ML061460338
| ML061460338 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem, Hope Creek  |
| Issue date: | 01/22/2004 |
| From: | NRC/OI |
| To: | |
| References | |
| 1-2003-051F, FOIA/PA-2005-0194 | |
| Download: ML061460338 (130) | |
Text
'I I I !fE Official Transcript-of Proceedings NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION I . -, af
Title:
Interview of Docket Number: 1-2003-051 F Location: -7'---_
t/I a,7- -2 r 2 Date: Tfiursday, January 22, 2004 Work Order No.: NRC-#### Pages 1-128 NEAL R. GROSS AND CO., INC.
Court Reporters and Transcribers 1323 Rhode Island Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005 (202) 234-4433 A 4luuiaaullut inthis record was delved Inaccordance with the. Freedom df Intarmatiat M12 &e
MEMORANDUM To: Scott Barber and Ted Wingfield From: Jeff Teator, OI:RI
Subject:
Transcript of Interview of 01 Assist to Staff on Salem/Hope Creek SCWE Issue Date: 2/17/04 Ted/Scott - attached for your review is the transcript of interview o which I received from the court reporting service today. Among other issues discussed with is the Salem SJ valve issue which he believes technical specification compliance was not met by how they handled this issue. e etified that he informed at did not believe they were in tech spec compliance an aled pressure/push-back. After you have reviewed this transcript (and that of Salem I believe this issue needs to be brought before an ARB for consideration of a po SSW. Je A{ ?-
1 1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3 + . . . .
4 OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS 5 INTERVIEW 6 _ _ _ _ _ _ _I__--x 7 IN THE MATTER OF: : Docket No.
8 INTERVIEW OF: : 1-2003-OSF 9
10 (CLOSED) 11 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ -x 12 Thursday, January 22, 2004 13 14 15 16 17 18 The above-entitled interview was conducted 19 at 12:51 p.m.
20 21 BEFORE:
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22 Sr. Special Agent JEFFERY TEATOR 23 STEVE PINDALE, SENIOR INSPECTOR:
24 Division of Reactor Safety Region I 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
2 1 P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S 2 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: It's i
3 approximately 12:51 in the afternoon. My name is I iIi iI 4 Jeffery Teator, I'm a senior special agent with the E
5 NRC's office of investigations, and this afternoon I'm 6 interviewing This interview is i
7 taking place in th c r
8 9 II'm going to be talking to i
10 you now about the safety conscious work environment i
i 11 down and Salem-Hope Creek. And although there's no 12 specific SCWE regulation, the NRC is interested in 13 this area, and as such, I'm asking you questions in a 14 formal nature. It's your obligation to answer all my 15 questions truthfully and completely, do you understand 16 that?
i I
17 I understand. I 18 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. Can you 19 raise your right hand for me, please? do 20 you swear that the information that you are about to 21 -provide to me is the truth, the whole truth, and 22 nothing but the truth?
23 Yes.
24 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Thank you.
25 Also present for this interview is Mr. Steve Pindale, NEAL R. GROSS A l
3 1 a senior inspector from the Division of Reactor Safety 2 in the NRC's Region I office. L just so that this 3 transcript is complete, this is a voluntary interview.
4 Knowing it's voluntary, do you wish to go forward?
S Yes.
6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. And when 7 did you become employed at Artificial Island 8 (phonetic), the Salem-Hope Creek site?
9 10 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And for the 11 first years of your employment down there, were you 12 working primarily on the Salem side?
13 § The first year on the Salem 14 side.
15 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. And what 16 was that job again?
17 wa 18 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And what was 19 your next job down there?
20 21 22 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: At Salem?
23 DBoth.
24 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Both. And what 25 were the approximate time periods you held that job, NEAL R. GROSS if COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS i 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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Roughly, 3 VJVM17. ft*.I) 3 4 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. And then 5 in where did you go?
6 Hope Creek's I-- .7 L 7 -SLL JififfiwiW I 40MRMN991R, -n-JI SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And how long 9 were you the Hope Creek 10 approximately?
11 I was responsible for Hope
-12 Cree f - -rom that day on until 13 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
14 Of 15 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: But at some 16 point, were you just the Hope Creek 17 -- strictly Hope Creek?
18 Strictly Hope Creek until "Now&
19 20 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. And then 21 in you became the, for 22 Hope Creek and Salem, is that correct?
23 That is correct.
24 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.
25 Okay. We had an interview this morning on another I manl rrT NEAL R.GROSS DFDfCTCCDV A Llrn.rO A nrr.-
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5 1 matter, and during that discussion we talked a little 2 bit about why you left Salem-Hope Creek. And if we 3 could start with that, because you mentioned that part 4 of the reason for you leaving, I guess, was a 5 disconnect between yourself and the senior management, 6 because there was a lot of turnover on who you were 7 reporting to. Maybe we can go into that. If you 8 could tell me when you first started to have a 9 disconnect with management and who it was with and 10 what the causes -- what you saw was the cause of that 11 disconnect. Maybe we can start with that. I think 12 that's a good area -- a good place to begin at.
13 Okay. The best place to 14 begin with is when that first began.
15 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.
16 Oka IsC"0 1w 17 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Would you 18 rather start some place else?
19 I can tell you pretty much 20 big stuff. As far as I had said earlier, to me 21 employment has to be enjoyable, and enjoyable -- you 22 have to be doing work that is (inaudible) the big 23 picture.
24 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.
25 What started -- what I saw NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE. N W
6 1 was first off, a very large disconnect, frankly, with 2 the - A very difficult person to communicate to, 3 a very different view, at least of licensing, and 1 l9 4 especially with the (inaudible) of the RROP, which is 5 pretty much occurring. It was like in '99 is when 6 that started and that's when --
7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Who is the )
8 you're talking about?
9 10 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.
11 - Okay. So it started over 12 there where he -- one of his initial comments was that 13 there was no need for licensing, okay, which is 14 (inaudible) work environment, specifically, but it )
15 does have to do with the concept of how the relation 16 between the plant and the NRC really works. And 17 that's fine. And I said, truly, you know me, that's 18 okay.
19 MR. PINDALE: Well, was that an opinion or 20 comments that the staff or -- how did that come out 21 that there was no need for licensing?
22 It came out -- well, I heard 23 it personally, but I also heard -- well, I heard it --
24 you know, but this thing we don't need. (inaudible).
25 It was kind an off the cuff --
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NEAL R. GROSS A
7 1 MR. PINDALE: Okay.
2 comment.
3 MR. PINDALE: Okay.
4 Okay? And -- but that hurt 5 -- it didn't hurt so much -- it was a comment. A 6 comment's a comment. But it hurts when it comes time 7 to staffing and resources. Okay? So this is when 8 reality starts coming into play. Then later on, other 9 mismatches -- and then the one that really started 10 impacting what I -- how I felt was that it became 11 pretty clear, maybe a year and a half, two years ago, 12 that performance of the plant truly was not headed the 13 right way. And I believed at the time and I still 14 believe that there isn't full acceptance of that.
15 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: By who?
16 By senior management.
17 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.
18 jJ Okay. And the NRC's 19 reaction to plant performance was viewed as a 20 licensing shortcoming. The communication -- you know, 21 we don't have a strategy -- a licensing strategy on 22 communicating with -- you know, I'm thinking about the 23 plant. So that was the biggest single -- what I felt 24 at the time, because it was not performing well, okay, 25 and there's issues that day that were -- that were NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHDnF ISI AND AVE.. N.W
8 1 happening to the plant or should've been, and you 2 can't whitewash it. Okay.
3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.
4 So that's what some of our 5 disconnect was.
6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: You said that 7 about a year and a half to two years ago, you noticed 8 a performance -- the plant was not heading in the 9 right way. Can you be specific -- specific incidents, 10 specific individuals --
11 Okay. I can -- yeah, I can.
12 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Because, 13 frankly, like I said, we've talked to a lot of people.
14 I have some specific technical things that I'm going 15 to ask you about later, but this isn't the first time 16 I've heard about what -- and we were only talking for 17 a few minutes on this, but we've heard this from other 18 people, also.
19 On performance?
20 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Oh, yeah. And, 21 you know -- sure, yes.
22 Okay.
23 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: From different 24 levels in the company.
25 Okay. Well, good. )
NEAL R. GROSS fI~k 1(
9 1 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.
2 And not good, but at least 3 I'm not out to lunch. So there were issues that were 4 there, issues such as the Salem diesel issue, like a 5 year and a half ago by now -- the turbocharger. Then 6 __
7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: What happened 8 on them? Let's break that one down a little bit.
9 What happened on that issue that -- that --
10 Well, we had -- when this 11 one first happened, we don't know anything other than, 12 hey, the turbocharger took -- blew up, okay, and 13 that's all you know.
14 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.
15 It's when you start digging 16 into it. And what happened subsequently that 17 concerned -- well, not -- it makes you start wondering 18 what's going on. When you look back on it, 19 apparently, it wasn't the first time. There was a 20 history behind turbocharger failure. And here we are 21 a year and a half later and we still don't have a 22 resolution in place. And so you go back -- you look 23 at that whole staff and say what's going on? Why not?
24 And it's not -- and diesels are not a new-fIngled 25 invention.
NEAL R.GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS A"I1 47ni DU&JflE gel A bledIC LI IAI
10 1 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.
2 ~i Neither are turbochargers.
3 They're nothing new. So what's happening there? Why )
4 did it happen? And that's the kind of -- that's 5 management -- senior management, I think, was not 6 really grabbing the problem -- the bull by the horns 7 and they weren't addressing that. And that's the kind 8 of stuff that -- that's one event --
9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.
10 -- that I'm talking about.
11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Let's talk 12 about that issue. Steve, do you know anything about 13 that issue?
14 MR. PINDALE: Just that -- just a little 15 bit. I have maybe one or two specific questions.
16 When that occurred, does PSE and G or did PSE and G at 17 the time develop their own risk analysis of that in 18 terms of how that factors into the ROT (phonetic)?
19 Yes.
20 MR. PINDALE: And I guess -- I was not 21 involved, but I -- you know, I was in the office and 22 I heard some of the -- some issues were happening.
23 Right.
24 MR. PINDALE: But I think there were some 25 -- he's usually there.
NEAL R. GROSS
11 1 I was also responsible for -
2 - for the J group.
3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: okay.
4 Yeah. The risk description 5 that you're talking about really was handled by my 6 guys. And that's another example of -- that we -- of 7 what was -- why I felt that the plant was heading in 8 the wrong, because there were -- these issues kept 9 coming up and it appeared to me that they were coming 10 up more frequently where we had to go and really just 11 look in every nook and cranny to kind of get an 12 analysis that would avoid the sites to getting into 13 regulatory -- you know, pointing to each -- you don't 14 want to be doing it.
15 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.
16 Okay. And it's a lot of--
17 and we looked at and I thought, oh, very difficult 18 analysis. Someone's done a lot of work with -- I 19 think we wound up with (inaudible).
20 MR. PINDALE: I don't know if (inaudible),
21 but I don't -- I really don't --
22 But initially, the 23 discussions were a lot of work. You're talking about 24 the attention of multiple people, okay, and all of 25 them have the same or similar or different charges and NEAL R.GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS ant I 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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12 1 you could be looking at some very deeply colored 2 findings. So those -- and we did do this. You know, 3 let me think. It's a matter of opinion to look at the 4 -- it was real significant (inaudible).
5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. So in 6 doing that body of work after the incident happened --
7 you did the 0 analysis -- was a senior manager 8 trying to steer an answer a particular way? Was that 9 type of thing going on with this issue?
10 Let me back up. Your job as 11 a person is to come up with -- with an accurate --
12 it has to be factual.
13 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.
14 Okay. But it also has --
15 you can come to work as much and as hard on it as you 16 need to in order to get it to the best possible color.
17 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. Okay.
18 Okay. So that's just the 19 ground rules. I mean, that's why you're hired. So if 20 you can -- first you come up with yellow. You're 21 going to take it to your boss and say hey, I put in X 22 hours of work and this is where I am, yellow. Then I 23 would tell him, well, okay, put in some more time. So 24 what else can we do? And I said, well, maybe I could 25 possibly look at, you know, what the (inaudible) is.
NEAL R. GROSS CM IRT RFAPnTCrQ akin TQAfJIrcIMcQ
13 1 Then, well, we'll do that. So that's typically how 2 the process would work.
3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. So now 4 you explained to me typically how the process works.
5 And that's how it works.
6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: How did it work 7 with this particular --
8 It worked. It worked, 9 definitely.
10 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right. Did 11 you take -- was your initial review of this issue, was 12 it a darker colored issue in the NRC's scheme of 13 things? Was it a yellow or --
14 I think it probably was a is yellow right out of the -- at least a yellow. I don't 16 -- it was -- and if you take a look at it even without 17 looking at PRAs, right out of the chute, it's dark 18 gray, potentially. But then you start cutting away 19 things, like for -- you start to take a look at --
20 well, I don't really have the same problem with that 21 diesel, or I really don't have the -- these other 22 things were operable, or I took these actions during 23 that time frame. So you start limiting it. And 24 yellow is where we were for actually quite a while in 25 that process. I believe we were there.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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14 1 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TVATOR: Okay. Who were 2 you bringing that -- that conclusion to?
