ML061770170
| ML061770170 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem, Hope Creek  |
| Issue date: | 01/09/2004 |
| From: | NRC/OI |
| To: | |
| References | |
| 1-2003-051F, FOIA/PA-2005-0194, NRC-1295 | |
| Download: ML061770170 (124) | |
Text
Officia ITranscript of Proceedings NUCLEAR. REGULATORY COMMISSION Til' ri t. II "t v" -rf W .d
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Docket Number: 1-2003-051F Location: : Kihg of Prussia, Penn*sylvania Date: Friday, January 9, 20C)4 Work Order No.: NRC-1295 Pages 1-123
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NEA-L R. GROSS AND CO., INC.
.. 4 .
Court Reporters and Transcribers
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in accordance with the Freedom of InFo*rmation 1323 1YIsland Avenue, N.W.
ashington, D.C -.-20005--,
(202) 234-4433 Ae Act, exemptions .. c FOIA-,. .., 9-,_,
2 I P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S 2 (3:00 p.m.)
3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Today's date is 4 January 9, 2004. The time is approximately 3:00 p.m.
5 Speaking is Special Agent Eileen Neff, 6 U.S. NRC, Region I, Office of Investigations. Also 7 present is Senior Reactor Engineer Scott Barber with 8 NRC Region I.
9 This interview is being conducted with 10
.\/ " " who 11 is at the Hope Creek 12 Station. The subject of the interview is the safety 13 conscious work environment at Salem andHope Creek.
14 Prior to going on the record, I explained 15 to you that you're not the subject of any wrongdoing 16 investigation. You understood that you were 17 approached as a witness, more or less, to the -- we're 18 looking for your assessment of the work environment.
Yes, ma'I am.
19 20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: At Hope Creek. I 21 understand your experience is at Hope Creek. Do you 22 have any work experience at Salem?
23 No, ma'am.
24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. So we'll be C 25 talking about the Hope Creek Station, then.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
3 1 Yes, ma'am.
2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And you also 3 understood that, along with the safety conscious work 4 environment inquiry, there is no specific potential 5 violation associated with that. Okay?
6 E,73 Yes, ma'am.
7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You also agreed that 8 you would conduct the interview under oath. If you 9 would raise your right hand, please. Do you swear 10 that the testimony you are about to provide is the 11 truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so 12 help you God?
13 . Yes, ma'am.
14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. For the 15 record, could you provide some identifying 16 information? I noted from your license your date of 17 birth is Social Security Number?
18 ~ffj i¶T 19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. And your home 20 address?
21 22 23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And telephone number?
24 II 25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. And your NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
-7C 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.
4 1 education history, please?
2 Including 3 background?
4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Sure 5
6 7
8 9
10 11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And what year did you 12 leave college?
.13 14.
15 16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. And what 17 position did you start with at PSEG?
18 I started as aM 19 20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: At Hope Creek?
21 g -w... At Hope Creek, that's 22 correct.
23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. So from 24 until when?
25 , M* As a --
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
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5 1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: As an 2
3 4.
5 6
7 8 SPECIAL. AGENT NEFF: Okay. So you 9 finished that, what, a year and a half later or so?
10 11 12.
13 .SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER:. May 4th?
14 7jApril 4th.
15 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.
16 Because {ou said you took your exam April 18th.
17 I'm sorry. 'March, if I --
18 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: March?
- March 18th.
-19 20 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.
21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: March for the exam, 22 license a couple weeks later, then.
23 . That's correct.
24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.
25 Apologize.
NEAL R. GROSS /1 C COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
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6 1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.
2 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: No problem.
3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: jWin position at 4 Hope Creek since that time, then.
5 That's correct.
6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So April And 7 who have been your shift supervisors?
8 Since I've been on shift?
9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I think at --
10 . i*Shift supervisors.
11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- Hope Creek they're 12 OSs, right, Ops superintendent?
13 Or now they're called shift 14 managers. as been 15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. And you have 16 a recent -- a *recent switch now?
17 Li - 2 That's correct. Not next 18 week, but the following week -- oh, actually this week 19 was_
20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Just for this week?
21 W No. _Ie took over C shift 22 for *JI went off shift, and is now the shift 23 manager for C shif3' So technically! is now I 24 25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. So your work NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
7 1 experience with the OSs there would be primarily under 2
3 That's correct.
4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: How do you rate your 5 work experience with a T or any other shift 6 manager there? I mean, how much -- how much exposure 7 do you have to them?
8 F0-1 --- 7 Mostly with 9 I -- the only time I ever deal with any of the other 10 shift managers would be in an overtime or if they were 11 to -- vacation coverage forl -
12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So infrequent --
13 Infrequent, yes.
14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Okay. In your 15 assessment of the safety conscious work environment --
16 and I throw that out and it's a pretty broad term, but 17 what we're -- we're going to be focusing on are 18 employee and management's abilities to raise concerns 19 of a nuclear safety nature, what the response is to 20 those concerns, and their comfort level with raising 21 concerns. Will look at, you know, from you to your 22 management in particular.
23 And also, part of that we look at 24 decision-making, conservative decision-making in terms 25 of operations in the plant. That's pretty much what NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 6
8 1 we're going to be focusing on today. But I guess in 2 considering that, what I'd like to do is get your 3 assessment of -- of the culture as it exists right now 4 onsite.
5 lpi . I think overall you can 6 bring up safety concerns. As far as the conservative 7 decision-making, I believe in some ways they are 8 conservative. But I believe -- I strongly believe 9 that the -- all of the verbiage in the ops standard 10 and other procedures is more -- for lack of better 11 terminology -- lip service.
12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What makes you say 13 that?
14 i think there is a lot of 15 schedule pressure put on the organization, and my 16 supervisors as well.
17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you have examples 18 where you would see that it was evidence of non-19 conservative decision-making?
20 I can only think of a few 21 instances. Off-gas -- we had the off-gas flow being 22 higher than the procedural guidance where the 23 procedure -- the precaution on limitation stated, "Do 24 not operate the system greater than 75 SCFM." And --
25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: When was this, then?
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 7q_.
9 1 . That was like in March of 2 2003. And --
3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And this -- is this 4 the incident where off the record you referred to W 5 7 writing --
6 . . j That's correct.
7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- a notification on 8 that?
9 That's correct.
10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. So March of 11 '03.
12 . That notification was 13 written as a.Level 1. It is -- I have looked at that 14 since, and it has been downgraded to a Level 3. It 15 was -- we were better than at 90 -- or we were better 16 than 75 SCFM. The procedure, the cross-limitation 17 stated, "Do not operate greater than 75." And the 18 words "do not" I believe were not only capitalized but 19 bold.
20 And we did operate -- later, come to find 21 out, that 75 was actually an FSAR limit, and we did 22 operate. They eventually then wrote a CROD (phonetic) 23 saying that it was --
24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: A CROD is?
25 It's a justification for --
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
10 1 I don't know the exact terminology, but my 2 interpretation is basically it's a justification for 3 something not being exactly as it was designed. It's 4 an engineering -- I believe an engineering 5 evaluation --
6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Oh, okay.
713-- type of thing.
8 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: It's an 9 operability determination. The OD part of that stands 10 for operability.
11 okay.
12 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.
13 Corrective action operability determination.
14 F Okay. Yes, that sounds 15 correct. In which case they wrote this CROD for --
16 and it said 90 SCFM and they put terminology in there.
17 I mean, basically I got Engineering to sign off saying 18 90 was all right. But the terminology in that CROD 19 was, you know, "We believe -- we think that they used 20 an overly conservative number," and stuff like that.
21 So--
22 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Did you get 23 a chance to look at the original notification, at the 24 way it was written?
25 Yes.
NEAL R. GROSS 76 COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS iVrn DLUrf,%-leiC Akln MIC %$A
11 1 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: And what - -
2 did it express concern? I mean, other than the 3 procedural limit, or the limit that was stated in the 4 FSAR, was there something -- was there some listed 5 consequence that said, "Okay. If you exceed this, 6 you're likely to have this problem."
7 Was there anything like that that led --
8 the point of it -- you know, direction where 9 Engineering should focus their attention -- I mean, 10 you -- you know, I mean, was there -- what's the 11 concern? Is it explosion concern? Is it too much 12 release? Is it too much in-leakage to the condenser?
13 What's the concern with too' high a flow rate?
14 The concern I believe was 15 due to the fact that we had, at the time, a known fuel 16 defect. So we are a -- we knew that there was -- we 17 had defect -- at least one bundle that'-was defective.
18 So we were -- we had -- I guess we had fission product 19 being released into the coolant.
20 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.
21 Which would then be 22 transferred to off-gas.
23 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. And 24 the off-gas -- isn't the off-gas designed to remove --
25 .it's designed, but it -- the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
12 1 off-gas release levels I believe were still going or 2 slightly elevated --
3 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.
4 - - at the site to a level of 5 concern, but they were elevated from previous cycles.
6 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: To your 7 knowledge, did they exceed tech spec limits? Or were 8 they approaching tech spec limits?
9 I do not believe they were 10 even remotely close to any tech spec limits.
12 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Do you have 12 any idea what the tech spec limits are for those?
13 No, I don't.
14 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. Okay.
15 All right. All right. So what -- I guess what I'm 16 trying to get a better understanding of, was it 17 something that was kind of like a -- an uncomfortable 18 feeling type of concern? Or was there -- was there 19 something very specific that -- that either the FSAR 20 or plant procedures were pointing to, you know, if you 21 exceed this, this could happen? Or was there 22 something step-wise that provided additional limits 23 above 75? Or was -- just kind of a -- just a 24 statement with no -- with no other attendant 25 description?
NEAL R. GROSS -7 COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.
13 1 W MThe 75 precaution limitation 2 was like a limit that was very clear, but then also it 3 was -- it was -- we all felt and believed that it was 4 the design limit of the system.
5 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.
6
- So exceeding the design 7 limit, the flow rate for the system, although not 8 knowing the specific consequences, knowing that that's 9 inherently not good.
10 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. Okay.
11 J And also -- prior to this, 12 also, in our training we were -- we had run a 13 simulator scenario where off-gas flow had gone high.
14 The crew was trained -- or during a critique of the 15 crew's performance afterwards we were informed by the 16 assistant ops manager of his feelings of off-gas flow 17 rates and -- because we had an off-gas flow rate that 18 was going high.
19 It may be -- I can't remember exactly, but 20 I know the off-gas flow rate was high. And I believe 21 we had elevated off-site release levels that the crew 22 was basically coached on the fact that we didn't take 23 the unit off.
24 In the simulator, we didn't take the unit 25 offline in an expeditious manner. That we were NEALR. GROSS -7 COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
14 1 basically trained that, you know, off-gas flow rate 2 going high is -- is a precursor or a sign of something 3 that is bad happening, at which case, I mean, the 4 training was basically that this is a parameter that 5 can be tied to something that it -- we should be 6 concerned with, especially with a known fuel defect, 7 and that the unit should be taken offline.
8 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Who was the 9 mat the time?
10 That was at the 11 time.
12 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.
13 Who--
14 And then just as Murphy's 15 Law, I guess you would say, a few months or weeks or 16 whatever later we -- off-gas flow did indeed go high.
17 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: And what was 18sreaction to that?
19 I don't know 20 specifically. I can't talk about ;specific 21 reaction.
22 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Well, I 23 guess the only reason I'm -- the only reason I'm 24 asking is, I mean, you recount a situation where you 25 were in this simulator. You know, the crew responded NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
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15 1 to an apparent high off-gas flow condition. And you 2 were -- you were coached and counseled by the AOM to 3 be -- to --
4 Not specifically coached and 5 counseled, but more of a -- a crew critique at the 6 end. Yes, he --
7 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Yes. I 8 didn't mean you personally, but I meant the crew, just 9 to -- maybe a discussion item or whatever, where he's 10 saying, you know --
11 Comment on our performance.
12 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay, okay, 13 okay.
~~It's like a -
- 14 15 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. Yes.
16 -- yes, you guys got it off.
17 You eventually did take the unit offline, but kind of 18 a -- we have a known fuel defect. This will release 19 -- you know, this is --. it would be dosing the public 20 type of thing, you know.
21 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Was there --
22 Reaffirmation of the fact 23 that, you know, our job as a licensed operator is to 24 protect the health and safety of the public.
25 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.
NEAL R. GROSS -7L COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE, N W
16 1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So the criticism 2 there was that you didn't take the unit offline, and 3 the simulator, quickly enough.
4 That's correct.
5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Under the 6 circumstances known. Was there a discussion at that 7 point of any other options that you could have done?
8 Or was it just take the unit offline?
9 .. In the simulator I -- I 10 don't recall.
11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Now --
12 I don't remember. It was a 13 long time ago, so it's just, I mean, my takeaway from 14 that situation was that off-gas flow was high, and we 15 didn't take the unit offline expeditiously enough.
16 And then we were coached that -- I can't recall 17 specifics. I apologize.
18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: But you recall that 19 he wanted -- the criticism or the coaching was in 20 taking the unit offline more quickly, under those 21 circumstances.
22 That might be a stretch. It 23 was -- we were definitely coached on the importance of 24 off-gas and --
25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.
NEAL R. GROSS -
COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 42)'2 oUerC~ MC A Kin A%/ I~ NI A
17 1 -- the consequences of such.
2 I--
3 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Well, it 4 took -- yes. I mean, if you walk away --
5 5* 1 kind of 6 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: If you walk 7 away with an impression, that's okay. We're just 8 sharing impressions.
9 Yes, okay. That's the 10 impression I got was that basically we didn't take the 11 unit offline --
12 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.
13 -- in a fast -- in an 14 expeditious fashion, or expeditiously enough.
