0.4 establish the general requirements applicable to all Specifications and apply at all times, unless otherwise stated.

SR 3.0.1 SR 3.0.1 establishes the requirement that SRs must be met during the MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability for which the requirements of the LCO apply, unless otherwise specified in the individual SRs. This Specification is to ensure that Surveillances are performed to verify the OPERABILITY of systems and components, and that variables are within specified limits. Failure to meet a Surveillance within the specified Frequency, in accordance with SR 3.0.2, constitutes a failure to meet an LCO.

Systems and components are assumed to be OPERABLE when the associated SRs have been met. Nothing in this Specification, however, is to be construed as implying that systems or components are OPERABLE when:

a.

The systems or components are known to be inoperable, although still meeting the SRs; or

b.

The requirements of the Surveillance(s) are known to be not met between required Surveillance performances.

Surveillances do not have to be performed when the unit is in a MODE or other specified condition for which the requirements of the associated LCO are not applicable, unless otherwise specified. The SRs associated with a Special Operations LCO are only applicable when the Special Operations LCO is used as an allowable exception to the requirements of a Specification.

Unplanned events may satisfy the requirements (including applicable acceptance criteria) for a given SR. In this case, the unplanned event may be credited as fulfilling the performance of the SR. This allowance includes those SRs whose performance is normally precluded in a given MODE or other specified condition.

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA-UNIT 1 TS / B 3.0-12 Revision 1 PPL Rev. 3 LCO APPLICABILITY B 3.0 B 3.0 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) APPLICABILITY BASES SRs SR 3.0.1 SR 3.0.1 through SR 3.0.4 establish the general requirements applicable to all Specifications and apply at all times, unless otherwise stated.

SR 3.0.1 establishes the requirement that SRs must be met during the MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability for which the requirements of the LCO apply, unless otherwise specified in the individual SRs. This Specification is to ensure that Surveillances are performed to verify the OPERABILITY of systems and components, and that variables are within specified limits. Failure to meet a Surveillance within the specified Frequency, in accordance with SR 3.0.2, constitutes a failure to meet an LCO.

Systems and components are assumed to be OPERABLE when the associated SRs have been met. Nothing in this Specification, however, is to be construed as implying that systems or components are OPERABLE when:

a.

The systems or components are known to be inoperable, although still meeting the SRs; or

b.

The requirements of the Surveillance(s) are known to be not met between required Surveillance performances.

Surveillances do not have to be performed when the unit is in a MODE or other specified condition for which the requirements of the associated LCO are not applicable, unless otherwise specified. The SRs associated with a Special Operations LCO are only applicable when the Special Operations LCO is used as an allowable exception to the requirements of a Specification.

Unplanned events may satisfy the requirements (including applicable acceptance criteria) for a given SR. In this case, the unplanned event may be credited as fulfilling the performance of the SR. This allowance includes those SRs whose performance is normally precluded in a given MODE or other specified condition.

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.0-12 Revision 1

PPL Rev. 3 LCO APPLICABILITY B 3.0 B 3.0 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) APPLICABILITY SR 3.0.1 Surveillances, including Surveillances invoked by Required Actions, do not (continued) have to be performed on inoperable equipment because the ACTIONS define the remedial measures that apply. Surveillances have to be met and.

performed in accordance with SR 3.0.2, prior to returning equipment to OPERABLE status.

Upon completion of maintenance, appropriate post maintenance testing is required to declare equipment OPERABLE. This includes ensuring applicable Surveillances are not failed and their most recent performance is in accordance with SR 3.0.2. Post maintenance testing may not be possible in the current MODE or other specified conditions in the Applicability due to the necessary unit parameters not having been established. In these situations, the equipment may be considered OPERABLE provided testing has been satisfactorily completed to the extent possible and the equipment is not otherwise believed to be incapable of performing its function. This will allow operation to proceed to a MODE or other specified condition where other necessary post maintenance tests can be completed.

Some examples of this process are:

a.

Control Rod Drive maintenance during refueling that requires scram testing at > 800 psi. However, if other appropriate testing is satisfactorily completed and the scram time testing of SR 3.1.4.3 is satisfied, the control rod can be considered OPERABLE. This allows startup to proceed to reach 800 psi to perform other necessary testing.

b.

High pressure coolant injection (HPCI) maintenance during shutdown that requires system functional tests at a specified pressure. Provided other appropriate testing is satisfactorily completed, startup can proceed with HPCI considered OPERABLE. This allows operation to reach the specified pressure to complete the necessary post maintenance testing.

SR 3.0.2 SR 3.0.2 establishes the requirements for meeting the specified Frequency for Surveillances and any Required Action with a Completion Time that requires the periodic (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.0-13 Revision 2 PPL Rev. 3 LCO APPLICABILITY B 3.0 B 3.0 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) APPLICABILITY SR 3.0.1 (continued)

SR 3.0.2 Surveillances, including Surveillances invoked by Required Actions, do not have to be performed on inoperable equipment because the ACTIONS define the remedial measures that apply. Surveillances have to be met and performed in accordance with SR 3.0.2, prior to returning equipment to OPERABLE status.

Upon completion of maintenance, appropriate post maintenance testing is required to declare equipment OPERABLE. This includes ensuring applicable Surveillances are not failed and their most recent performance is in accordance with SR 3.0.2. Post maintenance testing may not be possible in the current MODE or other specified conditions in the Applicability due to the necessary unit parameters not having been established. In these situations, the equipment may be considered OPERABLE provided testing has been satisfactorily completed to the extent possible and the equipment is not otherwise believed to be incapable of performing its function. This will allow operation to proceed to a MODE or other specified condition where other necessary post maintenance tests can be completed.

Some examples of this process are:

a.

Control Rod Drive maintenance during refueling that requires scram testing at > 800 psi. However, if other appropriate testing is

. satisfactorily completed and the scram time testing of SR 3.1.4.3 is satisfied, the control rod can be considered OPERABLE. This allows startup to proceed to reach 800 psi to perform other necessary testing.

b.

High pressure coolant injection (HPCI) maintenance during shutdown that requires system functional tests at a specified pressure. Provided other appropriate testing is satisfactorily completed, startup can proceed with HPCI considered OPERABLE. This allows operation to reach the specified pressure to complete the necessary post maintenance testing.

SR 3.0.2 establishes the requirements for meeting the specified Frequency for Surveillances and any Required Action with a Completion Time that requires the periodic (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS I B 3.0-13 Revision 2

PPL Rev. 3 LCO APPLICABILITY B 3.0 B 3.0 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) APPLICABILITY SR 3.0.2 performance of the Required Action on a "once per..." interval.

(continued)

SR 3.0.2 permits a 25% extension of the interval specified in the Frequency.

This extension facilitates Surveillance scheduling and considers plant operating conditions that may not be suitable for conducting the Surveillance (e.g., transient conditions or other ongoing Surveillance or maintenance activities).

The 25% extension does not significantly degrade the reliability that results from performing the Surveillance at its specified Frequency. This is based on the recognition that the most probable result of any particular Surveillance being performed is the verification of conformance with the SRs. The exceptions to SR 3.0.2 are those Surveillances for which the 25% extension of the interval specified in the Frequency does not apply. These exceptions are stated in the individual Specifications.

As stated in SR 3.0.2, the 25% extension also does not apply to the initial portion of a periodic Completion Time that requires performance on a "once per..." basis. The 25% extension applies to each performance after the initial performance. The initial performance of the Required Action, whether it is a particular Surveillance or some other remedial action, is considered a single action with a single Completion Time. One reason for not allowing the 25%

extension to this Completion Time is that such an action usually verifies that no loss of function has occurred by checking the status of redundant or diverse components or accomplishes the function of the inoperable equipment in an alternative manner.

The provisions of SR 3.0.2 are not intended to be used repeatedly merely as an operational convenience to extend Surveillance intervals (other than those consistent with refueling intervals) or periodic Completion Time intervals beyond those specified.

SR 3.0.3 SR 3.0.3 establishes the flexibility to defer declaring affected equipment inoperable or an affected variable outside the specified limits when a Surveillance has not been completed within the specified Frequency. A delay (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA-UNIT 1 TS / B 3.0-14 Revision 2 PPL Rev. 3 LCO APPLICABILITY B 3.0 B 3.0 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) APPLICABILITY SR 3.0.2 (continued)

SR 3.0.3 performance of the Required Action on a "once per... " interval.

SR3.0.2 permits a 25% extension of the interval specified in the Frequency.

This extension facilitates Surveillance scheduling and considers plant operating conditions that may not be suitable for conducting the Surveillance (e.g., transient conditions or other ongoing Surveillance or maintenance activities).

The 25% extension does not significantly degrade the reliability that results from performing the Surveillance at its specified Frequency. This is based on the recognition that the most probable result of any particular Surveillance being performed is the verification of conformance with the SRs. The exceptions to SR 3.0.2 are those Surveillances for which the 25% extension of the interval specified in the Frequency does not apply. These exceptions are stated in the individual Specifications.

As stated in SR 3.0.2, the 25% extension also does not apply to the initial portion of a periodic Completion Time that requires performance on a "once per... " basis. The 25% extension applies to each performance after the initial performance. The initial performance of the Required Action, whether it is a particular Surveillance or some other remedial action, is considered a single action with a single Completion Time. One reason for not allowing the 25%

extension to this Completion Time is that such an action usually verifies that no loss of function has occurred by checking the status of redundant or diverse components or accomplishes the function of the inoperable equipment in an altemative manner.

The provisions of SR 3.0.2 are not intended to be used repeatedly merely as an operational convenience to extend Surveillance intervals (other than those consistent with refueling intervals) or periodic Completion Time intervals beyond those specified.

SR 3.0.3 establishes the flexibility to defer declaring affected equipment inoperable or an affected variable outside the specified limits when a Surveillance has not been completed within the specified Frequency. A delay (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS I B 3.0-14 Revision 2

PPL Rev. 3 LCO APPLICABILITY B 3.0 B 3.0 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) APPLICABILITY SR 3.0.3 period of up to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or up to the limit of the specified Frequency, (continued) whichever is greater, applies from the point in time that it is discovered that the Surveillance has not been performed in accordance with SR 3.0.2, and not at the time that the specified Frequency was not met.

This delay period provides adequate time to complete Surveillances that have been missed. This delay period permits the.completion of a Surveillance before complying with Required Actions or other remedial measures that might preclude completion of the Surveillance.

The basis for this delay period includes consideration of unit conditions, adequate planning, availability of personnel, the time required to perform the Surveillance, the safety significance of the delay in completing the required Surveillance, and the recognition that the most probable result of any particular Surveillance being performed is the verification of conformance with the requirements.

When a Surveillance with a Frequency based not on the time intervals, but upon specified unit conditions, operating situations, or requirements of regulations (e.g., prior to entering MODE 1 after each fuel loading, or in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix j, as modified by approved exemptions, etc.) is discovered to not have been performed when specified, SR 3.0.3 allows for the full delay period of up to the specified Frequency to perform the Surveillance. However, since there is not a time interval specified, the missed Surveillance should be performed at the first reasonable opportunity.

SR 3.0.3 provides a time limit for, and allowances for the performance of Surveillances that become applicable as a consequence of MODE changes imposed by Required Actions.

Failure to comply with specified Frequencies for SRs is expected to be an infrequent occurrence. Use of the delay period established by SR 3.0.3 is a flexibility which is not intended to be used as an operational convenience to extend Surveillance intervals. While up to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or the limit of the specified Frequency is provided to perform the missed Surveillance, it is expected that the missed Surveillance will be performed at the first reasonable opportunity.

The determination of the first reasonable opportunity should include consideration of the impact on plant risk (from delaying the Surveillance as well as any plant configuration changes required or shutting the plant down to perform the Surveillance) and impact on any analysis assumptions, in addition to unit conditions, planning, availability of personnel, and the time required to perform the Surveillance. The risk impact should be managed through the program in place to (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.0-15 Revision 2 PPL Rev. 3 LCO APPLICABILITY B 3.0 B 3.0 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) APPLICABILITY SR 3.0.3 (continued) period of up to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or up to the limit of the specified Frequency, whichever is greater, applies from the point in time that it is discovered that the Surveillance has not been performed in accordance with SR 3.0.2, and not at the time that the specified Frequency was not met.

This delay period provides adequate time to complete Surveillances that have been missed. This delay period permits the completion of a Surveillance before complying with Required Actions or other remedial measures that might preclude completion of the Surveillance.

The basis for this delay period includes consideration of unit conditions, adequate planning, availability of personnel, the time required to perform the Surveillance, the safety significance of the delay in completing the required Surveillance, and the recognition that the most probable result of any particular Surveillance being performed is the verification of conformance with the requirements.

When a Surveillance with a Frequency based not on the time intervals, but upon specified unit conditions, operating situations, or requirements of regulations (e.g., prior to entering MODE 1 after each fuel loading, or in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendixj, as modified by approved exemptions, etc.) is discovered to not have been performed when specified, SR 3.0.3 allows for the full delay period of up to the specified Frequency to perform the Surveillance. However, since there is not a time interval specified, the missed Surveillance should be performed at the first reasonable opportunity.

SR 3.0.3 provides a time limit for, and allowances for the performance of Surveillances that become applicable as a consequence of MODE changes imposed by Required Actions.

Failure to comply with specified Frequencies for SRs is expected to be an infrequent occurrence. Use of the delay period established by SR 3.0.3 is a flexibility which is not intended to be used as an operational convenience to extend Surveillance intervals. While up to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or the limit of the specified Frequency is provided to perform the missed Surveillance, it is expected that the missed Surveillance will be performed at the first reasonable opportunity.

The determination of the first reasonable opportunity should include consideration of the impact on plant risk (from delaying the Surveillance as well as any plant configuration changes required or shutting the plant down to perform the Surveillance) and impact on any analysis assumptions, in addition to unit conditions, planning, availability of personnel, and the time required to perform the Surveillance. The risk impact should be managed through the program in place to (coniinued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.0-15 Revision 2

PPL Rev. 3 LCO APPLICABILITY B 3.0 B 3.0 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) APPLICABILITY SR 3.0.3 (continued) implement 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) and its implementation guidance, NRC Regulatory Guide 1.182, "Assessing and Managing Risk before Maintenance Activities at Nuclear Power Plants." This Regulatory Guide addresses consideration of temporary and aggregate risk impacts, determination of risk management action thresholds, and risk management action up to and including plant shutdown. The missed Surveillance should be treated as an emergent condition as discussed in the Regulatory Guide. The risk evaluation may use quantitative, qualitative, or blended methods. The degree of depth and rigor of the evaluation should be commensurate with the importance of the component. Missed Surveillances for important components should be analyzed quantitatively. If the results of the risk evaluation determine the risk increase is significant, this evaluation should be used to determine the safest course of action. All missed Surveillances will be placed in the Corrective Action Program.

If a Surveillance is not completed within the allowed delay period, then the equipment is considered inoperable or the variable is considered outside the specified limits and the Completion Times of the Required Actions for the applicable LCO Conditions begin immediately upon expiration of the delay period. If a Surveillance is failed within the delay period, then the equipment is inoperable, or the variable is outside the specified limits and the Completion Times of the Required Actions for the applicable LCO Conditions begin immediately upon the failure of the Surveillance.

Completion of the Surveillance within the delay period allowed by this Specification, or within the Completion Time of the ACTIONS, restores compliance with SR 3.0.1.

SR 3.0.4 SR 3.0.4 establishes the requirement that all applicable SRs must be met before entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability.

This Specification ensures that system and component OPERABILITY requirements and variable limits are met before entry into MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability for which these systems and components ensure safe operation of the unit. The provisions of this Specification should not be interpreted as endorsing the failure to exercise the good practice of restoring systems or components to OPERABLE status before entering an associated MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability.

A provision is included to allow entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability when an LCO is not met due to Surveillance not being met in accordance with LCO 3.0.4.

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.0-16 Revision 0 PPL Rev. 3 LCO APPLICABILITY B 3.0 B 3.0 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) APPLICABILITY SR 3.0.3 (continued)

SR 3.0.4 implement 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) and its implementation guidance, NRC Regulatory Guide 1.182, "Assessing and Managing Risk before Maintenance Activities at Nuclear Power Plants." This Regulatory Guide addresses consideration of temporary and aggregate risk impacts, determination of risk management action thresholds, and risk management action up to and including plant shutdown. The missed Surveillance should be treated as an emergent condition as discussed in the Regulatory Guide. The risk evaluation may use quantitative, qualitative, or blended methods. The degree of depth and rigor of the evaluation should be commensurate with the importance of the component. Missed Surveillances for important components should be analyzed quantitatively. If the results of the risk evaluation determine the risk increase is significant, this evaluation should be used to determine the safest course of action. All missed Surveillances will be placed in the Corrective Action Program.

If a Surveillance is not completed within the allowed delay period, then the equipment is considered inoperable or the variable is considered outside the specified limits and the Completion Times of the Required Actions for the applicable LCO Conditions begin immediately upon expiration of the delay period. If a Surveillance is failed within the delay period, then the equipment is inoperable, or the variable is outside the specified limits and the Completion Times of the Required Actions for the applicable LCO Conditions begin immediately upon the failure of the Surveillance.

Completion of the Surveillance within the delay period allowed by this SpeCification, or within the Completion Time of the ACTIONS, restores compliance with SR 3.0.1.

SR 3.0.4 establishes the requirement that all applicable SRs must be met before entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability.

This Specification ensures that system and component OPERABILITY requirements and variable limits are met before entry into MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability for which these systems and components ensure safe operation of the unit. The provisions of this Specification should not be interpreted as endorsing the failure to exercise the good practice of restoring systems or components to OPERABLE status before entering an associated MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability.

A provision is included to allow entry into a MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability when an LCO is not met due to Surveillance not being met in accordance with LCO 3.0.4.

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.0-16 Revision 0

PPL Rev. 3 LCO APPLICABILITY B 3.0 B 3.0 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) APPLICABILITY SR 3.0.4 (continued)

However, in certain circumstances, failing to meet an SR will not result in SR 3.0.4 restricting a MODE change or other specified condition change.

When a system, subsystem, division, component, device, or variable is inoperable or outside its specified limits, the associated SR(s) are not required to be performed, per SR 3.0.1, which states that Surveillances do not have to be performed on inoperable equipment. When equipment is inoperable, SR 3.0.4 does not apply to the associated SR(s) since the requirement for the SR(s) to be performed is removed. Therefore, failing to perform the Surveillance(s) within the specified Frequency does not result in an SR 3.0.4 restriction to changing MODES or other specified conditions of the Applicability. However, since the LCO is not met in this instance, LCO 3.0.4 will govern any restrictions that may (or may not) apply to MODE or other specified condition changes. SR 3.0.4 does not restrict changing MODES or other specified conditions of the Applicability when a Surveillance has not been performed within the specified Frequency, provided the requirement to declare the LCO not met has been delayed.in accordance with SR 3.0.3.