3 Oh, this was a constant 4 topic of conversation.
5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: With who in the 6 management chain?
7 I think it was -
8 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: At that time.
9 -- several. The in 10 general knew it, and I think it was either, again, 11 or I went to -- who I dealt with 12 mostly.
13 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. And when 14 you brought that to them, did they put any undue type 15 of pressure on you or your people to come back with a 16 better color?
17 Not undue pressure. I think 18 it was appropriate pressure.
19 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Explain the 20 difference to me.
21 Undue pressure --
22 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Specific to 23 this issue.
24 Okay. Well, specific. In 25 this particular case as well, you need more resources.
NEAL R. GROSS Al I - (
15 1 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.
2 Okay. And -- and I'm not 3 sure whether it's this one or not, but we actually had 4 to have some external PRA work done.
5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Contractors?
6 eah.
7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.
8 2 And the money was 9 forthcoming in those cases.
10 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.
11 Good. Yeah. The undue 12 pressure would be - in my view would be where he 13 starts -- and the force of personality. You better 14 get this to be white or -- if you could talk. Nothing 15 like that happened. Is there anything we can do?
16 What do you need to get it done? Okay?
17 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did it -- did 18 it get to a point in your mind, you know, that -- all 19 right, we're getting the extra resources. We're 20 hiring contractors. We're looking at other things.
21 We're still coming back with the same answer. Was 22 that happening with this?
23 Not with the same -- once we 24 got to whatever we could get to, it was accepted.
25 Like white, I think, is -- Al NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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16 1 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.
2 Yeah. There's a lot of 3 discussion that takes place within our PRA individual 4 and the -- what we call SRA.
5 MR. PINDALE: Yeah.
6 The SRA, senior --
7 MR. PINDALE: SRA, senior (inaudible).
8 Right.
9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: At the region?
10 At the region.
11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.
12 A lot of discussion of a lot 13 back and forth -- sometimes it takes longer than the 14 SRA wants it to, but so be it. But there's no -- that 15 kind of a response and reaction, that I did not get.
16' SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: From your 17 management?
18 From management.
19 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.
20 MR. PINDALE: Well, that's good.
21 It is good.
22 MR. PINDALE: Were there any instances --
23 again, I don't know if it was -- would've been this 24 one or other issues that had come up, but were there 25 any instances where either you were not able -- you, NEAL R.GROSS / I -
17 1 again, at the time, PSEG -- was not either able or 2 willing to perform PRA analyses for issues in 3 communications regarding, you know, if it was the 4 utility's job versus the NRC?
5 That's the second aspect in 6 place, and I can give you my view on this.
7 MR. PINDALE: Okay.
8 And I was responsible for --
9 like I said, for the uys, so my view really was 10 PSEG --
11 MR. PINDALE: Okay.
12 -- at the time. I felt that 13 the PRA really was the NRC's job. Okay. That's what 14 the regulations called for, okay? The way the process 15 works is -- if you know anybody (inaudible) phase one.
16 I know you're (inaudible) phase two you go through the 17 worksheet, and if that doesn't work, then you do your 18 PRA. And now the two sides get together to see where 19 they are. Now, the PRA work isn't -- not -- not cheap 20 in the sense that it takes time to do it, okay? And 21 this typically (inaudible). And Salem and Hope were 22 not unique in that. We had four or five people. And 23 to put one person on one of these is (inaudible). We 24 put somebody on a PRA when it appeared to us right out 25 of the chute that this could be a significant issue.
NEAL R. GROSS X //C COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.
18 1 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.
2 Otherwise we did not. We 3 waited -- I don't think it's a significant 'issue.
4 Well, and then something might come back from -- and 5 it did happen from the region. And I said hey, how 6 are -- how's it looking to you guys? They said, oh, 7 we haven't really looked at it. Okay. This is a 8 resource issue and -- it was certainly not a 9 regulatory requirement. Having said that, I do 10 understand there are other places -- some plants do 11 more up front PRA work than Salem-Hope would do.
12 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. Talk 13 about PRA while we're -- we'll stick with that for a 14 couple of minutes.
15 Yeah.
16 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Were there 17 other instances in the last -- in the time you were 18 responsible for where -- or were there any 19 instances where maybe the response from your 20 management to your group's findings was not 21 appropriate?
22 I have not seen that.
23 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Or was an undue 24 type of pressure or insinuated threat, anything along 25 those lines -- )
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19 1 Not in PR -- not after an --
2 I have not -- for one thing, we had who 3 happened to be an excellent PRA practioner. I mean, 4 he is one of the prophets of PRA. PRA is published to 5 the third -- second or third decimal. But even the 6 first decimal is -- you know, a lot of judgment goes 7 into that. So it's more of an art than -- and there's 8 a lot of math -- but really it's an art.
9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.
10 And if you have a good PRA 11 person, he can -- he can perform your analyses and 12 more effectively come up with results that -- that are 13 -- that are better than someone else. It's like 14 playing the piano or an instrument. I mean, you have 15 people who just are much better than others.
16 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Who's your PRA 17 guy down there?
18the last 19 name's pronounced but it's spel 20 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: The first name 21 l 22 23 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. Is he 24 still there, do you know?
25 He's still there.
NEAL R. GROSS air/ yk COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
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20 1 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. How long 2 were you responsible for the !group? What time 3 period?
4 I think two and a half 5 years.
6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Your last two 7 and a half years there?
8 Yeah.
9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. All 10 right. So during that two and a half years, again, 11 did -- did you get any type of inappropriate response 12 from your management when you brought them an issue 13 that your group had reviewed? Inappropriate --
14 Not inappropriate. I just-15 - you do get -- hey, this is where we are, okay? What 16 do you think? Well, what do we need to get from here 17 to there?
18 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.
19 You know, and I'll say --
20 and I'll talk to -- oh, I think we have an opportunity 21 here by looking over here, by looking over there.
22 Maybe we'll get our (inaudible) and then move on.
23 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right. At 24 any point in one of those processes, did the 25 management, in your view, cross the line? l NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS Iq AHOfnn InRAhmn, Al: PiIw
21 1 No, not there. Not at PRA.
2 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: You say not 3 there.
4 That's correct.
5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. Meaning 6 any--
7 Not in that arena. I think 8 that there's enough confidence in the PRA staff that 9 they knew that if it was there, they were going to 10 find it and use it.
11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: If it was 12 something possible that could legitimately come up 13 with the reason to change something, those guys would 14 find it?
15 sExactly.
16 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Well, that's 17 good. They had confidence in your people. You 18 mentioned something -- maybe we'll leave PRA, then.
19 You said -- when I asked you the question about undue 20 pressure, inappropriate response --
21 Yeah.
22 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- you made a 23 point that'not there.
24 Not there.
25 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- which leads NEAL R. GROSS *1/ 2&-
COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 41non CDrC: ICS Amn A%/= M W
22 1 me to believe --
2 Not in PRA. Issues tend to 3 come up, you know, through operability and that's 4 where the issues come (inaudible).
5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Let's talk 6 about operability, then. Youwer 7
8 Yeah.
9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- for, gees, 10 quite a while down here. You had the dates on here, 11 right?
12 wEl"f~el PIYes.
13 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And I want to 14 go back to '97, '98, and maybe '99. But in that time 15 frame, were there operability-type issues which you 16 felt management didn't act correctly in? And so we 17 can talk about that. They may be some of the same 18 ones I have heard about already.
19 j Okay. Not that far. Not 20 '97, '98, and '99.
21 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.
22 9 As the plant availability 23 improved, there was more pressure to maintain the 24 availability, clearly.
25 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. When did .
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23 1 that first start? When did you first start feeling or 2 sensing that?
3 Probably about two years or 4 so. About three, three and a half years ago.
5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: What time, in 6 2000?
7 Yeah, that's probably close.
8 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Was there a 9 change in senior management at that point that that 10 happened before you saw this starting to - - started to 11 feel that?
12 There was a -- well, yeah, 13 there was a change in management.
14 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Is that when 15 ~Jbbcame the 16 Well, let's see. I think 17 Q M actually becam in -- he finished his five 18 years up in '98 and it was likely a year or two after 19 that.
20 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.
21 Okay?
22 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.
23 What we had was -- yeah, 24 25 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.
NEAL R.GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
24 1 ll -- and reporting to him was 2 (phonetic).
3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. Okay.
4 It was primarily that 5 combination -- thoug was part of that.
6 It was -- I'd say those three individuals exerted 7 probably the most pressure on that. Specific -- an 8 example would be -- I don't know if you -- I don't 9 know if this made your list or not, but there was an 10 issue with -- was it an SJ-12, 11 13 --
12 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yeah, the SJ 13 files. The Hope Creek.
14 MR. PINDALE: (inaudible).
15 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Salem. That's 16 right. Yeah, I do know about that. Go ahead and tell 17 me, though --
18 Okay.
19 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- what 20 happened there. It's in the -- that the engineer is 21 away.
22 That's right.
23 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: So that's the 24 issue that I have to look at.
25 9That's the issue. And that NEAL R. GROSS All/ /-
25 1 is the issue.
2 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Let's talk 3 about that.
4 Okay. Was it -- that's on 5 your list?
6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes.
7 Okay.
8 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Well, are you 9 surprised?
10 Yeah. (inaudible) low 11 excitement with that at the time.
12 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: But to you it's 13 not.
14 Well, that stuck with me.
15 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.
16 It did stick with me.
17 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: It stuck with 18 other people, too. Okay.
19 Okay. That was where there 20 was a leaking -- the criteria I think was like zero 21 leakage through the check-valve.
22 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.
23 ' And in fact, there was some 24 -- and there some testing that should've been done.
25 And this was about two and a half years ago, as I NEAL R. GROSS 4//
COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
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26 1 recall. And the details, frankly, are -- what I do 2 recall on it is that the valves were declared operable 3 on what I believed to be a sound technical basis.
4 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Were there 5 people -- do you recall if there were people who were 6 championing the position that we need --
7.
8 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- to do the 9 surveillance test?
10 Yes.
11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: There were 12 people saying we need to go in and do the testing.
13 Yeah.
14 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And there was 15 other people -- well, that didn't happen. The testing 16 _
17 Okay.
18 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- did not 19 occur --
20 Okay.
21 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- right?
22 A I believe that's accurate.
23 I believe that he would -- let's see. There's four 24 lines on the -- I don't recall (inaudible). But I 25 think we did some numbers and some analysis and I'm NEAL R. GROSS 41/ IC.
27 1 sure that it was just fine. That's about -- oh, you 2 got something -- some information on that?
3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Well, you made 4 the -- you made the comment -- and it's more coming 5 from the work environment-type -- what is the 6 conservative thing done?
7 I don't -
8 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I mean, I'm not 9 going to debate --
10 Yeah.
11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- the 12 technical -- well, I mean -- okay.
13 I don't believe the 14 conservative thing was -- I don't believe the 15 compliance piece was done on that. To me it --
16 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: From what 17 standpoint?
18 Tech spec compliance.
19 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. And how 20 -- how was that allowed to proceed? Who made that 21 decision?
22 E Operability is an operations 23 call.
24 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: But licensing 25 has input.
NEAL R. GROSS s I1-COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS q11.11 Duane%llbia A&$^ ,ll LS&%
28 1 Not on operability.
2 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. Really?
3 Absolutely. Reportability .
4 ends--
5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.
6 -- after operability' is 7 determined.
8 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. Thanks.
9 And the pressure -- this 10 comes fro clearly.
11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did it really 12 come from or was it coming from --
13 Well 14 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- from the 15 16 -- I thought from 17 Okay. I did not -'- I did not speak to him physically 18 -- over there. And my interactions were the operation 19 of (inaudible) with 9 20 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: What we've 21 heard from more than one person, is N was not 22 responsible for whoever was above him.
23 I know that's 24 (inaudible) has that -- he has put on pressure. I've 25 had phone calls with him where he says -- he comes NEAL R. GROSS rDi lOT Djoyp TaCor AI.Ifl YP aIr% ff1 1
1,// 4
29 1 across with -- operations was telling me that -- how 2 can they possibly be telling me that, okay? And I'm 3 trying to think of the specifics.
4 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Well, let's 5 finish with this document --
6 Yeah.
7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- and then 8 we're going to talk about okay?
9 -J I mean, in that case, I did 10 not -- I had no conversations with (inaudible).
11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. Tell me 12 abo.ut 1then. I mean, did you tell t that what 13 you thought --
14 Yeah.
15 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- about -- I 16 don't think we're in compliance here?
17 1117 ] Yeah.
18 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And how did he 19 respond to that?
20 He says, well, engineering -
21 - it was a standard response, where there's always an 22 argument in the other direction. Okay.
23 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. I'll 24 respect that.
25 (I A.M Yeah.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
30 1 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I mean, but you 2 got to get a balance. There's got to be a balance 3 there.
4 There needs to be a balance.
5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.
6 And I was surprised that--
7 I was obviously surprise by his approach, because I do 8 think that5 'h--f*
as two-way background.
9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. Well, 10 then he should be right on top of whatever's required, 11 then.