15 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.
16 It was --
17 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Do you 18 recall what the parameters of the -- I mean, was it a 19 high flow condition by itself? Or was there high flow 20 with a significant fuel defect? Do you remember any 21 of the ..
22 I--
23 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.
24 I believe at the time, 25 because of how the simulator was modeled, we try to NEAL R. GROSS -7, COUIRT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.
18 1 model the plant. So if something is -- if something 2 were to break, if we were to lose -- a B pump is 3 damaged to the point where it's not going to be able 4 to do -- for some reason -- I just use that as an 5 example -- then they would model the same -- they 6 would take that B pump away because we would train --
7 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.
8 *-- as the plant is.
9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Trying to mirror 10 that.
11 .1 Yes. So we --
12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.
13 -,I know they try to model 14 stuff like that, like --
15 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: So you're 16 going back on shift at some point within the next 17 month or two. And this exact same condition or very 18 similar condition occurs, and you're thinking in the 19 back of your mind, "Hey, when this happened in the 20 simulator, this is the way we were -- this is what we 21 discussed doing. So shouldn't we be doing this?" Is 22 that --
23 Yes, we did.
24 SR PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: -- about 25 right?
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
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19 1 Yes. The licensed 2 operators, I believe if you look at the log entry, 3 it's -- the log entry is rather detailed. And he, 4 prior to placing his log entry, talked to the other 5 union licensed operators as in, "Do you agree with 6 this statement?"
7 And I believe we all were in agreement 8 that -- that the statement -- and I can't remember 9 exactly what the statement said -- but we were all in 10 agreement that the statement was -- we believe it to 11 be correct, and we agree with his assessment. Or our 12 collective assessment was that -- that this was 13 definitely a concern, and that we didn't feel as 14 though it was given the level of attention that we 15 felt was prudent.
16 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.
17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And who -- the person 18 asking you this was mwho was making the log 19 entry?
20 1 believe was the 21 reactor operator at the time, so he made the log 22 entry, yes.
23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And do you recall 24 that -- when you were presented with the situation on 25 shift, was it just like what you had practiced in the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
20 1 simulator? Do you recall any differences?
2 All I can recall is that --
3 is the correlation between the two off-gas -- they 4 said off-gas flow being high.
5 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Was there 6 any discussion between you and that said, 7 "Hey, you remember back in the simulator, you know, we 8 had this problem come up, and this is what we were 9 told," or, you know --
10 I don't recall, sir.
11 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.
12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What about the point 13 about the fuel defect, was that also --
14 I donit know if it 15 specifically talked about that, but it was a known 16 problem. Is that --
17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So that was a part of 18 what you were dealing with when it came up in reality.
19 That's correct.
20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.
21 We at the time did have a 22 small fuel defect, that's correct.
23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Okay. So now, 24 you're talking about at the operator level you have 25 some sort of a sense of agreement that --
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 7,ýf 4 13113 owr M AP% A% Id MW
21 1 .. Not only that, we have the 2 procedure open and it says, "Do not operate greater 3 than 75 SCFM." So, I mean, it's --
4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What is your --
5 *There is not a whole lot of 6 mincing words, not a lot of open to interpretation.
7 The cross-limitation for condenser air removal was, I 8 believe, very clear.
9 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: So that was 10 actually a P&L in the procedure.
11 Yes. It was, I mean, in 12 black and white.
13 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.
14 It was 15 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: It wasn't 16 just in the -- it wasn't just in the FSAR. It was 17 also right in the procedure.
18 To tell you the truth, I 19 didn't -- I didn't know that there was actually an 20 updated final safety analysis report until after the 21 fact.
22 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.
23 It was not something I'm 24 intimately familiar with.
25 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.
NEAL R. GROSS --7C COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 119 RH0fl1 ISLAND AVE.. N.W.
22 1 ... I don't read the 20-some 2 volumes, or whatever it is, of the FSAR.
3 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.
4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So at -- what 5 direction did you think you were going go in handling 6 this?
7 Well, I knew that we -- we 8 were looking for the leak, but it was one of the 9 things we weren't having -- there was no signs of 10 success type of thing, as in I guess you get guys in 11 there, and you put a tracer gas, and you're basically 12 looking for condenser air and le akage that you can 13 definitely attribute it to being a -- a pinhole leak 14 in a pipe or something like that that you can actually 15 repair, that you know that it'.s not -- that you can 16 say it's air in-leakage.
17 And I know we were looking for that, but 18 it was one of those things that -- I believe it was 19 one of those things they didn't just all of a sudden 20 go one day from the 30/40 range to 80. It was one of 21 those things there was a gradual -- and at which point 22 it became -- I mean, obviously elevated concern, but 23 -- for the plant and that people were being called in.
24 I believe that's a special group. I don't 25 know exactly, but, say, I believe (inaudible) -- that NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W. 76L
23 1 they shoot tracer gas -- and I don't know exactly what 2 that entails. I assume it -- I -- my mind picture a 3 little bottle squirting --
4 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Was there 5 any--
6 -- discharging.
7 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: To your 8 knowledge, was there ever a condition -- I'm sorry.
9 Was there ever a notification written prior to getting 10 to 75? I mean, was there any -- any sort of 11 monitoring program or any -- any acknowledgement or 12 recognition on the part of the station, whether it be 13 Operations or Engineering, that, hey, this is a 14 slowly-degrading trend, we need to do some monitoring, 15 we need to 16 I do believe --
17 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: -- develop 18 a plan to address it, or what have you.
19 The station was definitely 20 addressing it, as in off-gas flow was rising, and we 21 were actively looking for it. I believe when it went 22 greater than 75, then -- it was a long time ago -- it 23 was one of the things -- we were concerned with the 24 fact that there was no signs of success. There's no 25 -- there was no -- could not find a smoking gun, and NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
24 1 they were having no -- they were having no success 2 finding the leak.
3 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.
4 And off-gas flow continued 5 to march upward.
6 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Do you 7 remember a forced outage in March of 2003, right 8 around the same time this event was happening? It was 9 related to a -- it might have been related to this or 10 a couple of other things. There was like a diesel 11 leak, emergency diesel generator leak.
12 Yes.
13 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: And there 14 was this -- there was a shutdown in the middle of the 15 month, middle -- third week of the month, something.
16 like that.
17 I believe it was found, 18 then, during that outage.'
19 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.
20 That's what I'm -- that's why I asked you. So was 21 there -- was that part of what was being done? Was 22 part of the outage to, in fact, go after that and look 23 for that?
24 Well, I can't attest to 25 that.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 7
1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
25 1 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.
2 **an 3 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: But you 4 think it might have been found there, whether that was 5 the stated purpose or not, you know, or one of the 6 main purposes.
7 jMM.M*
I can't state that it was a 8 reason why. But it's one of -- I believe when we did 9 go to -- when we did get shut down, it was -- there 10 was like this is a great opportunity to find this 11 leak, because, you know, rad levels and stuff like 12 that. So I know there was concern after we shut down, 13 I mean, to find this leak type of thing.
14 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.
15' I mean, I can't attest to 16 that that's why we shut down. I can't recall the 17 details. But I definitely believe that -- that the 18 company was concerned with finding this leak after 19 they were shut down.
20 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.
21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Back at the time when 22 the operators were in agreement regarding something 23 had to be done with the off-gas flow rate, who was 24 your CRS?
25 I can't recall.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.
26 1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you recall if they 2 were in agreement with where you wanted -- what you 3 wanted to do, or the concerns that you noted?
4 I don't recall. It would be 5 a guess, but I believe at that time--and 6 And I only say that because they were 7 ** n C shift. I -- I don't remember if they were 8 -- who had the watch or if we had somebody else as a 9 filling in. I understand that a ndant 10 for a large portion -- for the most 11 part, my time on harlie shift, were 12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: It would be one of 13 those two CA lime 14 I'm not saying that they 15 were. I'm just saying thatihey were my 16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. You're just 17 unsure of --
18 'II'm not sure who the 19 was.
20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What you were doing 21 was -- we asked about non-conservative decision-22 making, instances in your opinion'that fall under that 23 category. And this isn't the first one that you came 24 to. At what level was the non-conservative decision 25 made? Who made that? Where do you see that in this NEAL R. GROSS Li" COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
27 1 instance?
2 I don't -- I don't know who 3 made the decision to -- I don't know who ultimately 4 made that decision. It's --
5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: The decision being --
6 so I don't assume, is the decision being that you 7 remained online?
8 -- Yes. Obviously, the 9 ultimate, most conservative would be take the unit 10 offline. But then, I mean, maybe they had concerns 11 that it would aggravate -- aggravate the fuel leak, or 12 something like that. And I was -- I don't -- I don't 13 recall. I don't know exactly how to answer that.
14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: But the operators 15 were in agreement that something had to be done, and 16 conservatively it would be to shut down. Is that 17 accurate?
18 I think that ultimately was 19 conservative. But how we shut down might be prudent, 20 like as in some planning on how we shut down, to not 21 aggravate a fuel leak or something like that. We 22 wouldn't necessarily -- I don't say -- you know, I say 23 that it might not be prudent to take the most with 24 shutdown. A scram might aggravate --
25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.
-7<C NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.
28 1 fuel defect or 2 something like that. I mean, I --
3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Was there some 4 discussion --
5 -- I don't know.
6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- over what should 7 be done, though? Do you recall that -- what the 8 discussion was?
9 I don't know.
10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I guess what I'm 11 getting from you is a sense of, at some point --
12 It didn't seem like that 13 they were taking -- that there were concerns --
14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Who is "they,"
15 though?
16 J "They" as in management. At 17 what level I can't attest to. I mean, above us.
18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Would that include --
19 ] It didn't seem --
20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- the CRS, or is 21 that above the CRS?
22 This is just a feel, but I 23 don't feel as though the CRS has that much power. It 24 would have to come -- such as that, it would be --
25 have to come from higher up.
NEAL R. GROSS ~7 /'.-
COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.
29 1 The CRS can take something if it's clearly 2 obvious that there is a problem, like any -- I believe 3 the CRS has the power and the responsibility, if 4 there's an immediate operator action or a -- something 5 driven by an EOP, to order. But as far as something 6 that could be interpreted two ways, or something like 7 that, I don't necessarily believe it -- that's a 8 decision most CRSs would want to make, if that makes 9 any sense.
10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Why? Is that 11 something that's written? Is that something that's 12 unspoken? What is --
13 It's just a feel. It's --
14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: A feel based on what?
15 Have you observed the CRSs hesitate to make decisions 16 when it's a gray area?.
17 1 think sometimes some CRSs 18 are hesitant 'to make decisions that could be 19 interpreted differently. I don't know how to put it.
20 And, once again, this is just a feel. I mean, I can't 21 speak for a CRS.
22 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Could we go 23 back to the event for a moment? Do you happen to 24 recollect how much timeframe expired between when the 25 event was identified and when there was a forced NEAL R. GROSS -
COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
30 1 outage? I mean, a relative scale like a month, or two 2 months, or six months.
3 It sounded like, if I understood you 4 right, I think you said the event -- the off-gas --
5 the high flow rate was -- I thought you said March, 6 but maybe you meant February or -- or sometime before 7 that. But the outage was also in March -- a forced 8 outage. Admittedly, it probably wasn't just for this.
9 This may have b)en one of the items, or not, that was 10 going after.
11 I know there was a thing for -- there was 12 a diesel leak. There was a leak inside one of the --
13 one of the rooms that the operators had some concerns 14 with, because there was, you know, carbon monoxide, 15 things like that.
16 Some guys that got sick.
17 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Yes, right.
18 Exactly. So there was an outage to take advantage of 19 the need to fix that, and there may have been some 20 other issues that were being addressed intentionally.
21 I mean, it was all like all part of a forced outage or 22 -- what I'm trying to get a sense of is, you know, was 23 it something that there was -- there was a long period 24 of time between when it was identified and when it was 25 fixed? Or -- or it was an afterthought?
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
31 1 I'm trying to -- I'm trying to get a sense 2 of what may have happened in that regard. And 3 whatever - -
4 - Maybe I misspoke on the 5 March. I said March maybe because I was just -- I 6 can't be positive that it was March.
7 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.
8 Basically, just the early --
9 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Early part 10 of the year?
11 . -- spring. This spring, 12 early part of the year.
13 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.
14 And Ijust 15 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: I guess I'm 16 trying to get a sense, did you feel like it went on 17 excessively? I meani do you feel like the flow was 18 high excessively, and you felt like nothing was going 19 on?
20 I got the sense that it went 21 to -- when it exceeds 75, we change our -- I remember 22 the one thing, we changed it to 90.
23 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.
24 And then I remember thinking 25 and talking to other guys and saying, "You know, well, NEAL R. GROSS -I COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N-W
32 1 it's 90 now until it exceeds 90." And at which point 2 I do believe it actually did go above 90.
3 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: And what 4 happened then? Was there another CROD to take it up 5 to a higher --
6 I don't remember if it --
7 this is my recollection, and I could be -- I'm not 100 8 percent sure, but --
9 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.
10 - I1 remember thinking, so 11 I don't know if it actually did happen, but I -- I 12 think it did, but I -- I can't be sure.
- 13. SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.
14 It's a long time ago. But 15 I do remember thinking -- looking at the CROD and 16 seeing 90 was the -- my thought there was that it's --
17 yes, it's 90 now. That's only because it's less than 18 90. As soon as it goes above 90, they will change 19 that to something other than -- something greater than 20 what we have currently.
21 If that's the -- if it's currently 90, if 22 it goes to 100, they'll make it 110 until it -- and 23 that might - - may have just been my thought processes 24 on how they had handled the 75, saying, "Well, 75 was 25 the limit, and now we're going to make it 90." "Oh, NEAL R. GROSS 7C COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.