The provisions of SR 3.0.4 shall not prevent entry into MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are required to comply with ACTIONS. In addition, the provisions of SR 3.0.4 shall not prevent changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that result from any unit shutdown. In this context, a unit shutdown is defined as a change in MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability associated with transitioning from MODE 1 to MODE 2 or MODE 3, MODE 2 to MODE 3, and MODE 3 to MODE 4.

The precise requirements for performance of SRs are specified such that exceptions to SR 3.0.4 are not necessary. The specific time frames and conditions necessary for meeting the SRs are specified in the Frequency, in the Surveillance, or both. This allows performance of Surveillances when the prerequisite condition(s) specified in a Surveillance procedure require entry into the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability of the associated LCO prior to the performance or completion of a Surveillance. A Surveillance that could not be performed until after entering the LCOs Applicability, would have its Frequency specified such that it is not "due" until the specific conditions needed are met.

Alternately, the Surveillance may be stated in the form of a Note, as not required (to be met or performed) until a particular event, condition, or time has been reached. Further discussion of the specific formats of SRs' annotation is found in Section 1.4, Frequency.

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.0-17 Revision 0 PPL Rev. 3 LCO APPLICABILITY B 3.0 B 3.0 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) APPLICABILITY SR 3.0.4 (continued)

However, in certain circumstances, failing to meet an SR will not result in SR 3.0.4 restricting a MODE change or other specified condition change.

When a system, subsystem, division, component, device, or variable is inoperable or outside its specified limits, the associated SR(s) are not required to be performed, per SR 3.0.1, which states that Surveillances do not have to be performed on inoperable equipment. When equipment is inoperable, SR 3.0.4 does not apply to the associated SR(s) since the requirement for the SR(s) to be performed is removed. Therefore, failing to perform the Surveillance(s) within the specified Frequency does not result in an SR 3.0.4 restriction to changing MODES or other specified conditions of the Applicability. However, since the LCO is not met in this instance, LCO 3.0.4 will govern any restrictions that may (or may not) apply to MODE or other specified condition changes. SR 3.0.4 does not restrict changing MODES or other specified conditions of the Applicability when a Surveillance has not been performed within the specified Frequency, provided the requirement to declare the LCO not met has been delayed *in accordance with SR 3.0.3.

The provisions of SR 3.0.4 shall not prevent entry into MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that are reql:'ired to comply with ACTIONS. In addition, the provisions of SR 3.0.4 shall not prevent changes in MODES or other specified conditions in the Applicability that result from any unit shutdown. In this context, a unit shutdown is defined as a change in MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability associated with transitioning from MODE 1 to MODE 2 or MODE 3, MODE 2 to MODE 3, and MODE 3 to MODE 4.

The precise requirements for performance of SRs are specified such that exceptions to SR 3.0.4 are not necessary. The specific time frames and conditions necessary for meeting the SRs are specified in the Frequency, in the Surveillance, or both. This allows performance of Surveillances when the prerequisite condition(s) specified in a Surveillance procedure require entry into the MODE or other specified condition in the Applicability of the associated LCO prior to the performance or completion of a Surveillance. A Surveillance that could not be performed until after entering the LCOs Applicability, would have its Frequency specified such that it is not "due" until the specific conditions needed are met.

Alternately, the Surveillance may be stated in the form of a Note, as not required (to be met or performed) until a particular event, condition, or time has been reached. Further discussion of the specific formats of SRs' annotation is found in Section 1.4, Frequency.

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.0-17 Revision 0

PPL Rev. 3 ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 B 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION B 3.3.5.1 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Instrumentation BASES BACKGROUND The purpose of the ECCS instrumentation is to initiate appropriate responses from the systems to ensure that the fuel is adequately cooled in the event of a design basis accident or transient.

For most anticipated operational occurrences and Design Basis Accidents (DBAs), a wide range of dependent and independent parameters are monitored.

The ECCS instrumentation actuates core spray (CS), low pressure coolant injection (LPCI), high pressure coolant injection (HPCI), Automatic Depressurization System (ADS), the diesel generators (DGs) and other features described in the DG background. The equipment involved with each of these systems with exception of the DGs and other features, is described in the Bases for LCO 3.5.1, "ECCS-Operating."

Core Spray System The CS System may be initiated by either automatic or manual means.

Automatic initiation occurs for conditions of Reactor Vessel Water Level Low, Low, Low, Level 1 or Drywell Pressure - High concurrent with Reactor Pressure - Low. Each of these diverse variables is monitored by four redundant instruments. The initiation logic for one CS loop is arranged in a one-out-of-two-twice network using level and pressure instruments which will generate a signal when:

(1) both level sensors are tripped, or (2) two high drywell pressure sensors and two low reactor vessel pressure sensors are tripped, or (3) a combination of one channel of level sensor and one of the other channel of high drywell pressure sensor together with its associated low reactor vessel pressure sensor (i.e. Channel A level sensor and Channel C high drywell and low reactor vessel pressure sensor).

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.3-101 Revision 0 B 3.3 B 3.3.5.1 BASES INSTRUMENTATION Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Instrumentation PPL Rev. 3 ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.

5.1 BACKGROUND

The purpose of the ECCS instrumentation is to initiate appropriate responses from the systems to ensure that the fuel is adequately cooled in the event of a design basis accident or transient.

For most anticipated operational occurrences and Design Basis Accidents (DBAs), a wide range of dependent and independent parameters are monitored.

The ECCS instrumentation actuates core spray (CS), low pressure coolant injection (LPCI), high pressure coolant injection (HPCI), Automatic Depressurization System (ADS), the diesel generators (DGs) and other features described in the DG background. The equipment involved with each of these systems with exception of the DGs and other features, is described in the Bases for LCO 3.5.1, "ECCS-Operating."

Core Spray System The CS System may be initiated by either automatic or manual means.

Automatic initiation occurs for conditions of Reactor Vessel Water Level Low, Low, Low, Level 1 or Drywell Pressure - High concurrent with Reactor Pressure - Low. Each of these diverse variables is monitored by four redundant instruments. The initiation logic for one CS loop is arranged in a one-out-of-two-twice network using level and pressure instruments which will generate a signal when:

(1 )

(2)

(3)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 both level sensors are tripped, or two high drywell pressure sensors and two low reactor vessel pressure sensors are tripped, or a combination of one channel of level sensor and one of the other channel of high drywell pressure sensor together with its associated low reactor vessel pressure sensor (i.e. Channel A level sensor and Channel C high drywell and low reactor vessel pressure sensor).

(continued)

TS / B 3.3-101 Revision 0

PPL Rev. 3 ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES BACKGROUND Core Spray System (continued)

Once an initiation signal is received by the CS control circuitry, the signal is sealed in until manually reset.

The logic can also be initiated by use of a manual push button (one push button per subsystem). Upon receipt of an initiation signal, the CS pumps are started 15 seconds after initiation signal if normal offsite power is available and 10.5 seconds after diesel generator power is available.

The CS test line isolation valve, which is also a primary containment isolation valve (PCIV), is closed on a CS initiation signal to allow full system flow assumed in the accident analyses and maintain primary containment isolated.

The CS System also monitors the pressure in the reactor to ensure that, before the injection valves open, the reactor pressure has fallen to a value below the CS System's maximum design pressure.. The variable is monitored by four redundant instruments. The instrument outputs are connected to relays whose contacts are arranged in a one-out-of-two taken twice logic.

Low Pressure Coolant Iniection System The LPCI is an operating mode of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR)

System, with two LPCI subsystems. The LPCI subsystems may be initiated by automatic or manual means. Automatic initiation occurs for conditions of Reactor Vessel Water Level Low, Low, Low, Level 1 or Drywell Pressure - High concurrent with Reactor Pressure - Low. Each of these diverse variables is monitored by four instruments in two divisions.

Each division is arranged in a one-out-of-two-twice network using level and pressure instruments which will generate a signal when:

(1) both level sensors are tripped, or (2) two high drywell pressure sensors and two low reactor vessel pressure sensors are tripped, or (3) a combination of one channel level sensor and one of the other channel of high drywell pressure sensor together with its associated low reactor vessel pressure sensor.

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.3-102 Revision 0 BASES BACKGROUND Core Spray System (continued)

PPL Rev. 3 ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 Once an initiation signal is received by the CS control circuitry, the signal is sealed in until manually reset.

The logic can also be initiated by use of a manual push button (one push button per subsystem). Upon receipt of an initiation signal, the CS pumps are started 15 seconds after initiation signal if normal offsite power is available and 10.5 seconds after diesel generator power is available.

The CS test line isolation valve, which is also a primary containment isolation valve (PCIV), is closed on a CS initiation signal to allow full system flow assumed in the accident analyses and maintain primary containment isolated.

The CS System also monitors the pressure in the reactor to ensure that, before the injection valves open, the reactor pressure has fallen to a value below the CS System's maximum design pressure. The variable is monitored by four redundant instruments. The instrument outputs are connected to relays whose contacts are arranged in a one-out-of-two taken twice logic.

Low Pressure Coolant Injection System The LPCI is an operating mode of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR)

System, with two LPCI subsystems. The LPCI subsystems may be initiated by automatic or manual means. Automatic initiation occurs for conditions of Reactor Vessel Water Level Low, Low, Low, Level 1 or Drywell Pressure - High concurrent with Reactor Pressure - Low. Each of these diverse variables is monitored by four instruments in two divisions.

Each division is arranged in a one-out-of-two-twice network using level and pressure instruments which will generate a signal when:

(1) both level sensors are tripped, or (2) two high drywell pressure sensors and two low reactor vessel pressure sensors are tripped, or (3) a combination of one channel level sensor and one of the other channel of high drywell pressure sensor together with its associated low reactor vessel pressure sensor.

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.3-102 Revision 0

PPL Rev. 3 ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES BACKGROUND Low Pressure Coolant Iniection System (continued)

(i.e. Channel A level sensor and Channel C high drywell and low reactor vessel pressure sensor.).

The initiation logic is cross connected between divisions (i.e., either start signal will start all four pumps and open both loop's injection valves).

Once an initiation signal is received by the LPCI control circuitry, the signal is sealed in until manually reset. The cross division start signals for the pumps affect both the opposite division's start logic and the pump's 4KV breaker start logic. The cross division start signal to the opposite division's start logic is for improved reliability. The cross division start signals to the pump's 4KV breaker start logic is needed to ensure specific control power failures do not prevent the start of an adequate number of LPCI pumps.

Upon receipt of an initiation signal, all LPCI pumps start after a 3 second time delay when normal AC power is lost and standby diesel generator power is available. If normal power is available, LPCI pumps A and B will start immediately and pumps C and D will start 7.0 seconds after initiation signal to limit loading of the offsite sources.

The RHR test line and spray line are also isolated on a LPCI initiation signal to allow the full system flow assumed in the accident analyses and for those valves which are also PCIVs maintain primary containment isolated.

The LPCI System monitors the pressure in the reactor to ensure that, before an injection valve opens, the reactor pressure has fallen to a value below the LPCI System's maximum design pressure. The variable is monitored by four redundant instruments. The instrument outputs are connected to relays whose contacts are arranged in a one-out-of-two taken twice logic.

Logic is provided to close the recirculation pump discharge valves to ensure that LPCI flow does not bypass the core when it injects into the recirculation lines. The logic consists of an initiation signal (Low reactor water level and high drywell pressure in a one out of two taken twice logic) from both divisions of LPCI instruments and a pressure permissive. The pressure variable is monitored by four redundant instruments.

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA-UNIT 1 TS / B 3.3-103 Revision 0 BASES BACKGROUND Low Pressure Coolant Injection System (continued)

PPL Rev. 3 ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 (i.e. Channel A level sensor and Channel C high drywell and low reactor vessel pressure sensor.).

The initiation logic is cross connected between divisions (i.e., either start Signal will start all four pumps and open both loop's injection valves).

Once an initiation signal is received by the LPCI control circuitry, the Signal is sealed in until manually reset. The cross division start signals for the pumps affect both the opposite division's start logic and the pump's 4KV breaker start logic. The cross division start signal to the opposite division's start logic is for improved reliability. The cross division start signals to the pump's 4KV breaker start logic is needed to ensure specific control power failures do not prevent the start of an adequate number of LPCI pumps.

Upon receipt of an initiation signal, all LPCI pumps start after a 3 second time delay when normal AC power is lost and standby diesel generator power is available. If normal power is available, LPCI pumps A and B will start immediately and pumps C and D will start 7.0 seconds after initiation signal to limit loading of the offsite sources.

The RHR test line and spray line are also isolated on a LPCI initiation signal to allow the full system flow assumed in the accident analyses and for those valves which are also PCIVs maintain primary containment isolated.

The LPCI System monitors the pressure in the reactor to ensure that, before an injection valve opens, the reactor pressure has fallen to a value below the LPCI System's maximum design pressure. The variable is monitored by four redundant instruments. The instrument outputs are connected to relays whose contacts are arranged in a one-out-of-two taken twice logic.

Logic is provided to close the recirculation pump discharge valves to ensure that LPCI flow does not bypass the core when it injects into the recirculation lines. The logic consists of an initiation signal (Low reactor water level and high drywell pressure in a one out of two taken twice logic) from both divisions of LPCI instruments and a pressure permissive. The pressure variable is monitored by four redundant instruments.

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.3-103 Revision 0

PPL Rev. 3 ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES BACKGROUND Low Pressure Coolant Injection System (continued)

The instrument outputs are connected to relays whose contacts are arranged in a one-out-of-two taken twice logic.

Hiqh Pressure Coolant Iniection System The HPCI System may be initiated by either automatic or manual means.

Automatic initiation occurs for conditions of Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low, Level 2 or Drywell Pressure-High. Each of these variables is monitored by four redundant instruments. The instrument. outputs are connected to relays whose contacts are arranged in a one-out-of-two taken twice logic for each Function.

The HPCI System also monitors the water level in the condensate storage tank (CST). HPCI suction is normally maintained on the CST until it transfers to the suppression pool on low CST level or is manually transferred by the operator. Reactor grade water in the CST is the normal source. Upon receipt of a HPCI initiation signal, the CST suction valve is automatically signaled to open (it is normally in the open position) unless the suppression pool suction valve is open. If the water level in the CST falls to the level switch process setpoint value, an automatic suction transfer is initiated. The suppression pool suction valve receives a signal to open and in parallel, the CST suction valve receives a signal to close to complete the transfer. Two level switches are used to detect low water level in the CST. Either switch can cause the suppression pool suction valve to open and the CST suction valve to close.

The HPCI provides makeup water to the reactor until the reactor vessel water level reaches the Reactor Vessel Water Level-High, Level 8 trip, at which time the HPCI turbine trips, which causes the turbine's stop valve, minimum flow valve, the cooling water isolation valve, and the injection valve to close. The logic is two-out-of-two to provide high reliability of the HPCI System.

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.3-104 Revision 2 BASES BACKGROUND Low Pressure Coolant Injection System (continued)

PPL Rev. 3 ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 The instrument outputs are connected to relays whose contacts are arranged in a one-out-of-two taken twice logic.

High Pressure Coolant Injection System The HPCI System may be initiated by either automatic or manual means.

Automatic initiation occurs for conditions of Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low, Level 2 or Drywell Pressure-High. Each of these variables is monitored by four redundant instruments. The instrument outputs are connected to relays whose contacts are arranged in a one-out-of-two taken twice logic for each Function.

The HPCI System also monitors the water level in the condensate storage tank (CST). HPCI suction is normally maintained on the CST until it transfers to the suppression pool on low CST level or is manually transferred by the operator. Reactor grade water in the CST is the normal source. Upon receipt of a HPCI initiation signal, the CST suction valve is automatically signaled to open (it is normally in the open position) unless the suppression pool suction valve is open. If the water level in the CST falls to the level switch process setpoint value, an automatic suction transfer is initiated. The suppression pool suction valve receives a signal to open and in parallel, the CST suction valve receives a signal to close to complete the transfer. Two level switches are used to detect low water level in the CST. Either switch can cause the suppression pool suction valve to open and the CST suction valve to close.

The H PCI provides makeup water to the reactor until the reactor vessel water level reaches the Reactor Vessel Water Level-High, Level 8 trip, at which time the HPCI turbine trips, which causes the turbine's stop valve, minimum flow valve, the cooling water isolation valve, and the injection valve to close. The logic is two-out-of-two to provide high reliability of the HPCI System.

( contif1ued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.3-104 Revision 2

PPL Rev. 3 ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES BACKGROUND Higqh Pressure Coolant Injection System (continued)

The HPCI System automatically restarts if a Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low, Level 2 signal is subsequently received.

Automatic Depressurization System The ADS may be initiated by either automatic or manual means.

Automatic initiation occurs when signals indicating Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low, Level 1; Drywell Pressure-High or ADS Drywell Bypass.Actuation Timer; confirmed Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low, Level 3; and CS or LPCI Pump Discharge Pressure-High are all present and the ADS Initiation Timer has timed out. There are two instruments each for Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low, Level I and Drywell Pressure-High, and one instrument for confirmed Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low, Level 3 in each of the two ADS trip systems. Each of these instruments drives a relay whose contacts form the initiation logic.

Each ADS trip system includes a time delay between satisfying the initiation logic and the actuation of the ADS valves. The ADS Initiation Timer time delay setpoint is chosen to be long enough that the HPCI system has sufficient operating time to recover to a level above Level 1, yet not so long that the LPCI and CS Systems are unable to adequately cool the fuel if the HPCI fails to maintain that level. An alarm in the control room is annunciated when either of the timers is timing. Resetting the ADS initiation signals resets the ADS Initiation Timers. The ADS also monitors the discharge pressures of the four LPCI pumps and the four CS pumps. Each ADS trip system includes two discharge pressure permissive instruments from both CS pumps in the division and from either of the two LPCI pumps in the associated Division (i.e., Division 1 LPCI pumps A or C input to ADS trip system A, and Division 2 LPCI pumps B or D input to ADS trip system B). The signals are used as a permissive for ADS actuation, indicating that there is a source of core coolant available once the ADS has depressurized the vessel. With both CS pumps in a division or one of the LPCI pumps operating sufficient flow is available to permit automatic depressurization.

The ADS logic in each trip system is arranged in two strings. Each string has a contact from each of the following variables: Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low. Low, Level 1; Drywell (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B] 3.3-105 Revision 0 BASES BACKGROUND High Pressure Coolant Injection System (continued)

PPL Rev. 3 ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 The HPCI System automatically restarts if a Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low, Level 2 signal is subsequently received.

Automatic Depressurization System The ADS may be initiated by either automatic or manual means.

