ML061800027

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
OI Interview Transcript of Witness
ML061800027
Person / Time
Site: Salem, Hope Creek  PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 06/24/2004
From:
NRC/OI
To:
References
1-2003-051F, FOIA/PA-2005-0194, NRC-1556
Download: ML061800027 (55)
v • d • e


Text

"i

!/

  • Official Transcript of Proceedings NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION

Title:

Interview o0_

t'11 Docket Number: 1-2003-05.1 F Location: Wilmington, Delaware Date: Thursday, June 24, 2004 Work Order No.: NRC-1 556 Pages 1-54 NEAL R. GROSS AND CO., INC.

Court Reporters and Transcribers 1323 Rhode Island Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20005 (202) 234-4433

,,*.i.auosi in tVis record was 4eleted a: accordance with the Freedom of inf0m0011h Act, exemptions -2 ,

FOIA- _,______ -._

1 1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3

4 OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS 5 INTERVIEW 6 -------------------------x 7 IN THE MATTER OF:

8 INTERVIEW OF Docket No.1-2003-051F 9

10 (Closed) 11 -------------------------- x 12 Thursday, 13 June 24, 2004 14 15 1300 N. Market Street 16 Suite 400 17 Wilmington, Delaware 18 19 The above- entitled interview was 207 conducted.

21 BEFORE:

22 DAVID J. VITO, Senior Allegations Coordinator 23 JEFFREY TEATOR, Senior Special Agent 24 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

-A AA-2-3 WASHINGTON. D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.conn

2 1 APPEARANCES:

2 On Behalf of the Interviewee:

3 MICHAEL T. BISSINGER, ESQ.

4 of: Pitney Harden LLP 5 P.O. Box 1945 6 Morristown, New Jersey 07962-1945 7

8 9

10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.

-n . A A-)1 WASHINGTON. D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com

3 1 P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S 2 5:24 p.m.

3 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: 5:24 p.m., and now 4 we're going to begin the second interview. This 5 interview o the NRC has been conducting a 6 review and assessment of the safety conscious work 7 environment down at Salem/Hope Creek. You are 8 considered a witness in this investigation. There is 9 no NRC regulation regarding the safety conscious work 10 environment, but we have been conducting a review and 1i an assessment in that area down the plants, and you're 12 just considered a witness in this area. Although, you 13 know, I reminded you you are still are under oath. Do 14 you understand that?

i5 .Yes, I do.

16 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. And, again, 17 you're just. considered a witness in this 18 investigation.

19 Dave, you want to read off and then I'll 20' jump in.

21 SR. COORDINATOR VITO: Okay. It's just 22 for background.

23 Allegations, not just 24 allegations., but other allegations as well as 25 inspections that is also for the past couple of years NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS

. .~.... ..

1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

A1AQW2 r.JTnN D.C. 200053701 www.nealrgross.com

4 1 are the reason that we initiated the review.

2 Okay. You're probably aware, that 3 we've had issues in the PI&R area, the problem 4 identification and resolution area --

~~Yes. _ .

5 6 SR. COORDINATOR VITO: -- at Salem and 7 Hope Creek. And I'm an allegation coordination, so 8 I'm not incredibly versed in the new reactor oversight 9 process, but Pi&R is considered a cross cutting issue.

10 It's an area that effects all areas of the plant. It 11 relates to finding, identifying problems, getting them 12 into a process that can correct those problems and 13 taking action to make sure that they don't occur again 14 to the best of your ability.

15 We've had issues in that area, and you're 16 aware of a lot of those issues.

17 We got to a point in time where we just 18 felt we needed to do an independent look to see what 19 we could see. And it's pretty-different, probably the 20 first time the NRC's done anything like this for 21 proactively, I guess, is the way we would look at it.

22 We initiated the review in the fall of 23 2003. We've interviewed, how many, Jeff? Sixty-five.

24 Somewhere between 65 and 70 people. And about half 25 way through we got to a point where we had seen enough NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.

(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON. D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com

1 commentary from our interviews that we felt that we 2 needed to provide some findings to PSEG. There were 3 issues that we saw, we didn't want to wait three or 4 four or five or six more months to finish the review 5 and then say well then here's this big pile of issues 6 that we see. We wanted to make sure that the licensee 7 was aware of those ahead of time.

8 So on January 28th, I don't know whether 9 you've seen that letter or not, of '04 we wrote a 10 letter to Public Service giving them preliminary 11 findings. And I'll read through them briefly.

12 We had concerns as safety conscious work 13 relates to the handling of emersion equipment issues 14 and associated operational decision making. We had 15 concerns about the station's ability to effectively 16 address potential safety issues.

17 And we know that a lot of these comments 18 have been documented in inspection reports and 19 assessments letters, and we noted the substantive 20 cross-cutting issue and the problem identification in 21 the solution area.

22 Some of the specifics that our review 23 brought out were questions about the openness of 24 management, the concerns and alternative views, the 25 strength of communications, the effectiveness of the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON. D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com w

6 1 station's CAP, corrective action program and feedback 2 to that program, work management type thing. And 3 events involving disagreements or different 4 perspectives of operators and senior managers on 5 operating decisions particularly as they might impact 6 on continuing plant operations and outage schedules.

7 And we talked about a couple of those examples earlier 8 today.

9 And questions as to whether management 10 assessed and addressed the negative impacts of some of 11 these disagreement on the people at the station.

12 We Wanted to interview you a while ago.

13 We're glad we're getting the opportunity to do it now.

14 You're an integral person in what was going on at the 15 facility over the past few years, so we would like to 16 get your comments, perceptions, your impressions.

17 There were some assertions made about your 18 involvement in that area, and we're going to ask you 19 some questions about that. But .1 guess just to start 20 off with just a real general question, I wrote down a 21 comment that you said earlier today in a prior 22 interview that related to a different case about when 23 you came on board and you looked at the organization 24 and you saw that changes needed to happen. And I 25 guess I'll ask, I'll start with a real general NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS

)mn N.W.

r,,1, AVE..

1323 RHODE ISLAND li wwna lAWIraIMss.COm

7 1 question of did any of those changes relate to the 2 work environment broadly and problem identification 3 and how readily folks at the site knew about the 4 corrective action program, how easy it was to use, 5 that kind of thing?

6 If we could just start off with that and 7 then we'll go down into some specific questions from 8 there.

9 One change with SAP, right, 10 was to automate the corrective action program and link 11 it with the work management system. That really made 12 the corrective action program difficult. We were 13 taking a look at the corrective action program looking 14 at the backlog, looking at the identification of 15 issues, etcetera, that computer would allow people to 16 send notifications back and forth and then close them 17 inappropriately, etcetera. And so that issues could 18 live forever or issues could be closed incorrectly.

