ML062630474
| ML062630474 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vermont Yankee  |
| Issue date: | 12/31/2002 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Byrdsong A T | |
| References | |
| 50-271-OLA, Entergy-Licensee-4, NUREG-0800, RAS 12254 | |
| Download: ML062630474 (20) | |
Text
DOCKET NUMBER ....
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-0"0*tooo U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION STANDARD REVIEW PLAN IOFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION 14.2.1 GENERIC GUIDELINES FOR EXTENDED POWER UPRATE TESTING' PROGRAMS This Standard Review Plan (SRP) section provides general guidelines for reviewing proposed extended power uprate (EPU) testing programs. This review ensures that the proposed testing program adequately verifies that the plant can be operated safely at the proposed uprated power level.
Power uprates can be classified in three categories. Measurement uncertainty recapture power uprates are less than 2 percent and are achieved by Implementing enhanced techniques for calculating reactor power. Stretch power uprates are typically up-to 7 percent and do not generally Involve major plant modifications. EPUs are greater than stretch power uprates and have been approved for Increases as high as 20 percent.
EPUs usually require significant modifications to major balance-of-plant equipment A power uprate is classified as an EPU based on a combination of the proposed power increase and the plant modifications necessary to support the requested uprate. This SRP applies only to EPU license amendment requests.
REVIEW RESPONSIBILITIES Primary - Equipment and Human Performance Branch (IEHB)
Secondary - Reactor Systems Branch (SRXB)
Plant Systems Branch (SPLB)
Probabilistic Safety Assessment Branch (SPSB)
Materials and Chemical Engineering Branch (EMCB)
Electrical and Instrumentation & Controls Branch (EEIB)
Mechanical & Civil Engineering Branch (EMEB)
DRAFT Rev. 0 - Debember 2002 USNRC STANDARD REVIEW PLAN Standard review plans are prepared for the guidance of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation staff responsible for the made available to the publIc review of applicaUons to construct and operate nuclear power plants. These documents areregulatory aspart of the Commission's policy to Inform the nuclear Industry and the general public of procedures and policies. Standard review plans are not substitutes for regulatory guides or the Commiss~on's regulations andand Content compliance with them Is not required. The standard review plan sections are keyed to the Stndard Format of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants. Not all sections of the Standard Format have a corresponding review plan.
Published standard review plans will be revised periodically, as appropriate, to accommodate comments and to rflect new information and experience.
Comments and suggestions for Improvement will be considered and should be sent to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. Washington, D.C. 20555.
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I. AREAS OF RE.IEW The Equipment and Human Performance Branch coordinates the review of the overall K-I power uprate testing program. Secondary~review branches are responsible for reviewing EPU applications to ensure that the licensee has proposed an EPU testing program that demonstrates that structures, systems, and components (SSCs) will perform satisfactorily in service at the requested Increased plant power level. Secondary review branches will assist IEHB In the review of proposed testing plans and acceptance criteria, as needed.
The review of EPU testing programs should be performed In conjunction with staff reviews of othter aspects of the EPU license amendment request Paperwork Reduction Act Statemement The information collections contained in this NUREG are covered by the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50 which were approved by the Office of Management and Budget, approval number 3150-0011.
Public Protection Notification If a means used to Impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
DRAFT Rev. 0 - December 2002 14.2.1-2
II. , ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA, Extended power uprate test program acceptance criteria are based on meeting the relevant requirements of the following regulations:
Appendix A, "General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants.' to 10 CFR Part 50, establishes In Criterion 1, "Quality Standards and Records,' as it relates to establishing the necessary testing requirements for SSCs Important to safety, such that there Is reasonable assurance that the facility can be operated without undue risk to the health and safety of the public. However, as discussed In Section 2.1.5.6 of LIC-1 00, "Control of Licensing Basis for Operating Reactors," the General Design Criteria (GDC) are not applicable to plants with construction permits Issued before May 21, 1971. Each plant licensed before the GDC were formally adopted was evaluated on a plant-specific basis, determined to be safe, and licensed by the Commission.
S Criterion XI, "Test Control," of Appendix B tol 0 CFR Part 50, as it relates to establishment of a test program to assure that testing required to demonstrate that
. SSCs will perform satisfactorily In service is Identified and performed In accordance with written test procedures which Incorporate the requirements and acceptance limits contained in applicable design documents.
10 CFR 50.90, "Application for Amendment of Ucense or Construction Permit,' as it relates to an application for an amendment following as far as applicable the form
'prescribed for original applications; Section 50.34, "Contents of Applications:
Technical Information," which specifies requirements for the original operating license application, requires that the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) Include plans for preoperational testing and Initial operations.