33 1 now it's greater than 90, now we have to make it 110."
2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: When you saw that, 3 that's what you thought at the time.
4 . That's what I thought, and 5 I believe it actually did go greater than 90, but I 6 can't be certain.
7 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Yes. That's 8 -- I understand that. Do you --
9 *'--- .. But that might have--that 10 could have been just my thought process in my head.
11 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Is this --
12 But I do remember at one 13 point that -- when it was 90.
14 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. Is 15 this something -- I mean, what you're describing is 16 kind of a cynical outlook. I guess -- is there some 17 reason why -- was there other situations that occurred 18 prior to this where similar things happened that you 19 were aware of, like where there was some limit, there 20 was some involving by Engineering, and there was a 21 limit established, and then it was exceeded, and then 22 a new limit was established and that was exceeded, so 23 on and so forth.
24 I mean, was this something that in your 25 perception was just the way that the plant operated?
NEAL R. GROSS 76 COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
34 1 Or -- or what was your motivation for that, for 2 thinking that way?
3 - You're right, I do believe 4 that's a pessimistic view. I wish it wasn't true, but 5 in some ways sometimes it becomes pessimistic and it's 6 even more in the forefront of my mind, because last --
7 I was just on shift last night, and we ran a service 8 water surveillance.
9 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.
10So-11 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: You ran --
12 Although not a joke, it's --
13 unfortunately, the perception by at least -- at least 14 me, won't talk for anybody else, was-- is that run 15 service water -- service water is inop. It's part of 16 the process. We run -- this week is inop. Last night 17 it was the alpha service water pump.
18 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.
19 Run alpha service water 20 pump, it'll fail, and off valve service water pump.
21 Figure out -- and I -- although pessimistic, I --
22 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: We want 23 to--
2: 1 kind of chuckle because S25 they put out the work, they -- tonight we have to run NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.
t9fl97 -'A.AAII WAQW1KMf MMr %k If% nr~n 127'4
35 1 the alpha service water pump IST. If for some reason
°"
2 that fails, we've already got a troubleshooter for the 3 alpha service water pump. So it was -- it was rather, 4 in some ways, very expeditious, because it's known 5 that there is a problem.
6 And I believe it -- Engineering is saying 7 it's an instrumentation problem. Last night we ran 8 the alpha service water pump to fail on low DP. So 9 after that was assigned assessed, we looked at 10 that, it was like 61, the -- 63 I remember as being a number, and one of the --
12 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Sixty-three 13 is what -- what's acceptable?
14
- Sixty-three is what they.--
Thc 15 I was trying to get that explained to me by the 16 control room supervisor last night. He said 63 is --
17 it's 61. And although 63 is still in set, I believe 18 it's 60- -- I can't remember the numbers without 19 looking at a table.
20 I said, "I don't understand this 63 21 number," and he said -- he goes, "Well, the 63 number 22 is if it was greater than 63, it would still unsat the 23 IST. But if it was greater than 63, we could declare 24 it inoperable, but available." So with it being less C 25 than 63, it's -- it's inop.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
36 1 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.
2 PSo they got together, the 3 Operations superintendent -- shift manager got 4 together, had -- there was an on-shift engineer. Got 5 the on-shift engineer and the control room 6 supervisors, engaged -- I think pretty much they 7 already had a troubleshooter or -- troubleshooter or 8 evolution plan.
9 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.
10 : I believe they called it an 11 evolution plan -- ready within -- in a relatively 12 timely fashion. And I say timely fashion because this 13 happened -- we. announced the alpha service water 14 before lunch. Shortly after lunch, by say 1:15, we 15 were briefing to run this evolution plan. And we --
16 .SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: What did 17 that do? What did the evolution plan do?
18 The evolution plan --
19 basically, we took data. It was in -- basically 20 performing an IST, setting up flow. And there was 21 just flow points that we had taken, and I ran it from 22 the control room. But we took certain flow points, 23 set up flow from the reactor (inaudible)., getting flow 24 from the reactor (inaudible), and service water 25 getting discharge pressure and -- and stuff like that.
NEAL R. GROSS 7C COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVF MW
37 1 And just setting up flow, just taking data.
2 I believe Engineering -- the purpose of 3 the data was to recreate a pump curve. And I believe 4 what ended up happening -- you'd have to ask 5 Engineering, or look at the engineering evaluation.
6 But DP eventually -- it worked. It --
7 basically, we set up flow at max flow. Then, after we 8 got to max flow, we took that data. Then we lowered 9 flow I believe once to like 11,000 or -- I forget the 10 number. Maybe 15,000 per (inaudible). Then we 11 lowered flow to 5,000, and then -- then we had 5,000, 12 then 11,000, then 14,000, then 15,500, which is 13 basically at -- on the way up, we ran -- we ran the 14 IST, because basically when you set up flow per the 15 IST to step like 519.
16 And then when we established flow, which 17 was in accordance with the procedure, we got to the 18 flow for the procedure. Then we -- we performed our 19 procedure. We performed the IST the second time that 20 night, and DP was-good. So it passed and --
21 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Well --
22 -- and I'm like -- and 23 then --
24 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Yes. I 25 mean, that was really long and involved, but let me NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.
38 1 just ask a couple about it.
2 ,. But they were making the 3 determination if it was (inaudible) as I left, and I 4 believed it.
5 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. The 6 question I want to ask is, was the action they were 7 doing an action to correct a problem? I mean, was 8 this something that was done to like correct a 9 problem, like if a -- there's a plug transmitter.
10 Is it -- I mean, was it the equivalent of 11 cleaning a transmitter off? Or was it a way of 12 rebaselining the pump so that even under the degraded 13 condition you zero -- you negate the degradation 14 because you say, "Well, I'm going to reestablish a new 15 baseline curve based on the lower flow conditions or 16 lower performance capability of the pump." What was 17 your sense in --
18 7 My sense was that they --
19 which was kind of pessimistic, that, you know, it was 20 just basically they're going to blow off the silt, 21 that this -- basically, cycling this flow would -- I 22 believe it's the ultrasonic transducer or whatever, 23 but it -- this cycling the flow, Engineering thought 24 that this would bring the -- the flow transmitter --
25 optimize its performance, something like that, because NEAL R. GROSS 77C COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202 234-4433 WASHINGTON. D.C. 20005-3701 WWW.neaIrqross.com
39 1 we -- we already right now, as is, we take the -- this 2 flow transmitter, we take it out, and I believe we 3 calibrate it prior to --
4 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.
5:1 -- even running this thing.
6 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Let me --
7 let me back up to ask another --
8 j No, we did not -- we 9 didn't --
10 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: -- an 11 additional question, but I want your opinion on it.
12 You know, the service water-- most of the tech spec 13 requirements are put in place so that you can provide
- 14 -- especially like with service water, you can provide 15 a minimum amount of cooling flow to immerse the core 16 cooling system pumps and accident mitigation type 17 components during -- during accident conditions like 18 a LOCA or some other severe condition design basis 19 event.
20 Was it -- was the system capable of 21 providing the necessary flow, which would be the tech 22 spec minimum -- is it your perception that it was, and 23 that -- and in fact they were just really just making 24 sure that by verifying that -- that if there's a 25 problem with the flow transmitter, that the problem is NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.
40 1 with the -- just with the transmitter? Or were they 2 doing something to pre-condition the system to make 3 sure that in fact you had adequate flow? What's your 4 -- I mean --
5 /k- I strongly believe that it 6 did not pre-condition. But I agree with the part of 7 the purpose that it actually said it actually -- you 8 know, where the pump is relatively -- we can talk 9 about the (inaudible) and stuff like that. The only 10 thing that --
SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.
12 j -- the seating ring or 13 something like that could wear, and that could 14 actually change it. But it would be relatively 15 constant; it's not something to be, you know -- even 16 if you did cycle flow, it's not going to -- not going 17 to help it out. The pump either can, as you say, 18 provide that flow or it. cannot.
19 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.
20 AnidI -- I agreed that it 21 was probably just -- I -- my opinion is it was just a 22 flow -
23 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Transmitter.
24 j--how we do the IS -- the 25 performance test.
NEAL R. GROSS 7C COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1171 P*rfl I.M Awn AVF NW
41 1 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: And so it --
2 gYes, it's just -- I don't 3 necessarily believe -- although I believe service 4 water needs some help, I don't believe the pumps 5 are --
6 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.
7 I believe the pumps are 8 capable of performing that function.
9 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. But 10 there are other reliability issues with the system.
- Yes.
11 12 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.
13 And that'.s apparently 14 obvious, even to the most casual observer.
15 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.
16 j It's -- if you walk out the 17 service water'--
18 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: The reason 19 I wanted to know is because if it was an operability 20 problem, then we would have to deal with that on a 21 more immediate basis.
No. No, .no, no.
22 23 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: The way you 24 describe it is it doesn't appear like it was -- would 25 likely have been an operability problem.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS Cl 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
42 1No. I 2 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.
3 . -- believe this alpha 4 service water pump is able to do its function.
5 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.
6 7] Why I mentioned that -- it 7 was -- I was kind of addressing my pessimism of the --
8 I was trying to address my pessimism.
9 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. I 10 understand. Okay. Let's --
11 1 mean, I 12 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Let's step 13 back to the off-gas situation again. I want to ask 14 another question that's related to the original 15 training that you had and discussion afterwards, the 16 discussion with the AOM. Do you remember who else was 17 there from your shift, from a shift management 18 standpoint? Was the OS there and the CRS, were they 19 both there?
20 5 ] Oh, this is all of the CRSs, 21 the STAs, the licensed operators were all there.
22 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. So 23 they were all there. So it's a fairly big group, 24 five, six, seven people from the shift, right?
25 Something like that?
NEAL R. GROSS -7" COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.
43 1 Yes 2 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. With 3 *saying that to everybody, he wasn't just 4 talking to you, he was talking to the whole group --
5 j That's correct.
6 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: -- and he's 7 -- he's describing his -- his sense of, you know, if 8 we had this high off-gas-- high flow in the off-gas 9 system, where you have indications of a problem, where 10 you have a leaky fuel bundle or fuel pin, or what have 11 you, then I -- then, you know, I expect you to take 12 the unit offline more quickly, more promptly.
13 You.heard that message. .heard 14 the message. But so much the control room supervisor, 15 the shift manager, the STA, anybody else that 16 potentially would be in a supervisory role and shift.
17 Why do you think when the event actually occurred in 18 the plant, where you actually had a real plant event 19 where you had the high off-gas flow, why do you think 20 that they felt differently or acted and behaved 21 differently than what they -- what you perceived was 22 the message that was being given to them in training?
23 ] First of all, I can't'-- I 24 can't attest to what _ saw in training, 25 because he's not on my crew.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
44 1 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.
2 So I can't --
3 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: I'm sorry.
4 -- I can't assess that. He 5 was just on shift that particular day.
6 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.
7 _ Working overtime. Why they 8 perceive that's --
9 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: In other 10 words, you had a feeling that -- the way you described 11 it -- that this was wrong, that we needed to do 12 something, we needed -- you know, there's some action.
13 that was needed. What -- maybe you're not sure what 14 it was, but something, because of some -- also because 15 of some exposure to this previous training evolution 16 where this actually happened, and you were given some 17 direction or some information.
18 19 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: And I'm 20 asking, they must have heard the same thing you did.
21 Why are they not wanting to do the same thing -- kind 22 of thing that'you -- that you thought we should do?
23 Me personally, I was 24 slightly different set of experiences. I had an issue 25 with logs and -- where I had -- had not taken an off-NEAL R. GROSS 7C COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
II~nl) I'AA*4A1 WArHImr.TT* n r mmr..i7ni wwwn np.lmrnrn* Pmm
45 1 gas reading. So I -- I personally had been instructed 2 on the importance, as being a licensed operator of 3 off-gas and its relevance to release to the public, by 4 the" - I-5 He made it very, very clear to me that 6 this was a parameter that was important. So then 7 that, coupled with the fact of the simulator training, 8 and it not being in accordance with the procedure, and 9 the procedure being, you know, "do not" being bolded 10 and capitalized, all those factors to me definitely 11 raised a concern in my head as in meaning I don't know 12 exactly what's going on, but I know there's a 13 parameter or something that gets released to the 14 public, one, two --
15 (End of Tape 1, Side A. Beginning of Tape 1, Side B.)
16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. We're back on.
17 It's approximately 3:47 p.m.
18s. This parameter gets released 19 to the public. We had previously been trained on it.
20 I lost my train of thought. And --
21 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: You tell me 22 why you felt the way you did, and I understand that.
23 I Is -
24 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: I guess what 25 I'm trying to get at is --
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
46 1 Trying to get at why the 2 supervisors did not?
3 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Yes. I 4 mean, yes. What I've seen when I've been in the 5 control room -- and I've been in there many times when 6 events have occurred, not so much at Hope Creek, but 7 -- I have been at Hope Creek, but at other places 8 also.
9 But if -- if things are -- if the 10 direction is unclear, there's usually some sort of 11 discussion between the ROs, the control room 12 supervisor, maybe the -- in this case the OS, the 13 shift manager, what have you.
14 There's usually some sort of free-flowing 15 discussion where there's a discussion of pros and 16 cons, do we take some sort of action, or a 17 recollection, "Hey, you remember when this happened in 18 training? You know, we were told this or" -- was 19 there any bf that that took place to your knowledge?
20 I mean, you were actually on shift, right, 21 when this -- when the problem occurred, right? I 22 mean, this wasn't something where you were in there 23 like a shift after it occurred. It actually occurred 24 on your shift, did it not?
