Information Notice 2006-14, Potentially Defective External Lead-Wire Connections in Barton Pressure Transmitters
ML062490133 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Issue date: | 09/25/2006 |
From: | Ho Nieh NRC/NRR/ADRA/DPR |
To: | |
Beaulieu, David, NRR/DLPM, 415-3243 | |
References | |
IN-06-014, Suppl 1 | |
Download: ML062490133 (5) | |
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 September 25, 2006 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2006-14, SUPPLEMENT 1: POTENTIALLY DEFECTIVE
EXTERNAL LEAD-WIRE
CONNECTIONS IN BARTON
PRESSURE TRANSMITTERS
ADDRESSEES
All holders of operating licenses for nuclear power reactors, except those who have
permanently ceased operations and have certified that fuel has been permanently removed
from the reactor.
PURPOSE
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this supplement to Information
Notice (IN) 2006-14, Potentially Defective External Lead-Wire Connections in Barton Pressure
Transmitters, to provide additional information regarding Barton 763 and 763A gauge pressure
transmitters and Barton 764 differential pressure transmitters supplied by PRIME Measurement
Instruments, LLC, (PRIME - previously known as Barton and ITT-Barton) and Westinghouse
Electric Company, LLC, Reactor Systems and Services (Westinghouse). Specifically, subsequent to the issuance of IN 2006-14, NRC staff inspections found that neither PRIME nor
Westinghouse could provide documentation to indicate that Barton 763, 763A, and 764 pressure transmitters manufactured after May 1982 had been demonstrated to be
environmentally qualified. It is expected that addressees of this notice will review the
information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid
similar problems. However, suggestions contained in this information notice are not NRC
requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required.
DESCRIPTION OF CIRCUMSTANCES
IN 2006-14 discussed a defect in the Barton Models 763, 763A and 764 pressure transmitter
connector assemblies in which the external lead wires could be stressed in such a way as to
pull the insulation (which covered the external lead wires) out of the epoxy potting material and
expose the bare conductor. IN 2006-14 also addressed the manufacturers recommendation
for mechanically testing the external lead wires to determine whether they were susceptible to
this failure.
Prior to May 1982, the pressure transmitter connector external lead wires were individually
covered with Polyolefin heat-shrink sleeving which encompassed the solder joints of the
external lead wires and extended outside the case for about two inches before the external
cavity was filled with epoxy potting material (for approximately six months in early 1982, the
Polyolefin heat-shrink sleeving was replaced with Kynar heat-shrink sleeving).
IN 2006-14, Sup 1 The connector configuration using the Polyolefin heat-shrink sleeving was environmentally
qualified by PRIME using a loss-of-coolant accident and high-energy line break simulation
(performed at the Westinghouse testing facility). The connector configuration using Kynar
heat-shrink sleeving was identical to the tested configuration except for the use of Kynar
heat-shrink sleeving (a material demonstrated to have harsh-environment durability) in lieu of
Polyolefin heat-shrink sleeving. This design, with Kynar heat-shrink sleeving, was
environmentally qualified by the use of applicable material qualification data and similarity
analysis. Westinghouse performed a separate environmental qualification to support the supply
of qualified pressure transmitters to Westinghouse customers.
Subsequent to May 1982, all the connector assemblies for Barton Models 763, 763A and 764 pressure transmitters were manufactured without heat-shrink sleeving over the individual
external lead wires extending into the epoxy potting material.
The NRC staff performed an inspection of PRIME in July 2006 and determined that the most
recent PRIME environmental qualification for Barton Models 763, 763A and 764 pressure
transmitters was performed for the pre-May 1982 connector design with Polyolefin heat-shrink
sleeving over the individual external lead wires extending into the epoxy potting material. The
NRC staff found that PRIME was unable to provide documentation to demonstrate that the
post-May 1982 connector design, which does not have heat-shrink sleeving over the individual
external lead wires extending into the epoxy potting material, is environmentally qualified. The
environmental qualification of electrical equipment is described in NRC Regulatory Guide 1.89, Environmental Qualification of Certain Electric Equipment Important to Safety for Nuclear
Power Plants, the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc., (IEEE) Standard
323-1974, IEEE Standard for Qualifying Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating
Stations, IEEE Standard 344-1975, IEEE Recommended Practice for Seismic Qualification of
Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations, and other applicable industry
standards.
The NRC staff also performed an inspection of Westinghouse in August 2006 and determined
that Westinghouse had performed a separate environmental qualification of the pre-May 1982 design of the Barton 763, 763A, and 764 pressure transmitters and did not take credit for the
environmental qualification activities performed by PRIME. Westinghouse supplied its
customers with Barton pressure transmitters, manufactured by PRIME to Westinghouse
specifications, in accordance with the Westinghouse environmental qualification, and shipped
with a Westinghouse Certificate of Qualification. The NRC staff found that Westinghouse was
unable to provide documentation to demonstrate that the post-May 1982 connector design of
the Barton 763, 763A, and 764 pressure transmitters, which does not have heat-shrink sleeving
over the individual external lead wires extending into the epoxy material, is environmentally
qualified.