Technical Rationale This review ensures that the proposed EPU testing program adequately demonstrates that SSCs will perform'satisfactorily at EPU conditions. In particular, the EPU test program provides assurance that (1) iny po~ver-uprate related modifications to the facility have been adequately constructed and implemented; and (2) the facility can be operated at the proposed EPU conditions in accordance with design requirements and In a manner that will not endanger the health and safety of the public.
The following paragraphs describe the technical rationale for application of the above acceptance criteria to the review of EPU test programs:
Criterion I of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50. establishes the necessary testing requirements for SSCs important to safety;, that Is, SSCs that provide reasonable assurance that the facility can be operated without undue risk to the health and safety of the public. Also, SSCs important to safety shall be designed, fabricated, eiected Wind tested to quality standards commensurate with the Importance of the safety fkinatidns to be performed. Where generally recognized codes and standards are used, they shall be ldehtified and evaluated to determine their applicability. Additionally, a'quality assurance program shall be established to ensure that SSCs will satisfactorily perform their safety functions.
1421-3 I qID* w V DRAFT Rev. 0 - December 2002
a.
Application of Criterion 1 of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, to thb EPU test program ensures that the requested power uprate does not invalidate original testing requirements contained in the original licensing basis. This ensures that SSCs continue to meet their original design specifications. Testing is performed, as necessary to provide assurance that SSCs continue to meet their design capabilities. For example, testing could be performed to demonstrate that SSCs functions, as expected, actuate in the Intended time period and produce the expected flow rate within the expected time period. Original quality assurance standards and applicable codes and standards would be satisfied. The quality assurance program ensures proper documentation and traceability that applicable testing was accomplished, and codes and standards satisfied.
Criterion XI of Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50 requires that a test program be established to assure that all testing required to demonstrate that SSCs will perform satisfactorily in service Is Identified and performed In accordance with written test procedures which incorporate the requirements and acceptance limits contained in applicable design documents. The test program requirements Include, as appropriate, proof tests prior to installation, preoperational tests, and operational tests of SSCs. Test procedures are required to Include provisions for assuring that all prerequisites for the given test have been met, that adequate test Instrumentation is available and used, and that the test is performed under suitable environmental conditions. Test results are required to be documented and evaluated to assure that test requirements have been satisfied.
Application of Criterion XI of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, to the EPU test program ensures that SSC capabilities to perform specified functions are not adversely Impacted by Increasing the maximum allowed power level. This also ensures that deficiencies are Identified and corrected, and that testing activities are conducted in a manner which minimizes operational reliance on untested safety functions. This provides a high degree of assurance of SSC and overall plant readiness for safe operation within the bounds of the design and safety analyses, assurance against unexpected or unanalyzed plant behavior, and assurance against eariy safety function failures in service. Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.68, "lnitial Test Programs for Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants," Revision 2, describes the general scope and depth of Initial test programs that the NRC staff found acceptable during the review of original operating license applications. The SSCs subject to initial testing performed safety functions that included fission product containment;, reactivity monitoring and control; reactor safe shutdown (including maintaining safe shutdown); core cooling; accident prevention; and consequence mitigation as specified in the design and credited in safety analyses.
10 CFR 50.90, *Application for Amendment of License or Construction Permit,'
requires that each licensee submitting a license amendment request fully describe the changes desired and follow, as far as practicable, the form prescribed for the original application. Section 50.34, *Contents of Applications: Technical Information,' specifies requirements for the original operating license application.
In particular, 10 CFR 50.34(b)(6)(iii) requires that each application for a license to operate a facility include in the FSAR plans for preoperational testing and initial operations. The Initial test program (which Includes preoperational testing and testing during Initial operation) verifies that SSCs are capable of performing their safety functions as specified in the design and credited in safety analyses.
DRAFT Rev. 0 - December 2002 14.2.1-4
Application of 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.34(b)(6Xiii) to the EPU test program ensures that the licensee submits adequate Information, commitments, and plans demonstrating that operation at the requested higher power level will be within the bounds of the design and safety analyses and that EPU testing activities will be conducted In a sequence and manner which minimizes operational reliance on untested SSCs or safety functions. This also ensures that preoperational and Initial startup testing invalidated by the requested Increase In power level are evaluated and reperformed as necessary to demonstrate safe operation'of the plant.
IlL REVIEW PROCEDURES The purpose of this review Is to ensure that the proposed EPU testing program adequately controls the initial power ascension to the requested EPU power level. The EPU test program shall Include sufficient steady-state and transient performance testing to demonstrate that SSCs will perform satisfactorily at the requested power level. The proposed EPU test program should be based on a systematic review of the Initial plant test program to Identify initial licensing power-ascension testing that may be invalidated by the requested EPU. Additionally, the EPU test program should Include sufficient testing to demonstrate-that-EPU-related -plant modifications have been-adequately Implemented.
