ML083230387
| ML083230387 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nine Mile Point  |
| Issue date: | 10/01/2008 |
| From: | Nine Mile Point |
| To: | D'Antonio J Operations Branch I |
| Hansell S | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML081060454 | List: |
| References | |
| TAC U01690 | |
| Download: ML083230387 (131) | |
Text
NRC Scenario 1 1
October 2008 NMP SIMULATOR SCENARIO NRC Scenario 1 REV. 0 No. of Pages: 31 PLANT SHUTDOWN, RECIRC PUMP SEAL FAILURE, FUEL FAILURE, UNISOLABLE EMERGENCY CONDENSER LEAK TO THE ENVIRONMENT PREPARER DATE VALIDATED Frank Payne, Kyle James, Bruce Williams DATE 5/18/08 GEN SUPERVISOR OPS TRAINING DATE OPERATIONS MANAGER N/A - Exam Security DATE CONFIGURATION CONTROL N/A - Exam Security DATE SCENARIO
SUMMARY
Length:
90 minutes Initial Power Level:
4% with plant shutdown in progress Mitigating Strategy Code:
RR4, fuel leak with a failure of EC tubes and EC fails to isolate, requires RPV Blowdown to stop release The crew assumes the shift with the plant being shutdown. The crew is directed to de-inert the containment in accordance with N1-OP-9, N2 Inerting and H2-O2 Monitoring Systems. When drywell pressure is lowered to 0 psig, the operator will secure the lineup, but one of the containment isolation valves will fail to fully close. This will require entry into Technical Specifications and ensuring a second valve in the line is isolated. Then the crew will continue the shutdown by inserting control rods.
Next Reactor Building Radiation Monitor 12 will fail upscale causing a trip of RBVS and a start of RBEVS. Additionally there will be a failure of the Reactor Building to isolate. The crew must isolate the Reactor Building to restore Secondary Containment and the SRO must address Technical Specifications. When these actions are complete, both seals on the 11 Recirculation Pump will fail requiring the crew to shutdown and isolate the pump. Following the loss of the Recirculation Pump, a fuel failure will cause offgas and main steam line radiation levels to rise, requiring a reactor scram. Multiple control rods will fail to fully insert during the scram requiring the crew to enter N1-SOP-1 and take alternate actions to insert the control rods. The rods are inserted using RMCS.
NRC Scenario 1 2
October 2008 Following the scram, the crew will diagnose an Emergency Condenser tube leak. They will try to isolate the affected EC but the isolation valves will fail to fully close. Rising off site radiation levels will require an RPV blowdown before General Emergency levels are reached.
Major Procedures:
N1-SOP-1.2, N1-SOP-25.2, N1-SOP-1.1, N1-SOP-1, N1-EOP-2, N1-EOP-6, and N1-EOP-8 EAL Classification:
Site Area Emergency, EALs 3.4.1, 5.1.3 and 5.2.4 Termination Criteria:
RPV Blowdown in progress, RPV water level controlled in assigned band
NRC Scenario 1 3
October 2008 I. SIMULATOR SET UP A. IC Number:
IC 171 B. Presets/Function Key Assignments
- 1. Malfunctions:
- a. RM6V, RX BLDG VENT RAD MON 12, FINAL VALUE=100%
TRG 1
- b. HV04, RB VENTILATION FAILS TO ISOLATE PRESET
- c. RR06A, RR PUMP 11 LOWER(INNER) SEAL FAILS, RAMP=2:00 FINAL VALUE=100%
TRG 2
- d. RR07A, RR PUMP 11 UPPER(OUTER) SEAL FAILS, DELAY=1:30 RAMP=2:00, FINAL VALUE=100%
TRG 2
- e. RX01, FUEL CLADDING FAILURE, FINAL VALUE=7%
TRG 3
- f. RD33C, CONTROL ROD BANK BLOCKED BANK 3, FINAL VALUE=04 PRESET
- g. EC06A, EMERGENCY CONDENSER TUBE LEAK 111, RAMP=1:00, FINAL VALUE=4%
TRG 4
- h. EC07A, EMERGENCY CONDENSER FAILS TO ISOLATE 11 PRESET
- i.
EC08A, EC LOOP 11 STM IV FAIL TO CLOSE 111, FINAL VALUE=100%
PRESET
- j.
EC08B, EC LOOP 11 STM IV FAIL TO CLOSE 112, FINAL VALUE=100%
PRESET
- 2. Remotes:
- a. None
- 3. Overrides:
- a. OVR-11DS74LO5529 ON 2060 VLV201-7,9,17,31 RED LAMPS,
DELAY TIME=0:02, FINAL VALUE=ON (201-31 RED LAMP)
TRG 16
- 4. Annunciators:
- a. None
- 5. Triggers:
- a. TRG 4 - Initiates EC 11 tube failure when the mode switch is taken to shutdown
- i.
Event Action: zdrpstdn==1 ii. Command: None
- b. TRG 16 - Causes 201-31 red light to be overridden on when the control switch is taken to close, simulating the valve sticking in mid position
- i.
Event Action: zdpcv31o==1 ii. Command: None
NRC Scenario 1 4
October 2008 C. Equipment Out of Service
- 1. None D. Support Documentation
- 1. N1-OP-9, N2 INERTING AND H2-O2 MONITORING SYSTEMS, Section G.1.0 De-Inerting/Venting for Personnel Access-Rx Coolant Temp >212 °F marked up through step 1.5
- 2. N1-OP-43C marked up to step G.3.13.6
- 3. Shutdown Control Rod Sequence sheets updated to current control rod.
E. Miscellaneous
- 1. Setup trend recorder XP-1E1B on E console to trend recirc pump suction temperature.
- 3. Place yellow clearance tag on RWM bypass keylock switch.
NRC Scenario 1 5
October 2008 II.
SHIFT TURNOVER INFORMATION OFF GOING SHIFT: N
D DATE: Today PART I:
To be performed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.
Control Panel Walkdown (all panels) (SM, CRS, STA, RO, CRE)
PART II:
To be reviewed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.
Shift Manager Log (SM, CRS, STA)
Shift Turnover Checklist (ALL)
Lit Control Room Annunciators Computer Alarm Summary (RO)
Evolutions/General Information/Equipment Status:
Drywell entry is required for maintenance during forced outage Perform Containment De-Inerting per N1-OP-9 Plant shutdown to continue by inserting control rods Rod Worth Minimizer is inoperable with yellow clearance tag applied to bypass keylock switch PART III:
Remarks/Planned Evolutions:
- 1. Perform N1-OP-9, N2 Inerting and H2-O2 Monitoring Systems starting at step G.1.6 to de-inert the Primary Containment with Rx Coolant Temp >212°F, raising oxygen concentration to
>19.5%
- 2. Continue shutdown from step G.3.13.6 of N1-OP-43C PART IV:
To be reviewed/accomplished shortly after assuming the shift:
Review new Clearances (SM)
Test Control Annunciators (CRE)
Shift Crew Composition (SM/CRS)
TITLE NAME TITLE NAME SRO ATC RO BOP RO
NRC Scenario 1 6
October 2008 Scenario ID INSTRUCTOR COMMENTS (Strengths, Areas for Improvement, Open Items etc.)
What Happened?
What we did?
Why? (Goals)
Other Options?
NRC Scenario 1 7
October 2008 III.
PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES A. Critical Tasks:
CT-1.0 Given a fuel failure, the crew will insert a manual reactor scram as Main Steam Line radiation levels rise, in accordance with N1-SOP-25.2.
CT-2.0 Given an unisolable primary system leak, indications of fuel failure and rising off-site release rates approaching the General Emergency level, the crew will perform an RPV Blowdown, in accordance with N1-EOP-6 and N1-EOP-8.
B. Performance Objectives:
PO-1.0 Given the plant in a shutdown, the crew will perform Primary Containment de-inerting, in accordance with N1-OP-9, N2 Inerting and H2-O2 Monitoring Systems.
PO-2.0 Given a failure of a Primary Containment Isolation Valve to close, the crew will recognize the loss and take proper actions, in accordance with Technical Specifications.
PO-3.0 Given the plant in a shutdown, the crew will insert control rods, in accordance with N1-OP-5.
PO-4.0 Given a failed Reactor Building Radiation Monitor and a failure of the Reactor Building to isolate, the crew will respond to the condition and manually close the Reactor Building isolation valves, in accordance with N1-OP-10.
PO-5.0 Given a total recirculation pump seal failure, the crew will secure and isolate the pump, in accordance with N1-SOP-1.2.
PO-6.0 Given a fuel leak, the crew will respond to rising radiation levels, in accordance with N1-SOP-25.2.
PO-7.0 Given a failure of control rods to insert during a scram, the crew will enter and execute N1-SOP-1.
PO-8.0 Given an Emergency Condenser tube leak, the crew will enter and execute N1-EOP-6.
PO-9.0 Given the plant in a condition requiring emergency classification, the SRO shall classify the events properly, complete initial notification forms, and discuss the bases for the classification in accordance with the emergency plan procedure.
NRC Scenario 1 8
October 2008 PO-10.0 Given the plant or a plant system in a condition requiring Technical Specification action, identify the deviation and any required actions/notifications.
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 1 9
October 2008 Take the simulator out of freeze before the crew enters for the pre-shift walkdown and briefing.
Allow no more than 5 minutes for panel walkdown CREW Crew conducts pre-brief, walks down the panels, assumes the shift EVENT 1 Perform Containment De-Inerting The initiation point for this event is when the SRO directs the performance of Section G.1.0 of N1-OP-9, N2 Inerting and H2-O2 Monitoring Systems.
There are NO Console Operator activities related to this normal evolution.
PO-1.0 SRO Directs de-inerting the Primary Containment IAW Section G.1.0 of N1-OP-9, N2 Inerting and H2-O2 Monitoring Systems RO Monitors plant parameters EVENT 1 Continued BOP Acknowledge direction from the SRO to de-inert the containment Verify closed the following valves in the Control Room:
201-11, TORUS/DRYWELL VENT TO CONDENSER 201-10, DW AIR VENT & PURGE ISOLATION VALVE 11 201-08, TOR AIR VENT & PURGE ISOLATION VALVE 11
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 1 10 October 2008 EVENT 1 Continued BOP Continued 201-32, DW N2 VENT & PURGE ISOLATION VALVE 11 Open 201-16, TORUS N2 VENT &
PURGE ISOLATION VALVE 11 Start 201-35, DRYWELL & TORUS VENT & PURGE FAN Verify open the following valves:
201-21, DRYWELL & TOR VENT
& PURGE FAN INLET BV 201-22, DRYWELL & TOR VENT
& PURGE FAN OUTLET BV Throttle open 201-17, TORUS N2 VENT & PURGE ISOLATION VALVE 12 WHEN Torus pressure drops BELOW 0 psig, perform the following:
Stop 201-35, DRYWELL &
TORUS VENT & PURGE FAN Verify closed the following valves:
o 201-21, DRYWELL & TOR VENT & PURGE FAN INLET BV o 201-22, DRYWELL & TOR VENT & PURGE FAN OUTLET BV Verify closed the following valves:
o 201-16, TORUS N2 VENT &
PURGE ISOLATION VALVE 11 o 201-17, TORUS N2 VENT &
PURGE ISOLATION VALVE 12
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 1 11 October 2008 Note: The containment vacuum breakers may cycle during this event to equalize pressures.
Note: 201-31 will fail to fully close, as indicated by both red and green lights on, leading to the next event BOP Continued Open 201-32, DW N2 VENT &
PURGE ISOLATION VALVE 11 Start 201-35, DRYWELL & TORUS VENT & PURGE Verify open the following valves:
201-21, DRYWELL & TOR VENT
& PURGE FAN INLET BV 201-22, DRYWELL & TOR VENT
& PURGE FAN OUTLET BV Throttle open 201-31, DW N2 VENT &
PURGE ISOLATION VALVE 12 WHEN Drywell pressure drops BELOW 0 psig, perform the following:
Stop 201-35, DRYWELL &
TORUS VENT & PURGE FAN Verify closed the following valves:
o 201-21, DRYWELL & TOR VENT & PURGE FAN INLET BV o 201-22, DRYWELL & TOR VENT & PURGE FAN OUTLET BV Verify closed the following valves:
o 201-32, DW N2 VENT &
PURGE ISOLATION VALVE 11 o 201-31, DW N2 VENT &
PURGE ISOLATION VALVE 12
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 1 12 October 2008 EVENT 2 Failure of 201-31, DW N2 VENT & PURGE ISOLATION VALVE 12 to fully close following N2 Primary Containment De-Inerting PO-2.0 When the control switch for 201-31 is taken to close, verify TRG 16 automatically inserts the following override:
OVR-11DS74LO5529 ON 2060 VLV201-7,9,17,31 RED LAMPS, DELAY TIME=0:02, FINAL VALUE=ON (201-31 RED LAMP)
TRG 16 201-31 red light remains on Role Play: As Operations Management, acknowledge failure of 201-31 and direct the SRO to secure from de-inerting, until the next shift.
Direct the SRO to continue on with control rod insertion.
SRO Acknowledge report that 201-31, DW N2 VENT & PURGE ISOLATION VALVE 12 did NOT fully close Direct BOP to manually close 201-31 Acknowledge report that 201-31 DW did NOT fully close Direct BOP to verify 201-32, DW N2 VENT & PURGE ISOLATION VALVE 11 is fully closed Enter T.S. 3.3.4.b Contact Operations Management to notify about the failure of 201-31 to close Direct the crew to stop de-inerting and exit N1-OP-9 RO Monitors plant parameters BOP Notify Crew/SRO that 201-31 did NOT fully close Attempt to manually close 201-31 Verify 201-32 closed
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 1 13 October 2008 EVENT 3 Plant Shutdown using Control Rods There are NO Console Operator activities related to this normal evolution.