25 Yes.
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47 1 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. So 2 you got -- you guys were right there. You were there 3 right when it'-- when it happened. And you're seeing 4 it exceed the limit, you're --
5 J We'd tell them and --
6 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Yes.
7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: With the exception of 8 ]was anybody else on the crew different 9 than those who had gone through training? Was 10 everybody else who was with you -- experience the same 11 thing you did in the simulator?
12 , I would assume that's like 13 a segment training type of thing. That - I believe 14 that that scenario would be given to all of the crews 15 I believe that's how it's done. So although I don't 16 -- I can't attest to had the exact--
17 excuse me, the exact same experience, I do believe 18 that every -- it's my understanding that that's how 19 all the crews are given similar training. So they 20 would have that scenario as well.
21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -Right. But 22 specifically to your crew, all of the people who are 23 with you on your crew went on shift when it happened.
24 In reality, were they the same people who were with 25 you when you practiced it in the simulator?
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.
48 1 . Can't attest to -- I can't 2 say that I recall that.
3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Through the OS and --
4 I can't recall all that 5 everybody. I do know that at the time the only person 6 I'can remember is the 7 can't -- I can't recall.
8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: For both situations.
9 Ys 10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: was 11 For the -- for the simulator 12 and I'm pretty -- pretty sure that he was the shift 13 manager at the time.
14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.
15 But--
16 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: And you --
17 I think you also said that it -- you weren't sure who 18 the
- was, but it was probably eithe 19 or -- or, I'm sorry, 20 And I only say that because 21 those are --
22 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Who they 23 were, right?
24 Because they're -- no, 25 because they're --
7C NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
49 1 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: They're on 2 C shift?
3 -- they're on C shift.
4 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Right.
5 I can't say--
6 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: So there's 7 a high probability that --
8 Yes.
9 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: -- they were 10 at training, and they were also on shift at that.
11 Maybe not 100 percent, but a high probability.
12 . I could say that there's a 13 high probability --
14 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.
15 J -- that they were -- one of 16 those two was the-control room supervisor and/or work 17 control.
18 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Tell me, how 19 does the stuff -'- how does the interaction take place 20 on C shift? If there is a problem like this in the 21 plant, tell me -- like in this particular instance, 22 how does it go? Does someone raise an issue and, you 23 know, somebody documents it and goes in another room?
24 I mean, what happens?
25 If it's an immediate NEAL R. GROSS -7QC COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 11M RHODE IRI AND AVE.. N.W.
50 1 operational concern, it's -- as in requiring action 2 like, say, a boiler trip where we're losing -- we're 3 running the place at (inaudible) of service or, say, 4 something like that where there's actions that need to 5 be done, and actions performed like in a relatively 6 expeditious or actions have to be performed, everybody 7 is there.
8 Sometimes with stuff of a tech spec 9 nature, and it's like an interpretation of data type 10 stuff, like I'll give you another -- I'll mention 11 another instance that I have really no intimate 12 knowledge of other than I was on shift, and that was 13 being discussed, was the incident with the diesel 14 operability on some relays that weren't tested, and 15 stuff like that.
16 That -- I was on shift for that, and in 17 the control room. But that was all happening behind 18 me as in the discussion of why -- why- we were not 19 making preparations to go .to cold shutdown or hot 20 shutdown or the tech spec ramifications or -- those 21 decisions were all being made at above the control 22 room operator level, all those, and --
23 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Did you 24 recognize any of the faces for that discussion?
25 1 know NEAL R. GROSS "7c COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
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51 1 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: I mean, was 2 -- Iguess I--
3 I can't recall. I just --
4 what I'm saying is --
5 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: I'm only 6 asking you, you know, just in general, like the type 7 of people that were there. Was it a couple of OSs and 8 a CRS? Or was it like AOM, ops manager, plant 9 manager, engineering?
10 1 I will -- all I can say is 11 I believe there was like a higher-up guys like, say, 12 on the order of those guys, like other ops -- other 13 shift managers and AOMs and those type of people.
14 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.
15 *Like licensing, other 16 engineering -- engineering -- people who would be 17 involved with that type of stuff.
18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You had said that --
19 And I know that 20 was involved. And that's all I know -- I mean, it was 21 one of those things where I -- we kind of were like 22 going, "Okay. What's going on?" Like, "I don't know.
23 They're talking about some relay that we haven't 24 tested."
25 So it's not -- and I don't necessarily NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS lATI PrHn;: MRIA~n AVP MW
52 1 think that's a bad thing, because, I mean, they're 2 making the call. When they need the diesels run, 3 that's more of our thing, but -- and we don't get --
4 we don't make tech spec calls. That's not -- not 5 really in my training, and I don't get into that.
6 That's more of a supervisory function.
7 So, but -- and I say that because it's 8 more of a -- sometimes we don't know -- we're not 9 involved in that type of stuff. Like, say, although 10 they're not the same, like when we were -- we came 11 down in power and we were like 25 percent, and we were 12 -- I can't remember all of the details, but we were 13 doing something.
14 And then, at 5:30, we had a meeting, and 15 right before the meeting it's -- we're doing -- we 16 have our logs and our stuff to be doing -- being done.
17 And then kind of overhearing rumors like, "Hey, yes, 18 we're shutting down." "What? We're shutting down 19 now?"
20 I mean, before the -- it was just come 21 down to 20 percent, take the turbine offline, fix the 22 leak on the steam seal evaporator steam line, at --
23 you know, bring the turbine back and go back up. And 24 then someone -- it's like, "Hey, yes, somebody found 25 a steam leak. The (inaudible) of our cleanup has got NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 4'-2 0 r% l10 ALkl AttI kI MA
53 1 like a 12-foot plume, and we're going to go -- we're 2 going to be shutting down." It's like, "All right."
3 And then this -- this shift meeting. Yes, 4 it's -- it's -- you know, we were doing other stuff, 5 but it's -- then come up.
6 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: So it sounds 7 like the way you're -- what you're describing is 8 that--
9 And I almost think that's 10 better, because we were focusing on our job --
11 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Yes.
12 -- our task at hand. But 13 it's like -- and I'm just -- they have their stuff to 14 do, and we have our stuff to do, and sometimes,. I 15 mean, those calls are made at their level, and we have 16 our stuff to do. Sometimes when you ask me about what 17 they're thinking, I sometimes don't know, because I 18 have got logs that -- we have -- also, we have 19 workweek stuff to do.
20 We've got our -- we have our stuff to do.
21 We've got to implement the workweek as in we can 22 either run our surveillance something -- on something 23 else. We could be making sure tagouts are being done.
24 We have to respond to overhead alarms. We've got --
C 25 we're interfacing with the I&C technicians, running NEAL R. GROSS "7 COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1q23 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.
54 1 surveillances, stuff like that. So --
2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You're just 3 explaining that you're not a part of some of the 4 decisions when it's made --
5 Sometimes.
6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- to move the plant 7 in a certain direction. You're not always in on 8 something like that, but you might be given the 9 direction later.
10 Yes.
11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And you're comparing 12 that in the three incidents involving the off-gas 13 issue, this diesel operability decision. Was that --
14 what timeframe was that?
15 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: That was 16 December of --
17 I don't remember.
18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Was it 2003?
19 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: No, 2002.
20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: 2002? Does that 21 sound right to youhf 22 I can't recall. I just 23 remember there was something --
24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So you're throwing 2"* 25 out some incidents that say, "Look, I'm doing other--
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55 1 I'm tasked with other things. These decisions are 2 made elsewhere." So basically you don't know who was 3 involved in some --
4 . We have other stuff to do, 5 and we--
6 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: We're aware 7 of that.
8 SPECIAL-AGENT NEFF: Okay.
9 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: That issue, 10 that the --
11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.
12 I have no information on it, 13 other than --
14 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Yes.
15- - basically, we were aware 16 that something was going on. We knew that there was 17 an issue with a relay, like an 86 device or something 18 had been tested or potentially hadn't been tested, 19 surveilled, so then it's like, you know, how can you 20 say it's good? You have to test these things so --
21 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Right.
- 22 -- it's -- it was a decision 23 they were making, and it was more like that.
24 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: It was 25 actually the inputs for three relays, emergency NEAL R. GROSS 7C COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 4113V13DW f I1 Akin AI/ NW
56 1 generator lock-out, three 86 relays.
2 Yes. And I remember there 3 was an 86 relay issue, and it was -- and I do remember 4 there was some disagreement between the resident and 5 -- and that's all I can say. I just -- I remember 6 hearing that there was a disagreement between the 7 resident and --
8 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Management.
9 -- management. And then I 10 heard this is -- I have no -- this is just how I heard 11 it, the story was told, recanted, passed down, is that 12 the resident had took one position, the company took 13 another position, and I believe what I heard was that 14 Region I kind of not necessarily agreed, but was like 15 -- understood the company's point of view. So I just 16 remember there was some disagreement --
17 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.
-- on the exact call.
19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: On this diesel issue?
20 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Yes.
21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you need anything 22 further on that?
23 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: No.
24 1 I have no information on it.
25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I just want to go NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS vrri ownri tI1 &Kin aim* w w
57 1 back a little bit. You made a comment before, and 2 this goes into the decision-making. As you observe 3 it, you said it was your feeling that the CRSs would 4 hesitate to make decisions when things could be -- and 5 I think your words were "could be interpreted 6 differently." In what way do you mean?
7 We were talking about conservative calls, 8 and you were saying that they may hesitate when 9 something can be interpreted differently. What goes 10 into that? And interpreted in what way?
11 A decision to take the unit 12 offline that's not directly procedurally guided is 13 something that would come under extreme scrutiny type 14 of thing.
15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: From the CRSs, the 16 supervisors?
17 j From management.
18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Management being who?
19 Guys above -- our bosses' 20 bosses type of thing. Like I know--
21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Where would the 22 scrutiny come from? From the OS level or the shift 23 manager level?
24 L From like above that. I 25 believe above that type of thing, like, you know --
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58 1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So you're looking at 2 -- well, it used to be Director of Operations. What 3 is it now?
4 I don't know. I just know 5 that there would be -- if the decision was made 6 correctly, that would be good. And if it was made, or 7 it could be interpreted incorrectly, if there was --
8 if it could be, or if it was, it would be bad.
9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And --
10 Like as in the incident with 11 the -- when we had the stuck bypass valve. You asked 12 about non-conservative decision-making. And there 13 might be a whole bunch of reasons, what they were 14 going off, but to me I didn't understand why we had a 15 stuck bypass valve open for several days.
16 And it didn't -- during that evolution 17 type of thing, we were in a -- we were at an 18 intermediate range, and stuff like that, and ranging 19 and I -- we removed the pressure set, and stuff like 20 that, around -- I can't know -- I can't recall all of 21 the details, but --
22 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Were you 23 actually on the boards when that occurred?
24 .. No. No, sir. But the --
25 but they did, when that stuff was happening, whatever, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS C<
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59 1 the pressure transient and the level and -- initially, 2 it was one of those things that there was like the 3 job.
4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What did they do?
5 They basically stabilized 6 the plant.
7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Who was --
8 Using--
9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF* Okay. Who was 10 "they"? Just who was on for that?
11 The crew. The crew.
12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you recall who the 13 crew was, though, by name?
i4 I believe it was Echo shift, 15 and--
16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: The 17 would be who?
18 I'm not 19 critiquing their -- that's -- their performance was 20 already critiqued by several -- in great detail. But 21 I'm just saying that --
22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Understood. But 23 you're saying it changed at some point. It went from 24 good job to something else. What caused that?
25 It was not one of those NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
60 1 things that was initially identified as a bad thing.
2 And, in fact, it was like, you know, they had a 3 transient, they stabilized the plant. The reactor 4 operator ranged the IRMs as required, and another 5 operator stabilized level. And after the fact there 6 was training.
7 There was great discussion and remediation 8 for the people involved, and it -- there's basically, 9 after analyzing the data and stuff like that, it was 10 -- basically, a decision was made -- people believed 11 that they should have taken the unit off line, and they 12 didn't. They basically stabilized the plant. And 13 then, after this -- the plant was stable, then we 14 eventually did take the unit offline.
15 But the people reviewing the data said it 16 was -- they should have taken the unit offline. So I 17 -- it's hard to -- it's a hard thing to verbalize 18 exactly. When I say they can't -- a decision like 19 that, I mean, it would just be a gutsy call for the 20 CRS to say, "I think we should shutdown," and that's 21 hindsight. That's what -- that's what should have 22 been done.
23 I find it hard to articulate exactly how 24 I feel about that.
25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Well, are you saying NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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61 1 was afraid to shut -- to take --
2 No.
3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- the conservative 4 action and shut it down, and was later criticized for 5 not doing so? He hesitated to do that or -- I'm not 6 -- I don't know if I'm following you.
7 M"WThe crew didn't take -- I'm 8 not saying a name. The crew, the collective crew, did 9 not take the unit offline.
10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: They stabilized it.
11 3 They did stabilize it. They 12 stabilized it within the guidance of, I believe -- one 13 10 says, "Range IRMs as necessary to maintain on-14 scale."
15 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Were they in 16 a procedure when all of this happened?
17 They were in an IPDE, 18 formerly it was -- basically, it was bypass valve was 19 stuck open, and they -- we didn't know why it was 20 stuck open, why it wouldn't close. So that -- they 21 were doing data-gathering and --
22 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Which way 23 was the plant being -- was the plant being moved up in 24 power or down in power? Was it --
25 Down in power. We were I NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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62 1 think -- don't recall the whole incident, where 2 exactly it was. But it was -- it was -- we were low 3 in power, and I guess -- and I believe the intention 4 was we were on our way down. But we were gathering 5 data at this point, and I believe the IPDE was 6 something to do with pressure set, too.
