IR 05000271/2009003
| ML092110017 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vermont Yankee  |
| Issue date: | 07/29/2009 |
| From: | Diane Jackson NRC/RGN-I/DRP/PB5 |
| To: | Michael Colomb Entergy Nuclear Operations |
| Jackson D RGN-I/DRP/PB2/610-337-5306 | |
| References | |
| IR-09-003 | |
| Download: ML092110017 (31) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION uly 29, 2009
SUBJECT:
VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000271/2009003
Dear Mr. Colomb:
On June 30, 2009, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on July 22, 2009, with Mr. Chris Wamser and other members of your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations, and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.
Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web Site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Donald E. Jackson, Chief Projects Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No. 50-271 License No. DPR-28 Enclosure: Inspection Report No. 05000271/2009003 w/ Attachment: Supplemental Information
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000271/2009003; 04/01/2009 - 06/30/2009; Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station;
Routine Quarterly Integrated Report.
This report covered a three month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announced inspections by regional health physics and operator licensing inspectors. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 4, dated December 2006.
NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
B. Licensee-Identified Findings None.
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status
Vermont Yankee (VY) Nuclear Power Station began the inspection period operating at approximately 100 percent reactor power.
On May 12, VY reduced reactor power to 59 percent for planned Hydraulic Control Unit (HCU)replacements, Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) testing, single control rod scram testing, and control rod sequencing. VY returned to 100 percent reactor power on May 15.
On June 22, the A Recirculation Pump Motor-Generator speed control system malfunctioned.
As a result, VY decreased power to 94 percent. On June 23, VY reduced power to 24 percent to perform repairs on a main condenser tube and the A Recirculation Pump Motor-Generator speed control system. VY returned to 100 percent reactor power on June 25 and remained at or near 100 percent reactor power for the remainder of the inspection period.
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection (71111.01 - 2 Samples)
.1 Seasonal Readiness
a.
Inspection Scope (1 sample)
The inspectors reviewed Entergys procedures for seasonal preparations to evaluate the process for implementation of warm weather preparedness. The inspectors reviewed adverse weather information contained in the External Events Design Basis Document and compared it to the actions specified in operating procedure (OP) 2196, Seasonal Preparedness. The inspectors interviewed operators and performed a walk down with the reactor building operator of the emergency diesel generator (EDG) rooms, and the station air compressor room. The inspectors also examined equipment specified in the OP to determine if equipment readiness was maintained or adjusted to meet the onset of warm weather conditions. The inspectors reviewed a sample of seasonal preparedness-related conditions in Entergys corrective action program to determine if they were appropriately identified and corrected. Additional documents reviewed are listed in the
.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Alternating Current (AC) Power System Readiness
a. Inspection Scope
(1 sample)
The inspectors performed a review of Entergys AC power system readiness for adverse weather. The inspectors reviewed Entergys plant features and procedures for operation and continued availability of their AC power systems to determine if they were appropriate. The inspection focused on Entergys procedures for communication protocols with the transmission system operator (TSO) to determine if appropriate information would be exchanged when issues arise that could impact the offsite power system. The inspectors also reviewed Entergys procedures to determine if they addressed necessary actions to be taken if notified by the TSO that they needed to transfer safety-related loads to the onsite power supply, compensatory actions to be taken if it were not possible to predict grid conditions, and required communications between Entergy and the TSO. The inspectors also reviewed training presented to the operators for grid instability issues and reviewed the events logged during the ice storm on December 12, 2008. A list of documents reviewed is provided in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R04 Equipment Alignment
.1 Partial Walk-downs
a.
Inspection Scope (4 samples)
The inspectors performed partial system walkdowns of the following risk-significant systems listed below to determine the system alignment and to identify any discrepancies that could impact system operability. Observed plant conditions were compared to the standby alignment of equipment specified in applicable piping and instrumentation drawings (P&IDs) and OPs. The inspectors observed valve positions, power supply availability, and the general condition of selected components. Finally, the inspectors evaluated material condition, housekeeping, and component labeling. A list of documents reviewed is provided in the Attachment.