PO-3.0 Note: Provide GAI-OPS-05 Attachment 1, SRO REACTIVITY BRIEF CHECKLIST (may be done in pre-scenario brief) and plant shutdown RMI SRO Conduct crew brief of shutdown activities and responsibilities Conduct GAI-OPS-05 Reactivity Brief Direct Insertion of control rods for reactor shutdown in accordance with Shutdown Control Rod Sequence Provides oversight of reactivity maneuver Note: Recommend allowing insertion of four control rods to allow the crew to stop at a stable point RO Insert control rods to continue reactor shutdown in accordance with Shutdown Control Rod Sequence Observe IRM response AND range IRM switches as required, maintaining recorder pen as follows:
0-125 scale between 25 and 75 nominal 0-40 scale between 8 and 24 nominal Monitor and maintain reactor cooldown rate less than 100°F/hr BOP Monitor Feedwater Level Control Monitor plant parameters Provide peer checks as required
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 1 14 October 2008 EVENT 4 Reactor Building Ventilation Radiation Monitor 12 fails UPSCALE and RB Ventilation fails to Isolate When control rod 30-47 has been inserted and directed by the examiner, insert malfunction:
RM6V, RX BLDG VENT RAD MON 12 (0-100%),
FINAL VALUE=100%
TRG 1 Verify the following malfunction is active:
HV04, RB VENTILATION FAILS TO ISOLATE PRESET Expected Annunciators:
L1-4-3, RB VENT RAD MONITOR OFF NORMAL L1-1-5, RB VENT EXH FAN 11-12 TRIP L1-3-6, EMER VENT CH 11 RELAY OPERATE L1-4-6, EMER VENT CH 12 RELAY OPERATE RBVS fans trip RBEVS initiates RB isolation valves remain open PO-4.0 CREW Respond to annunciators and diagnose Radiation Monitor trip with failure of RB to isolate EVENT 4 Continued SRO Acknowledges reports Enter N1-EOP-5, Secondary Containment Control, AND execute concurrently with ARPs SRO Continued
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 1 15 October 2008 Direct manual isolation of the Reactor Building Determine that the reactor building failed to isolate and one channel of RB Rad Monitoring is inop and entry into Tech Spec 3.4.2 is required Enter LCO 3.4.4.e (7 day plant shutdown LCO when one train of EVS is inoperable)
RO Monitor plant parameters Role Play: If contacted as RP, acknowledge request but delay any reports on Reactor Building radiation levels EVENT 4 Continued BOP Verifies Reactor Building Radiation Monitor 12 failed UPSCALE Confirm alarm on computer printout Verify shutdown of RB Vent Sys and startup of RBEVS per N1-OP-10 section H.2.0 or N1-EOP-HC attachment 6 Confirm the following fans started:
202-53, EVS FAN 11 202-33, EVS FAN 12 Confirm the following fans stopped:
202-01, REACTOR BLDG SUPPLY FAN 11 202-02, REACTOR BLDG SUPPLY FAN 12 202-05, REACTOR BLDG EXHAUST FAN 11 202-06, REACTOR BLDG EXHAUST FAN 12 BOP Continued
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 1 16 October 2008 EVENT 4 Continued Confirm open the following valves:
202-34, EM VENT EXHAUST FAN 11 OUTLET BV 202-37, EM VENTILATION LOOP 11 INLET BV 202-35, EM VENT EXHAUST FAN 12 OUTLET BV 202-38, EM VENTILATION LOOP 12 INLET BV Confirm closed the following valves:
202-74, EM VENTILATION LOOP 11 COOLING BV 202-75, EM VENTILATION LOOP 12 COOLING BV 202-03, REACTOR BLDG SUPPLY FAN 11 INLET DAMPER 202-04, REACTOR BLDG SUPPLY FAN 12 INLET DAMPER 202-80, REACTOR BLDG EXHAUST FAN 11 OUTLET DAMPER 202-81, REACTOR BLDG EXHAUST FAN 12 OUTLET DAMPER 202-15, REACTOR BLDG SUPPLY ISOLATION VALVE 11 202-16, REACTOR BLDG SUPPLY ISOLATION VALVE 12 202-32, REACTOR BUILDING EXHAUST ISOLATION VALVE 11 202-31, REACTOR BUILDING EXHAUST ISOLATION VALVE 12 BOP Continued
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 1 17 October 2008 Note: Examiner may decide to proceed with next event before one train of RBEVS is secured Notify Rad Protection, the normal Reactor Building Emergency Ventilation system has isolated AND Reactor Building Emergency Ventilation system is in service BEFORE 30 minutes has elapsed, secure one train of RBEVS:
Place EVS FAN 11(12) control switch to RED FLAG Place EM VENTILATION LOOP 11(12) INLET BV control switch to OPEN Verify flow approximately 1600 CFM Place EVS FAN 12(11) control switch to PULL TO LOCK Enter LCO 3.4.4.e (7 day plant shutdown LCO when one train of EVS is inoperable)
Verify closed EM VENTILATION LOOP 12(11) INLET BV Verify in OFF position the following control switches:
REACTOR BLDG SUPPLY FAN 11 REACTOR BLDG SUPPLY FAN 12 REACTOR BLDG EXHAUST FAN 11 REACTOR BLDG EXHAUST FAN 12
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 1 18 October 2008 EVENT 5 Recirculation Pump Seal Failure When directed by examiner, insert malfunction:
RR06A, RR PUMP 11 LOWER(INNER) SEAL FAILS, RAMP=2:00, FINAL VALUE=100%
TRG 2 RR07A, RR PUMP 11 UPPER(OUTER) SEAL FAILS, DELAY=1:30, RAMP=2:00, FINAL VALUE=100%
TRG 2 RRP 11 seal pressures lower Drywell leakage, pressure and humidity rise Expected Annunciator:
F2-1-1 REACT RECIRC PUMP-MOTOR 11 PO-5.0 CREW Acknowledge/report annunciator F2 1 Diagnose RRP 11 seal failure ARP F2-1-1 directs entry into SOP-1.2 if seal pressure <425 psig or high seal flow/leakage exists. Drywell conditions will begin to deteriorate and increased drywell humidity and in-leakage to the DWEDT will be indicated. When Drywell parameters are impacted, the failure is considered catastrophic and the pump must be tripped and isolated.
EVENT 5 Continued SRO Acknowledges report from crew Directs execution of ARP Directs entry into N1-SOP-1.2, RRP SEAL FAILURE Determine the failure is catastrophic and pump should be tripped and isolated Provide reactivity management oversight for removing the pump from service When RRP 11 has been shutdown and isolated exit N1-SOP-1.2 and enter N1-OP-1, Section H, for 4 Loop Operation Review TS for impact of seal leakage and removal of pump from service
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 1 19 October 2008 Role Play: When contacted as Reactor Engineering, acknowledge request to verify thermal limits SRO Continued Tech Spec 3.2.5 identifies RCS leakage be limited to <2 GPM/day increase for identified leakage. This will apply until the RRP is isolated TS 3.1.7.e applies for partial loop operation, limits power to 90.5% until clearance applied to valve breakers Contacts Reactor Engineering to verify thermal limits RO Monitor plant parameters
- Monitor reactor power and recirculation flow during closure of RRP suction and discharge valves Verify operating position on the Power to Flow Map BOP Reviews/executes ARP F2-1-1 Confirms alarm computer point A072 RRP 11 SEAL LEAK DET FL Enters N1-SOP-1.2 for seal failure Monitors containment parameters Monitors RRP seal indications Determines that both seals are failed Determines seal failure is catastrophic Place REACTOR RP MOTOR MG SET 11 control switch to STOP Close REACTOR R PUMP 11 BYPASS VALVE
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 1 20 October 2008 EVENT 5 Continued BOP Continued Simultaneously close Suction AND Discharge Valves for RRP 11 holding switches in CLOSE position Exit N1-SOP-1.2 AND enter N1-OP-1, Section H, for 4 Loop Operation
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 1 21 October 2008 EVENT 6 Fuel Failure When actions to isolate 11 RRP have been completed and directed by examiner insert malfunction:
RX01, FUEL CLADDING FAILURE (0-100%),
FINAL VALUE=7%
TRG 3 Expected Annunciators:
H1-1-7, OFF GAS HIGH RADIATION (initial)
F1-2-7, MAIN STEAM RAD MONITOR CH 11 HI/LO (later)
F4-2-2, MAIN STEAM RAD MONITOR CH 12 HI/LO (later)
Rising off-gas radiation levels Rising main steam line radiation levels PO-6.0 CREW Acknowledge/report annunciator H1 7, OFF GAS HIGH RADIATION Recognize rising offgas and main steam line radiation levels Determine fuel failure has occurred EVENT 6 Continued SRO Acknowledge report of off-gas high radiation annunciator Enter N1-SOP-25.2 Fuel Failure/High Activity Notify Chemistry to sample reactor coolant for gross activity Classify event as an UNUSUAL EVENT per EAL 1.2.1 Brief crew on event impact Direct reactor power reduction per N1-SOP-1.1 as necessary to control radiation levels
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 1 22 October 2008 SRO Continued Acknowledge report that MSL Rad Monitors are approaching/exceeding 3.75 X normal Direct a manual scram CT-1.0 Directs manual vessel isolation and entry into N1-SOP-40.2, if Main Steam Line rad levels reach 3.75 x NFPB RO Perform emergency power reduction per N1-SOP-1.1 as directed When directed place Mode Switch in Shutdown CT-1.0 Recognize/diagnose failure of all control rods to insert Perform a manual vessel isolation by placing both Vessel Isolation Ch 11 and Ch 12 Control Switches on the E Panel to ISOLATION IN, if necessary Role Play: When dispatched as Chemistry to take samples, acknowledge request.
Role Play: When directed to close Turbine Building Roof Vents, Sidewall Vents and Roll Doors, wait 2 minutes then report the Turbine Building Roof Vents, Sidewall Vents and Roll Doors are CLOSED. Also report that RP is with you, and they have detected higher than normal rad levels near the offgas piping.
BOP Execute N1-SOP-25.2 Notify Chemistry to sample offgas and reactor coolant for gross activity Direct NAO to close Turbine Building Roof Vents, Sidewall Vents and Roll Doors Monitor ARM's and rad monitors to determine plant radiation levels Notify SRO/Crew of rising Main Steam Line Radiation Monitor levels
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 1 23 October 2008 EVENT 6 Continued BOP Continued Notify SRO when MSL Rad Monitors approach/exceed 3.75 X normal
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 1 24 October 2008 EVENT 7 Reactor Scram with failure of one bank of control rods to fully insert The following malfunctions are preset:
RD33C, CONTROL ROD BANK BLOCKED BANK 3, FINAL VALUE=04 PO-7.0 CREW Recognize and report failure of rods to fully insert SRO Acknowledge SCRAM report Acknowledge report that control rods failed to insert Directs N1-SOP-1 actions Directs RPV water level controlled 53-95 with Condensate/FW Directs RPV pressure controlled 800-1000 psig with Emergency Condensers RO Provide scram report Recognize/ report all control rods not inserted Perform N1-SOP-1, Reactor Scram, scram verification actions Place IRMs on range 9 Insert IRM and SRM detectors Downrange IRMs as necessary to monitor power decrease Reduce Recirc Master flow to 25-43 x 106 lb/hr RO Continued
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 1 25 October 2008 EVENT 7 Continued Note: The RO will not be able to reset the scram until RPV pressure is less than 600 psig once the MSIVs are closed. This will likely delay control rod insertion.
Attempts to insert control rods using N1-OP-5, section H.23.0 BOP Performs N1-SOP-1, Reactor Scram, level control actions:
Restores RPV level to 53-95 inches by controlling injection and rejecting through RWCU, as necessary Determines #13 FWP was not running Verifies RPV water level above 53 Verifies 11/12 FWP controllers in MANUAL and set to zero output Resets HPCI signal, if required Places 11/12 FWP BYPASS Valve in AUTO, sets to 65-70 inches Secures 2nd FWP, if running If RPV level reaches 85 inches and rising, then:
Verifies off all Feedwater Pumps Secures CRD Pumps not required Maximizes RWCU reject flow Closes FWIVs if required Closes MSIVs if required Maintain RPV water level in assigned band Maintain RPV pressure below 1080 psig and in assigned band Performs N1-SOP-40.2 for Vessel Isolation verification
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 1 26 October 2008 EVENT 8 Failure of Emergency Condenser Tubes Verify the following malfunction is automatically inserted when the mode switch is taken to SHUTDOWN:
EC06A, EMERGENCY CONDENSER TUBE LEAK 111, RAMP=1:00, FINAL VALUE=4%
TRG 4 Expected Annunciator:
K-1-1-2, EC Rad Vent 11 Monitors Rising rad levels on EC Vent Rad Monitor (J panel)
PO-8.0 CREW Recognize/report annunciator K1-1-2 Recognize/report rising EC Vent Rad Monitor readings SRO Acknowledges report of annunciator, K-1-1-2, EC Rad Monitors Directs crew to obtain a radiation value from EC VENT RAD Monitors Enters N1-EOP-6 due to EC Vent Rad Monitor above 30 mR/hr (ALERT EAL level)
Directs/grants permission for the isolation of 11 Emergency Condenser Role Play: If requested as RP to check dose rates at EC piping, wait 3 minutes and report dose rates are 50 mR/hr and rising. Wait another 3 minutes and report dose rates are 200 mR/hr and rising, you are leaving the refuel floor to perform downwind site boundary surveys.
EVENT 8 Continued RO/BOP Reports/responds to annunciator K 1-2, EC Rad Monitors Confirms alarm on computer printout Confirms radiation levels on J Panel Contacts RP to check dose rates at EC piping above elevation 340 RO/BOP Continued
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 1 27 October 2008 Role Play: If requested as Chemistry to assess for possible unmonitored radiological release, acknowledge request Role Play: If directed as RP/Chemistry to perform a downwind site boundary radiological survey, report that you are assembling and dispatching the team. Wait 4 minutes after the above RP role plays are complete, and then report that the dose rate at the north site boundary is 750 mRem TEDE and rising. Wait another 4 minutes, and if the crew has not entered RPV Blowdown yet, report that the dose rate at the north site boundary is 950 mRem TEDE and rising.
Contacts Chemistry to assess for possible unmonitored radiological release Contacts RP to perform downwind site boundary radiological survey Notifies crew of radiation levels
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 1 28 October 2008 EVENT 9 Emergency Condenser Failure to Isolate When an operator attempts to isolate EC 11, the following preset malfunctions act to prevent steam isolation valve closure:
EC07, EMERGENCY CONDENSER FAILS TO ISOLATE 11 EC08A, EC LOOP 11 STM IV FAIL TO CLOSE 111 (0-100%), FINAL VALUE=100%
EC08B, EC LOOP 11 STM IV FAIL TO CLOSE 112 (0-100%), FINAL VALUE=100%
PO-9.0 CREW Diagnose/report failure of EC 11 to isolate EVENT 9 Continued SRO Acknowledges Emergency Condenser cannot be isolated Evaluates EAL matrix and determines the rising off site dose rates are approaching General Emergency levels per section 5.2.6 of EPIP-EPP-01, Emergency Action Level Matrix IF a primary system is discharing outside primary and secondary containments AND the discharge cannot be isolated, THEN before the offsite release rate reches the Emergency Plan General Emergency level:
Scram Enter N1-EOP-2, RPV Control Enter N1-EOP-8, RPV Blowdown
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 1 29 October 2008 SRO Continued N1-EOP-8, RPV Blowdown actions:
Answers Are all control rods inserted to at least position 04 YES Answers Drywell pressure? below 3.5 psig Directs Emergency Condenser 12 initiation Answers Torus water level? > 8.0 ft Directs open 3 ERVs CT-2.0 Stops at WAIT block for 120 psig RO/BOP When granted permission or directed, attempts to isolate EC 11 by closing the following valves:
Places control switch for 39-07R, EC STM ISOLATION VALVE 112 in CLOSE Diagnoses failure of 39-07R to fully close Places control switch for 39-09R, EC STM ISOLATION VALVE 111 in CLOSE Diagnoses failure of 39-09R to fully close Report failure of steam IVs to isolate Initiates Emergency Condenser 12 Places control switches for 3 ERVs to open CT-2.0
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 1 30 October 2008 EVENT 9 Continued RO/BOP Continued Reports 3 ERVs open Restores and maintains RPV water level 53-95 inches using Condensate/FW and CRD TERMINATING CUE All control rods inserted RPV Blowdown in progress RPV Water Level controlled in assigned band
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 2 31 October 2008 V.
POST SCENARIO CRITIQUE A. N/A, NRC Exam VI.
REFERENCE EVENTS AND COMMITMENTS A. Reference Events
- 1. None B. Commitments
- 1. None VII. LESSONS LEARNED A. None
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 2 32 October 2008 NMP SIMULATOR SCENARIO NRC Scenario 2 REV. 0 No. of Pages: 29 LOSS OF POWERBOARD 11, UNISOLABLE RWCU LEAK IN THE SECONDARY CONTAINMENT PREPARER DATE VALIDATED Frank Payne, Kyle James, Bruce Williams DATE 5/17/08 GEN SUPERVISOR OPS TRAINING DATE OPERATIONS MANAGER N/A - Exam Security DATE CONFIGURATION CONTROL N/A - Exam Security DATE SCENARIO
SUMMARY
Length:
90 minutes Initial Power Level:
90%, 4 Loop Operation Mitigating Strategy Code:
SC1, unisolable primary system leak in the Secondary Containment, RPV Blowdown required The crew assumes the shift with the plant operating at 90% power and four recirculation loops in service. Immediately after assuming the shift the crew will be directed to restore Recirculation Pump 15 to service and return to full power. The crew will assess plant conditions and lower power with Recirculation Flow until flow is less than 50 Mlbm/hr. They will then return Recirculation Pump 15 to service. After the crew has placed the pump in service, the Main Generator Auto Voltage Regulator will fail. The crew will diagnose the failure and take manual control of generator voltage and restore the correct generator output. When a normal generator output is established, the Control Rod Drive Flow Control Valve fails closed, requiring shifting to the alternate FCV. After CRD flow is returned to normal, a loss of power to Power Board 11 occurs. The SRO will address Technical Specifications.
A Reactor Water Cleanup system line break will occur in the Secondary Containment downstream of the Supply Isolation Valves. Reactor Water Cleanup will fail to isolate on high area temperature. The crew will attempt to isolate the system, but the valves will fail to fully close. This break will require a scram and RPV blowdown due to exceeding the Maximum Safe Value for general area temperatures. When the Mode Switch is placed in SHUTDOWN and/or the Reactor Trip pushbuttons on the E Panel are pushed, the reactor will NOT scram. ARI must be manually initiated to scram the control rods.
