ML083230387
| ML083230387 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nine Mile Point  |
| Issue date: | 10/01/2008 |
| From: | Nine Mile Point |
| To: | D'Antonio J Operations Branch I |
| Hansell S | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML081060454 | List: |
| References | |
| TAC U01690 | |
| Download: ML083230387 (131) | |
Text
NMP SIMULATOR SCENARIO NRC Scenario 1 REV. 0 No. of Pages: 31 PLANT SHUTDOWN, RECIRC PUMP SEAL FAILURE, FUEL FAILURE, UNISOLABLE EMERGENCY CONDENSER LEAK TO THE ENVIRONMENT PREPARER DATE VALIDATED Frank Payne, Kyle James, Bruce Williams DATE 5/18/08 GEN SUPERVISOR OPS TRAINING DATE OPERATIONS MANAGER N/A - Exam Security DATE CONFIGURATION CONTROL N/A - Exam Security DATE SCENARIO
SUMMARY
Length: 90 minutes Initial Power Level: 4% with plant shutdown in progress Mitigating Strategy Code: RR4, fuel leak with a failure of EC tubes and EC fails to isolate, requires RPV Blowdown to stop release The crew assumes the shift with the plant being shutdown. The crew is directed to de-inert the containment in accordance with N1-OP-9, N2 Inerting and H2-O2 Monitoring Systems. When drywell pressure is lowered to 0 psig, the operator will secure the lineup, but one of the containment isolation valves will fail to fully close. This will require entry into Technical Specifications and ensuring a second valve in the line is isolated. Then the crew will continue the shutdown by inserting control rods.
Next Reactor Building Radiation Monitor 12 will fail upscale causing a trip of RBVS and a start of RBEVS. Additionally there will be a failure of the Reactor Building to isolate. The crew must isolate the Reactor Building to restore Secondary Containment and the SRO must address Technical Specifications. When these actions are complete, both seals on the 11 Recirculation Pump will fail requiring the crew to shutdown and isolate the pump. Following the loss of the Recirculation Pump, a fuel failure will cause offgas and main steam line radiation levels to rise, requiring a reactor scram. Multiple control rods will fail to fully insert during the scram requiring the crew to enter N1-SOP-1 and take alternate actions to insert the control rods. The rods are inserted using RMCS.
NRC Scenario 1 1 October 2008
Following the scram, the crew will diagnose an Emergency Condenser tube leak. They will try to isolate the affected EC but the isolation valves will fail to fully close. Rising off site radiation levels will require an RPV blowdown before General Emergency levels are reached.
Major Procedures: N1-SOP-1.2, N1-SOP-25.2, N1-SOP-1.1, N1-SOP-1, N1-EOP-2, N1-EOP-6, and N1-EOP-8 EAL Classification: Site Area Emergency, EALs 3.4.1, 5.1.3 and 5.2.4 Termination Criteria: RPV Blowdown in progress, RPV water level controlled in assigned band NRC Scenario 1 2 October 2008
I. SIMULATOR SET UP A. IC Number: IC 171 B. Presets/Function Key Assignments
- 1. Malfunctions:
- a. RM6V, RX BLDG VENT RAD MON 12, FINAL VALUE=100% TRG 1
- b. HV04, RB VENTILATION FAILS TO ISOLATE PRESET
- e. RX01, FUEL CLADDING FAILURE, FINAL VALUE=7% TRG 3
- f. RD33C, CONTROL ROD BANK BLOCKED BANK 3, FINAL VALUE=04 PRESET
- g. EC06A, EMERGENCY CONDENSER TUBE LEAK 111, RAMP=1:00, FINAL VALUE=4% TRG 4
- h. EC07A, EMERGENCY CONDENSER FAILS TO ISOLATE 11 PRESET
- 2. Remotes:
- a. None
- 3. Overrides:
- a. OVR-11DS74LO5529 ON 2060 VLV201-7,9,17,31 RED LAMPS ,
DELAY TIME=0:02, FINAL VALUE=ON (201-31 RED LAMP) TRG 16
- 4. Annunciators:
- a. None
- 5. Triggers:
- a. TRG 4 - Initiates EC 11 tube failure when the mode switch is taken to shutdown
- i. Event Action: zdrpstdn==1 ii. Command: None
- b. TRG 16 - Causes 201-31 red light to be overridden on when the control switch is taken to close, simulating the valve sticking in mid position
- i. Event Action: zdpcv31o==1 ii. Command: None NRC Scenario 1 3 October 2008
C. Equipment Out of Service
- 1. None D. Support Documentation
- 1. N1-OP-9, N2 INERTING AND H2-O2 MONITORING SYSTEMS, Section G.1.0 De-Inerting/Venting for Personnel Access-Rx Coolant Temp >212 °F marked up through step 1.5
- 2. N1-OP-43C marked up to step G.3.13.6
- 3. Shutdown Control Rod Sequence sheets updated to current control rod.
E. Miscellaneous
- 1. Setup trend recorder XP-1E1B on E console to trend recirc pump suction temperature.
- 3. Place yellow clearance tag on RWM bypass keylock switch.
NRC Scenario 1 4 October 2008
II. SHIFT TURNOVER INFORMATION OFF GOING SHIFT: N D DATE: Today PART I: To be performed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.
PART II: To be reviewed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.
- Shift Turnover Checklist (ALL)
- Lit Control Room Annunciators
- Computer Alarm Summary (RO)
Evolutions/General Information/Equipment Status:
Drywell entry is required for maintenance during forced outage Perform Containment De-Inerting per N1-OP-9 Plant shutdown to continue by inserting control rods Rod Worth Minimizer is inoperable with yellow clearance tag applied to bypass keylock switch PART III: Remarks/Planned Evolutions:
- 1. Perform N1-OP-9, N2 Inerting and H2-O2 Monitoring Systems starting at step G.1.6 to de-inert the Primary Containment with Rx Coolant Temp >212°F, raising oxygen concentration to
>19.5%
- 2. Continue shutdown from step G.3.13.6 of N1-OP-43C PART IV: To be reviewed/accomplished shortly after assuming the shift:
- Review new Clearances (SM)
- Test Control Annunciators (CRE)
- Shift Crew Composition (SM/CRS)
TITLE NAME TITLE NAME SRO ATC RO BOP RO NRC Scenario 1 5 October 2008
Scenario ID INSTRUCTOR COMMENTS (Strengths, Areas for Improvement, Open Items etc.)
What Happened? What we did? Why? (Goals) Other Options?
NRC Scenario 1 6 October 2008
III. PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES A. Critical Tasks:
CT-1.0 Given a fuel failure, the crew will insert a manual reactor scram as Main Steam Line radiation levels rise, in accordance with N1-SOP-25.2.
CT-2.0 Given an unisolable primary system leak, indications of fuel failure and rising off-site release rates approaching the General Emergency level, the crew will perform an RPV Blowdown, in accordance with N1-EOP-6 and N1-EOP-8.
B. Performance Objectives:
PO-1.0 Given the plant in a shutdown, the crew will perform Primary Containment de-inerting, in accordance with N1-OP-9, N2 Inerting and H2-O2 Monitoring Systems.
PO-2.0 Given a failure of a Primary Containment Isolation Valve to close, the crew will recognize the loss and take proper actions, in accordance with Technical Specifications.
PO-3.0 Given the plant in a shutdown, the crew will insert control rods, in accordance with N1-OP-5.
PO-4.0 Given a failed Reactor Building Radiation Monitor and a failure of the Reactor Building to isolate, the crew will respond to the condition and manually close the Reactor Building isolation valves, in accordance with N1-OP-10.
PO-5.0 Given a total recirculation pump seal failure, the crew will secure and isolate the pump, in accordance with N1-SOP-1.2.
PO-6.0 Given a fuel leak, the crew will respond to rising radiation levels, in accordance with N1-SOP-25.2.
PO-7.0 Given a failure of control rods to insert during a scram, the crew will enter and execute N1-SOP-1.
PO-8.0 Given an Emergency Condenser tube leak, the crew will enter and execute N1-EOP-6.
PO-9.0 Given the plant in a condition requiring emergency classification, the SRO shall classify the events properly, complete initial notification forms, and discuss the bases for the classification in accordance with the emergency plan procedure.
NRC Scenario 1 7 October 2008
PO-10.0 Given the plant or a plant system in a condition requiring Technical Specification action, identify the deviation and any required actions/notifications.
NRC Scenario 1 8 October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Take the simulator out of freeze before the crew CREW enters for the pre-shift walkdown and briefing. Crew conducts pre-brief, walks down the Allow no more than 5 minutes for panel walkdown panels, assumes the shift EVENT 1 PO-1.0 Perform Containment De-Inerting The initiation point for this event is when the SRO directs the performance of Section G.1.0 of N1-OP-9, N2 Inerting and H2-O2 Monitoring Systems.
There are NO Console Operator activities related to this normal evolution.
- Directs de-inerting the Primary Containment IAW Section G.1.0 of N1-OP-9, N2 Inerting and H2-O2 Monitoring Systems RO
- Monitors plant parameters BOP
- Acknowledge direction from the SRO to de-inert the containment
- Verify closed the following valves in the Control Room:
- 201-11, TORUS/DRYWELL VENT TO CONDENSER
- 201-10, DW AIR VENT & PURGE ISOLATION VALVE 11
- 201-08, TOR AIR VENT & PURGE ISOLATION VALVE 11 EVENT 1 Continued NRC Scenario 1 9 October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS BOP Continued
- 201-32, DW N2 VENT & PURGE ISOLATION VALVE 11
- Open 201-16, TORUS N2 VENT &
PURGE ISOLATION VALVE 11
- Start 201-35, DRYWELL & TORUS VENT & PURGE FAN
- Verify open the following valves:
- 201-21, DRYWELL & TOR VENT
& PURGE FAN INLET BV
- 201-22, DRYWELL & TOR VENT
& PURGE FAN OUTLET BV
- Throttle open 201-17, TORUS N2 VENT & PURGE ISOLATION VALVE 12
- WHEN Torus pressure drops BELOW 0 psig, perform the following:
- Stop 201-35, DRYWELL &
TORUS VENT & PURGE FAN
- Verify closed the following valves:
o 201-21, DRYWELL & TOR VENT & PURGE FAN INLET BV o 201-22, DRYWELL & TOR VENT & PURGE FAN OUTLET BV
- Verify closed the following valves:
o 201-16, TORUS N2 VENT &
PURGE ISOLATION VALVE 11 o 201-17, TORUS N2 VENT &
PURGE ISOLATION VALVE 12 EVENT 1 Continued NRC Scenario 1 10 October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS BOP Continued
- Open 201-32, DW N2 VENT &
PURGE ISOLATION VALVE 11
- Start 201-35, DRYWELL & TORUS VENT & PURGE
- Verify open the following valves:
- 201-21, DRYWELL & TOR VENT
& PURGE FAN INLET BV
- 201-22, DRYWELL & TOR VENT
& PURGE FAN OUTLET BV Note: The containment vacuum breakers may
- Throttle open 201-31, DW N2 VENT &
cycle during this event to equalize pressures. PURGE ISOLATION VALVE 12
- WHEN Drywell pressure drops BELOW 0 psig, perform the following:
- Stop 201-35, DRYWELL &
TORUS VENT & PURGE FAN
- Verify closed the following valves:
o 201-21, DRYWELL & TOR VENT & PURGE FAN INLET BV o 201-22, DRYWELL & TOR VENT & PURGE FAN OUTLET BV
- Verify closed the following valves:
o 201-32, DW N2 VENT &
PURGE ISOLATION VALVE 11 Note: 201-31 will fail to fully close, as indicated by o 201-31, DW N2 VENT &
both red and green lights on, leading to the next PURGE ISOLATION VALVE event 12 NRC Scenario 1 11 October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT 2 PO-2.0 Failure of 201-31, DW N2 VENT & PURGE ISOLATION VALVE 12 to fully close following N2 Primary Containment De-Inerting When the control switch for 201-31 is taken to SRO close, verify TRG 16 automatically inserts the
- Acknowledge report that 201-31, DW following override: N2 VENT & PURGE ISOLATION VALVE 12 did NOT fully close OVR-11DS74LO5529 ON 2060 VLV201-
- Direct BOP to manually close 201-31 7,9,17,31 RED LAMPS , DELAY TIME=0:02, FINAL VALUE=ON (201-31 RED LAMP)
- Enter T.S. 3.3.4.b
- Contact Operations Management to notify about the failure of 201-31 to Role Play: As Operations Management, close acknowledge failure of 201-31 and direct the SRO
- Direct the crew to stop de-inerting and to secure from de-inerting, until the next shift. exit N1-OP-9 Direct the SRO to continue on with control rod insertion.
- Monitors plant parameters BOP
- Notify Crew/SRO that 201-31 did NOT fully close
- Attempt to manually close 201-31
- Verify 201-32 closed NRC Scenario 1 12 October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT 3 PO-3.0 Plant Shutdown using Control Rods There are NO Console Operator activities related to this normal evolution.