A. Comparison of Proposed EPU Test Program to the Initial Plant Test Program
- 1. General Discussion The licensee should provide a comparison of the proposed EPU testing program to the original power-ascension test program performed during initial plant licensing. The scope of this comparison shall Include (1) all power-ascension tests Initially performed at a power level of equal to or greater than 80 percent of the original licensed thermal power level; and (2) Initial power-ascension tests performed at lower power levels Ifthe EPU would invalidate the test results. The licensee shall either reperform initial power-ascension tests within the scope of this comparison or adequately justify proposed deviations.
- 2. Specific Acceptance Criteria Within its associated technical discipline, each secondary branch reviewer will determine if the licensee has adequately Identified the following In the EPU license amendment request:
- All power-ascension tests Initially performed at a power level of equal to or greater than 80 percent of the original licensed thermal power level.
- All Initial power-ascension tests performed at power levels lower than 80 percent of the original licensed thermal power level that would be invalidated by the EPU.
Differences between the proposed EPU power-ascension test program and the portions of the initial power-ascension program included within the scope of this comparison.
14.2.1-5 DRAFT Rev. 0 - December 2002
The reviewer should refer to the plant-specific testing identified in FSAR Chapter 14.2, "Initial Plant Test Program* (or the equivalent FSAR section for non standard format plants), and startup test reports, If available, to verify that the licensee has adequately identified the scope of the initial plant test program. Additionally, Attachment 1, OSteady-State Power Ascension Testing Applicable to Extended Power Uprates," and Attachment 2, "Transient Testing Applicable to Extended Power Uprates,*
.to this SRP section provIde a generic summary of power-ascension tests performed at or near full power.
Ifthe licensee's proposed EPU test program does not include performance of testing originally performed during the Initial plant test program, the reviewer shall ensure that the licensee adequately justifies all differences. The reviewer should refer to Section ill.C, below, for guidance on assessing the adequacy of justifications for proposed differences.
B. Post Modification Testing Requirements for Functions Important to Safety
-rpacted b-EPU-RelatedPlant odifications-. .. ...- ..
- 1. General Discussion EPUs usually require significant modifications to major balance-of-plant equipment, in addition to setpoint and operating parameter changes.
Therefore, within its respective technical area, each secondary review branch will assess if the licensee adequately evaluated the aggregate Impact of EPU plant modifications, setpolnt adjustments, and parameter changes that could adversely Impact the dynamic response of the plant to anticipated initiating events. The objective of this review Is to verify that the licensee has proposed a testing program which demonstrates that EPU-related modifications to the facility have been adequately Implemented.
The reviewer Is not expected to evaluate the specific component- and system-level testing requirements for each plant modification, parameter change, or setpoint adjustment. Based on previous experience, testing required by Technical Specifications and existing 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, quality assurance programs have been adequate to demonstrate individual system or component performance characteristics. Therefore, this review Is intended to ensure that functions Important to safety that rely on the Integrated operation of multiple SSCs following an anticipated operational occurrence are adequately demonstrated prior to extended operation at the requested EPU power level.
- 2. Specific Acceptance Criteria Based on review of the licensee's EPU license amendment request, the reviewer will determine if the licensee has adequately identified the following:
DRAFT Rev. 0 - December 2002 14.2.1-6
plant modifications and setpoint adjustments necessary to support operation at power uprate conditions, and changes In plant operating parameters (such as reactor coolant temperature, pressure, T., reactor pressure, flow, etc.) resulting from operation at EPU conditions.
The reviewer should assess Ifthe licensee adequately Identified functions Important to safety that are affected by EPU-related modifications, setpoint adjustments, and changes In plant operating parameters. In particular, the licensee should have considered the safety Impact of first of-a-kind plant modifications, the introduction of new system dependencies or Interactions, and changes In system response to Initiating events. The review scope can be limited to those functions Important to safety associated with the anticipated operational occurrences described lnAttachment 2 to this SRP, *TransientTesting Applicable to Extended Power Uprates." To assist In this review, Attachment 2 also Includes typical transient testing acceptance criteria
--.-and functions-important tosafety-associated with these anticipated events.
The reviewer should verify that the proposed EPU test program adequately demonstrates each function Important to safety that meets all of the following criteria: (1) Is Impacted by EPU-related modifications, (2) is required to mitigate a plant transient listed In Attachment 2, and (3)
Involves the Integrated response of multiple SSCs. If a function Important to safety cannot be adequately tested by overlapping Individual component- or system-level tests, the licensee should propose suitable system functional testing.