12 Right. And I knew 13 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Strict 14 compliance.
15 Yeah. And in general,' I 16 thought that )did take the appropriate approach.
17 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.
18 j This one he didn't. Now, I 19 was surprised, also, that this was not an issue, 20 frankly, with the inspectors, okay?
21 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.
22 Which I don't -- because 23 this was a high-visibility issue.
24 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. Who was 25 involved from the high-visibility issue -- who from )
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
31 1 the plant was --
2 A .11 right. From AWWWZe-n Ai*
3 mean, .p..
wanc2Ss_=I 4
5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. Both of 6 them, for both --
7 Both Salem and Hope Creek.
8 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. Okay.
9 W_ So the only guy higher than 10 him i Ed 11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
12 MR. PINDALE; (inaudible) --
13 Yes, right. So when you 14 have an issue where is involved, it's not just 15 Lon, it's every -- it's everybody.
16 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Sure.
17 Yeah.
18 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I asked you a 19 question about when you told ^ and you didn't think 20 what they were doing was compliant with the 21 requirements. You came back with what again?
22 Something about engineering was -- an engineering 23 judgment, an engineering --
24 That's a point of judgment.
25 It was more than judgment, it was -- he went through NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 4"1/1 7 &C 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
32 1 some --
2 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did he have a 3 tech guy next to him to explain the technical basis 4 for where they were going?
5 I don't recall that, no.
6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. All 7 right.
8 But what really sticks with 9 me is more the event and the push-back.
10 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right. The 11 push-back from who?
12 Well, 13 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right. Who 14 else was -- I'm a simple guy. I draw black and white. -
15 Who was on your side of the equation tellingi 16 I don't think we're doing the right thing here. I 17 don't think we're in compliance. Do you remember who 18 else was on -- who was on your side of that?
19 / Well, licensing was. Okay.
20 The other licensing guy.
21 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.
22 As far as -- that's about 23 all I -- the only people who I really were involved 24 with were Z engineering -- and I wish knew who the 25 engineering supervisor or manager was at the time. )
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS OCI
33 1 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Well, I can --
2 I'll find that out.
3 okay. And who actually 4 wound up presenting he arguments.
5 MR. PINDALE: And how was it that they got 6 involved? You were the only person with this issue.
7 Let Dk me 8 MR. PINDALE: Did they know you 9 requested --
10 Yeah, yeah.
11 MR. PINDALE: Okay. Wasn't there concern 12 about a shutdown or something -- licensing?
13 *z~nacesNo.
.14 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Who called you 15 in for your assistance -- this is taking you in for 16 assistance, was it or was it --
17 I -- I think it was before 18 even j ot involved. It really -- it works like, 19 hey, SJ pump is leaking. It's an operational issue.
20 Hey, licensing --
21 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.
22 Okay.
23 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.
24 So -- okay, we need to --
25 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Because I've NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.
113M% -)<A AA32 - _ _ - -
34 1 heard from some of the ops people that they thought 2 the testing needed to be done to go find out which 3 one's actually -- I mean, how much it is that --
4 Yeah.
5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Because there 6 were people on ops who were on -- of the belief that 7 we need to go find out what's going on there. Does 8 that ring a bell to you now?
9 It sounds right. If I had 10 to -- it looked to me that what was happening -- and 11 this not -- not that.
12 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: But we're 13 asking -- I mean, for your --
14 It looked to me like -- like 15 you had -- it was pushing one agenda, and there's 16 only so much push-back that you can reasonably expect.
17 So there was an expression of opinion and then, well, 18 I don't care. I think this what we need to do.
19 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.
20 Okay. And that's the kind 21 of -- okay, that' s what we'll do. That's kin of 22 (inaudible).
23 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: After that --
24 in the end it was the requirements on those valves 25 were engineered away somehow? Can you -- do you )
NEAL R. GROSS JO/
35 1 remember how that happened or -- because that's what 2 happened, but that doesn't mean anything to me, 3 really. If you don't --
4 I don't recall.
5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.
6 Okay. Let's -- let's talk, then, about similar issues 7 that you were involved in from the 8 level. Before getting to your --
9 you mentioned something about phone calls. Okay.
10 Let's talk about other specific technical issues that 11 went like that, where maybe senior management didn't 12 triumph this time, but they tried. Any other similar 13 type issues that -- because I have more. And again, 14 maybe some are the same.
15 Well, let me -- okay.
16 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Tell me ones 17 that -- if there are any more like that.
18 There was one where we wound 19 up by shutting the plant down.
20 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Well, that's 21 good.
22 That is a good one.
23 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And, you know -
24 - and frankly, good, bad, whatever it is, if 25 there's an issue where, hey, senior management stepped NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
36 1 up and made the right call without undue push-back, 2 undue pressure, we want to hear that, too.
3 Okay.
4 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Both sides of 5 the equation.
6 All right. Now, this was 7 about two years ago at Salem -- diesels. And I think 8 it was the -- a voltage regulator on a diesel. We 9 tried everything known in the world.
10 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Within the tech 11 specs, within the requirements, within complying with 12 all that --
13 Yes.
14 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: action I 15 statement stuff?
16 The voltage regulator wasn't 17 regulating.
18 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I know. Okay.
19 And you're in a 72-hour 20 action statement.
21 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Um-hum.
22 And within the 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, I 23 mean, they changed out the voltage regulator, they 24 changed relays, yeah, everything they could possibly 25 think of they tried.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
37 1 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Being prudent 2 in following --
3 S S C AGj Yes.
4 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- what they 5 can do.
6 - Yes. So now we start coming 7 down, you know, to the end.
8 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: The end.
9 So the question to -- hey 10 7Xv W , We have (inaudible). And I said, well, how 11 about the cause of discretion? And so then§ looks 12 and says, well, do you know what the cost of the 13 problem is? Because you need to know that, you know, 14 to get cause of discretion.
15 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: The cost of it?
16 The cause, c-a-u-s-e.
17 MR. PINDALE: The cause, like root cause.
18 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.
19 Sorry.
20 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: It's all right.
21 Go ahead. The basic cost.
22 :w-sEww^R Yeah 23 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.
24 And that's the way -- you 25 need to know what the problem is and you need to know NEAL R. GROSS f COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS nnr- imANrn AVF. N-W.
v RHw I .
38 1 how long it's going to you to fix it and you need to 2 be confident that you're going to fix it.
3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. )
4 So (inaudible), well, do you 5 know where the problem is? And the answer was no.
6 Well, you know, I don't think our cause of discretion 7 is really appropriate.
8 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.
9 And this is with 10 Again, he thought about it and said, okay, you're 11 right. So shut the plant down.
12 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: That was a good 13 work environment --
14 ~~That was--.
. S.
15 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- example.l 16 Yeah.
17 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.
18 Right. (inaudible).
19 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: (inaudible).
20 Okay.
21 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Hope Creek, the 22 turbine bypass valve issue, March '03.
23 0 _ Okay.
24 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: There was like 25 three things that happened in a row in March of '03 )
NEAL R. GROSS 4ot/ 7
39 1 over in Hope Creek.
2 Okay.
3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: (inaudible) 4 valve --
5 Okay.
6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- issue, but 7 the one I'm talking about is the turbine bypass valve 8 issue.
9 Yeah, I recall that one.
10 Okay.
11 MR. PINDALE: The (inaudible)?
12 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: (inaudible) 13 there's metal on metal in the valve. Tell me about 14 your involvement in that, what you saw --
15 Okay. That's where --
16 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- good, bad, 17 ugly.
18 That's the issue where they 19 were -- they had a reactivity change, which was 20 not--
21 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yeah, that' s 22 another one.
23 That's actually the same 24 one.
25 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right, but it's NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
40
?1 a different slice of it.
2 Okay. That's the slice of 3 it that I'm -- F 4 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.
5 Okay. The --
6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Let's talk 7 about the reactivity thing, then.
8 Okay. They had -- ok ay.
9 What I--
10 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: They're going 11 up and down -- I mean, over like a -- I don't know, a 12 four, five, six-day period. There's lots of things 13 that happened that caused the plant to --
14 Yeah, but I think 15 specifically what happened is when they were trying to 16 figure out what is going on over here (inaudible).
17 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.
18 They had a power increase.
19 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.
20 Unexplained.
21 Unexplained.
22 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.
23 Okay. And that was the 24 issue.
25 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Is that what NFAL R_ GROSS ASI 12-
41 1 you're going to speak to, the unexplained power 2 increase?
3 Well, that it happened and 4 that operations really didn't address -- they just 5 went to pot -- I mean, no problem.
6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Let's talk 7 about that. How did you get involved in that? When 8 did y 'ou get involved and how?
9 Actually, I was not involved 10 in that.
11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.
12 01jJ Okay. Just with the roll 13 out of the -- that this happened and it was taken as 14 a big deal 15 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.
16 -- by this time.
17 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.
18 ij3J And that's appropriate.
19 Okay. (inaudible). I don't see anything particularly 20 negative about the spike reaction or management's 21 reaction to that event. What I did see is the fact 22 that it event happened.
23 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.
24 That's bad.
25 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. And what NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
12021 234-4433 WASHINGTON Dn.. M .S-3701 MIxe 'VIA AA'ss
42 1 was bad about what happened?
2 ~ What's bad about what 3 happened is that I -- and this is where the culture I .)
4 perhaps comes into play.
5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.
6 Okay. The goal is to 7 generate power and that's why we have a power plant.
8 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.
9 Okay.
10 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Understood.
11 Okay. And at some point, 12 you have to step back and consider, am I in a position 13 to proceed --
14 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.
15 i__ -- unless something 16 happened? And I do believe that if you take a look at 17 -- and this is not the first thing. If you take a 18 look at five indicators on performance (inaudible) 19 programs that we had, they are -- from what I 20 understand, focus on two things, and one is all in 21 that budget, and the other one is availability and the 22 various pieces of it. So it's clear --
23 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Operating a 24 plant?
25 Running the plant and I)
L-NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS it-i7 /
ivr% wnna: lIe Amn AVF M W
43 1 running it efficiently and cheaply. So when you're 2 trying to bring the plant on-line, there's -- because 3 everything has to be conscious and that's the 4 insidious part. (inaudible) conscious decision.
5 Well, I realize I'm not safe, but nonetheless, I'm 6 going to proceed. It doesn't work like that. It 7 works more like, well --
8 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: You need to 9 take a call?
10 (inaudible) 600 bucks.
11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: You need to 12 take a break?
13 No. And I rather do this 14 than do that.
15 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.
16 What you said was -- go ahead and --
17 MR. PINDALE: Yeah.
18 If the -- it's a culture 19 piece, where these are not timely decisions. But 20 being that, obviously, it's so important to generate 21 the power, that this happened over here, but I think 22 it's acceptable, because I don't (inaudible) 23 generating power.
24 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.
25 jf I mean, that's the danger NEAL R. GROSS All 1(
COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS r II I 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W. 1 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON. D.C. 20005-3701 /2021 234-4433
44 1 that I found, that's the attitude.
2 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: In this 3 particular incident?
4 Yeah, well, in this one as 5 well as -- see that's what I'm saying. It's not a 6 conscious call.
7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. But 8 sometimes it is.
9 But sometimes it is, but it 10 wasn't. I don't believe it was in this one. And I 11 don't think you -- I don't think you really see too 12 many conscious calls.
13 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I've seen --
14 I've seen a handful over the years --
15 Okay.
16 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- in what I 17 do.
18 Ruh 19 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Oh, yeah.
20 Okay. Well, I'm glad I 21 haven't.
22 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Well, that's 23 good.
24 Yeah.
25 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I'm glad you )
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
45 1 haven't either. That's a joy not --
2 The whole response to that 3 in this case was. That's about as close to it as I've 4 seen.
5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. All 6 right. Now, what happened here with this reactivity 7 event? The guys on shift, from my understanding, 8 didn't bring it up to anybody until after --
9 II J That's the point. Why 10 wouldn't you tell? Because --
11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Aren't they 12 required -- aren't they required to by --
13 ) Are they required?
14 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- something in 15 your plant, something in the regulations, if they see 16 17 18 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- an 19 unexplained --
20 MR. PINDALE: The fire corrective action 21 system.
22 i Corrective action program 23 would require you to write a notification and put in 24 the programming.
25 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Was one NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS /
4101 OWAdog ICI AhMr At/= Li AI
46 1 written, do you know?
2 j mI know there was one 3 written, but I'm not sure it was written immediately. B.
4 I mean, obviously, there was one written.
5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Do you know why 6 the shift manager didn't bring this up to his manager 7 when it happened?
8 I don't know.
9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.
10 J Again, this is going back to 11 where I think it's an issue of what's important and 12 what is not.
13 MR. PINDALE: Reactivity management, I 14 think, is getting more and more important things, you I 15 know, the operator's --
16 Yes.
17 MR. PINDALE: -- base.
18 Yes.
19 MR. PINDALE: One of the challenges.
20 z rYes.
21 MR. PINDALE: I mean, if you the manager 22 of something like that -- I don't know the extent of 23 the reactivity transient, but as a general rule it's 24 (inaudible) you get transient like that, you need to 25 inform your management. llI NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
47 1 You should. You should when 2 you have an unexplained change in reactivity. Over 3 here we try to have the decisions right away, that 4 when you have a controller step, in or out, one step, 5 (inaudible).