Major Procedures:
N1-SOP-1, N1-SOP-1.1, N1-SOP-1.3, N1-SOP-5.1, N1-SOP-30.1, N1-EOP-2, N1-EOP-3, N1-EOP-5, and N1-EOP-8
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 2 33 October 2008 EAL Classification:
Site Area Emergency, EALs 3.4.1, 4.1.1 Termination Criteria:
All control rods are in, RPV Blowdown in progress, RPV water level controlled in assigned band
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 2 34 October 2008 I. SIMULATOR SET UP F. IC Number:
IC 172 G. Presets/Function Key Assignments
- 1. Malfunctions:
- a. EG02, GENERATOR AUTO VOLTAGE REGULATOR FAILS - INCREASE TRG 1
- c. ED04, AC POWER BOARD ELECTRICAL FAULT(PB11)
TRG 3
- d. CU14, CLEANUP ISOLATION VALVES STUCK OPEN PRESET
- e. CU11, COOLANT LEAK OUTSIDE OF DRYWELL, RAMP TIME=10:00, FINAL VALUE=20%
TRG 4
- f. RP05B, REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM FAILURE TO SCRAM CH 12 PRESET
- 2. Remotes:
- 3. Overrrides:
- a. OVR-9DS51LO51912 ON 1150 STATUS MOVS ARRAY 33-01 GR CLO, FINAL VALUE=ON TRG 17
- b. OVR-9DS53LO51914 ON 1150 STATUS MOVS ARRAY 33-02 GR CLO, FINAL VALUE=ON TRG 18
- c. OVR-9DS55LO5200 ON 1150 STATUS MOVS ARRAY 33-04 GR CLO, FINAL VALUE=ON TRG 19
- 4. Annunciators:
- a. None
- 5. Triggers:
- a. TRG 16 - Activates when the CRD FCV transfer switch is moved to Valve 12 to automate the corresponding field action
- i.
Event Action: zdrdfcvb==1 ii. Command: None
- b. TRG 17 - Activates when RWCU IV 33-01 control switch is taken to close to override on the green light, simulating some valve movement
- i.
Event Action: zdcu301c==1 ii. Command: None
- c. TRG 18 - Activates when RWCU IV 33-02 control switch is taken to close to override on the green light, simulating some valve movement
- i.
Event Action: zdcu302c==1
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 2 35 October 2008 ii. Command: None
- d. TRG 19 - Activates when RWCU IV 33-04 control switch is taken to close to override on the green light, simulating some valve movement
- i.
Event Action: zdcu304c==1 ii. Command: None H. Equipment Out of Service
- a. RRP 15 removed from service, control switch green flagged, discharge valve closed I. Support Documentation
- 1. N1-OP-1 marked up through step H.4.5
- 2. N1-OP-43B marked up through step 2.7
- 3. RMR for lowering recirc flow to 50 Mlbm/hr
- 4. RMR for power ascension to rated J. Miscellaneous
- 1. Steam Packing Exhauster 12 should be in operation at the beginning of the scenario to prevent the crew from having to swap to this division following a loss of PB 11.
- 2. Ensure LPRM downscale pushbuttons are depressed on rod block monitor.
NRC Scenario 2 36 October 2008 II.
SHIFT TURNOVER INFORMATION OFF GOING SHIFT: N
D DATE: Today PART I:
To be performed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.
Control Panel Walkdown (all panels) (SM, CRS, STA, RO, CRE)
PART II:
To be reviewed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.
Shift Manager Log (SM, CRS, STA)
Shift Turnover Checklist (ALL)
Lit Control Room Annunciators Computer Alarm Summary (RO)
Evolutions/General Information/Equipment Status:
Load Dispatcher was notified of power reduction and RRP 15 start two (2) hours ago PART III:
Remarks/Planned Evolutions:
RRP 15 removed from service. TS 3.1.7.e. Four loop operation.
Start RRP 15 per N1-OP-1, H.4.0, and return to five-loop operation. N1-OP-1, H.4.0, signed off up to step 4.6. N1-OP-43B signed off up to step 2.8.
Reactor power is at 90% and must be lowered until recirc flow <50 Mlbm/hr to support starting RRP 15.
After starting Recirc Pump 15 MG set, operate it for one hour while maintenance takes readings before returning to 100% power.
PART IV:
To be reviewed/accomplished shortly after assuming the shift:
Review new Clearances (SM)
Test Control Annunciators (CRE)
Shift Crew Composition (SM/CRS)
TITLE NAME TITLE NAME SRO ATC RO BOP RO
NRC Scenario 2 37 October 2008 Scenario ID INSTRUCTOR COMMENTS (Strengths, Areas for Improvement, Open Items etc.)
What Happened?
What we did?
Why? (Goals)
Other Options?
NRC Scenario 2 38 October 2008 IV.
PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES C. Critical Tasks:
CT-1.0 Given an un-isolable RWCU leak outside primary containment and one general area temperature approaching or exceeding the maximum safe limit, the crew will insert a manual reactor scram, in accordance with N1-EOP-5.
CT-2.0 Given a failure of RPS to de-energize when a scram is required, the crew will insert control rods by initiating manual Alternate Rod Insertion (ARI),
in accordance with N1-EOP-3.
CT-3.0 Given an un-isolable RWCU leak outside primary containment and two general area temperatures above the maximum safe limit, the crew will perform an RPV Blowdown, in accordance with N1-EOP-5 and N1-EOP-
- 8.
D. Performance Objectives:
PO-3.0 Given the plant at power, the crew will reduce reactor power with recirculation flow, in accordance with N1-OP-43B.
PO-4.0 Given the plant at power, the crew will return a Recirculation Pump to service, in accordance with N1-OP-1, section H.4.0.
PO-3.0 Given a voltage regulator failure on the main generator, the crew will take manual control of generator voltage, in accordance with N1-ARP-A7.
PO-4.0 Given the plant at power, the crew will respond to a failure of the operating CRD Flow Control Valve, in accordance with N1-SOP-5.1.
PO-5.0 Given the plant at power, the crew will respond to a loss of Powerboard 11, in accordance with N1-SOP-30.1.
PO-6.0 Given the plant at power, the crew will respond to a Reactor Water Cleanup leak outside of the primary containment, in accordance with N1-EOP-5.
NRC Scenario 2 39 October 2008 PO-7.0 Given the plant in a condition requiring emergency classification, the SRO shall classify the events properly, complete initial notification forms, and discuss the bases for the classification in accordance with the emergency plan procedure.
PO-8.0 Given the plant or a plant system in a condition requiring Technical Specification action, identify the deviation and any required actions/notifications.
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 2 40 October 2008 Take the simulator out of freeze before the crew enters for the pre-shift walkdown and briefing.
Allow no more than 5 minutes for panel walkdown.
CREW Walkdown panels Conduct shift turnover brief Assume the shift EVENT 1 Power Reduction with Recirculation Flow PO-1.0 Note: Provide GAI-OPS-05 Attachment 1, SRO REACTIVITY BRIEF CHECKLIST (may be done in pre-scenario brief) and RMR SRO Conduct GAI-OPS-05 Reactivity Brief Reviews Reactivity Maneuver Request Form Provides direction to RO/BOP regarding assignments RO adjusts recirculation flow BOP monitors RRPs and feed system response Directs RO to lower core flow to <50 Mlbm/hr IAW RMR Supervises reactivity maneuver RO Reduces recirc flow IAW RMR Continuously observes the following:
APRMs lowering Recirc flow lowering Steam and feedwater flow lowering Vessel level normal Lower recirc flow until <50 Mlbm/hr Notify Crew of the new power level and that recirc flow is <50 Mlbm/hr
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 2 41 October 2008 EVENT 1 Continued BOP Monitors individual RRP for response Individual M/A-Speed Control stations trending uniformly Individual RRP indications trending normally for lowering speed Monitors feed water controls for proper response FWP 13 FCV responding to power change RPV Water Level remains within program band (65 - 83)
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 2 42 October 2008 EVENT 2 Restore Reactor Recirculation Pump 15 to Service Note: Crew directed to start RRP 15 in pre-brief, starting at N1-OP-1, step H.4.6. Provide the SRO with the RMR for RRP #15 recovery.
PO-2.0 SRO Direct start up of RRP 15, using N1-OP-1, starting at step H.4.6 Supervise reactivity manipulation Acknowledge report that RRP 15 is in service Determine TS 3.1.7.e no longer applies and the LCO Actions can be exited RO Continuously observe the following:
APRMs Recirc flow Monitor P/F map and transfer from 4 loop to 5 loop map when the startup is performed BOP Acknowledge direction to start RRP 15 Verify recirculation flow < 50 x 106 lb/hr Verify RRP 15 GEMAC in MAN and matched with other four GEMACs but no greater than 50%
Verify RRP 15 discharge valve closed
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 2 43 October 2008 EVENT 2 Continued CAUTIONS from N1-OP-1 Failure to raise Recirc Pump speed during opening of discharge valve may result in stalled rotor and pump trip due to reverse flow.
To Prevent backflow thru the RRP, discharge valve should be opened before MG frequency lowers to 20 Hz. Frequency will raise, then drop quickly, then raise again before SLOWLY lowering. Discharge BV should be opened when frequency is slowly lowering.
Role Play: As NAO sent to Aux Control Room, wait one minute then report you have reset 50SR Pump Motor Stalled Rotor Target Role Play: As NAO, when requested report MG set oil temperature is 120oF and stable.
BOP Continued Verify RRP 15 suction and discharge bypass valves are open Make a plant announcement for start of RRP 15 Place RRP 15 control switch to START and observe indications MG MOTOR starts, Amp Meter Amps increase then decrease MG Generator accelerates to proper speed (approx 50 - 60 Hz)
Generator Field Bkr closes Generator slows toward 20%
speed (Approximately 11.5 Hz)
WHEN speed (Frequency Meter) is between 30 and 25 Hz, open REACTOR R PUMP DISCH VALVE Verify RRP 15 maintained less than or equal to OP limits Adjust pump speed to match other pumps Null RRP 15 controller and shift to BAL or AUTO Verify power/flow map updated to five loop requirements Dispatch NAO to reset 50SR Pump Motor Stalled Rotor Target (Aux Control Room)
Dispatch NAO to check MG set oil temperature locally May perform N1-ARP-F2-1-5 action to depress PUMP MOTOR VIBRATION RESET pushbutton on F Panel, clearing annunciator F2-1-5
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 2 44 October 2008 EVENT 3 Main Generator Auto Voltage Regulator Failure After RRP 15 has been placed in service and when directed by the examiner, insert malfunction:
EG02, GENERATOR AUTO VOLTAGE REGULATOR FAILS - INCREASE TRG 1 Amplidyne output meter will peg HI Exciter output voltage will peg HI Generator field current will peg HI Expected Annunciators:
A3-1-1, TURB GEN EXC. TRANS. 1 TEMP RECORDER (first)
A7-2-6, GEN VOLT REGULATOR TRIP (later)
PO-3.0 CREW Recognize/diagnose Auto Voltage Regulator Failure from:
Amplidyne output meter will peg HI Exciter output voltage will peg HI Generator field current will peg HI Generator mVars and terminal voltage will respond accordingly Annunciator A7-2-6, GEN VOLT REGULATOR TRIP Role Play: When contacted as Power Control (National Grid), acknowledge the voltage regulator in OFF and request NMP1 supply 60 MVARS to the bus while in manual voltage control SRO Acknowledge report from the crew Direct/supervise ARP response Acknowledge voltage regulator transferred to OFF Notify Power Control (National Grid) that the voltage regulator is in manual control (required within 30 minutes)
Direct CSO to adjust reactive load to 60 MVARS to bus RO Execute N1-ARP-A7-2-6 for voltage regulator trip Confirm computer point F099
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 2 45 October 2008 EVENT 3 Continued RO Continued Monitor generator output voltage Place VOLTAGE REG TRANSFER switch to OFF Notify Crew/SRO Coordinate with SRO to contact Power Control Acknowledge direction to adjust VARS from the SRO Adjust generator reactive load using exciter field rheostat to 60 MVARS to the bus (N1-OP-32)
BOP Monitor plant parameters Monitor Turbine and Generator parameters on the A Panel
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 2 46 October 2008 EVENT 4 CRD Flow Control Valve Failure When actions for the voltage regulator failure are complete and when directed by the examiner, insert malfunction:
RD36A, CRD FCV 44-151 FAILURE - CLOSED TRG 2 CRD charging water pressure rises CRD drive water pressure lowers CRD cooling water pressure and flow lower Expected Annunciator:
F3-1-5, CRD CHARGING WTR PRESSURE HI/LO PO-4.0 CREW Acknowledge/report annunciator F3 5, CRD CHARGING WTR PRESS HI/LO Diagnose CRD FCV 11 is closed SRO Acknowledge report from the crew Direct entry into N1-SOP-5.1, LOSS OF CRD Acknowledge report that CRD FCV has failed Acknowledge report that CRD FCV has been shifted and is in AUTO Enter Technical Specifications 3.1.6.b, 7 day LCO for loss of CRD FCV 44-151 RO Monitor plant parameters
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 2 47 October 2008 EVENT 4 Continued Role Play: As NAO, when directed to transfer CRD FCV, wait 1 minute and inform the control room that you are standing by Role Play: As NAO, when directed to open 44-148 and 44-152, wait 1 minute and report task completion Role Play: As NAO, when directed to countdown and swap transfer switch, give simulated countdown and report task completion (see note below), as required Note: When the control room operator takes the CRD Flow Control Transfer Switch to "VALVE 12 TRG 16 will automatically insert remote:
RD05, CRD FLOW CONTROL VALVE ISOL, FINAL VALUE=nc30b TRG 16 This precludes the console operator from having to time the insertion of this remote.
Role Play: As NAO, when directed to close 44-150 and 44-153, wait 1 minute and report task completion.
BOP Acknowledge direction from SRO Execute N1-SOP-5.1 Answers Is a CRD pump operating YES Determines need to switch CRD Flow Control Valves per N1-OP-5 Section F.5.0:
Dispatch NAO to report to RB 237 and establish communications Place CRD Flow Control in MAN Direct NAO open 44-148 and 44-152 Direct NAO to count-down to place RB air transfer switches in UP position while you place CRD FCV transfer switch in VALVE 12 position at F panel Places CRD FCV transfer switch in VALVE 12 position Direct NAO close 44-150 and 44-153 Monitor flow Place CRD Flow Control in AUTO EVENT 5 Loss of Powerboard 11 PO-5.0 CREW
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 2 48 October 2008 When directed by examiner, insert malfunction:
ED04, AC POWER BOARD ELECTRICAL FAULT(PB11)
TRG 3 Expected Annunciators:
A4-1-1, PB 11 R113 TRIP L1-3-4, REACT BLDG/ATM DIFF PRESS Also the following equipment trips:
Reactor Recirculation Pumps 11 & 12 Drywell fans 14, 15, 16 Condensate Pump 11 Feedwater Booster Pump 11 Feedwater Pump 11 Circulating Water Pump 11 Service Water Pump 11 RBCLC Pump 11 TBCLC Pump 11 Reactor Building Exhaust Fan 11 Respond to annunciators and equipment trips Diagnose/report loss of PB 11 Recognize/report loss of the following:
Reactor Recirculation Pumps 11 &
12 Drywell fans 14, 15, 16 Condensate Pump 11 Feedwater Booster Pump 11 Feedwater Pump 11 Circulating Water Pump 11 Service Water Pump 11 RBCLC Pump 11 TBCLC Pump 11 Reactor Building Exhaust Fan 11 Recognize/report drop in reactor power Recognize/report lowering condenser vacuum Recognize/report loss of Reactor Building D/P EVENT 5 Continued SRO Acknowledge report from crew Direct entry into N1-SOP-30.1 Direct and supervise power reduction per N1-SOP-1.1 Emergency Power Reduction to stabilize condenser vacuum, as necessary Direct entry into N1-SOP-1.3 Recirculation Pump Trip, as required SRO Continued Direct closure of Recirc Pump 11 & 12
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 2 49 October 2008 Note: The examiner may move to the next event prior to the SRO addressing Technical Specifications. The Technical Specifications may be covered using a follow-up question.
Note: On the loss of Powerboard 11, Recirc pumps 11 and 12 trip. The APRMs are inoperable due to reverse flow through the tripped Recirc loops. The APRMs will be declared operable once the discharge valves are closed on both tripped Recirc loops.
