ML043640362

Ltr to Bruce S. Mallett, USNRC Region IV - from Jeff Griffin, Regional Director, FEMA - Subject: Final Report Camp Roberts Reception and Care Center Drill and El Chorro Emergency Worker Monitoring and Decontamination Center Drill - Diablo C

ML043640362
Person / Time
Site:	Diablo Canyon
Issue date:	03/04/2004
From:	Jeffery Griffin US Dept of Health & Human Services (HHS), Federal Emergency Management Agency
To:	Mallett B NRC Region 4
Schneck D 415-3079 NSIR/DPR/EPD
References
Download: ML043640362 (74)

Text

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 111I Broadway, Suite 1200 Oakland, CA. 946074052

- FEMA MAR 0O4 00 Mr. Bruce S. Mallett Regional Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region IV 611 Ryan Plaza, Suite 400 Arlington, Texas 76011-8064

Dear Mr. Mallett:

On April 30, 2003, and June 4, 2003, the Department of Homeland Security's Federal Emergency Management Agency Region IX evaluated the Camp Roberts Reception and Care Center and the EI Chorro Emergency Worker Monitoring and Decontamination Center Drills for the Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP). The purpose of these drills was to assess the level of State and local preparedness in responding to a radiological emergency.

I have enclosed a copy of the final report fof your records. One issue was identified, and we will monitor the correction of this issue. We have determined that based on the overall results of the drills, there is reasonable assurance appropriate measures canbe taken off-site to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency at DCPP. The level of preparedness and adequacy in the off-site radiological emergency response plans for the State of California and the jurisdictions site-specific to DCPP, together with the ability to implement these plans, were well demonstrated. Therefore, the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 44 Part 350 interim approval of the off-site radiological emergency response plans and preparedness for the State of California, site-specific to DCPP, will remain in effect.

If you have any questions or need additional information, please contact me at (510) 627-7100, or your staff may contact Mr. Kenneth Chin, Regional Assistance Committee Chair, at (510) 627-7122.

Sincerely,

-krJeff Griffin Regional Director Enclosure cc: Ms. Vanessa Quinn, FEMA HQ Mr. Eric Weiss, NRC HQ www.ferna.gov

] .: I Final Report Camp Roberts Reception and Care Center Drill and El Chorro Emergency Worker Monitoring and Decontamination Center Drill DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT Licensee: Pacific Gas and Electric Company Drill Dates: April 30, 2003 June 4, 2003 Report Date: February 19, 2004 FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY REGION IX 1111 Broadway, Suite 1200 Oakland, California 94607-4052

K,

11. REPORT CREDITS/ TABLE OF CONTENTS Document Preparation, Richard Echavarria Research FEMA Region IX.

and Chief Editor Document Preparation Elena Joyner FEMA Region IX Final Editor Kenneth Chin.

Chair, Regional Assistance Committee FEMA Region IX

.5

. I . . *. . .

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS Page EXECUTIVE I .

SUMMARY

II. REPORT CREDITS/TABLE'OFCONTENTS . .ii III. INTRODUCTION.............................................................................................................. Iv IV. OVERVIEW ............. vii A. Plume Emergency Planning Zone Description .vii B. Participants .: viii V. EVALUATION AND RESULTS .. ix A. Summary Results of Evaluation ix B. Status of Jurisdictions Evaluated .xi o Camp Roberts Reception and Care Center 1 o El Chorro Emergency Worker Monitoring and Decontamination Center 22 List of Tables Table I - Summary Results of Evaluation .x Table 2 - Issues ............ xiii List of Appendices APPENDIX 1 - ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS .32 APPENDIX 2 - EVALUATORS .34 APPENDIX 3 - CRITERIA AND EXTENT-OF-PLAY AGREEMENT .36 APPENDIX 4 - SCENARIO .53 ill

I I. EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

On April 30, 2003, and June 4, 2003, respectively, the Camp Roberts Reception and Care Center and the El Chorro Emergency Worker Monitoring and Decontamination Center Drills were conducted in the emergency planning zone (EPZ) around the Diablo Canyon Power Plant. The purpose of the drills was to assess the level of local and State preparedness in responding to a radiological emergency. The drills were held in accordance with FEMA's policies and guidance concerning the exercise of local and State radiological emergency response plans and procedures.

The most recent previous plume pathway exercise at this site was conducted on October21, 2002. The qualifying emergency preparedness exercise was conducted on August 19, 1981..

The most recent drill for the Camp Roberts Reception and Care Center was conducted on April 28, 1999, and for the El Chorro Emergency Worker Monitoring and Decontamination Center on June 16, 1999.

FEMA wishes to acknowledge the efforts of the many individuals from San Luis Obispo County, the State of California, the volunteer organizations, and the private organizations who participated in these drills.

Protecting the public health and safety is the full-timejob of some of the exercise participants and an additional assigned responsibility for others., Still others have willingly sought this responsibility by volunteering to provide vital emergency services to their communities.

Cooperation and teamwork of all the participants were evident during this exercise.

This report contains the final evaluation.of these drills.

The State and local organizations, except where noted in this report, demonstrated knowledge of their emergency response plans and procedures and adequately implemented them. There was one Area Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA) identified as a result of the Camp Roberts Reception and Care Center drill; the ARCA was corrected during the El Chorro Emergency Worker Monitoring and Decontamination Center drill. One ARCA from the 1999 Camp Roberts Reception and Care Center remains uncorrected, and five ARCAs from 1999 drills were corrected.

i

i -

III. INTRODUCTION On December 7, 1979'the President directed FEMA to assume the lead responsibility for all off-site nuclear planning and response.' FEMA's activities are conducted pursuant to 44 Code of Federal Regulations '(CFR) Parts 350, 351 and 352. These regulations are a key element in the Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program that was established following the Three'Mile Island Nuclear'Stati6naccident in March 1979.

' FEMA 'Rule 44 CFR 350 establishes the policies and procedures for FEMA's initial and continued approval of State'and local governments' radiological emergency planning and preparedness' for coinniercial nuclear po)w.e'r plants. This approval is contingent, in part, on State andlocal government participation'in joint exercises with licensees.

FEMA's'responsibilities in radiological emergency planning'for fixed nuclear facilities include the following:,' -

Taking the lead in off-site emergency planning and in the review and evaluation of RERPs and'procedures de'veloped by State and local governments;'

'Determining whether such plans and procedures can be implemented on the basis oof observation and evaluation of exercises of the'plans'and procedures conducted by State and local governments;'*

• 'Responding tb requests:by ;the U!S. Nuclear Reggulatory Commission (NRC) pursuant to the Memorandum' of Understanding between the NRC and FEMA dated June 17, 1993 (Federal Register;, Vol.' 58; No.' 176; Septenmbier 14, 1993);

and Coordinating' the, activities of Federal'agencies with responsibilities' in the radiological emergency planning process,' '

- U.S. Department of Corhnmerce,; 0 ' '; -

- U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Cormmission,

- U.S. Environmental Protection Agency; '  ;

- U.S. Department of Energy,

- U.S. Department of Health and Human Services,

- U.S. Department of Transportation,

- U.S. Department of Agriculture,

- U.S. Department of the Interior, and

- U.S. Food and Drug Administration.

Representatives of these agencies serve on the FEMA Region RIX Regional Assistance Committee (RAC) which is chaired by FEMA.

iv'

Formnal submission of the RERPs for the Diablo Canyon Power Plant to FEMA Region IX by the State of California and the involved local jurisdictions occurred on May 31, 1988.

State and local Radiological Emergency Preparedness plans are required, in NUREG-0654/FEMA REP 1, Rev.' 1 (November 1980), to designate primary and back-up medical facilities capable of providing appropriate care to injured/contaminated individuals originating from the off-site effects of an incident at a nuclear power plant. One or more of these facilities are usually exercised as part of the biennial State/Local REP exercise.

Others may be exercised during the off-year period. At least one evaluated medical drill must be held each year at each nuclear facility, according to NUREG-0654 Planning Standard N.2.c.

FEMA Region IX evaluated on April 30, 2003, and June 4, 2003, respectively, the Camp Roberts Reception and Care Center and the El Chorro Emergency Worker Monitoring and Decontamination Center Drills, to assess the capabilities of local emergency preparedness organizations in implementing their RERPs and procedures to protect the public health and safety during a radiological emergency involving the Diablo Canyon Power Plant. The purpose of this report is to present the results and findings on the performance of the off-site response organizations (ORO) during a simulated radiological emergency.

The findings presented in this report are based on the evaluations of the Federal evaluator team, with final determinations made by the FEMA Region IX RAC Chairperson, and approved by the Regional Director.

The criteria utilized in the FEMA evaluation process are contained in:

NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," November 1980; FEMA Radiological Emergency Preparedness: Exercise Evaluation Methodology, April, 2002; and FEMA Guidance Memoranda MS-1, "Medical Services, " November, 1986.

Section IV of this report, entitled " Overview," presents basic information and data relevant to the drill. This section of the report contains a description of the plume pathway EPZ and a listing of all participating jurisdictions and functional entities that were evaluated.

v.

Section V of this report, entitled "Evaluation and Results," presents detailed information on the 'demonstration-of applicable exercise-criteria at each jurisdiction or functional entity evaluated in a-jurisdiction-based, issues-only format.- This section also contains:

(1) descriptions of all ARCAs assessed during this exercise, recommended corrective actions, and (2) descriptions of unresolved ARCAs assessed during previous drills.

vi'

IV. EXERCISE OVERVIEW Contained in this section are data and basic information relevant to theCamp Roberts Drill on April 30, 2003, and the El Chorro Drill on June 4, 2003, to test a portion of the off-site emergency response capabilities for the area surrounding the Diablo Canyon Power Plant. This section of the report includes a description of the plume pathway EPZ, and a listing of all participating jurisdictions and functional entities that were evaluated.

Federal guidance identifies an approximate ten-mile area. where FEMA has primary oversight responsibilities for off-site plans and exercise performance. Protective Action Zones (PAZs) 1 through 5 form the basis of the basic area where the Federal government has primary oversight responsibilities. As such, evaluation of exercise objectives is focused and limited to decisions and/or response activities that take place within PAZs 1 through 5. The area of the Diablo Canyon Power Plant Emergency Planning Zone that comprises PAZs 6 through 12 is an area where the State of California has primary oversight responsibility. The State of California is the entity that will determine whether any corrective actions are required for actions or decisions that affect PAZs 6 through 12.

Both areas together comprise the Plume Emergency Planning Zone.

A. Plume Emergency Planning Zone Description The State of California has designated a Basic Emergency Planning Zone (BEPZ) which extends out from a 10-mile circle around the plant to include surrounding cities. The BEPZ includes the follow'ing areas:

Cities: Arroyo Grande; Grover Beach; Morro Bay; Pismo Beach; and San Luis Obispo.

Unincorporated areas of San Luis Obispo County: Avila Beach; Baywood Park; Cayucos; Cienega Valley; Clark Valley; Indian Knob; Los Osos; Los Osos Valley; northern Nipomo Mesa; Oceano; Port San Luis; Perfumo Canyon; Price Canyon; San Luis Bay Estates; See Canyon; and Squire Canyon.

Institutions: California Men's Colony; California Polytechnic State University; Camp San Luis Obispo; and Cuesta College.

Parks and Recreational Areas: Cayucos State Beach; Los Osos Oaks State Reserve; Montafia de Oro State Park; Morro Bay State Park; Morro Strand State Beach; Oceano Dunes State Vehicle Recreational Area; Pismo State Beach; Pirate's Cove; and Whale Rock Reservoir Recreational Area.

Vii,

B. Exercise Participants Thelfollowing agencies, organizations, and units of government participated in the Camp Roberts Drill on April 30, 2003, and the El Chorro Drill on June 4,2003.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA California Conservation Corps

• California National Guard-Camp Roberts  :

Department'of Health' Services Governor's Office of Emergency Services

• RISK JURISDICTION County of San Luis Obispo

-Animal Services

Departmrnt'of Social Services Fire Department .' ..

Health Agency .

Behavioral Health'DiVision' Office of Emergency Services.

Sheriffs Office -'

- .. I PRIVATENVOLUNTEER ORGANIZATIONSg': '

Amateur Radio Em6rgency SerViceg/Radio"Arnateur CiVil'Emergency Services American Red Cross-San Luis Obispo County Chapter

-Diablo Canyon Power Plant Paso Robles High School - ' '

. * ;:,1. - fw-.;.:

S. 1, . .- ..

.. . ~~~ ..- . *: .: * .

t. .. .

viii'

V. EXERCISE EVALUATION AND RESULTS Contained in this section are the results and findings of the evaluation of all jurisdictions and functional entities which participated in the Camp Roberts Drill on April 30, 2003, and the El Chorro Drill on June 4, 2003, to test the off-site emergency response capabilities of local and State governments in the EPZ surrounding the Diablo Canyon Power Plant Each jurisdiction and functional entity was evaluated,'on the basis of its demonstration of.

criteria delineated in exercise evaluation area criteria contained- in the FEMA REP Program Manual. Detailed information on the exercise evaluation area criteria and the' extent-of-play agreement used in this exercise are found inAppendix 3 of this report.

A. Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation.- Table 1 The matrix presented in Table 1, on the following page(s), presents the status of all exercise evaluation area-criteria from the'FEMA REP Program Manual. that were scheduled for demonstration during this. exercise .by all participating jurisdictions and functional entities. Exercise evaluation area criteria are listed by number and the-demonstration status of-those evaluation area criteria is indicated by the use of the following!letters:

M - Met (No Deficiency or ARCAs assessed and no unresolved ARCAs-fro ?m prior e-er ci-ei f cyassessed D -, Deficiency asesd-.....

A - 'ARCA(s),'asessed Or unfesolved ARCA(s) from prior exercise(s).

N - Not Demonstra~ted (Reasoni explained' in Suibsection B)

.~ .x

• - 1 1I .

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Camp Roberts.Reception Center M M - l l M - l l -l A Ml El Chorro Emergency Worker Ctr lll Ml M . l lMM . M

B. Status of Jurisdictions Evaluated This subsection provides information on the evaluation of each participating jurisdiction and functional entity, in a jurisdictionbased, issues only format.

Presented below is a definition of the terms used in this subsection relative to objective demonstration status.

Met - Listing of the demonstrated exercise evaluation area criteria under which no Deficiencies or ARCAs were assessed during this exercise and under which no ARCAs assessed during prior exercises remain unresolved.

Deficiency - Listing of the demonstrated.exercise evaluation area criteria under which one or more Deficiencies, was assessed during this exercise.

Included is a description of each Deficiency and recommended corrective actions.

Area Requiring Corrective Actions - Listing of the demonstrated exercise.evaluation area criteria under. which one or more ARCAs were assessed during the current exercise or ARCAs assessed during prior exercises remain unresolved. Included is a description of the ARCAs assessed during this exercise and the recommended corrective action to be demonstrated before or during the next biennial exercise.

Not Demonstrated - Listing of the.exercise.evaluation area criteria which were not demonstrated as scheduled during this exercise and the reason they were not demonstrated.

Prior ARCAs e Resolved - Descriptions -of ARCAs assessed during previous exercises that were resolved in this exercise and the corrective actions demonstrated.

- 4.. . .; .. ., . ,,44.

Prior ARCAs - Unresolved - Descriptions of ARCAs assessed during prior exercises that were not resolved in this'exercise. Included is the reason the ARCA remains unresolved and recommended corrective actions to be demonstrated before or during the next biennial exercise.

The following are definitions of the two types of exercise issues that are discussed in this report.