SRO Note: Provide GAI-OPS-05 Attachment 1, SRO
- Conduct crew brief of shutdown REACTIVITY BRIEF CHECKLIST (may be done in activities and responsibilities pre-scenario brief) and plant shutdown RMI
- Conduct GAI-OPS-05 Reactivity Brief
- Direct Insertion of control rods for reactor shutdown in accordance with Shutdown Control Rod Sequence
- Provides oversight of reactivity maneuver RO
- Insert control rods to continue reactor shutdown in accordance with Note: Recommend allowing insertion of four Shutdown Control Rod Sequence control rods to allow the crew to stop at a stable
- 0-125 scale between 25 and 75 nominal
- 0-40 scale between 8 and 24 nominal
- Monitor and maintain reactor cooldown rate less than 100°F/hr BOP
- Monitor Feedwater Level Control
- Monitor plant parameters
- Provide peer checks as required NRC Scenario 1 13 October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT 4 PO-4.0 Reactor Building Ventilation Radiation Monitor 12 fails UPSCALE and RB Ventilation fails to Isolate When control rod 30-47 has been inserted and directed by the examiner, insert malfunction:
RM6V, RX BLDG VENT RAD MON 12 (0-100%),
FINAL VALUE=100%
TRG 1 Verify the following malfunction is active:
HV04, RB VENTILATION FAILS TO ISOLATE PRESET Expected Annunciators:
L1-4-3, RB VENT RAD MONITOR OFF NORMAL L1-1-5, RB VENT EXH FAN 11- 12 TRIP L1-3-6, EMER VENT CH 11 RELAY OPERATE L1-4-6, EMER VENT CH 12 RELAY OPERATE CREW RBVS fans trip
- Respond to annunciators and RBEVS initiates diagnose Radiation Monitor trip with RB isolation valves remain open failure of RB to isolate SRO
- Acknowledges reports
- Enter N1-EOP-5, Secondary Containment Control, AND execute concurrently with ARPs SRO Continued EVENT 4 Continued NRC Scenario 1 14 October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS
- Direct manual isolation of the Reactor Building
- Determine that the reactor building failed to isolate and one channel of RB Rad Monitoring is inop and entry into Tech Spec 3.4.2 is required
- Enter LCO 3.4.4.e (7 day plant shutdown LCO when one train of EVS is inoperable)
- Monitor plant parameters BOP
- Verifies Reactor Building Radiation Monitor 12 failed UPSCALE
- Confirm alarm on computer printout Role Play: If contacted as RP, acknowledge
- Verify shutdown of RB Vent Sys and request but delay any reports on Reactor Building startup of RBEVS per N1-OP-10 radiation levels section H.2.0 or N1-EOP-HC attachment 6
- Confirm the following fans started:
- 202-53, EVS FAN 11
- 202-33, EVS FAN 12
- Confirm the following fans stopped:
- 202-01, REACTOR BLDG SUPPLY FAN 11
- 202-02, REACTOR BLDG SUPPLY FAN 12
- 202-05, REACTOR BLDG EXHAUST FAN 11
- 202-06, REACTOR BLDG EVENT 4 Continued EXHAUST FAN 12 BOP Continued NRC Scenario 1 15 October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS
- Confirm open the following valves:
- 202-34, EM VENT EXHAUST FAN 11 OUTLET BV
- 202-35, EM VENT EXHAUST FAN 12 OUTLET BV
- Confirm closed the following valves:
- 202-03, REACTOR BLDG SUPPLY FAN 11 INLET DAMPER
- 202-04, REACTOR BLDG SUPPLY FAN 12 INLET DAMPER
- 202-80, REACTOR BLDG EXHAUST FAN 11 OUTLET DAMPER
- 202-81, REACTOR BLDG EXHAUST FAN 12 OUTLET DAMPER
- 202-15, REACTOR BLDG SUPPLY ISOLATION VALVE 11
- 202-16, REACTOR BLDG SUPPLY ISOLATION VALVE 12
- 202-32, REACTOR BUILDING EXHAUST ISOLATION VALVE 11
- 202-31, REACTOR BUILDING EXHAUST ISOLATION VALVE 12 EVENT 4 Continued BOP Continued NRC Scenario 1 16 October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS
- Notify Rad Protection, the normal Reactor Building Emergency Ventilation system has isolated AND Reactor Building Emergency Ventilation system is in service
- BEFORE 30 minutes has elapsed, secure one train of RBEVS:
Note: Examiner may decide to proceed with next
- Place EVS FAN 11(12) control event before one train of RBEVS is secured switch to RED FLAG
- Verify flow approximately 1600 CFM
- Place EVS FAN 12(11) control switch to PULL TO LOCK
- Enter LCO 3.4.4.e (7 day plant shutdown LCO when one train of EVS is inoperable)
- Verify in OFF position the following control switches:
- REACTOR BLDG SUPPLY FAN 11
- REACTOR BLDG SUPPLY FAN 12
- REACTOR BLDG EXHAUST FAN 11
- REACTOR BLDG EXHAUST FAN 12 NRC Scenario 1 17 October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT 5 PO-5.0 Recirculation Pump Seal Failure When directed by examiner, insert malfunction: CREW
- Acknowledge/report annunciator F2 RR06A, RR PUMP 11 LOWER(INNER) SEAL 1 FAILS, RAMP=2:00, FINAL VALUE=100%
- Diagnose RRP 11 seal failure TRG 2 RR07A, RR PUMP 11 UPPER(OUTER) SEAL FAILS, DELAY=1:30, RAMP=2:00, FINAL VALUE=100%
TRG 2 RRP 11 seal pressures lower Drywell leakage, pressure and humidity rise Expected Annunciator:
F2-1-1 REACT RECIRC PUMP-MOTOR 11 SRO ARP F2-1-1 directs entry into SOP-1.2 if seal
- Acknowledges report from crew pressure <425 psig or high seal flow/leakage
- Directs execution of ARP exists. Drywell conditions will begin to deteriorate
- Directs entry into N1-SOP-1.2, RRP and increased drywell humidity and in-leakage to SEAL FAILURE the DWEDT will be indicated. When Drywell
- Determine the failure is catastrophic parameters are impacted, the failure is considered and pump should be tripped and catastrophic and the pump must be tripped and isolated isolated.
- Provide reactivity management oversight for removing the pump from service
- When RRP 11 has been shutdown and isolated exit N1-SOP-1.2 and enter N1-OP-1, Section H, for 4 Loop Operation
- Review TS for impact of seal leakage and removal of pump from service EVENT 5 Continued NRC Scenario 1 18 October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS SRO Continued
- Tech Spec 3.2.5 identifies RCS Role Play: When contacted as Reactor leakage be limited to <2 GPM/day Engineering, acknowledge request to verify thermal increase for identified leakage. This limits will apply until the RRP is isolated
- TS 3.1.7.e applies for partial loop operation, limits power to 90.5% until clearance applied to valve breakers
- Contacts Reactor Engineering to verify thermal limits RO
- Monitor plant parameters
- Monitor reactor power and recirculation flow during closure of RRP suction and discharge valves
- Verify operating position on the Power to Flow Map BOP
- Reviews/executes ARP F2-1-1
- Confirms alarm computer point A072 RRP 11 SEAL LEAK DET FL
- Enters N1-SOP-1.2 for seal failure
- Monitors containment parameters
- Monitors RRP seal indications
- Determines that both seals are failed
- Determines seal failure is catastrophic
- Close REACTOR R PUMP 11 BYPASS VALVE NRC Scenario 1 19 October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT 5 Continued BOP Continued
- Simultaneously close Suction AND Discharge Valves for RRP 11 holding switches in CLOSE position
- Exit N1-SOP-1.2 AND enter N1-OP-1, Section H, for 4 Loop Operation NRC Scenario 1 20 October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT 6 PO-6.0 Fuel Failure CREW When actions to isolate 11 RRP have been
- Acknowledge/report annunciator H1 completed and directed by examiner insert 7, OFF GAS HIGH RADIATION malfunction:
- Recognize rising offgas and main steam line radiation levels RX01, FUEL CLADDING FAILURE (0-100%),
- Determine fuel failure has occurred FINAL VALUE=7%
TRG 3 Expected Annunciators:
H1-1-7, OFF GAS HIGH RADIATION (initial)
F1-2-7, MAIN STEAM RAD MONITOR CH 11 HI/LO (later)
F4-2-2, MAIN STEAM RAD MONITOR CH 12 HI/LO (later)
Rising off-gas radiation levels Rising main steam line radiation levels SRO
- Acknowledge report of off-gas high radiation annunciator
- Enter N1-SOP-25.2 Fuel Failure/High Activity
- Notify Chemistry to sample reactor coolant for gross activity
- Classify event as an UNUSUAL EVENT per EAL 1.2.1
- Brief crew on event impact
- Direct reactor power reduction per N1-SOP-1.1 as necessary to control radiation levels EVENT 6 Continued NRC Scenario 1 21 October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS SRO Continued
- Acknowledge report that MSL Rad Monitors are approaching/exceeding 3.75 X normal
- Direct a manual scram CT-1.0
- Directs manual vessel isolation and entry into N1-SOP-40.2, if Main Steam Line rad levels reach 3.75 x NFPB RO
- Perform emergency power reduction per N1-SOP-1.1 as directed
- When directed place Mode Switch in Shutdown CT-1.0
- Recognize/diagnose failure of all control rods to insert
- Perform a manual vessel isolation by placing both Vessel Isolation Ch 11 and Ch 12 Control Switches on the E Panel to ISOLATION IN, if necessary BOP Role Play: When dispatched as Chemistry to take
- Execute N1-SOP-25.2 samples, acknowledge request.
- Notify Chemistry to sample offgas and reactor coolant for gross activity Role Play: When directed to close Turbine
- Direct NAO to close Turbine Building Building Roof Vents, Sidewall Vents and Roll Roof Vents, Sidewall Vents and Roll Doors, wait 2 minutes then report the Turbine Doors Building Roof Vents, Sidewall Vents and Roll Doors
- Monitor ARM's and rad monitors to are CLOSED. Also report that RP is with you, and determine plant radiation levels they have detected higher than normal rad levels
- Notify SRO/Crew of rising Main Steam near the offgas piping. Line Radiation Monitor levels NRC Scenario 1 22 October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT 6 Continued BOP Continued
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT 7 PO-7.0 Reactor Scram with failure of one bank of control CREW rods to fully insert
- Recognize and report failure of rods to fully insert The following malfunctions are preset:
RD33C, CONTROL ROD BANK BLOCKED BANK 3, FINAL VALUE=04 SRO
- Acknowledge SCRAM report
- Acknowledge report that control rods failed to insert
- Directs N1-SOP-1 actions
- Directs RPV water level controlled 53-95 with Condensate/FW
- Provide scram report
- Recognize/ report all control rods not inserted
- Place IRMs on range 9
- Downrange IRMs as necessary to monitor power decrease
- Reduce Recirc Master flow to 25-43 x 106 lb/hr RO Continued NRC Scenario 1 24 October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT 7 Continued
- Attempts to insert control rods using N1-OP-5, section H.23.0 Note: The RO will not be able to reset the scram until RPV pressure is less than 600 psig once the MSIVs are closed. This will likely delay control rod insertion.
- Performs N1-SOP-1, Reactor Scram, level control actions:
- Restores RPV level to 53-95 inches by controlling injection and rejecting through RWCU, as necessary
- Determines #13 FWP was not running
- Verifies RPV water level above 53
- Verifies 11/12 FWP controllers in MANUAL and set to zero output
- Resets HPCI signal, if required
- Places 11/12 FWP BYPASS Valve in AUTO, sets to 65-70 inches
- Secures 2nd FWP, if running
- If RPV level reaches 85 inches and rising, then:
- Verifies off all Feedwater Pumps
- Secures CRD Pumps not required
- Maximizes RWCU reject flow
- Closes FWIVs if required
- Closes MSIVs if required
- Maintain RPV water level in assigned band
- Maintain RPV pressure below 1080 psig and in assigned band
- Performs N1-SOP-40.2 for Vessel Isolation verification NRC Scenario 1 25 October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT 8 PO-8.0 Failure of Emergency Condenser Tubes CREW Verify the following malfunction is automatically
- Recognize/report annunciator K1-1-2 inserted when the mode switch is taken to
- Recognize/report rising EC Vent Rad SHUTDOWN:
Monitor readings EC06A, EMERGENCY CONDENSER TUBE LEAK 111, RAMP=1:00, FINAL VALUE=4%
TRG 4 Expected Annunciator:
K-1-1-2, EC Rad Vent 11 Monitors Rising rad levels on EC Vent Rad Monitor (J panel)
- Acknowledges report of annunciator, K-1-1-2, EC Rad Monitors
- Directs crew to obtain a radiation value from EC VENT RAD Monitors
- Enters N1-EOP-6 due to EC Vent Rad Monitor above 30 mR/hr (ALERT EAL level)
- Directs/grants permission for the isolation of 11 Emergency Condenser RO/BOP Role Play: If requested as RP to check dose rates
- Reports/responds to annunciator K at EC piping, wait 3 minutes and report dose rates 1-2, EC Rad Monitors are 50 mR/hr and rising. Wait another 3 minutes
- Confirms alarm on computer printout and report dose rates are 200 mR/hr and rising,
- Confirms radiation levels on J Panel you are leaving the refuel floor to perform
- Contacts RP to check dose rates at downwind site boundary surveys. EC piping above elevation 340 EVENT 8 Continued RO/BOP Continued NRC Scenario 1 26 October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS
- Contacts Chemistry to assess for Role Play: If requested as Chemistry to assess for possible unmonitored radiological possible unmonitored radiological release, release acknowledge request
- Contacts RP to perform downwind site boundary radiological survey Role Play: If directed as RP/Chemistry to perform
- Notifies crew of radiation levels a downwind site boundary radiological survey, report that you are assembling and dispatching the team. Wait 4 minutes after the above RP role plays are complete, and then report that the dose rate at the north site boundary is 750 mRem TEDE and rising. Wait another 4 minutes, and if the crew has not entered RPV Blowdown yet, report that the dose rate at the north site boundary is 950 mRem TEDE and rising.
NRC Scenario 1 27 October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT 9 PO-9.0 Emergency Condenser Failure to Isolate CREW When an operator attempts to isolate EC 11, the
- Diagnose/report failure of EC 11 to following preset malfunctions act to prevent isolate steam isolation valve closure:
EC07, EMERGENCY CONDENSER FAILS TO ISOLATE 11 EC08A, EC LOOP 11 STM IV FAIL TO CLOSE 111 (0-100%), FINAL VALUE=100%
EC08B, EC LOOP 11 STM IV FAIL TO CLOSE 112 (0-100%), FINAL VALUE=100%
- Acknowledges Emergency Condenser cannot be isolated
- Evaluates EAL matrix and determines the rising off site dose rates are approaching General Emergency levels per section 5.2.6 of EPIP-EPP-01, Emergency Action Level Matrix
- IF a primary system is discharing outside primary and secondary containments AND the discharge cannot be isolated, THEN before the offsite release rate reches the Emergency Plan General Emergency level:
- Enter N1-EOP-2, RPV Control
- Enter N1-EOP-8, RPV Blowdown EVENT 9 Continued NRC Scenario 1 28 October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS SRO Continued N1-EOP-8, RPV Blowdown actions:
- Answers Are all control rods inserted to at least position 04 YES
- Answers Drywell pressure? below 3.5 psig
- Directs Emergency Condenser 12 initiation
- Answers Torus water level? > 8.0 ft
- Directs open 3 ERVs CT-2.0
- Stops at WAIT block for 120 psig RO/BOP
- When granted permission or directed, attempts to isolate EC 11 by closing the following valves:
- Places control switch for 39-07R, EC STM ISOLATION VALVE 112 in CLOSE
- Diagnoses failure of 39-07R to fully close
- Places control switch for 39-09R, EC STM ISOLATION VALVE 111 in CLOSE
- Diagnoses failure of 39-09R to fully close
- Report failure of steam IVs to isolate
- Initiates Emergency Condenser 12
- Places control switches for 3 ERVs to open CT-2.0 NRC Scenario 1 29 October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT 9 Continued RO/BOP Continued
- Reports 3 ERVs open
- All control rods inserted
- RPV Blowdown in progress
- RPV Water Level controlled in assigned band NRC Scenario 1 30 October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS V. POST SCENARIO CRITIQUE A. N/A, NRC Exam VI. REFERENCE EVENTS AND COMMITMENTS A. Reference Events
- 1. None B. Commitments
- 1. None VII. LESSONS LEARNED A. None NRC Scenario 2 31 October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NMP SIMULATOR SCENARIO NRC Scenario 2 REV. 0 No. of Pages: 29 LOSS OF POWERBOARD 11, UNISOLABLE RWCU LEAK IN THE SECONDARY CONTAINMENT PREPARER DATE VALIDATED Frank Payne, Kyle James, Bruce Williams DATE 5/17/08 GEN SUPERVISOR OPS TRAINING DATE OPERATIONS MANAGER N/A - Exam Security DATE CONFIGURATION CONTROL N/A - Exam Security DATE SCENARIO
SUMMARY
Length: 90 minutes Initial Power Level: 90%, 4 Loop Operation Mitigating Strategy Code: SC1, unisolable primary system leak in the Secondary Containment, RPV Blowdown required The crew assumes the shift with the plant operating at 90% power and four recirculation loops in service. Immediately after assuming the shift the crew will be directed to restore Recirculation Pump 15 to service and return to full power. The crew will assess plant conditions and lower power with Recirculation Flow until flow is less than 50 Mlbm/hr. They will then return Recirculation Pump 15 to service. After the crew has placed the pump in service, the Main Generator Auto Voltage Regulator will fail. The crew will diagnose the failure and take manual control of generator voltage and restore the correct generator output. When a normal generator output is established, the Control Rod Drive Flow Control Valve fails closed, requiring shifting to the alternate FCV. After CRD flow is returned to normal, a loss of power to Power Board 11 occurs. The SRO will address Technical Specifications.
A Reactor Water Cleanup system line break will occur in the Secondary Containment downstream of the Supply Isolation Valves. Reactor Water Cleanup will fail to isolate on high area temperature. The crew will attempt to isolate the system, but the valves will fail to fully close. This break will require a scram and RPV blowdown due to exceeding the Maximum Safe Value for general area temperatures. When the Mode Switch is placed in SHUTDOWN and/or the Reactor Trip pushbuttons on the E Panel are pushed, the reactor will NOT scram. ARI must be manually initiated to scram the control rods.