19 SR. COORDINATOR VITO: The old process or 20- the SAP, the new process?

21 J1 The new process. The new SAP

22. process. -

23 So we -- I want to say many occasions, but 24 went out and benchmarked our corrective action program 25 to the industry and revised our program according to NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

WASHINGTON. D.C. 20005.3701 www.nealrgross.com

/~

8 1 the -- in putting more line management reviews of the 2 corrective action documents so that we could improve 3 the process. We wanted to make sure that problems 4 were being identified. When the problem was 5 identified, that the root cause or approximate cause 6 was appropriate and germane to the issue. That was 7 one, you know, one change over the years. One change 8 over the years was to improve the effectiveness of the 9 corrective action program because the computer program I0 really set us back a little bit.

11 Benchmarked it a couple of times. Made 12 the changes. Put the corrective action review board 13 in process -- in place, put other committees in place 14 to improve the program.

15 We also came up with performance 16 indicators to track along the process. At my staff 17 meetings we would look at the performance indicators, 18 age of the corrective action program, number 19 initiated. The average age of the efficiencies 20 identified. That package was put together, it was put 21 together by staff -- excuse me, a lot of 22 reorganization with respect tothat. But that package 23 also became a part of the package that biweekly I had 24 a telephone conference call with video 25 conference. And it was a key indicator in there as to NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.

.AJIWIMNMO D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com

9 1 our -- whether the corrective action program was being 2 effective from this bean count and not from through 3 measurement of effecting some of the closeout of HIL.

4 We implemented leadership academy and 5 taught -- tried to put all the supervisors through the 6 leadership academy. And that process went through 7 change over the time I was there from non-existent to a six weeks, cutting back to I guess it's three weeks.

9 What I wanted to do in that program, give 10 them, the supervisors, basic fundamental leadership 11 skills. Ingrain in them the philosophy of safety 12 reliability, cost effectiveness through people. An 13 element of that was problem identification. An 14 element of that was assessment.

15 So I don't if that --

16 SR. COORDINATOR VITO: I understand. I 17 guess I want to ask, we have the benefit of going 18 through a lot of review up to this point in time. We 19 had a meeting with the utility in March to tell them 20 what the results were, as I had mentioned from the 21 letter.' And we asked them to come up with a plan to

22. make things better. At that time they had already had 23 Synergy in to do a review, to do a work environment 24 review at the site.

25 There was a group called ISA, which I NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND S^..%A1A W1KTn AVE.. N.W.

fnC. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com v

10 1 believe it's a -- USA?

2 3 SR. COORDINATOR VITO: A group of 4 individually owned utilities, and they were going 5 around the country doing assessments of work 6 environment, I take in response to the Davis-Bessie 7 incident. I think that there was an IMPO ER that 8 bought that out. And they also committed to doing 9 their own review. And they hired a bunch of -- some 10 ex-NRC people, a lot of utility executive types. And 11 they brought people in to do an independent review.

12 And out of all of those reviews together,

13. they sort of found that a lot of those things that we 14 mentioned in our letter were happening. And that 15 corrective action program problems were one of the 16 things they validated, you know, still -- equipment in 17 bad shape, you know, that stays there forever. People 18 put in condition report or notification after 19 notification after notification. The problems get 20 shuffled to the bottom of the pile and don't get 21 resolved.

22 I guess from your time there were you 23 frustrated? Did you see problems in projects in the 24 PI&R, the corrective action area?

25 .J Was I frustrated, yes. Did NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

- -  %**A ^.* r*tJý

%TP~ o mnr7 www.nealraross.com

11 1 I find the program acceptable, yes. Did I find the 2 program what I wanted it to be, no. The program had 3 deficiencies, right, and in the context using, right.

4 When I got there the backlog of 5 maintenance items was very high. And we placed that 6 indicator and started working off the backlog. At 7 different points in times, different years we put 8 monies aside to particularly solve longstanding 9 equipment problems on things. There was a long 10 backlog. We went after it from the equipment issues.

11 At Salem, the aux building vent vans were 12 always faiiingi the belts were always failing. We

'*3 found that we -- you know, wcame -- we

!14 just don't have the technical expertise to solve any 15 of these problems. So he went out and brought 16 expertise in, you know, consultants, brought them in.

17 And we just started ticking through the major problems 18 that we had, recurring problems.

19 CSCUs. was a problem. And it's a 20 complicated system, complicated control system but we 2i were able to make changes to the instrumentation 22 associated with it, and the number came down.

23 One year uthorized us -- you know 24 authorized, not in a sense of piece of paper, but I 25 made him aware that we're going to spend $30 million NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

AAnmAi Tnm nC. 20005.3701 www.nealrgross.com

12 1 above our budget to improve these equipment issues.

2 And we had identified for him what all the equipment 3 issues were so we get tick them off.

4 It was extremely frustrating to me. We 5 reorganized the engineering department when IMPO would 6 come into the reliability issue as opposed to the 7 maintenance issue so that we could get the engineer 8 closer for the mechanic so we solve the problem.

9 There were issues, you know, communications issues 10 between engineering, operation, maintenance as to our 11 effectiveness and what really was broke, what wasn't 12 broke, what should be fixed first.

13 One year we -- it seems like it was $5

14. million like eventually we put towards the chemistry 15 system to fix the problems we were having there, due 16 to a lot of little leakages, but it turned out to be 17 there were some major tanks leakage that just had to 18 be fixed.

19 I guess I'm trying to communicate with ten 20 years of service there was still a lot of equipment 21 problems, longstanding equipment problems that had to 22 be fixed. We were working on the most important ones 23 and bringing it down. And it was a dynamic interplay, 24 as you're aware of; the more you fix the more they 25 identify, the more it breaks the less likely they are NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W. www.nealrgross.com

.A.A..jIN. Tnm n C. 20005-3701

13 1 to turn in -- as long as it's hot, you know, safety 2 related equipment, important equipment, the operators 3 will start to lose your respect, your trust and not 4 turn in as many issues. But to comment that I and the 5 given manager would take a walk through the plant each 6 Friday so I could see for myself what the plants are 7 working on to ensure cleaning them up, right.

8 But I was aware of -- and very frustrated 9 with the continued issues of inability to get to the 10 bottom of the issue and solve. There were some issues 11 that I thought were either: (a) were not solvable or 12 just major undertakings. The grassing incident for 13 example. I just look at that system and say I don't 14 know how I'm going to keep the Delaware River from 15 generating all that grass, I just don't know to do it.