Automatic initiation occurs when signals indicating Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low, Level 1; Drywell Pressure-High or ADS Drywell Bypass'Actuation Timer; confirmed Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low, Level 3; and CS or LPCI Pump Discharge Pressure-High are all present and the ADS Initiation Timer has timed out. There are two instruments each for Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low, Level 1 and Drywell Pressure-High, and one instrument for confirmed React.or Vessel Water Level-Low, Level 3 in each of the two ADS trip systems. Each of these instruments drives a relay whose contacts form the initiation logic.

Each ADS trip system includes a time delay between satisfying the initiation logic and the actuation of the ADS valves. The ADS Initiation Timer time delay setpoint is chosen to be long enough that the HPCI system has sufficient operating time to recover to a level above Level 1, yet not so long that the LPCI and CS Systems are unable to adequately cool the fuel if the HPCI fails to maintain that level. An alarm in the control room is annunciated when either of the timers is timing. Resetting the ADS initiation signals resets the ADS Initiation Timers. The ADS also monitors the discharge pressures of the four LPCI pumps and the four CS pumps. Each ADS trip system includes two discharge pressure permissive instruments from both CS pumps in the division and from either of the two LPCI pumps in the associated Division (Le., Division 1 LPCI pumps A or C input to ADS trip system A, and Division 2 LPCI pumps B or D input to ADS trip system B). The signals are used as a permissive for ADS actuation, indicating that there is a source of core coolant available once the ADS has depressurized the vessel. With both CS pumps in a division or one of the LPCI pumps operating sufficient flow is available to permit automatic depressurization.

The ADS logic in each trip system is arranged in two strings. Each string has a contact from each of the following variables: Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low. Low, Level 1; Drywell (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.3-105 Revision 0

PPL Rev. 3 ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES BACKGROUND Automatic Depressurization System (continued)

Pressure-High; or Drywell Pressure Bypass Actuation Timer. One of the two strings in each trip system must also have a confirmed Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low, Level 3. All contacts in both logic strings must close, the ADS initiation timer must time out, and a loop of CS or LPCI pump discharge pressure signal must be present to initiate an ADS trip system.

Either the A or B trip system will cause all the ADS relief valves to open.

Once the Drywell Pressure-High signal, the ADS Drywell Pressure Bypass Actuation Timer, or the ADS initiation signal is present, it is individually sealed in until manually reset.

Manual inhibit switches are provided in the control room for the ADS; however, their function is not required for ADS OPERABILITY (provided ADS is not inhibited when required to be OPERABLE).

Diesel Generators and Other Initiated Features The DGs may be initiated by either automatic or manual means.

Automatic initiation occurs for conditions of Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low, Level 1 or Drywell Pressure-High. The DGs are also initiated upon loss of voltage signals (Refer to the Bases for LCO 3.3.8.1, "Loss of Power (LOP) Instrumentation," for a discussion of these signals.)

The initiation logic is arranged in a one-out-of-two-twice network using level and pressure instruments which will generate a signal when:

(1) both level sensors are tripped, or (2) both high drywell pressure sensors are tripped, or (3) a combination of one level sensor and one high drywell pressure sensor is tripped.

DGs A and B receive their initiation signal from CS system initiation logic Division I and Division II respectively. DGs C and D receive their initiation signals from either LPCI systems initiation logic Division I or Division II.

The DGs can also be started manually from the control room and locally from the associated DG room. The DG initiation signal is a (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.3-106 Revision 0 BASES BACKGROUND Automatic Depressurization System (continued)

PPL Rev. 3 ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 Pressure-High; or Drywell Pressure Bypass Actuation Timer. One of the two strings in each trip system must also have a confirmed Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low, Level 3. All contacts in both logic strings must close, the ADS initiation timer must time out, and a loop of CS or LPCI pump discharge pressure signal must be present to initiate an ADS trip system.

Either the A or B trip system will cause all the ADS relief valves to open.

Once the Drywell Pressure-High signal, the ADS Drywell Pressure Bypass Actuation Timer, or the ADS initiation signal is present, it is individually sealed in until manually reset.

Manual inhibit switches are provided in the control room for the ADS; however, their function is not required for ADS OPERABILITY (provided ADS is not inhibited when required to be OPERABLE).

Diesel Generators and Other Initiated Features The DGs may be initiated by either automatic or manual means.

Automatic initiation occurs for conditions of Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low, Level 1 or Drywell Pressure-High. The DGs are also initiated upon loss of voltage signals (Refer to the Bases for LCO 3.3.8.1, "Loss of Power (LOP) Instrumentation," for a discussion of these signals.)

The initiation logic is arranged in a one-out-of-two-twice network using level and pressure instruments which will generate a signal when:

(1) both level sensors are tripped, or (2) both high drywell pressure sensors are tripped, or (3) a combination of one level sensor and one high drywell pressure sensor is tripped.

DGs A and B receive their initiation signal from CS system initiation logic Division I and Division II respectively. DGs C and D receive their initiation signals from either LPCI systems initiation logic Division I or Division II.

The DGs can also be started manually from the control room and locally from the associated DG room. The DG initiation signal is a

( continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS I B 3.3-106 Revision 0

PPL Rev. 3 ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES BACKGROUND Diesel Generators and Other Initiated Features (continued) sealed in signal and must be manually reset. The DG initiation logic is reset by resetting the associated ECCS initiation logic. Upon receipt of a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) initiation signal, each DG is automatically started, is ready to load in approximately 10 seconds, and will run in standby conditions (rated voltage and speed, with the DG output breaker open). The DGs will only energize their respective Engineered Safety Feature buses if a loss of offsite power occurs. (Refer to Bases for LCO 3.3.8.1.).

In addition to DG initiation, the ECCS instrumentation initiates other design features. Signals from the CS System logic initiate (1) the reset of two Emergency Service Water (ESW) timers, (2) the reset of the degraded grid timers for the 4kV buses on Unit 1, (3) LOCA load shed schemes, and (4) the trip of Drywell Cooling equipment. Signals from the LPCI System logic initiate (1) the reset of two Emergency Service Water (ESW) timers, (2) the trip of turbine building chillers, and (3) the trip of reactor building chillers. The ESW pump timer reset feature assures the ESW pumps do not start concurrently with the CS or LPCI pumps. If one or both ESW pump timer resets in a division or reactor building/turbine building chiller trips are inoperable; two offsite circuits with the 4kV buses aligned to their normal configuration are required to be OPERABLE. If one or both ESW pump timer resets in a division or reactor building/turbine building chiller trips are inoperable; the effects on one offsite circuit have not been analyzed; and therefore, the offsite circuit is assumed not to be capable of accepting the required loads during certain accident events. The ESW pump timer reset is not required in MODES 4 and 5 because concurrent pump starts, on a LOCA signal, of the ESW pumps (initiated by the DG start circuitry) with CS or LPCI pumps cannot occur in these MODES.

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.3-107 Revision 1 BASES BACKGROUND PPL Rev. 3 ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 Diesel Generators and Other Initiated Features (continued) sealed in signal and must be manually reset. The DG initiation logic is reset by resetting the associated ECCS initiation logic. Upon receipt of a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) initiation signal, each DG is automatically started, is ready to load in approximately 10 seconds, and will run in standby conditions (rated voltage and speed, with the DG output breaker open). The DGs will only energize their respective Engineered Safety Feature buses if a loss of offsite power occurs. (Refer to Bases for LCO 3.3.8.1.).

In addition to DG initiation, the ECCS instrumentation initiates other design features. Signals from the CS System logic initiate (1) the reset of two Emergency Service Water (ESW) timers, (2) the reset of the degraded grid timers for the 4kV buses on Unit 1, (3) LOCA load shed schemes, and (4) the trip of Drywell Cooling equipment. Signals from the LPCI System logic initiate (1) the reset of two Emergency Service Water (ESW) timers, (2) the trip of turbine building chillers, and (3) the trip of reactor building chillers. The ESW pump timer reset feature assures the ESW pumps do not start concurrently with the CS or LPCI pumps. If one or both ESW pump timer resets in a division or reactor building/turbine building chiller trips are inoperable; two offsite circuits with the 4kV buses aligned to their normal configuration are required to be OPERABLE. If one or both ESW pump timer resets in a division or reactor building/turbine building chiller trips are inoperable; the effects on one offsite circuit have not been analyzed; and therefore, the offsite circuit is assumed not to be capable of accepting the required loads during certain accident events. The ESW pump timer reset is not required in MODES 4 and 5 because concurrent pump starts, on a LOCA signal, of the ESW pumps (initiated by the DG start circuitry) with CS or LPCI pumps cannot occur in these MODES.

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.3-107 Revision 1

PPL Rev. 3 ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES (continued)

APPLICABLE The actions of the ECCS are explicitly assumed in the safety analyses of SAFETY References 1 and 2. The ECCS is initiated to preserve the integrity of the

ANALYSES, fuel cladding by limiting the post LOCA peak cladding temperature to less LCO, and than the 10 CFR 50.46 limits.

APPLICABILITY ECCS instrumentation satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement (Ref. 4). Certain instrumentation Functions are retained for other reasons and are described below in the individual Functions discussion.

The OPERABILITY of the ECCS instrumentation is dependent upon the OPERABILITY of the individual instrumentation and channel Functions specified in Table 3.3.5.1-1. Each Function must have a required number of OPERABLE channels, with their setpoints within the specified Allowable Values, where appropriate. The actual setpoint is calibrated consistent with applicable setpoint methodology assumptions. Each ECCS subsystem must also respond within its assumed response time.

Table 3.3.5.1-1, footnotes (b) and (c), are added to show that certain ECCS instrumentation Functions are also required to be OPERABLE to perform DG initiation and actuation of other Technical Specifications (TS) function.

Allowable Values are specified for each ECCS Function specified in the table. Nominal trip setpoints are specified in the setpoint calculations.

The nominal setpoints are selected to ensure that the setpoints do not exceed the Allowable Value between CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS.

Operation with a trip setpoint less conservative than the nominal trip setpoint, but within its Allowable Value, is acceptable. A channel is inoperable if its actual trip setpoint isnot within its required Allowable Value. Trip setpoints are those predetermined values of output at which an action should take place. The setpoints are compared to the actual process parameter (e.g., reactor vessel water level), and when the measured output value of the process parameter reaches the setpoint, the associated device changes state. The analytic limits are derived from the limiting values of the process parameters obtained from the safety analysis. The Allowable Values are derived from the analytic limits, corrected for calibration, process, and some of the instrument errors. The trip setpoints are then determined, accounting for the remaining instrument errors (e.g., drift). The trip setpoints derived in this manner (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.3-108 Revision 0 BASES (continued)

APPLICABLE SAFETY

ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABI LlTY PPL Rev. 3 ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 The actions of the ECCS are explicitly assumed in the safety analyses of References 1 and 2. The ECCS is initiated to preserve the integrity of the fuel cladding by limiting the post LOCA peak cladding temperature to less than the 10 CFR 50.46 limits.

ECCS instrumentation satisfies Criterion 3 of the NRC Policy Statement (Ref. 4). Certain instrumentation Functions are retained for other reasons and are described below in the individual Functions discussion.

The OPERABILITY of the ECCS instrumentation is dependent upon the OPERABILITY of the individual instrumentation and channel Functions specified in Table 3.3.5.1-1. Each Function must have a required number of OPERABLE channels, with their setpoints within the specified Allowable Values, where appropriate. The actual setpoint is calibrated consistent with applicable setpoint methodology assumptions. Each ECCS subsystem must also respond within its assumed response time.

Table 3.3.5.1-1, footnotes (b) and (c), are added to show that certain ECCS instrumentation Functions are also required to be OPERABLE to perform DG initiation and actuation of other Technical Specifications (TS) function.

Allowable Values are specified for each ECCS Function specified in the table. Nominal trip setpoints are specified in the setpoint calculations.

The nominal setpoints are selected to ensure thatthe setpoints do not exceed the Allowable Value between CHANNEL CALIBRATIONS.

Operation with a trip setpoint less conservative than the nominal trip setpoint, but within its Allowable Value, is acceptable. A channel is inoperable if its actual trip setpoint is 'not within its required Allowable Value. Trip setpoints are those predetermined values of output at which an action should take place. The setpoints are compared to the actual process parameter (e.g., reactor vessel water level), and when the measured output value of the process parameter reaches the setpoint, the associated device changes state. The analytic limits are derived from the limiting values of the process parameters obtained from the safety analysis. The Allowable Values are derived from the analytic limits, corrected for calibration, process, and some of the instrument errors. The trip setpoints are then determined, accounting for the remaining instrument errors (e.g., drift). The trip setpoints derived in this manner (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.3-108 Revision 0

PPL Rev. 3 ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY

ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued) provide adequate protection because instrumentation uncertainties, process effects, calibration tolerances, instrument drift, and severe environment errors (for by 10 CFR 50.49) are accounted for.

An exception to the methodology described to derive the Allowable Value is the methodology used to determine the Allowable Values for the ECCS pump start time delays and HPCI CST Level 1 - Low. These Allowable Values are based on system calculations and/or engineering judgement which establishes a conservative limit at which the function should occur.

In general, the individual Functions are required to be OPERABLE in the MODES or other specified conditions that may require ECCS (or DG) initiation to mitigate the consequences of a design basis transient or accident. To ensure reliable ECCS and DG function, a combination of Functions is required to provide primary and secondary initiation signals.

The specific Applicable Safety Analyses, LCO, and Applicability discussions are listed below on a Function by Function basis.

Core Spray and Low Pressure Coolant Injection Systems 1.a, 2.a. Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low, Level 1 Low reactor pressure vessel (RPV) water level indicates that the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened. Should RPV water level decrease too far, fuel damage could result. The low pressure ECCS and associated DGs are initiated at Level 1 to ensure that core spray and flooding functions are available to prevent or minimize fuel damage. The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low, Level 1 is one of the Functions assumed to be OPERABLE and capable of initiating the ECCS during the transients analyzed in References 2. In addition, the Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low, Level 1 Function is directly assumed in the analysis of the recirculation line break (Ref. 1). The core cooling function of the ECCS, along with the scram action of the Reactor Protection System (RPS), ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46.

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.3-109 Revision 1 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY

ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

PPL Rev. 3 ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 provide adequate protection because instrumentation uncertainties, process effects, calibration tolerances, instrument drift, and severe environment errors (for by 10 CFR 50.49) are accounted for.

An exception to the methodology described to derive the Allowable Value is the methodology used to determine the Allowable Values for the ECCS pump start time delays and HPCI CST Level 1 - Low. These Allowable Values are based on system calculations and/or engineering judgement which establishes a conservative limit at which the function should occur.

In general, the individual Functions are required to be OPERABLE in the MODES or other specified conditions that may require ECCS (or DG) initiation to mitigate the consequences of a design basis transient or accident. To ensure reliable ECCS and DG function, a combination of Functions is required to provide primary and secondary initiation signals.

The specific Applicable Safety Analyses, LCO, and Applicability discussions are listed below on a Function by Function basis.

Core Spray and Low Pressure Coolant Injection Systems 1.a, 2.a. Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low, Level 1 Low reactor pressure vessel (RPV) water level indicates that the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened. Should RPV water level decrease too far, fuel damage could result. The low pressure ECCS and associated DGs are initiated at Level 1 to ensure that core spray and flooding functions are available to prevent or minimize fuel damage. The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low, Level 1 is one of the Functions assumed to be OPERABLE and capable of initiating the ECCS during the transients analyzed in References 2. In addition, the Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low, Level 1 Function is directly assumed in the analysis of the recirculation line break (Ref. 1). The core cooling function of the ECCS, along with the scram action of the Reactor Protection System (RPS), ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46.

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.3-109 Revision 1

PPL Rev. 3 ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES APPLICABLE 1.a, 2.a. Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low, Level 1 SAFETY (continued)

ANALYSES, LCO, and Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low, Level 1 signals are initiated APPLICABILITY from four level instruments that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low, Level 1 Allowable Value is chosen to allow time for the low pressure core flooding systems to activate and provide adequate cooling The initiation logic for LPCI pumps and injection valves is cross connected such that either division's start signal will start all four pumps and open both loop's injection valves. This cross division logic is required in MODES 1, 2, and 3. In MODES 4 and 5, redundancy in the initiation circuitry is not required. Therefore, in MODES 4 and 5 for LPCI, only one division of initiation logic is required.

DGs C and D which are initiated from the LPCI LOCA initiation are cross connected such that both DGs receive an initiation signal from both Divisions of the LPCI LOCA initiation circuitry. This cross connected logic is only required in MODES 1, 2, and 3. In MODES 4 and 5, redundancy in the DG initiation circuitry is not required. Therefore, in MODES 4 and 5 for DGs C and D only one division of ECCS initiation logic is required.

Four channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low, Level 1 Function are only required to be OPERABLE when the ECCS or DG(s) are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude ECCS and DG initiation. Refer to LCO 3.5.1 and LCO 3.5.2, "ECCS-Shutdown," for Applicability Bases for the low pressure ECCS subsystems; LCO 3.8.1, "AC Sources--Operating"; and LCO 3.8.2, "AC Sources-Shutdown," for Applicability Bases for the DGs.

1.b, 2.b. Drywell Pressure-High High pressure in the drywell could indicate a break in the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB). The low pressure ECCS (provided a concurrent low reactor pressure signal is (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.3-110 Revision 0 BASES APPLIGABLE SAFETY

ANALYSES, LGO, and APPLIGABILITY PPL Rev. 3 EGGS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 1.a, 2.a. Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low, Level 1 (continued)

Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low, Level 1 signals are initiated from four level instruments that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low, Level 1 Allowable Value is chosen to allow time for the low pressure core flooding systems to activate and provide adequate cooling The initiation logic for LPGI pumps and injection valves is cross connected such that either division's start signal will start all four pumps and open both loop's injection valves. This cross division logic is required in MODES 1, 2, and 3. In MODES 4 and 5, redundancy in the initiation circuitry is not required. Therefore, in MODES 4 and 5 for LPGI, only one division of initiation logic is required.

DGs G and D which are initiated from the LPGI LOGA initiation are cross connected such that both DGs receive an initiation signal from both Divisions of the LPGI LOGA initiation circuitry. This cross connected logic is only required in MODES 1, 2, and 3. In MODES 4 and 5, redundancy in the DG initiation circuitry is not required. Therefore, in MODES 4 and 5 for DGs G and D only one division of EGGS initiation logic is required.

Four channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low, Level 1 Function are only required to be OPERABLE when the EGGS or DG(s) are required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude EGGS and DG initiation. Refer to LGO 3.5.1 and LGO 3.5.2, "EGGS-Shutdown," for Applicability Bases for the low pressure EGGS subsystems; LGO 3.8.1, "AG Sources-Operating"; and LGO 3.8.2, "AG Sources-Shutdown," for Applicability Bases for the DGs.