Major Procedures: N1-SOP-1, N1-SOP-1.1, N1-SOP-1.3, N1-SOP-5.1, N1-SOP-30.1, N1-EOP-2, N1-EOP-3, N1-EOP-5, and N1-EOP-8 NRC Scenario 2 32 October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EAL Classification: Site Area Emergency, EALs 3.4.1, 4.1.1 Termination Criteria: All control rods are in, RPV Blowdown in progress, RPV water level controlled in assigned band NRC Scenario 2 33 October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS I. SIMULATOR SET UP F. IC Number: IC 172 G. Presets/Function Key Assignments
- 1. Malfunctions:
- a. EG02, GENERATOR AUTO VOLTAGE REGULATOR FAILS - INCREASE TRG 1
- d. CU14, CLEANUP ISOLATION VALVES STUCK OPEN PRESET
- e. CU11, COOLANT LEAK OUTSIDE OF DRYWELL, RAMP TIME=10:00, FINAL VALUE=20% TRG 4
- f. RP05B, REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM FAILURE TO SCRAM CH 12 PRESET
- 2. Remotes:
- 3. Overrrides:
- a. OVR-9DS51LO51912 ON 1150 STATUS MOVS ARRAY 33-01 GR CLO, FINAL VALUE=ON TRG 17
- b. OVR-9DS53LO51914 ON 1150 STATUS MOVS ARRAY 33-02 GR CLO, FINAL VALUE=ON TRG 18
- c. OVR-9DS55LO5200 ON 1150 STATUS MOVS ARRAY 33-04 GR CLO, FINAL VALUE=ON TRG 19
- 4. Annunciators:
- a. None
- 5. Triggers:
- a. TRG 16 - Activates when the CRD FCV transfer switch is moved to Valve 12 to automate the corresponding field action
- i. Event Action: zdrdfcvb==1 ii. Command: None
- b. TRG 17 - Activates when RWCU IV 33-01 control switch is taken to close to override on the green light, simulating some valve movement
- i. Event Action: zdcu301c==1 ii. Command: None
- c. TRG 18 - Activates when RWCU IV 33-02 control switch is taken to close to override on the green light, simulating some valve movement
- i. Event Action: zdcu302c==1 NRC Scenario 2 34 October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS ii. Command: None
- d. TRG 19 - Activates when RWCU IV 33-04 control switch is taken to close to override on the green light, simulating some valve movement
- i. Event Action: zdcu304c==1 ii. Command: None H. Equipment Out of Service
- a. RRP 15 removed from service, control switch green flagged, discharge valve closed I. Support Documentation
- 1. N1-OP-1 marked up through step H.4.5
- 2. N1-OP-43B marked up through step 2.7
- 3. RMR for lowering recirc flow to 50 Mlbm/hr
- 4. RMR for power ascension to rated J. Miscellaneous
- 1. Steam Packing Exhauster 12 should be in operation at the beginning of the scenario to prevent the crew from having to swap to this division following a loss of PB 11.
- 2. Ensure LPRM downscale pushbuttons are depressed on rod block monitor.
NRC Scenario 2 35 October 2008
II. SHIFT TURNOVER INFORMATION OFF GOING SHIFT: N D DATE: Today PART I: To be performed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.
PART II: To be reviewed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.
- Shift Turnover Checklist (ALL)
- Lit Control Room Annunciators
- Computer Alarm Summary (RO)
Evolutions/General Information/Equipment Status:
- Load Dispatcher was notified of power reduction and RRP 15 start two (2) hours ago PART III: Remarks/Planned Evolutions:
- RRP 15 removed from service. TS 3.1.7.e. Four loop operation.
- Start RRP 15 per N1-OP-1, H.4.0, and return to five-loop operation. N1-OP-1, H.4.0, signed off up to step 4.6. N1-OP-43B signed off up to step 2.8.
- Reactor power is at 90% and must be lowered until recirc flow <50 Mlbm/hr to support starting RRP 15.
- After starting Recirc Pump 15 MG set, operate it for one hour while maintenance takes readings before returning to 100% power.
PART IV: To be reviewed/accomplished shortly after assuming the shift:
- Review new Clearances (SM)
- Test Control Annunciators (CRE)
- Shift Crew Composition (SM/CRS)
TITLE NAME TITLE NAME SRO ATC RO BOP RO NRC Scenario 2 36 October 2008
Scenario ID INSTRUCTOR COMMENTS (Strengths, Areas for Improvement, Open Items etc.)
What Happened? What we did? Why? (Goals) Other Options?
NRC Scenario 2 37 October 2008
IV. PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES C. Critical Tasks:
CT-1.0 Given an un-isolable RWCU leak outside primary containment and one general area temperature approaching or exceeding the maximum safe limit, the crew will insert a manual reactor scram, in accordance with N1-EOP-5.
CT-2.0 Given a failure of RPS to de-energize when a scram is required, the crew will insert control rods by initiating manual Alternate Rod Insertion (ARI),
in accordance with N1-EOP-3.
CT-3.0 Given an un-isolable RWCU leak outside primary containment and two general area temperatures above the maximum safe limit, the crew will perform an RPV Blowdown, in accordance with N1-EOP-5 and N1-EOP-8.
D. Performance Objectives:
PO-3.0 Given the plant at power, the crew will reduce reactor power with recirculation flow, in accordance with N1-OP-43B.
PO-4.0 Given the plant at power, the crew will return a Recirculation Pump to service, in accordance with N1-OP-1, section H.4.0.
PO-3.0 Given a voltage regulator failure on the main generator, the crew will take manual control of generator voltage, in accordance with N1-ARP-A7.
PO-4.0 Given the plant at power, the crew will respond to a failure of the operating CRD Flow Control Valve, in accordance with N1-SOP-5.1.
PO-5.0 Given the plant at power, the crew will respond to a loss of Powerboard 11, in accordance with N1-SOP-30.1.
PO-6.0 Given the plant at power, the crew will respond to a Reactor Water Cleanup leak outside of the primary containment, in accordance with N1-EOP-5.
NRC Scenario 2 38 October 2008
PO-7.0 Given the plant in a condition requiring emergency classification, the SRO shall classify the events properly, complete initial notification forms, and discuss the bases for the classification in accordance with the emergency plan procedure.
PO-8.0 Given the plant or a plant system in a condition requiring Technical Specification action, identify the deviation and any required actions/notifications.
NRC Scenario 2 39 October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Take the simulator out of freeze before the crew CREW enters for the pre-shift walkdown and briefing.
- Walkdown panels Allow no more than 5 minutes for panel walkdown.
- Conduct shift turnover brief
- Assume the shift EVENT 1 PO-1.0 Power Reduction with Recirculation Flow SRO Note: Provide GAI-OPS-05 Attachment 1, SRO
- Conduct GAI-OPS-05 Reactivity Brief REACTIVITY BRIEF CHECKLIST (may be done in
- Reviews Reactivity Maneuver pre-scenario brief) and RMR Request Form
- Provides direction to RO/BOP regarding assignments
- RO adjusts recirculation flow
- Supervises reactivity maneuver RO
- Reduces recirc flow IAW RMR
- Continuously observes the following:
- APRMs lowering
- Recirc flow lowering
- Steam and feedwater flow lowering
- Vessel level normal
- Lower recirc flow until <50 Mlbm/hr
- Notify Crew of the new power level and that recirc flow is <50 Mlbm/hr NRC Scenario 2 40 October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT 1 Continued BOP
- Monitors individual RRP for response Individual M/A-Speed Control stations trending uniformly Individual RRP indications trending normally for lowering speed
- Monitors feed water controls for proper response FWP 13 FCV responding to power change
- RPV Water Level remains within program band (65 - 83)
NRC Scenario 2 41 October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT 2 PO-2.0 Restore Reactor Recirculation Pump 15 to Service Note: Crew directed to start RRP 15 in pre-brief, starting at N1-OP-1, step H.4.6. Provide the SRO with the RMR for RRP #15 recovery.
- Direct start up of RRP 15, using N1-OP-1, starting at step H.4.6
- Supervise reactivity manipulation
- Acknowledge report that RRP 15 is in service
- Determine TS 3.1.7.e no longer applies and the LCO Actions can be exited RO
- Continuously observe the following:
- APRMs
- Recirc flow
- Monitor P/F map and transfer from 4 loop to 5 loop map when the startup is performed BOP
- Acknowledge direction to start RRP 15
- Verify recirculation flow < 50 x 106 lb/hr
- Verify RRP 15 GEMAC in MAN and matched with other four GEMACs but no greater than 50%
- Verify RRP 15 discharge valve closed NRC Scenario 2 42 October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT 2 Continued BOP Continued
- Verify RRP 15 suction and discharge bypass valves are open
- Make a plant announcement for start of RRP 15
- Place RRP 15 control switch to START and observe indications
- MG MOTOR starts, Amp Meter Amps increase then decrease
- MG Generator accelerates to proper speed (approx 50 - 60 Hz)
- Generator Field Bkr closes CAUTIONS from N1-OP-1
- Generator slows toward 20%
- Failure to raise Recirc Pump speed during speed (Approximately 11.5 Hz) opening of discharge valve may result in stalled
- WHEN speed (Frequency Meter) is rotor and pump trip due to reverse flow. between 30 and 25 Hz, open
- To Prevent backflow thru the RRP, discharge REACTOR R PUMP DISCH VALVE valve should be opened before MG frequency
- Verify RRP 15 maintained less than or lowers to 20 Hz. Frequency will raise, then drop equal to OP limits quickly, then raise again before SLOWLY
- Adjust pump speed to match other lowering. Discharge BV should be opened pumps when frequency is slowly lowering.
- Null RRP 15 controller and shift to BAL or AUTO
- Verify power/flow map updated to five loop requirements
- Dispatch NAO to reset 50SR Pump Role Play: As NAO sent to Aux Control Room, Motor Stalled Rotor Target (Aux wait one minute then report you have reset 50SR Control Room)
Pump Motor Stalled Rotor Target
- May perform N1-ARP-F2-1-5 action to set oil temperature is 120oF and stable.
depress PUMP MOTOR VIBRATION RESET pushbutton on F Panel, clearing annunciator F2-1-5 NRC Scenario 2 43 October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT 3 PO-3.0 Main Generator Auto Voltage Regulator Failure CREW
- Recognize/diagnose Auto Voltage After RRP 15 has been placed in service and when Regulator Failure from:
directed by the examiner, insert malfunction:
- Amplidyne output meter will peg HI
- Exciter output voltage will peg HI EG02, GENERATOR AUTO VOLTAGE
- Generator field current will peg HI REGULATOR FAILS - INCREASE
- Generator mVars and terminal voltage TRG 1 will respond accordingly Amplidyne output meter will peg HI
- Annunciator A7-2-6, GEN VOLT Exciter output voltage will peg HI REGULATOR TRIP Generator field current will peg HI Expected Annunciators:
A3-1-1, TURB GEN EXC. TRANS. 1 TEMP RECORDER (first)
A7-2-6, GEN VOLT REGULATOR TRIP (later)
- Acknowledge report from the crew
- Direct/supervise ARP response
- Acknowledge voltage regulator transferred to OFF
- Notify Power Control (National Grid)
Role Play: When contacted as Power Control that the voltage regulator is in manual (National Grid), acknowledge the voltage regulator control (required within 30 minutes) in OFF and request NMP1 supply 60 MVARS to
- Direct CSO to adjust reactive load to the bus while in manual voltage control 60 MVARS to bus RO
- Execute N1-ARP-A7-2-6 for voltage regulator trip
- Confirm computer point F099 NRC Scenario 2 44 October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT 3 Continued RO Continued
- Monitor generator output voltage
- Place VOLTAGE REG TRANSFER switch to OFF
- Notify Crew/SRO
- Coordinate with SRO to contact Power Control
- Acknowledge direction to adjust VARS from the SRO
- Adjust generator reactive load using exciter field rheostat to 60 MVARS to the bus (N1-OP-32)
- Monitor plant parameters
- Monitor Turbine and Generator parameters on the A Panel NRC Scenario 2 45 October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT 4 PO-4.0 CRD Flow Control Valve Failure CREW When actions for the voltage regulator failure are
- Acknowledge/report annunciator F3 complete and when directed by the examiner, 5, CRD CHARGING WTR PRESS insert malfunction: HI/LO
- Diagnose CRD FCV 11 is closed RD36A, CRD FCV 44-151 FAILURE - CLOSED TRG 2 CRD charging water pressure rises CRD drive water pressure lowers CRD cooling water pressure and flow lower Expected Annunciator:
F3-1-5, CRD CHARGING WTR PRESSURE HI/LO SRO
- Acknowledge report from the crew
- Direct entry into N1-SOP-5.1, LOSS OF CRD
- Enter Technical Specifications 3.1.6.b, 7 day LCO for loss of CRD FCV 44-151 RO
- Monitor plant parameters NRC Scenario 2 46 October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT 4 Continued BOP
- Acknowledge direction from SRO
- Execute N1-SOP-5.1
- Answers Is a CRD pump operating YES
- Determines need to switch CRD Flow Control Valves per N1-OP-5 Section Role Play: As NAO, when directed to transfer F.5.0:
CRD FCV, wait 1 minute and inform the control
- Dispatch NAO to report to RB 237 room that you are standing by and establish communications
- Place CRD Flow Control in MAN Role Play: As NAO, when directed to open 44-148
- Direct NAO open 44-148 and 44-152 and 44-152, wait 1 minute and report task
- Direct NAO to count-down to place RB completion air transfer switches in UP position while you place CRD FCV transfer Role Play: As NAO, when directed to countdown switch in VALVE 12 position at F and swap transfer switch, give simulated panel countdown and report task completion (see note
- Direct NAO close 44-150 and 44-153 Note: When the control room operator takes the
- Monitor flow CRD Flow Control Transfer Switch to "VALVE 12
RD05, CRD FLOW CONTROL VALVE ISOL, FINAL VALUE=nc30b TRG 16 This precludes the console operator from having to time the insertion of this remote.
Role Play: As NAO, when directed to close 44-150 and 44-153, wait 1 minute and report task completion.