- B and D Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system during the planned A and C RHR maintenance outage the week of April 27, 2009
- Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system during the planned High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) surveillance test on May 19, 2009
- HPCI system on June 3, 2009
- Standby Gas Treatment System on June 5, 2009
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Complete Walk-down
a. Inspection Scope
(1 sample)
The inspectors performed a complete system walkdown of the A and C RHR Service Water system to determine the system alignment and to identify any discrepancies that could impact system operability. Observed plant conditions were compared to the standby alignment of equipment specified in applicable P&IDs and OPs. The inspectors observed valve positions, power supply availability, and the general condition of selected components. Finally, the inspectors evaluated material condition, housekeeping, and component labeling. A list of documents reviewed is provided in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection
Fire Protection - Tours (71111.05Q)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors identified five fire areas based on a review of Vermont Yankees Safe Shutdown Capability Analysis, the Fire Hazards Analysis, and the Individual Plant Examination for External Events (IPEEE). The inspectors toured plant areas important to safety to evaluate Entergys control of transient combustibles and ignition sources, and the material condition and operational status of fire protection systems, equipment, and barriers. A list of additional documents reviewed is provided in the Attachment to this report. The following fire zones (FZs) were inspected:
- Torus Room 213 North (RB-1);
- Torus Room 213 South (RB-2);
- RB 280 North (RB-5);
- RB 280 South (RB-6); and
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R06 Flood Protection Measures
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed Entergys flood protection design and barriers for coping with internal flooding in the intake structure. The inspectors reviewed internal flooding information contained in Entergys IPEEE and the Internal Flooding Design Basis Document as they related to the intake structure. Finally, the inspectors performed a walk down of the intake structure with the system engineer for the service water (SW)system and the engineer for the circulating water (CW) system to ensure equipment and structures needed to mitigate an internal flooding event were as described in the IPEEE and the DBD. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed condition reports (CRs) related to internal flooding to ensure identified problems were properly resolved. A list of documents reviewed is provided in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R07 Heat Sink Performance
Annual Sample Review (71111.07A)
a. Inspection Scope
On April 27, 2009, the A RHR heat exchanger was removed from service for maintenance. The heat exchanger was cleaned using extensive hydrolazing processes.
Eddy current testing of the heat exchanger began on April 29, 2009. The inspectors observed portions of the hydrolazing process and eddy current testing. The inspectors also reviewed the results of the A RHR heat exchanger eddy current testing. The inspectors discussed the test results with the system engineer and reviewed the completed surveillance data to determine whether test results met acceptance criteria.
The inspectors also reviewed Entergys corrective action program to ensure significant heat exchanger performance issues were appropriately identified and documented, and that the corrective actions assigned, if any, were appropriate. A list of documents reviewed is provided in the Attachment to this report.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program
Requalification Activities Review by the Resident Staff (71111.11Q)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed a simulator-based licensed operator requalification exam on April 7, 2009. The inspectors evaluated E crew performance in the areas of clarity and formality of communications; ability to take timely actions; prioritization, interpretation, and verification of alarms; procedure usage; control board manipulations; and command and control. Crew performance in these areas was compared to the Instructor Guide for Simulator session LOR-27-301 Scenarios 5 and 6, Entergy management expectations, and guidelines. The inspectors also compared the simulator configuration with the actual control board configuration. Finally, the inspectors observed VY training evaluators discuss identified weaknesses with the crew and individual crew members.
The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness
Routine Maintenance Effectiveness (71111.12Q)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed Entergys evaluation of three conditions involving structures, systems or components (SSCs) for maintenance effectiveness during this inspection period. The inspectors reviewed Entergys implementation of the Maintenance Rule, 10 CFR 50.65, to determine if the condition was appropriately evaluated against applicable Maintenance Rule functional failure criteria, as found in Entergy scoping documents and procedures. The inspectors reviewed the applicable system health reports and discussed the issue with the Maintenance Rule Coordinator to determine if the condition was appropriately tracked against the system performance criteria and classified in accordance with Maintenance Rule implementation guidance. The inspectors also reviewed the Maintenance Rule Expert Panel meeting performance evaluation/action plans. Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the
. The specific conditions reviewed were:
- Instrument Air approaching established Maintenance Rule criteria;
- 125 V DC Station Main Battery Subsystem from (a)(1) to (a)(2) status; and
- BC-5A, 345 KV Switchyard Battery Charger AC input breaker inadvertently opened (CR 2009-1902).