A Deficiency, is defined in the FEMA REP Program Manual as "...an observed or identified inadequacy of organizational performance in an exercise that could cause a finding that off-site emergency preparedness is not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate protective x..

measures can be taken in the event of a radiological emergency to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of a nuclear power plant."'

An ARCA is defined ifn' the FEMA REP Program Manual. as "...an observed or identified inadequacy of organizational performance in an exercise that is not considered, by itself, to adversely impact public health.

and safety." . '*

FEMA hias developed a standardized system for numbering exercise issues

-(Deficiencies and ARCAs). This system is used to achieve consistency in numbering exercise 'issues among FEMA Regions and site-specific exercise reports within each Regioh. It is also used to expedite tracking of exercise issues on a nationwide basis. :- .

The identifying numbers for Deficiencies and ARCAs includes the following elements, with each element separated by a hyphen (-).

Plant Site Identifier - A two-'digit number corresponding to the Utility

- Billable Plant Site'Codes.

Exercise Year -The last' two' digits' of 'the 'year the exercise was conducted.  : ' ' :'

Evaluation Area Criterion - A lieitr and'nurhber corresponding to the criteria in the FEMA REP Program Manual.

Issue Classification Identifier - (D Deficiency, A = ARCA). Only Deficiencies and ARCAs are included in exercise reports.

Exercise Issue Identification Number - A separate two (or three) digit indexing number assigned to each issue identified in the exercise.

,,~~ .- '. ': i'* ': :;'.

I ,; J'.' .- ' .g

• . 2' i' '

- * . , . .. X X xi'

• TABLE 2 ISSUES APRIL 30, 2003, CAMP ROBERTS RECEPTION AND CARE CENTER DRILL JUNE 4,2003, EL CHORRO EMERGENCY WORKER MONITORING AND DECONTANIINATION CENTER DRILL LOCATION NEW ISSUE(S) PREVIOUS PREVIOUS ISSUE(S) . ISSUE(S)

-RESOLVED UNRESOLVED Camp Roberts Reception and 19-03-6.a.1-A-1 19-99-5-A-1 19-99-18-A4 Care Center 19-99-18-A-2 19-99-18-A-3 19-99-18-A-5 El Chorro Emergency Worker NONE 19-99-22-A-6 . NONE Monitoring and 19-03-6.a.1-A-1 Decontamination Center I . .. .

xiii,

I o CAMP ROBERTS RECEPTION AND CARE CENTER'":'"

The County' bf San Luis Obispo in support of the Dihblo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP) off-site response organization, held'a drill at Camp Roberts on April 30,2003, to demonstrate the adequacy of the radiological monitoring, decontamination and registration of evacuees, and for congregate care of evacuees. In response to a radiological event at DCPP, emergency response plans provide for a possible northerly evacuation of the residentsof the Basic Emergency Planning Zone into Monterey County. In such h contingency, vehiclesivill be directed to the Monitoring and Decontamination Center at Camp Roberts off Highway 101. There, the vehicles and their passengers will be monitored and decontaminated, if necessary. . .

o DETAIL There were five'criteria established for demonstration, observation and evaluation at the Camp Roberts Monitoring and Dec6ntamination Center. Four cnriteria were m'et: and an ARCA was' identified for one criterion. Six ARCAs from'the' 1999 drill were corrected,'and one remains uncorrected. Two periods to monitor six individuals-vere timed; one was'done at the Registration' Center and one at the Evacuee Monitoring and Decontamination Center. The average processing time was ten seconds per individual (the result of 45 seconds for one-and 65 seconds for the other).

Based on this average time, two portal monitors would be necessary to monitor 20% of the expected population within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />." .-. *. - -. . .. .

The drill was held out-of-sequence and the original time line was adjusted to provide a drill scenario that was initiated by a County Health Officer (CHO) decision to activate the Camp Roberts Facility at 0504 during an Emergency Classification Level of Site Area Emergency. The CHO then carried out his notification responsibilities including DCPP, the County Health Agency (CHA) and the County Department of Social Services (DSS). 'As planned, thiswould have initiated the activation, notification and operation of the Camp Roberts Facility.

The necessary supplies for the different Camp Roberts Facilities utilized by the County Response Team are stored in the San Luis Obispo area and the drill implementation allowed for the pre-staging' of the necessary supplies at Camp Roberts. Necessary personnel arrived as pre-arranged between 0730 and 0800 and setup commenced upon their arrival.' The drill was scheduled to begin at 1000.

The Drill was started after a safety and scenario briefing was provided to all participants by the Drill' controllers and the specific facility controller determined that the facilities drill personnel were ready.

The Drill started with the Vehicle Monitoring function and the Reception Center registration function.

Communications equipment was adequately demonstrated. The primary'commnunication system in all functional areas except vehicle monitoring was landlin'e telephones connected through the Camp Roberts'PBX telephone system. All functional areas utilized 16 channel Motorola model GP 300 county radio net hand held radios. This'communications system was used for communications among all functional areas. Amateur Radio Emergency Services/Radio Amateur Civil Emergency

Services (ARES/RACES) were available to provide additional communications systems.

Primary and backup communications were functional at the commencement of the exercise, communications systems were checked, and there were no communications failures.

Communications systems were managed in support of emergency operations.

The capability to provide equipment and supplies sufficient to support monitoring/ decontamination activities, registration, and temporary care of evacuees at the Camp Roberts in support of a potential emergency at the DCPP was adequately demonstrated.

This facility is located approximately 40 miles from DCPP. All Emergency Workers (Emergency workers) from the various functional areas were issued a Radiation Detection Corporation thermoluminescent dosimeter (TLD) and a kit containing a low range CD-V138 (0-200 mR) self-reading dosimeter (SRD), a card for recording SRD readings, one bottle containing fourteen potassium iodide (KI) tablets (expiration date of February 2005), and a package insert containing instructions for administration (including contraindications) of the KI. Additionally, each team member was issued a copy of Emergency Worker Exposure Control (EWEC) Checklist (EWEC-3).

The Emergency workers were instructed to return their dosimetry/KI kits back to the Evacuee Monitoring Decontamination Center Administrative Building at the end of their duty day.

In accordance with the Extent-Of-Play Agreement, instrument, equipment, and supplies were pre-staged and available in labeled boxes (kits).. Inventory verification of procedure-specified equipment and supplies was performed, All specified items were present. Additional supplies were available, as needed, and staged at th~eEvacue~e Monitoring Decontamination Center.

In the monitoring functional areas, directional and-instructional signs indicated the flow from one functional area to another. Contaminated waste receptacles were lined with yellow/magenta bags labeled "Caution Radioactive Material."

A sufficient supply of various forms and handouts utilized by the monitoring team members was available. Sufficient quantities and a variety of sizes of anti contamination clothing, overboots (booties) and gloves, in addition to quantities of 'Tyvex" jump suits, booties, towels, decontamination brushes, and soaps were also available in the decontamination center.

There were four portal monitors TSA Systems Ltd. portable-portal monitors (PPM), model TPM-903, two of .which were available at the Registration Monitoring Area and two at the Initial Monitoring Point outside the Decontamination Center.. One was used to monitor evacuees arriving in transport vehicles and the other was available as a backup at each of the two monitoring points.

All PPM units were operationally checked prior to commencement of the drill. Thirteen CDV 700 survey meters equipped with side window Geiger-Muller (GM), open side-window probes were available for the various functional monitoring areas. The CDV 700 instruments were primarily used inside the decontamination center and at the vehicle monitoring point. In addition, the CDV 700 survey meters were available for use;in incidental monitoring of hands, areas, and/or equipment as necessary in all the functional areas.

2.

Five canopies were set up to provide shade: two each at the portable portal monitoring areas and one at the vehicle' monitoring point. These canopies provided weather protection and shade for equipment and evacuees. -

The lead monitors/managers at the various mbnitoring functional areas carried a two-way radio (Motorola'Radius GP-300) for comimunicatio'nii with 6ther function'al areas and County 'command personnel. This'radio served as the primary means of comimunication'. Backup communication was provided by two ARES/RACES personnel. Landline' telepho'nes ivere also available in all fixed facilities at Camp Roberts. The operability of both primary and secondary communications was demonstrated.-

Traffic and access control at Camp Roberts wie're'suiccessfully demonstrated by greeters, monitors, and the California Conservation Corps'(CC):'; " . , ,

Orange and white barricades, orange traffic'cones, and yellow-and-magenta radiation barrier tape-delineated:paths for evacuees'to follow'in the fuictional areas and 'the evacuee monitoring area' points.' The ground and sidewalk were covered with butcher paper under the portal monitors.' This paper was replaced whenever an evacuee'was'detefmined to be'contaminated. -

The facilities utilized for the registration and congregate care of evacuees included an administration building, registration building, block rranager building,'three barracks',a dining hill, and recreation hall equipped in accordance with 'the Extent-'of-Play'Agreetment: Adequate office equipment, including tables, desks, chairs, and file cabinets w'as availabfesin' all adrini'strative buildings. The dining facility was fully equipped for serving hot meals to evacuees. The three barracks contained restrooms/shower facilities 'and weirefumished With 6eds' `6d Ie'eits/blankets'dr'awni froma nearby:

supply building. 'All buildings contained dldeqate

'electricai,'heatingcooling and sanitation equipment. ' ' ' '" ' -

VEHICLE MONITORING ' -i i.  : ,,,

The capability to providd'space,'adequate reso'urces',and rainedd 'ersi6nnel form ionitorinn of evacuee vehicles was demonstrated by a team of six members of the DCPP. The demonstration took place at the procedure-designated vehicle' mbnit6rig"' 'area wxithin'the6 bound'~aries of the Camp'Roberts' military reservation. 'Team members were lemployees of the DCPP 'who 'had'ireceived specific training in the plans and procedures to be followed'during evac'iatibn of the geeneral public from' affected Protective Action Zones following an incident at the DCPP involving radioactivity release.

Team members were pre-staged at the Camp Roberts facility in accordance'with the Extent-of-Play.

At about 0730, the team obtained from the Decontamination Center its pre-packaged kits containing all supplies and equipment needed to set up the vehicle'monitoring functional area,'about 3/4 mile north of the Decontamination Center. 'At 0745, it began-set-up of the'functional 'area, which was complete and ready for use at 0820. The team, along with all other Participants; then received 'a" 3'.

safety briefing by County CHA and was subsequently directed back to the Decontamination Center where team members received procedure-prescribed communications equipment and dosimetry.

The capability to continuously monitor and control radiation exposure to emergency workers was demonstrated by seven monitors and one ARES/RACES radio operator. At the Decontamination Center, each team member was assigned a Radiation Detection Corporation TLD exhibiting an issue date of January 17, 2003 and a kit containing the following: one 0-200 mR CD-V138 SRD, a Field Exposure Log card on which to record periodic field readings of the SRD, one bottle of fourteen 30-milligram KI tablets (expiration date - February 2005), and a package insert specifying pertinent instructions and information relative to KI ingestion. Team members also received a copy of the EWEC Checklist (EWEC-3) from the County Emergency Response Plan Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) 111.06 HP-IlI, which details actions to be taken by team members and specifies radiation exposure limits, reporting limits, and use of appropriate forms and/or logs. Team members zeroed their own SRDs by use of one of several CD V-750 (Model Sb) dosimeter chargers, all of which were shown to be in operating condition, and filled out the required Field Exposure Log card.

Both the bus driver transporting potentially-contaminated evacuees to the Evacuee Decontamination Center and the driver transporting the evacuees free of contamination from the Evacuee Decontamination Center to the Registration Facility had the appropriate dosimetry (TLD and SRD).

This corrects a planning issue from the 1995 drill.

The team then returned to the vehicle monitoring area and, following checkout of their CD V-700 portable survey meters, they notified Cbunty command officials that the vehicle monitoring area was operational and ready to receive and process evacuees, at approximately 1015.

Six CD V-700 portable survey meterswith attached side-window probes were available for use in the vehicle monitoring area. New batteries were installed in the instruments, and all instruments were checked for operability and proper response., An undesignated radioactive check source affixed to the side of each instrument was used to determine if the instrument responded within a specified range in counts per minute (cpm). All instruments were found to be operable and responding within the specified range and, according to an attached label, had been last calibrated March 20, 2003.

The lead monitor at the vehicle monitoring station carried a two-way radio.(Motorola Radius GP-300) for communication with other functional areas and County command officials. This radio served as the primary means of communication. Backup was provided by two ARES/RACES volunteers (call signs N6TPY and WA6TYJ) using their standard and universal radio communication equipment. Operability of primary and backup communications was demonstrated.

4

The adequacy of procedures, facilities, equipment, and personnel for the radiological monitoring of vehicles was demonstrated.-Team members b6gan'monitoring of arriving mock-evacuee vehicles at approximately 1020. One member of the team was designated to greet arriving evacuees. He instructed the drivers on how to proceed to the monitoring location, verbally briefed them on what to expect, and gave them a handout entitled "Welcome to Camp Roberts Congregate Care Center." He carried a CD V-700 survey 'n'eter with 'which he6'obtained background readings at' 30-minute intervals. A sign which read "Stop Here/Turn offYourEngine/Stayin Your Vehicle" was posted in both English and Spanish at the'entririce-to the'monitoring laries.'

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• c f D V Vehicles were-monitored byus'e'of large-arel wipes! that were checked by use of the CD V-700 survey meter for contamination. Survey mieter probes were covered with plastic, in accordance with procedures.' Areas of vehicles checked were'hoods, trunk lids, roofs, tires, and wheel areas, in accordance with procedures. 'Conjaminated.ivipes were disposed of ini a marked "Contaminated Waste" receptacle. 'Receptacles for'contaminated waste'and clean waste were provided.' Both were marked only in black letters. The contaminated-waste receptacle should be clearly identified by use of a magenta-and-yellow radioactive-waste symbol for future use, to reduce the likelihood of improper disposal of contaminated waste to the clean-waste receptacle, and vice-versa.

Following monitoring of their vehicle for contaminration, drivers were pr'vided with 'a color-coded handout, dependent on whether their vehicle was determnined (designated by the controller) to be clean (green) or contaminated (yellow). 'Drivers of 'clean vehicles were verbally instructed concerning the route to be taken to the Registratiori'Building' personnel monitoring area. 'Al drivers were asked to be sure to read the handouts 'pfoVided`" ' ' '

Drivers of contaminated vehicles were verbally instructed by the lead team member to turn left out of the monitoring area into a pre-designated contaminated-vehicle parking 'area-where they would be' transported by bus to the Decoritamination Cen'terd 0ersoniiel"monitoring area. 'All drivers were asked to be sure to read the handouts' pr6vided.: The' first 3' vehicles parked in thie lot and locked their vehicles. They immediately bbarded'the bus. The'only'instrutions givehby the bus driver were to sit' apart on the bus. ' ' '

Another car drove into the contaminated-vehicle parking area just as bus was leaving. The driver parked and locked his vehicle and waited f 6 iothe bu's to retu'r--."Se'veral inore`'ehicles 'drove in and the drivers did the same. There wiis no one ini the contaminat'ed-vehicle parking area'to ensure the drivers folio wed the 'diiections' on -th&'handout, and:t 'a'ssist th'e 'driver'sor ansiwer'any of their' concerns while they waited for the' bus. The busetuhed'aboui 15'minutes after it had left and transported this next group of drivers to th&eDecontaffiuination'C-ente'r.' " ': .' ' " -:-'

Handouts given to contaminated vehicle driver's we're left on the dashboard of the parked and locked vehicles. 'This action corrected ARCA #19-99-5-A-2'"'

Team members were aware'of their decontamination'thieshold (200 cpm'above background), their maximum individdal exposure limit (1000'niR), their incremental reporting levels (250 mR, 500 mR, 750 mR) of exposure as accumulated on their SRDs, and the requirement to read and record the sV

readings of their SRDs at least hourly intervals. (This demonstrated knowledge corrected ARCA

1. 19-99-5-A-I. The incremental exposures reporting levels and mission dose limits have been changed.)