7 If you have more information -- and the 8 transient occurred, and I can't recall the details, 9 and power basically was -- came up and the reactor 10 operator ranged the IRMs and kept it on-scale and did 11 not incur a scram.
12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you know why they 13 did not? Did you have any discussions with this crew?
14 Do you know.why they would stabilize as opposed .to 15 shutting down?
16 That's part of the -- of the 17 -- the assessment was done afterwards where they --
18 they -- that's a matter of record I guess. You can 19 look at what they did, and stuff --
20 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Do you 21 think, had they shut down, would they have been 22 second-guessed the other way? Would they have been 23 told, "Oh, you should have stabilized the plant where 24 you were"'?
25 2 Hindsight, no, they would NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.
63 1 not have been. But --
2 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Oh, you 3 don't think they would have been? You think that 4 would have been noted as that was -- it would have 5 been a good decision to make?
6 After the fact? Now, of 7 course, looking back, there was --
8 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: I mean, what 9 you're doing -- and I don't want to put too many words 10 in your mouth -- but what you're describing is you're 11 saying that -- at least this is how I'm interpreting 12 it -- is that when operators take action, they're 13 going to get second-guessed by management, whether 14 it's to go this way -- then they're going to say, "Why 15 didn't you do this," or if you go that way, "Why don't 16 you do this?" That's how you're portraying it.
17 And I don't know if you mean it that way, 18 but --
19 I believe that's -- yes, I 20 believe that our -- all of our decisions are second-21 guessed or put under a microscope. And if the 22 performance doesn't in any way -- if there's even the 23 remotest -- even if things go well, as in we had a 24 level where the -- recently, during a downpower, where 25 the -- the one we said -- I said we were shutting NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
64 1 down, and then come to find out that we ended up going 2 to cold shutdown or -- when we were coming down we had 3 an incidental level.
4 And I was peer-checking the reactor 5 operator on rods, and basically feed flow got to the 6 point where -- you had two feed pumps then, and one 7 recirc valve started opening, which started robbing 8 flow, so level -- so that the feed pumps on automatic 9 would -- basically started having a level oscillation.
10 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: What caused 11 that?
12 Basically, the recirc valve 13 on the feed-pump.
14 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: No. But why 15 -- why did you -- was this post-trip or --
16 No, no. This was -- we were 17 still online.
18 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.
19 But -- I forget where I was 20 going with this, but basically we -- the guidance 21 should have been clearer. Come to find out, the 22 guidance should have been clearer on -- that we should 23 have taken a feed pump out before this, because 24 basically we're down -- so low in feed that we had two 25 feed pumps in. We only needed one.
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65 1 Then we got low and -- so basically the 2 recirc valve, an in-flow valve starts opening up. So 3 when that starts opening -- so then flow goes down one 4 -- so you starting fighting, and it oscillates it.
5 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: I 6 understand.
7 Thelevel starts oscillating 8 to a point, and expeditious -- action was taken by the 9 plant operator. Or, actually, I was the plant 10 operator. The guy who was doing feed was able to take 11 manual control feed to get level within band, 12 (inaudible) and out of the way, and then basically get 13 one -- stabilize on one feed pump.
14 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.
15 Which is where we needed to 16 be. But that level oscillation, in my -- now I 17 remember my point. My point is -- some of these we 18 stopped, stabilized the plant. We did a brief, we 19 captured all the data we could, and that's -- in 20 nuclear, that's a good thing.
21 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.
22 r Butalso -- but I -- I know 23 I personally walked away with a sense that I hope 24 tomorrow when we come back in that they haven't 25 decided that we somehow made some error as in this is NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.
66 1 going to be looked at, and, I mean, our statements are 2 going to be evaluated.
3 And I certainly hope we didn't make any 4 errors, although the plant is stabilized. I mean, we 5 didn't scram. I remember -- I remember distinctly 6 calling out to _thinking -- and we were 7 all watching it, not just me, but I remember it 8 distinctly because we -- people were calling out 9 levels like, you know, 16.5, you know, inches per --
10 and we have a (inaudible) override of 15 inches taking 11 (inaudible) shutdown.
12 And I distinctly remember seeing 16 13 inches, and I just like -- llevel is 16 inches."
14 And he's like, "Level, 16 inches." And then looked 15 back, now what? But I remember turning around like to 16 make sure I got his attention, even though he was 17 already like on -- the level is 16 inches. It's 18 understood that -- everyone knows that (inaudible) 19 override is 15 inches.
20 And I looked again, and I remember -- I 21 also remember making a report -- level -- I level 22 is recovering." So we were all focused in on it.
23 But, I mean, it was just --
24 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Now, that 25 is - -
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67 I I think -- I think we did 2 the right things.
3 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.
4 And I -- that came out I 5 guess, at least we didn't --
6 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Well, you 7 mean for this plant -- this plant, the circumstances 8 at the time, but was there a step that was missed 9 earlier that had you in a condition where you had two 10 feed pumps on, where you should only have had one?
11 That was part of the -- the 12 corrective action was that we were going to make the 13 -- the procedure enhancements to --
14 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Do you mean 15 the procedure didn't say this? The shutdown 16 procedure, or the taking the unit offline procedure 17 didn't -- didn't have something that said, "At this 18 power level you take -- take off one feed pump"? Like 19 40 percent power or something like that? I find that 20 hard to believe -- it didn't say that.
21 . It did say something; but 22 it--
23 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: I mean, if 24 somebody missed it, fine.
25 f It was like --
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.
68 1 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: You coped 2 with what you had. But, you know, again, there may 3 have been -- that may have been viewed as a positive, 4 the way that the shift handled that. But there might 5 have been some -- you know, something going back to 6 how you got yourself in the situation you were in.
7 7- The guidance isn't totally 8 clear.
9 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.
10 p .. But it's one of those things 11 I remember -- you know, like, hey, you know, we want 12 to make sure that when feed gets to this level that we 13 want to be -- we don't want this -- or we knew this 14 could possibly happen type of thing. But we were 15 looking at different indications.
16 I mean, like I think it says -- it gives 17 a-megawatts generator -- generator megawatts that, you 18 know, it should be taken out. We were less than that, 19 but we weren't -- we didn't meet the feed -- we got --
20 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: There were 21 inconsistent indications, so --
22 Yes. So we -- part of the 23 corrective action was that we -- there was going to be 24 more procedural clarity for that situation. But my 25 point of saying all that stuff was the fact that you NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS "
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69 1 were asking me how I feel about it.
2 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Yes.
3 We were -- after the fact, 4 your actions are going to be greatly scrutinized. And 5 it's not a good thing not to have performed or not to 6 make -- have made any -- it's just not a good idea.
7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What did you think 8 the criticism was going to be for that event? Where 9 was your fear on that?
10 Truth be told, I had no 11 idea. And that's the part that scared me more than 12 anything, or that scared -- I was apprehensive of the 13 fact, just thinking I didn't -- I thought that -- I 14 left with a sense that we had done the right thing.
15 By the same token, the incident with the 16 bypass valve, that crew left with the sense that they 17 did the right thing. Does that make any sense? That 18 crew left that day, and it wasn't until like a week 19 later that they were told -- or it was -- it came out 20 that --
21 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Do you 22 remember who the operator was for that? You said 23 was the Do you remember who the 24 operator was or the control room supervisor for the 25 bypass valve?
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.
70 Yes. I can name a bunch of 2 the guys on the shift. But, I mean --
3 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Do you --
4 It's an INPO thing. I mean, 5 .you can look it up.
6 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.
7 8
9 10 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.
11 mean --
12 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Those guys.
13 So it was all of those - those five names you just 14 mentioned?
15 At least those. I mean --
16 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.
': -it's--
17 18 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.
19 NOW It's a matter of record.
20 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. All 21 right. All right. Okay. Okay. All right.
22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So you --
23 But you were just asking me 24 about how -- I mean, you said --
25 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Yes, I NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1/'~
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71 1 just --
2 And 3 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: If we have 4 questions about that, I mean, we --
5 -- there's a fear of --
6 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: -- may need 7 to follow up.
8 -- that the Monday morning 9 quarterback will -- and it could be just me.
10 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Do you think 11 -- is this something that's -- that has changed since 12 you've been licensed? I mean, how long have you been 13 licensed?
14.
15 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. So 16 not quite two years, but close to two years.
17 N-] That's correct.
18 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Has this 19 been something that's been a change for you that --
20 that you didn't have this kind of scrutiny before, and 21 now you do, or has it always been like this? And how 22 does this compare to like when you were a nuclear 23 equipment operator? Is this a totally different 24 environment or not?
25 It's much better being a NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1.323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.
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72 1 nuclear operator.
2 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: And why is 3 that? Why would you say that?
4 I think expectations for a 5 nuclear operator are much clearer. And there's no --
6 there's almost nothing you have to do as a nuclear 7 operator that has to be -- time-critical type stuff.
8 I mean, anything that's time-critical as a nuclear 9 equipment operator is inherent -- apparently obvious 10 and, I mean, it doesn't take a genius to figure it 11 out, you know?
12 If you've got a diesel exploding, you 13 know, two fingers, you know, emergency shutdown type 14 of stuff. I mean, it's not as -- to me, it's just 15 there's more clearer guidance as an equipment operator 16 than there is as a general operator.
17 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Is there --
18 is there something unique to -- to Hope Creek that 19 you've compared to Salem or compared to other -- other 20 plants that causes that, you know, additional tension 21 or additional concern about, you know, how -- how 22 things will be viewed after the fact? Or do you think 23 it's like that everywhere?
24 I can't speak of another 25 facility or another plant. I can --
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73 1 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Or how about 2 like through time? I mean, you obviously talk to 3 other operators that are -- that are at the station.
4 Have they said, you know, like it was -- five years 5 ago it was different, or 10 years ago it was 6 different, or -- or it's -- you know, was there any 7 kind of -- has there ever been discussion where you've 8 been involved where someone has said, "Oh, it's -- you 9 know, it's very different than the way it used to be,"
10 or, "No, it's always been like this."
11 .M I have certainly been 12 involved in discussions with this. It's just 13 different than it used to be.
14 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: It's what?
15 ., It's much different than it 16 used to be.
.17 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.
18 But that also could be -- I 19 attribute some of that to the direction of the 20 industry.
21 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. And 22 what would that be? Where --
23 : It -- the nuclear industry 24 has never been an error-tolerant industry, but it's 25 even less so now. I mean, human performance is even NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
74 1 -- in the nuclear industry, for human performance --
2 to me it seems human performance is -- yes, we'll have 3 humans operate, but we don't expect them to be humans.
4 There's -- mistakes are -- don't make a 5 mistake, which is good, but sometimes even the 6 smallest mistake is -- is overexaggerated. There are 7 mistakes and there are big mistakes, and that could be 8 just my perception. And I understand that human --
9 obviously, I understand the importance of human 10 performance.
11 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.
12 But how we deal with those 13 things I -- maybe as my company as -- at Hope Creek we 14 deal with some human performance. It 15 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.
16 _-- could use some 17 improvement, I believe.
18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you see that 19 emphasis and that increased scrutiny on human 20 performance and the less tolerance for -- for errors 21 in human performance, is that due to a heightened 22 concern for safety and safe operations?
23 I believe that -- that our 24 human performance safety would have to improve.
25 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Do you think NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
75 1 that's what's driving the desire to have the better 2 performance statistics from a human performance 3 standpoint? I mean, is that what's behind that, or is 4 there something else behind it? Or is it a 5 combination of things? What -- what's driving that?
6 I don't know. I mean, I 7 know some of our safety stuff, like from a nuclear 8 safety -- from just a safety -- industrial safety 9 perspective, we've had many more reportable incidents 10 last year than there have been in the past. But some 11 of that I -- I think is attributed to the fact that 12 they've changed what they call an incident, so --
13 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: How about 14 the cost pressures?. You know, we've heard a lot in 15 our office about cost pressures of plants today 16 compared to five years ago, or 10 years ago.
17 I mean, the plants are "operated" at --
18 many of them as merchant fleets where you've got, you 19 know, fewer owners, and the owners span multiple 20 regions, and things like that that -- that it's so 21 competitive that, you know, we can't -- we can't 22 afford to have the plant shut down, or we can't afford 23 downpowers, or we have to maximize capacity factors, 24 and things like that.
25 Would you -- does any of that filter down NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.
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76 1 to your level? Do you hear any of that? Do you --
2 does that come up during discussion?
3 I know it was thought of.
4 I know that with the deregulation that there is a --
5 definitely a sense of you have to operate longer type 6 of -- I don't know about longer, but you have to -- to 7 run longer. I mean, to stay online longer. I mean, 8 there's no outage in -- once you come offline to get 9 back online as soon as possible.
10 And from my -- what I see is that outages 11 are shorter and shorter, and it seems that less and 12 less stuff is actually -- or I haven't been there that 13 long, but, I mean, it seems like they do -- your 14 outage is shorter. You can't fix as many things that 15 you would like to get fixed. And I believe that's due 16 to cost, and some good, some bad.
17 I mean, some things don't -- I can 18 understand the cost effectiveness of some things, but 19 some things I believe are sacrificed by the fact that 20 you have shorter outages. I mean, it seems like we've 21 had a lot of problems lately as -- from Hope Creek's 22 standpoint. It seems like we've been challenged with 23 stuff.
24 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.
25 ll I mean, from drywell, now NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
77 1 currently we're battling drywell leakage. And we came 2 offline I believe -- I mean, last cycle for drywell 3 leakage.
4 Part of that thing -- you know, I mean, 5 operations I -- as -- it was made clear to us that 6 when it -- we were -- the thinking was that it was 7 seal leakage, because our -- we had a degraded seal on 8 the Bravo feed pump -- not the feed pump, the Bravo 9 recirc pump. And then, come to find out, there was a 10 chill water leak.