C. Use of Evaluation To Justify Elimination of Power-Ascension Tests
- 1. General Discussion
- " In certain cases, the licensee may propose an EPU test program that does not Include all of the power-ascension testing that would normally be required by the review criteria of Sections IIlA and III.B above. The licensed Mhail provide an adequate justification for each of these normally required power-ascension tests that are not Included In the EPU test program. For each proposed test exception within its technical area, each secondary review branch will verify (he adequacy of the licensee's
- justification:.
- 2. - S*ecific AcceDtance Criteria If the licensee proposes to not perform a power-ascension test that would normally be required by the review criteria contained In Sections III.A and Ill.B, above, the reviewer should ensure that the licensee provides an adequate justification. The proposed EPU test program shall be sufficient to adequately demonstrate that SSCs will perform satisfactorily in service. The reviewer should consider the following factors when assessing the adequacy of the licensee's Justification:
14.2.1-7 - DRAFT Rev. 0 - December 2002
a.
- a. Previous Operatinq Experience Ifthe licensee proposes not to perform a required transient test based on operating experience, a review should be conducted to determine the applicability of the operating experience to the specific plant configuration and test requirements. If the licensee references industry operating experience, the reviewer should consider similarity Inplant design and equipment; operating power level; and operating and emergency operating procedures.
- b. Introduction of New Thermal-Hydraulic Phenomena or Identified System Interactions The reviewer should ensure that the licensee adequately addressed the effects of any new thermal-hydraulic phenomena or system Interactions that may be introduced as a result of the EPU.
C- Fcility Conformance to Limitations Associated With Analtcal Analysis Methods The licensee's justification for not performing specific power ascension testing should Include consideration of the facility conformance to limitations associated with analytical analysis methods. These limitations may include, but are not limited to, plant operating parameters, system configuration, and power level.
- d. Plant Staff Familiarization With Facility Operation and Trial Use of Operating and Emergency Operating Procedures Plant modifications and parameter changes, in conjunction with increased decay heat generation associated with higher power operation, can impact the execution of abnormal and emergency operating procedures. For example, the EPU may change the timing and sequence of significant operator actions used In abnormal and emergency operating procedures, or could Impact accident mitigation strategies In abnormal or emergency operating procedures.
For each EPU license amendment request, IEHB reviews the impact of the requested power uprate on operator training and human factors Inaccordance with separate EPU review standard guidance. These reviews Include an evaluation of the changes in operator actions, procedures, and training (including necessary changes to the control room simulator) resulting from the EPU.
Although the initial power-ascension test program objectives, as described In Reference 8, included plant staff familiarization with facility operation and trial use of plant abnormal and emergency operating procedures, the EPU review standard adequately addresses the operator training and human factors aspects of the EPU. Therefore, it is not expected that power-ascension testing DRAFT Rev. 0 - December 2002 14.2.1-8
would normally be required for the purposes of procedure verification or operator familiarization.
- e. Margin Reduction In Safety Analysis Results for Anticipated Onerational Occurrences The licensee's justification for not performing a particular power ascension test should include a consideration of the change In the associated safety analysis results due to the proposed EPU. To aid in this review, the Information provided in Attachment 2 to this SRP section Includes a reference to the safety analysis SRP sections related to each transient test, If applicable. For safety analysis acceptance criteria that can be quantitatively measured (e.g. peak reactor coolant system pressure), a reduction In available rnargin by less than approximately 10 percent would normally be considered to be a minimal change in consequences.
The available margin is the difference between the standard review plan accident analysis acceptance criterion of Interest and
- --the-plant-specific-value calculated at EPU conditions. For larger reductions In available margin, the licensee may consider such factors as the amount of remaining margin; the sensitivity of the results to changes In analysis assumptions; and the capability of transient testing to provide useful confirmatory data.
Although the Initial power-ascension test program objectives, as described in Reference 8, Included validation of analytical models and verification of assumptions used for predicting plant response to anticipated transients and postulated accidents, transient testing Is not required for the purposes of analytical code validation for EPU license amendment reviews. The applicability and validation of accident analysis analytical codes Is reviewed by the staff In accordance with separate EPU review standard guidance.