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated online risk management for three planned and three emergent maintenance activities. The inspectors reviewed maintenance risk evaluations, maintenance plans, work schedules, and control room logs to determine if concurrent or emergent maintenance activities significantly increased the plant risk. The inspectors compared reviewed items and activities to requirements listed in administrative procedure (AP) 0125, "Plant Equipment," and AP 0172, "Work Schedule Risk Management - Online." Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the
. The inspectors also walked down areas of the plant containing equipment that was determined to have higher risk significance during the following work activities:
- April 16, 2009, EDGs Declared Inoperable During Cooling Tower Alternate Supply Breaker Testing;
- April 27- May 1, 2009, A RHR Planned Maintenance Outage (Risk Yellow);
- June 2-4, 2009, AS-1 Battery Charger Emergent Work Concurrent with AS-2 Battery Charger Maintenance Activities;
- June 16, 2009, EDG Degraded Voltage Relay Calibrations (Risk Yellow);
- June 23-25, 2009, A Recirculation Pump Motor-Generator Emergent Work; and
- June 28-30, 2009, VELCO Switchyard Emergent Work.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R15 Operability Evaluations
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed six operability evaluations prepared by Entergy. The inspectors evaluated the operability evaluations against the guidance contained in NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2005-20, Revision to Guidance Formerly Contained in NRC Generic Letter 91-18, Information to Licensees Regarding Two NRC Inspection Manual Sections on Resolution of Degraded and Nonconforming Conditions and on Operability, and Entergy procedure EN-OP-104, Operability Determinations. A list of documents reviewed is provided in the Attachment. The inspectors also discussed the conditions with operators and engineering staff, as necessary. The inspectors reviewed evaluations of the following degraded or non-conforming conditions:
- Water Leak On A EDG Turbo Charger Cooling Line (CR 2009-1207);
- A SW Pump Packing and Oil leak (CR 2009-1423);
- C SW Pump Operating Low in Flow Band (CR 2009-1944);
- Recurring Standby Gas Treatment Flow Adjustments (CR 2009-2043); and
- SW Traveling Screen Piping Thru Wall Leakage (CR 2009-2093).
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R18 Plant Modifications
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the Traveling Screen Wash Water Temporary Supply temporary modification (TM) to ensure that it did not adversely affect the availability, reliability, or functional capability of any risk-significant SSCs. The inspectors reviewed the engineering change package and completed work order (WO) which installed the modification, and compared the installation and control of the modification to the requirements of Entergy Corporate Procedure EN-DC-136, Revision 4, Temporary Modifications. A list of documents reviewed is provided in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed post-maintenance testing (PMT) activities on risk-significant systems. The inspectors either observed the PMT or reviewed completed PMT documentation to determine if the test data met the acceptance criteria contained in the WO, Technical Specifications (TS), Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR),and/or the in-service testing program. When testing was directly observed, the inspectors determined whether installed test equipment was appropriate and controlled, and whether the test was performed in accordance with applicable station procedures.
The inspectors also reviewed the test activities to determine if the PMT was adequate to ensure system operability and functional capability following maintenance, if the systems were properly restored following testing, and if discrepancies were appropriately documented in the corrective action program (CAP). Additional documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. The inspectors reviewed the PMTs performed for the following maintenance activities:
- Drywell Sump Flow Transmitter Replacement (WO 00178181);
- Cooling Tower (CT) 2-1 Inspection and Structural Repairs (WO 51796997);
- A Standby Gas Treatment Flow Relay Replacement (WO 00195501);
- B EDG Alarm Temperature Switch Replacement (WO 00186645);
- A RHR Maintenance Outage for Check Valve Repairs (WO 51074193);
- Torus Vacuum Breaker 5G Maintenance Following Failed Testing (WO 00195389);
- C Service Water Pump Planned Replacement (WO 51671311);
- Planned HCU Accumulator Replacements (WOs 00153279 and 00192426); and
- Diesel Driven Fire Pump Maintenance (WO 00174515).