A total of 17 mock-evacuee vehicles were monitored, seven of which were designated by the controller to be contaminated. Monitoring time per vehicle average d approximately two minutes, counting transition time between vehicles. At this rate, it would require five teams (five monitoring lanes) of two monitors per lane to monitor the planning estimate of 1688 arriving- evacuee vehicles in a 12-hour period. Although only six monitors utilizing two monitoring lanes participated in this exercise, the lead monitoring team member stated that at least 16 persons were trained to capably act as vehicle monitors.

Team members simulated the use of anti-contamination protective clothing during the exercise.

However, one member capably demonstrated donning and doffing of protective clothing out-of-sequence at the end of the exercise, which, for the vehicle monitoring function, was at approximately 1100.

The one planning issue identified during the April 28, 1999, Drill relative to vehicle monitoring has not been sufficiently. addressed. Although the vehicle monitoring team knew that they would proceed to the Decontamination Center for decontamination if they were found contaminated during the required post-activity of monitoring themselves, paragraph 2.10 of the Vehicle Monitor Checklist

- Congregate Care on page 10 of SOP 111.06 HP-6 entitled "Vehicle Monitoring," does not provide clear and detailed instruction on what they should do if they are contaminated. As stated in this planning issue, "the instructions should be incorporated into all SOPs requiring the whole-body survey at the completion of removing the anti-Cs."

Throughout the exercise, vehicle monitoring team members exhibited excellent knowledge of monitoring techniques, they showed commendable interest in and enthusiasm for the work, and they demonstrated sensitivity to the need to alleviate apprehensions that arriving evacuees might have under stressful conditions.

EVACUEE MONITORING AND DECONTAMINATION CENTER The capability to continuously monitor and control radiation exposure to emergency workers was demonstrated. Dosimetry was issued at the Evacuee Monitoring and Decontamination Center Administrative Building. Each. emergency worker was issued a Radiation Detection Corporation TLD, a CDV 138 SRD (0 to.200 mR), a bottle containing fourteen 30 KI tablets and a THYRO-BLOC package insert. The KI had an expiration date of February 2005 and the THYRO-BLOC package insert provided information concerning why, how, and when to take KI, and possible side effects. There was not an orderly issuance of dosimetry by functional area, which delayed the activation of functional areas. It, is recommended that the dosimetry issue be prioritized by functional area (i.e., first Vehicle Monitoring, then Registration Monitoring, and then Monitoring and Decontamination).,

6

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The SRDs were zeroed using a CDV 750 model 5B operating SRD charger. The TLD serial number along with pertinent personal data were entered on Form CC-1, "PERSONNEL ROSTER/EXPOSURE LOG NPPERP 08/02," for later assignment of total dose to the user. Initial (start) and ending SRD reading where entered on "field exposure log for low range dosimeters (CDV 138) 0-200 mR" (blue chrd) along- with-the date of use, time of reading, net reading, and total exposure. Pertinent personal information and the TLD serial numberwere entered on the front of the log. 'A space was also available to log date and ti'me'of KI ingestion.

Emergency workers also i' ere Issued an "EWEC-3-EMERGENCY WORKER EXPOSURE CONTROL CHECKLIST," which describes the contents of an EWEC kit, how to charge an SRD, a pre-field checklist and precautions, radiation'exposure tracking anrd emergency worker exposure guidelines' Emergency' vorkers were insiructed t read their SRDs at one-hour intervals.

Some emergency workers did not'charge their SRDs "before'exiting the issue point. While this' requirement is identified in the EWEC-3 checklist, emergency workers should be reminded to read and initial each item on'the EWEC-3 checklist.

Emergency workers. w'er& aiware of the requirement to report to their Command Center vhen their' total exposure was 250 mRR, 500 mR, 750 miR','arid 1000 mR as shdwn on' their blue card 'and'the administrative limit of 1000 rmR. This cofrtcted ARCA #19-99-5LA1: ' ' ':

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t: .'.i . '; 1..  ;

Initial Moniiorin- ' - ' .  ; K **4-"

The adequacy of facilities, equipment, supplies, persbnnel,'aurd p'ro'edures for initial monitorinig of evacuees was demonstrated. The Decontamination Barracks and Evacuee Monitoring Station was established at buildings 6315 and 6316-at Ca'rnpR6berts,'Californ'ia.' There was appropriate space and adequate resour6es for all operatioris."'Theb' nmitoiing area vwas'get up in' front of the' Decontamination Barracks (building 631'6) in kacordance with the' diagrams in thl'EmErgency Response Plan and SOPs. - ' '

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The evacuee monitoring area was staffed by'volunteers from DCPP. They were working under the oversight of the California Department of He'dlth'Servic~e '(DHS); "A totfl 'of eight ev'a'cuees-were sent to this location. They were from DCPP and the San Luis Obispo Chapter of the American Red Cross (ARC). " ' :'" ' ';' ' :; "-::

, *  ; ,-  !' . -I ;i ' ) . 'i, Three radiation monitoring personnel plus' bn'e super'visofr' vere'assig'ned to the evacuee monitoring' area. They'have 'all been cross-trained so they are able to fill in for each' other. 'The supervisor is a full time radiation protection engineer.' : '* ' - .- :' ' i All emergency

• orkers &t this' l6cation had been issuedpersonal'dosim'etry packages that included CDV 138 'SRDs, "Radiation'Detection'Corpboration" TLDs (issue date'01/17/03), KI tablets with information sheets (expiration date 2/05), blue-exposure record cards,Va'nd EWEC Checklists which included exposure limits and instruction's'.' 'All dosim'etry 'was issued fron-Decontaimina'tion 7

Administration in building 6315, and was turned in to the same location at the conclusion of activities.

Contamination Control of the monitoring station was maintained by covering areas under the portal monitors with butcher paper. Use of yellow and magenta radiation barrier tape, orange cones and orange and white barricades delineated walkways. Emergency workers wore latex gloves and plastic booties according to their procedures and checklists. Workers on the potentially-contaminated side wore two pair of gloves, and those on the clean side wore one pair. This corrected ARCA #19 18-A-5 from the 1999 Drill.

One trash can was lined with a heavy yellow plastic bag marked "CAUTION, RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL." This container was monitored periodically with a survey meter, which was calibrated to read cpm. The supervisor instructed his personnel that the bag was to be replaced-whenever the readings rose to double'background. This would prevent false positive readings on the portal monitor.

One .Therrno-Electron TPM 903 A Portal Monitor (Serial Number 903001) was set up to screen evacuees after they arrived from the contaminated vehicle parking lot. A second TPM 903 (Serial Number 903002) was also set up as a standby. Functional checks were performed on both portal monitors with a source of known strength (1 microcurie Cesium- 137) in accordance with a checklist in the operating procedures. This resolved Planning Issues 3 and4 from the 1999 Drill. Both portal monitors had manufacture dates of 7/02 and performance verification dates of 2-26-03 with due dates of 5-26-03. These verifications.are perfornmd quarterly. Two CDV Model 700 6B Survey Meters (Serial Numbers 57726 and 72618) with QM Probes.were set up to survey potentially contaminated items. These survey meters were operationally checled. One was placed on the clean side of the area, while the other was placed on the potentially contaminated side. The CDV 700s. had been calibrated on March 20, 2003. The uprights of the portal monitors and probes of the survey meters were covered with transparent plastic wrap. .

The Drill started with the Vehicle Monitoring function and the Reception Center registration, function. Individuals in contaminated vehicles and individuals that alarmed the portal monitor set up at Registration were brought by bus to the Reception Center Monitoring and Decontamination, Facilities. These evacuees were then monitored with the use of the portal monitor.

The bus/van routes, for. transporting the contaminated and uncontaminated evacuees are now proceduralized. The van that drove to the rear of the Evacuee Decontamination Center to pick up the evacuees free of contamination did not drive over the same roadway that had been used by the bus transporting potentially-contaminated evacuees from the Contaminated Parking Area to the Evacuee Decontamination Center. This corrected a planning issue from the 1995 drill.

Evacuees were directed to walk through the portal monitor and stop on the butcher paper to await further instructions. When the alarm on the portal monitor sounded, the evacuee was instructed to back up to the five-foot line, and then reenter. the monitor. A second alarm resulted in the evacuee being directed into thedecontamination barracks. Clean evacuees had their left hand stamped.

8.

"CLEAN" and were then directed to a bus that transported them'to the reception center. 'A total of nine evacuees were monitored.

Whenever an'evacuee was determined to be contaminated, the butcher paper 'was changed, with the removed paper being 'disposed of in' the "Contaminated'Materials" receptacle. Personnel who handled the 'paper also changed their gloves - outer pair only on the contaminated side. On 6ne occasion, the monitoron the clean side picked up a clean sheet of butcherpaper'before changing his gloves. The monitor on the other side immediately caught 'this and 'advised the other person to dispose of the paper in his hands, change his gloves and then obtain a clean piece of paper. This action demonstrated excellent teamwork and 'Ale titess on the part of the emergency workers.

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-. 2.. a Evacuee Decontamination and Radiological Mionitorini of Evacuee Possessions ' ' '

The adequacy of facilities,'equipment, su'pplies,Ipersonnel, and procedures for the decontamination of. evacuees -was not demonstrated.'Sixteeh Emergency workers were assigned to the Evacuee Monitoring and Decontarination 'team. Pricr to activation, all Emergency workers from the'various' monitoring' functional areas 'reported -to' the decontamination center 'to be" issued their EWEC dosimetry'kits. The dosimetry kits 'consisted of a Radiation Detection Corporation TLD (issue date January 17, 2003) and a kit containing a low-range CD-V 138 (0-200'mR) SRD, a "Field Exposure Log for Low Range Dosimeter" card for recoidiigiSRD readings, 6fie bottle containiin'g fourteen KI tablets (expiration date of' February 2005), 'iaind 'a'package insert"containinig instructions for-administration'(including contraindicati6ns) bf A.`9hch tea'miimember wa's'alsolissued a copy of Khe "EWEC Checklist" (EWEC-3). 'The Emergency workers w'vrealso instruucted toer'o their SRDs'and to return their EWEC 'kits to the Evacuee Monitoring D'eoiitamination-Cenht Administrative Building at theend of theirduty day. i- '. - i 4 *-*.1 . .; ,)) :.- t-.N.t

... , i - .b..I-Prior to activating the' decontamination center the radiaiti6n' monitioring personnel performed the operational check of five CDV 700 survey meters'(calibrated 20 March 2003 due; 20 March 2004) with beta-gamma, open side-window probes'. Five radiation monitoring personnel performed the instrument check in conjunction with the Monitoring Supervisor providing direction utilizing Checklist-5 step' L6 in SOPs SLO HP and 9' During the' oper'ation'al check,'two survey mneters were found to be responding iniprbperly. -One indicated' alow'respoi'se t6the built-in check'source and was verified with another check source to be operating properly; how'ever, they'noted that the built-in check source ne'6ded 'to be checked and/or repaired/replabed.'The'second irnit wAs Providing an erratic response and was tagged ahd removed from'service.

The team minimized cr6ss-contamination iin the'decientamination op6raiional area by establishing a "clean" area and contaminated (dirty) area, intaccordance with the diagram in the plan.'"'Additionally, the probes on' the CDV 700 meters were 'covered with plastic.'

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l There was an established traffic flow within'the facility. The "dirty" areas had sigfis placediaround the 'area to indicate the function 'of each 'station. Indaddition, the team placed yellow-and-magenta' tape on the floor to indicate "dirty" and "clean" zones within the-facilityi. AtMth6 locationrof the~entiy`

9.-;

point, the radiation monitors frequently mopped the monitoring area with a Massillin cloth mop to minimize cross-contamination to the next evacuee. However, the entrance to the decontamination area was a narrow doorway divided in half, with the "clean" and "dirty" boundary indicated by a line of yellow-and-magenta tape, which did not provide an effective barrier, to prevent cross-contamination. This problem is recognized by the staff as a "bottle-neck," which should be resolved.

The entrance to the decontamination area should be widened or an exit point in the "clean" side of the decontamination area should be established. Therefore ARCA #19-99-18-A-4 was not adequately corrected.

Several levels of protective clothing were established, in accordance with the operating procedure.

To minimize cross-contamination from the contaminated evacuees, the radiation monitor (entry point and decontamination area) wore overboots (booties), and double-layer gloves; team members in the "clean" areas of the decontamination center wore booties and a single layer of gloves; and the decontamination specialists wore full anti-contamination clothing, booties, and double gloves as required by the HP-7 operating procedure. The decontamination specialists followed Checklist 8 "Anti Contamination Clothing Checklist" for donning and removing the protective clothing. All waste receptacles were lined with yellow-and-magenta bags indicating "Caution Radioactive Material". The rad-waste receptacles located at the entry point were monitored routinely and removed if the count rate of the collected waste significantly raised the background of the area.

Decontamination Center processing was initiated by the receipt of a contaminated evacuee at the entry point. A contaminated evacuee was identified at the initial monitoring point portal monitors.

After entering the center, the,eva~cuee, was interviewed by the assigned recorder registering the evacuee who complete4 the "Fonm A - Personal Data" sheet. "Form A" consisted of personal data (name, address, phone ,numrbers-, etc),,accident data (location at various time during the accident),

medical data, medical follow-up (2 to,3 weeks later), checkout (personal items) and the evacuee's signature (provided after decontamination). At the conclusion of the interview, the radiation monitoring team members (2) began the body frisk of the evacuee to identify areas of contamination.

The decontamination action threshold was a response of 200 cpm above background or greater on the CDV 700 survey meter..

Prior to conducting the body~frisk of the evacuee, any personal property was surrendered and placed.

in a holding area until the completion. of the body scan. Before the next contaminated evacuee entered the decontamination center, the personal property was monitored and decontaminated, if necessary, in accordance with the SOP in HP-7. This corrected ARCA #19-99-18-A-3.

During frisking of evacuees with a CDV 700 survey meter, areas of contamination were identified and called out to the recorders to mark and label the body map on "Form B - Clothing and Body Contamination Report." FEMA guidance specifies that an adequate frisk of an evacuee using a CDV 700 survey meter should take, at a minimum, approximately 19 minutes. The two radiation monitors located at the entry point paired up (one scanning the front of the evacuee and the other scanning the back), thus reducing the time necessary to conduct a thorough scan. During the body frisking of the evacuees, it was noted that the procedure was not being conducted properly. The scan rate was too fast, and the probe was held too far away from the body. In consultation with the lead controller, the 10

monitoring supervisor was notified and're-training as conducted. The radiation supervisor maintained a post on the "clean" side of -the decontamination center, conducted re-training, maintained that post, and continued to'coach the monitors throughout the&remainder of the drill.

However, the monitors never performed an adequate frisk on any of the'evacuees.

Revision of the decontamination procidure and training method is one solution to this problem.