11 So there's definitely some emphasis on 12 trying to find the -- the leak this time. I mean, 13 because we came off line to replace a, you know, recirc 14 seal, and we ended up replacing the recirc seal. But 15 the increase in flow during leakage was due to chill 16 water leak.
17 So now we're going through an extensive 18 procedure right now to make sure that we isolate and 19 we know exactly what is leaking. And I believe we're 20 thinking that it's the CRD.
21 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. You 22 know, you related that -- that after this incident 23 where you had like two feed pumps at low power, and 24 the recirc valve open, that you felt good when you 25 were done, but like coming back you were thinking NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.
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78 1 that, you know, "I hope, you know, we don't later get 2 told we made a mistake, or get second-guessed, or what 3 have you."
4 And I think people can understand why you 5 might feel that way. One of the things that I guess 6 I'm interested to know is, is that the kind of -- do 7 you have those kind of feelings a lot?
8 I mean, do people -- do people that are on 9 shift, do they feel that way a lot, that -- is it --
10 is it only when something happens, or is it also like 11 just day to day that, you know, what's going to -- it 12 might have -- is something going to come up like in --
13 like when nothing has happened for a while, do you 14 feel like, okay, it's going to be a good shift?
15 Things are going to go well? Or do you -- do you have 16 this feeling that, you know what, I think somebody is 17 going to come up and -- or there's a possibility that 18 something will come up, and it's going to be a 19 problem?
20 I can't speak for other 21 people. Ic 22 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: I guess the 23 reason I'm asking, it's sort of a -- kind of a broad 24 work environment question. You know, like some of the 25 things, the incidents we're talking about, are what NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.
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79 1 the work environment is like. And it's kind of like, 2 how do you feel coming to work every day?
3 I mean, is it one of those things where, 4 yes, you look forward to it, you know, you look 5 forward to operating the plant, or -- or if there's 6 been problems, you know, maybe -- maybe there's some 7 reluctance. You say, geez, you know, I hope I don't 8 get second-guessed on this, or get asked a lot of 9 questions.
10 Or is it, well, this has happened, and 11 this has happened, so I really have to watch my P's 12 and Q's, and I've got to -- you know, I really don't 13 feel comfortable with the circumstances or -- or where 14 is your -- where is your feelings on that?
15 Personally, because of my 16 situation, I feel as though, as you -- to use your 17 terminology, I have to watch my P's and Q's, maybe 18 more so than others.
19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: To clarify that for 20 the record, because a lot of that discussion occurred 21 off the record, you have some incidents, documented 22 incidents, that there were errors that you made that 23 were noted by the shift manager. And you -- you said 24 you were criticized for making some --
25 I (inaudible), and I NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.
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80 1 understand that's (inaudible), and so forth. It's a 2 rod, so reactivity mismanagement is huge. And I 3 totally understand that.
4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Right. So --
5 I've taken -- personally, 6 I've taken steps so that I will -- knock on wood --
7 will not be involved with a reactivity mismanagement 8 event again.
9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And you --
10 I'm very deliberate in that 11 -- and committed to that philosophy.
12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Just to sum it up for 13 the record -- well, we don't have to go into a great 14 deal of detail. It was the -- there was the 15 (inaudible) step incident, and you -- you described 16 that came down on you pretty hard for 17 that, was very critical. And then, later on, as a 18 crew.there was a simulator failure.
19 But for those reasons, you feel that you 20 personally have to be cautious, that you're kind to 21 walking --
22 That's correct.
23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- on thin ice is the 24 way -- the way you see it right now.
25 That's correct.
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81 1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: But in answer to 2 Scott's question, overall, if you could apply that and 3 -- in your discussions with your peers, is that a 4 feeling where at -- at Hope Creek the operators come 5 to work? And are they comfortable that when they have 6 to make a decision they're -- are they going to be 7 scrutinized if they -- if they articulate why they 8 made the decision they made?
9 Or, you know, do they -- are you so bound 10 up with -- with fear for this Monday morning 11 quarterbacking that people are afraid to take action?
12 I can't speak for others, 13 but, for me, it's not so much that I go in there with 14 a sense of fear of what the Monday morning 15 quarterback. If something does happen, that 16 definitely enters my mind.
17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And, again, you're 18 speaking from your personal --
19 Personally. I can't speak 20 for others. But for me personally, if something 21 happens on shift -- and sometimes those don't even 22 have monitors, like I hope all my I's are dotted and 23 my T's are crossed.
24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What about from your 25 observations of working with others? Back when we NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.
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82 1 started this interview, we asked about people's 2 comfort level with raising concerns of a nuclear 3 safety nature. And you said it was your belief that 4 you can do that there, that concerns are raised.
5 1I believe you can.
6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I had "that people 7 can bring up concerns" is the way you put it. I don't 8 know if you were speaking for yourself personally or 9 for you and the people that you work with.
10 I think you can bring up 11 concerns at work.
12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you see other 13 people do that?
14 1I think -- I can't speak for 15 them, but I -- I believe other people can.
16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Have you seen other 17 people raise concerns?
18 Yes. Sometimes those 19 concerns are given a lot, and sometimes not as much.
20 So I know that -- I heard rumors that somebody 21 recently wrote -- brought up a concern, and he got to 22 speak to a lot of people.
23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: We'll get back to 24 that, too. But I just wanted to follow up on a point 25 you're saying. So you're saying that from -- from NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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83 1 what you've observed, people will raise concerns. If 2 they have a safety concern, they'll raise the concern.
3 They may not get the attention that they're looking 4 for, but they'll raise the concern?
5 I believe so, yes.
6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Are you aware of any 7 instances that would indicate or tend to inhibit 8 someone from raising a concern?
9I can't think of anything 10 specific.
11 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: How about 12 you? Because you feel like you're walking on thin 13 ice, if you saw something at the plant you thought was 14 not right, maybe there was something -- there was a 15 limit that was exceeded, very similar to off-gas, 16 let's say it's some other system, some other issue, 17 but it's a similar set of circumstances where there's 18 a limit, it's written, it's exceeded, but there's no 19 guidance. It's just -- it's something that's just 20 there. It's a number. It's whatever. You find that 21 on a system. What -- what action would you take?
22 I don't necessarily think 23 that I would be apprehensive of bringing it up as a 24 concern. I -- the only part that I would be 25 apprehensive about is that I don't -- I don't -- I'm NEAL R. GROSS 7/
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84 1 not apprehensive of bringing up a concern. Jumping up 2 and down would be probably another thing. Okay?
3 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.
4 1 would --
5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You're saying you 6 would be careful about how you would bring it up?
7.. I don't -- I don't fear 8 bringing up an issue. I wouldn't want to be 9 personally involved in a situation where I more than 10 once made my concern known, or more -- or not more 11 than once. I wouldnit want to be too vocal. That's 12 how I would like to put that. I wouldn't want to be 13 too vocal. I would want to bring up the concern, but 14 I would not want to be too vocal.
15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What happens if 16 you're too vocal?
17 I don't know if anything 18 happens. I just -- I've had some bad experiences, and 19 I would not like to -- I would not like to be too 20 vocal. I mean, I think it's important to -- if I see 21 something that -- it's important, that's a condition 22 of my licensing, it's how I want to do business. But 23 it's something that it -- I would not want to be too 24 vocal.
25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You're saying for NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
85 1 having raised a concern and being vocal, or too vocal 2 even, about something, you had bad experiences. In 3 what way?
4 I don't 1l know if it was 5 directly attributed to it, but I know it -- after 6 being relatively vocal about the off-gas and bringing 7 up reading the CROD and the portions of the CROD are 8 -- I thought that were not totally clear, at some
- 9. point later on I had some issues, which I believe that 10 I was treated differently.
11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Is that --
12 And I will term it as 13 harassed, but that's just my feeling. That's a 14 personal feeling, and others might not feel that. But 15 I--
16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.
17 - I1 had a bad morning in 18 the simulator, and that translated to months of pain 19 and--
20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you think it was 21 tied to --
22 (End of Tape 1, Side B. Beginning of Tape 2, Side A.)
23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: We're going to 24 Side A. The time is approximately 4:35 p.m.
25 What we were talking about is you're NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.
86 1 saying you're not quite sure why, but you can connect 2 in your mind being -- being too vocal about the off-3 gas issue with this remediation that you were placed 4 through at a later point in time. And how far apart 5 was that in time, the two incidents?
6 73.. Several months. I don't 7 know exactly. Maybe three or four months. And I'm 8 not saying -- is it -- as you said, in my mind, I --
9 I just -- as I use the word, I personally feel as 10 though I was harassed, but that's just -- that's my 11 feeling.
12 I don't know if that's true, and I use the 13 term "harassed" because I feel as though I was treated 14 so much differently than anybody else that I had seen 15 and/or heard about ever -- the severity of the -- or 16 just the different approach that I was given with my 17 remediation, the fact that I was given a written NRC 18 exam when I was led to believe that it was a 19 diagnostic quiz, which the term "quiz" I was --
20 although not necessarily happy with it because it was 21 a simulator failure, and they gave me a written, the 22 fact that they were going to give me a written 23 diagnostic quiz was abnormal.
24 But the fact that I did have the. 100-25 question NRC exam was --
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87 1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Definitely 2 different --
3 -- relatively extreme.
4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- you're saying for 5 -- for your experience from anybody else's for failing 6 a simulator exam.
7 And everybody I've talked to 8 or discussed the incident with, they are -- most of 9 them are taken aback by -- by the fact that they gave 10 me an NRC exam.
11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What about in the 12 months between from your being too vocal to this time 13 of the remediation? Were you experiencing any adverse 14 actions, anything from subtle comments through, you 15 know, something as as tangible as a financial loss, 16 a cut in overtime, you know, changing your shift, any 17 type of adverse actions that affected your working 18 conditions?
19 No, ma'am.
20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So nothing from when 21 yoq voiced your concerns at the meeting, and you --
22 you talked about the engineering evaluation on the 23 off-gas issue being what you felt was inaccurate, so 24 you --
25 I didn't necessarily say NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W...
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88 1 inaccurate. I just --
2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Wishy-washy I think 3 were the words.
4 I read yes, I read 5 I just read their words .out at the morning meeting.
6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You questioned the 7 finding on the engineering evaluation, is that right?
8 1 just questioned the fact 9 that they were raising the limit, and they -- wishy-10 washy I guess is a good way to put it.
11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Well, that was your 12 words, right?
13 I don't think -- I thought 14 you said wishy-washy. I don't think I said wishy-15 washy.
16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I think you said 17 wishy-washy.
18 *I have alluded to the wishy-19 washy.
20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Earlier it was wishy-21 washy. I'm using your words.
22 It was -- I don't think I 23 used wishy-washy. I used the term -- did I use wishy-24 washy?
25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Yes.
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89 1 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Yes, you 2 did.
- I Dang it 3
4 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Well, that's 5 all right. I mean, if that's what you think, that's 6 what you think.
7 No, I just -- I can't 8 believe I used wishy-washy. They were just basically 9 -- the phraseology was such that it was, you know, we 10 believe, you know, we feel as though they -- we --
11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Those are the words, 12 to my recollection, of why you called it what you 13 called it.
14 MI O Yes.
15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And I don't want to 16 sit here with the record going, "We're telling you 17 what you said," but 18 Oh, no, no, no. I wasn't --
19 I wasn't 20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Because we did this 21 off the record --
22 23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- right before we 24 started.
25 J I wasn't -- I wasn't saying NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.
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90 1 -- I wasn't questioning the -- if I -- I was just 2 questioning -- I'm shocked that I used the terminology 3 "wishy-washy," although I could have --
4 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: If you want 5 to pick a different term to describe --
6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Right.
7 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: -- it, go 8 ahead.
9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Go ahead and describe 10 it the way you saw it.
11 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: We don't 12 want to put words in your mouth.
13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You know, you can 14 call it anything you like.
15 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Yes.
16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: We just want to make 17 sure that it's accurate in your mind, it's 18 described --
19 Wishy-washy is pretty much 20 accurate. I just -- I'm more --
21 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.
22 I can't believe I said 23 wishy-washy. It was definitely -- like I said, they 24 used the phraseology, "We believe they used a non-25 conservative number." We -- they were -- we believe NEAL R. GROSS j COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.
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91 1 they used an overly conservative number. We do not 2 believe that it will build up, and I brought that up 3 in the meeti ng.
4 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: And what 5 kind of meeting was this that you brought this up?
6 It was a shift turnover 7 meeting, like a 6:30 meeting, that we --
8 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.
9 U- -- basically, the equipment 10 operators'normally have like other departments, like 11 rad pro and rad waste and chemistry are there.
12 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. And 13 you were there representing the shift, or what was --
14 *I was thea' so 15 I was giving the status of the plant. So --
16 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.
17 -- -- the status of the plant 18 -- I was mentioning .-- I went through the status of 19 the plant, and I said, you know, off-gas flow is high, 20 we've got this CROD, and I said I just want to read 21 you some of the things. And I had highlighted some of 22 the -- the --
23 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: The 24 important 25 -- the sentences that I NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.
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92 1 thought were non -- that were non-assertive.
2 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.
3 '7 I mean, and at which point 4 the shift manager said the limit is 90 SCFM, like it 5 may be -- was very assertive, might have even raised 6 his voice. And I -- I remember that only because one 7 of the equipment operators made -- as I talked to him 8 later that day for stuff, he made reference to the 9 fact that my shift manager was very --
10 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Who was the 11 at that time?