16 But that's like so what, like there's got to be 17 someone out there who knows how to do that. And so, 18 you know, we initiated a project to go do that.

19 The CSCUs, we initiated a project to try 20 and eliminate them, eliminate them and that has 21 something to do with the engineering analysis and make 22 these problems go away. So to make them go away, I 23 built in some redundancies.

24 We would do some surveys, PCP surveys, you 25 know, to make sure if people were still willing to NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

WASHINGTON. D.C. 20005-3701 www.neafrgross.com

14 1 identify issues. And with that it looked reasonable.

2 SR. COORDINATOR VITO: Everything you talk 3 about gets me into another. You talked a ECP, I'll 4 tell you one of the pieces of input we got and it was 5 also brought out by PSEG's subsequent review is that 6 all the elements were there for ECP to work.

7 Ys 8 SR. COORDINATOR VITO: But that a lot of 9 people, a fairly large percentage of the folks on 10 site didn't trust them. And I'll be frank, but the 11 reason that was stated as to why they didn't trust it 12 is because they knew they were tied directly to 13 1 At least the perception was there that an 14 issue would come in and you would know about it 15 relatively quickly, and that was the reason given by 16 a number of folks as to why they choose not to use 17 ECP.

18 Were you aware of that or what's your 19 comment or reaction --

20 IMR. BISSINGER:/'i I don't follow exactly 21 what you're saying. An issue would come in that he

22. was aware of and 7-23 SR. COORDINATOR VITO: Employee concerns 24 programs are alternative means of raising safety 25 issue.

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.

.. 1'- 1^A jrTnT rC. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com

15 1 ,MR. BISSINGER:" I'm familiar with the 2 program.

3 SR. COORDINATOR VITO: The standard 4 process is to go through the corrective action 5 program.

6 " R. BISSINGERjj' Right.

7 SR. COORDINATOR VITO: We don't regulate 8 ECP either. But we're interested in them because they 9 are alternative means to raise issues, and they can be 10 a place where condition adverse to quality is raised.

11 Sure.

12 SR. COORDINATOR VITO: And we would hope 13 that they're there and functioning and able to gather 14 those issues and then put them into the corrective 15 action process so they can get resolved.

16 I wasn't 1* aware that the 17 employees had'that concern.

18 SR.. COORDINATOR VITO: Okay.

19 "And I was insulated from it.

20 In other-woads", I had line managers between me and it.

21 SR. COORDINATOR VITO: Okay. But there's 22 a sense of anonymity -- it's more difficult -- it's 23 easier for me to -- someone's anonymity that comes to 24 me, but it's harder for an ECP director because he 25 works at the plant and he knows the person that NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS

--- 1323 RHODE ISLAND AI AUIPIMT-MJ AVE., N.W.

n r. 20005.3701 www.nealraross.com

16 1 brought the issue, and it's hard to follow it up.

2 '-MR. BISSINGER:"< I'm clear now. You're 3 saying that the program was directly tied to !so 4 they were concerned there was no anonymity?

5 SR. COORDINATOR VITO: That was the 6 perception. And we just wanted to hear , what he 7 thought of it. And, you know, do you remember being 8 tied in on ECP issues that quickly?

9 1$ Absolutely not. Absolutely 10 not. You know, had I know that was an issue, heck I 11 would have had& that thing move off 'site. I just 12 wasn't aware there was.

13 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did ECP report to 14 you while you were the m 15 N.

16 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Who did they report 17 'to, do you remember?

18 When I left'they reported to 19 '

20 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

21 And .I always kept it, you 22 know --

23 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: 'in turn 24 then reported to you, though.

25 *:* Yes, he did. Right. But, NEAL`R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS

  • 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. "N.W.

17 1 you know, in the end --

2 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Everybody reported 3 to you at the site.

4 Right. But I -- because I 5 used to test with the ECP people, you know, how was it 6 going, you know, do you have adequate resources, 7 etcetera. What's the sense of the troops? And we 8 used to do surveys. And I never got the feedback that 9 you know, people they wouldn't discuss this system 10 because it came to me. That's news.

11 SR. COORDINATOR VITO: I know they did 12 surveys periodically. Did.you think the surveys were 13 useful, successful, pertinent? I mean what's your 14 general comment about the ECP surveys?

15 *I mean, I thought they were 16 too general. They hit all the bold dots right, but we 17 were asking the same question year after year or 18 quarter after quarter. And in the end, you know, 19 employee is going to say aahh. So I think with time 20 they lose their usefulness.

21 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: The surveys do?

22 The surveys do. They'd have 23 to change the survey form.

24 SR. COORDINATOR VITO: Did it seem that 25 way after a while that they were not putting out NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com

18 1 useful information to you?

2 . The only thing I noted, 3 right, was there wasn't change in it, you know, in the 4 indicators. The one I watched closely was to make 5 sure that the age of the ECP item was working its way 6 down, met its targets, all right. And it did.

7 You know, I had a chance to a cursory 8 review of the -- independent review of the company 9 that -- on the safety conscious work environment and 10 it really struck me that this was a new approach or a 11 different way to do the business. And I just wish I 12 had that knowledge back then so I could improve the 13 system. I wish our people had that knowledge so they 14 could improve the system.

15 I on the one hand was probably lulled to 16 sleep because our manager at the ECP program,'or one 17 of the managers at one point. in time was highly 18 respected as an ECP manager, knew the programs, go i9 around the industry. So I really believed we had a 20 good program.

21 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Is it 22 Yes, it wap 23 So it surprises me.

24 SR. COORDINATOR VITO: Were other reviews 25 done of work environment while you were there? I'm NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS N.W.

1323 RHODE ISLAND lAfAcWIwI*TCtM nn AVE.,

5of*Sf.701 www.nealrgross.com

19 1 asking about IMPO/WANO type reviews. Were there other 2 assessments that were done periodically of that area?

3 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Work environment.

4 SR. COORDINATOR VITO: Work environment, 5 problem identification area?

6 Have a routine survey, it was 7 an annual survey. It dealt with the Gallup survey.

8 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

9 I can't -- there were other--

10 the implements we gave to the senior management team 11 to look at the leadership attributes which would, you 12 know, impact the employee's concerns or the work

13. environment, and so we did that, yes.

14 SR. COORDINATOR VITO: We were given 15 information that at least in some context IMPO 16 provides some feedback on the work environment when 17 they do their assessments. Is that true or not true?

18 w1 I don't recall them doing 19 that for me.

20 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I got a question.