EVENT 5 PO-5.0 Loss of Powerboard 11 CREW NRC Scenario 2 47 October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS When directed by examiner, insert malfunction:
- Respond to annunciators and equipment trips ED04, AC POWER BOARD ELECTRICAL
- Diagnose/report loss of PB 11 FAULT(PB11)
- Recognize/report loss of the following:
TRG 3
Expected Annunciators: 12 A4-1-1, PB 11 R113 TRIP
- Drywell fans 14, 15, 16 L1-3-4, REACT BLDG/ATM DIFF PRESS
- Condensate Pump 11 Also the following equipment trips:
- Feedwater Booster Pump 11 Reactor Recirculation Pumps 11 & 12
- Feedwater Pump 11 Drywell fans 14, 15, 16
- Circulating Water Pump 11 Condensate Pump 11
- Service Water Pump 11 Feedwater Booster Pump 11
- TBCLC Pump 11 Circulating Water Pump 11
- Reactor Building Exhaust Fan 11 Service Water Pump 11
- Recognize/report lowering condenser Reactor Building Exhaust Fan 11 vacuum
- Recognize/report loss of Reactor Building D/P SRO
- Acknowledge report from crew
- Direct entry into N1-SOP-30.1
- Direct and supervise power reduction per N1-SOP-1.1 Emergency Power Reduction to stabilize condenser vacuum, as necessary
- Direct entry into N1-SOP-1.3 Recirculation Pump Trip, as required EVENT 5 Continued SRO Continued
- Direct closure of Recirc Pump 11 & 12 NRC Scenario 2 48 October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Discharge Valves
- Enter N1-EOP-5 on loss of Reactor Building Ventilation (positive pressure in RB)
- Direct entry into N1-SOP-6.1 for loss of spent fuel pool cooling pump, as time permits Note: The examiner may move to the next event
- Review Technical Specifications prior to the SRO addressing Technical
- Acknowledge that the APRMs are Specifications. The Technical Specifications may inoperable while the RRP discharge be covered using a follow-up question. valves are still open
- Determine that TS 3.1.7e Partial Loop Note: On the loss of Powerboard 11, Recirc Operations, 3 loop limitations need to pumps 11 and 12 trip. The APRMs are inoperable be checked by Reactor Engineering due to reverse flow through the tripped Recirc
- Limited to 90% power in 3 loop loops. The APRMs will be declared operable once operations the discharge valves are closed on both tripped
- 2% MCPR penalty must be Recirc loops.
applied per COLR
- Review N1-OP-19 Section H.7.0 for operation exceeding SPDES permit, as time permits
- Acknowledge direction from SRO NRC Scenario 2 49 October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS
- Confirm plant is stable by verifying:
- No thermal hydraulic Instability
- 3 Recirc pumps running
- Not operating in the Restricted Zone
- Execute N1-SOP-1.1, Emergency Power Reduction, to lower recirc flow to stabilize condenser vacuum, as required
- Determine plant operating point on the 3-loop power to flow curves BOP
- Execute N1-SOP-30.1, Loss of Power Board 11
- Start Service Water Pump 12
- Verify TBCLC pump 12 running
- Verify IAC 12 and/or 13 running
- Verify RBCLC pump(s) running
- Verify Steam Packing Exhauster 12 running
- Answers Are A4-4-6, A4-4-7, A4-1-3 OR A5-2-8 in alarm YES
- Determines Power Board 11 is faulted and cannot be reenergized
- Restores power to Power Board 16A as follows:
- Opens R1041
- Closes R1042
- Verifies Power Board 16B amps
<962 EVENT 5 Continued BOP Continued Role Play: As NAO when directed to energize
- Dispatch NAO to reenergize Power NRC Scenario 2 50 October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS PB13A-15A, acknowledge order, but delay any Boards 13A, 14A, and 15A action
- Notify SRO that APRMs are inoperable
- Close Recirc Pump 11 & 12 Discharge Valves
- Hold open for 2-3 seconds Recirc Pump 11 & 12 Discharge Valves Role Play: As NAO when directed to restore
- Execute N1-SOP-1.3, Recirc Pump offgas vacuum pump, acknowledge order, but Trip, as required delay any action
- Dispatch NAO to restore Offgas Vacuum Pump Role Play: As NAO when directed to investigate
- Enter N1-SOP-6.1 for loss of spent spent fuel pool cooling, acknowledge order, but fuel pool cooling, as time permits delay any action
- Dispatch NAO to investigate loss of spent fuel pool cooling, as time permits
- May take action to restore Turbine Building Ventilation in accordance with Note: The operator may choose to either restore either N1-ARP-L1-2-3 or N1-OP-26 normal Reactor Building Ventilation or initiate
- Respond to either annunciator:
Reactor Building Emergency Ventilation to restore
- L1-1-5, RB VENT EXH FAN 11-12 Reactor Building differential pressure. TRIP - VIB (Normal Ventilation) o Verify closed Reactor Building Exhaust Fan 11 outlet damper o Start Reactor Building Exhaust Fan 12
- L1-3-4, REACT BLDG/ATM DIFF PRESS (Emergency Ventilation) o Start RBEVS per N1-OP-10 EVENT 5 Continued BOP Continued NRC Scenario 2 51 October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Possible actions in N1-OP-10 Section H.1.0 to start RBEVS
- Verify open 202-36, EM VENTILATION FROM REACTOR BLDG BV
- Verify closed the following valves:
- 202-47, EM VENTILATION TIE BV
- Notify Rad Protection, the Reactor Role Play: As RP, acknowledge report that Building Emergency Ventilation RBEVS is in service and RBVS is secured system will be placed in service
- Start 202-53(33), EVS FAN 11(12)
- Verify open 202-34(35), EM VENT EXHAUST FAN 11(12) OUTLET BV
- Confirm proper operation of 202-50(51), EM VENT EXHAUST FAN 11(12) INLET FCV, by observing indicating lights and flow indication NRC Scenario 2 52 October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENTS 6, 7 and 8 PO-6.0, 7.0 RWCU Leak in the Secondary Containment and CREW failure of the Mode Switch and RPS Pushbuttons to
- Acknowledge/report:
cause a scram
- L1-3-3, CONTINUOUS AIR RAD MONITOR When directed by examiner, insert malfunction:
- H1-4-8, AREA RADIATION MONITORS CU11, COOLANT LEAK OUTSIDE OF
- K3-3-4, CLEAN-UP SYS LEAK DRYWELL, RAMP TIME=10:00, FINAL AREA T HI VALUE=20%
- Diagnose leak from RWCU into TRG 4 secondary containment Expected Annunciators:
- Diagnose RWCU failed to isolate L1-3-3, CONTINUOUS AIR RAD MONITOR H1-4-8, AREA RADIATION MONITORS K3-3-4, CLEAN-UP SYS LEAK AREA T HI The following malfunction is preset:
RP05B, REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM FAILURE TO SCRAM CH12 PRESET RPS Ch 12 lights do not extinguish Control rods do not insert based on automatic or manual scram signals Control rods insert once ARI is manually initiated EVENTS 6, 7 and 8 Continued SRO NRC Scenario 2 53 October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS
- Acknowledges report from the crew
- Enters N1-EOP-5
- Directs RWCU system isolation
- Acknowledges report that RWCU failed to isolate both automatically and manually
- Directs dispatching of an NAO and RP Tech to obtain general area temperatures and radiation levels in the Reactor Building
- When Reactor Building Ventilation exhaust radiation exceeds 5 mR/hr, then directs verification of RB Vent isolation and RBEVS initiation
- Requests report on ARMs
- Determines area temperatures and radiation levels are above setpoints in Tables T and R, and transitions to circle 27
- Determines a primary system is discharging into the reactor building and the discharge cannot be isolated, and transitions to circle 28
- Before any area temperature or radiation level reaches 135oF or 8 R/hr, respectively:
- Directs manual scram and N1-SOP-1 execution CT-1.0
- Acknowledges scram report
- Acknowledges electrical failure to scram EVENTS 6, 7 and 8 Continued SRO Continued NRC Scenario 2 54 October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS
- Enters N1-EOP-2 due to power above 6% when a scram is required
- Answers All rods in to at least 04?
NO
- Answers Will the reactor stay Note: Execution of the N1-EOP-3 steps listed here shutdown without boron? NO may be bypassed if the crew manually initiates ARI
- Exits N1-EOP-2, enters N1-EOP-3 immediately upon the electrical failure to scram
- Directs ADS bypassed
- Directs Core Spray jumpers installed per N1-EOP-1 Attachment 4
- Directs manual ARI CT-2.0
- Acknowledges new scram report
- Acknowledges all rod in
- Exits N1-EOP-3, enters N1-EOP-2
- Assigns RPV level band 53 to 95 inches using Condensate/Feedwater
- Directs RPV pressure maintained
<1080 psig using Turbine Bypass Valves
- May direct anticipatory blowdown with Turbine Bypass Valves and Emergency Condensers with cooldown in excess of 100oF/hr
- Acknowledges reports of Reactor Building temperatures and radiation levels
- When report is received that 2 General Areas temperatures are above 135°F, enters N1-EOP-8, RPV Blowdown
- Answers Are all control rods inserted EVENTS 6, 7 and 8 Continued to at least position 04 YES SRO Continued NRC Scenario 2 55 October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS
- Answers Drywell pressure? <3.5 psig
- Directs initiation of Emergency Condensers
- Answers Torus water level? >8 ft
- Acknowledge direction from the SRO
- Rotate reactor mode switch to shutdown CT-1.0
- Recognizes/reports RPS CH 12 does not deenergize and control rods do not insert
- Recognizes/reports RPS CH 12 does not deenergize and control rods do not insert
- Provide scram report
- Mode Switch in SHUTDOWN
- Control rods NOT all in
- When ARI is initiated, notify Control Room all rods are IN
- Provides scram report
- Places IRMs on range 9
- Downranges IRMs as necessary to monitor power decrease EVENTS 6, 7 and 8 Continued RO Continued NRC Scenario 2 56 October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS
- Reduces Recirc Master flow to 25-43 x 106 lb/hr
- Control RPV pressure <1080 psig using Turbine Bypass Valves
- If directed to perform anticipatory depressurization
- Open all bypass valves using BOJM
- Report all bypass valves open
- Initiate Emergency Condensers Note: No General Area temperature information is BOP available until an operator has been dispatched to
- Attempts to isolate RWCU the Reactor Building to monitor area temperatures.
- Closes33-02R, CU SUPPLY The following timeline of field reports may be ISOLATION VALVE 11 (INSIDE) adjusted by examiner as necessary for evaluation
- Informs SRO that 33-02R, CU Supply purposes. Isolation Valve 11 has failed to fully close Role Play: When directed as NAO and RP Tech
- Closes33-04R, CU SUPPLY ISO VLV to obtain general area temperatures and radiation 12 (OUTSIDE) levels in the Reactor Building:
- Informs SRO that 33-04R, CU Supply Isolation Valve has failed to fully close Wait 4 minutes and report RB 261 east side
temperature is 125 F and rising, radiation level is VLV 25 mr/hr and rising.
- Informs SRO that 33-01R, CU RETURN Isolation Valve has failed to Note: When one general area temperature is fully close reported above 135oF and a second general
- Dispatches NAO and RP Tech to area temperature is reported as approaching obtain Reactor Building general area o
135 F, the crew is likely to perform an temperatures and radiation levels anticipatory blowdown per N1-EOP-2 EVENTS 6, 7 and 8 Continued BOP Continued NRC Scenario 2 57 October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS
- If directed during N1-EOP-3 execution Role Play Continued: - Bypasses ADS Wait an additional 3 minutes and report RB 261 - Prevents Core Spray Injection o
east side temperature is 140 F and rising, radiation - Initiates Manual ARI level is 30 mr/hr and rising; RB 281 east side CT-2.0 o
temperature is 120 F and rising, radiation level is
- Performs N1-SOP-1, Reactor Scram, 20 mr/hr and rising. level control actions:
- Restores RPV level to 53-95 inches Note: When 2 general area temperatures are by controlling injection and rejecting o
reported above 135 F, the crew will perform an through RWCU RPV Blowdown
- Determines #13 FWP running and RPV water level recovering Wait an additional 3 minutes and report RB 281
- Verifies at least one Electric FW Pump o
east side temperature is 140 F and rising, radiation running level is 30 mr/hr and rising
- Terminates 13 FWP injection as follows:
- Places FWP 13 VALVE CONTROL in MANUAL AND closes
- Disengages 13 FWP
- Gives 29-10, FEEDWATER PUMP 13 BLOCKING VALVE, a CLOSE signal
- Verifies RPV water level +53 inches and rising
- Verifies 11/12 FWP controllers in MANUAL and set to zero output
- Resets HPCI signal
- Places 11/12 FWP BYPASS Valve in AUTO, sets to 65-70 inches
- Verifies level stable AND secures 2nd FWP, if running EVENTS 6, 7 and 8 Continued BOP Continued NRC Scenario 2 58 October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS
- If RPV level reaches 85 inches and rising, then:
- Verifies off all Feedwater Pumps
- Secures CRD Pumps not required
- Maximizes RWCU reject flow
- Closes FWIVs if required
- Closes MSIVs if required
- Maintain RPV water level in assigned band
- Notifies crew of reports on general area temperatures and radiation levels
- When N1-EOP-8, RPV Blowdown, is entered:
- Initiates Emergency Condensers
- Opens 3 ERVs CT-3.0 TERMINATING CUE:
- RPV Blowdown in progress
- All control rods are in
- RPV water level controlled in assigned band NRC Scenario 2 59 October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS VIII. POST SCENARIO CRITIQUE B. N/A, NRC Exam IX. REFERENCE EVENTS AND COMMITMENTS C. Reference Events
- 1. None D. Commitments
- 2. None X. LESSONS LEARNED A. None NRC Scenario 3 60 October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NMP SIMULATOR SCENARIO NRC Scenario 3 REV. 0 No. of Pages: 35 LOSS OF POWERBOARD 103, FEEDWATER PROBLEMS, LOCA WITH LOSS OF HIGH PRESSURE INJECTION, RPV BLOWDOWN REQUIRED TO RESTORE RPV WATER LEVEL PREPARER DATE VALIDATED Frank Payne, Kyle James, Bruce Williams DATE 5/17/08 GEN SUPERVISOR OPS TRAINING DATE OPERATIONS MANAGER N/A - Exam Security DATE CONFIGURATION CONTROL N/A - Exam Security DATE SCENARIO
SUMMARY
Length: 90 minutes Initial Power Level: Approximately 100%, above 100% rodline Mitigating Strategy Code: RL2, Small LOCA, RPV Blowdown required to permit injection with low pressure systems to recover RPV water level above TAF
SUMMARY
The crew assumes the shift with the plant at 100% power with Feedwater Pump 12 under clearance for maintenance. The crew will perform N1-PM-Q7, Turbine Thrust Bearing Test from the Control Room. Next, APRM 13 fails. The crew will bypass the APRM and reset the half scram. Next, Powerboard 103 trips on fault. The crew will take action to secure EDG 103 and attempt to restore Powerboard 17B. Powerboard 103 and Powerboard 17B are both faulted and are not restored. The trip of CRD Pump 12 (PB 17B) will require starting CRD Pump 11 and the SRO must address Technical Specifications.
When the necessary steps for the loss of Powerboard 103 are completed, Feedwater Booster Pump 11 will trip with a failure of the standby pump to start. The standby pump can be manually started. The SRO must again address Technical Specifications. When the standby Feedwater Booster Pump is manually started, the Master Feedwater Controller will fail as-is.
RPV water level will slowly deviate from the set level. The crew must diagnose the failure and the BOP operator will be required to take manual control of RPV water level. With RPV water level in manual control, Feedwater Pump 11 will trip because of delayed effects from the earlier Feedwater Booster Pump trip. This will require an entry into N1-SOP-1.1, Emergency Power Reduction to lower power to within the capacity of Feedwater Pump 13.
NRC Scenario 3 61 October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS While troubleshooting the electrical faults and troubles with the Feedwater system, the crew recognizes a coolant leak in the containment. Drywell pressure and temperature rise, requiring the crew to insert a manual SCRAM on rising drywell pressure. When the turbine trips, Powerboards 11 and 12 fail to automatically transfer. This results in a loss of feedwater, condensate, circulating water and other loads. Operators are able to restore these power boards. RPV water level continues to drop with only one liquid poison pump and CRD pump 11 available for injection. The crew will determine they cannot restore and maintain RPV water level above -109" and enter N1-EOP-8, RPV Blowdown. While blowing down the crew must diagnose that the inboard IV for Core Spray 111 fails to open and Core Spray pump 121 fails to start. With Core Spray unavailable for injection, the crew will inject with the feedwater booster pumps using N1-EOP-1, Att 25 or 26.
Major Procedures: N1-SOP-1, N1-SOP-1.1, N1-SOP-5.1, N1-SOP-16.1, N1-SOP-30.1, N1-SOP-30.2, N1-EOP-1, N1-EOP-2, N1-EOP-4, N1-EOP-8 Termination Criteria: RPV Blowdown in progress, RPV water level above TAF and controlled in assigned band, containment pressure controlled in accordance with N1-EOP-1 Att 17 EAL Classification: Alert, EAL 3.1.1 NRC Scenario 3 62 October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS II. SIMULATOR SET UP K. IC Number: IC 173 L. Presets/Function Key Assignments
- 2. Malfunctions:
- a. FW03B, FEEDWATER PUMP TRIP 12 PRESET
- h. CU01, COOLANT LEAK INSIDE OF DRYWELL, RAMP TIME=10:00, FINAL VALUE=40% TRG 6
- i. ED26, FAILURE OF PB11 TO AUTO TRANSFER PRESET
- j. ED27, FAILURE OF PB12 TO AUTO TRANSFER PRESET
- k. CS01C, CORE SPRAY PUMP TRIP 121 PRESET
- l. CS03C, CORE SPRAY INBD INJECT VLV FAIL TO OPEN 40-11 PRESET
- 3. Remotes:
- 4. Overrides:
- a. OVR-7S43DI4116 POS_3 4H17/51-02A C FRM B, FINAL VALUE=OFF PRESET
- 5. Triggers:
- a. TRG 4 - Fails Feedwater Pump 13 FCV as-is when Feedwater Booster Pump 12 control switch is taken to start
- i. Event Action: zdfwbncb==1 ii. Command: None
- 6. Equipment Out of Service:
- a. Feedwater pump 12 control switch in PTL and yellow tagged C. Support Documentation NRC Scenario 3 63 October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS
- 5. N1-PM-Q7, QUARTERLY MAIN TURBINE THRUST BEARING AND GENERATOR CORE MONITOR TESTING, signed off through step 6.1, up to step 6.2 (Note 6.1 is N/A if you perform 6.2)
D. Miscellaneous
- 1. Verify CRD pump 12 is in service
- 2. Place protected equipment signs NRC Scenario 3 64 October 2008
II. SHIFT TURNOVER INFORMATION OFF GOING SHIFT: N D DATE: Today PART I: To be performed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.