6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: How many steps 7 were happening in this Hope Creek issue?
8 Well, it's a different 9 situation, it's a different plant.
10 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.
11 MR. PINDALE: And where is the control 12 room? Can you tell where that is? Because it seemed 13 because of --
14 Right.
15 MR. PINDALE: (inaudible).
16 Right. It wasn't running.
17 But the reactivity change was significantly bigger 18 here than one step would be in (inaudible).
19 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. We're 20 going to switch over to side B, so it's 1:36.
21 (Off the record.)
22 (On the record.)
23 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. We're 24 back on and it's 1339, which is 1:39 for you non-25 military people, and we've gone over to the side B.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-433 WASHINGTON. D.C. 20005-3701 (202) 234-4433
48 1 t was there a review done on this reactivity 2 change thing?
3 There was a whole group 4 conference (inaudible).
5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. And what 6 was blowout of that? What came out of that from 7jj Do you remember how that was handled and 8 what -- the message that was sent to the operator?
9 Well, that's it significant, 10 that you've got -- this is unacceptable. You got to -
11 - it's all the right things were said in the rollout.
12 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.
13 Okay.
14 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: But because the 15 right things are said, does that mean the right thing 16 can be done in the future? What was the real message 17 that the operators got, from your viewpoint?
18 From my viewpoint, you get 19 conflicting messages.
20 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Meaning what?
21 Meaning that you still have 22 your incentive plan, you still have your high level 23 and performance indicators, and you still have this 24 message, okay? So --
25 MR. PINDALE: I'm sorry. Who's subject to )
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
49 the performance -- is that a certain level up or 2 worker --
3 Yeah, actually, everybody.
4 MR. PINDALE: Okay.
S I think everybody.
6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: The SSOs on 7 shift, the shift managers, the AONs --
8 Absolutely.
9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- yourself?
10 $_S Yes.
11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And the boss?
12 NIP Yes, and go up.
13 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And go up?
14 Yeah.
15 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: So -- all 16 right. The rollout comes to the plant staff. What 17 was the -- in your view, what was the message sent to 18 the operators? They had to begin to do what?
19 i Well, the message is that 20 this is a significant thing. Do not let it happen 21 again. And this is what happened now and here are the 22 mistakes that were made and don't make these mistakes 23 again.. That's the message.
24 MR. PINDALE: What were some of those 25 mistakes? What were the unacceptable -- was NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
50 1 there - -
2 I think -
I 3 MR. PINDALE: -- a follow-up to the --
4 0 A follow-up to -- well, it 5 started actually all the way from the beginning, which 6 is how did you even get into this situation. And then 7 the tolerance of being in that situation, and then the 8 consequences, which is the reactivity changes. Okay. I1'
)
9 So it's -- and it was -- it made sense and it's 10 logical, because it went back to when you're in a 11 situation that you don't feel comfortable with, well, 12 it's time to stop and, you know, corral those issues 13 and address them (inaudible). That was the message 14 and it's appropriate.
15 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: That is 16 appropriate.
17 Yeah.
18 SR.: SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: The message 19 was.
~-.1 20 The message.
21 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: We talked off 22 the record a little bit and you made a comment that if 23 that happened again, people might hide it -- try and 24 hide it. Did you say -- you did say that.
25 ! I did say that. What I --
NEAL R. GROSS / <c x COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
51 1 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Where were you 2 coming from?
3 I I'm coming from a point --
4 it's -- if I tell you or anybody -- (inaudible),
S okay? If I see another letter with a type in it from 6 you, you're done.
7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.
8 And then son of gun, the
,,9 letter goes out and I don't catch the typo. He sees 10 that it's done and (inaudible) with the typo in it.
11 What' going to do?
12 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: You tell me, 13 what's he going to do?
14 _ Well, I think he will make 15 sure that -- he will try to make sure that any copy 16 that I see will not have a typo in it. I mean, he 17 could possibly go back and change the letter, the one 18 that's actually in my files -- on the drive. Okay.
19 It makes the problem go away without it going away.
20 That is the purest hypothesis and it depends on the 21 consequences.
22 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.
23 It also depends a lot on the 24 individual.
25 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. I mean, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 4jl l 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
52 1 you worked there for quite a period of time. You were 2 involved in --
3 Yeah.)
4 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- at your 5 level in the issues --
6 Rilght.
7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- like we're 8 talking about.
9 Right. Right. Let me give 10 one example, which (inaudible) about the problems and 11 how sometimes they were addressed. The corrective 12 action program. This happened to me (inaudible).
13 Corrective action program. (inaudible) came down a 14 few years -- three years ago, after January, whatever 15 -- the 15th. There will be no overdue corrective 16 action items. Then comes the 16th. So on the 16th, 17 I work on my corrective action and I got like three or 18 four overdue items.
19 SR. SPECIALAGENT TEATOR: Go ahead.
20 W7 - It turns out that on May 15, 21 the guy who actually had them must've gave them to me, 22 so they just show up in my inbox already overdue, 23 okay?
24 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: A pretty shrewd 25 move. a NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
53 1 /That's right, a pretty 2 shrewd move. But that's what I knew, okay, about 3 hiding. If you want to -- yeah, (inaudible).
4 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Talk about the 5 actual valve not being able to close, which led to the 6
7 The spike, yeah.
8 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. Which 9 led to the spike in the --
10 Yeah. They tried to do a 11 few things in order to -- they didn't really know why 12 it wasn't closing when it wasn't closing, though, so 13 they tried to open another valve and this valve 14 and--
15 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Were you part 16 of those discussions and decisions on what we need to 17 do find out what's wrong with the valve? Were you 18 part of that?
19 19 j I was there when -- it 20 happened that I was on night shift, and I believe I'd 21 been on night shift and I took -- I was sitting -- you 22 know, I wasn't in those discussions, but I did hear 23 some of it.
24 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
25 Not J No, wasn't
/
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
i Sf
//e AAVIA u
54 1 part of that.
2 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Not when yCou I
3 were there?
4 ; Not while I was there. It 5 was the. operators and -- well, it was strictly 6 operators and the (inaudible). This is documented.
7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: This is up in 8 the control room, then?
9 rIt was actually in -- not in 10 the control room, but in the -- the room where 11 the--
12 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: The shift 13 manager's office?
14 A Wo-00-3No.
15 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: No.
16 Where -
17 MR. PINDALE: Work control?
18 No.
19 MR. PINDALE: (inaudible).
20 jj Yeah, (inaudible) -- you 21 know where the control center is, right next -- there 22 are like two or three offices.
23 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: But I 24 (phonetic) an on the top of the (inaudible).
25 9e (inaudible).
fII NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.
55 1 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: It was his 2 office.
pc 3 It was his. He was on a 4 phone call.
5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right, he was 6 there.
7 Actually, I got a phone call 8 when I was at home.
9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.
10 j Yeah. But he was part of 11 that.
12 MR. PINDALE: What was your role for --
13 I was -- I was there on 14 night as -- what do they call them --
15 whatever. So if an engineering came up, 16 then I was the first to --
17 MR. PINDALE: All right.
18 -- handle it. But if 19 (inaudible) until night. So that ended the 20 conversation.
21 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And what was 22 the end result of that conversation? What was the 23 direction decided?
-~1 24 I Yeah.
25 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Just the at NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
Arn{ 7
56 1 that point.
2 It was -- it was -- that was 3 the kind of a day -- they're having some difficulties 4 with the valve, okay, and they just got various things 5 (inaudible) what was going on.
6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.
7 And the power excursion 8 discussion, I think it happened subsequent to -- I 9 think, this is -- yeah. That's my recollection that 10 it happened subsequent to this discussion.
11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.
12 And it happened, actually, 13 while I was there, but I didn't know about it 14 until --
15 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Well, nobody 16 knew about it at Salem.
17 r-Li 7 Yeah, nobody knew about it.
18 Yeah.
19 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Now, were you -
20 - did you participate in any discussions surrounding 21 the valve issue, not the reactivity spike, but the 22 valve issue, with being in 23 a room together with 24 No, it's not--
25 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did you hear NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS A/I N 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.
57 1 anything about those discussions?
2 I never heard -- I didn't 3 know they were going to (inaudible).
4 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Oh, yeah.
5 _ Yeah?
6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: For quite a 7 period of time.
8 Okay.
9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Extended 10 debate, it's a black and white -- most people thought 11 it was a black and white issue instead of 0 A 12 black and white issue meaning we need to go inside and 13 find out what's wrong -- what's binding up the valve, 14 why it won't close. Two, three, four hours of 15 discussions from on have we done this, can we 16 check this, can,-- you're shaking your head yes.
17 Yeah. That's not quite 18 but I do know about the discussion.
19 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Fine. Okay.
20 You mentioned -- early on we were talking about the 21 disconnect.
22 . SWhich -
23 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Disconnect with 24 senior management.
25 Oh, okay.
IXC-,
74//
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS V~AT PWM MaBurl A%/= NW
58 1 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And we talked 2 a little bit about Can we go back in 3 that, and then maybe come back to more -- some 4 specific issues?
5 Okay.
6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And first of 7 all, that disconnect, I think you said it was about 8 three years ago?
.9 Yeah.
10 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right. Can 11 we talk some more about that and in particular, if you 12 could say who --
13 Who?
14 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- who -- with 15 who was the disconnect and what you saw as the cause, 16 the reason for the disconnect occurring between you 17 and your management? It probably happened with other 18 people, too, at. your level.
19 Wel11 20 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: It sounds like 21 that to me.
22 -- communications, period, 23 was very difficult with 24 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.
25 Again, I think it was )
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS f/ 1'-
4'o)a aurnc l oiI &Kin alc hi tI
59 2 (inaudible).
2 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.
3 He was just a very difficult 4 person to get the information either to or from.
5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.
6 Okay? But you can live with 7 as long as you, nonetheless, do get -- do have the 8 communications open. That was not the case. Where we 9 had -- and again, the disconnects that I had with him 10 were not on those issues. Well, it never got to that 11 point.
12 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Good.
13 Yeah.
14 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Was there --
15 but how about his people, the the 16 t, t Le You're shaking your head.
17 Well, no, I'm just nodding 18 that's right. Those are names that --
19 was (inaudible).
-l 20 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.
21 3" Okay. And there -- the 22 whole scenario you went through with i seen 23 that. I seen that scenario.
24 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And was 25 debating when people feel that it's a black and white NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
-41(
+<
1323 RHODF ISLAND AVE. N.W
60 1 issue, we need to do this.
2 Yeah. And --
3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did it seem --
4 Then I was referring to the 5 phone call to me.
6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Let's talk 7 about that.
8 Yeah. Okay, that's the --
9 let's talk some about the situation. This happened, 10 I don't know, a few times, two, three, four -- three 11 or four times.
12 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Tell me the one 13 that sticks out most in your mind, the phone call from 14 about an issue.
15 And I'm trying to -- I knew 16 that. An issue.
17 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And is it from 18 a standpoint where not coming from a 19 conservative direction?
20 He is not coming a 21 conservative direction. It's the question of these 22 guys are telling you this. Why do we have to do that?
23 Okay?
24 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: You know, what 25 issue are you talking about?
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
61 1 And this I'm trying to come 2 up with. I should've taken notes.
3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yeah. That SJ 4 valve issue --
5 That's the one that --
6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- the steam 7 generator, feed reg valve issue.
8 Okay. That (inaudible).
9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: BF-19? Does 10 that ring a bell?
11 Well, BF-19 does, but I 12 didn't know (inaudible).
13 MR. PINDALE: Now, definitely the valve 14 was -- it failed.
15 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: It failed, 16 right.
17 MR. PINDALE: Yeah.
18 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And they were 19 hitting with it a hammer -- with a big mallet.
20 That's not mechanically --
21 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Let's talk 22 about generally, then.
23 (inaudible).
24 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Were there 25 occasions where -- where he was not coming from the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
62 1 conservative-type of position in operating the plant?
2 I felt that his approach was 3 on the edge (inaudible) as far as what to do -- to the 4 edge. I did not feel that he went over the edge, but 5 he did push to get to the edge. And I had never 6 personally heard him tell me to do something 7 -- or anyone else for that matter -- to do something 8 that would result in a violation of the regulations or 9 tech specs or procedures.
10 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: The problem is 11 that every time you go to the edge, at some point, you 12 might slip over to the other side.
13 You might do that.
14 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And that's part 15 of where this is coming from. I mean, was the plant 16 going in that direction? Well, the plant's going in 17 that direction.
18 Again, what-- and I think-19 - to me, again, it'.s not the specifics that -- and 20 it's going right back to -- but when you do that 21 approach over and over and over, what message are you 22 sending? What behavior are you -- not verbally, but 23 what behavior are you actually projecting as being 24 acceptable? Not only acceptable, but desirable.
25 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.
NEAL R. GROSS Aj/1 C
63 I That Was the issue to me.
2 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right. And 3 what was being projected as desirable from 4 as well?
5 _It was you run the plant 6 serious. Okay.