Training should be conducted to present a more realistic scenario to the trainee. This can be accomplished by placing a small radiological check source (close to the action leVel threshold of 200 cpm or above background) on 'a table under a cover or on a mannequin. This type of training will reinforce the appropriate scanning rate on the trainee: An additional recommendation is to acquire updated and more efficient surv'ey meters:

In accordance with SOPs, contaminated evacuees Were routed to the decontamination specialist, after the completion of the body frisk, to initiate the decontamination process: Decontamination consisted of removing the clothing of the evacuee from the area where contamination was identified (for localized d6contamination), or all of the clothing when a shower was indicated as the preferred' method of decontamination, and the evacuee 'was then provided with modesty clothing. The decontamination team processed five evacue6e 'during the drill. The first'mock'ev'icuee (EM-1) indicated contamination' on the feet. Shoes and socks 'were removed -fnd the feet ivashed. 'The' second evacuee (EM-2) had contamination indicated 'on'the entire head and neck,'the back, and hands, and again loc'alized decontamination'riidthod's werie emply6ed when h shower'w-ai indicated.'

The third evacuee had'coniamnination indicated on the back bf the head ahd the' palms of both hands, but at levels lower than th'e prescribed actioin level '(>200 cpnm).- She was' led through th&"clean" side of the center,' her left hand stamped "clean", p'ro'v'ided' w'ith afornii'idicating"'FEMA Advises to bathe and change clothing within 3 days", ana then directed'to the "cleah" bug'to'be transported to the registration area.' The fourth'bvaciee had contaminAti'onxiindicated fromi the chest up (front and' back) and once again localized decont6 miinatibin was employ6d; h'ow'ev& a'aho-e'r would have been.'

the preferred decontamination method. The finalfevacue 6e(EM-8) h'ad contaminatio'i indicated on the back and stomach, legs and feei (front iiand back)'fbf Whi'chtihe decitarnifiation 'nmethod utilized was showerinig. Upon entei ig the shower he was told to use soap; rinse,dry off,-and proceed to the monitoring point to verify decontamination;' Inappropriate decontamination methods were utilized on two occasions,'in' addition to iiot 'enough 'direction was given to the evacuee" The HP-7 operating procedure has several guides describing vari'ous'decontaminaition'mrithods.- These should be changed to checklists for use by the decontamination specialists:' The decoin'tamiInation specialists should' provide more verbal direction and encouragement :to the' e`Vac-uee's 'during "the'process. ':-A guide/checklist should also be developed to'provide'instructions to the specialists as't6 which decontamin'ation method be employed based 'on th'e locaiion of'the cont'aminatiorn oh the e'vacuee.'

After decontamination, a radiation monitor usin'g a CDV 700 survey meter monitored the evacue.

The evacuee approached the tape line of the "dirty" area; and the radiation monitor was located on the'other side 'of 'the 'tape line' in' the "clean" area. -Th'e'action -level indicatingsuccessful decontamination was a count' raie' less' than 200 cpm.' -Upon being declar'ed dbco'ntaiminhted, the' evacuee was provided a disposable "Tyvec" jump suit;'received a "clea'rr" 'starmp on the left hand, provided with a form indicating "FEMA Adviss t'bathe and change'dlthing withiii'3 day", and -

Ili

then directed to the "clean" bus to be transported to the registration area.

Through interview, the Decontamination Center Manager stated that three decontamination efforts would be attempted for the evacuee. If the evacuee was not successfully decontaminated, he/she would be held in the area for transport to a medical facility. The Health Care Group Supervisor would coordinate the transport of the contaminated evacuee.

The Decontamination Center Manager gave a pre-operational briefing to the team members on the duties for the functional area they were assigned. In: addition, the team members in the decontamination center were, acquainted with their. duties. and, responsibilities and their plan/procedures. In addition to being familiar with their duties, the team members were quite caring to the evacuees and responded to their concerns in a professional and informative manner.

REGISTRATION CENTER Initial Monitoring The capability to continuously monitor and control radiation exposure to emergency workers was successfully demonstrated by the Evacuee Monitoring Team at the Registration Center. Emergency workers were directed to go to the Evacuee Monitoring and Decontamination Center Administrative Building where dosimetry was issued. Each emergency worker was issued a Radiation Detection Corporation TLD, a CDQV 138 R,§D (0 to 200: mR), a bottle containing fourteen 30-milligram KI tablets and a THYRQ-BL C p,ackage insert.: The KI had an expiration date of February 2005, and the THYRO-BLOC package insqrt provided information concerning ingestion of KI, and possible side effects.

The SRDs were zeroed using a CDY 750 model SB operating SRD charger. The TLD serial number along with pertinent personal: data. were., entered on. Form. CC-I,, "PERSONNEL ROSTER/EXPOSURE LOG NPPERP 08/02," for later assignment 6f total dose to the user. Initial (start) and ending SRD readings were entered on "Field Exposure Log for Low Range Dosimeters (CDV 138) 0-200 mR" (blue card) along with the date of use, time of reading, net reading, and total exposure. Pertinent personal information and the TLD serial number were entered on the front of the card. A space was also available toilpg date and time of KI ingestion.

Emergency workers also were issued an "EWEC-3-EMERGENCY WORKER EXPOSURE CONTROL CHECKLIST," which describes the contents of an EMERGENCY WORKER exposure control kit, how to charge an SRD, a pre-field checklist and precautions, radiation exposure tracking and EMERGENCY WORKER exposure guidelines. Emergency workers were instructed to read their SRDs at one-hour intervals. Emergency workers were aware of the requirement to report to their Command Center vhen their accumulated exposure reached 250 mR, 500 mR, 750 mR, 1000 mR (as shown on their blue card), and the administrative limit of 1000 mR. Emergency workers returned to their assigned location, and the monitoring area was declared operational at 1030.

The ability to monitor evacuees from non-contaminated vehicles prior to registration was adequately 12

demonstrated. The monitoring adia 'wasset up outside of Buiildihg'4008, the registration facility.

Equipment and supplies were prepositioned, as provided for in the'extent-of-play agreement, but not setup. Three knowledgeable DCPP personnel who worked together as an integrated team carried out the monitoring'activity.

Two TSA Systems Ltd. Model TPM 903 PPMs, one for use in monitoring evacuees and one as a standby, were available. Both PPMs had been tested for proper operation on 2/26/03 and were due to be tested again on 5/26/03.- The PPMs were set up and tested with a one-microcurie cesium -137 source, following Radiatibn Control Procedure RCP EM-19 "Thermo-Electron (St.'Gobain) TPM-903 Portals." These actions, following-RCP EML'19 and setting up the standby PPM, c6rrected planning issues 3 and 4 from the 1999 drill. The PPM uprights were covered with thin plastic, and a paper mat was placed at the base.

Two CDV 700 survey meters with side-window GM probes arid headphones were available,-if needed, for hand monitoring. Both instruments were calibrated on'3/20/03 (due 3/20/04). Batteries were placed into the instruments and checked with a radioactive source of known value inimR per hour. Instrument probes were covered-with thin plastic and left 'in 'the open-window 'position.

Supplies such as-batteries, extension cords, paper mats,iplastic'gloves, overboot's, and a "clean" hand stamp were available to support emergency operations. The supplies'xere stored outside'the monitoring area. ' ' ' -' -

The monitoring area was delineated with A!framebarricades and pliistic'tap-e' and was covered with portable coverings to protect'the mock-evacuees from th 'e eather.'Aksign with the legend "FORM LINE FOR REGISTRATION HERE" was'placed atfthe'eritiraiice'to the monitoring area.

Twenty-seven evacuees from vehicles found free'from contamination were monitored. A "greeter" wearing two pairs of plastic gloves' and 6v'fbot s, wg7p6siti6ned 'teh feet fr6ni the PPM. He explained to each evacuee the purpose for being monitbred and how jo pass through the PPM. -He' also answered questions and maintained conitrol.- On the 6tOitr side of the PPM, a second "greeter" stamped -the :evacuee's left hand 'with an" indelible "clean" stamp and directed th'em to the Registration area. -. -'  : .  !  :; . v

• lA - *;- no- ***1, . * . -- , --

Since there were evacuees with 'sinulated'disabiliti6s, 'the times foir monitoring ihe evacuees varied:

Therefore, twenty-one'evacuees in four separategroups were timed."' This provided an average time based on'a mixture of evacuiees with and without disabilitieg'JiAn average timebof 23 seconds for monitoring an evacuee was established. At this'rate, 'twe'nty perce'nt (4,557)of the 22,787 evacuees expected on a normal -summer weekend could be monitored in ih'e'l2 hur time period by addirig a third monitoring line. - - ' I By controller-inject the last evacuee was found to be contaminated (simulated). The individual'was told to step'back five feet and the pass'through the' PPM again'. When' the'PPM'ala'rm sounded (simulated) a second time, the individual was'instructed to sit in a chairin the'rmonitoring iareA, and as specified by procedure, the bottoms of her shoes were monitored. A controller inject indicated the shoes were cledn and the evacuee was told to return6't6 the Vehicle'mo6nitoring aiea' The V'ehiile' 13 -

monitoring personnel were contacted by radio and told that the evacuee was returning to the vehicle monitoring area in a blue Chevrolet pickup truck.

The paper mat at the base of the PPM was changed, and the monitor explained that if the bottoms of shoes were contaminated, a meter survey of the monitoring area would have been performed.

Repistration The capability to establish a facility for registration of evacuees with appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel was successfully demonstrated at the Camp Roberts Reception and Congregate Care Center.

In accordance with County plans and procedures, operations within the registration facility are a shared responsibility between the DSS and the ARC. During this exercise the DSS staffed and performed the functions of registering evacuees and responding to disaster welfare inquiries from the County Phone Assistance Center (PAC), while the ARC staffed and provided family services, health services/first aid, and disaster mental health services. County Behavioral Health also assisted the ARC in providing mental health services to evacuees within the registration facility. Backup communications was provided by County ARES/RACES and building security and the CCC provided escort services for evacuees.

Leadership for performing registration functions was provided by a DSS Supervisor/Coordinator and Deputy. An ARC Client Distribution Supervisor provided leadership for ARC functions.

At 0900, a briefing was conducted to inform all exercise paiticipants of the scenario for exercise play and safety precautions. Thereafter, all participants repored to their work locations within the registration facility and made final preparations for opening the facility to evacuees. The first evacuees arrived at the registration facility at 1034. Consistent with plans, all evacuees were monitored outside the entrance to the registration facility for radiation c'ontamination. For evacuees found to be free of contamination, their left hands were stamped with a "clean" marking and they were allowed entry into the regi'stration facility. Security outside the entry-way was provided by the CCC. Once inside the registration facility, evacuees were immediately met by the DSS Registrar Supervisor or Deputy and checked to ensure they were clean. Evacuees were then directed to a registration table. Security for ensuring no contaminated individuals were-present in the registration facility was excellent throughout the duration of the exercise. At each ARC work-station, evacuees were checked for their "clean" stamp. One evacuee who entered the facility without a "clean" stamp was quickly identified and directed to immediately exit the facility.

Three registration positions were established for this exercise. At one of the positions the Registrar spoke both English and Spanish. The standard ARC Disaster Shelter Registration form was used for registration and the following questions were asked of each evacuee and answers thereto recorded on the shelter registration form:

• Are you ill, sick,.or feel you need medical attention?

14.

Will you require assistance with lodging?

Are you separated from your family?

• Do you have any special needs?

Will you authorize release of information about your whereabouts?

The Registrars provided friendly and profesgional assistance to all evsacuees'and clearly explained the process and resources available to them. Once registration was completed, evacuees with no problems were directed or escorted to the rear entrance to the facility where they were met by CCC staff members, then directed totahe sitting'area outside the facility; and escorted 'in groups of approximately five evacuees~ tohe Blbck 'Manager Headquarters Building. As soon as evacuee registration forms were completed, a copy of the'form was distributed to the DisasterWelfare Inquiry (DWI) function that was located in the registration facility.'A total of 35 evacuees were registered during the exercise.

Evacuees with' problems were escorted or directed to the work area of the ARC Client Distribution Supervisor/Coordinator and her two assistants where the' nature 'of the evacuee's problem was discussed. Thereafter, the'evacuee was escorted to 6ne of three functional areas established ihnthie registration area for evacuee services -'family services, health services/first'aid,'and'disaster mental health services. ' .' '

Evacuees anIhe with tf special memb needs were directed to Family Services, 'which. was staffed, by a Supervisor

. . A' . 1~. . , .. I.,

and threestaff members'., The Supervisor assigned evacuees to' a staff iiiember ahd was within calling distarice if'a staff member needed assistance in r'e'sol'ing arn eva6c'ue'e pr6bleii. 'No evacuees were left unattended or waiting in line during this exercise. This' corrects Planning Issue Number 6 from the April 28, 1999 exercise wherein the 'eed for a Farily Services

.- qv esSuperisor to oversee this, function was identified. .

Similarly, evacuees with medical 6r mental h6elth problems were escorted or directed to the health services/first -aid and disaster' merital healtlh services' %Vdrk-areaisby the'ARC Client Distributio6i Supervisor/Coordinator and her staff., The' ARC -Client Distribution'nSupe'rvisor/Coordinaitor provided oversight and assistance to all ARC functions withini ih'&registration area throughout the exercise. The scenario provided for evacuees with a vriety ofroblenms ia-nd special needs. Sorne of these were a blind evacuee with 'a seeing-e '."d " c I'uple w'th newborn twins, ev'acuees w'ith m'edical problems, and evacuees in i'eed of'cri'sis c6unseling. The ARC staff did not'encounter a problemi they could not handle. This staff displayed the highest cegren ad ring.

in dealing with evacuees anidtheiir problems. ' ., '

There were no private and quiet areas for providing mental health and medical services-to evacuees.

All functions were performed in one large room with a high noise'level throughout the exercise.

This may have been an exercise artificiality as there'ewere two rooins-at the end of the building that w&re used by the Exerciise Simulation' Cell'iand' ARES/RACES. In 'an actual emergency, the Simulation Cell would not exist. Also,'the twvo-pers'on ARES/RACES t"am did noti ned 'all the space that was allocated nor did it need a separate room. The layput of floor space within the Registration'Building be revised to accommriodate privacy for mnental hea iha nd niedical services 15

functions.

Beyond the extent-of-play agreement, the DSS tested the feasibility of locating the DXWI function in the Registration Building in lieu of the Administration Building in order to improve efficiency and response to DWVI queries from the PAC. This appeared to work well as the DWI staff of two DSS personnel had almost instant access to copies of evacuee registration forms after they were completed and therefore they could provide more timely responses to the PAC. It also eliminated the need to periodically send a runner with these forms to the Administration Building. Locating the DWI function in the Registration Building did not have any impact or detract from registration functions. During the exercise the DWI staff received 25 DWI queries from the PAC and were able to match five evacuees. They were, able to report information, on only two of the evacuees as the other three had not authorized release of information on their whereabouts (on their Disaster Shelter Registration forms).

CONGREGATE CARE The adequacy of facilities, equipment, supplies, personnel, and procedures for congregate care of evacuees was demonstrated.

The ARC demonstrated the capability to provide congregate care for evacuees at Camp Roberts.

Congregate care drill objectives were attained in accordance with American Red Cross MASS CARE - Preparedness Operations, ARC 3031. ARC staff, in partnership with other voluntary organizations, ensured that.evacuees were monktqred and found "clean" prior to their entering the various facilities utilized for demonstrating congregate care capabilities.

The shelter manager indicated that. staff and volunteers from the San Luis Obispo Chapter of the ARC arrived at 0730 to set up equipmnent iij each of thle congregate care buildings. These buildings included: the dining hall building 4101, the barracks administration building 4121, the shelter management building 4008, andjthe sleeping barracks located in buildings 4104, 4105, and 4106.