DISCUSSION
Based on the above information, the NRC staff found that neither PRIME nor Westinghouse
(which performed separate environmental qualification of the pressure transmitters) could
provide documentation to indicate that Barton 763, 763A, and 764 pressure transmitters
manufactured after May 1982 and which do not have heat shrink sleeving over the external
lead wires extending into the epoxy material, had been demonstrated to be environmentally
IN 2006-14, Sup 1 qualified, as required by Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Section 50.49, Environmental Qualification of Electric Equipment Important to Safety for Nuclear Power
Plants. It should be noted that the issue concerning environmental qualification does not apply
to pressure transmitter connectors supplied by PRIME or Westinghouse which were
manufactured prior to May 1982, with heat-shrink sleeving over the individual external lead
wires extending into the epoxy material. It should also be noted that transmitters manufactured
prior to May 1982 may have had the connector assemblies replaced with the post-May 1982 design either in the field or at PRIME during maintenance or repair activities.
NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2005-20, Revision to Guidance Formerly Contained in NRC
Generic Letter 91-18, Information to Licensees Regarding Two NRC Inspection Manual
Sections on Resolution of Degraded and Nonconforming Conditions and on Operability, and
NRC Inspection Manual Part 9900 Technical Guidance, Operability Determinations &
Functionality Assessments for Resolution of Degraded or Nonconforming Conditions Adverse to
Quality or Safety, provides guidance on nonconforming conditions related to environmental
qualification (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System, Accession No.
ML052700274). Further, NRC Generic Letter 88-07, Modified Enforcement Policy Relating to
10 CFR 50.49, Environmental Qualification of Electrical Equipment Important to Safety For
Nuclear Power Plants, provides guidance regarding the application of 10 CFR 50.49.
CONTACT
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Please direct any
questions about this matter to one of the technical contacts listed below.
/RA by John Lubinski for/
Ho K. Nieh, Acting Director
Division of Policy and Rulemaking
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical Contacts: Bill Rogers, NRR/DE Kamalakar Naidu, NRR/DE
301-415-2945 301-415-2980
E-mail: bhr@nrc.gov E-mail: krn@nrc.gov
Hukam Garg NRR/DE Stephen Alexander, NRR/DR
301-415-2929 301-415-2995 E-mail: hcg@nrc.gov E-mail: sda@nrc.gov
ML062490133 OFFICE DE:EQ TECH EDITOR DE:EIC BC:EQV DD:DE D:DE
NAME BRogers HChang AHowe HHamze GImbro MMayfield
DATE 9/1/06 9/13/06 9/1/06 9/1/06 9/1/06 9/1/06 OFFICE DORL: DIRS:O LA:PGCB:DPR PGCB:DPR BC:PGCB:DPR (A)D:DPR
NAME DTerao MJRoss CHawes DBeaulieu CJackson Jlubinski for
HNieh
DATE 9/1/06 9/5/06 9/20/06 9/13/06 9/20/06 9/25/06
COVER PAGE
DATE: September 26, 2006 DOCUMENT NAME: ADAMS Accession #: 062490133 SUBJECT: NRC IN 2006-14, Supp 1: Potentially Defective External Lead-wire Connection in Barton
Pressure Transmitters
CONTACT
- Bill Rogers, 301-415-2945
!!! ROUTING LIST !!!
NAME DATE
1. B. Rogers 9/1/06
2. Tech Editor 9/13/06
3. A. Howe 9/1/06
4. H. Hamze 9/1/06
5. G. Imbro 9/1/06
6. M. Mayfield 9/1/06
7. D. Terao 9/1/06
8. MJ. Ross 9/5/06
9. C. Hawes 9/20/06
10. D. Beaulieu 9/13/06
11. C. Jackson 9/20/06
12. H. Nieh
13. Secretary - Dispatch
ADAMS ACCESSION #: ML062490133 TEMPLATE #: NRR-052
9 DRAFT or 9 FINAL Security Rights:
Folder: 9 DIRS Owner = : NRR-DPR Secretaries
9 9 Other
9 Viewer = : NRC Users
9 Other _______ Author = : Others
AVAILABILITY: Case/Reference #: (TAC, WITs, Yellow Ticket, etc.)
9 Non-Publicly Available
9 Non-Publicly Available Pending Review
or Document Sensitivity: 9 Non-Sensitive
9 Publicly Available 9 Sensitive (pre-decisional)
9 Publicly Available SISP Review Complete 9 Copyright