21 SR. COORDINATOR VITO: Go ahead, Jeff.

22 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I mean it's a 23 little bit different area. And I'm going to describe 24 a meeting to you where a number of people have 25 testified that you made a statement, it's the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND

%AIA ul1IhI/TI)M AVE., N.W.

n (-. 20005.3701 www.nealrgross.com v

20 1 )you don't it meeting." Do you remember that 2 meeting?

3 ,,. No, but I remember making 4 that statement.

5 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: What we understand, 6 there was an incident that happened in one of the 7 plants and then you then had a meeting with the 8 licensed operators at the site, SROs and above where 9 you made a statement you don't get it. And from what 10 we've been told the -- well, first, did you recall 11 that?

12 .a This was the lightening event 13 of '99 at Hope Creek?

14 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. Yes. Okay.

15 And it's been reported to us that during that meeting 16 you informed the operators that they didn't have the 17 power or authority to bring the unit --

18 .I To increase power.

19 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Increase power, 20 right.

21 Okay. Yes.1 22 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Can you go ahead 23 and share with me?

24 I was the 25 .

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com

21 1 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

2 And I was in the control room 3 like at night. I was there with the shift supervisor.

4 And the unit took a lightening strike. And all the 5 indicators came on, they all came on and all the 6 lights down here, one way or another. And, you know, 7 the shift supervisor is standing there wondering are 8 we still on line. So he's focusing on the reactor 9 power level indicator, he's trying to see. And he 10 says, you know, nobody touch anything.

11 So from that event I learned lightening 12 strikes, big problem.

13 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

14 High stress for the 15 operators.

16 When I was the executive for Entergy my 17 responsibilities for Grand Gulf. Grand Gulf would 18 reasonably get hit with, lightening during this time 19 period, fairly' reasonable, fairly regularly, and it 20 could end up with a trip, right?

21 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

22 "fif . Again, I m into the impact of 23 lightening strikes. My biggest learning or one of the 24 biggest learnings off of TMI -- I wa 25 > -- one of my biggest learnings was NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

.... ,A,^uDO nLI m n n 2n00f3701 www.nealraross.com

............. 67-* ........

22 1 you have to have the shift call off site. They have to 2 tell you that there's some transient undergoing at the 3 power plant, that they need the Marines.

4 MR. BISSINGER: When you say "Marines,"

5 just - -

6 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: You call that the 7 TARP process --

8 *. The TARP process.

9 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- is that where it 10 eventually it evolves into the TARP process?

11 '* 2 Eventually it evolves into 12 the TARP process, right. But I mean I had to call off 13 site so someone knew the plant was undergoing a 14 transient, right?

15 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

16 ,9 And in this situation the 17 phone call went off site. It went to an AOM, right.

18 He took the call. The OM, operation manager of the 19 site, convened to him took the lightening strike, took 20 a look around, I'm ready to increase power because we 21 had even undergone a runback to about 80 percent 22 power. I'm ready to go up.

23 The OM, you know, thought-about it; should 24 I go in the plant, shouldn't I go in the plant, 25 elected not to go into the plant. He told me, he NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.

.- - _J _ n^A~nc 17M uuwu no=mlrnrn.g.trom

23 1 elected not to go in because he had a SORC meeting 2 that morning and if he went now, because it was 3 sometime during the evening, he would be too tired, he 4 could to the SORC meeting.

5 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: SORC.

6 SORC, right.

7 So we went up in power and we had violated 8 -- operations because the heat water valve shut and 9 the heat water -- and I was really upset because my 10 expectations were that someone has to go to the 11 control room from off site and see the whites of their 12 eyes. I mean, these people have just undergone a 13 significant transient, what is really happening in 14 that power plant. What's really happening in the 15 power plant, what kind'of head are these people in? Is 16 the plant safely shutdown at point and in a stable 17 condition. I mean, that has to occur, the purpose of

.18 this phone call.

19 And I found out there was no such process.

20 There was just that phone call and then the receiver 21 of the phone call can elect 'not to go to the power 22 plant.

23 SPECIAL-AGENT TEATOR: Right.

24 And an SS could then just 25 increase power level. I'm saying, see, he'd just NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005.3701 www.nealrgross.com

24 1 undergone this transient. These same guys that are 2 shook up, if you will, take a look around and puff, 3 they miss the light on the control room panel. That 4 can't happen.

5 So I had this meeting, right, to say you 6 don't get it, you know. The plant undergoes a severe 7 transient, right, you can't raise power level again 8 until you know the accurate status of the power plant.

9 Bringing people in, have them walk around and be 10 available to the OS or oM to support whatever needs he

11. has. And so you don't get it.

12 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

13 Why are you increasing power?

14. There's this comment production over safety.

15 SR. COORDINATOR VITO: We're getting 16 there.

1~7 I'm saying why are you 18 increasing power level. I mean, it -- I'd had, you 19 know, a different -;- you know, the same topic but a 20 different conversation with Dave Garchow. Dave, when 21 we take the reactor critical, it's 1 a very involved 22 process, detailed procedures, etcetera. That same 23 analogy applies not just taking it critical, but 24 taking the unit up in power. -

25 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did he disagree NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

...... ' 'MMf,.1701 www.nealrgross.com

25 1 with you on that area that you don't get it issue?

2 Did disagree with --

3 No, he did not disagree with 4 me.

5 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

6 And from there started 7 saying, oh yes when I was in Vwe had things 8 similar to the TARP process. I got it. I know what 9 you want.

10 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: From that meeting 11 that you just described that you had with the licensed 12 operators, did.the TARP process evolve out of that?

  • ....Yes.

13 14 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. Now, I want 15 to ask you this question, g1oing forward in time did 16 anyone bring to your attention or say to you that this 17 TARP process, the you don't get it. message turned

18. around to where the licensed operators, the shift 19 managers felt they didn't have thepower themselves to 20 take the plant down in power?

21 No. No And like I 22 mentioned to you, my conversations with them, right, It1.

23 when I became right, my conversations at an all 24 hands meetings, right, my conversations at the senior 25 leadership academy or leadership academy graduation, I

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

. .' V' 2fA ',,fl wwww.neafraross.c0m

26 1 my conversations to them being licensed operators, 2 right, the day they got the license we hold a dinner, 3 a celebration appreciation, right. And I would.

4 deliver the message or would deliver the message 5 of you've got the license, got to shut the unit down.

6 So, I mean, no.

7 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Because at some 8 point the units didn't have a plant manager position, 9 is that correct?

10 .i Each unit, that's correct, 11 yes.