7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: How about 8 Did you see him acting in that fashion?
e _1 9 Not at once. is an 10 interesting individual. High energy, intelligent, and 11 (inaudible). I did not see -- he's done it. He's 12 also gone the other way.
13 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Being 14 conservative?
15 Yeah. Yeah. He's more --
16 he listens better, okay, and he doesn't -- he's got 17 his own personality. He doesn't imitate too much.
18 And is -- all right, ja loose cannon, he 19 has lost his temper, or at least it's -- that it's on 20 purpose on whether he lost his temper or not. So it's 21 debatable. I've never seen do that.
22 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: How about 23 24 MR. SALAMON: I've never seen#gdo that.
25 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: In the pecking NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS [
!/ 7C 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
64 1 order he's a three are a 2 little less challenging to the staff at the plant than
/
I 3 How about where does he stand --
4 QUIUMMONW 7He's --
5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- on that 6 scale?
7 Well, you put it toi 8 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.
9 -- okay, most of the time, 10 you know. And he's pretty much different -- he's like 11 5 sort of, but he did not lose his temper. I don't 12 feel comfortable always talking to him about my points 13 of view. Having said that, it doesn't mean that he 14 necessarily agreed with me, but that we always had an 15 open channel communications.
16 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: The SJ valve 17 issue you were dealing with him.
18 Yeah, I was dealing with 19 him.
20 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did he ever 21 make a statement during those discussions -- this is 22 what K wants?
23 - , No.
24 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: He wouldn't go I) 25 there?
NEAL R. GROSS X COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
65 1 No, he would not, no.
2 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.
3 It's almost 2:00. We'll take a short break.
4 Okay.
5 (Off the record.)
6 (On the record.)
7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. We're 8 back on. It's about 2:06. And,I wanted to 9 still talk about the work environment stuff. But you 10 were talking about an area -- about reportability. As 11 the licensing manager, that would be one of your main 12 responsibilities with potential reportable issues to 13 the NRC, correct?
14 (inaudible) my 15 accountability.
16 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.
17 Okay. Were there cases where you had discussions with 18 senior management about potential reportability issues 19 where -- you mentioned one occasion that sticks out in 20 your mind. Could you talk about that a little bit?
21 (inaudible) this was a while 22 back.
23 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Where at?
24 Which plant?
25 Salem.
NEAL R. GROSS 16-COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
1 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. One or 2 two, do you remember?
3 I don't remember the 4 specifics, but that's when the proper water level --
5 feed-water and there was -- there was a disagreement, 6 okay, and I felt that we had a reportable -- in this 7 particular -- operability -- reportablility-type of 8 (inaudible). I thought we had (inaudible) reporting.
9 That didn't happen.
10 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Who was 11 disagreeing with you?
12 Who was I talking to about 13 this?
14 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes.
15 7 It was discussed and the 16 management -- you know, I don't really know what time 17 we discussed it, at 8:00 or 9:00 or 10:00 (inaudible) 18 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.
19 And the position of the 20 (inaudible) was and then officially it was discussed 21 and/or expressed, and nothing happened. That's pretty 22 much it.
23 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Come on,L7 24 you got to give me more than that.
25 Right, if I could. I wish NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS X 1 76-
67 1 I could.
2 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I need you to.
3 You really -- come on. You remember this.
4 9 The time frame is -- is like 5 -- this is a three-year ago type thing.
6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. So then 7 it's January '04, so we're late 2000, early 2001 time 8 period?
9 JI -- yeah, yeah.
10 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And what's the 11 piece of equipment, the aux feed-water what?
12 The aux feed-water pump.
13 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Pump.
14 It was the aux feed-water 15 pump.
16 SR. ,SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. And what 17 was the matter with the pump? I guess it wasn't 18 working.
19 It wasn't that simple. It's 20 not that --
21 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: It never is.
22 It never is.
23 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. The 24 bottom line is something's not right with it, and not 25 only in your opinion, but the technical people's NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS I-41123 MUfW lC Iel A NrAt/C Li IA
68 1 opinion, and I guess that that was inoperable and 2 reportable.
3 The whole focus of the )
4 discussion was on -- not on reportability, okay, it S was on performance.
6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Performance of 7 who or what?
8 The pump, the pump.
9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.
10 Mechanical performance.
11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.
12 You know, I guess 13 (inaudible).
14 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right. )
15 -- yeah 16 SR. .SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: But what you 17 remember was you came into that meeting with --
18 Right.
19 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- you felt it 20 was inop and reportable.
21 And subsequently, I talked 22 t netic), who's not at this (pho 23 plant. He manages --
24 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.
25 I 00ww"06-WAbout --
)
NEAL R. GROSS s,91/ 7Cr COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
69 1 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: After .the 2 meeting.
3 # 0610 WiYeah.
4 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.
5 He was -- at that time he 6 was notQ- he was (inaudible) manager.
7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.
8 And that (inaudible).
9 MR. PINDALE: Did he agree with your 10 position?
11 I think -- I think 12 (inaudible) to my position.
13 MR. PINDALE: You didn't disagree on --
14 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TE.TOR: But your 15 position -- I mean, you didn't come up with it by 16 yourself. The.guys out in the field, the subject 17 matter expert guys must've gave you their opinion, and 18 that's what you brought --
19 Yeah, a position 20 (inaudible). This is a modification of the paperwork 21 we got on it.
22 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.
23 WAnd you look at it, great, 24 you know, the condition. And it looks like it's 25 reportable. (inaudible).
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.
70 1 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.
2 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And who at the 3 management meeting did not agree with that?
4 Again, it was -- whoever was 5 there three years ago -- and it's one date. I can't 6 (inaudible).
7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Who's that that 8 we're -- are we talking senior VP?
9 No, we're talking manager 10 level. The morning meeting is typically -- and there 11 may have been some VPs over there, but I can't tell 12 you if that day who was over there. I think -- we had 13 -- at these meetings, typically, you have a certain 14 cast of characters. However, there was a lot of 15 (inaudible), but not fro 16 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.
17 Sometimes it's one thing, 18 sometimes it's all things. (inaudible) and --
19 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: It had to have 20 been someone in the office management --
21 But --
22 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- who --
23 We also had an office 24 management--
25 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.
NEAL R.GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS I./ -
71 1 -- type. Yeah.
2 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. Who 3 didn't agree with --
4 Yeah.
5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- what you 6 said.
7 Yeah.
8 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Your position.
9 Yeah.
10 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right. At 11 some point -- well, what happened with it? What 12 was --
13 lQ-_-SNothing.
14 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Nothing.
15 Nothing happened with it.
16 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: No. work was 17 done, no --
18 No, the work was done on the 19 pump. The pump was -- was repaired. The condition 20 was corrected.
21 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.
22 QOkay? What did not happen 23 was the reportability aspect. I think nothing was 24 reported.
25 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: At any point NEAL R.GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS A/Iii A
/
1>
72 1 after you made your presentation at that meeting, were 2 you provided with a technical basis which changed your 3 position from not understanding -- I don't think it's 4 inop now, either, and I don't think it's --
5 No.
6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: No. How did 7 you resolve that, internally with yourself?
8 I didn't and that's what I'm 9 talking --
10 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.
11 This was not resolved. I 12 just felt it was -- first of all, I felt it was not 13 (inaudible) issue. Okay. (inaudible). So I felt 14 that we did not have a safety issue. I think --
15 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: If it's inop it 16 might be a safety issue.
17 MR. PINDALE: And he's talking reporting 18 aspect of it.
19 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.
20 Cl :Yeah.
21 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.
22 Right.
23 MR. PINDALE: But Thursday you reported to 24 the --
25 !4 Right, correct. Correct.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS ufrero arc A^ir% Atle Luses J*s AIC" 1 /
73 1 The condition was corrected. The condition was 2 recognized --
3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.
4 -- and was corrected. So 5 it's not like we did this like, yeah, no problem.
6 We're going to live with it. That is not going to 7 happen.
8 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.
9 The reportability of it is 10 what did not happen. And I -- and that one, I felt 11 uncomfortable, obviously. But I believe that it was 12 not a safety issue as well. Okay. You know, it's not 13 wrong to make an issue out of something. Are you 14 going to pick something that is partially negligence, 15 and then --
16 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And what time -
17 - what time period were you seeing those types of 18 issues come up and you felt you had to take your shot 19 on what you felt was a safety issue, is that what 20 you're saying?
21 You either take it on a 22 safety issue or you take it on something where --
23 before the fact. For example, if I'm going to be like 24 (inaudible) responses. Okay, on those, I really want 25 to make sure that whatever tell the office is NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
75 1 running out, you have two choices, okay? You can take 2 your chances and not (inaudible), or you can report 3 it. And then when you get the facts, here are the 4 facts.
5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: What was the 6 position at Salem-Hope Creek?
7 M M."W At Salem-Hope, I did not run 8 into that problem.
9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Except this.
10 Except this one time where 11 it didn't even get to the point of starting the clock.
12 It was just -- it was a discussion along the lines of, 13 is this reportable or not, okay, not so much is the 14 clock running, and at these hours, what do you think?
15 Those issues come up fairly regularly --
16 SR. ,SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.
17 2--on the clock running and 18 the (inaudible) reported. And sometimes they chose 19 (inaudible) testing. So Salem and Hope was not -- was 20 not difficult on reporting and retracting.
21 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. Other 22 type of operability issues like the one you described 23 where you felt something was inoperable, where 24 management didn't agree and really didn't provide a 25 basis for it -- for why they didn't agree? Any other NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.
M
76 1 instances like that?
2 I'm trying to -- I'm trying 3 to think of some. There's nothing coming -- nothing 4 clearly coming.
5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Talk about this 6 one a little bit, then.
7 Okay.
8 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: It's been 9 described to me that -^ we're talking about 10 operability determinations at Salem-Hope Creek. It 11 got to a point where it changed from, okay, you have 12 to prove to me it's inoperable, instead of proving 13 it's operable. Did you see that philosophy change 14 while you were there from you got to prove to me it's 15 inoperable or you don't do anything?
16 Yeah.
17 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.
18 Right. When -- even the 19 regulatory guidelines tell you that if you have 20 something that's operable in the plant and a question 21 comes up and you say hey, this condition is different, 22 you still -- the first thing that happens is you apply 23 your engineering to it.
24 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.
25 And based on that you can NEAL R.GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS All 1
77 1 proceed. So if I think that, hey, this one over here 2 is -- I think that when I'm done, I'll be okay.
3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.
4 Certainly. That's okay.
5 And then you proceed through your paperwork, and son 6 of gun, I was wrong. And that's okay.
7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.
8 All right. So I did not see 9 him writing, and I thought that the operability 10 evaluations, in general, were fair. Okay? I'm not 11 going to say they were the best, but they were fair, 12 and it was done without, you know, trying to -- trying 13 to use (inaudible) off the wall because of my 14 operability.
15 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.
16 It's in the discussion that 17 sometimes these things happen. When-someone brings up 18 an issue,. they say I don't -- these kinds of 19 conversations do happen, okay?
20 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: They did happen 21 at Salem-Hope Creek?
22 Yeah, they do. Right.
23 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Were you part 24 of them?
25 I'm sure I was part of some NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
78 1 of them.
2 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.
3 4 Because (inaudible) your 1) 4 inoperable, you're going to be -- it depends on -- it 5 depended on the situation.
6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.
7 Whereas if you're talking 8 about multiple components and shutdowns items, mostly 9 likely I've been part of them.
10 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. Was 11 there a point where that process turned into something 12 which you thought was not as healthy as it should be?
13 Yeah, yeah. And that's back 14 to that process again, like when it's the entire )'
15 approach, and this is just one example of it or one 16 manifestation of this philosophy where you have to 17 prove -- there were some other instances, the 18 vibration of pumps.
19 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.
20 .And some vibrations --
21 you've got the problem with vibration (inaudible), so 22 you go to relay five and you've still got a problem, 23 okay? And then you do something else and all of 24 sudden you have no problems. So that's why some of 25 these discussions took place, where you had to go in NEAL R. GROSS Al/ic C-COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
79 1 and just push and push and push until your matter 2 comes out okay. And sometimes you go so far that 3 actually it's not 100 per cent sure. You're at the 4 edge, okay, but are you -- what kind of edge are you 5 on? I don't know.
6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Which time were 7 you talking about?
8 Pump vibration.
9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Which plant, 10 when? I always come back to that point.
11 I know.
12 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I need to know 13 when and who.
14 Yeah, names and addresses.
15 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yes.
16 2 I'm not going to help you 17 much.
18 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Well, do the 19 best you can.
20 Yeah, I'm trying.
21 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.
22 I think it's -- one issue 23 was on a safety inspection (inaudible), where they 24 wound up loading up the (inaudible) to get the 25 vibration down. Does that sound familiar to you?
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.
80 1 MR. PINDALE: Um-hum.
2 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: That's bad?
3 MR. PINDALE: The Salem-Hope injection
)
v 4 pumps?
.5 handMMJI Yeah. the Salem-Hope 6 injection pumps.
7 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: That's a bad 8 thing?
9 R SYeah.
10 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Depending.