1.b,2.b. Drywell Pressure-High High pressure in the drywell could indicate a break in the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RGPB). The low pressure EGGS (provided a concurrent low reactor pressure signal is (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.3-110 Revision 0

PPL Rev. 3 ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY

ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY 1.b, 2.b. Drywell Pressure-High (continued) present) and associated DGs, without a concurrent low reactor pressure signal, are initiated upon receipt of the Drywell Pressure-High Function in order to minimize the possibility of fuel damage. The Drywell Pressure-High Function, along with the Reactor Water Level-Low Low Low, Level 1 Function, is directly assumed in the analysis of the recirculation line break (Ref. 1). The core cooling function of the ECCS, along with the scram action of the RPS, ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46.

High drywell pressure signals are initiated from four pressure instruments that sense drywell pressure. The Allowable Value was selected to be as low as practical and be indicative of a LOCA inside primary containment.

The Drywell Pressure-High Function is required to be OPERABLE when the ECCS or DG is required to be OPERABLE in conjunction with times when the primary containment is required to be OPERABLE. Thus, four channels of the CS and LPCI Drywell Pressure-High Function are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude ECCS and DG initiation. In MODES 4 and 5, the Drywell Pressure-High Function is not required, since there is insufficient energy in the reactor to pressurize the primary containment to Drywell. Pressure-High setpoint. Refer to LCO 3.5.1 for Applicability Bases for the low pressure ECCS subsystems and to LCO 3.8.1 for Applicability Bases for the DGs.

1.c, 1.d, 2.c, 2.d Reactor Steam Dome Pressure-Low Low reactor steam dome pressure signals are used as permissives for the low pressure ECCS subsystems. The low reactor pressure permissive is provided to prevent a high drywell pressure condition which is not accompanied by low reactor pressure, i.e. a false LOCA signal, from disabling two RHR pumps on the other unit. The low reactor steam dome pressure permissive also ensures that, prior to opening the injection valves of the low pressure ECCS subsystems, the reactor pressure has fallen to a value below these subsystems' maximum design pressure. The Reactor Steam Dome Pressure-Low is one of the Functions assumed to be OPERABLE and capable of permitting initiation of the ECCS during the transients analyzed in Reference 2. In addition, the Reactor Steam Dome Pressure-Low Function is directly assumed in the analysis of the recirculation line break (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.3-111 Revision 0 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY

ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABI LlTY 1.b, 2.b. Drywell Pressure-High (continued)

PPL Rev. 3 ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 present) and associated DGs, without a concurrent low reactor pressure signal, are initiated upon receipt of the Drywell Pressure-High Function in order to minimize the possibility of fuel damage. The Drywell Pressure-High Function, along with the Reactor Water Level-Low Low Low, Level 1 Function, is directly assumed in the analysis of the recirculation line break (Ref. 1). The core cooling function of the ECCS, along with the scram action ofthe RPS, ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46.

High drywell pressure signals are initiated from four pressure instruments that sense drywell pressure. The Allowable Value was selected to be as low as practical and be indicative of a LOCA inside primary containment.

The Drywell Pressure-High Function is required to be OPERABLE when the ECCS or DG is required to be OPERABLE in conjunction with times when the primary containment is required to be OPERABLE. Thus, four channels of the CS and LPCI Drywell Pressure-High Function are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude ECCS and DG initiation. In MODES 4 and 5, the Drywell Pressure-High Function is not required, since there is insufficient energy in the reactor to pressurize the primary containment to Drywell Pressure-High setpoint. Refer to LCO 3.5.1 for Applicability Bases for the low pressure ECCS subsystems and to LCO 3.8.1 for Applicability Bases for the DGs.

1.c, 1.d, 2.c, 2.d Reactor Steam Dome Pressure-Low Low reactor steam dome pressure signals are used as permissives for the low pressure ECCS subsystems. The low reactor pressure permissive is.

provided to prevent a high drywell pressure condition which is not accompanied by low reactor pressure, i.e. a false LOCA Signal, from disabling two RHR pumps on the other unit. The low reactor steam dome pressure permissive also ensures that, prior to opening the injection valves of the low pressure ECCS subsystems, the reactor pressure has fallen to a value below these subsystems' maximum design pressure. The Reactor Steam Dome Pressure-Low is one of the Functions assumed to be OPERABLE and capable of permitting initiation of the ECCS during the transients analyzed in Reference 2. In addition, the Reactor Steam Dome Pressure-Low Function is directly assumed in the analysis of the recirculation line break (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.3-111 Revision 0

PPL Rev. 3 ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES APPLICABLE 1.c, 1.d, 2.c, 2.d Reactor Steam Dome Pressure-Low (continued)

SAFETY

ANALYSES, (Ref. 1). The core cooling function of the ECCS, along with the scram LCO, and action of the RPS, ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature APPLICABILITY remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46.

The Reactor Steam Dome Pressure-Low signals are initiated from four pressure instruments that sense the reactor dome pressure.

The pressure instruments are set to actuate between the Upper and Lower Allowable Values on decreasing reactor dome pressure.

The Upper Allowable Value is low enough to ensure that the reactor dome pressure has fallen to a value below the Core Spray and RHR/LPCI maximum design pressures to preclude piping overpressurization.

The Lower Allowable Value is high enough to ensure that the ECCS injection prevents the fuel peak cladding temperature from exceeding the limits of 10 CFR 50.46.

DGs C and D which are initiated from the LPCI LOCA initiation are cross connected such that both DGs receive an initiation signal from both Divisions of the LPCI LOCA initiation circuitry. This cross connected logic is only required in MODES 1, 2, and 3. In MODES 4 and 5, redundancy in the DG initiation circuitry is not required. Therefore, in MODES 4 and 5 for DGs C and D only one division of ECCS initiation logic is required.

Four channels of Reactor Steam Dome Pressure-Low Function are required to be OPERABLE only when the ECCS is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude ECCS initiation. Refer to LCO 3.5.1 and LCO 3.5.2 for Applicability Bases for the low pressure ECCS subsystems.

1.e, 2.f. Manual Initiation The Manual Initiation push button channels introduce signals into the appropriate ECCS logic to provide manual initiation capability and are redundant to the automatic protective instrumentation. There is one push button for each of the CS and LPCI subsystems (i.e., two for CS and two for LPCI).

The Manual Initiation Function is not assumed in any accident or transient analyses in the FSAR. However, the Function is (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.3-1121 Revision 1 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY

ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY PPL Rev. 3 ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 1.c, 1.d, 2.c, 2.d Reactor Steam Dome Pressure-Low (continued)

(Ref. 1). The core cooling function of the ECCS, along with the scram action of the RPS, ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46.

The Reactor Steam Dome Pressure-Low signals are initiated from four pressure instruments that sense the reactor dome pressure.

The pressure instruments are set to actuate between the Upper and Lower Allowable Values on decreasing reactor dome pressure.

The Upper Allowable Value is low enough to ensure that the reactor dome pressure has fallen to a value below the Core Spray and RHR/LPCI maximum design pressures to preclude piping overpressurization.

The Lower Allowable Value is high enough to ensure that the ECCS injection prevents' the fuel peak cladding temperature from exceeding the limits of 10 CFR 50.46.

DGs C and 0 which are initiated from' the LPCI LOCA initiation are cross connected such that both DGs receive an initiation signal from both Divisions of the LPCI LOCA initiation circuitry. This cross connected logic is only required in MODES 1, 2, and 3. In MODES 4 and 5, redundancy in the DG initiation circuitry is not required. Therefore, in MODES 4 and 5 for DGs C and 0 only one division of ECCS initiation logic is required.

Four channels of Reactor Steam Dome Pressure-Low Function are required to be OPERABLE only when the ECCS is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude ECCS initiation. Refer to LCO 3.5.1 and LCO 3.5.2 for Applicability Bases

. for the low pressure ECCS subsystems.

1.e, 2.f. Manual Initiation The Manual Initiation push button channels introduce signals into the appropriate ECCS logic to provide manual initiation capability and are redundant to the automatic protective instrumentation. There is one push button for each of the CS and LPCI subsystems (i.e., two for CS and two for LPCI).

The Manual Initiation Function is not assumed in any accident or transient analyses in the FSAR. However, the Function is (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS/B3.3-112 Revision 1

PPL Rev. 3 ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY

ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY 1.e, 2.f. Manual Initiation (continued) retained for overall redundancy and diversity of the low pressure ECCS function as required by the NRC in the plant licensing basis.

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.3-112a Revision 1 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY

ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY 1.e, 2.f. Manual Initiation (continued)

PPL Rev. 3 ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 retained for overall redundancy and diversity of the low pressure ECCS function as required by the NRC in the plant licensing basis.

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.3-112a Revision 1

PPL Rev. 3 ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES APPLICABLE 1.e, 2.f. Manual Initiation (continued)

SAFETY

ANALYSES, There is no Allowable Value for this Function since the channels are LCO, and mechanically actuated based solely on the position of the push buttons.

APPLICABILITY Each channel of the Manual Initiation Function (one channel per subsystem) is required to be OPERABLE only when the associated ECCS is required to be OPERABLE. Refer to LCO 3.5.1 and LCO 3.5.2 for Applicability Bases for the low pressure ECCS subsystems.

2.e. Reactor Steam Dome Pressure-Low (Recirculation Discharge Valve Permissive)

Low reactor steam dome pressure signals are used as permissives for recirculation discharge and bypass valves closure. This ensures that the LPCI subsystems inject into the proper RPV location assumed in the safety analysis. The Reactor Steam Dome Pressure-Low is one of the Functions assumed to be OPERABLE and capable of closing the valves during the transients analyzed in Reference 2. The core cooling function of the ECCS, along with the scram action of the RPS, ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46.

The Reactor Steam Dome Pressure-Low Function is directly assumed in the analysis of the recirculation line break (Ref. 1).

The Reactor Steam Dome Pressure-Low signals are initiated from four pressure instruments that sense the reactor dome pressure.

The Allowable Value is chosen to ensure that the valves close prior to commencement of LPCI injection flow into the core, as assumed in the safety analysis.

Four channels of the Reactor Steam Dome Pressure-Low Function are only required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 with the associated recirculation pump discharge valve open. With the valve(s) closed, the function instrumentation has been performed; thus, the Function is not required. In MODES 4 and 5, the loop injection location is not critical since LPCI injection through the recirculation loop in either direction will still ensure that LPCI flow reaches the core (i.e., there is no significant reactor steam dome back pressure).

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.3-113 Revision 1 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY

ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABI L1TY 1.e, 2.f. Manual Initiation (continued)

PPL Rev. 3 ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 There is no Allowable Value for this Function since the channels are mechanically actuated based solely on the position of the push buttons.

Each channel of the Manual Initiation Function (one channel per subsystem) is required to be OPERABLE only when the associated ECCS is required to be OPERABLE. Referto LCO 3.5.1 and LCO 3.5.2 for Applicability Bases for the low pressure ECCS subsystems.

2.e. Reactor Steam Dome Pressure-Low (Recirculation Discharge Valve Permissive)

Low reactor steam dome pressure signals are used as permissives for recirculation discharge and bypass valves closure. This ensures that the LPCI subsystems inject into the proper RPV location assumed in the safety analysis. The Reactor Steam Dome Pressure-Low is one of the Functions assumed to be OPERABLE and capable of closing the valves during the transients analyzed in Reference 2. The core cooling function of the ECCS, along with the scram action of the RPS, ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46.

The Reactor Steam Dome Pressure-Low Function is directly assumed in the analysis of the recirculation line break (Ref. 1).

The Reactor Steam Dome Pressure-Low signals are initiated from four pressure instruments that sense the reactor dome pressure.

The Allowable Value is chosen to ensure that the valves close prior to commencement of LPCI injection flow into the core, as assumed in the safety analysis.

Four channels of the Reactor Steam Dome Pressure-Low Function are only required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 with the associated recirculation pump discharge valve open. With the valve(s) closed, the function instrumentation has been performed; thus, the Function is not required. In MODES 4 and 5, the loop injection location is not critical since LPCI injection through the recirculation loop in either direction will still ensure that LPCI flow reaches the core (Le., there is no significant reactor steam dome back pressure).

(continued)

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PPL Rev. 3 ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY

ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

HPCI System 3.a. Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low, Level 2 Low RPV water level indicates that the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened. Should RPV water level decrease too far, fuel damage could result. Therefore, the HPCI System is initiated at Level 2 to maintain level above the top of the active fuel. The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low, Level 2 is one of the Functions assumed to be OPERABLE analyzed in Reference 2. Additionally, the Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low, Level 2 Function associated with HPCI is directly assumed in the analysis of the recirculation line break (Ref. 2). The core cooling function of the ECCS, along with the scram action of the RPS, ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46.

Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low, Level 2 signals are initiated from four level instruments that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel.

The HPCI Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low, Level 2 Allowable Value is chosen to be consistent with the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 Allowable value.

Four channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low, Level 2 Function are required to be OPERABLE only when HPCI is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude HPCI initiation. Refer to LCO 3.5.1 for HPCI Applicability Bases.

3.b. Drvwell Pressure-Hiah High pressure in the drywell could indicate a break in the RCPB. The HPCI System is initiated upon receipt of the Drywell Pressure-High Function in order to minimize the possibility of fuel damage. The Drywell Pressure-High Function, along with the Reactor Water Level-Low Low, Level 2 Function, is directly assumed in the analysis of the recirculation line break (Ref. 1). The core cooling function of the ECCS, along with the scram action of the (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.3-114 Revision 1 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY

ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

HPCI System PPL Rev. 3 EGGS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 3.a. Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low, Level 2 Low RPV water level indicates that the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened. Should RPV water level decrease too far, fuel damage could result. Therefore, the HPCI System is initiated at Level 2 to maintain level above the top of the active fuel. The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low, Level 2 is one of the Functions assumed to be OPERABLE analyzed in Reference 2. Additionally, the Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low, Level 2 Function associated with HPCI is directly assumed in the analysis of the recirculation line break (Ref. 2). The core cooling function of the ECGS, along with the scram action of the RPS, ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 GFR 50.46.

Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low, Level 2 signals are initiated from four level instruments that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel.

The HPGI Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low, Level 2 Allowable Value is chosen to be consistent with the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low, Level 2 Allowable value.

Four channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low, Level 2 Function are required to be OPERABLE only when HPCI is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude HPCI initiation. Refer to LCO 3.5.1 for HPCI Applicability Bases.

3.b. Drywell Pressure-High High pressure in the drywell could indicate a break in the RCPB. The HPCI System is initiated upon receipt of the Drywell Pressure-High Function in order to minimize the possibility of fuel damage. The Drywell Pressure-High Function, along with the Reactor Water Level-Low Low, Level 2 Function, is directly assumed in the analysis of the recirculation line break (Ref. 1). The core cooling function of the EGGS, along with the scram action of the (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.3-114 Revision 1

PPL Rev. 3 ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES APPLICABLE 3.b. Drywell Pressure-High (continued)

SAFETY

ANALYSES, RPS, ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the LCO, and limits of 10 CFR 50.46.

APPLICABILITY High drywell pressure signals are initiated from four pressure instruments that sense drywell pressure. The Allowable Value was selected to be as low as possible to be indicative of a LOCA inside primary containment. '

Four channels of the Drywell Pressure-High Function are required to be OPERABLE when HPCI is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude HPCI initiation. Refer to LCO 3.5.1 for the Applicability Bases for the HPCI System.

3.c. Reactor Vessel Water Level-High, Level 8 High RPV water level indicates that sufficient cooling water inventory exists in the reactor vessel such that there is no danger to the fuel.

Therefore, the Level 8 signal is used to trip the HPCI turbine to prevent overflow into the main steam lines (MSLs). The Reactor Vessel Water Level-High, Level 8 Function is not assumed in the accident and transient analyses. It was retained since it is a potentially significant contributor to risk.

Reactor Vessel Water Level-High, Level 8 signals for HPCI are initiated from two level instruments. Both Level 8 signals are required in order to trip HPCI. This ensures that no single instrument failure can preclude an HPCI initiation or trip. The Reactor Vessel Water Level-High, Level 8 Allowable Value is chosen to prevent flow from the HPCI System from overflowing into the MSLs.

Two channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level-High, Level 8 Function are required to be OPERABLE only when HPCI is required to be OPERABLE.

Refer to LCO 3.5.1 and LCO 3.5.2 for HPCI Applicability Bases.

3.d. Condensate Storage Tank Level-Low The Condensate Storage Tank-Low signal indicates that a conservatively calculated NPSH-available limit is being approached.

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA-UNIT 1 TS / B 3.3-115 Revision 1 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY

ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY 3.b. Drywell Pressure-High (continued)

PPL Rev. 3 ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 RPS, ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46.

High drywell pressure signals are initiated from four pressure instruments that sense drywell pressure. The Allowable Value was selected to be as low as possible to be indicative of a LOCA inside primary containment..

Four channels of the Drywell Pressure-High Function are required to be OPERABLE when HPCI is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude HPCI initiation. Refer to LCO 3.5.1 for the Applicability Bases for the HPCI System.

3.c. Reactor Vessel Water Level-High, Level 8 High RPV water level indicates that sufficient cooling water inventory exists in the reactor vessel such that there is no danger to the fuel.

Therefore, the Level 8 signal is used to trip the HPCI turbine to prevent overflow into the main steam lines (MSLs). The Reactor Vessel Water Level-High, Level 8 Function is not assumed in the accident and transient analyses. It was retained since it is a potentially significant contributor to risk.

Reactor Vessel Water Level-High, Level 8 signals for HPCI are initiated from two level instruments. Both Level 8 signals are required in order to trip HPCI. This ensures that no single instrument failure can preclude an HPCI initiation or trip. The Reactor Vessel Water Level-High, Level 8 Allowable Value is chosen to prevent flow from the HPCI Systemfrom overflowing into the MSLs.

Two channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level-High, Level 8 Function are required to be OPERABLE only when HPCI is required to be OPERABLE.

Refer to LCO 3.5.1 and LCO 3.5.2 for HPCI Applicability Bases.

3.d. Condensate Storage Tank Level-Low The Condensate Storage Tank-Low signal indicates that a conservatively calculated NPSH-available limit is being approached.

(continued)

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PPL Rev. 3 ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY

ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY 3.d. Condensate Storaqe Tank Level-Low (continued)

Normally the suction valves between HPCI and the CST are open and, upon receiving a HPCI initiation signal, water for HPCI injection would be taken from the CST. However, if the water level in the CST falls to the level switch process setpoint value, an automatic suction transfer is initiated. The suppression pool suction valve receives a signal to open and in parallel, the CST suction valve receives a signal to close to complete the transfer. The HPCI suction transfer must be initiated prior to CST level dropping below the technical specification allowable value to ensure that an adequate suction head for the pump and an uninterrupted supply of makeup water is available to the HPCI pump. The Function is implicitly assumed in the accident and transient analyses (which take credit for HPCI) since the analyses assume that the HPCI suction source is the suppression pool.