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed surveillance testing to determine if the specified acceptance criteria was consistent with TS and UFSAR requirements, if the test was performed in accordance with the written procedure, if the test data was complete and met procedural requirements, and if the system was properly returned to service following testing. The inspectors observed selected pre-job briefings for the test activities. The inspectors also verified discrepancies were appropriately documented in the CAP. A list of documents reviewed is provided in the Attachment. The inspectors reviewed the following surveillances:
- Scram Discharge Instrument Volume High Water Functional Test on April 6, 2009;
- Electric Driven Fire Pump Surveillance Test on April 6, 2009;
- A Standby Gas Treatment System Monthly 10 Hour Run on May 5, 2009;
- Station Air Compressor Infrequently Performed Test on May 5, 2009;
- MSIV Closure Time Test (Containment Isolation Valve) on May 12, 2009; and
- Drywell Leakage Rate Surveillance Test on May 28, 2009.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness
1EP6 Drill Evaluation
a. Inspection Scope
On May 7, 2009, the inspectors observed an operating crew respond to a simulator-based event during licensed operator requalification training activities. The inspectors discussed the performance expectations and results with the lead instructor. The inspectors focused on the ability of licensed operators to perform event classifications and make proper notifications in accordance with station procedures.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
RADIATION SAFETY
Cornerstone: Public Radiation Safety
2PS1 Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (REMP) and Radioactive Materials Control (71122.03 - 10 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
- (1) The inspector reviewed the 2007 and 2008 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Reports, and Entergy assessment results, to verify that the REMP was implemented as required by TS and the Off-site Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM). The review included changes to the ODCM with respect to environmental monitoring commitments in terms of sampling locations, monitoring and measurement frequencies, land use census, inter-laboratory comparison program, and analysis of data. The inspector also reviewed the ODCM to identify environmental monitoring stations. In addition, the inspector reviewed the following: Entergy self-assessments and audits, event reports, inter-laboratory comparison program results, the Final Safety Analysis Report for information regarding the environmental monitoring program and meteorological monitoring instrumentation, and the scope of the audit program to verify that it met the requirements of 10 CFR 20.1101.
- (2) The inspector walked down seven environmental air particulate and iodine sampling stations; one south river water sampling station; two dairy farms; and, 37 thermo-luminescent dosimeter (TLD) monitoring locations and determined that they were located as described in the ODCM and determined applicable equipment material condition to be acceptable.
- (3) The inspector observed the collection and preparation of a variety of environmental samples including milk and verified that environmental sampling was representative of the release pathways as specified in the ODCM and that sampling techniques were in accordance with procedures. Additionally, the inspector observed technicians obtain a plant stack particulate, iodine, and a gaseous sample, and perform a system flow check. The inspector also observed sampling of on-site storm drains.
- (4) Based on direct observation and review of records, the inspector verified that the primary and backup meteorological tower instruments were operable, calibrated, and maintained in accordance with guidance contained in the FSAR, NRC Safety Guide 23, and licensee procedures. The inspector verified that the meteorological data readout and recording instruments in the control room and at the tower were operable and comparable.
- (5) The inspector reviewed each event documented in the Annual Radiological Environmental Monitoring Report which involved a missed sample, inoperable sampler, lost TLD, or anomalous measurement for the cause and corrective actions. The inspector conducted a review of Entergys assessment of any positive sample results. The last two annual radiological effluent release reports were also reviewed, which indicated that there were no abnormal or anomalous results identified and no significant changes in reported dose values from previous effluent release reports. These reports were reviewed with respect to the environmental monitoring program, which did not identify any plant-related radioactivity in the offsite environment or in any onsite groundwater monitoring wells. Monthly dose calculations were also reviewed covering the period from September 2008 through March 2009 with respect to license requirements.