11 Okay.
12 But it was, you know, to 13 analyze the way -- that it's okay. And that's what I 14 mean by going to the edge, but not -- I don't know if 15 it's -- for sure you don't want your pump loaded up 16 with water, okay, otherwise they'd come loaded up with 17 water.
18 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Uh-huh.
19 Okay. But you do whatever 20 you can too get the numbers to come out right.
21 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: In PRA space?
22 Maybe not PRA.
23 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.
24 I'm talking about the plant 25 and vibration measurements and -- )
NEAL R. GROSS
.1)1 7 G-,
rro Iwr PDEmTn c ANri T0aK1urQeD1=DQ
81 1 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.
2 Were you comfortable where the plant came out in the 3 end on that?
4 Was I comfortable? Well, 5 comfortable is --
6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Were you 7 uncomfortable?
8 I was -- I was okay with it 9 knowing that we were going to address the problem in 10 the long run. I knew that this is not something that 11 we wanted to live with for the next 20 years.
12 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did you feel 13 that -- that the problem that was identified at that 14 time was a tech spec issue?
15 No, it was not -- it's a 16 pump operability issue.
17 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yeah.
18 Okay? But once you get it 19 within the specs, you're out of the operability 20 question.
21 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.
22 But you've got this pump in 23 this configuration with this lead on it, which it 24 certainly was not originally designed to be like that, 25 and you just -- you just wonder what -- where are you?
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1391 Rl-nAF IdI Aim A In A N hAI
82 1 What's going on with this pump:
2 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Were the proper II 3 evaluations done? -- C 4 Yeah, they were all done.
5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.
6 They were all done. An 7 evaluation -- let me give you two examples. One is to 8 (inaudible) one point each. The aux feed pump, we 9 took care of this -- where they had a calculation that 10 this will not clog given the crud that's going to go 11 through it due to this model that they just came up 12 with. And then they run a physical test to confirm 13 the model and (inaudible), and you wind up with a red 14 binder, okay, for the calculations. Another 4
15 calculation is from (inaudible), where they start it 16 up and they hadscaught a whiff steam coming out from 17 the reactor header in the vessel plant, you know, the
- 18 (inaudible). So they did a calculation thing that 19 there's no problem from (inaudible). You go in six 20 months later and (inaudible) so you'll know where your 21 reactors are heading. So calculations are good and 22 they're necessary, but they're -- I don't have 23 (inaudible).
24 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Let's talk I) 25 about a meeting that I've been made aware of. I guess NEAL R. GROSS (
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83 1 this in -- when comes on board, he has a 2 meeting where he's talking to the managers that are on 3 site, including the shift guys. And he makes a 4 statement that -- something to the effect that you 5 don't get it -- that you don't get it, do you know 6 what I'm talking about?
7 Not specifically, but I know 8 that that -- he said that so frequently.
9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: What does that 10 mean to you, you don't get it?
11 I think exactly what it 12 sounded like. (inaudible) communication. I don't get 13 what -- you know, whatever he's thinking and whatever 14 he wants is something that I just don't get.
15 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. Okay.
16 I'll ask you to comment on it, but at least one senior 17 manager we've talked to has said that what you got 18 from was that the shift managers on shift running the 19 plant -- it wasn't their call. They didn't have the 20 power to make the call to raise power. That decision 21 can only be made by senior management above them. And 22 how that was eventually to people at that level --
23 just the plant guys -- let to the talk process? The 24 talk process --
25 Well, (inaudible).
Coo NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS P / --
84 1 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. And 2 what was that about?
3 And that was when they had 4 (inaudible).
5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And that's why 4t 6 I think this meeting happened right after that 7 event.
8 Andwhat happened is that it 9 was either taken off-line -- you have a requirement to 10 keep the boiler at a certain -- above a certain 11 temperature, and (inaudible). So the important thing 12 is they never noticed that the water (inaudible).
13 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
14 meeting was held to address that particular issue.
15 That's right.
16 SR. ,SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did you 17 remember --
18 The meeting? I 19 don't. I just remember the events. I just --
20 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. But this 21 -- that mind set that the shift managers don't really 22 have the call to make that call, eventually got to a 23 point where it turned that they felt they didn't have 24 the power for the employee to put the plant down that 25 was an issue. Any comment on whether you saw that --
NEAL R. GROSS 4 /l -
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85 1 felt that for sure or not?
2 I can tell you a 3 conversation that happened and associated with the 4 (inaudible) earlier --
5 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.
6 where coming out of that 7 was that the engineer, who finally thought of -- or 8 similar thoughts -- should not go to the (inaudible) 9 first, they should contact the management -- go up the 10 management chain. And then after the management has 11 taken a look at the problem and (inaudible), that's 12 when they should (inaudible). And in the direction, 13 then directly fro 14 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
15 MR. PINDALE: Has that been formalized?
16 Formalized?
17 MR. PINDALE: I mean, you know, in 18 corrective action system, like --
19 Yeah. I don't think you see 20 this in writing. I don't mean to (inaudible) 21 discussion.
22 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Do you feel 23 that was inappropriate that -- or what the message was 24 or--
25 Well, see that's where the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS A
86 1 difficulty comes in. It depends on how you do it.
2 Conceptually, you need to get management involved 3 early. I did not feel good about getting involved in 4 this at that time -- at the point where everything was 5 already out of service.
6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.
7 So I think you do need to 8 get management involved. Having said that, it depends 9 how the message was rolled out, because it can easily 10 come across like don't talk to us if you find the 11 problem. Okay? And that's where style comes in. If 12 you come -- if you're an aggressive senior manager --
13 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Like 14 - and you tell people that 15 I need to know before you talk to j that's a 16 message -- a specific message. Then it's someone who 17 -- who you know well and feel -,- hey, listen. When 18 you find something (inaudible), okay, before -- you 19 got to make sure it's a real issue and I want to be 20 sure that we (inaudible) to make sure that we take all 21 the right actions. There's different -- different 22 ways on how you communicate the -- even though it may 23 be the right message, it might come across as the 24 wrong message.
25 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did it come )
NEAL R. GROSS -7'--
frat DrT DCOr-bt^MO0 ALIM TO AMLentbosr 41
87 1 across as the wrong message to you?
2 Well, not to me. The 3 management -- the night shifters sure wanted to know 4 before -- really it was difficult. Okay. I 5 understood it, but I think it a very high likelihood 6 of coming across -- not to me, to the average 7 engineer, which is out there (inaudible).
8 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.
9 Okay. (inaudible). It was 10 a difficult situation.
11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.
12 MR. PINDALE: So in fact, a lot of times 13 that happens anyway, doesn't it, when it happens?
14 Typically, both 15 simultaneously.
16 MR. PINDALE: Right.
17 Okay?
18 MR. PINDALE: Particularly with the 19 engineering-types.
20 Yes.
21 MR. PINDALE: Having (inaudible) the 22 surveillance, it goes to operations or to jjright, 23 or they're involved in that? You know, they all --
24 They did that (inaudible).
25 -10C NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.
88 1 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I think you're 2 right most of the time.
3 And then I initialed--
4 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I know what 5 you're getting at. You really are --
6 And actually, their 7 approximations. And holy smokes, the pump will not do 8 what it's supposed to do. (inaudible).
9 MR. PINDALE: Typically, I don't -- not 10 necessarily best, but didn't engineering took some 11 time where -- if they come up with something, they'll 12 either bounce it of an engineer or either a supervisor 13 or--
14 With all of us.
15 MR. PINDALE: Right.
16 Right.
17 MR. PINDALE: To some extent that happens 18 much of the time, maybe not always.
19 And that's an area it does 20 happen and it's a challenge, because the opposite of 21 it is -- and actually, this happened, also, where 22 engineering (inaudible), look I'm doing this 23 calculation and my preliminary results are that you've 24 got a problem. And the manager goes and tells the ops 25 manager and he says it looks like we have a problem NEAL R. GROSS fAlj 1Co-g
89 1 with this pump. And then the ops manager gets 2 curious, because -- he says, okay. Now you told me 3 this, what do I do now? (inaudible).
4 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: It's 2:30. I'm 5 going to put a different tape in. This one's almost 6 burned out. We're going to go off the record.
7 (Off the record.)
8 (On the record.)
9 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay, we've 10 turned over to our tape two -- two -- just a few 11 minutes ago we turned the tape off. Actually, only a 12 minute afterwards, we turned the first tape off. But 13 anyway, now we began by talking about what you 14 saw as a disconnect between you and your managers. We 15 can come back to that, then we can get to the finish 16 line. Something,happened that -- there -- well, which 17 -- well, you resigned from your job. Can we go into 18 that? Then we'll come back --
19 Okay, all right. Like, 20 there were issues, a lot of issues, a lot of NRC 21 visibility. corrective action program problem that 22 -- I don't think I identified that. I think that --
23 as a matter of fact, my biggest issue with corrective 24 action was that after this there was an inspection 25 like last -- my (inaudible) and we were flat out told NEAL R.GROSS al)
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90 1 by regional management -- the wake up call? If you've 2 got a problem, fix it. And nothing happened.
3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Was (inaudible) 4 down here?
5 What do you mean 6 (inaudible). It was on of his sidekicks. (inaudible) 7 came for this last one.
8 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: . Right.
9 (inaudible) came down and -
10 - he's the deputy director (inaudible), I believe.
11 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And-.landy 12 hpnetic), (phonetic),ic-13 MR. PINDALE: Do you recall 14 (inaudible). He came 15 down to deliver the message and not just at the exit 16 of 101. (inaudible). And still nothing happened. As 17 a matter of fact, he was -- what happened is that we -
18 - after much delay, we started -- we put together an 19 organization, a corrective action group. And besides 20 people, the context of this group was to get some 21 people who really knew how to do (inaudible) together, 22 who knew how to make sure the program ran -- ran 23 appropriately and we made a presentation about that.
24 This was two (inaudible). Then what happened, in 25 September we re-organized. The group disappeared.
NEAL R. GROSS All 1 >
91 1 There is no such group anymore in Hope Creek now, 2 okay? And yet, that was the big get-well program. So 3 when this TINR (phonetic) inspection just happened in 4 the fall over at Hope Creek, I really expected action 5 much worse than Hope Creek got.
6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: From the NRC?
7 Yeah. Simply because of the 8 lack of responsiveness -- what I perceived from the 9 plant.
10 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right.
11 Okay.
12 But anyway, my point being 13 that we have issues. We don't address them and then 14 finally when we do address them, we go back to the 15 -- we went back to this thing and went hey, it's okay, 16 because we got new management in place and they're 17 going to decide, you know, they come from a good 18 culture. That's one -- one example. Okay. There --
19 you can actually go down through the significant 20 issues that happened at Salem-Hope Creek to the last 21 year or two and march down every one of them. The 22 focus has -- wherever my disconnect came is that the 23 issue always seemed to be at least -- always come to, 24 Gabe, you know, make it a non-issue. They would --
25 how's it going to look, what are we doing to make sure NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS At l x
92 1 it doesn't look bad, and if it does (inaudible) what 2 are we doing about it?
3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: So that's the 4 way you took it?
5 But that's the way I took 6 it, right. Because that's -- that is the reality of 7 the way it is. And that's from Hope. To some extent, 8 it's okay. The problem that I had is, again, you have 9 these issues and the resolution is licensing and that 10 is not the way it is. Okay, you don't resolve issues 11 through icensing(
12 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: How should they 13 have been resolved?
14 You resolve issues by fixing**
15 the problem.
16 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Fixing 17 equipment?
18 N Fix the equipment, fix the 19 processes, okay, and then fix the people, if you have 20 to.
21 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Who is laying 22 this at your doorstep, these issues? Who are they?
23 That's the 24 expectation, that this is how the process works. As 25 a matter of fact, like I said, it was looked at, that NEAL R. GROSS AI( 7C-'
93 1 the issue was that we're not carrying our message to 2 the region -- to the NRC, properly. And it's my job 3 to carry the right information to the region. They 4 have a licensing strategy out there. Now, there's 5 only so much paint.
6 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I agree.
7 3NNOkay.
8 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.
9 And I'm not about to do 10 that, okay? It -- whatever we communicate has to be 11 accurate.
12 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right, yeah, 13 it's 50.9.
14 550.9. And in (inaudible),
15 hey, sure the reactor tripped, but our response was 16 terrific, okay?, So the point -- the only thing I'm 17 trying to say is that we focused on the things that we 18 did well in response to the event. That's about as 19 far as we can go. Not so much focus on, well, how in 20 the world did you ever get here?
21 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.
22 And then that's where I have 23 difficulty. Okay. I think, also, that you've got to 24 give credit to the people on the other side in the 25 sense that when you talk about, hey, we had this NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS a i
94 1 problem, but look at how well we responded. That is 2 not the issue. The issue, I think, is how did you get 3 through that problem and are you really sure that 4 you've got it addressed? And that's where the 5 pressure -- that I saw pressure -- the direction I saw 6 was in making sure that we come across as -- we come 7 across on the positive side of responding effectively, 8 but at the same time, we're really not addressing how 9 we got there. And by responding effectively, I don't 10 mean corrective action. Okay, I mean, like if the 11 turbocharger failed, what we did was we stopped this, 12 we did this, we did that. Okay, but what are we 13 really doing to fix the problem?