PART II: To be reviewed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.
- Shift Turnover Checklist (ALL)
- Lit Control Room Annunciators
- Computer Alarm Summary (RO)
Evolutions/General Information/Equipment Status:
Power is approximately 100%.
Turbine Surveillance Testing, N1-PM-Q7, to be performed.
Feed Pump 12 is out of service because of a burned out motor. (TS 3.1.8, day 2 of 15)
PART III: Remarks/Planned Evolutions:
Perform N1-PM-Q7, QUARTERLY MAIN TURBINE THRUST BEARING AND GENERATOR CORE MONITOR TESTING, section 6.2.
PART IV: To be reviewed/accomplished shortly after assuming the shift:
- Review new Clearances (SM)
- Test Control Annunciators (CRE)
- Shift Crew Composition (SM/CRS)
TITLE NAME TITLE NAME SRO ATC RO BOP RO NRC Scenario 3 65 October 2008
Scenario ID INSTRUCTOR COMMENTS (Strengths, Areas for Improvement, Open Items etc.)
What Happened? What we did? Why? (Goals) Other Options?
NRC Scenario 3 66 October 2008
V. PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES E. Critical Tasks:
CT-1.0 Given a LOCA with a loss of high pressure injection, the crew will perform an RPV Blowdown when RPV water level drops below -84 inches, in accordance with N1-EOP-8.
CT-2.0 Given a LOCA with a loss of high pressure injection and Core Spray, the crew will inject to the RPV with Condensate and Feedwater Booster pumps, in accordance with N1-EOP-2.
CT-3.0 Given a LOCA in the Drywell, the crew will initiate Containment Sprays to prevent exceeding PSP, in accordance with N1-EOP-4.
F. Performance Objectives:
PO-1.0 Given the plant operating at power, the crew will perform Main Turbine Thrust Bearing wear testing, in accordance with N1-PM-Q7.
PO-2.0 Given a failed APRM, the crew will bypass the APRM and reset the half scram, in accordance with N1-ARP-F1.
PO-3.0 Given the plant operating at power, the crew will respond to a loss of a Powerboards 103 and 17B, in accordance with N1-ARP-A5.
PO-4.0 Given the plant operating at power, the crew will respond to a loss of the operating CRD pump, in accordance with N1-ARP-A5 or N1-SOP-5.1.
PO-5.0 Given a trip of Feedwater Booster Pump 11 and a failure of the standby pump to automatically start, the crew will start the standby pump, in accordance with N1-ARP-H3.
PO-6.0 Given a failed Feedwater flow control valve, the crew will take manual control to stabilize RPV water level, in accordance with N1-SOP-16.1.
PO-7.0 Given a loss of the operating motor driven feedwater pump, the crew will lower power to within the capacity of the turbine driven feedwater pump, in accordance with N1-SOP-16.1 and N1-SOP-1.1.
PO-8.0 Given a LOCA within the Drywell, the crew will scram the reactor, in accordance with N1-SOP-1.
PO-9.0 Given a failure of Powerboards 11 and 12 to automatically transfer following a Main Turbine trip, the crew will manually transfer the Powerboards, in accordance with N1-SOP-30.1 and N1-SOP-30.2.
PO-10.0 Given the plant in a condition requiring emergency classification, the SRO shall classify the events properly, complete initial notification forms, and NRC Scenario 3 67 October 2008
discuss the bases for the classification in accordance with the emergency plan procedure.
PO-11.0 Given the plant or a plant system in a condition requiring Technical Specification action, identify the deviation and any required actions/notifications.
NRC Scenario 3 68 October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Take the simulator out of freeze before the crew CREW enters for the pre-shift walkdown and briefing.
- Walkdown panels Allow no more than 5 minutes for panel walkdown.
- Conduct shift turnover brief
- Assume the shift EVENT 1 PO-1.0 Perform N1-PM-Q7, Turbine Thrust Bearing Test There are no simulator actions required for this test and no malfunctions are intended to occur SRO
- Directs the BOP to perform N1-PM-Q7, Quarterly Main Turbine Thrust Bearing and Generator Core Monitoring Testing, Sect 6.2, Thrust Note: Pre-job brief may be conducted prior to the Bearing Wear Test from the Control crew entering the simulator to facilitate scenario Room run-time.
- Perform a pre-job brief RO
- Monitors plant parameters BOP
- Acknowledges direction to perform turbine surveillance testing from the SRO
- Notifies RO of intention to perform the test
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT 1 Continued
- Confirms the following:
- Yellow TEST MODE 43X/TBWT light illuminates
- Annunciator A2-3-3 actuates
- Rotates and holds TBWT Motor switch to + READING position, until Annunciator A2-3-4 actuates
- Continues holding TBWT Motor switch to + READING position until POS light is lit then records reading at which trip occurred
- Rotates and holds TBWT Motor switch to - READING position until meter is zeroed, then releases switch
- Confirms Annunciator A2-3-4 clears
- Rotates and holds TBWT Motor switch to - READING position, until Annunciator A2-3-4 actuates
- Continues holding TBWT Motor switch to - READING position until NEG light is lit then records reading at which trip occurred
- Rotates and holds TBWT Motor switch to + READING position until meter is zeroed, then releases switch
- Confirms Annunciator A2-3-4 clears
- Direct the NAO at the middle standard to verify:
- Trip lights (front and rear) NOT illuminated Role Play: As NAO, when directed, report that the
- Test handle in normal (ZERO) trip lights are NOT illuminated and the test handle position is in the normal (ZERO) position at the middle standard BOP Continued EVENT 1 Continued NRC Scenario 3 70 October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS
- Place THRUST BRG WEAR TEST SOLENOID Switch to OFF
- Confirm YELLOW TEST MODE 43X/TBWT light is OFF
- Direct the NAO at the middle standard Role Play: As NAO, when directed, report that the of to verify TEST light NOT illuminated test light is NOT illuminated at the middle standard
- Confirm Annunciator A2-3-3 clears
- Verify reset, Flag Target 30/1 and Cue: If required inform the BOP that the flags on 30/2 on Panel B-3 30/1 and 30/2 are reset
- Notifies SRO/RO that the Turbine Thrust Bearing test has been successfully completed NRC Scenario 3 71 October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT 2 PO-2.0 APRM 13 Inoperative Failure CREW When directed by the examiner, insert
- Acknowledge/Report Annunciators:
malfunction:
- F2-1-6, APRM 11-14
- F3-4-4, ROD BLOCK NM21C, APRM 13 FAILURE - INOP
- F1-1-1, RPS CH 11 NEUTRON TRG 1 MONITOR Expected Annunciators:
- Diagnose failure of APRM 13 F1-1-1, RPS CH 11 REACT NEUTRON MONITOR F1-2-1, RPS CH 11 AUTO REACTOR TRIP SRO Role Play: If requested to investigate the failure of
- References TS 3.6.2.a, determines the Minimum Number of Operable Channels per Trip System is met RO
- Monitors plant parameters
- When directed bypasses APRM 13
- Places APRM BYPASS switch in BYPASS position
- Confirms APRM BYPASS light is ON on Panel E
- Resets the half scram BOP
- Investigates APRM 13 failure NRC Scenario 3 72 October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT 3 PO-3.0, 4.0 PB 103 and PB 17B trip on fault, loss of CRD Pump 12 CREW
- Acknowledge/report annunciators When directed by examiner, insert malfunctions:
- Recognize/report the following:
- Loss of PB 103 and PB 17B ED08, AC POWER BOARD ELECTRICAL
- R1013 tripped (PB 103 normal supply)
ED21, AC POWERBOARD ELECTRICAL
- R1053 tripped (PB 17B normal supply)
FAULT(PB17 SECTION B)
- Recognize/diagnose loss of CRD TRG 2 Major Expected Annunciators A5-3-7, POWER BD. 17 R1053 TRIP A5-4-7, POWER BD 17 LOW BUS VOLTAGE A5-4-3, POWER BD 103 BUS VOLTAGE LOW A5-3-5, DSL GEN 103 START-RUN OFFNORMAL (possible if EDG not secured rapidly with loss of cooling water)
The following major loads will be lost as a result of the loss of PB 103 and PB 17B:
Core Spray Pumps/Topping Pumps 112/122 Containment Spray Pumps 121/122 Static Batt Charger 171A/B RPS UPS 172A/B ESW Pump 12 CRD Pump 12 RBCLC Pump 12 Liquid Poison Pump 12 CREVS 12 RBEVS 12 EDG 103 Auxiliaries Condensate Transfer Pump 12 Emerg. Cond. 12 Inside Steam IV (39-09R)
EVENT 3 Continued SRO NRC Scenario 3 73 October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS
- Acknowledge report from crew
- Direct BOP/RO to execute applicable ARPs
- Recognize that EDG 103 auxiliaries are not powered (Raw Water Pump)
- Direct shutdown of EDG 103 using N1-ARP-A5-4-3
- Direct RO/BOP to start CRD Pump 11 Role Play: If dispatched as NAO to investigate PB IAW N1-SOP-5.1 or N1-ARP-A5-4-3 loss, wait 3 minutes then report that R1013, PB
- Review loads lost as result of PB 103 Normal Supply Breaker, tripped on over- 103/17B loss current
- Review Tech Specs for impact of loss of PB103
- TS 3.1.2, Liquid Poison System
- TS 3.1.4, Core Spray System
- TS 3.1.5, ADS (Requires to be less than 110 psig in 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />)
- TS 3.2.7.c, Reactor Coolant System Isolation Valves (Limiting LCO - requires initiating a normal orderly shutdown within one hour and having reactor in the cold shutdown condition within ten hours.)
- TS 3.6.3, Emergency Power Sources
- Recognize that TS 3.2.7.c is most limiting EVENT 3 Continued SRO Continued NRC Scenario 3 74 October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Role Play: When contacted as WEC/Mgmt,
- Notify WEC/Mgmt of impending acknowledge report of impending shutdown shutdown
- Brief crew on impending shutdown RO
- Monitor plant parameters
- Places 11 CRD pump control Role Play: If directed as NAO to shift RPV level switch to START CRD backfill per N1-OP-58, H.2.0 reply that you
- Places 12 CRD pump control will get the procedure and shift RPV level CRD switch to STOP backfill. Wait 5 minutes and report backfill has
- Observes proper operation of 11 been shifted. CRD pump (amps, flow, alarms)
- Executes N1-ARP-A5-4-3
- Confirm alarm on computer
- If PB 103 voltage is low:
- Verifies EDG 103 running
- Confirm A5-4-1 AND A5-4-2 clear
- Attempts to close R1032, EDG 103 Output Breaker
- Recognizes/reports R1032 will not close and PB 103 cannot be re-energized
- If PB 103 cannot be re-energized:
- Places R1013 in PTL
- Places EDG 103 control switch in emergency stop EVENT 3 Continued
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS
- Resets Lockout 86-17
- Opens R1053, PB 17B Normal Feeder Breaker
- Closes R1052, PB 17 A-B Tie Breaker
- Recognizes/reports R1052 will not close and PB 17B cannot Role Play: If requested to develop a clearance to be re-energized prevent autostart of EDG 103, acknowledge
- Requests clearance to prevent request and estimate one hour for completion. auto-start of EDG 103 EVENT 4 PO-5.0 NRC Scenario 3 76 October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Feedwater Booster Pump 11 Trip with Failure of CREW the Standby Pump to Auto Start
- Acknowledge/report annunciator H3-1-6 REACTOR FW BOOSTER P11 When directed by examiner, insert malfunction: TRIP
- Diagnose trip of Feedwater Booster FW02A, FEEDWATER BOOSTER PUMP TRIP 11 Pump 11 TRG 3 The following override prevents Feedwater Booster Pump 12 from Auto Starting on low header discharge pressure:
OVR-7S43DI4116 POS_3 4H17/51-02A C FRM B PRESET RPV water level slowly lowers Feedwater Booster Pump header pressure lowers Expected Annunciators:
H3-1-6 REACTOR FW BOOSTER P11 TRIP H3-1-7, H3-2-7, H3-3-7, REACTOR FW PUMP 11/12/13 SUCTION SRO
- Acknowledges report
- If BOP does not manually start FWBP 12, directs starting FWBP 12
- Enters Tech Spec 3.1.8.c
- Determines redundant component inoperable in both HPCI train 11 and 12, thus normal orderly shutdown shall be initiated within one hour and the plant brought to less than 110 psig in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> EVENT 4 Continued SRO Continued NRC Scenario 3 77 October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS
- Initiates surveillance requirement 4.1.8.c for redundant component operability verification
- Notifies WEC
- Notifies Ops Management
- Performs crew brief/update RO
- Monitors plant parameters
- Report alarm and respond per H3-1-6
- Recognizes/diagnoses failure of the standby pump to automatically start
- Manually starts FWBP 12
- Notifies crew of failure of FWBP 12 to auto start Role Play: When dispatched as NAO to swap
- Dispatches operators to shift HWC, wait 5 minutes and report that HWC injection Hydrogen Water Chemistry injection has been transferred from FWBP 11 to FWBP 12 from FWBP 11 to FWBP 12 NRC Scenario 3 78 October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT 5 PO-6.0 Failure of the Feedwater Master Controller AS-IS CREW
- Recognize/report RPV water level is The following malfunction will be automatically deviating from setpoint inserted when the control switch for Feedwater
- Diagnose/report failure of Feedwater Booster Pump 12 is placed in START: Master Controller FW14C, FEEDWATER MASTER CONTROLLER FAILS - AS IS TRG 4 RPV water level slowly deviates from setpoint Feedwater flow remains constant Expected Annunciator:
F2-3-3 REACT VESSEL LEVEL HIGH-LOW SRO
- When notified of feedwater controller failure, directs:
- Entry into N1-SOP-16.1
- Manual control of feedwater RO
- Monitors plant parameters
- Enters N1-SOP-16.1
- Determines problem with Feedwater Level Control
- Determines NOT a Flow Control Valve lockup EVENT 5 Continued NRC Scenario 3 79 October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS BOP Continued
- Using available FCVs, takes manual control of FWLC at MA stations
- Operates Feedwater FCV 11 or 13 in manual to control feedflow to restore RPV water level
- Controls RPV water level in MANUAL NRC Scenario 3 80 October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT 6 PO-7.0 Feedwater Pump 11 Trip CREW
- Acknowledge/report annunciator When the crew has restored RPV water level to
- Diagnose a trip of the operating normal band and directed by examiner, insert electric feedwater pump malfunction:
FW03A, FEEDWATER PUMP 11 TRIP TRG 5 RPV water level lowers Expected Annunciator:
H3-1-7, REACTOR FW PUMP 11 TRIP OVERLOAD SUCTION HI-LEVEL SRO
- Acknowledges report
- Directs entry into ARP
- Directs re-entry into N1-SOP-16.1
- Supervises power reduction
- Notifies WEC
- Notifies Ops Management
- Performs crew brief/update
- Recognizes Tech Spec 3.1.8 applies for loss of HPCI component NRC Scenario 3 81 October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT 6 Continued RO
- Monitors plant parameters
- Lowers reactor power IAW N1-SOP-1.1 using recirculation flow as directed/required for RPV water level control
- Monitors position on P/F map BOP
- Re-enters N1-SOP-16.1
- Determines problem with FW pumps
- Determines level can be maintained >53
- Enters ARP H3-1-7
- Places 11 FW Pump Control Switch to Stop spring return to Neutral Role Play: If dispatched as NAO to check FWP
- Confirms Aux Oil Pump running 11, wait 2 minutes and report that FWP 11 Aux Oil AND FW Pump not rotating Pump is running and the FWP shaft is not rotating backwards backwards.