Condensate Storage Tank Level-Low signals are initiated from two level instruments. The logic is arranged such that either level switch can cause the suppression pool suction valves to open and the CST suction valve to close. The Condensate Storage Tank Level-Low Function Allowable Value is high enough to ensure adequate pump suction head while water is being taken from the CST.

Two channels of the Condensate Storage Tank Level-Low Function are required to be OPERABLE only when HPCI is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude HPCI swap to suppression pool source. Refer to LCO 3.5.1 for HPCI Applicability Bases.

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.3-116 Revision 3 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY

ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY PPL Rev. 3 ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 3.d. Condensate Storage Tank Level-Low (continued)

Normally the suction valves between HPCI and the CST are open and, upon receiving a HPCI initiation signal, water for HPCI injection would be taken from the CST. However, if the water level in the CST falls to the level switch process setpoint value, an automatic suction transfer is initiated. The suppression pool suction valve receives a signal to open and in parallel, the CST suction valve receives a signal to close to complete the transfer. The HPCI suction transfer must be initiated prior to CST level dropping below the technical specification allowable value to ensure that an adequate suction head for the pump and an uninterrupted supply of makeup water is available to the HPCI pump. The Function is implicitly assumed in the accident and transient analyses (which take credit for HPCI) since the analyses assume that the HPCI suction source is the suppression pool.

Condensate Storage Tank Level-Low signals are initiated from two level instruments. The logic is arranged such that either level switch can cause the suppression pool suction valves to open and the CST suction valve to close. The Condensate Storage Tank Level-Low Function Allowable Value is high enough to ensure adequate pump suction head while water is being taken from the CST.

Two channels of the Condensate Storage Tank Level-Low Function are required to be OPERABLE only when HPCI is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude HPCI swap to suppression pool source. Refer to LCO 3.5.1 for HPCI Applicability Bases.

( continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.3-116 Revision 3

PPL Rev. 3 ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY

ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY 3.e. Manual Initiation The Manual Initiation push button channel introduces signals into the HPCI logic to provide manual initiation capability and is redundant to the automatic protective instrumentation. There is one push button for the HPCI System.

The Manual Initiation Function is not assumed in any accident or transient analyses in the FSAR. However, the Function is retained for overall redundancy and diversity of the HPCI function as required by the NRC in the plant licensing basis.

There is no Allowable Value for this Function since the channel is mechanically actuated based solely on the position of the push button.

One channel of the Manual Initiation Function is required to be OPERABLE only when the HPCI System is required to be OPERABLE.

Refer to LCO 3.5.1 for HPCI Applicability Bases.

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.3-117 Revision 1 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY

ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABI LlTY PPL Rev. 3 ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 3.e. Manual Initiation The Manual Initiation push button channel introduces signals into the HPCI logic to provide manual initiation capability and is redundant to the automatic protective instrumentation. There is one push button for the HPCI System.

The Manual Initiation Function is not assumed in any accident or transient analyses in the FSAR. However, the Function is retained for overall redundancy and diversity of the HPCI function as required by the NRC in the plant licensing basis.

There is no Allowable Value for this Function since the channel is mechanically actuated based solely on the position of the push button.

One channel of the Manual Initiation Function is required to be OPERABLE only when the HPCI System is required to be OPERABLE.

Refer to LCO 3.5.1 for HPCI Applicability Bases.

\\

(continued)

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PPL Rev. 3 ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY

ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY (continued)

Automatic Dewressurization System 4.a. 5.a. Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low. Level 1 Low RPV water level indicates that the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened. Should RPV water level decrease too far, fuel damage could result. Therefore, ADS receives one of the signals necessary for initiation from this Function. The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low, Level 1 is one of the Functions assumed to be OPERABLE and capable of initiating the ADS during the accident analyzed in Reference 1. The core cooling function of the ECCS, along with the scram action of the RPS, ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46.

Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low, Level 1 signals are initiated from four level instruments that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel. Four channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low, Level 1 Function are required to be OPERABLE only when ADS is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude ADS initiation. Two channels input to ADS trip system A, while the other two channels input to ADS trip system B. Refer to LCO 3.5.1 for ADS Applicability Bases.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low, Level 1 Allowable Value is chosen to allow time for the low pressure core flooding systems to initiate and provide adequate cooling.

4.b. 5.b. Drvwell Pressure-Hiah High pressure in the drywell could indicate a break in the RCPB.

Therefore, ADS receives one of the signals necessary for initiation from this Function in order to minimize the possibility of fuel damage. The Drywell Pressure-High is assumed to be OPERABLE and capable of initiating the ADS during the accidents analyzed in Reference 2. The core cooling function of the ECCS, along with the scram action of the RPS, ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46.

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.3-118 Revision 0 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY

ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABI LlTY (continued)

Automatic Depressurization System PPL Rev. 3 ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 4.a, 5.a. Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low, Level 1 Low RPV water level indicates that the capability to cool the fuel may be threatened. Should RPV water level decrease too far, fuel damage could result. Therefore, ADS receives one of the signals necessary for initiation from this Function. The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low, Level 1 is one of the Functions assumed to be OPERABLE and capable of initiating the ADS during the accident analyzed in Reference 1. The core cooling function of the ECCS, along with the scram action of the RPS, ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46.

Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low, Level 1 signals are initiated from four level instruments that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel. Four channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low, Level 1 Function are required to be OPERABLE only when ADS is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude ADS initiation. Two channels input to ADS trip system A, while the other two channels input to ADS trip system B. Refer to LCO 3.5.1 for ADS Applicability Bases.

The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low, Level 1 Allowable Value is chosen to allow time for the low pressure core flooding systems to initiate and provide adequate cooling.

4.b,5.b. Drywell Pressure-High High pressure in the drywell could indicate a break in the RCPB.

Therefore, ADS receives one of the signals necessary for initiation from this Function in order to minimize the possibility of fuel damage. The Drywell Pressure-High is assumed to be OPERABLE and capable of initiating the ADS during the accidents analyzed in Reference 2. The core cooling function of the ECCS, along with the scram action of the RPS, ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46.

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.3-118 Revision 0

PPL Rev. 3 ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES APPLICABLE 4.b, 5.b. Drywell Pressure-High (continued)

SAFETY

ANALYSES, Drywell Pressure-High signals are initiated from four pressure instruments LCO, and that sense drywell pressure. The Allowable Value was selected to be as APPLICABILITY low as possible and be indicative of a LOCA inside primary containment.

Four channels of Drywell Pressure-High Function are only required to be OPERABLE when ADS is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude ADS initiation. Two channels input to ADS trip system A, while the other two channels input to ADS trip system B. Refer to LCO 3.5.1 for ADS Applicability Bases.

4.c, 5.c. Automatic Depressurization System Initiation Timer The purpose of the Automatic Depressurization System Initiation Timer is to delay depressurization of the reactor vessel to allow the HPCI System time to maintain reactor vessel water level. Since the rapid depressurization caused by ADS operation is one of the most severe transients on the reactor vessel, its occurrence should be limited. By delaying initiation of the ADS Function, the operator is given the chance to monitor the success or failure of the HPCI System to maintain water level, and then to decide whether or not to allow ADS to initiate, to delay initiation further by recycling the timer, or to inhibit initiation permanently.

The Automatic Depressurization System Initiation Timer Function is assumed to be OPERABLE for the accident analyses of Reference 1 that require ECCS initiation and assume failure of the HPCI System.

There are two Automatic Depressurization System Initiation Timer relays, one in each of the two ADS trip systems. The Allowable Value for the Automatic Depressurization System Initiation Timer is chosen so that there is still time after depressurization for the low pressure ECCS subsystems to provide adequate core cooling.

Two channels of the Automatic Depressurization System Initiation Timer Function are only required to be OPERABLE when the ADS is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude ADS initiation. (One channel inputs to ADS trip system A, while the other channel (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.3-119 Revision 0 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY

ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABI LlTY 4.b, 5.b. Drywell Pressure-High (continued)

PPL Rev. 3 ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 Drywell Pressure-High signals are initiated from four pressure instruments that sense drywell pressure. The Allowable Value was selected to be as low as possible and be indicative of a LOCA inside primary containment.

Four channels of Drywell Pressure-High Function are only required to be OPERABLE when ADS is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude ADS initiation. Two channels input to ADS trip system A, while the other two channels input to ADS trip system B. Refer to LCO 3.5.1 for ADS Applicability Bases.

4.c, 5.c. Automatic Depressurization System Initiation Timer The purpose of the Automatic Depressurization System Initiation Timer is to delay depressurization of the reactor vessel to allow the HPCI System time to maintain reactor vessel water level. Since the rapid depressurization caused by ADS operation is one of the most severe transients on the reactor vessel, its occurrence should be limited. By delaying initiation of the ADS Function, the operator is given the chance to monitor the success or failure of the HPCI System to maintain water level, and then to decide whether or not to allow ADS to initiate, to delay initiation further by recycling the timer, or to inhibit initiation permanently.

The Automatic Depressurization System Initiation Timer Function is assumed to be OPERABLE for the accident analyses of Reference 1 that require ECCS initiation and assume failure of the HPCI System.

There are two Automatic Depressurization System Initiation Timer relays, one in each of the two ADS trip systems. The Allowable Value for the Automatic Depressurization System Initiation Timer is chosen so that there*

is still time after depressurization for the low pressure ECCS subsystems to provide adequate core cooling.

Two channels of the Automatic Depressurization System Initiation Timer Function are only required to be OPERABLE when the ADS is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude ADS initiation. (One channel inputs to ADS trip system A, while the other channel (continued)

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PPL Rev. 3 ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES APPLICABLE 4.c, 5.c. Automatic Depressurization System Initiation Timer (continued)

SAFETY

ANALYSES, inputs to ADS trip system B. Refer to LCO 3.5.1 for ADS Applicability LCO, and Bases.

APPLICABILITY 4.d. 5.d. Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low, Level 3 The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low, Level 3 Function is used by the ADS only as a confirmatory low water level signal. ADS receives one of the signals necessary for initiation from Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low, Level 1 signals. In order to prevent spurious initiation of the ADS due to spurious Level 1 signals, a Level 3 signal must also be received before ADS initiation commences.

Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low, Level 3 signals are initiated from two level instruments that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel. The Allowable Value for Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low, Level 3 is selected at the RPS Level 3 scram Allowable Value for convenience. Refer to LCO 3.3.1.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation," for the Bases discussion of this Function.

Two channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low, Level 3 Function are required to be OPERABLE only when the ADS is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude ADS initiation. One channel inputs to ADS trip system A, while the other channel inputs to ADS trip system B. Refer to LCO 3.5.1 for ADS Applicability Bases.

4.e, 4.f, 5.e, 5.f. Core Spray and Low Pressure Coolant Iniection Pump Discharge Pressure-High The Pump Discharge Pressure-High signals from the CS and LPCI pumps are used as permissives for ADS initiation, indicating that there is a source of low pressure cooling water available once the ADS has depressurized the vessel. Pump Discharge Pressure-High is one of the Functions assumed to be OPERABLE and capable of permitting ADS.

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.3-120 Revision 0 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY

ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABI LlTY PPL Rev. 3 EC.CS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 4.c, S.c. Automatic Depressurization System Initiation Timer (continued) inputs to ADS trip system B. Refer to LCO 3.5.1 for ADS Applicability Bases.

4.d, S.d. Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low, Level 3 The Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low, Level 3 Function is used by the ADS only as a confirmatory low water level signal. ADS receives one of the signals necessary for initiation from Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low Low Low, Level 1 signals. In order to prevent spurious initiation of the ADS due to spurious Level 1 signals, a Level 3 signal must also be received before ADS initiation commences.

Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low, Level 3 signals are initiated from two level instruments that sense the difference between the pressure due to a constant column of water (reference leg) and the pressure due to the actual water level (variable leg) in the vessel. The Allowable Value for Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low, Level 3 is selected at the RPS Level 3 scram Allowable Value for convenience. Refer to LCO 3.3.1.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation," for the Bases discussion of this Function.

Two channels of Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low, Level 3 Function are required to be OPERABLE only when the ADS is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude ADS initiation. One channel inputs to ADS trip system A, while the other channel inputs to ADS trip system B. Refer to LCO 3.5.1 for ADS Applicability Bases.

4.e, 4.f, S.e, S.f. Core Spray and Low Pressure Coolant Injection Pump Discharge Pressure-High The Pump Discharge Pressure-High signals from the CS and LPCI pumps are used as permissives for ADS initiation, indicating that there is a source of low pressure cooling water available once the ADS has depressurized the vessel. Pump Discharge Pressure-High is one of the Functions assumed to be OPERABLE and capable of permitting ADS.

(continued)

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PPL Rev. 3 ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY

ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY 4.e, 4.f, 5.e, 5.f. Core Spray and Low Pressure Coolant Iniection Pump Discharge Pressure-High (continued) initiation during the events analyzed in Reference 1 with an assumed HPCI failure. For these events the ADS depressurizes the reactor vessel so that the low pressure ECCS can perform the core cooling functions.

This core cooling function of the ECCS, along with the scram action of the RPS, ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46. Pump discharge pressure signals are initiated from twelve pressure instruments, two on the discharge side of each of the four LPCI'pumps and one on the discharge of each of CS pumps. In order to generate an ADS permissive in one trip system, it is necessary that only one LPCI pump or one CS subsystem indicate the high discharge pressure condition. The Pump Discharge Pressure-High Allowable Value is less than the pump discharge pressure when the pump is operating in a full flow mode and high enough to avoid any condition that results in a discharge pressure permissive when the CS and LPCI pumps are aligned for injection and the pumps are not running. The actual operating point of this function is not assumed in any transient or accident analysis.

Twelve channels of Core Spray and Low Pressure Coolant Injection Pump Discharge Pressure-High Function are only required to be OPERABLE when the ADS is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude ADS initiation. Two CS channels associated with CS pumps A and C and four LPCI channels associated with LPCI pumps A and C are required for trip system A. Two CS channels associated with CS pumps B and D and four LPCI channels associated with LPCI pumps B and D are required for trip system B. Refer to LCO 3.5.1 for ADS Applicability Bases.

4.q, 5.q. Automatic Depressurization System Drvwell Pressure Bypass Actuation Timer One of the signals required for ADS initiation is Drywell Pressure-High.

However, if the event requiring ADS initiation occurs outside the drywell (e.g., main steam line break outside containment), a high drywell pressure signal may never be present. Therefore, the Automatic Depressurization System Drywell Pressure Bypass Actuation (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.3-121 Revision 0 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY

ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABI LlTY PPL Rev. 3 ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 4.e, 4.f, 5.e, 5.f. Core Spray and Low Pressure Coolant Injection Pump Discharge Pressure-High (continued) initiation during the events analyzed in Reference 1 with an assumed HPCI failure. For these events the ADS depressurizes the reactor vessel so that the low pressure ECCS can perform the core cooling functions.

This core cooling function of the ECCS, along with the scram action of the RPS, ensures that the fuel peak cladding temperature remains below the limits of 10 CFR 50.46. Pump discharge pressure signals are initiated from twelve pressure instruments, two on the discharge side of each of the four LPCI'pumps and one on the discharge of each of CS pumps. In order to generate an ADS permissive in one trip system, it is necessary that only one LPCI pump or one CS subsystem indicate the high discharge pressure condition. The Pump Discharge Pressure-High Allowable Value is less than the pump discharge pressure when the pump is operating in a full flow mode and high enough to avoid any condition that results in a discharge pressure permissive when the CS and LPCI pumps are aligned for injection and the pumps are not running. The actual operating point of this function is not assumed in any transient or accident analysis.

Twelve channels of Core Spray and Low Pressure Coolant Injection Pump Discharge Pressure-High Function are only required to be OPERABLE when the ADS is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude ADS initiation. Two CS channels associated with CS pumps A and C and four LPCI channels associated with LPCI pumps A and C are required for trip system A. Two CS channels associated with CS pumps Band D and four LPCI channels associated with LPCI pumps Band D are required for trip system B. Refer to LCO 3.5.1 for ADS Applicability Bases.

4.g, 5.g. Automatic Depressurization System Drywell Pressure Bypass Actuation Timer One of the signals required for ADS initiation is Drywell Pressure-High.

However, if the event requiring ADS initiation occurs outside the drywell (e.g., main steam line break outside containment), a high drywell pressure signal may never be present. Therefore, the Automatic Depressurization System Drywell Pressure Bypass Actuation (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.3-121 Revision 0

PPL Rev. 3 ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY

ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABILITY 4a. 5.g. Automatic Depressurization System Drywell Pressure Bypass Actuation Timer (continued)

Timer is used to bypass the Drywell Pressure-High Function after a certain time period has elapsed. Operation of the Automatic Depressurization System Drywell Pressure Bypass Actuation Timer Function is not assumed in any accident analysis. The instrumentation is retained in the TS because ADS is part of the primary success path for mitigation of a DBA.

There are four Automatic Depressurization System Drywell Pressure Bypass Actuation Timer relays, two in each of the two ADS trip systems.

The Allowable Value for the Automatic Depressurization System Low Water Level Actuation Timer is chosen to ensure that there is still time after depressurization for the low pressure ECCS subsystems to provide adequate core cooling.

Four channels of the Automatic Depressurization System Drywell Pressure Bypass Actuation Timer Function are required to be OPERABLE only when the ADS is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude ADS initiation. Refer to LCO 3.5.1 for ADS Applicability Bases.

4.h, 5.h. Manual Initiation The Manual Initiation push button channels introduce signals into the ADS logic to provide manual initiation capability and are redundant to the automatic protective instrumentation. There are two push buttons for each ADS trip system for a total of four.

The Manual Initiation Function is not assumed in any accident or transient analyses in the FSAR. However, the Function is retained for overall redundancy and diversity of the ADS functions as required by the NRC in the plant licensing basis.

There is no Allowable Value for this Function since the channels are mechanically actuated based solely on the position of the push buttons.

Four channels of the Manual Initiation Function (two channels per trip system) are only (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.3-122 Revision 0 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY

ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABI L1TY PPL Rev. 3 ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 4.9,5.9. Automatic Depressurization System Drywell Pressure Bypass Actuation Timer (continued)

Timer is used to bypass the Drywell Pressure-High Function after a certain time period has elapsed. Operation of the Automatic Depressurization System Drywell Pressure Bypass Actuation Timer Function is not assumed in any accident analysis. The instrumentation is retained in the TS because ADS is part of the primary success path for mitigation of a DBA.