- f. Guidance Contained In Vendor Topical Reports The NRC previously reviewed and accepted General Electric (GE)
Company Ucensing Topical Report, 'Generic Guidelines for General Electric Boiling Water Reactor Extended Power Uprate' (referred to as ELTR-1), NEDC-32424P-A, Class III, February 1999, as anlacceptable basis for BWR EPU amendment requests. This topical report provided specific guidance for the performance of Integrated system transient testing at EPU conditions. As described In Section 5.11.9.d and Appendix L2.4
- " of ELTR-1, the generator load rejection and the main steam isolation valve (MSIV) tests Verify that the plant performance Is as predicted and projected from previous test data.
For PWRs, Westinghouse Report WCAP-10263, *A Review Plan for Uprating the Ucensed Power of a Pressurized Water Reactor Plant," provides limited guidance for power uprate testing.
Specifically, the document states that the recommended test 14.1-9 DRAFT Rev 0 - December2002
program for the nuclear steam supply system and Interfacing balance-of-plant systems be developed on a plant-specific basis depending on the magnitude of hardware modifications and the magnitude of the power uprate.
Although the NRC has previously approved certain exceptions to power-ascension testing requirements, the reviewer should assess the licensee's proposed justifications on a plant-specific basis.
- g. Risk Implications For cases where the licensee proposes a risk-Informed basis for not performing certain transient tests, SPSB should be consulted to assist in the review. Risk-informed justifications for not performing transient tests should be carefully weighed against the potential benefits of performing the testing. In addition to the risks inherent in initiating a plant transient, the review should also
oslder-the-benefit-ofldentifylng-potential latent-equipment deficiencies or other plant problems under controlled circumstances during transient testing. In any case, a risk Informed justification should not be used as the sole basis for not performing transient testing.
If the licensee provides adequate justification for not performing certain power-ascension tests, the staff may conclude that the EPU test program Is acceptable without the performance of these tests.
D. Evaluate the Adequacy of Proposed Transient Testing Plans
- 1. General Discussion The EPU amendment request should Include plans for the initial approach to the increased EPU power level and steady-state testing that will be used to verify that the reactor plant operates within design parameters.
- 2. Specific Acceptance Criteria For each EPU power-ascension test proposed by the licensee to demonstrate that the plant can be safely operated at EPU conditions, the staff will review the test objectives, summary of prerequisites and test methods, and specific acceptance criteria for each test to establish that the functional adequacy of SSCs is verified. This review assures that the test objectives, test methods, and the acceptance criteria are acceptable and consistent with the licensing basis for the facility.
Each secondary review branch will review the licensee's plans for the EPU test program within its respective technical area. The licensee's EPU test program should include the following:
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The Initial approach to the uprated EPU power level should be performed In an Incremental manner and Include steady-state power hold points to evaluate plant performance above the original full-power level. -
" The licensee should propose appropriate testing and acceptance criteria that ensure that the plant responds within design predictions. The predicted responses should be developed using real or expected values of Items such as beginning-of-life core reactivity coefficients, flowrates, pressures, temperatures, and response times of equipment and the actual status of the plant, and not the values or plant conditions used for conservative evaluations of postulated accidents.
" Contingency plans should be Implemented Ifthe predicted plant response Is not obtained.
" The test program should be scheduled and sequenced to
--minimizethe time untested functions Important to safety are relied upon during operation above the original licensed full-power level.
Safety-related functions relied upon during operation shall be verified to be operable in accordance with existing Technical Specification and Quality Assurance Program requirements.
To assist this review, Attachments I and 2 to this SRP section provide a generic listing of full power steady-state and transient tests and related acceptance criteria that are potentially applicable to an EPU test program.
If a power-ascension test is required to demonstrate that the plant can be
-. o[oerated safely at EPU conditions, the reviewer shall determine If a license condition should be Imposed to ensure that this testing Is performed in a timely and controlled manner.
IV. EVALUATION FINDINGS When the review of the Information In the EPU amendment application is complete and the reviewer has determined that it is satisfactory and in accordance with the acceptance criteria In Section II above, a statement similar to the following should be provided In the staffs Safety Evaluation Report (SER):
"The staff has reviewed the EPU test program Information provided In the license amendment request in accordance with'This SRP Section 14.2.1 and relevant guidance provided in the EPU Review Standard. review Included an evaluation of (1) plans for the initial approach to the proposed maximum licensed thermal power level, Including verification of adequate plant performance, (2) transient testing requirements necessary to demonstrate that the plant can be operated safely at the proposed Increased
-maximum licensed thermal power level, and (3) the test program's conformance with applicable regulations. The staff finds that there Is reasonable assurance that the applicant's EPU testing program-satisfies the requirements of Criterion XI, Test Control,'of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, and is therefore acceptable."