14 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Well, it's the 15 issue. Why weren't those problems being fixed from 16 your --economics? They didn't want to spend the 17 money?
18 9Economics is a piece of it, 19 I believe, because 0 and M is big.
20 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: 0 and M?
21 Operations --
22 And Maintenance.
23 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- and 24 Maintenance.
25 Budget. )
NEAL R. GROSS ant j
95 1 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Budget.
2 It's a big deal.
3 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: You emphasize 4 that.
5 I do. We just had layoffs 6 at Salem-Hope Creek.
7 MR. PINDALE: And I want to hash something 8 up. One is related to that and the other, I wanted to 9 just focus a little bit on the two areas that he 10 mentioned, because those are the corrective action 11 system and kind of the licensing.function, those are 12 the two areas I wanted to have some questions about.
13 But first of all, with respect to layoffs and the 14 current status there -- I'm not sure what your timing 15 was when you left, but Salem and Hope Creek went 16 through another.iteration where people would have --
17 needed to -- redid the job. Was that a factor at all, 18 or --
19 My insight? I --
20 MR. PINDALE: -- relative to your leaving?
21 I was not -- I made it 22 through that process.
23 MR. PINDALE: Okay. So you were going to 24 be in the same position?
25 Yes, I was in the same NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIDBERS A
MI v X
96 1 position.
2 MR. PINDALE: Okay.
3 Subsequently.
4 MR. PINDALE: Okay. With respect to the 5 corrective action program, at Salem and Hope Creek 6 it's part of it is SAP system -- site-wide system, it 7 does rule everything, right?
8 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: We've heard 9 that, too, from a lot of people.
10 MR. PINDALE: Do you think that's a piece 11 of the problems and the challenges you had with the 12 corrective action system? Corrective action 13 effectiveness because -- you know, what's the problem 14 with the corrective action system? Is it that they're 15 not being identified, they're not prioritized, they're 16 not, you know, corrected, and from your standpoint, do 17 you see that -- how it's managed within SAP has any 18 impact?
19 I think the impact is only 20 from the point of view of being extremely resource 21 intensive. It requires a lot of time, obviously.
22 It's painful. It's very painful.
23 MR. PINDALE: What's painful about it?
24 J From get to go. The system 25 we have over here, it's like a breath of fresh air to NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
97 1 me. For example, the way that the process works. You 2 write on the -- well, you know exactly how it works.
3 It just -- you're probably better than me because you 4 were in it more than me. Notification is written, 5 it's given one number, then they convert it 6 (inaudible) roll out an operation -- not an operation, 7 an order form. An order, that -- from that order, 8 that has a different number. Then underneath there, 9 you have an operation to do an evaluation. You do the 10 evaluation, then corrective action. Then when I look 11 at the evaluation to approve it, now that's called a 12 confirmation, and then there's another number to it.
13 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Oh, boy.
14 And I can't -- to this day, I needed help in getting the confirmation to come up with -- that's associated with --
MR. PINDALE: Are some of the difficulties with using the system, you know, directly related to its, you know, effective --
Yeah, I think it's related only from the point of view of research.
MR. PINDALE: All right. You still think things are getting done --
I do. As a matter of fact, I think there's too many things that are in the NEAL R.GROSS i /
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98 system. Too many (inaudible). I don't think there's any real problem getting things in there.
MR. PINDALE: Okay.
7But it was very difficult to get things out of it.
MR. PINDALE: (inaudible) audit, from my standpoint.
5" Yeah, yeah.
MR. PINDALE: The other piece, with respect to the licensing, you mentioned a piece of it, where to some extent, maybe it's the perception that they're coming to you at a point where they're in some degree of trouble and they want you to find the way out. That's -- it's probably not unique, right? In terms of licensing --
Yeah, that's appropriate, right.
MR. PINDALE: -- as part of the job. And like we were talking before, it's really when we get to the edge of more trouble, your job is to get us out, period, as opposed to evaluate this and you tell us which way to go. So it's probably related to how it's presented and perceived and what the-- what the -
- you know, the direction is. So one of the things we're interested in -- and you can have examples where NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
99 you knew the station was in trouble or what the outcome would be, but what the direction was -- you know, you're our technical lawyer, get us out of this.
Do you have any examples in that regard?
I have successful examples.
MR. PINDALE: Well, what successful things, what (inaudible)?
Yeah. An interpretation, a read, a loophole --
I MR. PINDALE: Right.
- or whatever.
MR. PINDALE: I mean, did you --
Okay.
MR. PINDALE: -- were you directed or did you come up with some that you -- looking back or probably not in the direction of safety?
I found situations where wrong calls were made, but it's not due to direction, primarily, because the people at the other end were typically not senior management, they were just operations, typically. There are two things that they do -- that people do to get the answers they want.
There are two big things (inaudible). One is polling, okay? You know what I'm talking about, polling? They call licensing engineer A. Hey, here's a (inaudible),
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 7 Cs 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
100 what do you think? Oh, you've got a problem. Okay, call licensing engineer B. What do you think?
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Shop around.
v7 /Yeah. And when they get the right answer, then -- the answer they want, they'll say okay, got it. Thank you. The other one is giving you half the information and that's the most challenging one. Okay, hey, here's the situation, A, B, C. Okay. (inaudible). There's a pressure gauge of heat pump suction and it was calibrated wrong.
Instead of four inches of mercury, it was calibrated -
- it was technically leaking. So that means that the pump was running and drawing on the condensation of the storage tank. If it's a draw-down all the was and it still keeps on running and destroy itself. Well, that's the (inaudible) the pump was destroyed after its initial safety function, after half the tank was empty, right? Answer is right. So then where's the problem at? There's no problem. Okay, got it.
Except that was the wrong scenario. It was a scenario where, in fact, it is important for that pump to drip.
Like, well, the scenario being (inaudible) and then the tank goes away, period. Okay, and that you always push the water and all of a sudden you can't put --
over here what they did was they had the controllers.
NEAL R. GROSS mi-IRT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
101 Well, if water gets down low, your -- you'd never get there. So that's the only reason I mentioned that was just that it's a typical scenario where you get half the story. You really have to be careful. That's what I -- that's what happened. But it wasn't really senior management, it mainly ops. And I'm not sure, again, whether it was ignorance or not.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: An occasion where you thought more that it was not ignorance?
In some cases, it was not ignorance, in other cases, it's unquestionable. Just purely from knowing individuals.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Could -- part of what we're looking at is production over safety-type issues. We talked about a few of those, the valve issue, the SJ valve issue. We've talked about some other stuff. You've seen other types of issues like that, production over safety, it came up to the line, maybe didn't go over the line, but right up to the line?
(inaudible) think of a couple of issues that come close to that. The one that (inaudible). Okay, where --
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: (inaudible)?
MR. PINDALE: To tell you the truth, I
- NEAL R.GROSS ^ 1 7C COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHOOF II Ann AvF Nw.
102 don't a lot about (inaudible).
It involved, again, the (inaudible). And I think we did find some issues there, and I'm not -- and over there, for sure, the pressure was felt, that had we taken the fact that they appeared to be as presented, we had an operability issue.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did you write things down?
' I believe so, eventually.
There was a fair amount of time taken in the evaluation and calculations were done and we found problems, not only in the Salem site, but in the Hope Creek site, so from that (inaudible). But the pressure was there.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: From Hope.
1 _ ! y Well, it's -- it's not even the front booth. Do I tell them X, Y, Z or do I tell them -- the issue tends to come out more like, hey, I've got this problem, what do I do? Do I tell my boss that, hey, we have this problem and I think we're going to have to shut down or, hey, don't worry, this issue was raised and I'm addressing it. Okay, that's the kind of -- so you always want to go on with the latter end. )
NEAL R. GROSS 7 COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
103 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: To who, though?
-M Well, I'm talking to the manager level who you would report a leak to.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.
MR. PINDALE: You know, that's probably a good example would be SSDI, and some of the questions that came up were potentially related to operability and as you know, we had some other difficulties with that team. But the lack of information coming when questions were asked like, you know, it looks like you don't have this or show me which calculation for that.
In some cases it took weeks to get any kind of answer to 2 You have any insight in terms of those?
I mean, was there some knowledge that there was potentially an operability issue recognized early, but the response was delayed for whatever reason?
.- I Well, there was no -- you know that the final results of the calculations were such that there was an operability issue, okay.
However, to get from here to there was painful, okay?
But in regulatory space, I think we were in engineering judgment, tell them that this is okay.
And however, having said that, it's going to take some time to go and grind through the calculation. If there were -- there were strong individuals on both NEAL R. GROSS I C COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
104 sides of that, and it's difficult in that situation when -- because over there, you've got the typical situation where I would've expected like they didn't ask, but I would've expected someone to tell me, if I went to them and said, hey, listen, that's a problem (inaudible) coming on that obstacle right now. I can't say (inaudible), but I can't be sure that --
okay, that's the kind of situation I'm talking about.
MR. PINDALE: Was there -- do you know if there was discussion at the time that, you know, if we
-- if we discuss what we know right now, the conclusion would be that if these (inaudible) were inoperable and then we shut down and then maybe, was there a strategy to either delay that or --
)
4 Don't give us that much credit, okay?
MR. PINDALE: Okay.
Ea It's only and t and whoever -- the engineer --
MR. PINDALE: I mean, recognize that this is only a two week inspection and if we -- you know, we don't typically wait a week or two for documents to come.
You're correct.
MR. PINDALE: And that's why --
NEAL R. GROSS A/f/
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105 What did --
and this is part of the review -- was that any information that came from guy A was reviewed by guy B and and whatever it (inaudible), so --
and now that's it.
MR. PINDALE: Okay.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: So the answers to these questions, the answer's no.
MR. PINDALE: In regard to -- was information intentionally withheld?
Right. Oh, no information was intentionally withheld. It was always here' s where we've gotten now, I want to make sure that information we get is correct and he held up because of that. Now, in retrospect, I don't think that's something we would do. As a matter of fact, I don't think the guy who's out there right now, this would not be done.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: We've had discussions from (inaudible) people where they believed that shutdown, safety-type decisions are being made by the corporate up in Newark. Can you comment on whether from your view that you've seen or heard that?
I have not seen or heard NEAL R.GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS M il 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
106 that. The best I can say is that that the knowledge, what has been made very clear at the facility is that Salem and Hope Creek are the cash generators, the cash cows of the company, but not specific is why they were not shut down or shut down -- nothing like that.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Who provided that direction or that information to the plant?
That --
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Who did it come from? Per
~The PSEG.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.
It actually was a formal--
part of the formal roll-out of business plans and the VP talked to it. Well, it's not a secret.
SR. ,SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.
- Yeah.l SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: that's fine.
It's high visibility that PSEG Nuclear generates a lot of cash for the company and that's what the company runs on. I mean, it's part of the business plans and (inaudible) rolled out by the VP.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. And you brought up earlier, you know, people's incentive.
NEAL R. GROSS id. kUI.b1 TI
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107 IN 11"-1Yeah.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: A plan (inaudible), everybody's going to make more money --
_ ; Riht.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- the division.
Right.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Couple that with this direction or this information and roll out, you know --
~Yeah.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did you see that as a problem or does that come back to where you began talking about people may not be making conscious decisions, but --
7 That's where it really plays in. I don't --
MR. PINDALE: Right, and that's dangerous.
It can be.
Well, it can be. If you take a look at your incentives, you don't see safety in there. Let me -- one data point from years ago that I can tell you, which is that at one point, there were meetings held with engineering where engineering was specifically told to take risks, okay? But it's NEAL R. GROSS .
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108 like five years ago, okay?
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Take risks?
Yeah, to take risks.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: From who?
~T at the time, who was first --
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: That's (inaudible).
I thought it was quite interesting.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did you disagree with that? Did you feel uncomfortable with -
I thought it was the wrong message.
SR.-SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Oh yeah.
, Yeah. I think that you need to make the right decision. You need to make the calculation and whatever the calculation, you know, make sure you use the right calculation. Whatever it comes out with is what it comes out with.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. Let the chips fall where they are.
Yeah. But with -- he was coming from the point of view that you've taken too Ad. .- _
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, , L £ le Ame#iai0000 I \jj 0
109 many conservatives on your calculations and blah, blah, blah, blah, blah. But if that position (inaudible).
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yeah.
(inaudible).
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yeah. You made a comment you don't see safety in peoples' performance No, you don't see that. You have a capability factor or availability and you have 0 and M, and what else? You've got a few other things, but if you don't see safety, maintaining those low-risk profiles, okay. You don't see that.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Comment on this, if you can. You know, in most the states -- I don't know if it's like that here in the mid-west, but on the east coast, it's the deregulating environment.
The plant can't pass on their costs to the rate payer.
Was it like that in New Jersey?
It was like that in New Jersey. Having said that, I don't know how much is relevant to that, because --
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Why?
-o I came from which was regulated --
NEAL R.GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS A Ic' 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.
110 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TVATOR: Right.
-- and I'm here, which is regulated and I see the same pressures on expenses.
)
(inaudible).
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.
JAtL( , actually, they had like three rounds of layoffs before I ever came up here. I get over here, we're talking specifically about reducing staff.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: At F.