There are four Automatic Depressurization System Dryweli Pressure Bypass Actuation Timer relays, two in each of the two ADS trip systems.

The Allowable Value for the Automatic Depressurization System Low Water Level Actuation Timer is chosen to ensure that there is still time after depressurization for the low pressure ECCS subsystems to provide adequate core cooling.

Four channels of the Automatic Depressurization System Drywell Pressure Bypass Actuation Timer Function are required to be OPERABLE only when the ADS is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that no single instrument failure can preclude ADS initiation. Refer to LCO 3.5.1 for ADS Applicability Bases.

4.h, 5.h. Manual Initiation The Manual Initiation push button channels introduce signals into the ADS logic to provide manual initiation capability and are redundant to the automatic protective instrumentation. There are two push buttons for each ADS trip system for a total of four.

The Manual Initiation Function is not assumed in any accident or transient analyses in the FSAR. However, the Function is retained for overall redundancy and diversity of the ADS functions as required by the NRC in the plant licensing basis.

There is no Allowable Value for this Function since the channels are mechanically actuated based solely on the position of the push buttons.

Four channels of the Manual Initiation Function (two channels per trip system) are only (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.3-122 Revision 0

PPL Rev. 3 ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES APPLICABLE 4.h, 5.h. Manual Initiation (continued)

SAFETY

ANALYSES, required to be OPERABLE when the ADS is required to be OPERABLE.

LCO, and Refer to LCO 3.5.1 for ADS Applicability Bases.

APPLICABILITY ACTIONS A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to ECCS instrumentation channels. Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies that once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components, or variables expressed in the Condition discovered to be inoperable or not within limits will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies that Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition. However, the Required Actions for inoperable ECCS instrumentation channels provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate inoperable Condition entry for each inoperable ECCS instrumentation channel.

A. 1 Required Action A.1 directs entry into the appropriate Condition referenced in Table 3.3.5.1-1. The applicable Condition referenced in the table is Function dependent. Each time a channel is discovered inoperable, Condition A is entered for that channel and provides for transfer to the appropriate subsequent Condition.

B.1, B.2, and B.3 Required Actions B. 1 and B.2 are intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable, untripped channels within the same Function result in redundant automatic initiation capability being lost for the feature(s). Required Action B.1 features would be those that are initiated by Functions 1.a, 1.b, 1.c, 2.a, 2.b, and 2.c (e.g., low pressure ECCS). The Required Action B.2 system would be HPCI. For Required Action B.1, redundant automatic initiation capability is lost if (a) one Function 1.a, 1.b, 1.c, 2.a, or 2.b is inoperable and untripped with only one offsite source OPERABLE, or (b) one or more Function l.a or Function 2.a channels in both divisions are inoperable and untripped, or (c) one or more Function 1.b or Function 2.b channels in both divisions are (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.3-123 Revision 1 BASES APPLICABLE SAFETY

ANALYSES, LCO, and APPLICABI LlTY ACTIONS 4.h, 5.h. Manual Initiation (continued)

PPL Rev. 3 ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 required to be OPERABLE when the ADS is required to be OPERABLE.

Refer to LCO 3.5.1 for ADS Applicability Bases.

A Note has been provided to modify the ACTIONS related to ECCS instrumentation channels. Section 1.3, Completion Times, specifies that once a Condition has been entered, subsequent divisions, subsystems, components, or variables expressed in the Condition discovered to be inoperable or not within limits will not result in separate entry into the Condition. Section 1.3 also specifies that Required Actions of the Condition continue to apply for each additional failure, with Completion Times based on initial entry into the Condition. However, the Required Actions for inoperable ECCS instrumentation channels provide appropriate compensatory measures for separate inoperable Condition entry for each inoperable ECCS instrumentation channel.

Required Action A.1 directs entry into the appropriate Condition referenced in Table 3.3.5.1-1. The applicable Condition referenced in the table is Function dependent. Each time a channel is discovered inoperable, Condition A is entered for that channel and provides for transfer to the appropriate subsequent Condition.

B.1, B.2, and B.3 Required Actions B.1 and B.2 are intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable, untripped channels within the same Function result in redundant automatic initiation capability being lost for the feature(s). Required Action B.1 features would be those that are initiated by Functions 1.a, 1.b, 1.c, 2.a, 2.b, and 2.c (e.g., low pressure ECCS). The Required Action B.2 system would be HPCI. For Required Action B.1, redundant automatic initiation capability is lost if (a) one Function 1.a, 1.b, 1.c, 2.a, or 2.b is inoperable and untripped with only one offsite source OPERABLE, or (b) one or more Function 1.a or Function 2.a channels in both divisions are inoperable and untripped, or (c) one or more Function 1.b or Function 2.b channels in both divisions are (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.3-123 Revision 1

PPL Rev. 3 ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES ACTIONS B.1, B.2, and B.3 (continued) inoperable and untripped, or (d) one or more Function 1.c or Function 2.c channels in both divisions are inoperable and untripped.

For (a) above (Function 1.a, 1.b, 1.c, 2.a, or 2.b is inoperable and untripped with only one offsite source OPERABLE), the ESW pump timer resets may not receive a reset signal and the Reactor Building chillers, Turbine Building chillers and the Drywell cooling equipment may not receive a trip signal. Without the reset of the ESW pump timers and without the trip of the Reactor Building and Turbine Building chillers, the OPERABLE offsite circuit may not be capable of accepting starts of the ESW pumps concurrently with CS or LPCI pumps. For this situation, both the OPERABLE offsite circuit and the DG, that would not be capable of starting, should be declared inoperable. Actions required by LCO 3.8.1 "AC Sources Operating" or LCO 3.8.2 "AC Sources Shutdown" should be taken or disable the affected reactor building/turbine building chillers and disable the affected ESW pumps automatic initiation capability and take the ACTIONS required by LCO 3.7.2 "ESW System".

For the Drywell cooling equipment trip, inoperability of this feature would require that the associated drywell cooling fans be declared inoperable in accordance with LCO 3.6.3.2 "Drywell Air Flow System".

With two offsite sources OPERABLE and one Function 1.a, 1.b, 1.c, 2.a, or 2.b inoperable and untripped, sufficient ECCS equipment is available to meet the design basis accident analysis.

For (b), (c) and (d) above, for each Division, since each inoperable channel would have Required Action B. 1 applied separately (refer to ACTIONS Note), each inoperable channel would only require the affected portion of the associated system of low pressure ECCS, DGs, and associated features to be declared inoperable. However, since channels in both Divisions are inoperable and untripped, and the Completion Times started concurrently for the channels in both subsystems, this results in the affected portions in the associated low pressure ECCS and DGs being concurrently declared inoperable.

For Required Action B.2, redundant automatic initiation capability is lost if two Function 3.a or two Function 3.b channels are inoperable and untripped in the same trip system. In this situation (loss of redundant automatic initiation capability), the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> allowance of Required Action B.3 is not appropriate and the feature(s) associated with the inoperable, untripped (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.3-124 Revision 1 BASES ACTIONS B.1, B.2, and B.3 (continued)

PPL Rev. 3 ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 inoperable and untripped, or (d) one or more Function 1.c or Function 2.c channels in both divisions are inoperable and untripped.

For (a) above (Function 1.a, 1.b, 1.c, 2.a, or 2.b is inoperable and untripped with only one offsite source OPERABLE), the ESW pump timer resets may not receive a reset signal and the Reactor Building chillers, Turbine Building chillers and the Drywell cooling equipment may not receive a trip signal. Without the reset of the ESW pump timers and without the trip of the Reactor Building and Turbine Building chillers, the OPERABLE offsite circuit may not be capable of accepting starts of the ESW pumps concurrently with CS or LPCI pumps. For this situation, both the OPERABLE offsite circuit and the DG, that would not be capable of starting, should be declared inoperable. Actions required by LCO 3.8.1 "AC Sources Operating" or LCO 3.8.2 "AC Sources Shutdown" should be taken or disable the affected reactor building/turbine building chillers and disable the affected ESW pumps automatic initiation capability and take the ACTIONS required by LCO 3.7.2 "ESW System".

For the Drywell cooling equipment trip, inoperability of this feature would require that the associated drywell cooling fans be declared inoperable in accordance with LCO 3.6.3.2 "Drywell Air Flow System".

With two offsite sources OPERABLE and one Function 1.a, 1.b, 1.c, 2.a, or 2.b inoperable and untripped, sufficient ECCS equipment is available to meet the design basis accident analysis.

For (b), (c) and (d) above, for each Division, since each inoperable channel would have Required Action B.1 applied separately (refer to ACTIONS Note), each inoperable channel would only require the affeCted portion of the associated system of low pressure ECCS, DGs, and associated features to be declared inoperable. However, since channels in both Divisions are inoperable and untripped, and the Completion Times started concurrently for the channels in both subsystems, this results in the affected portions in the associated low pressure ECCS and DGs being concurrently declared inoperable.

For Required Action B.2, redundant automatic initiation capability is lost if two Function 3.a or two Function 3.b channels are inoperable and untripped in the same trip system. In this situation (loss of redundant automatic initiation capability), the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> allowance of Required Action B.3 is not appropriate and the feature(s) associated with the inoperable, untripped (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.3-124 Revision 1

PPL Rev. 3 ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES ACTIONS B.1, B.2, and B.3 (continued) channels must be declared inoperable within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. As noted (Note 1 to Required Action B.1), Required Action B.1 is only applicable in MODES 1, 2, and 3. In MODES 4 and 5, the specific initiation time of the low pressure ECCS is not assumed and the probability of a LOCA is lower.

Thus, a total loss of initiation capability for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> (as allowed by Required Action B.3) is allowed during MODES 4 and 5. There is no similar Note provided for Required Action B.2 since HPCI instrumentation is not required in MODES 4 and 5; thus, a Note is not necessary. Notes are also provided (Note 2 to Required Action B.1 and the Note to Required Action B.2) to delineate which Required Action is applicable for each Function that requires entry into Condition B if an associated channel is inoperable. This ensures that the proper loss of initiation capability check is performed.

The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." For Required Action B.1, the Completion Time only begins upon discovery that a redundant feature in both Divisions (e.g.,

both CS subsystems) cannot be automatically (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.3-124a Revision 0 BASES ACTIONS B.1, B.2, and B.3 (continued)

PPL Rev. 3 ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 channels must be declared inoperable within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. As noted (Note 1 to Required Action B.1), Required Action B.1 is only applicable in MODES 1, 2, and 3. In MODES 4 and 5, the specific initiation time of the low pressure ECCS is not assumed and the probability of a LOCA is lower.

Thus, a total loss of initiation capability for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> (as allowed by Required Action B.3) is allowed during MODES 4 and 5. There is no similar Note provided for Required Action B.2 since HPCI instrumentation is not required in MODES 4 and 5; thus, a Note is not necessary. Notes are also provided (Note 2 to Required Action B.1 and the Note to Required Action B.2) to delineate which Required Action is applicable for each Function that requires entry into Condition B if an associated channel is inoperable. This ensures that the proper loss of initiation capability check is performed.

The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." For Required Action B.1, the Completion Time only begins upon discovery that a redundant feature in both Divisions (e.g.,

both CS subsystems) cannot be automatically (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.3-124a Revision 0

PPL Rev. 3 ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES ACTIONS B.1, B.2, and B.3 (continued) initiated due to inoperable, untripped channels within the same Function as described in the paragraph above. For Required Action B.2, the Completion Time only begins upon discovery that the HPCI System cannot be automatically initiated due to two inoperable, untripped channels for the associated Function in the same trip system. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Completion Time from discovery of loss of initiation capability is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration or tripping of channels.

Because of the diversity of sensors available to provide initiation signals and the redundancy of the ECCS design, an allowable out of service time of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> has been shown to be acceptable (Ref. 3) to permit restoration of any inoperable channel to OPERABLE status. If the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowable out of service time, the channel must be placed in the tripped condition per Required Action B.3. Placing the inoperable channel in trip would conservatively compensate for the inoperability, restore capability to accommodate a single failure, and allow operation to continue.

Alternately, if it is not desired to place the channel in trip (e.g., as in the case where placing the inoperable channel in trip would result in an initiation), Condition G must be entered and its Required Action taken.

C.1 and C.2 Required Action C.1 is intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable channels within the same Function result in redundant automatic initiation capability being lost for the feature(s).

Required Action C.1 features would be those that are initiated by Functions 1.d, 2.d, and 2.e (i.e., low pressure ECCS). Redundant automatic initiation capability is lost if either (a) two or more Function 1.d channels are inoperable such that the trip system loses initiation capability, (b) two or more Function 2.d channels are inoperable in the same trip system such that the trip system loses initiation capability, or (c) two or more Function 2.e channels are inoperable affecting LPCI pumps in different subsystems. In this situation (loss of redundant automatic initiation (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.3-125 Revision 0 BASES ACTIONS B.1, B.2, and B.3 (continued)

PPL Rev. 3 ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 initiated due to inoperable, untripped channels within the same Function as described in the paragraph above. For Required Action B.2, the Completion Time only begins upon discovery that the HPCI System cannot be automatically initiated due to two inoperable, untripped channels for the associated Function in the same trip system. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Completion Time from discovery of loss of initiation capability is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration or tripping of channels.

Because of the diversity of sensors available to provide initiation signals and the redundancy of the ECCS design, an allowable out of service time of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> has been shown to be acceptable (Ref. 3) to permit restoration of any inoperable channel to OPERABLE status. If the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowable out of service time, the channel must be placed in the tripped condition per Required Action B.3. Placing the inoperable channel in trip would conservatively compensate for the inoperability, restore capability to accommodate a single failure, and allow operation to continue.

Alternately, if it is not desired to place the channel in trip (e.g., as in the case where placing the inoperable channel in trip would result in an initiation), Condition G must be entered and its Required Action taken.

C.1 and C.2 Required Action C.1 is intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable channels within the same Function result in redundant automatic initiation capability being lost for the feature(s).

Required Action C.1 features would be those that are initiated by Functions 1.d, 2.d, and 2.e (Le., low pressure ECCS). Redundant automatic initiation capability is lost if either (a) two or more Function 1.d channels are inoperable such that the trip system loses initiation capability, (b) two or more Function 2.d channels are inoperable in the same trip system such that the trip system loses initiation capability, or (c) two or more Function 2.e channels are inoperable affecting LPCI pumps in different subsystems. In this situation (loss of redundant automatic initiation (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.3-125 Revision 0

PPL Rev. 3 ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES ACTIONS C.1 and C.2 (continued) capability), the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> allowance of Required Action C.2 is not appropriate and the feature(s) associated with the inoperable channels must be declared inoperable within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. Since each inoperable channel would have Required Action C.1 applied separately (refer to ACTIONS Note), each inoperable channel would only require the affected portion of the associated system to be declared inoperable. However, since channels for both low pressure ECCS subsystems are inoperable (e.g., both CS subsystems), and the Completion Times started concurrently for the channels in both subsystems, this results in the affected portions in both subsystems being concurrently declared inoperable. For Functions 1d, 2.d, and 2.e, the affected portions are the associated low pressure ECCS pumps. As noted (Note 1), Required Action C.1 is only applicable in MODES 1, 2, and 3. In MODES 4 and 5, the specific initiation time of the ECCS is not assumed and the probability of a LOCA is lower. Thus, a total loss of automatic initiation capability for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> (as allowed by Required Action C.2) is allowed during MODES 4 and 5.

Note 2 states that Required Action C.1 is only applicable for Functions 1.d, 2.d, and 2.e. Required Action C.1 is not applicable to Functions 1.e, 2.f, and 3.e (which also require entry into this Condition if a channel in these Functions is inoperable), since they are the Manual Initiation Functions and are not assumed in any accident or transient analysis. Thus, a total loss of manual initiation capability for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> (as allowed by Required Action C.2) is allowed. Required Action C.1 is also not applicable to Function 3.c (which also requires entry into this Condition if a channel in this Function is inoperable), since the loss of one channel results in a loss of the Function (two-out-of-two logic). This loss was considered during the development of Reference 3 and considered acceptable for the 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> allowed by Required Action C.2.

The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock."

For Required Action C.1, the Completion Time only begins upon discovery that the same feature in both subsystems (e.g., both CS subsystems) cannot be automatically initiated (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.3-126 Revision 1 BASES PPL Rev. 3 ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 ACTIONS C.1 and C.2 (continued) capability), the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> allowance of Required Action C.2 is not appropriate and the feature(s) associated with the inoperable channels must be declared inoperable within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. Since each inoperable channel would have Required Action C.1 applied separately (refer to ACTIONS Note), each inoperable channel would only require the affected portion of the associated system to be declared inoperable. However, since channels for both low pressure ECCS subsystems are inoperable (e.g., both CS subsystems), and the Completion Times started concurrently for the channels in both subsystems, this results in the affected portions in both subsystems being concurrently declared inoperable. For Functions 1.d, 2.d, and 2.e, the affected portions are the associated low pressure ECCS pumps. As noted (Note 1), Required Action C.1 is only applicable in MODES 1, 2, and 3. In MODES 4 and 5, the specific initiation time of the ECCS is not assumed and the probability of a LOCA is lower. Thus, a total loss of automatic initiation capability for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> (as allowed by Required Action C.2) is allowed during MODES 4 and 5.

Note 2 states that Required Action C.1 is only applicable for Functions 1.d, 2.d, and 2.e. Required Action C.1 is not applicable to Functions 1.e, 2.f, and 3.e (which also require entry into this Condition if a channel in these Functions is inoperable), since they are the Manual Initiation Functions and are not assumed in any accident or transient analysis. Thus, a total loss of manual initiation capability for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> (as allowed by Required Action C.2) is allowed. Required Action C.1 is also not applicable to Function 3.c (which also requires entry into this Condition if a channel in this Function is inoperable), since the loss of one channel results in a loss of the Function (two-out-of-two logic). This loss was considered during the development of Reference 3 and considered acceptable for the 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> allowed by Required Action C.2.

The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock."

For Required Action C.1, the Completion Time only begins upon discovery that the same feature in both subsystems (e.g., both CS subsystems) cannot be automatically initiated (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.3-126 Revision 1

PPL Rev. 3 ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES ACTIONS C.1 and C.2 (continued) due to inoperable channels within the same Function as described in the paragraph above. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Completion Time from discovery of loss of initiation capability is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration of channels.

Because of the diversity of sensors available to provide initiation signals and the redundancy of the ECCS design, an allowable out of service time of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> has been shown to be acceptable (Ref. 3) to permit restoration of any inoperable channel to OPERABLE status. If the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowable out of service time, Condition G must be entered and its Required Action taken. The Required Actions do not allow placing the channel in trip since this action would either cause the initiation or it would not necessarily result in a safe state for the channel in all events.