- Verifies closed, 11 FW FCV (29-141) AND 11 FW Low Flow FCV Role Play: If dispatched as NAO to investigate trip (29-49) of FWP 11, wait 2 minutes and report that FWP 11
- Dispatch NAO to investigate FWP 11 breaker tripped on overload, but there are no trip abnormal indications at the pump.
NRC Scenario 3 82 October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENTS 7, 8 and 9 PO-8.0, 9.0 RPV coolant leak in the Primary Containment CREW
- Recognize/report containment When the crew has restored RPV water level to parameters degrading normal band and directed by examiner, insert - DW humidity rising malfunction: - DW leakage rising
- DW pressure rising CU01, COOLANT LEAK INSIDE OF DRYWELL, - DW temperature rising RAMP TIME=10:00, FINAL VALUE=40%
- Diagnose RPV coolant leak TRG 6 Drywell humidity, leakage rate, pressure and temperature rise Expected Annunciators:
H2-4-7, DRYWELL WATER LEAK DETECTION SYS K2-4-3, DRYWELL PRESSURE HIGH - LOW The inboard IV for Core Spray 111 fails to open and Core Spray pump 121 fails to start The following malfunctions are preset:
CS01C, CORE SPRAY PUMP TRIP 121 PRESET CS03C, CORE SPRAY INBD INJECT VLV FAIL TO OPEN 40-11 PRESET EVENTS 7, 8 and 9 Continued SRO NRC Scenario 3 83 October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Initial Actions for RPV Coolant Leak
- May direct an emergency power reduction IAW N1-SOP-1.1, if time Note: A reactor scram will be required because of permits rising Drywell pressure
- Brief crew on plans to insert manual scram
- Direct the RO to place Mode Switch to SHUTDOWN
- Enters N1-EOP-2 when RPV water level reaches 53 inches
- Directs N1-SOP-1, Reactor Scram
- Enters N1-EOP-2 and N1-EOP-4 when DW pressure reaches 3.5 psig Actions for failure of PB to transfer
- Direct entry into N1-SOP-30.1
- Direct entry into N1-SOP-30.2
- Authorizes PB 11 and PB 12 re-energized
- Enters N1-EOP-2 when water level reaches 53 inches:
- Determines all control rods are in
- Directs RPV pressure controlled less than 1080 psig
- Adjusts level and pressure bands as coolant leak degrades RPV parameters EVENTS 7, 8 and 9 Continued SRO Continued NRC Scenario 3 84 October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS
- When RPV level can NOT be maintained >53 inches, directs use of Alternate Injection Systems, Detail E (Liquid Poison) to stay above -84 inches (TAF)
- Direct MSIVs closed to minimize inventory loss and pressure control with ECs
- Determines cannot stay above -84 inches (TAF) with current injection sources, and transitions to Alternate Level Control leg of N1-EOP-2
- Directs ADS bypassed
- Directs EC initiation
- Determines Core Spray pump 121 has failed to start
- Determines 2 Detail F Subsystems are available (Core Spray Loop 11 and Condensate/Feedwater Booster Pumps 12)
- Waits until level drops to -84 inches (TAF)
- Determines a Detail F Subsystem is lined up with a pump running
- Before level drops to -109 inches, determines an injection source is lined up with a pump running
- Enters N1-EOP-8, RPV Blowdown:
- Determines all control rods are in EVENTS 7, 8 and 9 Continued SRO Continued NRC Scenario 3 85 October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS
- Directs Emergency Condensers initiated
- Determines torus water level is above 8.0 feet
- Directs open 3 ERVs CT-1.0
- Directs RPV water level restored 53-95 inches using Core Spray (N1-EOP-1 Att 4) or Condensate/Feedwater Booster pumps (N1-EOP-1 Att 25/26)
- When RPV pressure is less than 365 psig, determines Core Spray IV 40-11 failed to open
- Directs RPV water level restored 53-95 inches using Condensate/Feedwater Booster pumps (N1-EOP-1 Att 25/26)
CT-2.0
- Determines RPV water level is rising
- Transitions back to Normal Level Control leg of N1-EOP-2
- Enters N1-EOP-4 when drywell pressure reaches 3.5 psig and/or drywell temperature reaches 150oF:
- Directs lockout of Containment Spray Pumps
- When torus pressure exceeds 13 psig or before drywell temperature exceeds 300oF:
EVENTS 7, 8 and 9 Continued SRO Continued NRC Scenario 3 86 October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS
- Determines plant is inside Containment Spray Initiation Limit Curve (Fig. K)
- Directs verification that the recirculation pumps are tripped
- Directs drywell cooling fans tripped
- Directs initiation of containment spray IAW N1-EOP-1 Att 17 CT-3.0
- Places REACTOR MODE Switch in SHUTDOWN
- Provides Scram Report
- Places IRMs on range 9
- Downranges IRMs as necessary to monitor power decrease
- Reduces Recirc Master flow to 25-43 x 106 lb/hr
- Controls RPV pressure <1080 psig using Turbine Bypass Valves, as required BOP
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS
- Performs N1-SOP-1, Reactor Scram, level control actions:
- Determines #13 FWP running and RPV water level recovering Note: Further level control actions may not be
- Determines no Electric FW Pump performed due to powerboard losses and coolant running/available leak
- Places FWP 13 VALVE CONTROL in MANUAL AND closes
- Disengages 13 FWP
- Gives 29-10, FEEDWATER PUMP 13 BLOCKING VALVE, a CLOSE signal
- Verifies RPV water level +53 inches and rising
- Verifies 11/12 FWP controllers in MANUAL and set to zero output
- Resets HPCI signal
- If RPV level reaches 85 inches and rising, then:
- Verifies off all Feedwater Pumps
- Secures CRD Pumps not required
- Maximizes RWCU reject flow
- Closes FWIVs if required
- Closes MSIVs if required
- Attempts to maintain RPV water level EVENTS 7, 8 and 9 Continued in assigned band RO/BOP NRC Scenario 3 88 October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS When the turbine trips, Power Boards 11 and 12 Actions for Failure of PBs to Transfer:
fail to transfer
- Enters N1-SOP-30.1 for PB 11 loss
- Enters N1-SOP-30.2 for PB 12 loss The following malfunctions cause the failure to Actions from N1-SOP-30.1(30.2) transfer:
- Verifies fault annunciators clear
- Obtains permission from SRO to re-ED26, FAILURE OF PB11 TO AUTO TRANSFER energize PB 11(12)
PRESET
- Verifies PB 11(12) components green ED27, FAILURE OF PB12 TO AUTO TRANSFER flagged PRESET
- Cleanup Pump 11(12)
Expected Annunciators:
- Service Water Pump 11(12)
A4-1-1, POWER BD. 11 R113 TRIP
- Circ Water Pump 11(12)
A5-1-6, POWER BD. 12 R122 TRIP
- RRMG Set 11 and 12 (14 and 15)
Major Loads Lost:
- TBCLC Pump 11(12)
Powerboard 11:
- FW Booster Pump 11(13)
RWCU Pump 11
- Condensate Pump 11(13)
Service Water Pump 11
- Inserts Sync Key and rotates Circ Pump 11 clockwise for R112(R123)
RR Pump 11
- Closes R112(R123)
RR Pump 12
- Confirms voltage normal on PB 11(12)
TBCLC Pump 11
- Rotates Sync Key counterclockwise Condensate Pump 11 and removes for R112(R123)
Feedwater Booster Pump 11
- Determines PB 11(12) energized Powerboard 12:
- Closes R111(124)
RWCU Pump 12
- Dispatches NAO to recover Service Water Pump 12 Powerboards 13, 14, 15 Circ Pump 12
Condensate Pump 13
- Starts Service Water Pump 11(12)
Feedwater Booster Pump 13
- Starts IAC 11(12)
EVENTS 7, 8 and 9 Continued
- Starts TBCLC Pump 11(12)
RO/BOP Continued
- Starts an RBCLC Pump NRC Scenario 3 89 October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Role Play: When contacted as NAO, acknowledge
- Verifies fault annunciators clear order to recover PBs 13, 14, 15, but delay any
- Obtains permission from SRO to re-report on task completion energize PB 12(11)
- Verifies PB 12(11) components green flagged
- Cleanup Pump 12(11)
- Service Water Pump 12(11)
- Circ Water Pump 12(11)
- RRMG Set 14 and 15 (11 and 12)
- TBCLC Pump 12(11)
- FW Booster Pump 13(11)
- Condensate Pump 13(11)
- Inserts Sync Key and rotates clockwise for R123(R112)
- Closes R123(R112)
- Confirms voltage normal on PB 12(11)
- Rotates Sync Key counterclockwise and removes for R123(R112)
- Determines PB 12(11) energized
- Closes R124(111)
- Reports PB 12(11) re-energized Subsequent EOP Actions:
- Maximizes injection with CRD and Liquid Poison to attempt to maintain level within the band assigned
- Updates crew on failure to maintain level and pressure bands EVENTS 7, 8 and 9 Continued RO/BOP Continued
- Operates Emergency Condensers to NRC Scenario 3 90 October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS maintain pressure with the band assigned and NOT exceed 100°F/hr cool-down rate
- Reports failure of Core Spray pump 121 to start
- Closes MSIVs when directed
- Locks out Containment Spray by placing 4 pump control switches in PTL
- Observes and reports containment parameters (torus pressure above 13 psig)
- Verifies/reports that all recirculation pumps have been tripped
- Verifies/reports that all drywell cooling fans have been tripped
- Initiates containment spray (N1-EOP-1 Att 17)
- Starts Containment Spray Pumps 111 and 112 CT-3.0
- Verifies Containment Spray flow
- Monitors containment pressure and temperature to ensure lowering trend
- Terminates Containment Sprays when drywell pressure is below 3.5 psig
- Reports containment spray terminated EVENTS 7, 8 and 9 Continued RO/BOP Continued
- Monitors DWP and reports if DWP NRC Scenario 3 91 October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS reaches 3.5 psig, after spray is terminated
- IF directed, initiates Containment Spray again
- Initiates Emergency Condensers when directed
- Bypasses ADS
- Opens 3 ERVs CT-1.0
- When RPV pressure lowers below 365 psig, recognizes/reports Core Spray IV 40-11 failed to open
- Attempts to manually open 40-11
- Report inability to inject with Core Spray
- Injects to the RPV with Condensate/Feedwater Booster pumps (N1-EOP-1 Att 25/26)
CT-2.0
- Restores and maintains RPV water level 53-95 inches Possible N1-EOP-1 Att 25 actions:
- WHEN Feedwater Booster HDR PR (PI-51-61A) is greater than RPV EVENTS 7, 8 and 9 Continued pressure, THEN:
- Place LVL SETPOINT SETDOWN to OVERRIDE RO/BOP Continued
- Verify Open, at least one of the NRC Scenario 3 92 October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS FEEDWATER ISOLATION VALVES 11 and 12
- Verify Open, FEEDWATER PUMP 13 BLOCKING VALVE
- Select Manual on 13 FWP Valve Control Selector Switch
- Verify Open at least one of the FEEDWATER ISOLATION VALVES 11 and 12 Role Play: When directed as NAO to pull fuses
- Verify Open, both FEEDWATER FU-8 and FU-9, wait 2 minutes and insert remote: PUMP 11 and 12 BLOCKING VALVES FW24, REMOVAL OF HPCI FUSES FU8/FU9,
- Select Manual on 11 and 12 FWP FINAL VALUE=PULL Valve Control Selector Switch TRG 26
- Turn 11 and 12 Feedwater FCV Then report that fuses FU-8 and FU-9 have been (Knurled Knob) fully counterclockwise pulled
- Remove the following fuses from Panel IS34 in the Aux Control Room:
EVENTS 7, 8 and 9 Continued
- FU-8
- FU-9 RO/BOP Continued
- Position 11 and 12 Feedwater FCV as necessary to maintain required level NRC Scenario 3 93 October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS while maintaining less than 1.5 E6 lbm/hr through each feed pump TERMINATING CUE
- RPV Blowdown in progress
- Containment pressure controlled in accordance with N1-EOP-1 Att 17 NRC Scenario 3 94 October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS XI. POST SCENARIO CRITIQUE C. N/A, NRC Exam XII. REFERENCE EVENTS AND COMMITMENTS E. Reference Events
- 1. None F. Commitments
- 3. None XIII. LESSONS LEARNED A. None NRC Scenario 4 October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NMP SIMULATOR SCENARIO NRC Scenario 4 REV. 0 No. of Pages: 35 SERVICE WATER STRAINER CLOGGING, FEEDWATER FLOW TRANSMITTER FAILURE, LOW LEVEL IN THE INTAKE STRUCTURE, ATWS WITH A LOCA AND FAILURE OF THE FEEDWATER ISOLATION VALVES CLOSED PREPARER DATE VALIDATED Frank Payne, Kyle James, Bruce Williams DATE 5/18/08 GEN SUPERVISOR OPS TRAINING DATE OPERATIONS MANAGER N/A - Exam Security DATE CONFIGURATION CONTROL N/A - Exam Security DATE SCENARIO
SUMMARY
Length: 90 minutes Initial Power Level: Approximately 90%, 4 loop operation Mitigating Strategy Code: AT3, high power ATWS with small LOCA, Blowdown required, re-inject with Core Spray The scenario begins with the crew performing a control rod pattern adjustment. Next, the crew will be directed to return TBCLC Pump 12 to service and secure TBCLC Pump 11. Next the crew must respond to high D/P across one of the Service Water Pump Discharge Strainers. This will require placing another Service Water Pump in service. Once the standby Service Water Pump has been started, Main Steam Line Radiation Monitor 111 will become inoperable. The SRO will determine the Technical Specification implications.
When this is complete, an RPS pressure transmitter will fail low, followed closely by the in-service feedwater system pressure transmitter also failing low. The crew will be required to shift to manual feedwater level control. The crew may then shift reactor pressure/level columns and return to automatic feedwater level control. Technical Specifications must be addressed due to the RPS pressure transmitter failure. Next the intake structure traveling screens clog causing high D/Ps. This will eventually result in a low level in the intake structure with the subsequent tripping of the Circulating Water pumps. This will require entering N1-SOP-18.1, Service Water Failure/Low Intake Level. As intake level continues to lower, the crew will insert a manual scram.
NRC Scenario 4 October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS When the scram occurs the control rods will not insert. This ATWS is complicated by the total loss of the normal heat sinks. Additionally, following the ATWS, a Recirculation Line break will cause RPV water level to lower, requiring the crew to re-establish injection. When the crew attempts to re-establish Feedwater flow, the Feedwater isolation valves will not re-open. When it is determined that RPV water level cannot be restored and maintained above -109 inches, the crew will perform an RPV Blowdown, and re-inject with Core Spray.