Yeah, -at (inaudible). So I really don't pay much -- I don't see that (inaudible). It seems like it should, but it )
doesn't. But I don't see it.
SR. . SPECIAL. AGENT TEATOR: There, at Salem-Hope Creek.
At Salem-Hope Creek.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Was that talked about from the senior VP corporate level, when it happened irI New Jersey?
ip Deregulation?
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yeah. How it would -- hcDw it could affect the plant?
Yeah, you -- right. But if )
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS Atll BIu/
ill you took a look at the economics of Salem and Hope Creek, they did something that was like very well done, which is deregulation, and they brought the costs of the plant down to like next to nothing.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.
And I'm going to use approximate numbers, but this -- even with the current staffing, the -- and all expenses. You're talking about roughly 300 million a year in expenses and yet they were taking in about 600 million.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Uh-huh.
7 So it was making big bucks cash.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Still is?
Still is.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: When you left?
Yeah.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Opinion --
questions. Why does (inaudible), frankly?
Yeah, right.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Was it about touchie-feelies, but in your opinion, was there an appropriate balance between safety and the plant operations?
Yeah, I believe so. In NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1Ca
112 general, yes. I think that, to a larger extent, it depends on who you've got at the top. And at Salem --
I think the world of 7 the Sale )
_AW SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay, good.
1 I think he makes good decisions and he understands safety. (inaudible).
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: With the Hope Creek?
am w(w inaudible).
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Who's the Hope Creeknow?
(phonetic).
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: . I MR. PINDALE: He was a right?
He was. He's got an
'interesting background. He was a as W then became the gand then he went to Cooke as the And then went to (inaudible) t and then he came to Salem
-- or Hope Creek.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Fro )
Fro q~w SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: You got new management at d (phonetic) now. You got i)
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113 (phonetic), /(phonetic) --
LI (inaudible).
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right, he was there --
Right.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- left and he's come back.
SR PCA AN e SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And . 0, M.
I--
.ANW Up here.
MR. PINDALE: No, he came from here.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: They were in place before you left?
Correct.
SR..SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did you notice if there was a change to the better -- and I know he hadn't been there that long, but --
For sureja jwasn't there that long. )73 was there maybe a couple of months.
MR. PINDALE: I know -- I knew
- from before he ever left.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I'm try to get a picture of whether at --
MR. PINDALE: (inaudible).
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS A'~f 1-I 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
114 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- with a new team. To be fair -- I mean, where are they at now?
Is what really counts.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. And is there residual things left, a hangover from the old crowd, thew--wXE-Xw'Y-
~I think that -
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: We'll talk about that.
Yeah. Okay.
from everything I hear about him, which -- yeah, I didn't know him real well over there and all I've got to go on is second-hand information. I think that he was a very good communicator, okay, so he's the exact opposite of SR.,,SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.
And he communicates frequently. I think that he' s been at enough turn-arounds successfully to know what it takes, so I have confidence in what he can do.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: He was here for a turn-around?
He was -- no, he wasn't. He was at -- he did it a few times. At (phonetic), a (phonetic), at NEAL R. GROSS .. ~~~~A I. ......
115 and then he came here. So he's got three turn-arounds under his belt.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And (phonetic) was in bad shape for a while.
Yes.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.
But he's done three of them and (inaudible). So I think that's probably pretty sound. The big issue -- okay, let me go on -- Vaca (phonetic) -- okay, Vaca, he's been through turn-around at Salem and has been at -- to a turn-around at
-- that's it, Salem. And he went to look atWiamm Whether he was at or not is debatable.
right now is (inaudible). Okay, not good.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: No.
But -- yeah, it ---- my concern with him is that if you give someone enough resources, they will be successful most of the time.
Yeah, you give him enough engineers, you give him enough dollars to get the contractors, to get parts, then you can do whatever you need to do with the plant. Even having all of that at (inaudible),
but he was successful at Salem.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yeah, I heard what people -- when he left there, people, for the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 129r PwAfn Lo AMfl ALcI D, GAG
116 most part, had confidence in him as a leader --
2 Right.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- and in management, they liked him.
JRight. He's likeable and he communicates straight, so my personal experience with him is -- similar to that. Okay, but when you look at what -- I don't know what happened at 'but for sure whatever happened at l was not good. I don't why it happened at _ but what happened wasn't good. So -- but Salem's another plant, different people, and people do like him. That's why he was successful. My bigger concern, actually, is the next step up. Above -- ] actually even above 1 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
(phonetic)?
I j If you take at look at the history of Salem, through the years, I mean well before I ever showed up --
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.
- -- with the operations and then with suport, and the plant kept going south, which is what happened in -- starting in '94.
And then plants were down and he'd throw all kinds of money at it, plant's up and running and then all of a NEAL R. GROSS v+// 7 COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
117 sudden you (inaudible) support again. And it's -- to me, it looks very similar to the cycle that happened earlier, and what's frustrating is the same thing I mentioned earlier, is that the place generates a lot of money.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.
And it doesn't take that much money to make a big difference.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I think that's right. He has a nuclear background.
Yeah, nuclear background.
Which is -- well, sir, that's not good.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Apparently.
You know what you're doing -
- and perhaps he thinks he knows more than he knows.
I don't know. That's speculation.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: So when you left, were - - did you think it was generally a healthy work environment or not?
Not -- no, not yet. Not yet.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Why?
Because -- well, for one thing, when you have a layoff like we just had, and the re-org that we just had, that puts in a lot of NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE..N.W.
118 stress on the organization. A lot of stress.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.
4 And a lot of managers left.
So we have lost some people.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: But before the layoff and the re-org, was the work environment better? From a safety-conscious work environment --
, Yeah.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- perspective, was it -- how was it before those two things happened?
Before -- before, okay. I think where they're headed is probably better than where they've been.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.
And the reason I say that is because the organization is structured better. Back then they didn't have a VP of -- director in charge of both plants.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: No plant manager.
No plant manager.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.
L w Now the organization makes sense.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right, okay.
NEAL R. GROSS 0\l I COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
119 I think that they still need to make a couple of changes -- my view, whatever it's worth. Well, it's -- in management, there's an issue, I think with SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.
a sharp guy who knows his stuff, but he goes with the wind, okay?
Whichever way the wind blows. And --
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: He's pretty high up. Who's blowing the wind?
The guy above him, okay?
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
9 Yeah. And he-needs to --
the guy in that position needs to -- the value he brings to the table, it's (inaudible) is what you know and what you believe in and what you think needs to get done, not necessarily -- you're going to think it's (inaudible) because you're boss is telling you, but what you bring to the discussion is yourself and I question tha V really does that, okay. And by going with the wind, whatever comes down, that's what happens. (inaudible). jI don't what he brings to the table. He's a nice guy, okay? No big issue, no change in the engineering number, send it down over there, because ever since left, there's NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.
120 been no leadership in engineering. You remember (inaudible). So a lack in engineering leadership is an issue over there. I think was there.
It's a big challenge. Okay. Those two guys are conservative and responsible for the plant (inaudible).
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: How about --
when you were there, did you feel you had the ability to raise an issue, a concern -- a plant concern, a safety concern? Did you have the ability to do that without fear of being retaliated against? We're getting into the --
Yeah.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- yes and no ')
type questions --
Yeah.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- now, but --
Yeah.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I mean, I know it fits into the work environment. People think they can raise an issue without getting knocked out of the box.
SE A ATeah.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did you think you could?
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS f~ I CY-
121 Did I think I could? I thought I could, yeah.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did you?
- I'm trying to think of any instances. I've raised issues. Again, it's the kind of things that I get involved in and see are -- I don't get -- I don't do the plant, okay? I don't operate the plant, I don't see a pump, I don't design equipment, I don't do calculations. So the kind of things that I get involved in are dealings with the NRC. That area corresponds (inaudible). But getting back once more to the bulletin response, I --
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: are you selling yourself short here as the L7 No, I'm just telling you that's the reality.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: There.
Yeah.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I've dealt with plants where licensing drove a lot of what was going on, frankly.
Really?
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Yeah. Had a lot of input. They provided a lot of direction, operability, that kind of stuff. ft NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.
V%{dV q A AS AAA...
122 That's surprising.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: You weren't a good performer, that's why.
j AWell, maybe so. There you go.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Got themselves in a lot of trouble.
- Okay. No, it's -- the licensing scope has -- my licensing scope -- and that's the way I seen it at at Salem and Hope Creek and here, too, frankly, is not operating the plant, it's in making sure -- the primary responsibility that licensing has is making sure that like -- that the plant operates efficiently within the regulations.
SR. ,SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: That's where the rubber meets the road, though.
Yeah.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Operating within the regs.
I~ Yeah.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: We talked about issues today where they've gone up to the line.
Yes.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: So from that
/
NEAL R. GROSS CP A S COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
123 standpoint, you would be involved in discussions regarding those types of issues.
Yes. Yeah.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: When you had a concern, was it dealt with --
Up high.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- in an appropriate way by your management?
I was dealt with in an appropriate way.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Appropriate --
Yeah SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- not inappropriate?
Correct. I was definitely appropriately SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: You want to make sure this comes out all right.
Yes.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Did anybody ever retaliate against you for -- you being on the side of the safety or conservative rules as opposed to the other side? The side, obviously.
Yeah. No retaliation.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: No retaliation.
NEAL R. GROSS cd I '
COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS e 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
124 No retaliation. You know, you have issues, but there was a right -- the most
-- I mentioned the shutdown where we were talking about cause of discretion, about a diesel and I said no. And he said, okay, let's shut the plant down.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right. Do people -- I got your answer about yourself, but did people -- managers at your level, your contemporaries, did they feel that they could push the conservative safety-type of call --
I just feel that -- but the culture is again, the guy who is the hero -- and it recognizes the one --
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Who saves the plant.
Saves the plant.
(inaudible) in the other direction.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR:
saved the plant when he shut that steam valve. The valve -- plume of steam going up, you couldn't get to it. The NEOs couldn't get to it. He found a way --
and it was shooting way up in the air 15, 20 feet.
You didn't hear about that?
No, no. If anybody can do it,* *can. o NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
125 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Well, he did it. He saved the plant. Some people would put it down as inappropriate, a guy at his level going in with a wrench and closing the valve.
That's the problem. That is the problem. But there's (inaudible).
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.
E~
L -,
Uj a sharp guy.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: I haven't met him.
- He's a good guy.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Is he?
Yeah.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay.
He does want to do the right thing. He does.come from the right side.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Do you mean the safety conservative-type --
Yeah.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: -- side?
+ Yeah.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: As opposed to the (inaudible) keep the plant open no matter what?
I Right, right. There are some guys who are loose cannons over there and you get NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
ono 9'AAAAV WAcRIAMrTnM n (. 9nnn.5-7ni lOMg 91AAXq
126 to know them after a while, but is not one of them.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: You made a comment a few minutes ago about the big issue and I cut you off. I put it in quotes.
Yeah, great.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right before --
right before -- I mean, we just started talking about deregulation, the new environment, deregulated plants, you can't pass it along to customers.
Yeah. (inaudible).
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: It's 3:17.
We're going to take a very short break and I'm going to finish up. I just want to go over my notes and make sure --
Okay, all right.
(off the record.)
(On the record.)
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay, we switched over to the other side of the tape again.
It's about 3:22. Li '^ I've gone through my notes here and at this point, I don't have any specific questions I wanted to ask you. But in closing, is there a final comment you can make about the work environment down there?
NEAL R.GROSS \.\
COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
lo 127 Well, okay. It's a tough environment in the sense that a lot is expected of the individual, a lot in the sense of making sure that the plant operates and runs. If I have any concerns, it's in the area of the expectations, the interpretive (inaudible).
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: And your basis for that is everything we talked about today?
Yeah.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: The corporate expectations.
Corporate expectations and reducing people --
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Right.
-- when you don't compete (inaudible) the ,firefighters, okay? So -- and that's
-- when you add it all together, that's where you wind up at.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay. I appreciate your time and your patience. It's about 3:25. If I need any follow-up after reading this --
it's probably about 200 pages. But after looking it over, if I have any follow-up questions, can I give you a call?
Of course.
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
lM~q% 44A A QA-2 %j11A0LU l^_'^K1 no Inn W A~n x . nes ash1 Ge74 AA Joe
128 SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Could you bring a little bit more?
r Of course.
2 )
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: You have my card. If something comes up that you think I need to know, you have my number.
- Sure.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: Okay? All right?
Got it.
SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right, this interview is concluded. Steve, anything else?
MR. PINDALE: No. j SR. SPECIAL AGENT TEATOR: All right, thank you very much. This interview's concluded.
(End of interview.)
NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS
CERTIFICATE This is to certify that the attached proceedings before the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the matter of:
Name of Proceeding: Interview of Docket Number: 1-2003-051F Location: _
were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for the file of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission taken by me and, thereafter reduced to typewriting by me or under the direction of the court reporting company, and that the transcript is a true and accurate record of the foregoing proceedings as recorded on tape(s) provided by the NRC.
David Martini Official Transcriber Neal R. Gross & Co., Inc.
. I)
NEAL R. GROSS