12 Thatwas()
13 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. Did 14 he actually talk to you about that after the fact 15 or --
16 7 After the fact, he called me 17 into his. office, and he said that he did not 18 appreciate me bringing up that concern in a public 19 forum. And at which point I responded to something to 20 the effect of, "I don't feel as though this is a 21 public forum."
22 This was the shift meeting, and it not --
23 off-gas flow not only affects operations, but it also 24 affects other departments, such as rad waste and 25 chemistry and stuff like that. I mean, it's a plant NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.
93 1 thing, and I didn't feel as though that was 2 necessarily a public forum. And I said public forum 3 to me would be if I went to USA Today. I said the 4 shift meeting is not a public forum.
5 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. What 6 was his response to that?
7 He was like, "I don't 8 appreciate that." And I can't remember the exact --
9 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Did he --
10 The feel that I got -- I 11 took away from him was that he didn't appreciate me 12 bringing that up in that meeting.
13 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.
14 j And that there was an 15 engineering evaluation done, and 90 was the limit, 16 and--
17 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Did he give 18 you an alternative? I mean, it sounded like -- it 19 sounded like you may have had some questions or 20 concerns about the way the limit was established.
21 Maybe there was a difference of opinion on how the --
22 that should have been highlighted.
23 But did he say, "I thought this was like 24 the wrong place, but you could go discuss it with the 25 engineer, or you could discuss it with me, or" -- I NEAL R. GROSS "*7/-
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94 1 mean, was there any offer of some other venue where 2 you could raise your concerns?
3 _ Not that I recall.
4 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Do you think 5 there should have been? Do you think you should have 6 said, you know, if -- if you have a question about 7 something or a comment or a concern, talk to me about 8 it or talk to the CRS or talk to the -- you know, I'm 9 trying to get your opinion here.
10 I mean, is there a stated policy on how 11 this kind of thing is supposed to be addressed within 12 the PSEG system?
13 I don't know of one. But if 14 the limit is.raised, I just didn't the part that I 15 disliked, about the CROD was not necessarily that they 16 raised the limit to 90. It was the --
17 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Basis for 18 it.
19-- the basis and the fact 20 that there was no, you know -- there was no definitive 21 statements. The number that they used was overly 22 conservative. It was like "we believe," and I -- I 23 almost -- I remember the words, "We believe -- we 24 believe they used" -- and it wasn't -- instead of --
25 I would have been more comfortable with the number NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.
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95 1 they used is -- was overly conservative, you know?
2 Hydrogen will not build up in off-gas. I mean, it was 3 never -- it was not --
4 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Was there 5 any--
6 -- phrased that way. There 7 was --
8 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Was there 9 any discussion about the technical basis for the 10 concern or the technical basis for the new limit?
11 That it was acceptable because -- I mean, even though 12 they said "we believe," was there any like tactical 13 discussion below that that supported why they believed 14 what they did? Orwas it strictly just.--
15 I can't -- I think there was 16 other stuff, but I -- and I might have just picked out 17 phrases that --
18 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.
19 J -- I disliked. But it was 20 -- it was all -- it was not just one page. It was 21 several pages. And reading through it, the sense that 22 I got, I personally summarized by those statements.
23 I mean, that was the feel that I got for -- I can't 24 remember exactly, but the feel that I got from reading 25 the whole thing was the overall, as I said, wishy-NEAL R. GROSS -7%
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96 1 washy - -
2 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. Do 3 you think that your involvement with that, and with 4 AMMand his recollection of that, do you think 5 that led to -- to some, as you describe, difference in 6 the way you were treated after the simulator exam, and 7 as far as the remediation program? Do you, in your 8 mind, believe that?
9I don't know. All I know is 10 I was treated -- all I know is I feel as though I was 11 treated differently. I don't --
12 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Did --
13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Were you --
14 I can't directly attribute 15 it, and I'm not going to accuse somebody of something.
16 So for lack of a better term, heinous as that --
17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: We talked about that.
18 -- I mean, that's -- that's 19 strong -- I'm not totally sure, but I think that's 20 illegal and stuff like that. So to make that kind of 21 statement, I don't know if I feel strongly enough 22 about it to make that strong of a statement.
23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: We talked about that 24 before we went on the record here.
25 Yes. And I still feel --
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97 1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And that you had 2 those concerns. And we also -- you're right, it is 3 serious and it is illegal. And we talked about how 4 that would be handled, if that's the allegation that 5 you're making. So --
6 *Yes. I don't feel as though 7 1I--
8 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Well, maybe 9 we should circle back and discuss a little bit about 10 what happened, just so we have it on the record. Can 11 you just --
12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Excuse me. I just 13 want to take a break. Off the record.
14 (Whereupon, the proceedings in the 15 foregoing matter went off the record 16 briefly.)
17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Are you still talking 18 or -- do you want to be off the record?
19 (Whereupon, the proceedings in the 20 foregoing matter went off the record 21 briefly.)
22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: All right. We went 23 back and forth briefly. It's approximately 4:49 p.m.
24 You were explaining that this is your hesitation in 25 terms of talking to us about the work environment, is NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.
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98 1 that you think your opinion might be kind of skewed 2 based on your own personal experience recently.
3 . j That's correct.
4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You don't -- or at 5 least at this time you're not alleging discrimination 6 against you for having engaged in protected activity 7 at this point in time.
8 . That's correct. I -- that's 9 too serious an accusation for a feel. I mean, it 10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: The other thing you 11 were saying, when I just -- when I went back on the 12 record, is you were thinking -- you said that you 13 don't think that the management team in place -- it's 14 not that they're not smart. You said that they're not 15 a good management team, I think it is. Can you 16 capture that, please, for why you would say --
17 q Once again, these are just 18 my opinions. I just don't think that they are -- I 19 read a book a long time ago by Michael Crichton like 20 -- called Rising Sun. And in that book they mention 21 a term, they mention -- as I remember it, is that the 22 Americans have a -- a phrase, whatever, it says that, 23 you know, "Fix the blame." The Japanese have another 24 similar saying, "Fix the problem."
25 That's what I think. I think that at work NEAL R. GROSS -'7C COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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99 1 they -- it's more about fixing blame than it is fixing 2 problems. It's -- we want to attribute the problem, 3 human performance problem or something like that, to 4 an individual rather than to an environment. And 5 that's how things are -- I personally feel they're not 6 -- Imean--
7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Would it --
8 I think there's also -- not 9 all -- I must confess I have a lot of very, very, very 10 good supervisors. And I could name those for the il record, and I would be happy to, but I don't think 12 that's appropriate. I have other supervisors that I 13 -- I honestly believe are out for themselves and want 14 to make themselves look good. And don't get in their 15 way. And some of that goes I think pretty high up.
16 But that being said, we've had some 17 changes recently. And from what I've heard, and what 18 I've personally seen, M " so far -- everything 19 I've heard about; has been positive.
20 So although I don' t know how everything is 21 going to end up, I think the introduction of f.
22 .into public service is a good thing so far.
23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you think that 24 some of the managers that are in place that you see as 25 -- with those behaviors as out for themselves and they NEAL R. GROSS 76 COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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100 1 fix the blame rather than fix the problem, do you see 2 that having an effect on nuclear safety on the site, 3 or the safe operations of the plant?
4 j No, ma'am. I think that 5 although I've lacked some personal respect for them, 6 I think that -- that I -- I can't think of anybody at 7 work that would jeopardize the safety of the plant in 8 any way, shape, or form.
9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Going back to your 10 experience with in that shift briefing 11 where you were criticized for being vocal in a public 12 forum -- I think is the way you described it -- had 13 that happened before, to you or to anybody else, for 14 raising concerns?
15 1I can't think of another 16 incident with me personally, and I don't know about 17 others.
18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You're not aware of 19 anybody being criticized for airing a concern in a 20 group setting like that?
21 1 can't think of one.
22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You can't think of 23 one.
24 I can't think of -- I --
25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.
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1 11 1 I can't recall.
2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Was that a first time 3 for you wit*,% where you learned that he 4 didn't care for you to state your position on that 5 engineering evaluation, or question the engineering 6 evaluation, in a group shift meeting?
7 That's all -- as I recall, 8 yes, that's the only time I can think of that.
9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: It seems like it had 10 an effect on you in terms of what you -- you say you 11 may raise a concern, but you wouldn't be too vocal 12 about it. How would you go about handling concerns 13 now that you would note?
14 I feel as though I can 15 definitely raise a concern. I guess it would depend 16 on the circumstance. Depends on the severity of it.
17 I would definitely want to get buy-in by my other --
18 my co-workers for one. I would definitely seek a 19 second opinion if it was -- I mean --
20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Something that you 21 had to push.
22 Yes. I would try to get 23 their buy-in and hope that, depending on the concern, 24 that they would help out if you will.
25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Support you --
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102
- Exactly.
1 2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- in that.
3 Do you have anything else on that, Scott?
4 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: No.
5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you want to get 6 into your --
7 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Yes.
8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- other incidents?
9 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: I have a 10 couple of specific technical issues that I want to 11 just go -- review and see if you have any knowledge or 12 involvement with any of these. One of the ones that 13 I was going to ask about was actually one we've talked 14 about a little bit, but it was the forced outage, 15 turbine bypass valve problem, reactivity management 16 problem that went along with that.
17 Were you involved in any way with any of 18 that activity, either the initial outage activity or 19 the -- on the boards for any of that or in a position 20 where you had some knowledge of what happened, you 21 know, from like a personal basis?
22 J I remember seeing the bypass 23 valve not indicating full closed.
24 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Were you 25 actually on the boards at the time? Were you -- I NEAL R. GROSS 7 COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.
103 1 guess what I'm asking, were you either the RO or plant 2 operator when that occurred?
3 No, I was not at that time.
4 I remember seeing it, but I don't -- I can't remember 5 if I came in to look at it, or --
6 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: okay.
7 - - or what the actual issue 8 was.
9 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. And 10 what was your opinion of that when you saw that?
11 Overall, my opinion was that 12 I didn't understand why it took so long, why we 13 operated so long. It seemed -- I can't remember the 14 details. It seemed like. that the bypass valve was 15 open for a long time, that it was stuck open for an 16 inordinate amount of time.
17 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: What do you 18 think the appropriate action should have been?
i9 I don't know the appropriate 20 action. But, I mean, because it should have been such 21 that, you know, get that bypass valve closed. I mean, 22 the -- shut down, close the MSIVs, and get Sam Rixey 23 if you have to, type of thing. I don't -- without 24 further review, I don't know exactly what -- I just 25 thought the bypass valve was -- we stalled too long or NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.
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104 1 we were at one level -- we -- there was inaction for 2 a long time with the bypass valve stuck open. That's 3 my overall --
4 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Do you 5 recall how long that was? I mean, was this like on 6 the order of seconds, minutes, hours, days?
7 Definitely hours. I believe 8" it's on the order of days.
9 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. So 10 you think that you were -- you were sitting in a 11 condition where you were at some low power condition 12 with your reactor critical? The bypass valve was 13 stuck -- stuck --
-* 14 J Well, eventually, when the 15 reactivity thing happened, it was definitely lower in 16 power, but I don't know exactly how high up in power 17 we got before we had the problem with the bypass 18 valves.
19 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: So that 20 actually --
21 CI think --
22 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: -- happened 23 on the way down? Is that --
24 I can't recall.
25 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
105 1 Yes, I thought it -- it was 2 on the way up. I can't remember if it was on-- if we 3 were recovering from an outage and it stuck. We were 4 loading the turbine, and we went to get the bypass 5 valves closed, and they didn't close, so I can't 6 remember.
7 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. Okay.
8 Do you have any other thoughts or anything else on 9 that?
10 Nothing other than I just --
11 it seemed like we were in limbo for -- for it seemed 12 like too long to me.
13 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.
14 " We do have lots more guys.
15 It seemed like we should -- could come to a decision, 16 and technically --
17 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.
18 -- you know, valid --
19 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Well --
20 , . j-. process or action plan.
21 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. All 22 right. There was a problem in June with the diesel 23 intercooler pump. Were you involved with that. at all?
24 : No, sir. That -- we were at 25 training I think when -- I just know that they NEAL R. GROSS --
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106 1 replaced it, and there was a bunch of -- it was like 2 the leak was very high, right? Leakage was high.
3 They replaced the pump.
4 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Was 5 your at the time?
7 Aiaand -
8 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.
9 .. -- it's kind of one of those 10 things, I think when they were fixing them, we were 11 actually at the training center.
12 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.
13 i So we were just hearing 14 updates like as in they found a leak on a diesel, and 15 it was so many drops per minute and --
16 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: All right.
17 So you didn't go in on overtime or --
18 No, sir.
19 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.
20 7 By the time we got. back it 21 was finished.
22 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: All right.
23 And do you remember a concern with use of temporary 24 logs, excessive use of temporary logs in the plant, 25 like where there's a lot of equipment that was out of NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.
107 1 service or that some way degraded and there was a 2 large number of logs? You know, more so than what --
3 you know, you said you were a nuclear equipment 4 operator, right?
5 W Yes.
6 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: So I'm sure 7 you've had to fill out a number of temporary logs in 8 your timeframe -- in your experience. Have you ever 9 gone through a period where you felt like there was an 10 excessive number, or you've heard of circumstances 11 where there were some concerns about excessive number 12 of--
13 Well, just recently the temp 14 log indexwas like two pages. We have.a full page now 15 of stuff.
16 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.
17 aS 18 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Is that 19 unusual, or has it been that high before? I mean, if 20 I went back and --
21 I think it has been high 22 before. But I can't -- but it seems to me like even 23 like, say, as recently as a year ago or something like 24 that, there was only a few temp logs. Now it's like 25 -- now it's like I'm going, "Okay. Which ones are NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
108 1 applicable today?" I mean, somewhere like, you know 2 -- somewhere like, you know, vibration data only on 3 Monday night. Other vibration data only on Wednesday 4 night.