D.1. D.2.1, and D.2.2 Required Action D.1 is intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable, untripped channels within the same Function result in a complete loss of automatic component initiation capability for the HPCI System. Automatic component initiation capability is lost if two Function 3.d channels are inoperable and untripped. In this situation (loss of automatic suction swap), the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> allowance of Required Actions D.2.1 and D.2.2 is not appropriate and the HPCI System must be declared inoperable within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> after discovery of loss of HPCI initiation capability. A Note identifies that Required Action D.1 is only applicable if the HPCI pump suction is not aligned to the suppression pool, since, if aligned, the Function is already performed. This allow s the HPCI pump suction to be realigned to the Suppression Pool within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, if desired.

The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." For Required Action D.1, the Completion Time only begins upon discovery that the HPCI System cannot be automatically (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.3-127 Revision 1 BASES ACTIONS C.1 and C.2 (continued)

PPL Rev. 3 ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 due to inoperable channels within the same Function as described in the paragraph above. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Completion Time from discovery of loss of initiation capability is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration of channels.

Because of the diversity of sensors available to provide initiation signals and the redundancy of the ECCS design, an allowable out of service time of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> has been shown to be acceptable (Ref. 3) to permit restoration of any inoperable channel to OPERABLE status. If the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowable out of service time, Condition G must be entered and its Required Action taken. The Required Actions do not allow placing the channel in trip since this action would either cause the initiation or it would not necessarily result in a safe state for the channel in all events.

0.1,0.2.1, and 0.2.2 Required Action 0.1 is intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable, untripped channels within the same Function result in a complete loss of automatic component initiation capability for the HPCI System. Automatic component initiation capability is lost if two Function 3.d channels are inoperable and untripped. In this situation (loss of automatic suction swap), the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> allowance of Required Actions 0.2.1 and 0.2.2 is not appropriate and the HPCI. System must be declared inoperable within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> after discovery of loss of HPCI initiation capability. A Note identifies that Required Action 0.1 is only applicable if the HPCI pump suction is not aligned to the suppression pool, since, if aligned, the Function is already performed. This allow s the HPCI pump suction to be realigned to the Suppression Pool within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, if desired.

The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." For Required Action 0.1, the Completion Time only begins upon discovery that the HPCI System cannot be automatically (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.3-127 Revision 1

PPL Rev. 3 ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES ACTIONS DA, D.2.1, and D.2.2 (continued) aligned to the suppression pool due to two inoperable, untripped channels in the same Function. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Completion Time from discovery of loss of initiation capability is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration or tripping of channels. Because of the diversity of sensors available to provide initiation signals and the redundancy of the ECCS design, an allowable out of service time of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> has been shown to be acceptable (Ref. 3) to permit restoration of any inoperable channel to OPERABLE status. If the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowable out of service time, the channel must be placed in the tripped condition per Required Action D.2.1 or the suction source must be aligned to the suppression pool per Required Action D.2.2. Placing the inoperable channel in trip performs the intended function of the channel (shifting the suction source to the suppression pool). Performance of either of these two Required Actions will allow operation to continue. If it is not desired to perform Required Actions D.2.1 and D.2.2, Condition G must be entered and its Required Action taken.

E.1 and E.2 Required Action E.1 is intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable, untripped channels within similar ADS trip system A and B Functions result in redundant automatic initiation capability being lost for the ADS. Redundant automatic initiation capability is lost if either (a) one Function 4.a channel and one Function 5.a channel are inoperable and untripped, (b) one Function 4.b channel and one Function 5.b channel are inoperable and untripped, or (c) one Function 4.d channel and one Function 5.d channel are inoperable and untripped.

In this situation (loss of automatic initiation capability), the 96 hour0.00111 days <br />0.0267 hours <br />1.587302e-4 weeks <br />3.6528e-5 months <br /> or 8 day allowance, as applicable, of Required Action E.2 is not appropriate and all ADS valves must be declared inoperable within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> after discovery of loss of ADS initiation capability The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.3-128 Revision 0 BASES ACTIONS D.1. D.2.1! and D.2.2 (continued)

PPL Rev. 3 ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 aligned to the suppression pool due to two inoperable, untripped channels in the same Function. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Completion Time from discovery of loss of initiation capability is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration or tripping of channels. Because of the diversity of sensors available to provide initiation signals and the redundancy of the ECCS design, an allowable out of service time of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> has been shown to be acceptable (Ref. 3) to permit restoration of any inoperable channel to OPERABLE status. If the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowable out of service time, the channel must be placed in the tripped condition per Required Action D.2.1 or the suction source must be aligned to the suppression pool per Required Action D.2.2. Placing the inoperable channel in trip performs the intended function of the channel (shifting the suction source to the suppression pool). Performance of either of these two Required Actions will allow operation to continue. If it is not desired to perform Required Actions D.2.1 and 0.2.2, Condition G must be entered and its Required Action taken.

E.1 and E.2 Required Action E.1 is intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable, untripped channels within similar ADS trip system A and B Functions result in redundant automatic initiation capability being lost for the ADS. Redundant automatic initiation capability is lost if either (a) one Function 4.a channel and one Function 5.a channel are inoperable and untripped, (b) one Function 4.b channel and one Function 5.b channel are inoperable and untripped, or (c) one Function 4.d channel and one Function 5.d channel are inoperable and untripped.

In this situation (loss of automatic initiation capability), the 96 hour0.00111 days <br />0.0267 hours <br />1.587302e-4 weeks <br />3.6528e-5 months <br /> or 8 day allowance, as applicable, of Required Action E.2 is not appropriate and all ADS valves must be declared inoperable within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> after discovery of loss of ADS initiation capability The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.3-128 Revision 0

PPL Rev. 3 ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES ACTIONS E.1 and E.2 (continued)

Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." For Required Action E.1, the Completion Time only begins upon discovery that the ADS cannot be automatically initiated due to inoperable, untripped channels within similar ADS trip system Functions as described in the paragraph above. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Completion Time from discovery of loss of initiation capability is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration or tripping of channels.

Because of the diversity of sensors available to provide initiation signals and the redundancy of the ECCS design, an allowable out of service time of 8 days has been shown to be acceptable (Ref. 3) to permit restoration of any inoperable channel to OPERABLE status if both HPCI and RCIC are OPERABLE. If either HPCI or RCIC is inoperable, the time is shortened to 96 hours0.00111 days <br />0.0267 hours <br />1.587302e-4 weeks <br />3.6528e-5 months <br />. If the status of HPCI or RCIC changes such that the Completion Time changes from 8 days to 96 hours0.00111 days <br />0.0267 hours <br />1.587302e-4 weeks <br />3.6528e-5 months <br />, the 96 hours0.00111 days <br />0.0267 hours <br />1.587302e-4 weeks <br />3.6528e-5 months <br /> begins upon discovery of HPCI or RCIC inoperability. However, the total time for an inoperable, untripped channel cannot exceed 8 days. If the status of HPCI or RCIC changes such that the Completion Time changes from 96 hours0.00111 days <br />0.0267 hours <br />1.587302e-4 weeks <br />3.6528e-5 months <br /> to 8 days, the "time zero" for beginning the 8 day "clock" begins upon discovery of the inoperable, untripped channel. If the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowable out of service time, the channel must be placed in the tripped condition per Required Action E.2. Placing the inoperable channel in trip would conservatively compensate for the inoperability, restore capability to accommodate a single failure, and allow operation to continue.

Alternately, if it is not desired to place the channel in trip (e.g., as in the case where placing the inoperable channel in trip would result in an initiation), Condition G must be entered and its Required Action taken.

F.1 and F.2 Required Action F.1 is intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable channels within similar ADS trip system Functions result in automatic initiation capability being lost for the ADS.

Automatic (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.3-129 Revision 0 BASES ACTIONS E.1 and E.2 (continued)

PPL Rev. 3 ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." For Required Action E.1, the Completion Time only begins upon discovery that the ADS cannot be automatically initiated due to inoperable, untripped channels within similar ADS trip system Functions as described in the paragraph above. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Completion Time from discovery of loss of initiation capability is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration or tripping of channels.

Because of the diversity of sensors available to provide initiation signals and the redundancy of the ECCS design, an allowable out of service time of 8 days has been shown to be acceptable (Ref. 3) to permit restoration of any inoperable channel to OPERABLE status if both HPCI and RCIC are OPERABLE. If either HPCI or RCIC is inoperable, the time is shortened to 96 hours0.00111 days <br />0.0267 hours <br />1.587302e-4 weeks <br />3.6528e-5 months <br />. If the status of HPCI or RCIC changes such that the Completion Time changes from 8 days to 96 hours0.00111 days <br />0.0267 hours <br />1.587302e-4 weeks <br />3.6528e-5 months <br />, the 96 hours0.00111 days <br />0.0267 hours <br />1.587302e-4 weeks <br />3.6528e-5 months <br /> begins upon discovery of HPCI or RCIC inoperability. However, the total time for an inoperable, untripped channel cannot exceed 8 days. If the status of HPCI or RCIC changes such that the Completion Time changes from 96 hours0.00111 days <br />0.0267 hours <br />1.587302e-4 weeks <br />3.6528e-5 months <br /> to 8 days, the "time zero" for beginning the 8 day "clock" begins upon discovery of the inoperable, untripped channel. If the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowable out of service time, the channel must be placed in the tripped condition per Required Action E.2. Placing the inoperable channel in trip would conservatively compensate for the inoperability, restore capability to accommodate a single failure, and allow operation to continue.

Alternately, if it is not desired to place the channel in trip (e.g., as in the case where placing the inoperable channel in trip would result in an initiation), Condition G must be entered and its Required Action taken.

F.1 and F.2 Required Action F.1 is intended to ensure that appropriate actions are taken if multiple, inoperable channels within similar ADS trip system Functions result in automatic initiation capability being lost for the ADS.

Automatic (condnued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.3-129 Revision 0

PPL Rev. 3 ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES ACTIONS F.1 and F.2 (continued) initiation capability is lost if either (a) one Function 4.c channel and one Function 5.c channel are inoperable, (b) a combination of Function 4.e, 4.f, 5.e, and 5.f channels are inoperable such that both ADS trip systems lose initiation capability, or (c) one or more Function 4.g channels and one or more Function 5.g channels are inoperable.

In this situation (loss of automatic initiation capability), the 96 hour0.00111 days <br />0.0267 hours <br />1.587302e-4 weeks <br />3.6528e-5 months <br /> or 8 day allowance, as applicable, of Required Action F.2 is not appropriate, and all ADS valves must be declared inoperable within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> after discovery of loss of ADS initiation capability. The Note to Required Action F.1 states that Required Action F.1 is only applicable for Functions 4.c, 4.e, 4.f, 4.g, 5.c, 5.e, 5.f, and 5.g. Required Action F.1 is not applicable to Functions 4.h and 5.h (which also require entry into this Condition if a channel in these Functions is inoperable), since they are the Manual Initiation Functions and are not assumed in any accident or transient analysis. Thus, a total loss of manual initiation capability for 96 hours0.00111 days <br />0.0267 hours <br />1.587302e-4 weeks <br />3.6528e-5 months <br /> or 8 days (as allowed by Required Action F.2) is allowed.

The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." For Required Action F.1, the Completion Time only begins upon discovery that the ADS cannot be automatically initiated due to inoperable channels within similar ADS trip system Functions as described in the paragraph above. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Completion Time from discovery of loss of initiation capability is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration or tripping of channels.

Because of the diversity of sensors available to provide initiation signals and the redundancy of the ECCS design, an allowable out of service time of 8 days has been shown to be acceptable (Ref. 3) to permit restoration of any inoperable channel to OPERABLE status if both HPCI and RCIC are OPERABLE (Required Action F.2). If either HPCI or RCIC is inoperable, the time shortens to 96 hours0.00111 days <br />0.0267 hours <br />1.587302e-4 weeks <br />3.6528e-5 months <br />. If the status of HPCI or RCIC changes such that the Completion Time changes from 8 days to 96 hours0.00111 days <br />0.0267 hours <br />1.587302e-4 weeks <br />3.6528e-5 months <br />, the 96 hours0.00111 days <br />0.0267 hours <br />1.587302e-4 weeks <br />3.6528e-5 months <br /> begins upon discovery of HPCI or RCIC inoperability.

However, the total time for (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.3-130 Revision 0 BASES ACTIONS F.1 and F.2 (continued)

PPL Rev. 3 ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 initiation capability is lost if either (a) one Function 4.c channel and one Function 5.c channel are inoperable, (b) a combination of Function 4.e, 4.f, 5.e, and 5.f channels are inoperable such that both ADS trip systems lose initiation capability, or (c) one or more Function 4.g channels and one or more Function 5.g channels are inoperable.

In this situation (loss of automatic initiation capability), the 96 hour0.00111 days <br />0.0267 hours <br />1.587302e-4 weeks <br />3.6528e-5 months <br /> or 8 day allowance, as applicable, of Required Action F.2 is not appropriate, and all ADS valves must be declared inoperable within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> after discovery of loss of ADS initiation capability. The Note to Required Action F.1 states that Required Action F.1 is only applicable for Functions 4.c, 4.e, 4.f, 4.g, 5.c, 5.e, 5.f, and 5.g. Required Action F.1 is not applicable to Functions 4.h and 5.h (which also require entry into this Condition if a channel in these Functions is inoperable), since they are the Manual Initiation Functions and are not assumed in any accident or transient analysis. Thus, a total loss of manual initiation capability for 96 hours0.00111 days <br />0.0267 hours <br />1.587302e-4 weeks <br />3.6528e-5 months <br /> or 8 days (as allowed by Required Action F.2) is allowed.

The Completion Time is intended to allow the operator time to evaluate and repair any discovered inoperabilities. This Completion Time also allows for an exception to the normal "time zero" for beginning the allowed outage time "clock." For Required Action F.1, the Completion Time only begins upon discovery that the ADS cannot be automatically initiated due to inoperable channels within similar ADS trip system Functions as described in the paragraph above. The 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> Completion Time from discovery of loss of initiation capability is acceptable because it minimizes risk while allowing time for restoration or tripping of channels.

Because of the diversity of sensors available to provide initiation signals and the redundancy of the ECCS design, an allowable out of service time of 8 days has been shown to be acceptable (Ref. 3) to permit restoration of any inoperable channel to OPERABLE status if both HPCI and RCIC are OPERABLE (Required Action F.2). If either HPCI or RCIC is inoperable, the time shortens to 96 hours0.00111 days <br />0.0267 hours <br />1.587302e-4 weeks <br />3.6528e-5 months <br />. If the status of HPCI or RCIC changes such that the Completion Time changes from 8 days to 96 hours0.00111 days <br />0.0267 hours <br />1.587302e-4 weeks <br />3.6528e-5 months <br />, the 96 hours0.00111 days <br />0.0267 hours <br />1.587302e-4 weeks <br />3.6528e-5 months <br /> begins upon discovery of HPCI or RCIC inoperability.

However, the total time for (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS I B 3.3-130 Revision 0

PPL Rev. 3 ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES ACTIONS F.1 and F.2 (continued) an inoperable channel cannot exceed 8 days. If the status of HPCI or RCIC changes such that the Completion Time changes from 96 hours0.00111 days <br />0.0267 hours <br />1.587302e-4 weeks <br />3.6528e-5 months <br /> to 8 days, the "time zero" for beginning the 8 day "clock" begins upon discovery of the inoperable channel. If the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowable out of service time, Condition G must be entered and its Required Action taken. The Required Actions do not allow placing the channel in trip since this action would not necessarily result in a safe state for the channel in all events.

G.1 With any Required Action and associated Completion Time not met, the associated supported feature(s) may be incapable of performing the intended function, and those associated with inoperable untripped channels must be declared inoperable immediately.

SURVEILLANCE As noted in the beginning of the SRs, the SRs for each ECCS REQUIREMENTS instrumentation Function are found in the SRs column of Table 3.3.5.1-1.

The Surveillances are modified by a Note to indicate that when a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> as follows: (a) for Function 3.c and 3.f; and (b) for Functions other than 3.c and 3.f provided the associated Function or redundant Function maintains ECCS initiation capability. Upon completion of the Surveillance, or expiration of the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> allowance, the channel must be returned to OPERABLE status or the applicable Condition entered and Required Actions taken. This Note is based on the reliability analysis (Ref. 3) assumption of the average time required to perform channel surveillance. That analysis demonstrated that the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> testing allowance does not significantly reduce the probability that the ECCS will initiate when necessary.

In addition, for Functions 1.a, 1.b, 1.c, 2.a and 2.b, the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> allowance is acceptable provided both offsite sources are OPERABLE.

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.3-131 Revision 1 BASES ACTIONS F.1 and F.2 (continued)

PPL Rev. 3 ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 an inoperable channel cannot exceed 8 days. If the status of HPCI or RCIC changes such that the Completion Time changes from 96 hours0.00111 days <br />0.0267 hours <br />1.587302e-4 weeks <br />3.6528e-5 months <br /> to 8 days, the "time zero" for beginning the 8 day "clock" begins upon discovery of the inoperable channel. If the inoperable channel cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the allowable out of service time, Condition G must be entered and its Required Action taken. The Required Actions do not allow placing the channel in trip since this action would not necessarily result in a safe state for the channel in all events.

With any Required Action and associated Completion Time not met, the associated supported feature(s) may be incapable of performing the intended function, and those associated with inoperable untripped channels must be declared inoperable immediately.

SURVEILLANCE As noted in the beginning of the SRs, the SRs for each ECCS REQUIREMENTS instrumentation Function are found in the SRs column of Table 3.3.5.1-1.

The Surveillances are modified by a Note to indicate that when a channel is placed in an inoperable status solely for performance of required Surveillances, entry into associated Conditions and Required Actions may be delayed for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> as follows: (a) for Function 3.c and 3.f; and (b) for Functions other than 3.c and 3.f provided the associated Function or redundant Function maintains ECCS initiation capability. Upon completion of the Surveillance, or expiration of the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> allowance, the channel must be returned to OPERABLE status or the applicable Condition entered and Required Actions taken. This Note is based on the reliability analysis (Ref. 3) assumption of the average time required to '

perform channel surveillance. That analysis demonstrated that the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> testing allowance does not significantly reduce the probability that the ECCS will initiate when necessary.

In addition, for Functions 1.a, 1.b, 1.c, 2.a and 2,b, the 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> allowance is acceptable provided both offsite sources are OPERABLE, (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.3-131 Revision 1

PPL Rev. 3 ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.3.5.1.1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK guarantees that undetected channel failure is limited to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

Agreement criteria which are determined by the plant staff based on an investigation of a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, may be used to support this parameter comparison and include indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its limit, and does not necessarily indicate the channel is Inoperable.