12 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. There came 13 a point in time at that artificial island that there 14 was no plant manager for each unit. And what people 15 have told us is. that taking that into account and the 16 TARP process becoming a -- I'm going to use my word --

17 a beast of its own, that because there's no plant 18 manager and you had this TARP process, it became a 19 decision by committee type issue on which way the 20 plant is going to go, up or down, not led the shift 21 managers, SROs and even ALNs to feel they -- they I

22 didn't have the power to move the plant where they 23 thought it needed to go up or downl in power. I'm 24 asking for you --

25  : I mean, but you can see how NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.

.* , 'MIcnnri7An www.nealrgrosscom

27 1 it could evolve to that, right?

2 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Some people it did, 3 yes.

4 SR. COORDINATOR VITO: That was the 5 feedback that we got.

6 When we had the TARP process, 7 right, the OSs, the shift managers.loved it. Because 8 prior to that they'd have to personally call -- you 9 know, if they needed an engineer, you need a mechanic.

10 They had to make their own phone calls. I'm saying 11 we're here to serve them, right.

12 So what you're feeding back to me is it 13 took a life of its own and we nuclearized it or 14 Salemized it or something and it missed what I had 15 originally set out for it, and I didn't help it out.

16 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Question. You 17 mentioned that at least initially the OSs loved the 18 TARP process, is that correct?

    • .iYes.

19 20 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: At some point, 21 though, the OSs, shift managers were lead to believe 22 that inoperability decision, they were led to believe 23 that they had to then try and prove that something was 24 inoperable before an action could be taken as opposed 25 to -- well, this is what we were told by people and NEAL R. GROSS ic_____

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE,. N.W.

-.. " , n irYA7ni1 www nealross com

28 1 this is the impression we've gotten in testimony that 2 people at their level were led to believe that 3 something had to be proven inoperable before they 4 could take the plant down. It had to be -- instead of 5 the other way, you have to prove it's operable.

6 That's the industry standard.

7 YeS.

8 MR. BISSINGER: That's why we wrote the 9 letter.

10 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Could you comment 11 on if you had knowledge that --

12 I had no knowledge.

13 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- people at that 14 level -- at least some of them felt that's the 15 direction they were being given.

16 1,Im glad you did the reviews.

17 I didn't know that. We put engineers on shift to help 18 the manager. We had, you know engineering problems 19 was there to help the SS do operability 20 determinations, right. But how that ot twisted, you 21 know, at least in some of their minds that you've got 22 to prove the equipment is inoperable 23 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. Actually, 24 that feeling among OSs, operation supervisors, 25 shift managers'led them to ask for a meeting with" NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND

%A1AQWIMrTnN AVE., N.W.

D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com

29 1 where that very issue was brought up to 2 and the OSs wanted clarification on what management at 3 the site wanted --

4 That's great.

5 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- on that very 6 issue. Well, it's not great, because they thought it 7 was a problem.

8 :J What I mean is it's good they 9 had the discussion, is what I'm saying.

SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. But the bad part of that -

12 The bad part, they shouldn't 13 had the discussion.

14 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. And they 15 did have it, but then they-did not get satisfaction 16 from that conversation with * . Was any of that 17 brought to your attention at all?

18 19 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR-s. No? And that would 20 have been with while he was still theA too over in -- I'm ot sure when he 21 22 took over.

23 - I'm not either. Late '02.

24 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: But this happened 25 when thever Das NEAL R. GROSS:i,,'."

COURT REPORTERS AND.TRANSCRIBERS 1323. RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. ~ AWfAIrlScr

30 1 bring that to your attention?

2 I don't recall, no.

3 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Because stuff like 4 this strikes right at the --

5 - Nuclear safety.

6 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Oh, yes.

7 I mean, I'm there.

8 SR. COORDINATOR VITO: To go one step 9 further on the production versus safety issue. I'll 10 use that bypass valve issue as an example and get to 11 my question from there.

12 When we got this comment from a number of 13 people, when that event happened and it did take what 14 a lot of folks perceived as an inordinant amount of

.15 time to make the decision to shut the plant down, 16 questions were asked to the effect of there's got to 17 be pressurecoming from somewhere for us to be sitting 18 here waiting to shut the plant down. And a lot of 19 that perception led to corporate. Are people on site 20 being told by folks at the corporate office, you know, 21 keep that thing up at all costs if you can.

22 i Yes. Absolutely not.

23 SR. COORDINATOR VITO: And that's my 24 question. Were you ever aware of a situation, not 25 just that but any other time where you or you were NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W. www.nealraross.com

-4 AIA WARHINMTON. D.C. 20005.3701

31 1 aware of any other manager at the site being contacted 2 by, pressured by, whatever by someone at the corporate 3 office to keep the plant on line?

4 To keep the units alive?

5 Absolutely not. Absolutely not. I mean, W -- you 6 know, I reported strictly toAft I mean, is --

7 well I think you know he's an 8 'I mean he operated the plant safely.

9 I mean, those are the things that scare me to death.

10 It concerned me, and I've had 11 conversations with -- it concerned me even the control 12 room talking to a load dispatcher.

13 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: That's right.

14 How that conversation goes.

15 It concerned me, and it's because it's the world, if 16 there's anything I can do about it, they -- the 17 operators, they know what the price of electricity is, 18 right.

19 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: In a new 20 environment.

21 In a new environment.

22 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Deregulated 23 environment.

24 . In a new environment, yes.

25 But so do you and I in a sense of it's summer, it's NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.

WAqHIN(rTnN D.C. 2000553701 www.nealrgross.com

32 1 hot, electricity is going for a high price, you now.

2 It's the fall, mild weather, if you will, there's 3 excess generation. I mean, they know that, right.

4 But my messages to them, right, is you have to ignore 5 that. You know, it's no way could safety be 6 compromised by production. And that was everything I 7 was about, given all these speeches I alluded to 8 earlier.

9 SR. COORDINATOR VITO: You mentioned that 10 you reported directly to 11 Ys 12 SR. COORDINATOR VITO: And we've gotten 13 several comments when came in that 14 reporting chain didn't exist anymore.

15 That's correct.

16 SR. COORDINATOR VITO: Your. replacement 17 now had to report through -No.

X 18 And the assertion that has been stated to us is that

.19 that's not a good thing, that '"is not a 20 nuclear person and he's more from the business side of 21 TS and the making power side, and isn't that going to 22 be detrimental to future, you know, operations in 23 terms of how upper management looks at production 24 versus safety. Before you left did you ever hear that 25 kind of commentary? Do you care to offer any comment?

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.WA (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com w

33 1 I mean I could see how it 2 could it could occur. I don't remember anyone making 3 those kinds of statements. I could see how it could 4 occur. But in the end a nuclear person ends up 5 reporting to a non-nuclear person because there are 6 very few top nuclear people, you know. Even the 7 Entergy Generation Company ends up reporting to, you 8 know, a non-nuclear CEO of a corporation. So I mean 9 that's -- that is reality.