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V. IMPLEMENTATiON This SRP section will be used by the staff when performing safety evaluations of EPU license amendment applications submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90. This SRP is not intended to be used in place of plant-specific licensing bases to assess the acceptability of an EPU application. Applicability of this SRP is determined on a plant-specific basis consistent with the licensing basis of the plant In addition, where the NRC has approved a specific methodology (e.g., topical report) for the type of power uprate being requested, licensees should follow the format prescribed for that specific methodology and provide the Information called for In that.
methodology and the NRC's letter and safety evaluation approving the methodology.
Except in those cases in which the applicant proposes an acceptable alternative method for complying with specified portions of the Commission's regulations, the method described herein will be used by the staff In Its evaluation of conformance with Commission regulations.
VI. REFERENCES
- 1. 10 CFR Part 52, §52.47 "Contents of Applications.7
- 2. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, "Test Control."
- 3. NUREG-1503, "Final Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Certification of the Advanced Boiling Water Reactor," Volumes I and 2, July 1994.
- 4. SECY-01-0124. "Power Uprate Application Reviews," dated July 9, 2001. The related Staff Requirements Memorandum Is dated May 24, 2001.
- 5. General Electric Company Ucensing Topical Report, "Generic Guidelines for General Electric Boiling Water Reactor Extended Power Uprate" (ELTR-1), NEDC-32424P-A, Class III, February 1999.
- 6. General Electric Company Ucensing Topical Report, "Generic Evaluations of General Electric Boiling Water Reactor Extended Power Uprate," (ELTR-2), NEDC-32523P-A, Class III, February 2000, and Supplement 1, Volumes I and II.
- 7. General Electric Company Ucensing Topical Report, "Constant Pressure Power Uprate,"
NEDC-33004P, Revision 1, July 2001.
- 8. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.68, "Initial Test Programs for Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants," Revision 2, August 1978.
- 12. Westinghouse WCAP-10263, "A Review Plan for Uprating the Licensed Power of a Pressurized Water Reactor Power Plant," January 1983.
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.13. NRC Inspection Manual, Part 9900."'10 CFR Part 50.59, Changes, Tests and Experiments," Change Notice Number 01-008.
- 14. NRC Information Notice 2002-26, "Failure of Steam Dryer Cover Plate After a Recent Power Uprate,' September 11, 2002.
14.2.1-13 DRAFT Rev. 0 - December 2002
Steady-State Power Ascension TestIna AwIllcable to Extended Power Uprates Power Ascensio Test Referece Recommended Initlal Conditons Typical Test Aceptac Criteda PdimayTechnalm Review Branch Conduct vibration testing Regulatory Guide (RG) 168. lowest practical power level reactor vessel and reactor coolant syspen EMEB and monmorng of reactor App A componnt vibrtion chaae*istics within design vessel nternals an racr 4.*. 5.9 See NRC Information Notice 2002-26 and RG 120 coolant system components Measure power reactivity RG 168, App A 100% of RTP characteristics h *nce with design SRXB coefrcients (PWR) or *.*power vs flow charaderstics (DWR) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Steady-state core RO 168. App A 100% of RTP cteractemsi iniaccordance with design SRXB performance 5b Control rod pattems RG 168. App A powe eual to highest power level that rod Coe lIit not exceeded SRXB exchange So exchanges wil be aslowed at power Control rod mnsalgnment RG 168. App A 100% of RTP demonstrate ability to detedtmisalignment SRXB testing 51 rod misalignment equal to or less than TS limits________________________
Failed fuel detection system RG 168. App A 100% of RTP verify prop Operation IEHB 5q Plant process computer RG 1.68. App A 100% of RTP inputs and calculation ae correct SPLBIEEIB 5r Calibrate major or principal RG 1.68, App A 100% of RTP verify peformance SRXB/SPLB plant control systems 5.s Main steam and main RG 1.68. Ap A 100% of RTP operate inaccordance with design performance SPLB feedwater system operatton 5v requtements Shield and penetration RG 168. App A 100% of RTP maintain temperature within design limits SPLB Cooling systoms S.w ESF auxiliry and RG 1.66, App A 100% of RTP capable of perfornmig design functions SPUO envonmental systems 5x Calibrate systems used to RG 168, App A 100% of RTP verily performance EElB determine reactor thermal 5y power Chemical end radlochernical RG 168, App A 100% of RTP conrmsystems function In accordance with design IEHB control systems 5.a.a Sample reactor coolant RG 168. AppA 100% of RTP chemistry limits we not exceeded EMC8 system and secondary S.a.a coolant systems DRAFT Rev. 0 - December 2002 14.2.1-14 ATTACHMENT I K
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Pow~er Asenslon Ted Refeen)e ReoMme d Wa Cond(oNS Typcal Test Aoceptamc Oltefla PmtmeTednlat ReslVw aMnct.