The dining hall was set 1up with, tables and snacks for staff and evacuees; it had ample space for serving meals and a large.kitchen to a oppodate mass care staff (six workers and one lead). The barracks administration buildingRwyas used to provide evacuees with bed assignments and longer-term services on an as-needed basis. Space was adequate to provide for ten to twelve staff persons in addition to the several evacuees rotating through at various times. Functional areas with tables and chairs were established for reception and housing assignments (two workers), physical health (1 registered nurse), family services (one worker), and ARES/RACES (two workers). A private office was established for disaster mental health (two licensed workers). Additional space was provided for the CCC workers serving as "floater"/escorts.

The shelter administration building housed the functional leads for each of the services areas, and other general administrative staff including: the shelter manager (one lead), an assistant shelter manager (one worker), logistics (four workers), communications (four workers), public affairs (one worker), CCC (two workers), staffing/records and reports (three workers, one lead), health services 16

(one registered nurse worker and'one registered nurse lead), menithl'health (one licensed lead), and family services (one lead). The space accommodated individual offices with phones and desks for each of the leads.'-

The barracks were designated according to three evacuee'groups: elderly, young families with children, 'and single adults.§-Signs 'de'pictin'g a 'map' of the propery and FEMA bathing recommendations were posted inside'the doois of the buildings. The barracks were set up with cots, sheets and blankets, and adeu'aite'space was demonstrated. Each building contained several showers, sinks,'and toilets: ' - ' '

' , .,. a. - .. .age. bra According to the lead for ARC staffing,'ARC' staff and volunteers from collaborating agencies signed- in land received an orientation pa-cket ahd'6a briefing, including an overview' of staff roles, management structure, functional area telephone numbers, and a map of the property. Members of the CCC served as escorts for evacuees, information runners, and general staff support for each of the congregate care buildings. The ARESIRACES volunteers established a communications hub in the shelter administration building and provided staff support to each of the congregate care buildings. They served as an emergency communications backup system for the telephones and radios provided to the ARC logistics and masnagement personnel. The'San Luis Obispo Depaitmen'n of Animal Control provided a vehicle equipped with cages to house the pets of evacuees. The San Luis Obispo County Departmenitof Behavioral Health'augmented the ARC'Menrtal Health 'staff, providing crisis counseling to evacuees, and general s'uppor-t6 all ARC' persnnel.

r  !  ;. *. . . - , . *. !.

The first bus of evacuees arrived at the cleantvehicle area acrossfror'the registration building at 1003. At 1033, the comptroller made a radio ah'foun6 eritn't; to_'-on'mie'nce the; start of the drill. The sequence for congregate care of evacuees follows. Upon-completion of registration-, evacuees were directed to a shady area to wait With'CCC staff. When groupbf appoximately fiv' evacuees had accumulated, they were instructed 'to line' ip"and CCC stiff 6scbrted' 'them 'to the barracks administration building. A inimiium of one CCC member w`ited ouxtside with evacuees, allowing two persons to enter the building at a time'. Inbarriaciks adr'nini'stration, "clean" hand stamps were verified and evacuees were given bed assignments'and additional services, if needed. 'As evacuees were assessed for shelter assignments, registration caids wiere'reviewed and verified, hllowihg'staff to gather special needs and demogiaphic inforir'ation- This brief conversation allowed evacuees to be matched with accommodation's in'etihg their uniqufe-circm' sta'nces.' The lead m'onitor for congregate care indicated the ARC would rfiake 'airrangerimenits' at n6arliy hotels to accommodate persons in wheelchairs if the n'eed presented. ' . ': ** .

- b.,,. .ia..;f,., i,., . . . .,r, - ing ; ,,, ev cu e as ARC staff demonstrated the ability to collaborate effectivelyon 'providing assistance to evacuees as critical needs emerged. In one'instance, the Block Manager'was "floating" thro'ughout the building' to provide support for the various functional areas. When an evacuee revealed the need for her insulin and concern about her children and husband, none of whom were at the camp, the manager intervened, escorting the woman to Family Services. The family services technician then worked in concert with the health services nurse to help address the evacuee's probienis` 'In order to ultimiately resolve the case, the family services worker called over to her funciionial'lead to request backup' support in order to resume her work with additional evacuees. 'Her backup'famrived in a timely 17

fashion and continued the casework. Upon completion of the barracks assignment, evacuees were either escorted to a service area for follow-up or accompanied by a CCC member to their assigned sleeping quarters. One CCC member was available at the intake desk at all times to escort evacuees to the barracks.

Before evacuees entered the barracks, the manager verified that each one had a "clean" stamp. He then asked evacuees to sign in, (a shelter diagram and sign in logs are included) explained the ground rules, and talked a little with them about their individual circumstances. In a subsequent interview, the shelter manager indicated the ARC policy states evacuees are responsible for their own personal items. Signs were posted, listing possessions prohibited in the barracks, e.g., knives. A mental health worker was present to support the manager with any arising issues. In one instance, an evacuee appeared at the barracks stating she was nervous about what would happen next and expressing anxiety about the well-being of her dog. The mental health worker and barracks manager worked together, explaining how she could obtain additional information on her family, describing what was available on the property in the way of meals and recreation, and offering to check on her animal for her.

The Shelter Manager indicated that in an actual event he would receive barracks census and meal counts from the mass care and barracks management leads approximately every 30 minutes.

Personnel manning the various work stations were provided with detailed phone lists and phones, which they used for communicating with other buildings, seeking clarification from supervisors, and requesting backup support.

According to the Shelter Manager, resources to meet the essential needs of thousands of evacuees are stored at Camp Roberts including cots, bedding, towels, cleaning supplies, and water for bathing, cleaning and drinking. Bathrooms with showers, sinks-and toilets are contained.in each of the barracks buildings. The ARC congregate care monitor indicated the ARC could provide napkins, plates and utensils and utilize catering contracts for the first twenty four hours if needed, and thereafter, could partner with tha Southern Baptists to provide meal preparation and/or feeding support. The shelter manager further indicated the ARC would provide comfort kits with personal hygiene products to evacuees. ,

The partnership between the ARC and the CCC provided structure, predictability, and continuity for evacuees. At each of the points in the sequence assistance,: evacuees were handled in a compassionate manner. The CCC staff worked out an excellent system for escorting evacuees and managing the flow into the barracks administration building, leading to a calmer environment in which ARC staff could focus on providing individualized service. CCC personnel were flexible in adapting to their taskings and worked well with evacuees, demonstrating patience and genuine concern for their feelings.

Evaluation Area Criteria Met 1.d.1, L.e.l, 3.c.1, 6.c.1 18

Deficiencies ' '

None -- -

Areas Requiring Corrective Action

1. Moni -t T.e .rin .c ..

19-03-6.a.1-A-1. t Monitoring Technique t !:. r .

CONDITION: During the body frisking of the evacuees, it was noted that the procedure was being conducted improperly; The'scan' rate wa'stoo fast, and the probe was held too far from the body. In consultation *with the lead controller, the monitoring supervisor was n6tified and re-training was conducted; The radiation supervisbr maintained dpost on the "clean" side of the decontamination center, conducted re-training, maintained that-post, and continued to coach the monitors throughout the remainder of the drill. However, the monitors never performed an adequate frisk on any of the evacuees.'

POSSIBLE CAUSE: Lack of experience and ineffective training might be the cause of the condition. - ' '  :- .

REFERENCE:

NUREG-9654, J. 10.h; J. 12;'K.5.a EFFECT: If the hand-frisking process is conducted at a high rate; leveIs-6f contamination at or near the action level would not be detected. This could result in unconditional release of a contaminated individual and possiblecross-conhtaimiination.' "'

RECOM1M1ENDATION: Conduct hand-friskingitraininig to priesent a mi ore realistic scenario

• to the trainee: Thisean be accomplished by plac6ing ia small radioactive check source (close to the action level threshold of 200 cpm abo've' background) on a'table under a cover or on a mannequin. This type of training'wvill reinforce the appropriate scaining rate and distance.

Revise the decontamination procedureand training m'-eihbd An additional recommendation is to acquire updated and more efficient survey meters.'

Prior Areas Requirink Correctiie Action-Corrected -  : ;' '

19-99-5-A-L ' Exposure and Dose Coiitrol Limits .".

. ,; '. t '

loI . ' .

'NUREG-0654

Reference:

K.3.b ' 'Criterion #5 Demonstration Criterion #2

1.

Description:

Neither the vehicle monitoring team members nor evacuee monitoring personnel knew the incremental exposure reporting levels of-50 mR, 100 rhR, etc. or '

the mission dose limit of 1.25 rem - ' ' - -

t --

2. Recommendation: Ensure that all staff that are required to wear a DRD receive appropriate training and that they understand the concept of the maximum authorized mission limit and that they understand their reporting requirements. Also, emphasize these in briefings.

3. Corrective Action: Emergency workers were aware of the requirement to report to their Command Center when their total exposure was 250 mR, 500 mR, 750 mR, and 1000 mR as shown on their blue card and the administrative limit of 1000 mR.

19-99-18-A-2..Handouts not left on the dashboard of the monitored vehicles.

NUREG-0654

Reference:

J.12 Criterion #18 Demonstration Criterion #5

1.

Description:

The handouts to indicate the vehicle had been through vehicle monitoring were not left on the dashboard of all vehicles.

2. Recommendation: Train the greeter at the vehicle monitoring station to verbally state this directive to the driver of each vehicle.

3. Corrective Action: The Handouts given-to contaminated vehicle drivers were left on the dashboard of the parked and locked vehicles.

19-99-18-A-3. Confusion Regarding Personal Items NUREG-0654

Reference:

J.10.h.,12 Criterion #18 Demonstration Criterion #3

1.

Description:

An evacuee was allowed to carry a backpack into the showers. The backpack was not contaminated and the individual only had contaminated feet. Thus, a shower was not necessary and only the feet needed to be washed. But the backpack would have been cumbersome and could have become contaminated in the shower area. It should have been removed, checked again for contamination and transferred to the clean side to be picked up by the evacuee after decontamination.

2. Recommendation: Emphasize the adherence to SOPs regarding evacuee possessions during training.

3. Corrective Action: Prior to conducting the body frisk of the evacuee, any personal property was surrendered and placed in a holding area until the completion of the body scan., Before the next contaminated evacuee entered the decontamination center, the personal property was monitored and decontaminated, if necessary, in accordance, with the SOP in HP-7.

20

*. a I .

19-99-18-A-5. Anti-contamination Clothing'for Initial Monitors'

NUREG-0654

Reference:

J.I0.h.,12:' Criterion #18 Demonstration Criterionf#l

'1

Description:

Inconsistent'with personnel performing other radiation monitoring

activities,', the radiation 'mionitors 'perforining monitoring of evacuees at the Decontamination Center and Registration' Center wore one paii of gloves instead of two pairs. SOP HP-14 requires the monitors performing vehicle monitoring and the public health nurses i v'olved in the decontamination of contaminated evacuees to

• wear double sets of gloves, but doe not refer to anti-contamination clothing required for the monitors performing the initial monitoring of evacuees.: Checklist 8 of HP-7 instructs all Evacuee Decontamination Center Staff (but not staff doing the initial monitoring at the Registration Center) to don two pairs of gloves. Checklist 5 of SOP HP-7 does instruct personnel monitors to don boots and gloves, but does not specify whether they sho'uld wear'oneor twopairs gloves.

2. Recommendation: Train'all monitoring and decontamination staff to wear two sets of gloves. Revise the SOPs defining the' appropriate'anti' contamination clothing required for the monitors performing the monitoring of evacuees at the Registration Center. 'This SOP should include the' rdq1irement that two 'sets of gloves 'are to be worn, i

3. Corrective Action

Ernergency worfkers wore latex gloves and plastic booties according" to' their procedures and checklists. Workers on the potentially-

contaminated side wore two pair of gloves, and those on the cle'an side wore one pair.

• , . r . . , , ...................... . .*

• Prior Areas Requiringi Corrective'Action-Uncorrected '

19-99-18-A 4. Contamination'Controi *"' '

a . t * . ;.! Tai ,,: .,.,

• i,--'e.::

' NUREG0654

Reference:

J.I;h., 12 ' ' Criterioni#18

'. "li'Dernoristiatioi Criterion #1

1. Desc'ription: There 'was only' one portal for the shower area in the Camp Roberts barracks. The staff had been very innovative in'establishingcontrol methods for this

' area.: Traffic was constan ly controlled in the area'and this opening was divided in half by a barrier tape, but this was really not an effective bani6r' to prevent cross-contamination. One evacuee with contaminated feet did accidentally step across the.

' barrier. The area should h'ave been immediately smeared and surveayed, but both

'inside monitors were busy. ' ' -

21-

2. Recommendation: Emphasize contamination control during training. Consider assigning one additional monitor in each facility to be able to immediately take care of monitoring needs resulting from possible contamination of a "clean" area. This monitor could the also provide a 5 or 10 minute break for the operating monitors.

o EL CHORRO REGIONAL PARK EMERGENCY WVORKER CENTER The County of San Luis Obispo, in support of the DCPP off-site response organization, held a drill at El Chorro Regional Park on June 4, 2001, to demonstrate the adequacy of the radiological monitoring, and decontamination of emergency workers, vehicles and equipment. In response to a radiological event at DCPP, emergency response plans provide, for emergency workers and their vehicles to be directed to the Emergency Worker Monitoring and Decontamination Center at El Chorro Regional Park off Highway 1. There, the vehicles and their passengers will be monitored and decontaminated, if necessary.

o DETAIL There were four criteria established for demonstration, observation and evaluation at the El Chorro Regional Park Emergency Worker Monitoring and Decontamination Center. All criteria were met, and an ARCA from the 1999 drill was corrected. In addition, an ARCA from the 2003 Camp Roberts drill was corrected.

The instruments, equipment, and supplies were adequate to support operations and were stored in labeled containers. These containers were maintained in a single axle, enclosed van body utility trailer. This trailer was approximately eight feet wide, twelve feet long, and seven feet high with a gross vehicle weight of 2,080 pounds., The.trailer was maintained in an area in close proximity to the County of San Luis Obispo Emergency Operations Center. The Parks Division of the County Department of General Seryices was responsible for moving the, trailer to the monitoring and decontamination center.

Supplies and equipment included, CDV-700 survey instruments; two portal monitors; anti-contamination clothing consisting of TYVEK coveralls, hoods, face shields, rubber boots, and gloves; detergent, water hoses with nozzles and wands, and long-handled brushes for vehicle decontamination; soap, shampoo, wash cloths, scrub brushes, towels, and temporary clothing for emergency worker decontamination; canopies to provide cover for various activities including the portal monitor and individuals waiting to be monitored; and an assortment of tables and chairs. The supply trailer also contained two collapsible buildings. Each building was approximately 10 feet wide and fourteen feet long. One of the buildings was setup and used to house the EWEC and Administration function. The other building was not setup, but was available for equipment storage or any other appropriate use if needed.

Five CDV 700 instruments with earphones were available for vehicle monitoring. However, only three were needed. Following their plans and procedures checklist (SOP, III.06, HP-6, page 11, 22

Vehicle Monitoring Checklist),' batteries were inserted into three.CDV-700 instruments, ear phones attached, the probe was covered in plastic, the background count rate was established, and the operability of each instrument was confirmed. Using the check source located 'on the side of each instrument and with the beta window open, each instrument registered within the range specified in the above checklist. All three instruments'were within calibration dates;'i.e., the first instrument was calibrated on April It, 2003, with- calibration due on April 1, 2004;' the second instrument was calibrated on April 3, 2003, with calibration due on April 3, 2004; and the third instrument was calibrated on April 30, 2003, with calibration due on April 30, 2004.