Major Procedures: N1-SOP-1.1, N1-SOP-16.1, N1-SOP-18.1, N1-EOP-1, N1-EOP-2, N1-EOP-3, N1-EOP-3.1, N1-EOP-4, N1-EOP-8 EAL Classification: Site Area Emergency, EAL 2.2.2 Termination Criteria: RPV Blowdown in progress, RPV water level above -109 inches and controlled in assigned band, containment pressure controlled in accordance with N1-EOP-1 Att 17 NRC Scenario 4 October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS I. SIMULATOR SET UP M. IC Number: IC 174 N. Presets/Function Key Assignments
- 7. Malfunctions:
- m. RR01D, RR PUMP 14 DRIVE BREAKER TRIP PRESET
- n. NM21C, APRM CHANNEL 13 FAILURE - INOP PRESET
- p. RM1A, MAIN STEAM LINE RAD MONITOR 111 INOP TRG 2
- r. RR92, RX VESL PRES XMTR 36-31 (LOCAL-FW CONTROL)
FAILS, DELAY TIME=15 SEC TRG 3
- s. CW12, CIRCULATING WATER INTAKE STRUCTURE BLOCKAGE (TRASH), FINAL VALUE=20% TRG 4
- t. RD33A, CONTROL ROD BANK BLOCKED BANK 1, INSERT FAIL POSITION, FINAL VALUE=12 PRESET
- u. RD33B, CONTROL ROD BANK BLOCKED BANK 2, INSERT FAIL POSITION, FINAL VALUE=12 PRESET
- v. RD33C, CONTROL ROD BANK BLOCKED BANK 3, INSERT FAIL POSITION, FINAL VALUE=18 PRESET
- w. RD33D, CONTROL ROD BANK BLOCKED BANK 4, INSERT FAIL POSITION, FINAL VALUE=12 PRESET
- x. RD33E, CONTROL ROD BANK BLOCKED BANK 5, INSERT FAIL POSITION, FINAL VALUE=12 PRESET
- z. FW24, FEEDWATER 13 FCV FAILS CLOSED TRG 20 aa. FW28A, HPCI MODE FAILURE TO INITIATE 11 TRG 20 bb. FW28B, HPCI MODE FAILURE TO INITIATE 12 TRG 20
- 3. Remotes:
- 3. Overrides:
- a. OVR-5S5DI309 POS_3 1F10/31-03A POS C, FINAL VALUE=INSYS TRG 19
- b. OVR-5S6DI3012 POS_3 1F10/31-03A POS C, FINAL VALUE=INSYS TRG 19 NRC Scenario 4 October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS
- c. OVR-5A144P1DI354 SET 1F27/ID15B MAN, FINAL VALUE=INSYS TRG 20
- d. OVR-5A144P1DI355 SET 1F27/ID15B AUTO, FINAL VALUE=INSYS TRG 20
- e. OVR-5A144P1AI3100 1F27/ID158 BAL R1, FINAL VALUE=0 TRG 20
- f. OVR-5A145P1DI356 SET 1F28/ID15C MAN, FINAL VALUE=0.00 TRG 20
- g. OVR-5A145P1DI357 SET 1F28/ID15C AUTO, FINAL VALUE=0.00 TRG 20
- h. OVR-5A145P1AI3120 1F28/ID15C BAL R1, FINAL VALUE=0 TRG 20
- k. OVR-5A300S3DI3122 POS_2 FOX 11 FLOW FLOW NORM TRG 20 INCREASE, FINAL VALUE=0.00
- 4. Annunciators:
- a. H2-1-3, CIRCULATING WATER PUMP INTAKE LEVEL LOW -
ON/OFF, FINAL VALUE=CRYWOLF TRG 4
- 5. Triggers;
- a. TRG 18 - Activates the coolant leak when the mode switch is taken to shutdown
- i. Event Action: zdrpstdn==1 ii. Command: None
- b. TRG 19 - When both FWIV 11 and 12 green lights are lit, activates the FWIV 11 and 12 control switch OPEN position to off, preventing reopening of the valves
- i. Event Action: hzlfwisg(1)==1&&hzlfwisg(2)==1 ii. Command: None
- c. TRG 20 - If both FWP 11 and 12 control switches are placed in PTL, activates malfunction to fail FW FCV 13 closed, and activates overrides on FW FCVs 11 and 12 to turn AUTO position off, MAN position on, and give a full close signal; also fails FW Low FCVs
- i. Event Action: zdfwfpk(1)==1&&zdfwfpk(2)==1 NRC Scenario 4 October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS ii. Command: None
- d. TRG 21 - Activates when the RPS jumpers are installed, ARI is overridden and RPS has been reset to allow a manual scram to achieve further inward rod movement
- i. Event Action: zdrpjb11(5)==1&&hzlrp12g1==1&&zdrrarov==1 ii. Command: bat n08scen4RH1.bat
- 6. Batch Files:
- a. n08scen4RH1.bat - Allows further rod movement using N1-EOP-3.1
- i. dmf rd33a ii. dmf rd33b iii. dmf rd33c iv. dmf rd33d
- v. dmf rd33e vi. imf rd33a (0 0) 6 vii. imf rd33b (0 0) 6 viii. imf rd33c (0 0) 10 ix. imf rd33d (0 0) 8
- x. imf rd33e (0 0) 8 C. Equipment Out of Service
- 1. APRM 13 bypassed and yellow tagged
- 2. Recirc Pump 14 control switch in PTL and yellow tagged D. Support Documentation
- 1. RMI for control rod pattern adjustment E. Miscellaneous None NRC Scenario 4 - 100 - October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS II. SHIFT TURNOVER INFORMATION OFF GOING SHIFT: N D DATE: Today PART I: To be performed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.
PART II: To be reviewed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.
- Shift Turnover Checklist (ALL)
- CSO Log (CSO)
- Lit Control Room Annunciators
- Computer Alarm Summary (CSO)
Evolutions/General Information/Equipment Status:
Reactor Power = 90%, 4 loop operation TBCLC pump 12 motor bearing repair complete APRM 13 bypassed due to failed power supply Recirc Pump 14 OOS due to high vibrations PART III: Remarks/Planned Evolutions:
- 1. Control rod pattern adjustment
- 2. TBCLC pump 12 to be returned to service
- 3. Power ascension to rated PART IV: To be reviewed/accomplished shortly after assuming the shift:
- Review new Clearances (SM)
- Test Control Annunciators (CRE)
- Shift Crew Composition (SM/CRS)
TITLE NAME TITLE NAME SM CRE/OATC CRS E STA E CSO Other NRC Scenario 4 - 101 - October 2008
VI. PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES G. Critical Tasks:
CT-1.0 Given a failure of the reactor to scram with power above 6% or unknown and RPV water level above -41 inches, the crew will terminate and prevent all injection except boron and CRD, in accordance with N1-EOP-3.
CT-2.0 Given a failure of the reactor to scram with RPV water level unable to be restored and maintained above -109 inches with Condensate/Feedwater and CRD, the crew will perform an RPV Blowdown and re-establish injection with Core Spray, in accordance with N1-EOP-3.
CT-3.0 Given a LOCA in the Drywell, the crew will initiate Containment Sprays to prevent exceeding PSP, in accordance with N1-EOP-4.
B. Performance Objectives:
PO-1.0 Given the plant at power, the crew will perform a control rod pattern adjustment, in accordance with N1-OP-5.
PO-2.0 Given the plant operating at power, the crew will shift operating TBCLC Pumps, in accordance with N1-OP-24.
PO-3.0 Given the plant operating at power with clogging of the operating Service Water Pump Discharge Strainer, the crew will shift to the alternate Service Water pump and strainer, in accordance with N1-OP-18.
PO-4.0 Given the plant operating at power and a failed Main Steam Line Radiation Monitor, the crew will determine the appropriate Technical Specification actions, in accordance with N1-ARP-F1.
PO-5.0 Given the plant operating at power and a failure of RPV pressure instruments, the crew will diagnose the failures and take manual control of RPV water level to prevent a reactor scram, in accordance with N1-SOP-16.1.
PO-6.0 Given the plant operating at power and lowering intake level, the crew will operate Circulating Water pumps, perform an emergency power reduction and scram the reactor, in accordance with N1-SOP-18.1.
NRC Scenario 4 - 102 - October 2008
PO-7.0 Given the plant in a condition requiring emergency classification, the SRO shall classify the events properly, complete initial notification forms, and discuss the bases for the classification in accordance with the emergency plan procedure.
PO-8.0 Given the plant or a plant system in a condition requiring Technical Specification action, identify the deviation and any required actions/notifications.
NRC Scenario 4 - 103 - October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Take the simulator out of freeze before the crew enters for the pre-shift walkdown and briefing Allow no more than 5 minutes to walkdown panels CREW
- Walkdown panels
- Conduct shift turnover brief
- Assume the shift EVENT 1 PO-1.0 Control rod pattern adjustment Note: There are no Control Console activities required for this event SRO Note: Reactivity briefing, procedure review and RMI
- Conducts reactivity brief for power review should occur prior to scenario start, in secure restoration (previously performed) briefing room
- Reviews Reactivity Maneuver Instruction (previously performed)
- Directs RO to perform control rod pattern adjustment in accordance with the RMI and N1-OP-5
- Acknowledges direction from SRO
- Obtains copy of RMI form
- Moves control rods in accordance with N1-OP-5 and RMI
- Reports to SRO when control rod pattern adjustment is complete NRC Scenario 4 - 104 - October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT 1 Continued BOP
- Monitors feedwater controls for proper response
- FWP 13 FCV responding to power change
- RPV Water Level remains within program band (65 - 75)
- Provides peer checks as required NRC Scenario 4 - 105 - October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT 2 PO-2.0 Return TBCLC Pump 12 to service and secure TBCLC Pump 11 After performing the control rod pattern adjustment, the crew shifts operating TBCLC pumps per N1-OP-24, Section F.1.0 Note: There are no Control Console activities required for this event SRO
- Provide pre-evolution brief
- Monitor plant parameters BOP
- Acknowledges direction to start TBCLC Pump 12 and secure TBCLC Pump 11 Role Play: When contacted as NAO to perform pre- IAW N1-OP-24, Section F.1.0 start checks, immediately report pre-start checks are
- Obtains and reviews N1-OP-24 SAT and you are standing by for pump start
- Starts TBCLC Pump 12
- May direct AO to vent pump through 71-Role Play: When contacted as NAO for proper pump 192, as follows:
start, immediately report pump start SAT
- Uncap AND open 71-192
- WHEN venting complete, close AND Role Play: When contacted as NAO for pump venting, cap 71-192 wait 1 minute and report the pump has been vented EVENT 2 Continued BOP Continued NRC Scenario 4 - 106 - October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS
- Confirms standby pump is operating correctly by verify stable pump amps and discharge pressure
- Stops TBCLC Pump 11, then places control switch for TBCLC Pump 11 in AUTO START NRC Scenario 4 - 107 - October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT 3 PO-3.0 Service Water Pump Discharge Strainer High D/P CREW When directed by the examiner, insert malfunction:
- Acknowledge/respond to annunciator H1-3-2, SERVICE WTR P STR 11-12 TRIP-CW16A, SW PUMP 11 STRAINER 72-05 LO VOLT DIFF PRESS CLOGGING, FINAL VALUE=10%
TRG 1 Expected Annunciator:
H1-3-2, SERVICE WTR P STR 11-12 TRIP-LO VOLT DIFF PRESS SRO
- Acknowledge report of SW Annunciator
- Direct entry into ARP for H1-3-2
- Determine the alarm cannot be cleared
- Direct shifting to SWP 12 per N1-OP-18 section F.2.0
- Acknowledge report that SWP 12 has been started
- Acknowledge report of current D/P EVENT 3 Continued RO
- Monitor plant parameters NRC Scenario 4 - 108 - October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS BOP
- Enter ARP for H1-3-2 Role Play: When directed as NAO to investigate, wait
- Direct an NAO to the Intake area to check two minutes, then report that Service Water pump 11 the SW Pump Strainer Strainer D/P is 10 psid and slowly rising due to a small
- IF strainer D/P is high perform the amount of grass coming in the intake. following:
- Confirm BV-72-408, ADAMS STRNR 11 Role Play: When directed as NAO to verify strainer Backwash VLV open backwash valve, 72-408 open, wait one minute, then
- Determine the alarm cannot be cleared report that 72-408 is open, backwash is in progress, but
- Start SWP 12 per N1-OP-18, Sect. F.