5 This vibration reading is -- or this is 6 only taken on Saturday night, and then this is two 7 times a shift, and this is once during the day.
8 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. Let's 9 talk just kind of in general about that. The 10 vibration data that's being asked to be retrieved --
11 is that because of equipment -.- is there a reliability 12 issue where the engineer wants information and it's 13 just -- it's a convenient way of him -- him or her 14 getting the. information?. Or is it, no, there are some 15 real issues here?
16 The pump is vibrating or the piping is 17 vibrating, we really -- you know, I mean, it's really 18 indicative of plant problems that -- you know, it 19 seems like there's more plant problems now than there 20 was a year ago.
21 I definitely -- I think 22 there are a few -- the feel was I think that there's 23 a few more problems than there were, say, last year.
24 If they're significant, I don't know. BUt it 25 definitely seems like there's just little -- little --
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109 1 like more -- the plant is older. It's like a car; 2 there's a few more rattles and squeaks I think, but --
3 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. Has 4 anybody ever voiced any concern to you about the 5 number of logs? Is it something that's discussed on 6 shift?
7 1* It's discussed more as in a 8 -- a nuisance than -- than a problem.
9 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.
10 I--some of the stuff I 11 don't think -- it's just a nuisance. It just seems 12 like -- once again, like a joke, you know, fix it with 13 a temp log or a white caution tag.
14 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. Were 15 you ever aware of a situation with a -- where the 16 plant was brought up -- this is after power uprate, 17 was brought up in power, and there was a loss of 18 instrumentation.
19 ] Cross-flow?
20 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Yes. And 21 there was a loss of instrumentation, so that -- so 22 that the ability to monitor power was in some way 23 reduced. Did you ever hear of a circumstance --
24 Me 25 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: -- like NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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110 1 that?
2 .
,_g Where we lost cross-flow, 3 and the reactor operators wanted to reduce power. And 4 they were basically told to leave power as is. I 5 guess the two schools of thought are like, you know, 6 if something is wrong, and you knew it was before, by 7 the same token, if you don't have cross-flow, then 8 your limit goes to 3293, not 3339, because that's --
9 the power uprate is the 3339.
10 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.
11
- Whatever percent.
12 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Were you 13 ever --
14 1 personally wouldn't want 15 to be the one to make the decision to stay at 3339 16 megawatts thermal without cross-flow.
17 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.
18 I wouldn't be comfortable 19 with that if --
20 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: What would 21 you--
22 I would make a 23 recommendation to reduce power to -- to the minimum of 24 3293.
25 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. And NEAL R. GROSS 7..
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ill 1 then what --
2 Which is the previous 3 license limit.
4 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. And 5 then, what would -- what would your approach be if --
6 if there was no push to do that? I mean, if you make 7 the recommendation to your control room supervisor, to 8 the OS, and they don't do that, what -- is that 9 something you would push more? Or is that -- would 10 that fall in the category of something where --
11 I would talk to the licensed 12 operator, at least-- there's going to be at least one 13 other RO.
14 -SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER:. Okay.
15 I would talk to the other 16 RO, and I would definitely just -- we would definitely 17 discuss it.
18 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.
19 And if they perceive --
20 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: If he agreed 21 with you, what would you do? He or she agreed with 22 you. Would you --
23 . We would make I think--
24 maybe go as a team, a -- we both feel though -- as 25 though power should be lowered to 3293 minimum.
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112 1 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Is there a 2 procedure that actually says that now?
3 - Not that I'm aware of.
4 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okays. So 5 if--
6 It's one of those things 7 that you go to it as a team, That specific instance 8 I would think I -- if we lost cross-flow, I would make 9 reference -- I would talk to CRS and say, "Hey, you 10 know, we've lost cross-flow. Without cross-flow, our 11 limit is 3293."
12 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.
13 j If he -- he objected to 14 lower power, or like, you know, "I. think we should 15 lower power," and he's like, "No, we're not going to,"
16 I would talk to other reactor operator -- or probably 17 actually before this, even before I went to him, I'd 18 probably talk to another reactor operator.
19 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.
20 ] And then if -- continue 21 operation at that power -- elevated power level. I 22 would -- I think a log entry to the effect of license 23 -- myself and the other licensed operator feel that 24 without cross-flow we should lower power to 3293. And 25 we were basically told not to lower power.
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113 1 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Would you 2 put that in the log?
3 4 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. Has 5 this ever happened before?
6 That particular instance?
7 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Yes. Excuse 8 me?
9 - I'm pretty sure it has.
10 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Did the 11 operator put it in the log, that he has -- that he 12 made a recommendation that wasn't followed?
13 I believe so, yes.
14 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Was there 15 any repercussions because of that?
16 I I'-- I don't know. I think 17 after the fact --
18 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Do you ever 19 hear stuff through the union stewards and all? I 20 mean, don't you guys talk?
21 Yes, we do talk. Nothing as 22 in -- nothing was, at least that I know of, like 23 officially done to those guys who put that in -- in 24 the logs.
25 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.
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114 1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What about 2 unofficially?
3 1 1 haven't heard anything.
4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.
5 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.
6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Had that been an 7 issue more than one time, or was that just once that 8 cross-flow --
9 7 I think it happened twice 10 like in a relatively short span.
11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Days? Weeks?
12 I can't recall. I 13 thought --
14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:-- Do-you know who the 15 shifts were?
16 if I 17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: The shifts that were 18 on?
19 I don't recall. I believe 20 one of the supervisors involved was I 21 believe. This is -- I can't -- I -- this is how I 22 remember. I believe it was -- I believe 23 was the -- at least at one point the 24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What about --
25 And that power -- I believe NEAL R. GROSS 7 COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.
115 1 power was -- I believe one time they lowered power and 2 one time they did not lower power.
3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you know what the 4 other -- was it twice, or was it a different 5 Do youknow if it was 6 I don't know. I know --
7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- twice, or if 8 somebody else --
MOnow -- I know it was him 10 at least once, I believe. I don't have a lot of 11 details. I think some of the guys involved were on
..12 Echo shift. I think the I believe
.... ws at least one of the instances I 14 believe . I believe another one --. and this is just 15 possible. I'm thinking that this is -- I thought 16 maybe one was.,
17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you know which 18 incident came first, the one where they powered down, 19 or the one that they didn't power down?
20 I can't recall.
21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: But you think it 22 might have happened twice.
23 I believe it did happen 24 twice where they lost cross-flow data, I believe.
25 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Was there NEAL R. GROSS 77 COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.
116 1 any feedback either way on like -- they did it right 2 in this case and not -- not -- you know, it wasn't 3 right in this case? Was there any - - did you ever 4 discuss like, if it happens on our shift, we're going 5 to do this?
6 I know how -- I think it was 7 pretty clear what the license -- the reactor operators 8 would recommend what to do is to lower power. I can't 9 recall if we had some crew training on it. I know 10 that all of us, the guys that I know of, would ii recommend to lower power. And I don't know where this 12 is going, but I don'i know how this associates with 13 Sgiving up his license either.
14 SPECIAL-AGENT NEFF: f 15 J That's correct. I don't 16 know what timeframe that is. Actually, my -- I can't 17 -- I don't remember the timeframe, because then, not 18 too long after that, was the eing walked 19 offsite thing, so --
20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So those would be 21 individuals we might want to 'ask some particulars 22 from.
23 =J Well, you obviously know giý ave up his license, because 24 25 he felt strongly about certain things. And I know NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 7C 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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117 1 there were some --. I thought it was around the time 2 that ihad some issues with -- I don't know 3 all of the details. I was actually in license class, 4 but was escorted offsite.
5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: We could follow up 6 with those individuals for -- for that.
7 . Have you heard that -- you 8 had to-- you obviously heard about, but --
9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: We've heard of a 10 number of incidents. It seems like you don't have any 11 more firsthand information on --
12 No. But I know-- Ican 13 just tell you as a -- you talk about workplace 14 environment stuff, the **----i thing was bad.
15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: In what way?
16 .- Bad as in a workplace 17 comfortability type of thing. I know -- has his 18 way, but he is very, very smart, ýand a very, very good 19 operator; To have him walked offsite --
20 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: When you say 21 he has his way, what do you mean by that?
22 I mean he's got his own 23 personality. Everybody has got a different 24 personality, and his is -- can be --
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118 1 abrasive or something? I mean, was there something --
2 j He's not -- he's --
3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What makes him 4 different?
I find him to be a good guy, 5
6 but he's just -- he could push your buttons, but 7 that's -- he's --
8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you mean --
9 FI That's a good --
10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- in a way that's 11 difficult to deal with? Makes him more difficult than 12 somebody else to deal with? "Push your buttons" is 13 generally taken as not a good thing.
14 He has a dry sense of humor 15 type of stuff, an is very, very good. I won't 16 say anything bad about is great.
17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: We're not asking you 18 to say anything bad about him. Just looking for -- in 19 terms of --
20 He definitely has some -- he 21 had some disagreements with his supervisors, and --
22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. So you're 23 looking at this incident --
24 -- they became frustrated 25 and were basically escorting him off shift.
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119 1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And this changed the 2 work environment in terms of your comfort level. But 3 your comfort level was specifically what?
4 The relationship between the 5 union and management I know for a fact was strained 6 there for a long time. Would be still.
7 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: You know, 8 I've heard that before. What I wonder is, when I hear 9 that, is that -- when that's said, is it really 10 between the union and management? Or is it between 11 the parties that were involved with whatever the 12 disagreement is? Is it -- is it --
13 Definitely the supervisors 14 were involved. They definitely were --
15 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: 'Were what?
16 I would watch, as you say, 17 P's and Q's. I make sure I dot my I's and cross my 18 T's around those particular supervisors.
19 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: And why is 20 that? I mean, what -- is there something unique about 21 their behavior --
22 I don't want--
23 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: -- compared 24 to others?
25 . This is all hearsay, but NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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120 1 there is -- there's a feeling that basically that --
2 that those -- see, that's all -- it's all hearsay type 3 stuff. I don't want to go too much into that, but --
4 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: There's a 5 feeling that --
6 Not good, very 7 uncomfortable.
8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: But --
9 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Just with 10 these -- with these individuals or in general? Are we 11 talking about all supervisors, or are we talking about 12 certain ones, or what?
13 M M Certain supervisors are 14 definitely --
15 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Are what?
16 .1 I prefer to deal with 17 certain supervisors more than others, and there's 18 definitely a group of supervisors who I would not, 19 given the choice, deal with.
20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Is that based on 21 their particular management style, the way they handle 22 people, the way they act as leaders?
23 . Definitely, yes.
24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Are you -- in 25 considering that you don't want to deal with certain NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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121 1 ones, or you have a preference for dealing with 2 certain supervisors, is it -- have you found yourself 3 in a situation where you've been asked to do something 4 unreasonable, unsafe, against what conservative 5 operational decision-making would do? Are you looking 6 at it from that way, or just a personal preference in 7 terms of who you want to be working for?
8 I've never been asked, I 9 don't think, to do anything unsafe. Definitely not 10 that way, just a -- more from a personal -- I know --
if they could further their career by taking you down, 12 they would. Certain individuals I would not want to 13 deal with.
14 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Yes. I 15 think you had earlier talked about people you trust 16 and people you don't trust as much. And obviously, 17 the ones that you -- that would fall under the 18 umbrella of, you know, wanting to take you down are 19 ones you wouldn't trust as much.
20 I mean, is it just limited to the ones 21 that interacted with -- withf or is it 22 -- are there a number of other supervisors that are 23 like that?
24 There are some supervisors 25 that are like that I think. My personal opinion, I NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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122 1 feel as though there are certain supervisors that are 2 like that.
3 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Are these at 4 the OS level, or is this --
5 Some are OSs.
6 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: -- at that 7 level and above? Or is it CRSs or --
8 iSome are OSs, some are CRSs.
9 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.
10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Anything 11 further on your incidents?
12 I wanted to go back just quickly on the 13 off-gas issue. We asked about the cross-flow. You 14 think that the cross-flow and the indicators, in terms 15 of power levels, was a two-time incident. How about 16 the off-gas, since that was I think March of 2003?
17 Had that become an issue again?
18 I can't recall. I thought 19 it was slightly elevated, not to the extent -- I 20 thought not too long ago it was just slightly 21 elevated. But i think they found it recently, so it's 22 not an issue right now.
23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Do you have 24 anything else, Scott?
25 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: No.
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123 1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I run through some 2 questions at the closing. LM" if there's anything 3 you'd like to add to anything that we covered, you can 4 do so right now. Either something we didn't get to, 5 we didn't ask on point, or you think you'd want to --
6 you want to add in here, you can do that.
7 No, ma'am.
8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Have I or any 9 other NRC representative offered you any promises of 10 reward or threatened you in any manner in exchange for 11 your information today?
12 No, ma'am.
13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Did you appear here 14 freely and voluntarily?
L-5 Yes, ma'am.
16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. The location 17 -- I want to note for the record the location of this 18 interview is NRC Region I at King of Prussia.
19 The time right now is approximately 20 5:17 p.m., and we are off the record.
21 (Whereupon, at 5:17 p.m., the interview 22 was concluded.)
23 _7C 24 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.
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CERTIFICATE This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the matter of:
Name of Proceeding: Interview of Docket Number: 1-2003-051F Location: King of Prussia, Pennsylvania were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for the file of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission taken by me and, thereafter reduced to typewriting by me or under the direction of the court reporting company, and that the transcript is a true and accurate record of the foregoing proceedings as recorded on tape(s) provided by the NRC.
tisa S'criber Official Transcriber Neal R. Gross & Co., Inc.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.