Discharge Valves Direct RO to re-energize PB16A and 13A-15A Enter N1-EOP-5 on loss of Reactor Building Ventilation (positive pressure in RB)
Direct entry into N1-SOP-6.1 for loss of spent fuel pool cooling pump, as time permits Review Technical Specifications Acknowledge that the APRMs are inoperable while the RRP discharge valves are still open Determine that TS 3.1.7e Partial Loop Operations, 3 loop limitations need to be checked by Reactor Engineering Limited to 90% power in 3 loop operations 2% MCPR penalty must be applied per COLR Determine that TS 3.1.8 for HPCI operability is a 15 day LCO Review N1-OP-19 Section H.7.0 for operation exceeding SPDES permit, as time permits Direct further power reduction as necessary for compliance with SPDES permit EVENT 5 Continued RO Acknowledge direction from SRO
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 2 50 October 2008 Confirm plant is stable by verifying:
No thermal hydraulic Instability 3 Recirc pumps running Not operating in the Restricted Zone Execute N1-SOP-1.1, Emergency Power Reduction, to lower recirc flow to stabilize condenser vacuum, as required Determine plant operating point on the 3-loop power to flow curves EVENT 5 Continued Role Play: As NAO when directed to energize BOP Execute N1-SOP-30.1, Loss of Power Board 11 Start Service Water Pump 12 Verify TBCLC pump 12 running Verify IAC 12 and/or 13 running Verify RBCLC pump(s) running Verify Steam Packing Exhauster 12 running Answers Are A4-4-6, A4-4-7, A4-1-3 OR A5-2-8 in alarm YES Determines Power Board 11 is faulted and cannot be reenergized Restores power to Power Board 16A as follows:
Opens R1041 Closes R1042 Verifies Power Board 16B amps
<962 BOP Continued Dispatch NAO to reenergize Power
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 2 51 October 2008 PB13A-15A, acknowledge order, but delay any action Role Play: As NAO when directed to restore offgas vacuum pump, acknowledge order, but delay any action Role Play: As NAO when directed to investigate spent fuel pool cooling, acknowledge order, but delay any action Note: The operator may choose to either restore normal Reactor Building Ventilation or initiate Reactor Building Emergency Ventilation to restore Reactor Building differential pressure.
EVENT 5 Continued Boards 13A, 14A, and 15A Notify SRO that APRMs are inoperable Close Recirc Pump 11 & 12 Discharge Valves Hold open for 2-3 seconds Recirc Pump 11 & 12 Discharge Valves Execute N1-SOP-1.3, Recirc Pump Trip, as required Dispatch NAO to restore Offgas Vacuum Pump Enter N1-SOP-6.1 for loss of spent fuel pool cooling, as time permits Dispatch NAO to investigate loss of spent fuel pool cooling, as time permits May take action to restore Turbine Building Ventilation in accordance with either N1-ARP-L1-2-3 or N1-OP-26 Respond to either annunciator:
L1-1-5, RB VENT EXH FAN 11-12 TRIP - VIB (Normal Ventilation) o Verify closed Reactor Building Exhaust Fan 11 outlet damper o Start Reactor Building Exhaust Fan 12 L1-3-4, REACT BLDG/ATM DIFF PRESS (Emergency Ventilation) o Start RBEVS per N1-OP-10 BOP Continued
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 2 52 October 2008 Role Play: As RP, acknowledge report that RBEVS is in service and RBVS is secured Possible actions in N1-OP-10 Section H.1.0 to start RBEVS Verify open 202-36, EM VENTILATION FROM REACTOR BLDG BV Verify closed the following valves:
202-47, EM VENTILATION TIE BV 202-74, EM VENTILATION LOOP 11 COOLING BV 202-75, EM VENTILATION LOOP 12 COOLING BV Notify Rad Protection, the Reactor Building Emergency Ventilation system will be placed in service Place 202-37(38), EM VENTILATION LOOP 11(12) INLET BV control switch to OPEN Verify open 202-37(38), EM VENTILATION LOOP 11(12) INLET BV Start 202-53(33), EVS FAN 11(12)
Verify open 202-34(35), EM VENT EXHAUST FAN 11(12) OUTLET BV Confirm proper operation of 202-50(51), EM VENT EXHAUST FAN 11(12) INLET FCV, by observing indicating lights and flow indication
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 2 53 October 2008 EVENTS 6, 7 and 8 RWCU Leak in the Secondary Containment and failure of the Mode Switch and RPS Pushbuttons to cause a scram When directed by examiner, insert malfunction:
CU11, COOLANT LEAK OUTSIDE OF DRYWELL, RAMP TIME=10:00, FINAL VALUE=20%
TRG 4 Expected Annunciators:
L1-3-3, CONTINUOUS AIR RAD MONITOR H1-4-8, AREA RADIATION MONITORS K3-3-4, CLEAN-UP SYS LEAK AREA T HI The following malfunction is preset:
RP05B, REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM FAILURE TO SCRAM CH12 PRESET RPS Ch 12 lights do not extinguish Control rods do not insert based on automatic or manual scram signals Control rods insert once ARI is manually initiated PO-6.0, 7.0 CREW Acknowledge/report:
L1-3-3, CONTINUOUS AIR RAD MONITOR H1-4-8, AREA RADIATION MONITORS K3-3-4, CLEAN-UP SYS LEAK AREA T HI Diagnose leak from RWCU into secondary containment Diagnose RWCU failed to isolate EVENTS 6, 7 and 8 Continued SRO
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 2 54 October 2008 EVENTS 6, 7 and 8 Continued Acknowledges report from the crew Enters N1-EOP-5 Directs RWCU system isolation Acknowledges report that RWCU failed to isolate both automatically and manually Directs dispatching of an NAO and RP Tech to obtain general area temperatures and radiation levels in the Reactor Building When Reactor Building Ventilation exhaust radiation exceeds 5 mR/hr, then directs verification of RB Vent isolation and RBEVS initiation Requests report on ARMs Determines area temperatures and radiation levels are above setpoints in Tables T and R, and transitions to circle 27 Determines a primary system is discharging into the reactor building and the discharge cannot be isolated, and transitions to circle 28 Before any area temperature or radiation level reaches 135oF or 8 R/hr, respectively:
Directs manual scram and N1-SOP-1 execution CT-1.0 Acknowledges scram report Acknowledges electrical failure to scram SRO Continued
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 2 55 October 2008 Note: Execution of the N1-EOP-3 steps listed here may be bypassed if the crew manually initiates ARI immediately upon the electrical failure to scram EVENTS 6, 7 and 8 Continued Enters N1-EOP-2 due to power above 6% when a scram is required Answers All rods in to at least 04?
NO Answers Will the reactor stay shutdown without boron? NO Exits N1-EOP-2, enters N1-EOP-3 Directs ADS bypassed Directs Core Spray jumpers installed per N1-EOP-1 Attachment 4 Directs manual ARI CT-2.0 Acknowledges new scram report Acknowledges all rod in Exits N1-EOP-3, enters N1-EOP-2 Assigns RPV level band 53 to 95 inches using Condensate/Feedwater Directs RPV pressure maintained
<1080 psig using Turbine Bypass Valves May direct anticipatory blowdown with Turbine Bypass Valves and Emergency Condensers with cooldown in excess of 100oF/hr Acknowledges reports of Reactor Building temperatures and radiation levels When report is received that 2 General Areas temperatures are above 135°F, enters N1-EOP-8, RPV Blowdown Answers Are all control rods inserted to at least position 04 YES SRO Continued
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 2 56 October 2008 Answers Drywell pressure? <3.5 psig Directs initiation of Emergency Condensers Answers Torus water level? >8 ft Directs open 3 ERVs CT-3.0 EVENTS 6, 7 and 8 Continued RO Acknowledge direction from the SRO Rotate reactor mode switch to shutdown CT-1.0 Recognizes/reports RPS CH 12 does not deenergize and control rods do not insert Depresses RPS CH 12 scram pushbutton Recognizes/reports RPS CH 12 does not deenergize and control rods do not insert Provide scram report Mode Switch in SHUTDOWN Control rods NOT all in When ARI is initiated, notify Control Room all rods are IN Provides scram report Perform N1-SOP-1, Reactor Scram, scram verification actions Places IRMs on range 9 Inserts IRM and SRM detectors Downranges IRMs as necessary to monitor power decrease RO Continued
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 2 57 October 2008 Reduces Recirc Master flow to 25-43 x 106 lb/hr Control RPV pressure <1080 psig using Turbine Bypass Valves If directed to perform anticipatory depressurization Open all bypass valves using BOJM Report all bypass valves open Initiate Emergency Condensers Note: No General Area temperature information is available until an operator has been dispatched to the Reactor Building to monitor area temperatures.
The following timeline of field reports may be adjusted by examiner as necessary for evaluation purposes.
Role Play: When directed as NAO and RP Tech to obtain general area temperatures and radiation levels in the Reactor Building:
Wait 4 minutes and report RB 261 east side temperature is 125oF and rising, radiation level is 25 mr/hr and rising.
Note: When one general area temperature is reported above 135oF and a second general area temperature is reported as approaching 135oF, the crew is likely to perform an anticipatory blowdown per N1-EOP-2 EVENTS 6, 7 and 8 Continued BOP Attempts to isolate RWCU Closes33-02R, CU SUPPLY ISOLATION VALVE 11 (INSIDE)
Informs SRO that 33-02R, CU Supply Isolation Valve 11 has failed to fully close Closes33-04R, CU SUPPLY ISO VLV 12 (OUTSIDE)
Informs SRO that 33-04R, CU Supply Isolation Valve has failed to fully close Closes33-01R, CU RETURN ISO VLV Informs SRO that 33-01R, CU RETURN Isolation Valve has failed to fully close Dispatches NAO and RP Tech to obtain Reactor Building general area temperatures and radiation levels BOP Continued
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 2 58 October 2008 Role Play Continued:
Wait an additional 3 minutes and report RB 261 east side temperature is 140oF and rising, radiation level is 30 mr/hr and rising; RB 281 east side temperature is 120oF and rising, radiation level is 20 mr/hr and rising.
Note: When 2 general area temperatures are reported above 135oF, the crew will perform an RPV Blowdown Wait an additional 3 minutes and report RB 281 east side temperature is 140oF and rising, radiation level is 30 mr/hr and rising EVENTS 6, 7 and 8 Continued If directed during N1-EOP-3 execution Bypasses ADS Prevents Core Spray Injection Initiates Manual ARI CT-2.0 Performs N1-SOP-1, Reactor Scram, level control actions:
Restores RPV level to 53-95 inches by controlling injection and rejecting through RWCU Determines #13 FWP running and RPV water level recovering Verifies at least one Electric FW Pump running Terminates 13 FWP injection as follows:
Places FWP 13 VALVE CONTROL in MANUAL AND closes Disengages 13 FWP Gives 29-10, FEEDWATER PUMP 13 BLOCKING VALVE, a CLOSE signal Verifies RPV water level +53 inches and rising Verifies 11/12 FWP controllers in MANUAL and set to zero output Resets HPCI signal Places 11/12 FWP BYPASS Valve in AUTO, sets to 65-70 inches Verifies level stable AND secures 2nd FWP, if running BOP Continued
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 2 59 October 2008 If RPV level reaches 85 inches and rising, then:
Verifies off all Feedwater Pumps Secures CRD Pumps not required Maximizes RWCU reject flow Closes FWIVs if required Closes MSIVs if required Maintain RPV water level in assigned band Notifies crew of reports on general area temperatures and radiation levels When N1-EOP-8, RPV Blowdown, is entered:
Initiates Emergency Condensers Opens 3 ERVs CT-3.0 TERMINATING CUE:
RPV Blowdown in progress All control rods are in RPV water level controlled in assigned band
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 3 60 October 2008 VIII. POST SCENARIO CRITIQUE B. N/A, NRC Exam IX.
REFERENCE EVENTS AND COMMITMENTS C. Reference Events
- 1. None D. Commitments
- 2. None X.
LESSONS LEARNED A. None
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 3 61 October 2008 NMP SIMULATOR SCENARIO NRC Scenario 3 REV. 0 No. of Pages: 35 LOSS OF POWERBOARD 103, FEEDWATER PROBLEMS, LOCA WITH LOSS OF HIGH PRESSURE INJECTION, RPV BLOWDOWN REQUIRED TO RESTORE RPV WATER LEVEL PREPARER DATE VALIDATED Frank Payne, Kyle James, Bruce Williams DATE 5/17/08 GEN SUPERVISOR OPS TRAINING DATE OPERATIONS MANAGER N/A - Exam Security DATE CONFIGURATION CONTROL N/A - Exam Security DATE SCENARIO
SUMMARY
Length:
90 minutes Initial Power Level:
Approximately 100%, above 100% rodline Mitigating Strategy Code:
RL2, Small LOCA, RPV Blowdown required to permit injection with low pressure systems to recover RPV water level above TAF
SUMMARY
The crew assumes the shift with the plant at 100% power with Feedwater Pump 12 under clearance for maintenance. The crew will perform N1-PM-Q7, Turbine Thrust Bearing Test from the Control Room. Next, APRM 13 fails. The crew will bypass the APRM and reset the half scram. Next, Powerboard 103 trips on fault. The crew will take action to secure EDG 103 and attempt to restore Powerboard 17B. Powerboard 103 and Powerboard 17B are both faulted and are not restored. The trip of CRD Pump 12 (PB 17B) will require starting CRD Pump 11 and the SRO must address Technical Specifications.
When the necessary steps for the loss of Powerboard 103 are completed, Feedwater Booster Pump 11 will trip with a failure of the standby pump to start. The standby pump can be manually started. The SRO must again address Technical Specifications. When the standby Feedwater Booster Pump is manually started, the Master Feedwater Controller will fail as-is.
RPV water level will slowly deviate from the set level. The crew must diagnose the failure and the BOP operator will be required to take manual control of RPV water level. With RPV water level in manual control, Feedwater Pump 11 will trip because of delayed effects from the earlier Feedwater Booster Pump trip. This will require an entry into N1-SOP-1.1, Emergency Power Reduction to lower power to within the capacity of Feedwater Pump 13.
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 3 62 October 2008 While troubleshooting the electrical faults and troubles with the Feedwater system, the crew recognizes a coolant leak in the containment. Drywell pressure and temperature rise, requiring the crew to insert a manual SCRAM on rising drywell pressure. When the turbine trips, Powerboards 11 and 12 fail to automatically transfer. This results in a loss of feedwater, condensate, circulating water and other loads. Operators are able to restore these power boards. RPV water level continues to drop with only one liquid poison pump and CRD pump 11 available for injection. The crew will determine they cannot restore and maintain RPV water level above -109" and enter N1-EOP-8, RPV Blowdown. While blowing down the crew must diagnose that the inboard IV for Core Spray 111 fails to open and Core Spray pump 121 fails to start. With Core Spray unavailable for injection, the crew will inject with the feedwater booster pumps using N1-EOP-1, Att 25 or 26.
Major Procedures:
N1-SOP-1, N1-SOP-1.1, N1-SOP-5.1, N1-SOP-16.1, N1-SOP-30.1, N1-SOP-30.2, N1-EOP-1, N1-EOP-2, N1-EOP-4, N1-EOP-8 Termination Criteria:
RPV Blowdown in progress, RPV water level above TAF and controlled in assigned band, containment pressure controlled in accordance with N1-EOP-1 Att 17 EAL Classification:
Alert, EAL 3.1.1
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 3 63 October 2008 II. SIMULATOR SET UP K. IC Number:
IC 173 L. Presets/Function Key Assignments
- 2. Malfunctions:
- a. FW03B, FEEDWATER PUMP TRIP 12 PRESET
- c. ED08, AC POWER BOARD ELECTRICAL FAULT(PB103)
TRG 2
- h. CU01, COOLANT LEAK INSIDE OF DRYWELL, RAMP TIME=10:00, FINAL VALUE=40%
TRG 6
- i.
ED26, FAILURE OF PB11 TO AUTO TRANSFER PRESET
- j.
ED27, FAILURE OF PB12 TO AUTO TRANSFER PRESET
- k. CS01C, CORE SPRAY PUMP TRIP 121 PRESET
- l.
CS03C, CORE SPRAY INBD INJECT VLV FAIL TO OPEN 40-11 PRESET
- 3. Remotes:
- 4. Overrides:
- a. OVR-7S43DI4116 POS_3 4H17/51-02A C FRM B, FINAL VALUE=OFF PRESET
- 5. Triggers:
- a. TRG 4 - Fails Feedwater Pump 13 FCV as-is when Feedwater Booster Pump 12 control switch is taken to start
- i.
Event Action: zdfwbncb==1 ii. Command: None
- 6. Equipment Out of Service:
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 3 64 October 2008
- 5. N1-PM-Q7, QUARTERLY MAIN TURBINE THRUST BEARING AND GENERATOR CORE MONITOR TESTING, signed off through step 6.1, up to step 6.2 (Note 6.1 is N/A if you perform 6.2)
D. Miscellaneous
- 1. Verify CRD pump 12 is in service
- 2. Place protected equipment signs
NRC Scenario 3 65 October 2008 II.
SHIFT TURNOVER INFORMATION OFF GOING SHIFT: N
D DATE: Today PART I:
To be performed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.
Control Panel Walkdown (all panels) (SM, CRS, STA, RO, CRE)
PART II:
To be reviewed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.
Shift Manager Log (SM, CRS, STA)
Shift Turnover Checklist (ALL)
Lit Control Room Annunciators Computer Alarm Summary (RO)
Evolutions/General Information/Equipment Status:
Power is approximately 100%.
Turbine Surveillance Testing, N1-PM-Q7, to be performed.