Two TSA Systems Ltd. Model TPM 903 PPMsWand eight CDV-700s were available for emergency worker monitoring. The PP4Ms were both tested foi proper operation on May 26,2003 and are due to be tested again on August 26,2003. They were'set-up'followigig Radiation Conrtrol Procedure, RCP EM-19 Revision OA "Thermo Electron (St: 'Gobain) TPM-903 Portals" and tested for proper response'using a one microcurie cesium-137 source calibrated on June 18, 1986. The eight CDV-700s were all calibrated on April 1, 2003 and due for calibration on April 1, 2004. The CDV-700s were set-up anid tested for operability uiin'g procedures identical'to those employed f6r vehicle' monitoring. ; -

All'personnel performing emergency worke~r and enmergency vehicle rmonitoring/decontamination activities registered at the EWEC desk and obtained an exposure conitrol kit. Each kit cofitained one' TLD (issue date January 17, 2003),'one CDV-138 SRD (full scale 'of 200b nR), one CDV-730 SRD (full scale of 20 R), one exposure record form for each SRD, one bottle containing 14 -'130 milligram KI tablets (expiration date February 2005), a KI instruction sheet, and the EWEC Checklist. ' ' .  ; '.

- ' w re co . - W ' .c . a,',#t

' ' r.e,_.

The two SRDs as'signed'to 'each i dividual 'were consistenritwiih the tDecoiotamination Center Exposure Control Checklist found 6n'page'41 of the SOP, 1IE.06,1HP-9. This checklist states that each monitoring individual i 'required to wear a'0:200 m'R SRD'anrd a 0-20 R SRD. This checklist is not'consistent with SOP M.06, HP-9, pag'e 70, which states that 0-200 mR SRDs'are the only SRDs needed Decontamination Center staff.

Also,'included in'the supplies were traffic cone's,'various colors4of iape, 'and barrier r'o'pe. 'Th'6es items were used to delineate thedp'ath for'irnc6ming 'emergency vehicles, separate contaminated and clean areas in the .vehicle decontarnin'ation ' area 'and' effergen6 'lworker rnonitoring and decontamination areas. ' ' . ' .-

Signs were in place to guide emergency workers io the various m6nitoring an'd decontamination functional areas and the path to follow if they were found t6'be free' of c6nt'amination.':

The implementation of emergency worker exposure control was adequately demonstrated. Dosimetry was issued at'the EWEC Desk' set-up--in 'the portable building 'at"thleEI'Chofro'Re'gioxnal Park Campground. " ' i - - ,

* * , ¢ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~' *'.;,

,..'.,'.,! -,.' ,@' ,.I 23 "-

Each emergency worker was issued an EWEC Kit containing a TLD with an exchange date of 01/17/03, a CDV model 138 (0-200 mR) SRD and a CDV model 730 (0-20 R) SRD, a bottle containing fourteen 130 milligram KI tablets, a Thyro-Block package insert, Field Exposure Logs; one blue for low range and one yellow for high range SRDs and a copy of "EWEC-3 EWEC CHECKLIST "(EWEC-3) The KI had an expiration date of February 2005 and the THYRO-BLOCK package insert provided information concerning why, how and when to take KI and possible side effects.

The EWEC-3 describes the contents of the EWEC kit, how to zero an SRD, a pre-field checklist and precautions, radiation exposure tracking and emergency worker exposure guidelines. Emergency workers were instructed to read their SRDs at one-hour intervals. In addition to the one-hour intervals, the vehicle decontamination team leader instructed his team to read their SRDs after decontaminating each vehicle.

The SRDs were zeroed using a CDV 750 model SB operating SRD charger. The TLD serial number along with pertinent personal data was entered on FORM CC-i "PERSONNEL ROSTER/EXPOSURE LOG" for later assignment of total dose to the user. Initial (start) and ending SRD readings were entered on "FIELD EXPOSUE LOG FOR LOW RANGE DOSIMETER" (CDV-138) 0-200 mR (blue card) and "FIELD EXPOSURE LOG FOR HIGH RANGE DOSIMETER" (CDV-730) 0-20 R (yellow card) along with date of use, time of reading, start and ending readings, net and total exposure. Pertinent personal information andTLD serial numberwere entered on the front of the card.,A space was also available to note the date and time of KI ingestion.

Emergency workers were aware of the mission limit (1000 mR) and the requirement to notify the Decontamination Center Manager when the low range SRD read approximately 50, 100, and 150 mR. They understood that if the low range SRD approached 175mR they were to reset the SRD after approval from the Decontamination Center Manager and enter the new start reading on the low range dosimeter log. To ensure that this requirement was being folloWed.the Decontamination Center Manager sent a representative to each functional area to remind personnel of the actions to be taken and reported.

Emergency workers. read their SRDs at least every 30 minutes. A recorder outside of the decontamination area was responsible for logging the SRD readings on the record cards for all the workers inside the decontamination area. However, all the monitoring staff had to log (write down) their SRD readings themselves,.which proved awkward for some of them because the record card was inside a plastic bag. These staff should also have their SRD readings logged by a recorder.

To prevent personnel contamination overboots, shoe covers, Anti-C overalls, gloves, disposable particle masks and face shields were worn in the functional areas as appropriate.

Prior to the beginning of the, exercise three briefings were given; the first covered general and environmental safety, the second the simulated conditions that resulted in the Emergency Worker Monitoring and Decontamination Center being opened and the third covered briefings in the functional areas, start and stopping of play and repacking of instruments, equipment and supplies.

24

The ability to monitor and decontaminate emergency workers was adequately demonstrated. The initial monitoring area was setup ' immediately outside of the definitive monitoring and decontamination' area 'that was inside of a restroom/shower facility. The' monitoring and decontamination activity was carried out by personnel fr6m DCPP, the County CHA, and the State of California DHS.

Two TSA Systems Ltd. Model TPM 903 PPMs, one for use in the initial monitoring of emergency workers and one as'a standby were set-up at the'entry to the monitoring and decontamination area.

Both PPMs were 'tested for' proper operation ton 05/26/03' 'and are due to be tested again on 08/26/03.The PPMs were set-up follow'ing Radiaii6n Control Procedure RCP EM-19 Revision OA "Thermo Electron (St. Goblin) TPM-903 Portals" and tested for proper response to radiation with a one microcurie cesium-137 source, calibrated 06/18/86, carried through the PPM. The PPM uprights were covered with thin plastic and butcher paper laid across the base. The PPM area was covered with a large'portable awning to provide protectio n from the elements. A line'was'marked five feet back from the PPM to facilitate re-monitoring.-

Eight CDV 700 survey meters with side-window, metal-walled GM probes and headphones were available for definitive hand monitoring. The instrumerits were calibrated on 04/01/03 and due for calibration on 04/01/04. Batteries were placed in the instruments and each instrument checked with the beta window open and on' the X10 range againsi 'aradioactive s6ur'ce of known response located on the side of the instrument. One instru'mentfailed to'respond properl' and was labeled as "bad".

Instrument probes were left in the open window position and covered with thin plastic.

The monitoring and deccintamin'ation area in'side the restroom/shower building was set-up in accordance with m.06, HP-9 "Emergency'Worker Ddconitamfinatio-n" NPPERP (05/03) Figure 4.

"GUIDANCE FOR LAYOUT OF DECONTAMINATION CENTER"'. Male and female shower facilities were available however only the male shbv'ei6rea w'as used in accordance with the Extent-'

of-Play Agreement.' ' ' ' ' " ' . .

Appropriate signs such as Men's, Women's'Decon, No smbking, Eating or Drinking, Instructions 'for' donning and removing protective clothirig, Decontamiriation' Procedures and other appropriate signs' were displayed outside and inside thiebuilding.fThe team also recogniized theyhne'ded two additional signs: a "Do Not Enter" sign for the standby PPM, hnd'a'ndtry-sign to guide emergency workers coming from the vehicle'decontaminatibn area'. They'created these signs using butcher paper and displayed them appropriately.' ' i . ,. I Tape was placed on the floor-to delineate the:'cleafi andco'ntrolled Areas'.- Radioactivev 'waste containers were monitored at one-half hour intervals 'to prevent an increase in background.

Monitoring personnel wore overboots and two pair of gloves and the Dec6ntamination Specialists wore overboots, Anti-C coveralls and tvo pairs of gloves 'The towels used 'are not of sufficieri' size

to appropriately'cover the decontaminated emergency w6rer'durinig re-'monitoring. AlI perso'nnel were issued appropriate dosimetry. '  ;' '. ..; :..2: ': l: '.'.-' '

25 -

Emergency workers were directed to walk through the portal monitor and stop on the butcher paper to await further instructions. The PPM alarmed (simulated) when the first emergency worker passed through. He was asked to step back to the five-foot line, pause while the PPM reset, and walk back through the PPM. When the alarm sounded again (simulated), he was directed to the definitive monitoring and decontamination area. As he entered, he stepped on the tape that demarcated the contaminated and clean areas. Monitoring staff wiped the portion on which he had stepped, and then monitored the wipe for any contamination.

Monitoring staff removed the potentially-contaminated butcher paper. Since there was no "Contaminated Materials" receptacle outside of the decontamination area, they tried to pass this paper into the decontamination area to be disposed of. This. was very awkward because the monitoring staff had to hold the paper while waiting for someone to come out of the decontamination area and take it. The process also involved monitoring of gloves of'the staff involved in the transfer, and changing gloves if necessary. The monitoring staff decided to just roll up the butcher paper, contaminated portion inside, and store by the side of the building. The SOP should be revised to include a "Contaminated Materials" receptacle outside of the decontamination area.

Monitoring staff then laid down a new sheet of butcher paper through the PPM. This process also proved awkward because they had to get down on their hands and knees to securely tape the paper.

They were thoroughly monitored for contamination before the next emergency worker was sent through the PPM. The removal and replacement of the butcher paper was repeated following the identification of two other contaminated emergency workers.

Emergency workers who did.ngt alarm the PPM had their left hand stamped "CLEAN" and were then directed to take.the path. away from the monitoring and decontamination area.

The monitoring staff exhibited, excellent teamwork, especially for contamination control. They made sure the other members of their team were re-monitored correctly with the CDV-700s (using earphones) after touching, stepping, or kneeling in potentially-contaminated areas.

DCPP personnel carried out, monitoring of simulated contaminated emergency workers in an effective -and efficient manner. -Public Health Nurses efficiently supervised simulated decontamination. Personal data was entered on FORM A-"PERSONAL DATA", contamination location and net cpm were entered on FORM B-CLOTHING AND BODY CONTAMINATIONREPOR1T".. and decontamination results were entered on FORM B -

"DECONTAMINATION RESULT," by recorders from CHA. Recorders also recorded hourly self-reading dosimeters readings to prevent the possible spread of contamination. Personnel were aware of the 200 cpm above background as read on a CDV-700 decontamination trigger level.

Three simulated contaminated emergency workers were monitored and decontaminated (simulated).

The monitoring and decontamination procedure was explained to each individual. Contamination control and direction and control within the monitoring and decontamination area were excellent.

Clean clothing was available for the decontaminated (simulated) emergency workers. The Personnel Decontamination. Specialist Coordinator was aware of the actions to be taken in the event that 26

decontamination of the emergency worker was'not effective after three attempts Valuables and personal items were monitored and placed in a plastic bag with a label containing the owner's name, Social Security Account Nurmbeir'and a 'description of the' items. The Owners were told that the items'would be returned to them.

At the conclusion of the monitoring'and decontamiriation activities the Decontamination Specialists were monitored out following the Anti-C clothing removal procedure. The'monitors fully explained the procedures for ieturning the area'to unrestricted use'and disposal of the radioactive waste.

At the'conclusion'of the vehicle' nonitoring"'activities, the monitor who had been the recorder monitored the individual who had been'peifdrmiiig the vehicle monitoring duties for contamination.

The recorder, wearing headphones,' conducted 'the monitoring in'an appropriate 'manner. This corrected the previous ARCA #19-99-22-A'6. .' '

The monitoring and decontamination of emergency worker equipmexit ahd vehicles were adequately demonstrated. Using a campground roadway, fourftraffic cones and yellow caution tape were used to delineate the path for in coming emergency vehicles to be monitored and decontaminated if needed.

Two personnel performed initial vehicle6'rnonitoring activities. One individual performed 'the' monitoring and one individual recorded the'results'on the Vehicle Co~ntarniination Report form. A third individual performed vehicle monitoring activities 6nhcontamiinated vehicles following decontamination efforts. 'In addition, four personnel performed vehicle d6contani'nation' activities.'

Three CDV:700 survey instruments with earphofnes wvere used forVe hicle monitoring. Following their plans and procedures checklist (SOP,'III.06; HP-6,;'page- i1;,Vehicle Monitoring Chec6klist),

batteries were inserted into three CDV-700 instruments, ear phones were attached, the probe was covered in plastic, the background count rate was established,'and theii'struments operability 'was confirmed. Using the check source located on the'side of each instrument and with the beta window open, each instrument registered within the range specified in th6 above checklist.

In accordance with SOP, I1.06 HP-6;-VEHICLE MONITORING,-206 cprm above background, as read on a CDV-700, was the action level for'determinini 'th'e need for de66ntamin-ati6n of emergency vehicles and/or equipment. ' ' - ' .:. .,  ;

When an emergency worker vehicle pulled into the' vehicle nmonitoring area, tihe driver was briefed on activities, provided booties to place over his' shoes,' and i"ehicle i'nonitoring activities were' initiated. Initially, the monitoring was comrpletb ai'd thoroufgh, but th- methcdology emp0loyed was' not consistent with the vehicle monitoring checklist detailed in the SOP M.06,'HP-6, pagel 1. 'The evaluator, in concert with the vehicle monitoring controller, stopped the demonstration and explained that the monitoring procedure \was not consistent with the checklist: 'As the demonstration continued,'

the monitoring recorder referred to the checklist and provided guidance'to the monitor' Monitoring was accomplished in accordance with the checklist and included iwiping the hoo'd,' roof,' trunk, and tires with a small clean cloth; The cloth was'then monitored for c6ntaminatioon. The action level of 200 cpm above'background for determining' the'eed for'dec ntaminaiionhwas'i so'ap'plicablW for 27'

this wiping cloth. Following the monitoring of the wiping cloth, the vehicle was monitored using a CDV-700. Monitoring included the engine compartment, air filter, wheel wells, tires, and inside of the vehicle's passenger compartment and trunk. All measurements were documented on the Vehicle Contamination Report form by the recorder and placed on the vehicle's dashboard.

One emergency vehicle to be monitored was a police car driven by a police officer with a second officer in the passenger seat. Part of the monitoring procedure was to monitor the inside of the vehicle's trunk. When the monitor asked the driver to open the trunk, he said he could not do that.

When the officers were asked to step out of the vehicle so that the monitor could check the interior, the driver was visibly uncomfortable. He looked at the rifle mounted between the driver and passenger seats, hesitated, and then complied. The monitoring procedures (SOP 111.06, HP-6, page

13) also state that the occupants are to be directed to leave radios and firearms in the vehicle. Based on the observed actions of the two officers, there was no chance that the officers would leave their radios and firearms inside the vehicle so the monitor did not address this. A suggestion is to position a uniformed officer at vehicle monitoring to provide a comfort level for emergency workers who are law enforcement officers, to be visible for all incoming emergency workers, and to support any law enforcement issues that might arise at the emergency worker monitoring and decontamination center.

If the vehicle was not contaminated, the driver was directed to park the vehicle in a nearby "clean" parking area and proceed to the emergency worker monitoring area for personnel monitoring.