10 I know.

  • had gone off to the MIT 11 school.

12 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:

13 So, I mean, 14 did have some --

15 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did have some 16 training.

17 Did have some training. But 18 actually knew -- I mean, the company has been 19 through enough problems over its history at the Salem 20 units that' "knows the plant has to be operated 21 safely. Let the board of directors do it.

22 I believe that, and I don't know this, 23 right, that thenuclear community of the board still 2.4 exists. And it's the outside directors. And while I 25 was there was not a member of that committee, but used NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

I(922 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com

34 1 to attend that committee meeting in executive session.

2 I was the oof Salem/Hope Creek. So I 3 still had the access around right to the board.

4 Always had the access to go around him to too.

5 And that didn't change. Like you're saying, the only 6 change was there.

7 That made sense to me, putting 8 there. Administratively it becomes cumbersome. The HR changed back and forth, back forth. By that I mean 10 over the years at the site nuclear had their own 11 company, did away with that. Not just in nuclear, but 112 everywhere.. And then brought in someone --

13 prior to but the same role. And that 14 individual now is. trying to get up to speed, so where 15 HR and going right to process. We're going 16 straight to HR. With the passage of time, well 17 in there so it's a complicated IR issues, complicated human resource issues and .putting. p i I. in charge 18 19 cleaned that up.

20 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: People have said to 21 us during our review that the day your retirement was 22 announced, on that very day the power and reporting 23 relationship changed where, you know, at that point 24 was in charge of nuclear. The day of 25 your retirement was announced that at that point NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com

35 1 Mwas in fact running nuclear. Can you comment 2 on did anyone express .a concern to you while you were 3 still there that was running the nuclear 4 organization and he wasn't just qualified to? Anyone 5 express that to you?

6 I was responsible for the 7 safe operation of the facility.

8 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Up until the day 9 you left?

10 Up until the day I left, 11 right.

12 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

13 14 !talked to me and says I'm trying to hire a 15 training manager and he had .gotten -- you know, some 16 feedback. He couldn't do it. I say what's going on.

17 So :he ends up calling,9. right. gives 18 -him a message that he can't do it, right?

19 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: He can't do it?

20 A*  ! Can't do it. I had no idea, 21 all right, prior to this conversation that they had 22 frozen those jobs. That' A ;had stepped in. I 23 called~i and said, you know, what's going on? And 24 he said for the critical jobs, and the training 25 manager was a critical job, he wanted to fill that NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

WARHINGTON. D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.coin

36 1 with a -- he wanted to be involved in the filling 2 of that job.

3 2MR. BISSINGER::X What was the timing of 4 this? How close was this to period we're talking 5 about.

6 It's close to the end.

7 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I think people have 8 said what did he do in your actual retirement, because 9 it would have been right about that time that people 10 are saying --

11i . Like the 8th of March.

12 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. So it's 13 probably --

14 Three weeks.

15 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- around that time 16 period.

17 . And, you know, like I said it 18 was a shock to me. If 'would have communicated 19 that to me, if would have communicated to me 20 that that's what he wanted and that was going on, I 21 don't think would have had issue. I don't know 22 how far around the falls it would have gone, but I 23 think it was also brought back up to me.

24 (Whereupon, a recess.)

25 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: It's 6:12 we're NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323

.. -RHODE

,-6 V r% ISLAND l r AVE.,

V N.W.

nn -V3701 www.nealrgorss.com

37 1 back on the record.

2 I guess' is there something you want 3 to continue with.

4 Well, I was going to say when 5 I had put -- I told that to I don't know exact 6 date, but came to the site. He came looking for a 7 house, he stopped by the site. He and I had a 8 discussion. He said he didn't agree with that, that 9 you know when he took over the site, he'd do whatever 10 is there when he takes over the site.

11 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

12 And I told him to tell 13 that and I presume he did. I don't know that.

14 SR. COORDINATOR VITO: Can I just ask a 15 quick question. Other the training manager job, did 16 you feel in any other way that '.Isomehow 17 marginalized your ability to run nuclear after -- in 18 this March-time period --

19 ., Oh, it wasn't as the training 20 jobs.- It was both jobs we were looking for.

21 SR. COORDINATOR VITO: Whichever job --

  • i"Right. Yes.

22 23 SR. COORDINATOR VITO: -- you were talking 24 about, did you feel that he had in addition to that 25 somehow marginalized your ability to run nuclear as NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON. D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com w

38 1 you saw fit?

2 I mean I thought I could run 3 nuclear safely with or without the plant manager, but 4 his decision had an impact on the station.

5 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes, it did on 6 people. It left them with that impression that he was 7 running the show.

8 1R. BISSINGER:X Did you have that 9 impression, :Mwas somehow running 10 the show?

11 No, I did not. Running the 12 people show, but not that. Not the plant.

13 SR. COORDINATOR VITO: Just a couple more.

14 Hopefully, we can get this done fairly quickly.

15 We did receive some comments about your --

16 the monthly leadership meeting that you ran and that 17 -. ran I guess prior in that time frame. And I 18 guess the general comment was that those meetings were 19 pretty hard hitting if not intimidating. And I just 20 want to get your comments on that, how you think those 21 were and whether you think anybody could have been 22 negatively effected by how those meetings were 23 conducted?

24 No, I can't recall the 25 subject matter of any of the meetings. They were NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.

,,,AluIkMTA nr. M05-3701 www.neafrgross.com

39 1 direct in the sense of trying to explain our 2 performance, what issues we had and could have adverse 3 impact on anyone, any person. Yes, they could have.

4 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I have something.

5 SR. COORDINATOR VITO: Go ahead, Jeff.

6 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Go back to talk 7 about, for a minute.

  • wo Yes.

8 9 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And I talked to you 10 about the perception that the OSs and shift managers II had under 'regime that things had to be proven 12 inoperable before they'd be allowed to move the plant.

13 Now, that impression on that level of 14 people continued to the iregime as, 15 Did anyone.make you aware when,:becamel 16 hat they felt that, that they were concerned in 17 that area?

No. I can't recall.

18 19 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. Now, you've 20 testified earlier that when the bypass valve issue 21 happened in March of 2003, you believe you were away 22 from the site then the day that issue -- the day and 23 a half that that issue occurred on the site.

24 25 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: From what we NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.

(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com

40 1 understand,.- was acting for you 2 while you were gone.

  • Yes.

3 4 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And on that issue, 5 had a discussion with about 6 the bypass valve issue. Dids e 7 you his conversation with 8 I don't always hearj.