Feed Pump 12 is out of service because of a burned out motor. (TS 3.1.8, day 2 of 15)
PART III:
Remarks/Planned Evolutions:
Perform N1-PM-Q7, QUARTERLY MAIN TURBINE THRUST BEARING AND GENERATOR CORE MONITOR TESTING, section 6.2.
PART IV:
To be reviewed/accomplished shortly after assuming the shift:
Review new Clearances (SM)
Test Control Annunciators (CRE)
Shift Crew Composition (SM/CRS)
TITLE NAME TITLE NAME SRO ATC RO BOP RO
NRC Scenario 3 66 October 2008 Scenario ID INSTRUCTOR COMMENTS (Strengths, Areas for Improvement, Open Items etc.)
What Happened?
What we did?
Why? (Goals)
Other Options?
NRC Scenario 3 67 October 2008 V.
PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES E. Critical Tasks:
CT-1.0 Given a LOCA with a loss of high pressure injection, the crew will perform an RPV Blowdown when RPV water level drops below -84 inches, in accordance with N1-EOP-8.
CT-2.0 Given a LOCA with a loss of high pressure injection and Core Spray, the crew will inject to the RPV with Condensate and Feedwater Booster pumps, in accordance with N1-EOP-2.
CT-3.0 Given a LOCA in the Drywell, the crew will initiate Containment Sprays to prevent exceeding PSP, in accordance with N1-EOP-4.
F. Performance Objectives:
PO-1.0 Given the plant operating at power, the crew will perform Main Turbine Thrust Bearing wear testing, in accordance with N1-PM-Q7.
PO-2.0 Given a failed APRM, the crew will bypass the APRM and reset the half scram, in accordance with N1-ARP-F1.
PO-3.0 Given the plant operating at power, the crew will respond to a loss of a Powerboards 103 and 17B, in accordance with N1-ARP-A5.
PO-4.0 Given the plant operating at power, the crew will respond to a loss of the operating CRD pump, in accordance with N1-ARP-A5 or N1-SOP-5.1.
PO-5.0 Given a trip of Feedwater Booster Pump 11 and a failure of the standby pump to automatically start, the crew will start the standby pump, in accordance with N1-ARP-H3.
PO-6.0 Given a failed Feedwater flow control valve, the crew will take manual control to stabilize RPV water level, in accordance with N1-SOP-16.1.
PO-7.0 Given a loss of the operating motor driven feedwater pump, the crew will lower power to within the capacity of the turbine driven feedwater pump, in accordance with N1-SOP-16.1 and N1-SOP-1.1.
PO-8.0 Given a LOCA within the Drywell, the crew will scram the reactor, in accordance with N1-SOP-1.
PO-9.0 Given a failure of Powerboards 11 and 12 to automatically transfer following a Main Turbine trip, the crew will manually transfer the Powerboards, in accordance with N1-SOP-30.1 and N1-SOP-30.2.
PO-10.0 Given the plant in a condition requiring emergency classification, the SRO shall classify the events properly, complete initial notification forms, and
NRC Scenario 3 68 October 2008 discuss the bases for the classification in accordance with the emergency plan procedure.
PO-11.0 Given the plant or a plant system in a condition requiring Technical Specification action, identify the deviation and any required actions/notifications.
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 3 69 October 2008 Take the simulator out of freeze before the crew enters for the pre-shift walkdown and briefing.
Allow no more than 5 minutes for panel walkdown.
CREW Walkdown panels Conduct shift turnover brief Assume the shift EVENT 1 Perform N1-PM-Q7, Turbine Thrust Bearing Test There are no simulator actions required for this test and no malfunctions are intended to occur PO-1.0 Note: Pre-job brief may be conducted prior to the crew entering the simulator to facilitate scenario run-time.
SRO Directs the BOP to perform N1-PM-Q7, Quarterly Main Turbine Thrust Bearing and Generator Core Monitoring Testing, Sect 6.2, Thrust Bearing Wear Test from the Control Room Perform a pre-job brief RO Monitors plant parameters BOP Acknowledges direction to perform turbine surveillance testing from the SRO Notifies RO of intention to perform the test Places THRUST BRG WEAR TEST SOLENOID switch in TEST BOP Continued
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 3 70 October 2008 EVENT 1 Continued Role Play: As NAO, when directed, report that the trip lights are NOT illuminated and the test handle is in the normal (ZERO) position at the middle standard EVENT 1 Continued Confirms the following:
Yellow TEST MODE 43X/TBWT light illuminates Annunciator A2-3-3 actuates Rotates and holds TBWT Motor switch to + READING position, until Annunciator A2-3-4 actuates Continues holding TBWT Motor switch to + READING position until POS light is lit then records reading at which trip occurred Rotates and holds TBWT Motor switch to - READING position until meter is zeroed, then releases switch Confirms Annunciator A2-3-4 clears Rotates and holds TBWT Motor switch to - READING position, until Annunciator A2-3-4 actuates Continues holding TBWT Motor switch to - READING position until NEG light is lit then records reading at which trip occurred Rotates and holds TBWT Motor switch to + READING position until meter is zeroed, then releases switch Confirms Annunciator A2-3-4 clears Direct the NAO at the middle standard to verify:
Trip lights (front and rear) NOT illuminated Test handle in normal (ZERO) position BOP Continued
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 3 71 October 2008 Role Play: As NAO, when directed, report that the test light is NOT illuminated at the middle standard Cue: If required inform the BOP that the flags on 30/1 and 30/2 are reset Place THRUST BRG WEAR TEST SOLENOID Switch to OFF Confirm YELLOW TEST MODE 43X/TBWT light is OFF Direct the NAO at the middle standard of to verify TEST light NOT illuminated Confirm Annunciator A2-3-3 clears Verify reset, Flag Target 30/1 and 30/2 on Panel B-3 Notifies SRO/RO that the Turbine Thrust Bearing test has been successfully completed
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 3 72 October 2008 EVENT 2 APRM 13 Inoperative Failure When directed by the examiner, insert malfunction:
NM21C, APRM 13 FAILURE - INOP TRG 1 Expected Annunciators:
F2-1-6, APRM 11-14 F3-4-4, ROD BLOCK F1-1-1, RPS CH 11 REACT NEUTRON MONITOR F1-2-1, RPS CH 11 AUTO REACTOR TRIP PO-2.0 CREW Acknowledge/Report Annunciators:
F2-1-6, APRM 11-14 F3-4-4, ROD BLOCK F1-1-1, RPS CH 11 NEUTRON MONITOR F1-2-1, RPS CH 11 AUTO REACTOR TRIP Diagnose failure of APRM 13 Role Play: If requested to investigate the failure of APRM 13, reply that you will investigate.
SRO Determines APRM 13 is INOP Contacts WWM to request troubleshooting for APRM 13 References TS 3.6.2.a, determines the Minimum Number of Operable Channels per Trip System is met RO Monitors plant parameters When directed bypasses APRM 13 Places APRM BYPASS switch in BYPASS position Confirms APRM BYPASS light is ON on Panel E Resets the half scram BOP Investigates APRM 13 failure
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 3 73 October 2008 EVENT 3 PB 103 and PB 17B trip on fault, loss of CRD Pump 12 When directed by examiner, insert malfunctions:
ED08, AC POWER BOARD ELECTRICAL FAULT(PB103)
TRG 2 ED21, AC POWERBOARD ELECTRICAL FAULT(PB17 SECTION B)
TRG 2 Major Expected Annunciators A5-3-7, POWER BD. 17 R1053 TRIP A5-4-7, POWER BD 17 LOW BUS VOLTAGE A5-4-3, POWER BD 103 BUS VOLTAGE LOW A5-3-5, DSL GEN 103 START-RUN OFFNORMAL (possible if EDG not secured rapidly with loss of cooling water)
The following major loads will be lost as a result of the loss of PB 103 and PB 17B:
Core Spray Pumps/Topping Pumps 112/122 Containment Spray Pumps 121/122 Static Batt Charger 171A/B RPS UPS 172A/B ESW Pump 12 CRD Pump 12 RBCLC Pump 12 Liquid Poison Pump 12 CREVS 12 RBEVS 12 EDG 103 Auxiliaries Condensate Transfer Pump 12 Emerg. Cond. 12 Inside Steam IV (39-09R)
PO-3.0, 4.0 CREW Acknowledge/report annunciators Recognize/report the following:
Loss of PB 103 and PB 17B EDG 103 started but not supplying PB 103 R1013 tripped (PB 103 normal supply)
R1053 tripped (PB 17B normal supply)
Recognize/diagnose loss of CRD EVENT 3 Continued SRO
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 3 74 October 2008 Role Play: If dispatched as NAO to investigate PB loss, wait 3 minutes then report that R1013, PB 103 Normal Supply Breaker, tripped on over-current EVENT 3 Continued Acknowledge report from crew Direct BOP/RO to execute applicable ARPs Recognize that EDG 103 auxiliaries are not powered (Raw Water Pump)
Direct shutdown of EDG 103 using N1-ARP-A5-4-3 Acknowledge report from BOP/RO that no CRD Pumps operating and CRD Pump 11 is available Direct RO/BOP to start CRD Pump 11 IAW N1-SOP-5.1 or N1-ARP-A5-4-3 Review loads lost as result of PB 103/17B loss Review Tech Specs for impact of loss of PB103 TS 3.1.2, Liquid Poison System TS 3.1.4, Core Spray System TS 3.1.5, ADS (Requires to be less than 110 psig in 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />)
TS 3.1.6, CRD System TS 3.2.7.c, Reactor Coolant System Isolation Valves (Limiting LCO - requires initiating a normal orderly shutdown within one hour and having reactor in the cold shutdown condition within ten hours.)
TS 3.3.7, Containment Spray TS 3.6.3, Emergency Power Sources Recognize that TS 3.2.7.c is most limiting SRO Continued
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 3 75 October 2008 Role Play: When contacted as WEC/Mgmt, acknowledge report of impending shutdown Notify WEC/Mgmt of impending shutdown Brief crew on impending shutdown Role Play: If directed as NAO to shift RPV level CRD backfill per N1-OP-58, H.2.0 reply that you will get the procedure and shift RPV level CRD backfill. Wait 5 minutes and report backfill has been shifted.
RO Monitor plant parameters May perform N1-SOP-5.1 for loss of 12 CRD pump prior to BOP starting 11 CRD pump per ARPs Places 11 CRD pump control switch to START Places 12 CRD pump control switch to STOP Observes proper operation of 11 CRD pump (amps, flow, alarms)
EVENT 3 Continued BOP Executes N1-ARP-A5-4-3 Confirm alarm on computer If PB 103 voltage is low:
Verifies EDG 103 running Confirm A5-4-1 AND A5-4-2 clear Attempts to close R1032, EDG 103 Output Breaker Recognizes/reports R1032 will not close and PB 103 cannot be re-energized If PB 103 cannot be re-energized:
Places R1013 in PTL Places EDG 103 control switch in emergency stop May start CRD Pump 11 BOP Continued
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 3 76 October 2008 Role Play: If requested to develop a clearance to prevent autostart of EDG 103, acknowledge request and estimate one hour for completion.
Verifies RBCLC header pressure >40 psig Resets Lockout 86-17 Opens R1053, PB 17B Normal Feeder Breaker Closes R1052, PB 17 A-B Tie Breaker Recognizes/reports R1052 will not close and PB 17B cannot be re-energized Requests clearance to prevent auto-start of EDG 103 EVENT 4 PO-5.0
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 3 77 October 2008 Feedwater Booster Pump 11 Trip with Failure of the Standby Pump to Auto Start When directed by examiner, insert malfunction:
FW02A, FEEDWATER BOOSTER PUMP TRIP 11 TRG 3 The following override prevents Feedwater Booster Pump 12 from Auto Starting on low header discharge pressure:
OVR-7S43DI4116 POS_3 4H17/51-02A C FRM B PRESET RPV water level slowly lowers Feedwater Booster Pump header pressure lowers Expected Annunciators:
H3-1-6 REACTOR FW BOOSTER P11 TRIP H3-1-7, H3-2-7, H3-3-7, REACTOR FW PUMP 11/12/13 SUCTION CREW Acknowledge/report annunciator H3-1-6 REACTOR FW BOOSTER P11 TRIP Diagnose trip of Feedwater Booster Pump 11 EVENT 4 Continued SRO Acknowledges report If BOP does not manually start FWBP 12, directs starting FWBP 12 Enters Tech Spec 3.1.8.c Determines redundant component inoperable in both HPCI train 11 and 12, thus normal orderly shutdown shall be initiated within one hour and the plant brought to less than 110 psig in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> SRO Continued
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 3 78 October 2008 Initiates surveillance requirement 4.1.8.c for redundant component operability verification Notifies WEC Notifies Ops Management Performs crew brief/update RO Monitors plant parameters May perform Emergency Power Reduction per N1-SOP-1.1 as required to maintain RPV water level Role Play: When dispatched as NAO to swap HWC, wait 5 minutes and report that HWC injection has been transferred from FWBP 11 to FWBP 12 BOP Report alarm and respond per H3-1-6 Confirms alarm on computer (E049 RX FW BOOST PMP 11 TRIP)
Recognizes/diagnoses failure of the standby pump to automatically start Manually starts FWBP 12 Notifies crew of failure of FWBP 12 to auto start Dispatches operators to shift Hydrogen Water Chemistry injection from FWBP 11 to FWBP 12
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 3 79 October 2008 EVENT 5 Failure of the Feedwater Master Controller AS-IS The following malfunction will be automatically inserted when the control switch for Feedwater Booster Pump 12 is placed in START:
FW14C, FEEDWATER MASTER CONTROLLER FAILS - AS IS TRG 4 RPV water level slowly deviates from setpoint Feedwater flow remains constant Expected Annunciator:
F2-3-3 REACT VESSEL LEVEL HIGH-LOW PO-6.0 CREW Recognize/report RPV water level is deviating from setpoint Diagnose/report failure of Feedwater Master Controller SRO When notified of feedwater controller failure, directs:
Entry into N1-SOP-16.1 Manual control of feedwater RO Monitors plant parameters May perform Emergency Power Reduction per N1-SOP-1.1 as required to maintain RPV water level EVENT 5 Continued BOP Enters N1-SOP-16.1 Determines problem with Feedwater Level Control Determines NOT a Flow Control Valve lockup
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 3 80 October 2008 BOP Continued Using available FCVs, takes manual control of FWLC at MA stations Operates Feedwater FCV 11 or 13 in manual to control feedflow to restore RPV water level Controls RPV water level in MANUAL
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 3 81 October 2008 EVENT 6 Feedwater Pump 11 Trip When the crew has restored RPV water level to normal band and directed by examiner, insert malfunction:
FW03A, FEEDWATER PUMP 11 TRIP TRG 5 RPV water level lowers Expected Annunciator:
H3-1-7, REACTOR FW PUMP 11 TRIP OVERLOAD SUCTION HI-LEVEL PO-7.0 CREW Acknowledge/report annunciator Diagnose a trip of the operating electric feedwater pump SRO Acknowledges report Directs entry into ARP Directs re-entry into N1-SOP-16.1 Directs BOP to maintain RPV water level with FWP 13 using FWLC in manual Directs RO to lower power IAW N1-SOP-1.1 as necessary to recover RPV water level (80-85% power)
Supervises power reduction Notifies WEC Notifies Ops Management Performs crew brief/update Recognizes Tech Spec 3.1.8 applies for loss of HPCI component
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 3 82 October 2008 EVENT 6 Continued RO Monitors plant parameters Lowers reactor power IAW N1-SOP-1.1 using recirculation flow as directed/required for RPV water level control Monitors position on P/F map Role Play: If dispatched as NAO to check FWP 11, wait 2 minutes and report that FWP 11 Aux Oil Pump is running and the FWP shaft is not rotating backwards.
Role Play: If dispatched as NAO to investigate trip of FWP 11, wait 2 minutes and report that FWP 11 breaker tripped on overload, but there are no abnormal indications at the pump.