- (6) The inspector reviewed any significant changes made by Entergy to the ODCM as a result of changes to the land census or sampler station modifications since the last inspection. The inspector also reviewed technical justifications for any changed sampling locations and verified that Entergy performed the reviews required to ensure that the changes did not affect their ability to monitor the impacts of radioactive effluent releases on the environment.
- (7) The inspector reviewed the calibration and maintenance records for air samplers.
The inspector reviewed the following: the results of Entergys inter-laboratory comparison program to verify the adequacy of environmental sample analyses performed by Entergy; Entergys quality control evaluation of the inter-laboratory comparison program and the corrective actions for any deficiencies; Entergys determination of any bias to the data and the overall effect on the REMP; and quality assurance (QA) audit results of the program to determine whether Entergy met the TS/ODCM requirements. The inspector verified that the appropriate detection sensitivities with respect to TS/ODCM are utilized for counting samples and reviewed the results of the quality control program including the inter-laboratory comparison program to verify the adequacy of the program.
- (8) The inspector observed the radioactive material survey and release locations and inspected the methods used for control, survey, and release to include observing the performance of personnel surveying and releasing material for unrestricted use and verifying that the work is performed in accordance with plant procedures.
- (9) The inspector verified that the radiation monitoring instrumentation used for the release of material from the radiologically controlled area (RCA), was appropriate for the radiation types present and was calibrated with appropriate radiation sources. The inspector reviewed Entergys equipment to ensure the radiation detection sensitivities were consistent with the NRC guidance contained in Circular 81-07 and Information Notice 85-92 for surface contamination and HPPOS-221 for volumetrically contaminated material. Calibration records and source certificates for equipment used for the release of personnel and materials were reviewed for adequacy (APTEC personnel contamination monitors, Eberline PM-7 personnel contamination monitors, RM14 friskers, RM20 friskers, Small Article Monitors, Mini-Scalers).
- (10) The inspector reviewed Entergys audits and self-assessments related to the REMP since the last inspection to determine if identified problems were entered into the corrective action program, as appropriate. Selected corrective action reports were reviewed since the last inspection to determine if identified problems accurately characterized the causes and corrective actions were assigned to each commensurate with their safety significance. Any repetitive deficiencies were also assessed to ensure that Entergys self-assessment activities were identifying and addressing these deficiencies (see Section 4OA2).
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
[OA]
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification
a. Inspection Scope
Barrier Integrity Cornerstone The inspectors sampled Entergy submittals for the performance indicators (PIs) listed below for the period from April 2008 to March 2009. The inspectors reviewed portions of operator rounds surveillances, monthly reactor coolant iodine isotopic reports, and related CRs. The inspectors discussed the methods for compiling the data with the responsible operations department and chemistry department personnel. The PI definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Indicator Guideline, Rev. 5 and AP 0094, NRC Performance Indicator Reporting, Rev. 14 were used to verify the accuracy and completeness of the PI data reported during this period. Additional documents reviewed are listed in attachment.
- Reactor Coolant System Activity; and
- Reactor Coolant System Leakage.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems
.1 Reviews of Items Entered into the Corrective Action Program
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a screening of each item entered into Entergys CAP. This review was accomplished by reviewing printouts of each condition report, attending daily screening meetings, and/or accessing Entergys database. The purpose of this review was to identify conditions such as repetitive equipment failures or human performance issues that might warrant additional follow-up.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Semi-Annual Trend Review
a. Inspection Scope
(1 sample)
The inspectors performed a review of Entergys CAP and associated documents to identify trends that could indicate the existence of a more significant safety issue. The inspectors review nominally considered the six-month period or November 2008 to April 2009. The inspectors compared their results with the results contained in Entergys quarterly trend reports, operator logs and CRs. The corrective actions assigned to address select individual issues were reviewed for adequacy.
b. Findings and Observations
No findings or observations of significance were identified.
.3 Annual Sample Review - Operator Workarounds
a. Inspection Scope
(1 sample)
The inspectors reviewed the cumulative effects of the existing operator work-arounds (OWA), the list of operator burdens, and the list of open main control room deficiencies.
This review was performed to identify any effect on emergency operating procedure operator actions, and any impact on possible initiating events and mitigating systems.