it does not appear to be lowering D/P
- Place the SERVICE WTR PUMP 12 control switch at H Panel in Start
- Observe normal motor running current, Role Play: When directed as NAO to report on pump system flow, and discharge pressure start, immediately report that SWP 12 is operating normally Role Play: When requested as NAO after start of Service Water Pump 12, report Service Water Pump 12 Adams Strainer D/P is 3 psid, and report that Service Water Pump 11 Adams Strainer D/P is 9 psid (if still running)
NRC Scenario 4 - 109 - October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT 4 PO-4.0 Main Steam Line Radiation Monitor 111 Fails Inop CREW
- Acknowledge/report Annunciator F1-2-7, When directed by the examiner, insert malfunction: MAIN STEAM RAD MONITOR CH 11 HI/LO RM1A, MAIN STEAM LINE RAD MONITOR 111
F1-2-7, MAIN STEAM RAD MONITOR CH 11 HI/LO SRO
- Acknowledges report of MSL Rad Monitor Ch 11 alarm
- Directs execution of ARP for F1-2-7
- Acknowledges report that MSL Rad Monitor has failed
- Notifies WEC and requests investigation Role Play: When requested to investigate the MSL rad of the failure monitor failure, report that you will begin an immediate
- Enters TS Table 3.6.2.h (requires placing investigation channel in the tripped condition within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> or verifying Mechanical Vacuum pump isolated)
- Monitors plant parameters EVENT 4 Continued BOP
- Executes ARP for F1-2-7 NRC Scenario 4 - 110 - October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS
- Goes to back panel and determines the other MSL Rad Monitors indicate normal readings
- Observes downscale light on MSL Rad Monitor Ch 11 and diagnoses the Monitor is INOP
- Notifies crew that MSL Rad Monitor Ch 11 is INOP EVENT 5 PO-5.0 Reactor pressure transmitter failures CREW NRC Scenario 4 - 111 - October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS
- Acknowledge/report Annunciators When the TBCLC Pumps are shifted and directed by
- F2-3-3, REACT VESSEL LEVEL TRG 3 HIGH-LOW (Delayed >15 sec)
RR92, RX VESL PRES XMTR 36-31 (LOCAL-FW
- Diagnose failure of the pressure CONTROL) FAILS, DELAY TIME=15 SEC instruments on the F Panel then diagnose TRG 3 failure of FWLC Pressure/Level Column Two RPV pressure instruments indicate downscale Controlling RPV water level instrument indicates lower than actual Feedwater flow rises RPV water level rises Expected Annunciators:
F4-4-2, RPS CH 12 REACTOR PRESS LOW F4-4-7, RPS CH 12 MAIN STEAM ISOLATION AUTO OPERATE F2-3-3, REACT VESSEL LEVEL HIGH-LOW (delayed
>15 sec)
SRO Note: This event may cause a turbine trip and
- Acknowledge report of pressure subsequent reactor scram on high RPV water level if transmitter failures Feedwater flow is not controlled properly. In the event
- Diagnose the relationship between of a scram, the scenario will continue at event 7. pressure transmitter 36-31 and the Additionally, in the event of a scram, event 6 FWLCS malfunctions should be immediately inserted (TRG 4,
- Acknowledge report of RPV water level CW 16 and H2-1-3). rising SRO Continued NRC Scenario 4 - 112 - October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS
- Direct entry into N1-SOP-16.1 for failure of FWLC
- Directs placing FWLC in Manual
- Directs Shifting Reactor Pressure/Level Columns IAW N1-OP-16, section F.10.0 EVENT 5 Continued
- Acknowledge report of pressure and level columns shifted
- Enter T.S. Table 3.6.2.a (o), for pressure transmitter 36-07B (Place RPS Channel 11 in the tripped condition within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />)
- Notify WEC/Ops Mgmt Note: Switching level columns may result in
- Monitor plant parameters Annunciator F2-3-3, REACT VESSEL LEVEL HIGH-
- Verifies feedwater lineup Note: The same channel of level and pressure should be
- Shifts reactor pressure and level columns using the key lock switches on the E Panel
- Nulls FWP 13 VALVE CONTROL NRC Scenario 4 - 113 - October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS by adjusting the FEEDWATER MASTER CONTROL M/A station output with the manual knob until the deviation meter indicates 50% on FWP 13 VALVE CONTROL GEMAC
- Controls RPV water level with the manual knob at the FEEDWATER MASTER CONTROL LBS/HR controller in MAN mode
- Nulls FEEDWATER MASTER CONTROL setpoint error by adjusting Thumb/Setpoint tape to align setpoint (orange arrow) directly under automatic setpoint (green band)
- Places FEEDWATER MASTER CONTROL M/A station mode switch in AUTO or BAL
- Confirms system response by adjusting the thumbwheel on FEEDWATER MASTER CONTROL to maintain RPV water level
- Enters N1-SOP-16.1 due to failure of FWLC
- Manually restores RPV water level to normal band
- If directed to shift FWLC pressure/level NRC Scenario 4 - 114 - October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS columns:
STATION mode switch is in BAL, manual FWLC is
- Places FWP 13 VALVE CONTROL shifted to the RO at E-panel M/A STATION mode switch in BAL
- Dispatch NAO to investigate indications at ATS Cabinet Role Play: When directed as NAO to check ATS cabinet indication, wait 2 minutes and report that PT 36-07B is downscale with the gross failure light lit NRC Scenario 4 - 115 - October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT 6 PO-6.0 Intake Structure blockage resulting in loss of the Intake Structure CREW
- Acknowledge/report annunciators:
When the SRO has declared the Tech Specs and directed
- H2-1-3, CIRCULATING WATER by examiner, insert malfunction and annunciator: PUMP INTAKE LEVEL LOW
- H1-4-3, SCREEN WASH PUMP-CW12, CIRCULATING WATER INTAKE SCREEN TRIP LOW VOLT DIFF STRUCTURE BLOCKAGE(TRASH), FINAL PRESS VALUE=20%
- Analyze fluctuating CW Pump amps and LEVEL LOW, FINAL VALUE=CRYWOLF diagnose loss of intake structure TRG 4 Circ Water Pumps 11 and 12 amps fluctuate Circ Water Pumps 11 and 12 eventually trip Expected Annunciators:
H2-1-3, CIRCULATING WATER PUMP INTAKE LEVEL LOW H1-4-3, SCREEN WASH PUMP-SCREEN TRIP LOW VOLT DIFF PRESS H1-4-2 R. BUILDING SW PRESS/SERV W. PUMP HDR PRESS SRO
- Acknowledge crew reports
- Directs execution of ARP for H2-1-3
- Directs entry into N1-SOP-18.1
- Direct rapid power reduction to reduce load for one Circ Water Pump
- Determine intake level is NOT being restored
- Direct a Reactor Scram NRC Scenario 4 - 116 - October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT 6 Continued RO
- Monitor plant parameters
- Rapidly lower Recirc Flow to lower power for one CW Pump operation
- When directed to manually scram:
- Place Reactor Mode Switch in SHUTDOWN
- Recognize control rods did NOT fully insert BOP
- Execute ARP for H2-1-3
- Dispatch an operator to the screen house Role Play: When dispatched as NAO to investigate to investigate intake level, wait one minute and report that there are
- Enter N1-SOP-18.1 some weeds on the traveling screens, level in the intake
- Determine problem is with intake bay is approximately 238 and slowly lowering
- Trip one Circ Water pump
- Monitor pumps taking a suction from the Role Play: When contacted as NAO to give an update Forebay for abnormal operation on intake level following a power reduction,
- Request updates from NAO on intake immediately report that intake level is 237 and still level lowering at the same rate as before, and that the
- When directed by the SRO traveling screens will not rotate
- Trip the remaining CW Pump
- Verify one SW Pump operating
- Verify one SW Pump secured
- Perform actions of N1-SOP-1, Note: When the plant is scrammed, an ATWS will Reactor Scram occur, and subsequent actions in N1-SOP-18.1 may be
- Initiate Emergency Condensers prioritized
- Start ESW Pumps
- Secure SW Pump
- Close MSIVs NRC Scenario 4 - 117 - October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS
- Trip all Recirc Pumps NRC Scenario 4 - 118 - October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENTS 7 and 8 CREW ATWS and LOCA
- Diagnose failure of control rods to insert
- Diagnose degrading primary containment The following malfunctions are preset to cause an parameters ATWS:
RD33A, CONTROL ROD BANK BLOCKED BANK 1, INSERT FAIL POSITION, FINAL VALUE=12 RD33B, CONTROL ROD BANK BLOCKED BANK 2, INSERT FAIL POSITION, FINAL VALUE=12 RD33C, CONTROL ROD BANK BLOCKED BANK 3, INSERT FAIL POSITION, FINAL VALUE=18 RD33D, CONTROL ROD BANK BLOCKED BANK 4, INSERT FAIL POSITION, FINAL VALUE=12 RD33E, CONTROL ROD BANK BLOCKED BANK 5, INSERT FAIL POSITION, FINAL VALUE=12 Control rods partially insert Reactor power remains > 6%
When the mode switch is taken to shutdown, the following malfunction is automatically inserted:
RR29, RR LOOP RUPTURE (LOCA), DELAY TIME=3 MINUTES, RAMP TIME=4 MINUTES, FINAL VALUE=15%
TRG 18 Drywell leakage, humidity, pressure, and temperature rise EVENTS 7 & 8 Continued Expected Annunciators:
H2-4-7, DRYWELL WATER LEAK DETECTION SYS NRC Scenario 4 - 119 - October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS K2-4-3, DRYWELL PRESSURE HIGH - LOW SRO
- Acknowledges scram report
- Enters N1-EOP-2 due to reactor power above 6% when scram required
- Answers All rods in to at least 04 NO
- Answers Will the reactor stay shutdown without boron NO
- Exits N1-EOP-2, enters N1-EOP-3
- Directs ADS bypassed
- Directs prevent Core Spray injection per N1-EOP-1 Att 4
- Determines Reactor power is above 6%
and RPV level is above -41 inches
-41 inches
- If an ERV is cycling:
- Directs initiation of Emergency Condensers
- Directs RPV pressure controlled below 1080 psig using Emergency Condensers and ERVs EVENTS 7 & 8 Continued
- Monitors Figure M, Heat Capacity Temperature Limit
- Directs initiation of ARI
- Answers Turbine Generator on-line?
NRC Scenario 4 - 120 - October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NO
- Answers Reactor power? above 6%
- Directs Recirc Pumps tripped
- Directs execution of N1-EOP-3.1
- Before torus temperature reaches 110oF:
- Records Liquid Poison tank level
- Directs Liquid Poison injection
- Acknowledge report that Primary Containment parameters (pressure, temperature, humidity) rising
- Enters N1-EOP-4 on high drywell pressure, high drywell temperature and/or high torus temperature
- Directs Containment Spray pumps in PTL
- When torus pressure exceeds 13 psig or before drywell temperature reaches 300oF:
- Verifies inside Figure K, Containment Spray Initiation Limit
- Verifies that Recirc Pumps are tripped
- Directs trip of drywell cooling fans
- Directs initiation of Containment Spray per N1-EOP-1 Att 17 CT-3.0
- Monitors Figure L, Pressure Suppression Pressure EVENTS 7 & 8 Continued RO
- Provides scram report
- Bypasses Core Spray IV interlocks per N1-EOP-1 Att 4 by installing six jumpers inside Panel N
- When directed performs N1-EOP-3.1, Section 3 (driving rods) and/or 4 (manual NRC Scenario 4 - 121 - October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS scrams) (See actions below)
- Reports when APRMs <6%
- Reports status of control rod insertion Possible N1-EOP-3.1 Section 3 Actions:
- Verify a CRD Pump running
- Place Reactor Mode Switch in REFUEL
- Place ARI OVERRIDE switch in OVERRIDE
- Install RPS jumpers (5, 6, 12, 13)
- Reset the scram
- Insert rods to 00 using EMER ROD IN starting with high power regions of core (use LPRM indications)
Note: Control rods will successfully insert using RMCS
- If more drive pressure is required, then perform one or more of the following:
Note: RO will likely have to fully open the CRD flow
- Fully open CRD Flow Control Valve control valve and/or close 44-04 in order to achieve rod (F panel) movement via RMCS; these methods are preferential to
- Close 44-04, Control Rod Drive closing 44-167 due to ability to perform from the control Water Cont V (F Panel) room and not preventing further scram attempts by
EVENTS 7 & 8 Continued RO Continued Possible N1-EOP-3.1 Section 4 Actions:
- Reset the scram activate. This runs a batch file which deletes the
- Verify open 44-167, Charging Water following malfunctions:
Header Blocking Valve (RB 237)
NRC Scenario 4 - 122 - October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS
- When the SDV is drained, then initiate a RD33A, CONTROL ROD BANK BLOCKED BANK manual scram 1
RD33B, CONTROL ROD BANK BLOCKED BANK 2
RD33C, CONTROL ROD BANK BLOCKED BANK 3
RD33D, CONTROL ROD BANK BLOCKED BANK 4
RD33E, CONTROL ROD BANK BLOCKED BANK 5 And inserts malfunctions:
RD33A, CONTROL ROD BANK BLOCKED BANK 1, FINAL VALUE=6 RD33B, CONTROL ROD BANK BLOCKED BANK 2, FINAL VALUE=6 RD33C, CONTROL ROD BANK BLOCKED BANK 3, FINAL VALUE=10 RD33D, CONTROL ROD BANK BLOCKED BANK 4, FINAL VALUE=8 RD33E, CONTROL ROD BANK BLOCKED BANK 5, FINAL VALUE=8 Control rods partially insert EVENTS 7 & 8 Continued BOP
- Bypasses ADS
CT-1.0 NRC Scenario 4 - 123 - October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS
- Closes both FEEDWATER ISOLATION Valves 11 and 12 OR places FEEDWATER Pumps 11 and Role Play: When directed as NAO to pull HPCI fuses 12 in PTL FU-8 and FU-9, wait one minute and insert remote:
- Selects Manual on 11, 12 and 13 FWP Valve Control selector switches FW24, REMOVAL OF HPCI FUSES FU8/FU9,
- Directs NAO to remove fuses FU-8 and FU-9 from Panel IS34 in the Aux Then report that HPCI fuses FU-8 and FU-9 have been Control Room pulled
- Verifies closed, FEEDWATER PUMP 13 BLOCKING VALVE
- Verifies in MAN, FWP 11 BYPASS VALVE, AND set to zero output
- Verifies in MAN, FWP 12 BYPASS VALVE, AND set to zero output Note: Further RPV level actions are detailed in Event 9
- If any ERV is cycling:
- Initiates Emergency Condensers
- Initiates ARI
- Verifies all Recirc Pumps tripped
- Initiates Liquid Poison as directed
- Reports initial tank level
- Starts Liquid Poison pump 11 or 12
- Verifies RWCU isolated NRC Scenario 4 - 124 - October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS
- Places Containment Spray pumps in PTL
- Initiates Containment Spray (N1-EOP-1 Att 17)
- Starts Containment Spray Pump 111 or 122 CT-3.0
- Starts at least one of the other three Containment Spray Pumps
- May start Containment Spray Raw Water Pumps as needed for torus cooling
- Verifies Containment Spray flow
- Monitors containment pressure and temperature to ensure lowering trend
- Terminates Containment Sprays when drywell pressure is below 3.5 psig
- Reports containment spray terminated BOP Continued
- Monitors DWP and reports if DWP reaches 3.5 psig, after spray is terminated
- IF directed, initiates Containment Spray again EVENTS 7 & 8 Continued NRC Scenario 4 - 125 - October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 4 - 126 - October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT 9 Feedwater unavailable for RPV injection CREW
- Recognizes/reports failure of FWIVs If the crew terminates and prevents by closing the and/or FW FCVs to open FWIVs, then the following overrides will be automatically inserted to prevent re-opening of the valves:
OVR-5S5DI309 POS_3 1F10/31-03A POS C, FINAL VALUE=INSYS OVR-5S6DI3012 POS_3 1F10/31-03A POS C, FINAL VALUE=INSYS TRG 19 If the crew terminates and prevents by placing FW pumps 11 and 12 in PTL, then the following malfunctions and overrides will be automatically inserted to fail all five FW FCVs closed:
FW24, FEEDWATER 13 FCV FAILS CLOSED FW28A, HPCI MODE FAILURE TO INITIATE 11 FW28B, HPCI MODE FAILURE TO INITIATE 12 OVR-5A144P1DI354 SET 1F27/ID15B MAN, FINAL VALUE=INSYS OVR-5A144P1DI355 SET 1F27/ID15B AUTO, FINAL VALUE=INSYS OVR-5A144P1AI3100 1F27/ID158 BAL R1, FINAL VALUE=0 OVR-5A145P1DI356 SET 1F28/ID15C MAN, FINAL VALUE=0.00 OVR-5A145P1DI357 SET 1F28/ID15C AUTO, FINAL VALUE=0.00 OVR-5A145P1AI3120 1F28/ID15C BAL R1, FINAL VALUE=0 NRC Scenario 4 - 127 - October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS TRG 20 EVENT 9 Continued OVR-5A300S1DI3123 SET FOX 11 LOW FLOW SRO AUTO SWITCH, FINAL VALUE=0.00
- Acknowledges RPV water level below -41 OVR-5A300S3DI3121 1 FOX 11 LOW FLOW inches EMER INCREASE, FINAL VALUE=0.00
- If torus temperature is above 110oF, then OVR-5A300S3DI3122 POS_2 FOX 11 FLOW directs level lowered until:
FLOW NORM INCREASE, FINAL VALUE=0.00
- Level drops to -84 inches (TAF)
AUTO SWITCH, FINAL VALUE=0.00
- Records final actual level OVR-5A301S3DI3127 1 FOX 12 LOW FLOW
- Directs RPV injection with EMER. INCREASE, FINAL VALUE=0.00 Condensate/Feedwater and CRD OVR-5A301S3DI3128 POS_2 FOX 12 LOW FLOW
- Acknowledge report that NORM. INCREASE, FINAL VALUE=0.00 Condensate/Feedwater is not available for TRG 20 injection
- Answers Are all control rods inserted to at least position 04? NO
- Answers Will the reactor stay shutdown without boron? NO/UNKNOWN
- Directs Emergency Condensers initiated
- Answers Torus water level? Above 8 feet
- Directs open 3 ERVs CT-2.0
- Returns to N1-EOP-3 at circle 10
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS
- Waits until RPV pressure drops below 288 psig EVENT 9 Continued
- Answers Was level intentionally lowered before you entered N1-EOP-8? YES
- Returns to circle 9
- Directs RPV injection between -109 inches and previous final actual level with Core Spray per N1-EOP-1 Att 4 CT-2.0
- Acknowledges report of RPV level restored above -109 inches RO/BOP
- Attempts to re-inject with Condensate/Feedwater per N1-EOP-1 Att 24:
- Restarts FEEDWATER Pumps 11 and/or 12, if shutdown in step 2.1 (if required)
RO/BOP Continued EVENT 9 Continued
- IF RPV level restoration is required using the FEEDWATER System, THEN, Position FEEDWATER FCV NRC Scenario 4 - 129 - October 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS 11 and/or 12 to maintain required RPV level
- Reports Condensate/Feedwater not available for RPV injection
- Reports RPV water level below -109 inches
- Re-establishes terminate and prevent lineup per N1-EOP-1 Att 24 as necessary
- Initiates Emergency Condensers
- Opens 3 ERVs CT-2.0
- Re-establishes RPV injection using Core Spray per N1-EOP-1 Att. 4:
CT-2.0
- Installs Core Spray Jumpers
- Throttles Core Spray Inboard IV(s)
(40-01, 40-09, 40-10, 40-11) as necessary to restore RPV level above -
109" and maintain Core Spray within NPSH limits
- Reports RPV water level restored above -
109 inches TERMINATION CRITERIA
- RPV Blowdown in progress
- RPV water level above -109 inches and being controlled in assigned band
- Containment pressure controlled in accordance with N1-EOP-1 Att 17 NRC Scenario 4 - 130 - October 2008
XIV. POST SCENARIO CRITIQUE D. N/A, NRC Exam XV. REFERENCE EVENTS AND COMMITMENTS G. Reference Events None H. Commitments
- 4. None XVI. LESSONS LEARNED A. None NRC Scenario 4 - 131 - October 2008