BOP Re-enters N1-SOP-16.1 Coordinates RPV water level control with RO during power reduction Determines problem with FW pumps Determines level can be maintained >53 Restores level 65-83 by controlling injection from Feedwater FCV 13 Enters ARP H3-1-7 Places 11 FW Pump Control Switch to Stop spring return to Neutral Confirms Aux Oil Pump running AND FW Pump not rotating backwards Verifies closed, 11 FW FCV (29-141) AND 11 FW Low Flow FCV (29-49)
Dispatch NAO to investigate FWP 11 trip
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 3 83 October 2008 EVENTS 7, 8 and 9 RPV coolant leak in the Primary Containment When the crew has restored RPV water level to normal band and directed by examiner, insert malfunction:
CU01, COOLANT LEAK INSIDE OF DRYWELL, RAMP TIME=10:00, FINAL VALUE=40%
TRG 6 Drywell humidity, leakage rate, pressure and temperature rise Expected Annunciators:
H2-4-7, DRYWELL WATER LEAK DETECTION SYS K2-4-3, DRYWELL PRESSURE HIGH - LOW The inboard IV for Core Spray 111 fails to open and Core Spray pump 121 fails to start The following malfunctions are preset:
CS01C, CORE SPRAY PUMP TRIP 121 PRESET CS03C, CORE SPRAY INBD INJECT VLV FAIL TO OPEN 40-11 PRESET PO-8.0, 9.0 CREW Recognize/report containment parameters degrading DW humidity rising DW leakage rising DW pressure rising DW temperature rising Diagnose RPV coolant leak EVENTS 7, 8 and 9 Continued SRO
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 3 84 October 2008 Note: A reactor scram will be required because of rising Drywell pressure EVENTS 7, 8 and 9 Continued Initial Actions for RPV Coolant Leak May direct an emergency power reduction IAW N1-SOP-1.1, if time permits Brief crew on plans to insert manual scram Direct the RO to place Mode Switch to SHUTDOWN Enters N1-EOP-2 when RPV water level reaches 53 inches Directs N1-SOP-1, Reactor Scram Enters N1-EOP-2 and N1-EOP-4 when DW pressure reaches 3.5 psig Actions for failure of PB to transfer Direct entry into N1-SOP-30.1 Direct entry into N1-SOP-30.2 Authorizes PB 11 and PB 12 re-energized Acknowledges PB 11 and PB 12 can be re-energized Subsequent SRO EOP Actions:
Enters N1-EOP-2 when water level reaches 53 inches:
Determines all control rods are in Directs RPV water level controlled between 53-95 inches with CRD Directs RPV pressure controlled less than 1080 psig Adjusts level and pressure bands as coolant leak degrades RPV parameters SRO Continued
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 3 85 October 2008 EVENTS 7, 8 and 9 Continued When RPV level can NOT be maintained >53 inches, directs use of Alternate Injection Systems, Detail E (Liquid Poison) to stay above -84 inches (TAF)
Direct MSIVs closed to minimize inventory loss and pressure control with ECs Determines cannot stay above -84 inches (TAF) with current injection sources, and transitions to Alternate Level Control leg of N1-EOP-2 Directs ADS bypassed Directs EC initiation Determines Core Spray pump 121 has failed to start Determines 2 Detail F Subsystems are available (Core Spray Loop 11 and Condensate/Feedwater Booster Pumps 12)
Waits until level drops to -84 inches (TAF)
Determines a Detail F Subsystem is lined up with a pump running Before level drops to -109 inches, determines an injection source is lined up with a pump running Enters N1-EOP-8, RPV Blowdown:
Determines all control rods are in SRO Continued
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 3 86 October 2008 EVENTS 7, 8 and 9 Continued Directs Emergency Condensers initiated Determines torus water level is above 8.0 feet Directs open 3 ERVs CT-1.0 Directs RPV water level restored 53-95 inches using Core Spray (N1-EOP-1 Att 4) or Condensate/Feedwater Booster pumps (N1-EOP-1 Att 25/26)
When RPV pressure is less than 365 psig, determines Core Spray IV 40-11 failed to open Directs RPV water level restored 53-95 inches using Condensate/Feedwater Booster pumps (N1-EOP-1 Att 25/26)
CT-2.0 Determines RPV water level is rising Transitions back to Normal Level Control leg of N1-EOP-2 Enters N1-EOP-4 when drywell pressure reaches 3.5 psig and/or drywell temperature reaches 150oF:
Directs lockout of Containment Spray Pumps When torus pressure exceeds 13 psig or before drywell temperature exceeds 300oF:
SRO Continued
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 3 87 October 2008 Determines plant is inside Containment Spray Initiation Limit Curve (Fig. K)
Directs verification that the recirculation pumps are tripped Directs drywell cooling fans tripped Directs initiation of containment spray IAW N1-EOP-1 Att 17 CT-3.0 Monitors torus pressure and water level for PSP RO Places REACTOR MODE Switch in SHUTDOWN Provides Scram Report Performs N1-SOP-1, Reactor Scram, scram verification actions Places IRMs on range 9 Inserts IRM and SRM detectors Downranges IRMs as necessary to monitor power decrease Reduces Recirc Master flow to 25-43 x 106 lb/hr Controls RPV pressure <1080 psig using Turbine Bypass Valves, as required BOP Continues to control RPV Level in MANUAL BOP Continued
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 3 88 October 2008 Note: Further level control actions may not be performed due to powerboard losses and coolant leak EVENTS 7, 8 and 9 Continued Performs N1-SOP-1, Reactor Scram, level control actions:
Restores RPV level to 53-95 inches by controlling injection and rejecting through RWCU Determines #13 FWP running and RPV water level recovering Determines no Electric FW Pump running/available Terminates 13 FWP injection (as required with no Electric FW Pump and LOCA in progress):
Places FWP 13 VALVE CONTROL in MANUAL AND closes Disengages 13 FWP Gives 29-10, FEEDWATER PUMP 13 BLOCKING VALVE, a CLOSE signal Verifies RPV water level +53 inches and rising Verifies 11/12 FWP controllers in MANUAL and set to zero output Resets HPCI signal If RPV level reaches 85 inches and rising, then:
Verifies off all Feedwater Pumps Secures CRD Pumps not required Maximizes RWCU reject flow Closes FWIVs if required Closes MSIVs if required Attempts to maintain RPV water level in assigned band RO/BOP
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 3 89 October 2008 When the turbine trips, Power Boards 11 and 12 fail to transfer The following malfunctions cause the failure to transfer:
ED26, FAILURE OF PB11 TO AUTO TRANSFER PRESET ED27, FAILURE OF PB12 TO AUTO TRANSFER PRESET Expected Annunciators:
A4-1-1, POWER BD. 11 R113 TRIP A5-1-6, POWER BD. 12 R122 TRIP Major Loads Lost:
Powerboard 11:
RWCU Pump 11 Service Water Pump 11 Circ Pump 11 RR Pump 11 RR Pump 12 TBCLC Pump 11 Condensate Pump 11 Feedwater Booster Pump 11 Powerboard 12:
RWCU Pump 12 Service Water Pump 12 Circ Pump 12 RR Pump 14 RR Pump 15 TBCLC Pump 12 Condensate Pump 13 Feedwater Booster Pump 13 EVENTS 7, 8 and 9 Continued Actions for Failure of PBs to Transfer:
Enters N1-SOP-30.1 for PB 11 loss Enters N1-SOP-30.2 for PB 12 loss Actions from N1-SOP-30.1(30.2)
Verifies fault annunciators clear Obtains permission from SRO to re-energize PB 11(12)
Verifies PB 11(12) components green flagged Cleanup Pump 11(12)
Service Water Pump 11(12)
Circ Water Pump 11(12)
RRMG Set 11 and 12 (14 and 15)
TBCLC Pump 11(12)
FW Booster Pump 11(13)
Condensate Pump 11(13)
Inserts Sync Key and rotates clockwise for R112(R123)
Closes R112(R123)
Confirms voltage normal on PB 11(12)
Rotates Sync Key counterclockwise and removes for R112(R123)
Determines PB 11(12) energized Closes R111(124)
Dispatches NAO to recover Powerboards 13, 14, 15 Reports PB 11(12) re-energized Moves to other SOP to re-energize PB 12(11)
Starts Service Water Pump 11(12)
Starts IAC 11(12)
Starts TBCLC Pump 11(12)
RO/BOP Continued Starts an RBCLC Pump
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 3 90 October 2008 Role Play: When contacted as NAO, acknowledge order to recover PBs 13, 14, 15, but delay any report on task completion EVENTS 7, 8 and 9 Continued Verifies fault annunciators clear Obtains permission from SRO to re-energize PB 12(11)
Verifies PB 12(11) components green flagged Cleanup Pump 12(11)
Service Water Pump 12(11)
Circ Water Pump 12(11)
RRMG Set 14 and 15 (11 and 12)
TBCLC Pump 12(11)
FW Booster Pump 13(11)
Condensate Pump 13(11)
Inserts Sync Key and rotates clockwise for R123(R112)
Closes R123(R112)
Confirms voltage normal on PB 12(11)
Rotates Sync Key counterclockwise and removes for R123(R112)
Determines PB 12(11) energized Closes R124(111)
Reports PB 12(11) re-energized Subsequent EOP Actions:
Maximizes injection with CRD and Liquid Poison to attempt to maintain level within the band assigned Updates crew on failure to maintain level and pressure bands RO/BOP Continued Operates Emergency Condensers to
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 3 91 October 2008 EVENTS 7, 8 and 9 Continued maintain pressure with the band assigned and NOT exceed 100°F/hr cool-down rate Reports failure of Core Spray pump 121 to start Closes MSIVs when directed Locks out Containment Spray by placing 4 pump control switches in PTL Observes and reports containment parameters (torus pressure above 13 psig)
Verifies/reports that all recirculation pumps have been tripped Verifies/reports that all drywell cooling fans have been tripped Initiates containment spray (N1-EOP-1 Att 17)
Starts Containment Spray Pumps 111 and 112 CT-3.0 Verifies Containment Spray flow Monitors containment pressure and temperature to ensure lowering trend Terminates Containment Sprays when drywell pressure is below 3.5 psig Reports containment spray terminated RO/BOP Continued Monitors DWP and reports if DWP
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 3 92 October 2008 EVENTS 7, 8 and 9 Continued reaches 3.5 psig, after spray is terminated IF directed, initiates Containment Spray again Initiates Emergency Condensers when directed Bypasses ADS Reports RPV water level below -84 inches (TAF)
Opens 3 ERVs CT-1.0 When RPV pressure lowers below 365 psig, recognizes/reports Core Spray IV 40-11 failed to open Attempts to manually open 40-11 Report inability to inject with Core Spray Injects to the RPV with Condensate/Feedwater Booster pumps (N1-EOP-1 Att 25/26)
CT-2.0 Reports RPV water level above -84 inches (TAF)
Restores and maintains RPV water level 53-95 inches Possible N1-EOP-1 Att 25 actions:
WHEN Feedwater Booster HDR PR (PI-51-61A) is greater than RPV pressure, THEN:
Place LVL SETPOINT SETDOWN to OVERRIDE RO/BOP Continued Verify Open, at least one of the
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 3 93 October 2008 Role Play: When directed as NAO to pull fuses FU-8 and FU-9, wait 2 minutes and insert remote:
FW24, REMOVAL OF HPCI FUSES FU8/FU9, FINAL VALUE=PULL TRG 26 Then report that fuses FU-8 and FU-9 have been pulled EVENTS 7, 8 and 9 Continued FEEDWATER ISOLATION VALVES 11 and 12 Verify Open, FEEDWATER PUMP 13 BLOCKING VALVE Select Manual on 13 FWP Valve Control Selector Switch Turn 13 Feedwater FCV (Knurled Knob) clockwise to open Feedwater FCV Position 13 Feedwater FCV as necessary to maintain required level Possible N1-EOP-1 Att 26 actions:
WHEN Feedwater Booster HDR PR (PI-51-61A) is greater than RPV pressure, THEN:
Verify Open at least one of the FEEDWATER ISOLATION VALVES 11 and 12 Verify Open, both FEEDWATER PUMP 11 and 12 BLOCKING VALVES Select Manual on 11 and 12 FWP Valve Control Selector Switch Turn 11 and 12 Feedwater FCV (Knurled Knob) fully counterclockwise Remove the following fuses from Panel IS34 in the Aux Control Room:
FU-8 FU-9 RO/BOP Continued Position 11 and 12 Feedwater FCV as necessary to maintain required level
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 3 94 October 2008 while maintaining less than 1.5 E6 lbm/hr through each feed pump TERMINATING CUE RPV Blowdown in progress RPV water level above -84 inches (TAF) and controlled in assigned band Containment pressure controlled in accordance with N1-EOP-1 Att 17
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 4 October 2008 XI.
POST SCENARIO CRITIQUE C. N/A, NRC Exam XII. REFERENCE EVENTS AND COMMITMENTS E. Reference Events
- 1. None F. Commitments
- 3. None XIII. LESSONS LEARNED A. None
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 4 October 2008 NMP SIMULATOR SCENARIO NRC Scenario 4 REV. 0 No. of Pages: 35 SERVICE WATER STRAINER CLOGGING, FEEDWATER FLOW TRANSMITTER FAILURE, LOW LEVEL IN THE INTAKE STRUCTURE, ATWS WITH A LOCA AND FAILURE OF THE FEEDWATER ISOLATION VALVES CLOSED PREPARER DATE VALIDATED Frank Payne, Kyle James, Bruce Williams DATE 5/18/08 GEN SUPERVISOR OPS TRAINING DATE OPERATIONS MANAGER N/A - Exam Security DATE CONFIGURATION CONTROL N/A - Exam Security DATE SCENARIO
SUMMARY
Length: 90 minutes Initial Power Level:
Approximately 90%, 4 loop operation Mitigating Strategy Code:
AT3, high power ATWS with small LOCA, Blowdown required, re-inject with Core Spray The scenario begins with the crew performing a control rod pattern adjustment. Next, the crew will be directed to return TBCLC Pump 12 to service and secure TBCLC Pump 11. Next the crew must respond to high D/P across one of the Service Water Pump Discharge Strainers. This will require placing another Service Water Pump in service. Once the standby Service Water Pump has been started, Main Steam Line Radiation Monitor 111 will become inoperable. The SRO will determine the Technical Specification implications.
When this is complete, an RPS pressure transmitter will fail low, followed closely by the in-service feedwater system pressure transmitter also failing low. The crew will be required to shift to manual feedwater level control. The crew may then shift reactor pressure/level columns and return to automatic feedwater level control. Technical Specifications must be addressed due to the RPS pressure transmitter failure. Next the intake structure traveling screens clog causing high D/Ps. This will eventually result in a low level in the intake structure with the subsequent tripping of the Circulating Water pumps. This will require entering N1-SOP-18.1, Service Water Failure/Low Intake Level. As intake level continues to lower, the crew will insert a manual scram.
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 4 October 2008 When the scram occurs the control rods will not insert. This ATWS is complicated by the total loss of the normal heat sinks. Additionally, following the ATWS, a Recirculation Line break will cause RPV water level to lower, requiring the crew to re-establish injection. When the crew attempts to re-establish Feedwater flow, the Feedwater isolation valves will not re-open. When it is determined that RPV water level cannot be restored and maintained above -109 inches, the crew will perform an RPV Blowdown, and re-inject with Core Spray.
Major Procedures:
N1-SOP-1.1, N1-SOP-16.1, N1-SOP-18.1, N1-EOP-1, N1-EOP-2, N1-EOP-3, N1-EOP-3.1, N1-EOP-4, N1-EOP-8 EAL Classification:
Site Area Emergency, EAL 2.2.2 Termination Criteria:
RPV Blowdown in progress, RPV water level above -109 inches and controlled in assigned band, containment pressure controlled in accordance with N1-EOP-1 Att 17
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 4 October 2008 I. SIMULATOR SET UP M. IC Number:
IC 174 N. Presets/Function Key Assignments
- 7. Malfunctions:
- m. RR01D, RR PUMP 14 DRIVE BREAKER TRIP PRESET
- n. NM21C, APRM CHANNEL 13 FAILURE - INOP PRESET
- o. CW16A, SW PUMP 11 STRAINER 72-05 CLOGGING, FINAL VALUE=10%
TRG 1
- p. RM1A, MAIN STEAM LINE RAD MONITOR 111 INOP TRG 2
- r. RR92, RX VESL PRES XMTR 36-31 (LOCAL-FW CONTROL)
FAILS, DELAY TIME=15 SEC TRG 3
- s. CW12, CIRCULATING WATER INTAKE STRUCTURE BLOCKAGE (TRASH), FINAL VALUE=20%
TRG 4
- t.