The inspectors evaluated whether station personnel were identifying, assessing, and reviewing OWAs as specified in administrative procedure EN-OP-115, Conduct of Operations Rev. 7 and DP-0166, Operations Department Standards Rev. 19 with Limited Procedure Change 3.
The inspectors reviewed the Vermont Yankee processes to identify, prioritize and resolve main control room distractions to minimize operator burden. The inspectors reviewed the system used to track these operator work-arounds, burdens and control room deficiencies. The inspectors toured the control room and discussed the open items with the operators to ensure the items were being addressed on a schedule consistent with their relative safety significance.
b. Findings and Observations
No findings of significance were identified. At the time of the inspection, Vermont Yankee had one issue classified as an operator work-around and four operator burdens.
The one operator work-around and four operator burdens were determined to have a minimal impact on the ability of the operator to promptly and appropriately respond to an event.
The tracking system in place appeared to be effective at ensuring operators and management were aware of operator work-arounds and burdens and ensuring these items were addressed in a timely fashion.
.4 Public Radiation Safety Cornerstone
a. Inspection Scope
The inspector reviewed 23 corrective action condition reports associated with REMP program that were initiated from 2007 through 2009. The inspector verified that problems identified by these condition reports were properly characterized in the licensees event reporting system, and that applicable cause and corrective actions were identified, commensurate with the safety significance of the radiological occurrences. In cases where there were repetitive issues or issues that were not adequately addressed or corrected, Quality Assurance audits and follow-up assessments identified these and initiated actions to correct the condition.
b. Findings and Observations
No findings or observations of significance were identified.
4OA3 Event Follow-up
.1 A Reactor Cooling Pump Speed Control Signal Failure Results in Reactor Down-Power
a. Inspection Scope
On June 22, operators observed the A Recirculation Pump Speed decrease. The associated motor generator speed control system locked up and prevented remote operation of the recirculation pump control system, as designed. Reactor power decreased to 96% as a result of the decrease in pump speed and remained steady.
Operators then reduced the B Recirculation Pump Speed to match the A Recirculation Pump speed which further reduced reactor power to stabilize at 94%. The cause of the lock up was identified as a loss of control signal due to a failure of a control circuit card in the control system. The operation of the control system in this instance was as designed. The repair and associated testing required reducing reactor power to 24 percent and the removal of the A Recirculation loop from service. The loop was then returned to operation after all repairs and post maintenance testing was completed for the recirculation pump speed control system. Inspectors monitored and reviewed licensee performance in all activities of this evolution and determined that licensee performance was satisfactory.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA5 Other Activities
.1 Quarterly Resident Inspectors Observations of Security Personnel and Activities
a. Inspection Scope
During the inspection period, the inspectors conducted the following observations of security force personnel and activities to ensure that the activities were consistent with Vermont Yankee security procedures and regulatory requirements relating to nuclear plant security. These observations took place during both normal plant working hours and backshift hours. Specifically, the inspectors:
- Observed operations within the central and secondary security alarm stations; and
- Toured selected security officer response posts.
These quarterly resident inspector observations of security force personnel and activities did not constitute any additional inspection samples. Rather, they were considered an integral part of inspector normal plant status review and inspection activities.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA6 Meetings, including Exit
Exit Meeting Summary
An exit meeting was held with the licensee on May 21, 2009. The licensee acknowledged the results. The inspector verified whether any material provided by the licensee during the inspection was considered proprietary.
On July 22, 2009, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Chris Wamser and other members of the VY staff. The inspectors confirmed that no proprietary information was provided or examined during the inspection.
ATTACHMENT:
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Entergy Personnel
- M. Colomb, Site Vice President
- J. Dreyfuss, Director of Nuclear Safety
- C. Wamser, General Manager of Plant Operations
- D. Mannai, Licensing Manager
- N. Rademacher, Director of Engineering
- M. Philippon, Operations Manager
- S. Wender, Radiation Protection Manager
- W. Pittman, Asst. Operations Manager
- M. Gosekamp, Acting Maintenance Manager
- S. Aprea, Shift Manager
- D. Jones, Shift Manager
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
None