The Frequency is based upon operating experience that demonstrates channel failure is rare. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with the channels required by the LCO.

SR 3.3.5.1.2 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function. The Frequency of 92 days is based on the reliability analyses of Reference 3.

This SR is modified by a Note that provides a general exception to the definition of CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. This exception is necessary because the design of instrumentation does not facilitate functional testing of all required contacts of the relay which input into the combinational logic. (Reference 5) Performance of such a test could result in a plant transient or place the plant in an undo risk situation. Therefore, for this SR, the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST verifies acceptable response by verifying the (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.3-132 Revision 0 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.3.5.1.1 PPL Rev. 3 ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 Performance of the CHANNEL CHECK once every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> ensures that a gross failure of instrumentation has not occurred. A CHANNEL CHECK is normally a comparison of the parameter indicated on one channel to a similar parameter on other channels. It is based on the assumption that instrument channels monitoring the same parameter should read approximately the same value. Significant deviations between the instrument channels could be an indication of excessive instrument drift in one of the channels or something even more serious. A CHANNEL CHECK guarantees that undetected channel failure is limited to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />; thus, it is key to verifying the instrumentation continues to operate properly between each CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

Agreement criteria which are determined by the plant staff based on an investigation of a combination of the channel instrument uncertainties, may be used to support this parameter comparison and include indication and readability. If a channel is outside the criteria, it may be an indication that the instrument has drifted outside its limit, and does not necessarily indicate the channel is Inoperable.

The Frequency is based upon operating experience that demonstrates channel failure is rare. The CHANNEL CHECK supplements less formal checks of channels during normal operational use of the displays associated with the channels required by the LCO.

SR 3.3.5.1.2 A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST is performed on each required channel to ensure that the entire channel will perform the intended function. The Frequency of 92 days is based on the reliability analyses of Reference 3.

This SR is modified by a Note that provides a general exception to the definition of CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST. This exception is necessary because the design of instrumentation does not facilitate functional testing of all required contacts of the relay which input into the combinational logic. (Reference 5) Performance of such a test could result in a plant transient or place the plant in an undo risk situation. Therefore, for this SR, the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST verifies acceptable response by verifying the (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.3-132 Revision 0

PPL Rev. 3 ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.5.1.2 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS change of state of the relay which inputs into the combinational logic. The required contacts not tested during the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST are tested under the LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST, SR 3.3.5.1.5.

This is acceptable because operating experience shows that the contacts not tested during the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST normally pass the LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST, and the testing methodology minimizes the risk of unplanned transients.

SR 3.3.5.1.3 and SR 3.3.5.1.4 A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check that verifies the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology.

The Frequency of SR 3.3.5.1.3 is based upon the assumption of a 92 day calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis.

The Frequency of SR 3.3.5.1.4 is based upon the assumption of a 24 month calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis.

SR 3.3.5.1.5 The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required initiation logic for a specific channel. The system functional testing performed in LCO 3.5.1, LCO 3.5.2, LCO 3.8.1, and LCO 3.8.2 overlaps this Surveillance to complete testing of the assumed safety function. The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST tests the operation of the initiation logic up to but not including the first contact which is unique to an individually supported feature such as the starting of a DG.

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.3-133 Revision 0 BASES PPL Rev. 3 ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.5.1.2 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS change of state of the relay which inputs into the combinational logic. The required contacts not tested during the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST are tested under the LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST, SR 3.3.5.1.5.

This is acceptable because operating experience shows that the contacts not tested during the CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST normally pass the LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST, and the testing methodology minimizes the risk of unplanned transients.

SR 3.3.5.1.3 and SR 3.3.5.1.4 A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is a complete check that verifies the channel responds to the measured parameter within the necessary range and accuracy. CHANNEL CALIBRATION leaves the channel adjusted to account for instrument drifts between successive calibrations consistent with the plant specific setpoint methodology.

The Frequency of SR 3.3.5.1.3 is based upon the assumption of a 92 day calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis.

The Frequency of SR 3.3.5.1.4 is based upon the assumption of a 24 month calibration interval in the determination of the magnitude of equipment drift in the setpoint analysis.

SR 3.3.5.1.5 The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the required initiation logic for a specific channel. The system functional testing performed in LCO 3.5.1, LCO 3.5.2, LCO 3.8.1, and LCO 3.8.2 overlaps this Surveillance to complete testing of the assumed safety function. The LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TEST tests the operation of the initiation logic up to but not including the first contact which is unique to an individually supported feature such as the starting of a DG.

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.3-133 Revision 0

PPL Rev. 3 ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.5.1.5 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform portions of this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 24 month Frequency.

REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section 6.3.
2. FSAR, Chapter 15.
3. NEDC-30936-P-A, "BWR Owners' Group Technical Specification Improvement Analyses for ECCS Actuation Instrumentation, Part 2,"

December 1988.

4. Final Policy Statement on Technical Specifications Improvements, July 22, 1993 (58 FR 32193).
5. NRC Inspection and Enforcement Manual, Part 9900: Technical Guidance, Standard Technical Specification Section 1.0 Definitions, Issue date 12/08/86.

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT,1 TS / B 3.3-134 Revision 0 BASES PPL Rev. 3

. ECCS Instrumentation B 3.3.5.1 SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.5.1.5 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS REFERENCES The 24 month Frequency is based on the need to perform portions of this Surveillance under the conditions that apply during a plant outage and the potential for an unplanned transient if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 24 month Frequency.

1. FSAR, Section 6.3.
2. FSAR, Chapter 15.
3. NEDC-30936-P-A, "BWR Owners' Group Technical Specification Improvement Analyses for ECCS Actuation Instrumentation, Part 2,"

December 1988.

4. Final Policy Statement on Technical Specifications Improvements, July 22, 1993 (58 FR 32193).
5. NRC Inspection and Enforcement Manual, Part 9900: Technical Guidance, Standard Technical Specification Section 1.0 Definitions, Issue date 12/08/86.

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT.1 TS / B 3.3-134 Revision 0

PPL Rev. 2 RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation B 3.4.6 B 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)

B 3.4.6 RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation BASES BACKGROUND GDC 30 of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A (Ref. 1), requires means for detecting and, to the extent practical, identifying the location of the source of RCS LEAKAGE. Regulatory Guide 1.45 (Ref. 2) describes acceptable methods for selecting leakage detection systems.

Limits on LEAKAGE from the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB) are required so that appropriate action can be taken before the integrity of the RCPB-is impaired (Ref. 2). Leakage detection systems for the RCS are provided to alert the operators when leakage rates above normal background levels are detected and also to supply quantitative measurement of leakage rates. The Bases for LCO 3.4.4, "RCS Operational LEAKAGE," discuss the limits on RCS LEAKAGE rates.

Systems for separating the LEAKAGE of an identified source from an unidentified source are necessary to provide prompt and quantitative information to the operators to permit them to take immediate corrective action.

LEAKAGE from the RCPB inside the drywell is detected by at least one of two or three independently monitored variables, such as sump level changes and drywell gaseous and particulate radioactivity levels. The primary means of quantifying LEAKAGE in the drywell is the drywell floor drain sump monitoring system which consists of two drywell floor drain sump level Channels. Both Channels are required to be Operable to satisfy the LCO.

The drywell floor drain sump monitoring system monitors the LEAKAGE collected in the floor drain sump. This unidentified LEAKAGE consists of LEAKAGE from control rod drives, valve flanges or packings, floor drains, the Closed Cooling Water System, and drywell air cooling unit condensate drains, and any LEAKAGE not collected in the drywell equipment drain tank.

The level of each drywell sump is recorded by continuous pen recorders located in the Main Control Room. The change in (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.4-30 Revision 0 B3.4 B 3.4.6 BASES REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS)

RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation PPL Rev. 2 RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation B 3.

4.6 BACKGROUND

GDC 30 of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A (Ref. 1), requires means for detecting and, to the extent practical, identifying the location of the source of RCS LEAKAGE. Regulatory Guide 1.45 (Ref. 2) describes acceptable methods for selecting leakage detection systems.

Limits on LEAKAGE from the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB) are required so that appropriate action can be taken before the integrity of the RCPB'is impaired (Ref. 2). Leakage detection systems for the RCS are provided to alert the operators when leakage rates above normal background levels are detected and also to supply quantitative measurement of leakage rates. The Bases for LCO 3.4.4, "RCS Operational LEAKAGE," discuss the limits on RCS LEAKAGE rates.

Systems for separating the LEAKAGE of an identified source from an unidentified source are necessary to provide prompt and quantitative information to the operators to permit them to take immediate corrective action.

LEAKAGE from the RCPB inside the drywell is detected by at least one of two or three independently monitored variables, such as sump level changes and drywell gaseous and particulate radioactivity levels. The primary means of quantifying LEAKAGE in the drywell is the drywell floor drain sump monitoring system which consists of two drywell floor drain sump level Channels. Both Channels are required to be Operable to satisfy the LCO.

The drywell floor drain sump monitoring system monitors the LEAKAGE collected in the floor drain sump. This unidentified LEAKAGE consists of LEAKAGE from control rod drives, valve flanges or packings, floor drains, the Closed Cooling Water System, and drywell air cooling unit condensate drains, and any LEAKAGE not collected in the drywell equipment drain tank.

The level of each drywell sump is recorded by continuous pen recorders located in the Main Control Room. The change in (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.4-30 Revision 0

PPL Rev. 2 RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation B 3.4.6 BASES BACKGROUND (continued) sump level per unit time determines the leak rate and is calculated from the recorder.

The floor drain sump level indicators have switches that start and stop the sump pumps when required. If the sump fills to the high high level setpoint, an alarm sounds in the control room.

The primary containment air monitoring systems continuously monitor the primary containment atmosphere for airborne particulate and gaseous radioactivity. A sudden increase of radioactivity, which may be attributed to RCPB steam or reactor water LEAKAGE, is annunciated in the control room. The primary containment atmosphere particulate and gaseous radioactivity monitoring systems are not capable of quantifying LEAKAGE rates. These monitors provide an alternate means of leak detection to that supplied by the sump level monitors, and although they cannot ensure detection of a 1 gpm leak in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> in all cases, they provide a diverse means of leak detection (Ref. 3).

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES A threat of significant compromise to the RCPB exists if the barrier contains a crack that is large enough to propagate rapidly. LEAKAGE rate limits are set low enough to detect the LEAKAGE emitted from a single crack in the RCPB (Refs. 4 and 5). Each of the leakage detection systems inside the drywell is designed with the capability of detecting LEAKAGE less than the established LEAKAGE rate limits. The allowed LEAKAGE rates are well below the rates predicted for critical crack sizes (Ref. 6). Therefore, these actions provide adequate response before a significant break in the RCPB can occur.

RCS leakage detection instrumentation satisfies Criterion 1 of the NRC Policy Statement (Ref. 7).

LCO The drywell floor drain sump monitoring system is required to quantify the unidentified LEAKAGE from the RCS. Thus, for the system to be considered OPERABLE, the system must be capable of measuring reactor coolant leakage. The other monitoring systems provide early alarms to the operators so closer examination of other detection systems will be made (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.4-31 Revision 0 BASES BACKGROUND (continued)

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES LCO PPL Rev. 2 RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation B 3.4.6 sump level per unit time determines the leak rate and is calculated from the recorder.

The floor drain sump level indicators have switches that start and stop the sump pumps when required. If the sump fills to the high high level setpoint, an alarm sounds in the control room.

The primary containment air monitoring systems continuously monitor the primary containment atmosphere for airborne particulate and gaseous radioactivity. A sudden increase of radioactivity, which may be attributed to RCPB steam or reactor water LEAKAGE, is annunciated in the control room. The primary containment atmosphere particulate and gaseous radioactivity monitoring systems are not capable of quantifying LEAKAGE rates. These monitors provide an alternate means of leak detection to that supplied by the sump level monitors, and although they cannot ensure detection of a 1 gpm leak in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> in all cases, they provide a diverse means of leak detection (Ref. 3).

A threat of significant compromise to the RCPB exists if the barrier contains a crack that is large enough to propagate rapidly. LEAKAGE rate limits are set low enough to detect the LEAKAGE emitted from a single crack in the RCPB (Refs. 4 and 5). Each of the leakage detection systems inside the drywell is designed with the capability of detecting LEAKAGE less than the established LEAKAGE rate limits. The allowed LEAKAGE rates are well below the rates predicted for critical crack sizes (Ref. 6). Therefore, these actions provide adequate response before a significant break in the RCPB can occur.

RCS leakage detection instrumentation satisfies Criterion 1 of the NRC Policy Statement (Ref. 7).

The drywell floor drain sump monitoring system is required to quantify the unidentified LEAKAGE from the RCS. Thus, for the system to be considered OPERABLE, the system must be capable of measuring reactor coolant leakage. The other monitoring systems provide early alarms to the operators so closer examination of other detection systems will.be made (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.4-31 Revision 0

PPL Rev. 2 RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation B 3.4.6 BASES LCO to determine the extent of any corrective action that may be required.

(continued)

With the leakage detection systems inoperable, monitoring for LEAKAGE in the RCPB is degraded.

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, leakage detection systems are required to be OPERABLE to support LCO 3.4.4. This Applicability is consistent with that for LCO 3.4.4.

ACTIONS A.1 With the drywell floor drain sump monitoring system inoperable, the primary containment atmospheric activity monitor will provide indication of changes in leakage.

With the drywell floor drain sump monitoring system inoperable, operation may continue for 30 days. However, RCS unidentified and total LEAKAGE is still required to be determined every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> (SR 3.4.4.1).

The 30 day Completion Time of Required Action A.1 is acceptable, based on operating experience, considering the multiple forms of leakage detection that are still available.

B.1 and B.2 With both gaseous and particulate primary containment atmospheric monitoring channels inoperable, grab samples of the primary containment atmosphere must be taken and analyzed to provide periodic leakage information. Provided a sample is obtained and analyzed once every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, the plant may be operated for up to 30 days to allow restoration of at least one of the required monitors.

The 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> interval provides periodic information that is adequate to detect LEAKAGE. The 30 day Completion Time for (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.4-32 Revision 1 BASES PPL Rev. 2 RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation B3.4.6 LCO to determine the extent of any corrective action that may be required.

(continued)

With the leakage detection systems inoperable, monitoring for LEAKAGE in the RCPB is degraded.

APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, and 3, leakage detection systems are required to be OPERABLE to support LCO 3.4.4. This Applicability is consistent with that for LCO 3.4.4.

ACTIONS A.1 With the drywell floor drain sump monitoring system inoperable, the primary containment atmospheric activity monitor will provide indication of changes in leakage.

With the drywell floor drain sump monitoring system inoperable, operation may continue for 30 days. However, RCS unidentified and total LEAKAGE is still required to be determined every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> (SR 3.4.4.1).

The 30 day Completion Time of Required Action A.1 is acceptable, based on operating experience, considering the multiple forms of leakage detection that are still available.

B.1 and B.2 With both gaseous and particulate primary containment atmospheric monitoring channels inoperable, grab samples of the primary containment atmosphere must be taken and analyzed to provide periodic leakage information. Provided a sample is obtained and analyzed once every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, the plant may be operated for up to 30 days to allow restoration of at least one of the required monitors.

The 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> interval provides periodic information that is adequate to detect LEAKAGE. The 30 day Completion Time for (continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.4-32 Revision 1

PPL Rev. 2 RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation B 3.4.6 BASES ACTIONS B.1 and B.2 (continued) restoration recognizes that at least one other form of leakage detection is available.

C.1 and C.2 If any Required Action of Condition A or B cannot be met within the associated Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and MODE 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.

The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to perform the actions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

D.1 With all required monitors inoperable, no required automatic means of monitoring LEAKAGE are available, and immediate plant shutdown in accordance with LCO 3.0.3 is required.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.4.6.1 This SR is for the performance of a CHANNEL CHECK of the required primary containment atmospheric monitoring system. The check gives reasonable confidence that the channel is operating properly. The Frequency of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> is based on instrument reliability and is reasonable for detecting off normal conditions.

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.4-33 Revision 1 BASES ACTIONS B.1 and B.2 (continued)

PPL Rev. 2 RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation B 3.4.6 restoration recognizes that at least one other form of leakage detection is available.

C.1 and C.2 If any Required Action of Condition A or B cannot be met within the associated Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and MODE 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.

The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to perform the actions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

With all required monitors inoperable, no required automatic means of monitoring LEAKAGE are available, and immediate plant shutdown in accordance with LCO 3.0.3 is required.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.4.6.1 This SR is for the performance of a CHANNEL CHECK of the required primary containment atmospheric monitoring system. The check gives reasonable confidence that the channel is operating properly. The Frequency of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> is based on instrument reliability and is reasonable for detecting off normal conditions.

(continued)

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.4-33 Revision 1

PPL Rev. 2 RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation B 3.4.6 BASES SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.4.6.2 This SR is for the performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of the required RCS leakage detection instrumentation. The test ensures that the monitors can perform their function in the desired manner. The Frequency of 31 days considers instrument reliability, and operating experience has shown it proper for detecting degradation.

SR 3.4.6.3 This SR is for the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION of required leakage detection instrumentation channels. The calibration verifies the accuracy of the instrument string, including the instruments located inside containment. The Frequency of 24 months is a typical refueling cycle and considers channel reliability.

REFERENCES

1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 30.
2. Regulatory Guide 1.45, May 1973.
3. FSAR, Section 5.2.5.1.2.
4. GEAP-5620, April 1968.
5. NUREG-75/067, October 1975.
6. FSAR, Section 5.2.5.4.
7. Final Policy Statement on Technical Specifications Improvements, July 22, 1993 (58 FR 39132).

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT I TS / B 3.4-34 Revision 0 BASES PPL Rev. 2 RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation B 3.4.6 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SR 3.4.6.2 (continued)

REFERENCES This SR is for the performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of the required RCS leakage detection instrumentation. The test ensures that the monitors can perform their function in the desired manner. The Frequency of 31 days considers instrument reliability, and operating experience has shown it proper for detecting degradation.

SR 3.4.6.3 This SR is for the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION of required leakage detection instrumentation channels. The calibration verifies the accuracy of the instrument string, including the instruments located inside containment. The Frequency of 24 months is a typical refueling cycle and considers channel reliability.

1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 30.
2. Regulatory Guide 1.45, May 1973.
3. FSAR, Section 5.2.5.1.2.
4. GEAP-5620, April 1968.
5. NUREG-75/067, October 1975.
6. FSAR, Section 5.2.5.4.
7. Final Policy Statement on Technical Specifications Improvements, July 22, 1993 (58 FR 39132).

SUSQUEHANNA - UNIT 1 TS / B 3.4-34 Revision 0