RD33A, CONTROL ROD BANK BLOCKED BANK 1, INSERT FAIL POSITION, FINAL VALUE=12 PRESET
- u. RD33B, CONTROL ROD BANK BLOCKED BANK 2, INSERT FAIL POSITION, FINAL VALUE=12 PRESET
- v. RD33C, CONTROL ROD BANK BLOCKED BANK 3, INSERT FAIL POSITION, FINAL VALUE=18 PRESET
- w. RD33D, CONTROL ROD BANK BLOCKED BANK 4, INSERT FAIL POSITION, FINAL VALUE=12 PRESET
- x. RD33E, CONTROL ROD BANK BLOCKED BANK 5, INSERT FAIL POSITION, FINAL VALUE=12 PRESET
TRG 18
- z. FW24, FEEDWATER 13 FCV FAILS CLOSED TRG 20 aa. FW28A, HPCI MODE FAILURE TO INITIATE 11 TRG 20 bb. FW28B, HPCI MODE FAILURE TO INITIATE 12 TRG 20
- 3. Remotes:
- 3. Overrides:
- a. OVR-5S5DI309 POS_3 1F10/31-03A POS C, FINAL VALUE=INSYS TRG 19
- b. OVR-5S6DI3012 POS_3 1F10/31-03A POS C, FINAL VALUE=INSYS TRG 19
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 4 October 2008
- c. OVR-5A144P1DI354 SET 1F27/ID15B MAN, FINAL VALUE=INSYS TRG 20
- d. OVR-5A144P1DI355 SET 1F27/ID15B AUTO, FINAL VALUE=INSYS TRG 20
- e. OVR-5A144P1AI3100 1F27/ID158 BAL R1, FINAL VALUE=0 TRG 20
- f. OVR-5A145P1DI356 SET 1F28/ID15C MAN, FINAL VALUE=0.00 TRG 20
- g. OVR-5A145P1DI357 SET 1F28/ID15C AUTO, FINAL VALUE=0.00 TRG 20
- h. OVR-5A145P1AI3120 1F28/ID15C BAL R1, FINAL VALUE=0 TRG 20
- i.
OVR-5A300S1DI3123 SET FOX 11 LOW FLOW AUTO SWITCH, TRG 20 FINAL VALUE=0.00
- j.
OVR-5A300S3DI3121 1 FOX 11 LOW FLOW EMER INCREASE, TRG 20 FINAL VALUE=0.00
- k. OVR-5A300S3DI3122 POS_2 FOX 11 FLOW FLOW NORM TRG 20 INCREASE, FINAL VALUE=0.00
- l.
OVR-5A301S1DI31211 SET FOX 12 LOW FLOW AUTO SWITCH, TRG 20 FINAL VALUE=0.00
- n. OVR-5A301S3DI3128 POS_2 FOX 12 LOW FLOW NORM.
TRG 20 INCREASE, FINAL VALUE=0.00
- 4. Annunciators:
- a. H2-1-3, CIRCULATING WATER PUMP INTAKE LEVEL LOW -
ON/OFF, FINAL VALUE=CRYWOLF TRG 4
- 5. Triggers;
- a. TRG 18 - Activates the coolant leak when the mode switch is taken to shutdown
- i.
Event Action: zdrpstdn==1 ii. Command: None
- b. TRG 19 - When both FWIV 11 and 12 green lights are lit, activates the FWIV 11 and 12 control switch OPEN position to off, preventing reopening of the valves
- i.
Event Action: hzlfwisg(1)==1&&hzlfwisg(2)==1 ii. Command: None
- c. TRG 20 - If both FWP 11 and 12 control switches are placed in PTL, activates malfunction to fail FW FCV 13 closed, and activates overrides on FW FCVs 11 and 12 to turn AUTO position off, MAN position on, and give a full close signal; also fails FW Low FCVs
- i.
Event Action: zdfwfpk(1)==1&&zdfwfpk(2)==1
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 4
- 100 -
October 2008 ii. Command: None
- d. TRG 21 - Activates when the RPS jumpers are installed, ARI is overridden and RPS has been reset to allow a manual scram to achieve further inward rod movement
- i.
Event Action: zdrpjb11(5)==1&&hzlrp12g1==1&&zdrrarov==1 ii. Command: bat n08scen4RH1.bat
- 6. Batch Files:
- a. n08scen4RH1.bat - Allows further rod movement using N1-EOP-3.1
- i.
dmf rd33a ii. dmf rd33b iii. dmf rd33c iv. dmf rd33d
- v. dmf rd33e vi. imf rd33a (0 0) 6 vii. imf rd33b (0 0) 6 viii. imf rd33c (0 0) 10 ix. imf rd33d (0 0) 8
- x. imf rd33e (0 0) 8 C. Equipment Out of Service
- 1. APRM 13 bypassed and yellow tagged
- 2. Recirc Pump 14 control switch in PTL and yellow tagged D. Support Documentation
- 1. RMI for control rod pattern adjustment E. Miscellaneous None
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 4
- 101 -
October 2008 II.
SHIFT TURNOVER INFORMATION OFF GOING SHIFT: N
D DATE: Today PART I: To be performed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.
PART II:
To be reviewed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.
- Shift Turnover Checklist (ALL)
- CSO Log (CSO)
- Lit Control Room Annunciators
- Computer Alarm Summary (CSO)
Evolutions/General Information/Equipment Status:
Reactor Power = 90%, 4 loop operation TBCLC pump 12 motor bearing repair complete APRM 13 bypassed due to failed power supply Recirc Pump 14 OOS due to high vibrations PART III:
Remarks/Planned Evolutions:
- 1. Control rod pattern adjustment
- 2. TBCLC pump 12 to be returned to service
- 3. Power ascension to rated PART IV:
To be reviewed/accomplished shortly after assuming the shift:
- Review new Clearances (SM)
- Test Control Annunciators (CRE)
- Shift Crew Composition (SM/CRS)
TITLE NAME TITLE NAME SM CRE/OATC CRS E
STA E
CSO Other
NRC Scenario 4
- 102 -
October 2008 VI. PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES G. Critical Tasks:
CT-1.0 Given a failure of the reactor to scram with power above 6% or unknown and RPV water level above -41 inches, the crew will terminate and prevent all injection except boron and CRD, in accordance with N1-EOP-3.
CT-2.0 Given a failure of the reactor to scram with RPV water level unable to be restored and maintained above -109 inches with Condensate/Feedwater and CRD, the crew will perform an RPV Blowdown and re-establish injection with Core Spray, in accordance with N1-EOP-3.
CT-3.0 Given a LOCA in the Drywell, the crew will initiate Containment Sprays to prevent exceeding PSP, in accordance with N1-EOP-4.
B. Performance Objectives:
PO-1.0 Given the plant at power, the crew will perform a control rod pattern adjustment, in accordance with N1-OP-5.
PO-2.0 Given the plant operating at power, the crew will shift operating TBCLC Pumps, in accordance with N1-OP-24.
PO-3.0 Given the plant operating at power with clogging of the operating Service Water Pump Discharge Strainer, the crew will shift to the alternate Service Water pump and strainer, in accordance with N1-OP-18.
PO-4.0 Given the plant operating at power and a failed Main Steam Line Radiation Monitor, the crew will determine the appropriate Technical Specification actions, in accordance with N1-ARP-F1.
PO-5.0 Given the plant operating at power and a failure of RPV pressure instruments, the crew will diagnose the failures and take manual control of RPV water level to prevent a reactor scram, in accordance with N1-SOP-16.1.
PO-6.0 Given the plant operating at power and lowering intake level, the crew will operate Circulating Water pumps, perform an emergency power reduction and scram the reactor, in accordance with N1-SOP-18.1.
NRC Scenario 4
- 103 -
October 2008 PO-7.0 Given the plant in a condition requiring emergency classification, the SRO shall classify the events properly, complete initial notification forms, and discuss the bases for the classification in accordance with the emergency plan procedure.
PO-8.0 Given the plant or a plant system in a condition requiring Technical Specification action, identify the deviation and any required actions/notifications.
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 4
- 104 -
October 2008 Take the simulator out of freeze before the crew enters for the pre-shift walkdown and briefing Allow no more than 5 minutes to walkdown panels CREW Walkdown panels Conduct shift turnover brief Assume the shift EVENT 1 Control rod pattern adjustment Note: There are no Control Console activities required for this event PO-1.0 Note: Reactivity briefing, procedure review and RMI review should occur prior to scenario start, in secure briefing room SRO Conducts reactivity brief for power restoration (previously performed)
Reviews Reactivity Maneuver Instruction (previously performed)
Directs RO to perform control rod pattern adjustment in accordance with the RMI and N1-OP-5 Provides Reactivity SRO monitoring RO Acknowledges direction from SRO Obtains copy of RMI form Moves control rods in accordance with N1-OP-5 and RMI Reports to SRO when control rod pattern adjustment is complete
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 4
- 105 -
October 2008 EVENT 1 Continued BOP Monitors feedwater controls for proper response FWP 13 FCV responding to power change RPV Water Level remains within program band (65 - 75)
Provides peer checks as required
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 4
- 106 -
October 2008 EVENT 2 Return TBCLC Pump 12 to service and secure TBCLC Pump 11 After performing the control rod pattern adjustment, the crew shifts operating TBCLC pumps per N1-OP-24, Section F.1.0 Note: There are no Control Console activities required for this event PO-2.0 SRO Provide pre-evolution brief Direct BOP to start TBCLC Pump 12 and secure TBCLC Pump 11 IAW N1-OP-24, Section F.1.0 RO Monitor plant parameters Role Play: When contacted as NAO to perform pre-start checks, immediately report pre-start checks are SAT and you are standing by for pump start Role Play: When contacted as NAO for proper pump start, immediately report pump start SAT Role Play: When contacted as NAO for pump venting, wait 1 minute and report the pump has been vented EVENT 2 Continued BOP Acknowledges direction to start TBCLC Pump 12 and secure TBCLC Pump 11 IAW N1-OP-24, Section F.1.0 Obtains and reviews N1-OP-24 Starts TBCLC Pump 12 May direct AO to vent pump through 71-192, as follows:
Uncap AND open 71-192 WHEN venting complete, close AND cap 71-192 BOP Continued
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 4
- 107 -
October 2008 Confirms standby pump is operating correctly by verify stable pump amps and discharge pressure Stops TBCLC Pump 11, then places control switch for TBCLC Pump 11 in AUTO START
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 4
- 108 -
October 2008 EVENT 3 Service Water Pump Discharge Strainer High D/P When directed by the examiner, insert malfunction:
CW16A, SW PUMP 11 STRAINER 72-05 CLOGGING, FINAL VALUE=10%
TRG 1 Expected Annunciator:
H1-3-2, SERVICE WTR P STR 11-12 TRIP-LO VOLT DIFF PRESS PO-3.0 CREW Acknowledge/respond to annunciator H1-3-2, SERVICE WTR P STR 11-12 TRIP-LO VOLT DIFF PRESS SRO Acknowledge report of SW Annunciator Direct entry into ARP for H1-3-2 Acknowledge report that SW strainer BV-72-408, Backwash VLV is open and that D/P is not lowering Determine the alarm cannot be cleared Direct shifting to SWP 12 per N1-OP-18 section F.2.0 Acknowledge report that SWP 12 has been started Acknowledge report of current D/P EVENT 3 Continued RO Monitor plant parameters
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 4
- 109 -
October 2008 Role Play: When directed as NAO to investigate, wait two minutes, then report that Service Water pump 11 Strainer D/P is 10 psid and slowly rising due to a small amount of grass coming in the intake.
Role Play: When directed as NAO to verify strainer backwash valve, 72-408 open, wait one minute, then report that 72-408 is open, backwash is in progress, but it does not appear to be lowering D/P Role Play: When directed as NAO to report on pump start, immediately report that SWP 12 is operating normally Role Play: When requested as NAO after start of Service Water Pump 12, report Service Water Pump 12 Adams Strainer D/P is 3 psid, and report that Service Water Pump 11 Adams Strainer D/P is 9 psid (if still running)
BOP Enter ARP for H1-3-2 Direct an NAO to the Intake area to check the SW Pump Strainer IF strainer D/P is high perform the following:
Confirm BV-72-408, ADAMS STRNR 11 Backwash VLV open Determine the alarm cannot be cleared Start SWP 12 per N1-OP-18, Sect. F.
Place the SERVICE WTR PUMP 12 control switch at H Panel in Start Observe normal motor running current, system flow, and discharge pressure
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 4
- 110 -
October 2008 EVENT 4 Main Steam Line Radiation Monitor 111 Fails Inop When directed by the examiner, insert malfunction:
RM1A, MAIN STEAM LINE RAD MONITOR 111 INOP TRG 2 Expected Annunciator:
F1-2-7, MAIN STEAM RAD MONITOR CH 11 HI/LO PO-4.0 CREW Acknowledge/report Annunciator F1-2-7, MAIN STEAM RAD MONITOR CH 11 HI/LO Diagnose failure of MSL Rad Monitor 111 Role Play: When requested to investigate the MSL rad monitor failure, report that you will begin an immediate investigation SRO Acknowledges report of MSL Rad Monitor Ch 11 alarm Directs execution of ARP for F1-2-7 Acknowledges report that MSL Rad Monitor has failed Notifies WEC and requests investigation of the failure Enters TS Table 3.6.2.h (requires placing channel in the tripped condition within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> or verifying Mechanical Vacuum pump isolated)
Briefs crew on failure of MSL Rad Monitor RO Monitors plant parameters EVENT 4 Continued BOP Executes ARP for F1-2-7
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 4
- 111 -
October 2008 Goes to back panel and determines the other MSL Rad Monitors indicate normal readings Observes downscale light on MSL Rad Monitor Ch 11 and diagnoses the Monitor is INOP Notifies crew that MSL Rad Monitor Ch 11 is INOP EVENT 5 Reactor pressure transmitter failures PO-5.0 CREW
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 4
- 112 -
October 2008 When the TBCLC Pumps are shifted and directed by examiner, insert malfunctions:
RP16B, RPV PT 36-07B FAILED LOW TRG 3 RR92, RX VESL PRES XMTR 36-31 (LOCAL-FW CONTROL) FAILS, DELAY TIME=15 SEC TRG 3 Two RPV pressure instruments indicate downscale Controlling RPV water level instrument indicates lower than actual Feedwater flow rises RPV water level rises Expected Annunciators:
F4-4-2, RPS CH 12 REACTOR PRESS LOW F4-4-7, RPS CH 12 MAIN STEAM ISOLATION AUTO OPERATE F2-3-3, REACT VESSEL LEVEL HIGH-LOW (delayed
>15 sec)
Acknowledge/report Annunciators F4-4-2, RPS CH 12 RX PRESS LOW F4-4-7, RPS CH 12 MS ISO AUTO OPERATE F2-3-3, REACT VESSEL LEVEL HIGH-LOW (Delayed >15 sec)
Diagnose failure of the pressure instruments on the F Panel then diagnose failure of FWLC Pressure/Level Column Note: This event may cause a turbine trip and subsequent reactor scram on high RPV water level if Feedwater flow is not controlled properly. In the event of a scram, the scenario will continue at event 7.
Additionally, in the event of a scram, event 6 malfunctions should be immediately inserted (TRG 4, CW 16 and H2-1-3).
SRO Acknowledge report of pressure transmitter failures Diagnose the relationship between pressure transmitter 36-31 and the FWLCS Acknowledge report of RPV water level rising SRO Continued
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 4
- 113 -
October 2008 EVENT 5 Continued Direct entry into N1-SOP-16.1 for failure of FWLC Directs placing FWLC in Manual Directs Shifting Reactor Pressure/Level Columns IAW N1-OP-16, section F.10.0 Acknowledge report of pressure and level columns shifted Enter T.S. Table 3.6.2.a (o), for pressure transmitter 36-07B (Place RPS Channel 11 in the tripped condition within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />)
Notify WEC/Ops Mgmt Note: Switching level columns may result in Annunciator F2-3-3, REACT VESSEL LEVEL HIGH-LOW, due to circuit interruption.