Radiaton surieys RG 168.,Ap A 100% of RTrP sheldfng adequacy end Ident"Y 10 CFR Part20 Sbb hgh-rwebon zones Venotan systems RG 168. AppA 100% of RTP rntan senice aoses wtloin dlpnlt SF (lnldkngprmamy 4J]ndSff contalnmem and steam One Accepteby of reactor RO I 68.APPA Lowest pcil powMr v p meters wthn desIgn Yalue EMS Intemala. tpmg. and 1 e, ind 5oo 1.a.1, I-3.
wonbonent movements vlbrmlom, end exenlons I I DRAFT Rev. 0 - December 2002 14.2.1-15 ATTACHMENT I
Transient Testina Annplcable to Extended Power Uprates Transient Test Reference Typical Reactor Plant Initial Typical Transient Test Acceptance Cnteda and Applicable Accident Analyses Conditions Associated Functions Important to Safety (SRP Section)
Relef valve testing RO 168, AppA Reactor power isvel at pedetermined Relief valve rating at a specified pressure setting 15.1.2 Inadvertent Opening of a 4pandt power level plateaus Stem Generator Rowif or Delay time between the signal Initting roee valve opening and safety Valve Inspection AN relie vatvesset In auto the start of moton Procedure (IP) .156.1 Inadvertent Opening of a PWR 72510 Individu valve functimal tests at Opening stoe lime of the main valve di and distance Pressurizer Pressure Rebel prescribed power level plateaus Valve or a BWR Pressure Closing stroke t1me of tOe main valve piston following release of Rebel Valve Individual valve capacity tests at low power the pneumatlcaly operated medcanical push rod (25% of RTP) using bypass valve movement or turbine generator otp as a niessuremnt variable Dynamic response of plant Rg 168. App A 100% of RTP Performance Inaccordance with design to design load swings 5,hJ1 Reactor corn Isolation IP 72512 Steady.state reacto operabons at rated Startup from hot standby conditions and discharge of rated flow cooling functional test temperature and pressure into the reactor vessel at rated pressure end temperature within aespecified time RCIC aligned for standby operation Venfication o maxlmum rated flow Isolation trip Reactor power at apprommatly 25% of RTP Verification of overspeed tr Turbine gland seal condenser system shall prevent steam leak to atmosphere Dynamic response or plant RG 166, App A 100% of RTP Performance In accordance with desIl 165 3 1 (BWR) & 153 2 (PWR) to limiting reactor coolant 511 pump trips or closure of Trip from steady-state power operation Instrumentaion Is adjusled to provide an accurate conversion of Loss of Forced Reactor reactor coolant system flow IP 72512 individual jet pump Ap values to a summed core flow over the Coolant Flow Including Trip of control valves Recording of translents following trip and range of two-p operations Pump Motor during pump restart (Reactor coolant Reclrcrlatlon pump Instrumentation Is cabrated recircutatlon pump trip test) Recoeding of knlting heat transfer parameerM Loop flow from single-tap and double-tap pumnp agrees within 3%
Return to two-pump operation In accord with fackly operating procedures Core flow from single-tap and doublt pumps agrees within 2%
Trip of a single pump and of both pumps simultaneously. individual jet pump flow variation from average pump flow Is imited Dynamic response of Mhe RG 1.6k App A 90% of RTP performance In accordance with design 15.1.1 Decrease In Feedwater plant to loss of feedwater 5kk Temperature heaters that results In most severe feedwater temperature reduction DRAFT Rev. 0 - December 2002 14.2.1-16 ATTACHMENT 2
(
C ( C Transient Test Reference Typical Reactor Plant Initial Typical Transient Test Acceptance Criteria and Applicable Accident Arnlyses Conditions Associated Functions Important to Safety (BRP Section)
Oynamn response of pant RG 168, Appen plant perfornnce In accorne ewlh d*e*s 152.7 Ls of Nomal Feedwer tolos offeeedwat flow Asetlon5 Flow Dynanrlaspmes ofpladnt 1.08, AppA 100% of RTPih ellath ytem a"gned Performaence Inaomance wilh design' kwkW 15.2.6 Loss of Noneimeenicy AC for full bod rejection 5nn for on fullower operation anWdloed Power to the Statlon rejectio method id u t tuhe to Auto(mxt transer of pimt toads a desi .auto smr of Auxmllarl (Loss of Offme Power IP72517 ma i redbleeverspeedom condmilo doeselgertos m utomaoif load of dsl ee tors h heo Tesln) apcla sqec Test)IP 72582. sleady-stalari- operatin YAMi greeter KM q than 10% genrator Output QP 72517 & Reactor pressure. 1m1ins below the f't safetyvae setlg 72582). Pressurer e vlves donot lt rp Of lhe pa wthbesere hiseed All safy tms auch as RPS. HPCI. diesel generators and posfti so that plant lads WIN be RlC functlonwithoutomanul assista tramnfred d1ty to the diseel generators foiwrglose of house powe Normal reactor costng systemsahould. nisita adequate core trmperars.adpen actua*lm o* t*e Automa racrcltiomn aystemn flow Contbmodle Depressrlzton"Systen homwever slected rele Volvos may speclled fnconlao control press*e Turb*ne bypess ystemotmate to mWn speced pleassme Steasysm powereduetd pressure ref vaves openad dos at speelfd Value Presurze spray valve oce and dlose at specified Velues.