9 UI was aware that he called. because 10 I had left directions for each of the VPs, like if I0 they find -.- if they are acting in my stead and the 12 plant undergoes a transient that they need to give a 13 cursory. call to so he knows the plant 14 underwent a transient and describe what the transient is was.

16 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Now, when you were 17 acting as the when you in place there was a 18 transient in the plant, were you required to giveM 19 1 'such a call also?

20 N ".Required, no. Did I, yes.

21 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Why would you?

22 It was just perfunctory, 23 right. Transients are a potential indicator of a 24 problem at the power plant. He was my boss. My 25 analogy is if the plant underwent a transient, I NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS.

1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.

-,,^cuulk"rT-M nl 9flAO.701 www.nealrgross.com

41 1 expect.the to give me a call. Why? Because I'm 2 responsible for the operation of the power plant.

3 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

4 Am And the same analogy now back 5 to*

6 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. During any 7 of those discussions you had with 8 surrounding the transient in the plant, did he provide 9 any type of direction that he wanted the plant taken 10 back up, increase power, come out of an outage when 11 you felt the plant really couldn't do that at that 12 point?

13 Absolutely not. Absolutely 14 not.

15 IF had a keen interest-in the technical 16 aspects of why you were where you are, whether you're 17 coming up and you're delayed or whatever. And, you 18 know, many outages we were delayed.

19 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. I think the 20 record can show that.

21 k Yes. And I'd just tell him, 22 you know, here's what's happening. There was never 23 any pressure back to me, any comment that would 24 indicate I want you to move the plant up. Never.

25 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: That was my next NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

(202)

. o 2344433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com v

42 1 question. I mean, you have outages which are planned.

2 Planned ones, they don't go 3 well.

4 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

5 .1 We have outages that are 6 inadvertent.

7 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

8 ii And for each of those we put 9 together a schedule and I get the schedule.

10 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

11 ' wants to know.

12 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. So when 13 those outages are longer than scheduled, planned or 14 unplanned, would you call 'and let him know 15 that and the reasons why?

16 4 Most times. Sometimes, you 17 know, like give him a quick call. If we're over a 18 minute, give a call, tell him we got a new 19 schedule, right. It ain't like that.

20 The plant was down, he knew the plant was 21 down.

22 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

23 He had a feel for when it was 24 going to be up, indicate to it. If it didn't get up, 25 it didn't get up.

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

%AAU,^u tATnK1 nrl 2nOnn.53701 www.nealmrros.com

43 1 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. But when it 2 wouldn't get up and it would go into more days of 3 being in a outage, would you then call him back and 4 explain to him where the plant was and why it wasn't 5 back up?

6 I would keep him apprised of 7 the change in schedule. It wasn't a requirement, and 8 sometimes I did it. You know, , hadn't asked for 9 that or anything like that, it was just me give him a 10 call.

11 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

12 You know, it's like when a 13 new schedule came out, and it wasn't like people 14 quickly going like this and giving it to him. I'm 15 trying to communicate that if I knew that we had to 16 extend the outage for two weeks, you know --

17 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

18 'Mi I'd tell him' Tell him, hey, 19 I:might tell him tomorrow.

20 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right. If 21 Kwere unavailable to you, on vacation, out of 22 country, whatever, would' you then have those 23 discussions with 24 25 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com

44 1 f. I started having those 2 conversations with because he was, you know, 3 responsible for generation, and so he'd know.

4 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. Question.

5 During any of those discussions you had with 6 gdid they put any undue pressure on you to 7 get those plants back up when you didn't think they 8 were ready to do so?

9 .. . Absolutely not. Absolutely 10 not. Those were pretty much -- you know, the 1i communication was one way, here's where we are, all 12 right. They'd ask informational questions, why it's 13 down, how long do you think it'll be done. I'd'answer

.14 the question.

15 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: You understand why 16 I'm asking you?

17 Yes, I understand why you're 18 asking me. Absolutely not.

19 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did the 20 conversation in that area about a longer outage or the 21 plant not being able to come up schedule, when you had 22 those discussions with ew was it more challenging 23 from him than it was under 'when you had those 24 conversations with 25 'ý No. I viewed them as less NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

,'n'* *.A AWASHINGTON. D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealraross.com

45 1 challenging, right. And by that I mean i'was --

2 because he was a technocrat.

3 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

4 If you tell him down because 5 of the -- oh, is that the green part of the coffee cup 6 or the other part. So that -- ,phone calls were 7 always longer because he was interested in it, you 8 know, and it was no pressure the VP on up or anything 9 like that, it was just interest in --

10 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: He had a background 11 in the industry.

12 . , Yes, the depth was 13 phenomenal. - didn't have that kind of 14 knowledge, you know. We're down, you know, how long 15 you down for. And there is nothing given back.

16 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

17 SR. COORDINATOR VITO: While you were 18 there were there a lot of ops managers at Salem.

19 A A" Yes.

20 SR. COORDINATOR VITO: Did you ever step 21 back and ask the question, you know, how come we got 22 a revolving door.here?

23 *Yes, we talked about that 24 quite a bit. We thought we were selecting the right 25 person for the right reason. Sometimes we didn't NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

. ... . - . - - ý - 17%

wmjw 111p;,:1mrI assI,.II I

46 1 support them properly. I don't know what that support 2 would look like, but we didn't support them properly.

3 And* got real frustrated because of the work 4 management process, program.

5 That was also one of the reasons why we 6 put n that because of Salem. Rather 7 than to out to the street and bring another person in.

8 SR. COORDINATOR VITO: Well, a lot of the

9. perception that we got on this that we got was they 10 were back to the feel they were being over challenged 11 from the operational decision making area. Did that 12 ever -- was that ever a question with you?
13 No. No. But I'm not quite 14 sure what you meant they were over challenged, but I'd 15 meet with those guys and they -- you know, the 16 operations manager one-on-one. And they had the 17 opportunity to convey to me the issues they had. And 18 that never came up.

19 SR. COORDINATOR VITO: Not you necessarily 20 directly, but that they had to go through more hoops 21 than they thought they needed to in order to be in 22 charge in the control room to make the decisions that 23 they needed to make; that's the kind of comments that 24 we got.

25 . Yes. I don't what that -- I NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON. D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com v

47 1 thought -- I'm interpreting the comments right now.

2 That process became more bureaucratic. Depending on 3 the issue, they may have talk to may have to talk 4 to to. * - -

5 SR. COORDINATOR VITO: Right.

6 M M Yes. I did this. This place 7 is more complicated. Come up to the office.

8 SR. COORDINATOR VITO: Yes. Go ahead, 9 Jeff.

10 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Going back to talk 11 about :for a minute on the bypass valve 12 issue, you had a discussion witha4 I And I think you 13 said that he told you he was playing the devil's 14 advocate there and pushing his people, okay.