Note: The same channel of level and pressure should be selected EVENT 5 Continued Monitor plant parameters If directed to shift FWLC pressure/level columns:
Verifies feedwater lineup Verifies BOP has manual control of FWLC Shifts reactor pressure and level columns using the key lock switches on the E Panel Coordinates with BOP to return FWLC to auto:
Places FEEDWATER MASTER CONTROL M/A station mode switch in MAN RO Continued Nulls FWP 13 VALVE CONTROL
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PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 4
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October 2008 by adjusting the FEEDWATER MASTER CONTROL M/A station output with the manual knob until the deviation meter indicates 50% on FWP 13 VALVE CONTROL GEMAC Controls RPV water level with the manual knob at the FEEDWATER MASTER CONTROL LBS/HR controller in MAN mode Nulls FEEDWATER MASTER CONTROL setpoint error by adjusting Thumb/Setpoint tape to align setpoint (orange arrow) directly under automatic setpoint (green band)
Places FEEDWATER MASTER CONTROL M/A station mode switch in AUTO or BAL Confirms system response by adjusting the thumbwheel on FEEDWATER MASTER CONTROL to maintain RPV water level EVENT 5 Continued Enters N1-SOP-16.1 due to failure of FWLC Takes manual control of Feedwater pump 13 FCV BOP Continued Manually restores RPV water level to normal band If directed to shift FWLC pressure/level
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PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 4
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October 2008 Note: Once the FWP 13 VALVE CONTROL M/A STATION mode switch is in BAL, manual FWLC is shifted to the RO at E-panel Role Play: When directed as NAO to check ATS cabinet indication, wait 2 minutes and report that PT 36-07B is downscale with the gross failure light lit columns:
Coordinates with RO to return FWLC to auto:
Places FWP 13 VALVE CONTROL M/A STATION mode switch in BAL Dispatch NAO to investigate indications at ATS Cabinet
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 4
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October 2008 EVENT 6 Intake Structure blockage resulting in loss of the Intake Structure When the SRO has declared the Tech Specs and directed by examiner, insert malfunction and annunciator:
CW12, CIRCULATING WATER INTAKE STRUCTURE BLOCKAGE(TRASH), FINAL VALUE=20%
TRG 4 H2-1-3, CIRCULATING WATER PUMP INTAKE LEVEL LOW, FINAL VALUE=CRYWOLF TRG 4 Circ Water Pumps 11 and 12 amps fluctuate Circ Water Pumps 11 and 12 eventually trip Expected Annunciators:
H2-1-3, CIRCULATING WATER PUMP INTAKE LEVEL LOW H1-4-3, SCREEN WASH PUMP-SCREEN TRIP LOW VOLT DIFF PRESS H1-4-2 R. BUILDING SW PRESS/SERV W. PUMP HDR PRESS PO-6.0 CREW Acknowledge/report annunciators:
H2-1-3, CIRCULATING WATER PUMP INTAKE LEVEL LOW H1-4-3, SCREEN WASH PUMP-SCREEN TRIP LOW VOLT DIFF PRESS H1-4-2 R. BUILDING SW PRESS/SERV W. PUMP HDR PRESS Analyze fluctuating CW Pump amps and diagnose loss of intake structure SRO Acknowledge crew reports Directs execution of ARP for H2-1-3 Directs entry into N1-SOP-18.1 Direct rapid power reduction to reduce load for one Circ Water Pump Determine intake level is NOT being restored Direct a Reactor Scram
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PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 4
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October 2008 EVENT 6 Continued RO Monitor plant parameters Rapidly lower Recirc Flow to lower power for one CW Pump operation When directed to manually scram:
Place Reactor Mode Switch in SHUTDOWN Recognize control rods did NOT fully insert Role Play: When dispatched as NAO to investigate intake level, wait one minute and report that there are some weeds on the traveling screens, level in the intake is approximately 238 and slowly lowering Role Play: When contacted as NAO to give an update on intake level following a power reduction, immediately report that intake level is 237 and still lowering at the same rate as before, and that the traveling screens will not rotate Note: When the plant is scrammed, an ATWS will occur, and subsequent actions in N1-SOP-18.1 may be prioritized BOP Execute ARP for H2-1-3 Dispatch an operator to the screen house to investigate Enter N1-SOP-18.1 Determine problem is with intake bay Trip one Circ Water pump Monitor pumps taking a suction from the Forebay for abnormal operation Request updates from NAO on intake level When directed by the SRO Trip the remaining CW Pump Verify one SW Pump operating Verify one SW Pump secured Perform actions of N1-SOP-1, Reactor Scram Initiate Emergency Condensers Start ESW Pumps Secure SW Pump Close MSIVs
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PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 4
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October 2008 Trip all Recirc Pumps
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PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 4
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October 2008 EVENTS 7 and 8 ATWS and LOCA The following malfunctions are preset to cause an ATWS:
RD33A, CONTROL ROD BANK BLOCKED BANK 1, INSERT FAIL POSITION, FINAL VALUE=12 RD33B, CONTROL ROD BANK BLOCKED BANK 2, INSERT FAIL POSITION, FINAL VALUE=12 RD33C, CONTROL ROD BANK BLOCKED BANK 3, INSERT FAIL POSITION, FINAL VALUE=18 RD33D, CONTROL ROD BANK BLOCKED BANK 4, INSERT FAIL POSITION, FINAL VALUE=12 RD33E, CONTROL ROD BANK BLOCKED BANK 5, INSERT FAIL POSITION, FINAL VALUE=12 Control rods partially insert Reactor power remains > 6%
When the mode switch is taken to shutdown, the following malfunction is automatically inserted:
RR29, RR LOOP RUPTURE (LOCA), DELAY TIME=3 MINUTES, RAMP TIME=4 MINUTES, FINAL VALUE=15%
TRG 18 Drywell leakage, humidity, pressure, and temperature rise EVENTS 7 & 8 Continued Expected Annunciators:
H2-4-7, DRYWELL WATER LEAK DETECTION SYS CREW Diagnose failure of control rods to insert Diagnose degrading primary containment parameters
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PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 4
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October 2008 K2-4-3, DRYWELL PRESSURE HIGH - LOW Note: Further RPV level actions are detailed in Event 9 EVENTS 7 & 8 Continued SRO Acknowledges scram report Enters N1-EOP-2 due to reactor power above 6% when scram required Answers All rods in to at least 04 NO Answers Will the reactor stay shutdown without boron NO Exits N1-EOP-2, enters N1-EOP-3 Directs ADS bypassed Directs prevent Core Spray injection per N1-EOP-1 Att 4 Determines Reactor power is above 6%
and RPV level is above -41 inches Directs terminate and prevent of all injection except boron and CRD, N1-EOP-1 Att 24 CT-1.0 Directs RPV level lowered to at least
-41 inches If an ERV is cycling:
Directs initiation of Emergency Condensers Directs open ERVs to lower RPV pressure to less than 965 psig Directs RPV pressure controlled below 1080 psig using Emergency Condensers and ERVs Monitors Figure M, Heat Capacity Temperature Limit Directs initiation of ARI Answers Turbine Generator on-line?
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PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 4
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October 2008 NO Answers Reactor power? above 6%
Directs Recirc Pumps tripped Directs execution of N1-EOP-3.1 Before torus temperature reaches 110oF:
Records Liquid Poison tank level Directs Liquid Poison injection Acknowledge report that Primary Containment parameters (pressure, temperature, humidity) rising Enters N1-EOP-4 on high drywell pressure, high drywell temperature and/or high torus temperature Directs Containment Spray pumps in PTL When torus pressure exceeds 13 psig or before drywell temperature reaches 300oF:
Verifies inside Figure K, Containment Spray Initiation Limit Verifies that Recirc Pumps are tripped Directs trip of drywell cooling fans Directs initiation of Containment Spray per N1-EOP-1 Att 17 CT-3.0 Monitors Figure L, Pressure Suppression Pressure EVENTS 7 & 8 Continued RO Provides scram report Bypasses Core Spray IV interlocks per N1-EOP-1 Att 4 by installing six jumpers inside Panel N When directed performs N1-EOP-3.1, Section 3 (driving rods) and/or 4 (manual
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PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 4
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October 2008 Note: Control rods will successfully insert using RMCS Note: RO will likely have to fully open the CRD flow control valve and/or close 44-04 in order to achieve rod movement via RMCS; these methods are preferential to closing 44-167 due to ability to perform from the control room and not preventing further scram attempts by blocking the charging water header EVENTS 7 & 8 Continued Note: When the RPS jumpers have been installed, ARI is overridden, and the scram is reset, then TRG 21 will activate. This runs a batch file which deletes the following malfunctions:
scrams) (See actions below)
Reports when APRMs <6%
Reports status of control rod insertion Possible N1-EOP-3.1 Section 3 Actions:
Verify a CRD Pump running Place Reactor Mode Switch in REFUEL Place ARI OVERRIDE switch in OVERRIDE Install RPS jumpers (5, 6, 12, 13)
Reset the scram Insert rods to 00 using EMER ROD IN starting with high power regions of core (use LPRM indications)
If more drive pressure is required, then perform one or more of the following:
Fully open CRD Flow Control Valve (F panel)
Close 44-04, Control Rod Drive Water Cont V (F Panel)
Close 44-167, Charging Water Header Blocking Valve (RB 237)
RO Continued Possible N1-EOP-3.1 Section 4 Actions:
Place ARI OVERRIDE switch in OVERRIDE Install RPS jumpers (5, 6, 12, 13)
Reset the scram Verify open 44-167, Charging Water Header Blocking Valve (RB 237)
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PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 4
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October 2008 RD33A, CONTROL ROD BANK BLOCKED BANK 1
RD33B, CONTROL ROD BANK BLOCKED BANK 2
RD33C, CONTROL ROD BANK BLOCKED BANK 3
RD33D, CONTROL ROD BANK BLOCKED BANK 4
RD33E, CONTROL ROD BANK BLOCKED BANK 5 And inserts malfunctions:
RD33A, CONTROL ROD BANK BLOCKED BANK 1, FINAL VALUE=6 RD33B, CONTROL ROD BANK BLOCKED BANK 2, FINAL VALUE=6 RD33C, CONTROL ROD BANK BLOCKED BANK 3, FINAL VALUE=10 RD33D, CONTROL ROD BANK BLOCKED BANK 4, FINAL VALUE=8 RD33E, CONTROL ROD BANK BLOCKED BANK 5, FINAL VALUE=8 Control rods partially insert When the SDV is drained, then initiate a manual scram EVENTS 7 & 8 Continued BOP Bypasses ADS Terminates and prevents all injection except boron and CRD per N1-EOP-1 Att 24:
CT-1.0
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PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 4
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October 2008 Role Play: When directed as NAO to pull HPCI fuses FU-8 and FU-9, wait one minute and insert remote:
FW24, REMOVAL OF HPCI FUSES FU8/FU9, FINAL VALUE=PULL TRG 25 Then report that HPCI fuses FU-8 and FU-9 have been pulled Note: Further RPV level actions are detailed in Event 9 EVENTS 7 & 8 Continued Closes both FEEDWATER ISOLATION Valves 11 and 12 OR places FEEDWATER Pumps 11 and 12 in PTL Selects Manual on 11, 12 and 13 FWP Valve Control selector switches Closes 11, 12 and 13 Feedwater FCV (Knurled Knob) full counterclockwise Directs NAO to remove fuses FU-8 and FU-9 from Panel IS34 in the Aux Control Room Verifies closed, FEEDWATER PUMP 13 BLOCKING VALVE Verifies in MAN, FWP 11 BYPASS VALVE, AND set to zero output Verifies in MAN, FWP 12 BYPASS VALVE, AND set to zero output Informs SRO when RPV water level reaches -41 inches If any ERV is cycling:
Initiates Emergency Condensers Manually opens ERVs to lower RPV pressure <965 psig BOP Continued Controls RPV pressure below 1080 psig with Emergency Condensers and ERVs Initiates ARI Verifies all Recirc Pumps tripped Initiates Liquid Poison as directed Reports initial tank level Starts Liquid Poison pump 11 or 12 Verifies RWCU isolated
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PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 4
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October 2008 EVENTS 7 & 8 Continued Places Containment Spray pumps in PTL Initiates Containment Spray (N1-EOP-1 Att 17)
Starts Containment Spray Pump 111 or 122 CT-3.0 Starts at least one of the other three Containment Spray Pumps May start Containment Spray Raw Water Pumps as needed for torus cooling Verifies Containment Spray flow Monitors containment pressure and temperature to ensure lowering trend Terminates Containment Sprays when drywell pressure is below 3.5 psig Reports containment spray terminated BOP Continued Monitors DWP and reports if DWP reaches 3.5 psig, after spray is terminated IF directed, initiates Containment Spray again
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PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 4
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October 2008
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PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 4
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October 2008 EVENT 9 Feedwater unavailable for RPV injection If the crew terminates and prevents by closing the FWIVs, then the following overrides will be automatically inserted to prevent re-opening of the valves:
OVR-5S5DI309 POS_3 1F10/31-03A POS C, FINAL VALUE=INSYS OVR-5S6DI3012 POS_3 1F10/31-03A POS C, FINAL VALUE=INSYS TRG 19 If the crew terminates and prevents by placing FW pumps 11 and 12 in PTL, then the following malfunctions and overrides will be automatically inserted to fail all five FW FCVs closed:
FW24, FEEDWATER 13 FCV FAILS CLOSED FW28A, HPCI MODE FAILURE TO INITIATE 11 FW28B, HPCI MODE FAILURE TO INITIATE 12 OVR-5A144P1DI354 SET 1F27/ID15B MAN, FINAL VALUE=INSYS OVR-5A144P1DI355 SET 1F27/ID15B AUTO, FINAL VALUE=INSYS OVR-5A144P1AI3100 1F27/ID158 BAL R1, FINAL VALUE=0 OVR-5A145P1DI356 SET 1F28/ID15C MAN, FINAL VALUE=0.00 OVR-5A145P1DI357 SET 1F28/ID15C AUTO, FINAL VALUE=0.00 OVR-5A145P1AI3120 1F28/ID15C BAL R1, FINAL VALUE=0 CREW Recognizes/reports failure of FWIVs and/or FW FCVs to open
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PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 4
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October 2008 TRG 20 EVENT 9 Continued OVR-5A300S1DI3123 SET FOX 11 LOW FLOW AUTO SWITCH, FINAL VALUE=0.00 OVR-5A300S3DI3121 1 FOX 11 LOW FLOW EMER INCREASE, FINAL VALUE=0.00 OVR-5A300S3DI3122 POS_2 FOX 11 FLOW FLOW NORM INCREASE, FINAL VALUE=0.00 OVR-5A301S1DI31211 SET FOX 12 LOW FLOW AUTO SWITCH, FINAL VALUE=0.00 OVR-5A301S3DI3127 1 FOX 12 LOW FLOW EMER. INCREASE, FINAL VALUE=0.00 OVR-5A301S3DI3128 POS_2 FOX 12 LOW FLOW NORM. INCREASE, FINAL VALUE=0.00 TRG 20 SRO Acknowledges RPV water level below -41 inches If torus temperature is above 110oF, then directs level lowered until:
Power drops below 6%, OR Level drops to -84 inches (TAF)
Records final actual level Directs RPV injection with Condensate/Feedwater and CRD Acknowledge report that Condensate/Feedwater is not available for injection When RPV water level cannot be maintained above -109 inches, enters N1-EOP-8, RPV Blowdown Answers Are all control rods inserted to at least position 04? NO Answers Will the reactor stay shutdown without boron? NO/UNKNOWN Directs terminate and prevent of all RPV injection except boron and CRD Directs Emergency Condensers initiated Answers Torus water level? Above 8 feet Directs open 3 ERVs CT-2.0 Returns to N1-EOP-3 at circle 10 Answers Is any ERV open? YES SRO Continued
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October 2008 EVENT 9 Continued Waits until RPV pressure drops below 288 psig Answers Was level intentionally lowered before you entered N1-EOP-8? YES Returns to circle 9 Directs RPV injection between -109 inches and previous final actual level with Core Spray per N1-EOP-1 Att 4 CT-2.0 Acknowledges report of RPV level restored above -109 inches EVENT 9 Continued RO/BOP Acknowledges direction to re-establish RPV injection with Condensate/Feedwater and CRD Attempts to re-inject with Condensate/Feedwater per N1-EOP-1 Att 24:
Reopens at least one FEEDWATER ISOLATION Valve 11 and / or 12, if closed in step 2.1 OR Restarts FEEDWATER Pumps 11 and/or 12, if shutdown in step 2.1 (if required)
RO/BOP Continued IF RPV level restoration is required using the FEEDWATER System, THEN, Position FEEDWATER FCV
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS NRC Scenario 4
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October 2008 11 and/or 12 to maintain required RPV level Reports Condensate/Feedwater not available for RPV injection Reports RPV water level below -109 inches Re-establishes terminate and prevent lineup per N1-EOP-1 Att 24 as necessary Initiates Emergency Condensers Opens 3 ERVs CT-2.0 Re-establishes RPV injection using Core Spray per N1-EOP-1 Att. 4:
CT-2.0 Installs Core Spray Jumpers Throttles Core Spray Inboard IV(s)
(40-01, 40-09, 40-10, 40-11) as necessary to restore RPV level above -
109" and maintain Core Spray within NPSH limits Reports RPV water level restored above -
109 inches TERMINATION CRITERIA RPV Blowdown in progress RPV water level above -109 inches and being controlled in assigned band Containment pressure controlled in accordance with N1-EOP-1 Att 17
NRC Scenario 4
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October 2008 XIV. POST SCENARIO CRITIQUE D. N/A, NRC Exam XV. REFERENCE EVENTS AND COMMITMENTS G. Reference Events None H. Commitments
- 4. None XVI. LESSONS LEARNED A. None