Reactor coolaM temperaturelpassum relaonhip rwemns wthn rWesrbed values Pressurizer level IsmlIntaned wllfn prescried pi Steam generator level rembam wWM prescribed Plimt DRAFT Rev. 0 - December 2002 14.2.1-17 ATTACHMENT 2
Transient Test Reference Typical Reactor Plant Initial Typical Transient Test Acceptance Criteria and Applicable Accident Analyses Conditions Associated Functions Important to Safety (SRP Section)
Dynamic response of plant RG 168. App A trip from steady astt operaton at greater Performance In accordance with desIgn Including 152.1 Turbine Trip to turbine trip 511 thn 9S% of RTP reactor coolant pumps do not trp (Turbine trip or generator IP 72580 initiation of the test by trip of the main trip) IP 72514 generator output breaker apray valve opens and doses at the specified values reckciiation system flow control mode must reactor pressure remalns below the selpoint of the first fey be spectied valves, prmmzer safely valves do not tit or weep pressmurer level witin -r b W stem system powe actuated pressure ref valve opens and closes at specifled values reactor coolant pressuredtemperature relationshlp remains within defined values steam generator level renains wdhn prescribed limvts, no floodhing of the steam tunes during the trnsint, no initiation of ECCS and MSIV Isolation during the transilent turbine bypass system operates to maintain specific pressure (plae with 100% bypass capability sham remain at power without scram during the tmnserit) plants with select-rod-nseion shall maotria power wtomut scram from redrculatlon pump ovempeed or cold feedwater effect reactor protection aystem functions should be venred all safely and ECCS systems such as RPS. HPCI, diesel generators, and RCIC function without manual assistance d caged upon normal reactor cooling systems should maintain adequate cooing and prevent actustion of automatic depsurization system, even though re*ef valves may fumction to control priessu plant electrical loads (transferred as designed) turbine overspeed cniteria met Dynamic response of plant RG 168. App A Initial power level of 100% of RTP performance ataccordance with design 15.2A Main Steam Isolation Valve tosuomatc dolure of alt 5 m.m Closure (BWR) main steam isolation valves acceptance critera MSIV closing time IP 72510 DRAFT Rev. 0 - December 2002 14.2.1-18 ATTACHMENT 2
NRC FqRM 835 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 1. REPORT NUMBER (Aaslgme by NRC.AM VOL, Sum Rev.
32CUIm . BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET 2 7UE AND SUBTITL.E NIJREG-0800 NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan 3 DATE REPORT PUBJJSHED 142.1, Generic Guidelines For Extended Power Uprate Testing Programs WN7T YW.M December 2002
- 4. FIN OR GRANT NUMBER SL14ORCS) .TYPE OF REPORT Robert Pettis Kevin Coyne Paid Prescott 7. PEFIOD COVERED OvA.,w-- as L PERFORMING ORGANIZATION - NAME AND ADDRESS /VARapmvDWunfcaTcaRli.wp US Maw.*¢ huhb7C-undmVaw ashaw*isrlwc.
Division of Inspection Program Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington. DC 20555-0001 arkmer as abo Same as above
- 10. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 11.AO5TRAC~rp~mswo Ths Standard Review Plan (SRP) section provides general guidelines for reviewi ng proposed extended power uprate (EPU) testing programs. This review ensures that the proposed testing program adequa tely verifies that the plant can be operated safely at the proposed uprated power Ievel
- 12. KEY WORDS'DESCRIPTORS o PorivasesNut @assust*weumheis -* gr, rw ip~rt) 12 AVA.'L.BTY 5AI1EUrNT Extended Power Uprate, EPU, testing, test program, power ascension testing, tra nslent testing unrnifted 4r4 ~; 14 SECIMRTY CL4$SSCF=MN unclassified unclassified 15 NUMBER OF PAGES 1S PRICE IFOIW
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