If the vehicle was contaminated, the driver was directed to drive the vehicle to a nearby decontamination area. Upon arrival, the driver was directed to the emergency worker monitoring area for personnel monitoring and the vehicle was decontaminated by washing with water, detergent, and a brush. The team leader for vehicle decontamination supervised the decontamination efforts performed by the three personnel. He followed the vehicle decontamination checklist very closely, addressing each step.

Contamination control in the vehicle decontamination area was established by roping off an area separating the clean area from the contaminated area. Additionally, two trashcans, lined with plastic bags, were available and marked for contaminated waste and clean waste. The area established for decontamination was on a cement slab that inclined from the roadway thus allowing runoff of water from the roadway to a low area where the water could be absorbed without impacting sources of drinking water.

Two vehicles with simulated contamination arrived at the vehicle decontamination area. The first emergency worker vehicle requiring decontamination arrived at 1129. The driver was directed to go to the emergency worker monitoring station to be monitored for contamination. The Vehicle Contamination Report form was removed from the car, checked by the monitor for contamination, and then given to the vehicle decontamination team leader. The team leader reviewed the form and then provided instructions to the decontamination team on what areas of the vehicle were contaminated. He did this sequentially to ensure that areas with the highest radiation readings were decontaminated first. Initially, the vehicle was washed using a low pressure hose; then the contaminated area was thoroughly scrubbed using a brush with detergent and water; then the 28

contaminated area was rinsed with water; and finally, the scrub brush was sprayed with water before returning it to the pail containing the detergent and water. These steps were performed for each contaminated area of the vehicle.

Following decontamination, the vehicle was carefully re-monitored. The monitoring techniques demonstrated were adequate with respect to rate of movement'and instrument detector distance. All areas initially identified as contaminated were thoroughly re-monitored. All contaminated areas had been successfully decontaminated below 200 cpm with exception of the air filter. The team leader then directed that the vehicle be taken to the contaminated parking area for further decontamination efforts as time allowed. A "clean" vehicle decontamination' team member served as the driver.

Before he was allowed to enter the vehicle, the ground area around the c'r was rinsed and the vehicle door and front interior were re-monitoredt*to ensure it was clean. Decontamination activities associated with this vehicle were completed at'l 145.

A second contaminated vehicle arrived at the decontamination station at' 1200. Decontamination of this vehicle was accomplished using methodology similar to the decontamination of the first vehicle and was completed at' 1215.' At' 1230, operations';at the decontamination were terminated, decontamination personnel properly removed their protective clothing and placed them in the "contaminated waste" trash can, and they'were monitored to see if they' were clean' Thereafter ihe team leader collected all dosimetry and the EWEC kit§, returned them to the EWVEC desk, and' directed all team members to report to the portal monitor for a final check that they were clean.

. . .;i

.. -i.

• 4........

-~~~~~~~~~~~~ . ' ',I...........'  :  ;. ,'.::.*',

.l,'. ','.  :

Evaluation Area Criteria Met . .  :....

L.e.1,3.c.1, 6.a.1,6.c.1 ' * ' . .: r  ;. -.

Deficiencies . ' . "' ' . ' ' ' ' '