15 16 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Now from what we 17 understand that's not the only time that l jpushed 18 his people like that. And the impression from the 19 level of managers just underneath him, that led them 20 to believe or feel that was pushing production 21 over safety. That's the impression that that left on 22 levels of managers at that level. Did any of those 23 directors, shift managers, AOMs, OMs, operations 24 directors bring that to your attention that, of course 25 I don't believe this, but this is some of the things NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.

.........* , nnn 7nl www.nealrgross.com

48 1 I'm hearing from that level of people. Was that ever 2 raised to your attention?

3 No, I don't recall it. I 4 don't -- and, you know, I didn't --

5 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: You know, 6 a pretty aggressive guy.

7 4 'o He's a very strong guy.

8. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes.

9 He's frank. And if handled 10 the wrong way, it could be his weakness, right.

11 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

12 I mean,

1. no doubt about it.

13 But, you know, just comes from safety. You know, 14 I should account -- why did he take the devil 15 advocate? You know, why confuse the organization? I 16 don't have responses to that.

17 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Because that's 18 apparently what it did --

19 Ys 20 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: It did confuse 21 people, one of the reasons why we're here. But that 22 wasn't raised to your attention that people had that 23 concern with management style and the message it 24 was sending, was that --

25 `-.MR. BISSINGER:.\ Production over safety?

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005.3701 www.nealrgrosscom

49 1Yes.

2 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes, and just 3 pushing. You know, the devil's advocate all the time.

4 It's black and white and still pushing.

5 /MR. BISSINGERV< You were challenged.

6 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Makes people think 7 where the heck is he coming from. It plants a seed --

8 let me finish -- that there's management above who 9 is pushing you. That's the seed. Can you comment on 10 that?

11  : That's absolutely not true.

12 Move off of production for a second of the reactor.

13 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

14 --. That was very valuable in 15 developing schedule for refueling outages. Okay. This 16 activity is going to two days, one day, whatever it 17 is. ;challenging why. Developing challenge review 18 boards -- so that style of managemient being strong in 19 the right situation is very good.'

20 You.point out to me the down side of it, 21 right, and was I aware that that generated, you know, 22 concern with nuclear safety. No, I wasn't aware of 23 that.

24 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And 25 personality he said he's a strong individual, he's NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

(202) 234-4433 *WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com

50 1 forceful.

2 Yes.

3 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I sat with him 4 across a table for a number of hours. Well, I know 5 him a little bit and I could see that, how people 6 would take the way he managed with those type of 7 issues. But in your -- would

  • have been one of 8 your direct reports while you the 10 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. Did you ever 11 counsel him on his management style and how that --

12 his style might affect the people who worked for 13 No, I did not. I counseled 14 him on his language use. When he.first came he was 15 pretty rough language. You just can't do that. Can't 16 do it. I counseled him on that.

17 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. But not on- -

18: Not on his forceful impact 19 having an impact on safety, no.

20 SR. COORDINATOR VITO: We could for many 21 more hours, but I really don't have any --

22 SPECIAL AGENT'TEATOR: I'm going to go 23 back in.

24 SR. COORDINATOR VITO: Yes, go ahead, 25 Jeff.

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

Il~rlnq.o

.......nazflrtnrtnqqc~t

51 1 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right. I think 2 this just might another area. People have testified 3 to us during this review that it was their belief that 4 safety was the number one priority as long as it 5 didn't impact schedule or generation. If something 6 had to give, it tended to be safety. That's the 7 impression that the management style was left on 8 managers, SROs, down to the NEL level. We talked to a 9 whole level of people. So can you comment on that at 10 all? Did-anyone bring that concern to your attention, 11 first? I guess that's my first question.

12 I think elements of that came 13 out in our surveys like the Gallup surveys.

14 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes, we've them.

15 We've seen some of the comments.

16 So, you know, so the answer 17 is yes.

18 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

19 A different question of I 20 know it was the iROsthat were feeling that.

21 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I think they 22 anonymous.

23

  • Yes. So, I didn't relate 24 that back to it could have been a licensed operator, 25 senior licensed operator, anything like that.

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com

52 1 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. But when you 2 saw those responses in the Gallup survey, was any 3 action taken to address that issue with the site 4 staff? I'm asking if you know?

5 Yes. We took -- I don't 6 know how to respond. We were constantly dealing with 7 safety initiatives, right. I had an outside safety 8 come into this meeting. And people would get hurt, 9 we'd do a detailed review and correct the problems.

10 So I thought if you looked at OSHA safety performance-11 12 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.

13 That over the five years 14 we're getting better. So you know, I mean we're 15 getting better because we were making the changes, 16 right, improving the system, improving the plant, 17 communications, better training through leadership 18 academy, etcetera. So that would be my response.

19 Whether-we're brin in-- I don't know if 20 you're familiar' With his industrial 21 operators handbook.

22 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: No, I don't know 23 that one.

24 Anyway, he's got the 25 incidents that have happened around the world to NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005.3701 www.nealrgross.com

53 1 balance it. India, PMI -- he teac hes that course from 2 a couple of perspectives and one is, he'll put it on 3 for leadership attributes, someti .mes he'll put it on 4 for to train assessors and anoti ier way to do it is 5 just train operators in safe opei :ations. I mean, he 6 kind of in all those kind of acti vities.

7 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. I'm 8 going to take a very short brea6 just to see if we 9 need anything else. I don't thi .nk I have anything 10 else.

11 (Whereupon, at 6:30 p.m. a recess until 12 6:35 p.m.)

13 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. We're back 14 on the record. It's approximaLtely 6:35 in the 15 afternoon.

16 1 don' t have any other 17 questions for you on the work envi ronment area. Dave, 18 is there something more you want to add?

19 SR. COORDINATOR VITO): I have no more 20 questions.

21 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:

22 "

23 I dorL't have anything to 24 add.

25 Ihave niothing to add.

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANS( CRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N*

I.W.

(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3 701 www.nealrgross.com

54 1 SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.

2 thank you for your time. I know it's been a long day, 3 but this interview is concluded. Thank you very much.

4 We're off the record.

5 (Whereupon, the interview was concluded at 6 6:35 p.m.)

7 8

9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

,A,0U1t,*T% rl f 9nnA.l-17n1 www.nealrgross.com

Retrieved from "https://kanterella.com/w/index.php?title=ML061800027&oldid=2664201"