None . . . . - . . . .

~~~~ ~~ ~ .  !': ..

Areas Requiring Corrective Action None , .. .; .  :

..., , A .!

29'.

Prior Areas Requiring Corrective Action-Corrected 19-99-22-A-6. Vehicle monitoring area end-of-shift exit frisk NUREG-0654

Reference:

K.5.b Objective #22 Demonstration Criterion #2 1.

Description:

At the conclusion of the vehicle monitoring, the vehicle monitor and the recorder conducted a self-frisk before exiting the vehicle monitoring area. The technique demonstrated during this self-frisk was somewhat questionable, as at one point, while the recorder was frisking the monitor, it was observed that the monitor was still wearing the instrument earphones while the recorder was using the instrument for the exit contamination survey. Only the hands and feet were surveyed. It did not appear that a full whole body frisk was adequately performed as required by the Procedure 11.06, HP-6, Clecklist 3, step 10.

2. Recommendation: Train the vehicle monitors on the proper end of shift survey for removing Anti-Cs when leaving the vehicle monitoring area. Alternatively, the procedures could be revised to require all monitoring anddecontamination personnel to pass through the portal monitor at the end of their shift when exiting the El Chorro Emergency Worker Monitoring and Decontamination facility. .. .

3. Corrective Action: At the c'oncljusion of the vehicle monitoring, the monitor who had been the recorder monitored the individual who had been performing the vehicle monitoring duties for contamination. The recorder, wearing headphones, conducted the monitoring in an appropriate manner.

30

19-03-6.a.1-A-i. Monitoring Technique CONDITION: During the body frisking of the' evacuees, it was noted that the procedure was being conducted improperly. The scan rate was too fast, and the probe was held too far from the body. In consultation with the lead controller, the monitoring supervisor was notified and re-training was conducted. The radiation supervisor maintained a post on the "clean" side of the decontamination center, conducted re-training, maintained that post, and continued to coach the monitors throughout the remainder'of the drill. However, the monitors never performed an adequate frisk on any of the evacuees.

POSSIBLE CAUSE: Lack of 6xpenien6ce and ine'ffective training might be the cause of the condition.  ;

REFERENCE:

NUREG-9654, J.10.h; J.12; K.5.a EFFECT: If the hand-frisking process is conducted at a high rate, levels of contamination at or near the action level would not be detected. This could result in unconditional release of a contaminated individual and possible cross-contamination; RECOMMENDATION: Conduct hand-frisking training to present a more realistic scenario to the trainee. This can be accomplishdby placihng a sm'all radioactive check source (close to the action level threshold of 200 cpm above background) on'a able'under a-cover or on a mannequin. This type of training will'reinforce the appropriate scanning rate and distance:

Revise the decontamination procedure and training mreth'od. Au aaditional recommendation is to acquire updated and rmore efficient survey meters:

CORRECTIVE ACTION: DCPP perionnel in the decontamination area carried out monitoring of simulated contaminated emergency workers using CDV 700s in an effective and efficient manner. At the'conclusion'of the vehicle monitoring, the monitor who had been the recorder monitored the individual who had been performing the vehicle monitoring duties for contamination. The recorder, wearing headphones, conducted the monitoring in an appropriate manner.

Prior Areas Reguiring Corrective Action - Uncorrected None

• , -. . I-31 '

APPENDIX 1 ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ALARA as low as reasonably achievable ARC American Red Cross ARCA Area Requiring Corrective Action ARES Amateur Radio Emergency Services BEPZ Basic Emergency Planning Zone CALTRANS California Department of Transportation CDN Civil Defense CFR Code of Federal Regulations CHA County Health Agency CHO County Health Officer CHP California Highway Patrol cpm Counts Per Minute DCPP Diablo Canyon Power Plant DHS Department of Health Services (State)

DSS Department of Social Services DWI Disaster Welfare Inquiry EOC Emergency Operations Center EWEC Emergency Worker Exposure Control FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency FR Federal Register KI potassium iodide mR milliroentgen mR/h milliroentgen per hour NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NUREG-0654 NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, "Criteriafor Preparationand Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," November 1980 OES Office of Emergency Services 32

ORO Off-site Response Organioation PAC Phone Asstance Center, .

PAZ Protective Action Zone PG&E Pacific Gas and Electric Company PHN Public Health Nurses (County'Health Agency)

PIO Public Infornmation Officer PPM Port'able Portal Monitor R Roentgen RAC Regional Assistance Coimmittee RACES Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service rem Roentgen Equivalent Man REP Radiological Emergency Preparedness RERP Radiological Emergency Response Plan' R/h -'Roentgen(s) per hour' RIX Region 9 SLOCEOC San Luis Obispo County Emergency Operations Center SOP Standard Operating Procedure' SRD self-reading dosimeter TLD Thermoluminescent Dosimeter- -.

UHF UltraHighFrequency VHF Very High Frequency

. .; 'V.

. ' , j- '* ' ;,

3 3' '

-Z ',', 3-,3

APPENDIX 2.

EXERCISE EVALUATORS The following is a list of the personnel who evaluated the Diablo Canyon Power Plant Off-site Camp Roberts Drill on April 30, 2003, and the El Chorro Drill on June 4, 2003. The letters

"(TL)" indicate evaluator Team Leaders after their names. The organization that each evaluator represents is indicated by the following abbreviations:

ICF - ICF Consultants FEMA- - Federal Emergency Management Agency Camp Roberts Drill EVALUATION SITE EVALUATOR ORGANIZATION Initial Monitoring Art Ball ICF Evacuee Decontamination Hollis Berry ICF Evacuee Vehicle Monitoring Lyle Slagle ICF Registration Center Monitoring Frank Bold ICF Evacuee Registration Paul Carlson ICF(TL)

Congregate Care Laura Hokenstad FEMA RIX Administrative Support Michelle Mandolia ICF Richard Echavarria, FEMA RIX, Site-Specialist Ken Chin, FEMA RIX, RAC Chair 34

El Chorro Drill EVALUATION SITE -EVALUATOR ORGANIZATION Emergency Worker Monitoring Frank Bold ICF and Decontamination  ;

Emergency Worker Equipment Monitoring Daryl Thome.: ICF Emergency Worker Equipment Paul Carlson ICF (TL)

Decontamination Richard Echavarria, FEMA RIX, Site-Specialist

• .. t .

'a

,II I... . .

, . .. . ... . . . . ... I i, 35 '

APPENDIX 3 EVALUATION AREA CRITERIA AND EXTENT-OF-PLAY AGREEMENT This appendix lists the evaluation area criteria that were scheduled for demonstration in the Diablo Canyon Power Plant Off-site Camp Roberts Drill on April 30, 2003, and the El Chorro Drill on June 4, 2003, and the extent-of-play agreement approved by FEMA Region LX.

The exercise evaluation area criteria, contained in the "Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise New Methodology" represent a functional translation of the planning standards and evaluation criteria of NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, "Criteria for the Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," November 1980.

Because the evaluation area criteria are intended for use at all nuclear power plant sites, and because of variations among off-site plans and procedures, an extent-of-play agreement is prepared by the State and approved by FEMA to provide evaluators with guidance on expected actual demonstration of the Evaluation area criteria.

A. Exercise Evaluation Area Criteria Listed below is the specific radiological emergency preparedness evaluation area criteria scheduled for'dernonstration dulring this exercise.

EVALUATION AREA 1: EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT Sub-element L.d - Communications Equipment Criterion I.d.1: At'least;two communication systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations. Communication's capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations.

(NUREG-0654, F. 1., 2.)

Sub-element L.e - Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations' Criterion 1.e.l: Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, potassium iodide (KI), and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations. (NUREG-0654, H.,

J.10.a.b.e.fj.k., II, K.3.a.)

35

EVALUATION AREA 3: PROTECTIVE ACTION IMPLEMENTATION Sub-element 3.a - Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control Criterion 3.a.1: The OROs issue appropriate dosimetry and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance, with the plans and procedures.

EmreI o~rspei'i'l - atI Emergency workers periodicallyand at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart. (NUREG-0654, K.3.)

EVALUATION AREA 6: SUPPORT OPERATION/FACILITIES Sub-element 6.a - Monitoring and Decontamination of Evacuees and Emergency Workers, and Registration of Evacuees Criterion 6.a.1: The reception center/emergency worker. facility has appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to .provide monitoring, decontamination, and registration of evacuees and/or emergency workers. (NUREG-0.654, J.10.h.; K.5.b.)

Sub-element 6.b - Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency WVorker Equipment Criterion 6.b. 1: The facility/ORO has adequate. procedures and 'resources, for the accomplishment of monitoring a'nd .dcc6ntaminiation,of emergencyworker equipment including vehicles. (NUREG-0654, K.5.b)c Sub-element 6.c - Temporary Care ofEvacuees,. , .

Criterion 6.c.l: Managers of congregate care facilities demonstrate that the centers have resources to provide services and adcommodations c6nsistent with' American Red Cross planning guidelines. Managers demonstrate the procedures to assure that evacuees have been monitored for contamination and have beeh decontaminated astappropnate prior to entering congregate care facilities. (NUREG-0654, J. O.h., 12.)'

I, .. ,; ..

B. Extent-of-Play Agreement .  ; .. .I The extent-of-play agreement on the following pages was submitted .by San Luis Obispo County and was approved by FEMA Region IX, in preparation for the Diablo Canyon Power Plant Off-site Camp Roberts Drill on April 30, 2003, and the El Chorro-Drill on June 4, 2003. The extent-of-play agreement includes any significant modification or change in the level of demonstration of each exercise evaluation area criterion listed in Subsection A of this appendix.

36

COUNTY OF SAN LUIS OBISPO 2003 CAMP ROBERTS EVACUEE MONITORING, DECONTAMINATION, CONGREGATE CARE AND EMERGENCY WORKER & EMERGENCY WORKER VEHICLES

- . MONITORING & DECON EXERCISE OBJECTIVES AND EXTENT OF PLAY 03BOB/Chorro obj&play April 7, 2003 f-shared COUNTY OF SAN LUIS OBISPO- EVACUEE MONITORING DECONTAMINATION CONGREGATE CARE & EMERGENCY WORKER & VEHICLE MONITORING &

DECONTAMINATION EXERCISE APRIL 30, 2003 OBJECTIVES AND EXTENT- OF PLAY

'CAMP ROBERTS EXERCISE

Introduction:

On October 23, 2002'the County of San:Luis Obispo,-the State of California, and various Federal and local allied agencies, in support of a simulated .emergency at Diablo Canyon Power.Plant I(DCPP) participated in- a FederalEmnergency Management Agency (FEMA),

biennial Radiological Emergency Preparedriess (REP), exercise. The required FEMA REP Exercise Evaluation Methodology Criteria were demonstrated and evaluated. A subsequent element of this.Off-site Emergency Response Organization's (ORO) evaluated response capabiliti.will be the demonsfration of Evacuee Monitoring, Decontamination, Registration and Congregate Care plans and standard 'operating on 'procedure April 30,'2003 at Camp Roberts.' A separate demonstration -of .riFergency Worker vehicle and equipment decontamination procedures will be conducted on June 4, 2003 at'El Chorro Regional Park.

The extent of exercise play .for non-county'organizations is-based upon-County Plans, Standard Operating Procedures (SOP), and that organization's SOPs, goals, schedules and staffing." '  ! '.:;'.:. .. i'."; '

Objectives:. .. ., . .. . . 4... ..

y The intent of this Evacuee and (Cngregate Care exercise is to demonstrate- the ORO capability to effectively establish a relocation.'center, imrolitor iand if necessary decontaminate evacuees, emergency workers their equipment and vehicles while controlling the spread of contamination.. Procedures for the registration, processing and provision of congregate care will be demonstrated in'coordinationrwith the Armerican Red Cross.;

The joint objectives and extent of play have been developed in contact with state and local organizations that are involved jn respo and support to e'ergencsat ess Diablo Canyon Power Plant. The six evaluation criteria listed for demonstration are consistent with the approved Six.Year Exercise..Cycle',' NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP 1, Exercise Evaluation Methodology Criteria, and the criteria demonstrated on October 23, 2002.

Extent of Play:

Federal guidance identifies an approximate ten mile circle'where the Federal Emergency Management Agency has primary oversight responsibility for off-site plans and exercise performance. Protective Action'Zones (PAZ) 1 through 5 form the basic federal oversight Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ). -As such, evaluation of exercise objectives will be focused and limited to decisions and/or response activities that take place within or originate from PAZ 1 through 5. PAZ 6 through 12 of the State expanded Diablo Canyon Power Plant Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ), comprise those areas where the State of California has primary related oversight responsibility. The State of.California is the entity that will determine whether any corrective actions are required for actions or decisions that affect PAZ 6 through 12. .

03BOB/Chorro obj&play April 7, 2003 f-shared COUNTY OF SAN LUIS OBISPO- EVACUEE MONITORING DECONTAMINATION CONGREGATE CARE & EMERGENCY WORKER & VEHICLE MONITORING &

DECONTAMINATION EXERCISE OW APRIL 30, 2003 OBJECTIVES AND EXTENT OF PLAY As a result of the October 23, 2002 exercise scenario and extent of play, a Protective Action Decision (PAD) was issued for PAZ 1, 2, 4, 5, and 9. Occupants were ordered to evacuate and were directed to the Camp Roberts Reception and Congregate Care Center approximately 40 miles north of San Luis Obispo on US Highway 101. Affected school children had been relocated in advance of the general population to a designated School Evacuation Center at Paso Robles fairgrounds some 30 miles north of San Luis Obispo on US Highway 101. The relocation and accommodation procedure for public and private school children was evaluated in the October 23, 2002 exercise and is not an object of this exercise.

The evaluation of this exercise is to be based on the new FEMA Evaluation Methodology Criteria, that are applicable to the San Luis Obispo County/Cities Nuclear Power Plant Emergency Response Plan (NPP ERP) and relevant associated Standard Operating Procedures (SOP). Six Evaluation Area Criteria sub-elements will be demonstrated through the utilization of existing Plans and SOPs with those exceptions that are outlined within the context of this Extent of Play. Copies of the appropriate plans and procedures have been provided to FEMA Region IX staff, and updated procedures if any will be forwarded as available prior to the exercise. It is understood that FEMA Region IX is responsible for providing to evaluators copies of current applicable SOPs.

AN The following objectives and exte:ntof play have been developed in contact with state and local organizations involved in emergency planning and response to Diablo Canyon Power Plant..

The Exercise Evaluation Areas and Criteria that will be demonstrated and evaluated during the Exercise will be limited to:

1.d.1 Communications Equipment 1.e.1 Equipiment and.,Scu-plies to Support Operations 3.a.1 Implementatior of Emnergency Worker Exposure Control 6.a.1 Monitoring and Decontarnination of Evacuees and Emergency Workers and tlhe Registration of Evacuees 6.c.1 Temporary Car'e of Evacuees 6.b.1 Monitoring anpd Decontamination of Emergency Worker Equipment (TQ be demonstrated on June 4, 2003)

The listed Evaluation Areas and sub-elements with the exceptions outlined within this extent of play will be demonstrated and evaluated on the morning of April 30, 2003 beginning at approximately 10:00 AM.

The October 23, 2002 Diablo Canyon Plume Phase exercise extent of play precipitated the evacuation of PAZs 1,2,4 ,and.5 in the, Federal EPZ and PAZ 9 in the State expanded EPZ.

03BOBiChorro obj&play April 7, 2003 f-shared 3-

COUNTY OF SAN LUIS OBISPO- EVACUEE MONITORING DECONTAMINATION CONGREGATE CARE &EMERGENCY WORKER &VEHICLE MONITORING &

DECONTAMINATION EXERCISE APRIL 30, 2003 OBJECTIVES AND EXTENT OF PLAY At the direction of the Emergency Services Director at the County Emergency Operations Center the aibtivation of evacuee reception and congregate care centers was requested and accormplished. The activation'and'staffing' of the Camp Roberts Evacuee Reception and Congregate, Care Ceniter'(Canmp Roberts) for this exercise will be accomplished through the combined effots of the'California National Guard at Camp Roberts, Diablo Canyon Power Plant, State Department of Health Services, the San Luis Obispo County Departments of Health, Social'Services and Behavioral Health al6ng' with the; American Red Cross and the ARES/RACES amateur radio organizatio Additional groups and individuals 'naybe utilized to assist the preceding organizations and 'to act as mock'evacuees for exercise purposes.

The extent of play will be driven by the associated Plans, SOPs, facilities, evaluation criteria and exercise management. The details of the'precursor October 23, 2002 plume phase exercise and sceriario 'have been submitted to FEMA as a separate document prior to that exercise and should be available for review. - -  :

Sequence of Play: ' ' ' '

Mock evacuee vehicles will enter the exercise 'area through tvhe Camp Roberts', North'Gate entrance and will queue up on the road prior to the vehicle rnonitoring station. Vehicles will proceed one at a time'through Vehicle Moriitbring where m6nitoring 'procedures for contaminated vehicles will be demonstrated by Diablo'Cariy6n Poer Plant These technicians will be following San Luis Obispo County (SLO) SOP, 111.06, HP-6.

A= = '.  ; - *- . . .- :.: .:'i ! *: .,.Vd,, ............................................  :-

Exercise vehicle monitors will demonstrate firnding a number of vehicles tobe contaminated.

Those designated contaminated vehicles and their occupants will be directed to park in the immediately adjacent, secured quarantine parking area,' Contaminated vehicle occupants will be briefed *and transpdrted by 'a 'designrated 'bus"'to thet Evacuee Monitoring and Decontamination facility.

Vehicles and their occupant mock evacuees designated as clean will be directed to drive from the vehicle monitoring'stationr along a designated. and marked roite' t6 the Evacuee Registration and Congregate Care'drea f6r monitoring' registration ,arid pro6essing.

Mock evacuees from vehicles designated as contaminated wilT be delivered to the Evacuee Monitoring and Decontamination facility where they will be directed through a'portable portal monitor. The demonstration of this facility set up, evacuee rmoniitooring' and decontamination will follow SLO SOP 111.06 -HP-7. Those monitored evacuees designated as contaminated will be directed into the decontamination building where they will be registered as monitored and decontaminated and then directed through the decontamination process including simulated showering and final monitoring. Evacuees that have'completed the dec6ntamination 'process and for those found not contaminated at the portal monitor, will be bussed by a separate clean vehicle to Evacuee Registration and Congregate Care for further processing.'."-,

'All evacuees arriving at Registration and QCongregate Care will individually pass through 4V a portable portal monitor to ensure no contaninrationr~reaches'the"Registration area.

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DECONTAMINATION EXERCISE AW APRIL 30, 2003 OBJECTIVES AND EXTENT OF PLAY A simulated detected contamination will be demonstrated at this pre Registration monitoring location and the individual will be directed to return to his/her vehicle and proceed back to the initial vehicle monitoring area and park in the vehicle quarantine lot. From this location the individual will be transported by the designated contaminated bus to the monitoring and decontamination facility for processing before returning to Evacuee Registration and Congregate Care.

Representatives from SLO County Social Services, Behavioral Health and the American Red Cross Shelter managers will demonstrate the procedures per SOPs for registration, processing and the administration of evacuee welfare and care'needs.

The monitoring of emergency workers for contamination will take place at each monitoring location and the decontamination if necessary will be at their location if possible or at the monitoring and decontamination facility.

Monitoring and decontamination of emergency workers and equipment, represented by a fire engine, will be demonstrated out of sequence at El Chorro Regional Park Camp Ground on June 4, 2003 at 10 AM.

Supporting Plan and Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for this exercise are the following:

SLO Couinty/Cities Nuclear Power Plant Emergency Response Plan

• Health )fic"erI'll.05, Em ergency Services Director 111.01

• HeaIVh P'hysic`SOP (HP).6,7,8,9,11

• Social Seivice'sSOP 111.07

• Ameripan Red Qros' SOP 111.23 4I -

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CONGREGATE CARE & EMERGENCY WORKER & VEHICLE'MONITORING & -

DECONTAMINATION EXERCISE ,'

o^ , ,APRIL 30, 2603 OBJECTIVES'AND EXTENT'OF PLAY EXERCISE FACILITIES AND FUNCTION LOCATIONS:

CAMP ROBERTS Exercise Location A Federal facility operated by the Califorrnia National Guard for troope,training and mobilization. The Camp is located approximately 45 rniles north of the Diablo Canyon Power Plant and outside of the'State Basic,Emergency Plannilng Zone .(BEPZ),

VEHICLE MONITORING AREA . .

Located inside the North Gate entrance (East Garrison' Exit off of Hwy 101) on G.

Street (near the "FMC Building"). This includes an open area with a large parking area for.

contaminated vehicles. DCPP personnel (in support of county operations) will demonstrate the vehicle monitoring function. ARES/RACES may have a person available for additional communications capability and assistance.,

EVACUEE MONITORING and DECONTAMINATION AREA Barracks building 6315 and 6316 on New Mexico Avenue ywill be used to demonstrate evacuee monitoring'and decontamination. Evacube from contaminated vehicles and contaminated evacuees detected at Registratin ,report to these barracks for monitoring' Alt and decontamination. DCPP personrnel (in support of cbunty6i perations) will demonstrate portal monitoring and monitoring throughp'ut-capability'av'eraging 6'persons per minute.

Additionally the use of hand held CDV-700.rm'nitors will be deri'o'nstrated. Public Health Nurses activated by the County Health Agdncy willbe responsible for decontamination functions inside the above barracks.

EVACUEE MONITORING AT REGISTRATION Is located just Prior to entering the Reception and Care Registration area at Building- 4008 (located at the corner' of Arizona'Blvd2.and Ave. 10) all 'evacuees' from clean vehicles will be monitored by DCPP personnel prior to Registration.- A throughput capability demonstration averaginrg six persons per minute will take place at this location at the beginning of the exercise (in support of county operations).

ADMINISTRATION BUILDING Building 4007 (located on Ave 10). The administration of Reception and Congregate Care functions will be demonstrated from this building. ' Functions performed in' this Administration Building will include:

• Shelter Manager "Health Services'(Nursing Supervisor)

• Personnel ' *Disaster:Welfare Inquiries

-Logistics -Communications

• ARES/RACES Back up Communications

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COUNTY OF SAN LUIS OBISPO- EVACUEE MONITORING DECONTAMINATION CONGREGATE CARE & EMERGENCY WORKER & VEHICLE MONITORING &.

DECONTAMINATION EXERCISE APRIL 30, 2003 OBJECTIVES AND EXTENT OF PLAY REGISTRATION BUILDING Building 4008. The registration function for evacuees will be demonstrated in this building.

Functions performed in the Registration Building include:

$ Registration $ Housing Assignmrients

$ First Aid ,$ Family Services BLOCK MANAGER HEADQUARTERS BUILDING Building 4121. The Block Manager Headquarters Building will house the Block Manager responsible for all barracks within the Block, a Block Nurse, and a Behavioral Health Counselor.

BARRACKS Buildings 4104, 4105 and 4106. The Barracks Manager is the only function demonstrated within these barracks.

DINING HALL Building 4101. The Feeding and Canteen Service functions will be demonstrated in this facility by the American Red Cross.

RECREATION HALL Building 4102- The second dining hall will be used by the Recreation Coordinator as an example of a shelter indoor recreation area.

EL CHORRO REGiONAL PARK CAMP GROUND MONITORING/

DECONTAMINATION FACILITY.

(Out of sequence) On June 4, 2003, at EI.Chorro Regional Park.Camp.Ground, located approximately one mile north of the County EOC on US Highway 1, the Monitoring and.

Decontamination of simulated contaminated emergency workers and vehicle (fire engine) will be demonstrated for Evaluation Criteria 6.b.1 beginning at 10 AM. Facility security will not be demonstrated.

SIMULATED EXERCISE FACILITIES No other emergency facilities will be demonstrated outside of Camp Roberts. For purposes of message delivery and information flow the following facilities will be simulated:

County Emergency Operations Center American Red Cross Chapter Headquarters Phone Assistance Center 03BOB/Chorro obj&play April 7, 2003 f-shared COUNTY OF SAN LUIS OBISPO- EVACUEE MONITORING DECONTAMINATION CONGREGATE CARE & EMERGENCY WORKER & VEHICLE MONITORING &

DECONTAMINATION EXERCISE' 09% APRIL 30, 2003 OBJECTIVES AND EXTENT OF PLAY TRAINING ACTIVITIES OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THIS EXERCISE`

The California National-Guard command staff at Ca'mp Roberts will take advantage of the civilian exercise being'held at their facility by opening'the'Camp Ermirgency Operations'Center (EOC): During the FEMA Evaluated E ercise'the' Camp'EOC will conduct a parallel dill and training to exercise their new EOC facility' a'nd its staff. The Guard activities are nota part of the DCPP / County Evaluated Exercise, However, some incidental interaction and communications will take place to lend a-dditional -exerbise sre'alit' and stretch incident management skills. ' -

ARESIRACES COMMUNICATIONS activities'rmay include exercising and training activities that will include portable packet radio and the testing of equipment remote from the exercise site; This'is an 6ppoitunity t'opractic'ewith'the expan'ded con'imu nicatiohs capabili'tythatwould be available in a real event. Every'effort 'will be made toeensure the'independent no'n-NPP exercise ARES/RACES activities do not affect exercise play- -

EXCEPTIONS TO EXTENT OF PLAY:- : . '  ;' - ' '

The following exceptions are proposed as part of the Extent-of Play and agreement by FEMA Region IX'staff is requested. - ' '- ' i ' *- -U . ;. '

1 . SET UP: --.;'.-I; wi i-'; -';

The exercise will be run with all facilities' set'up ini advance. Set up of the De'contaminiation area facilities will be done at the March 26orientation aed dress rehearsal; Mock evacuees will be cued in their vehicles at the north gate (Garrison Road entrance) prior to the start of the exercise. Upon' determination by the iLdd tontr6ller, in coordinati ntvith' the" FEMA evaluation'team leadership 'and facility controlIers the exercise will start.'

2. EXERCISE TIME LINE'  : ' " . .. . ' .,

The scenario 'time line from' thea Ortober 23, 2002 exercise has been"'modified to accommodate exercise management. The estimated start time'of the Camp Roberts Exercise will be approximately' 10:00 AM 6n April 30, 2003.' ' ' - '"

3. OFF SITE SIGNAGE. -'-' -- '-

Cal Trans will'not set up signing on the' Highway to identify entrance gates'bbecause'of Cal Trans regulations restricting the use of highway signing for non emergency activity. Cal Trans highway signing' and traffic managment capabilities' were e'Val tlated by interview on October 24, 2002. ' -' - '  ;---

4. VEHICLEVMONITORING- '

n Procedures for vehicle'monitors at Camp Roberts identify large area swipes'for screening of A contaminated'vehicles. Vehicle monitors will not monitor air filters, engine compartments or 03BOB/Chorro obj&play April 7, 2003 f-shared

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DECONTAMINATION EXERCISE APRIL 30, 2003 OBJECTIVES AND EXTENT OF PLAY other interior areas of the car. The concept of operations is that if exterior contamination is discovered, the car is parked in the "contaminated vehicle parking" area and left there until sufficient resources are available to do follow-up monitoring and decontamination. The plan identifies this as a recovery issue. Procedure 111.06, HP-6 covering this. procedure also identifies that security is provided for the "contaminated vehicle" area, however this will not be demonstrated.

5. EVACUEE MONITORING Decon. Area (Build. 6315 and 6316).

The SOP layout calls for separate monitoring stations outside of each Decon barracks. For this exercise two portal monitors will be set up outside one representative barracks building.

One will be in use and the other will serve as back-up. For the exercise, male and females will not be segregated and will enter the same representative Decon Barracks. Persons who are monitored in the Decon area are registered by Public Health staff.

NOTE: THIS ONLY REGISTERS THE.PERSON AS HAVING BEEN MONITORED AT THE DECONTAMINATION AREA. REGISTRATION FOR CONGREGATE CARE TAKES PLACE AT THE REGISTRATION. BUILDING 4008.':.

6. DECONTAMINATION CENTER Decontamination barracks (Build; 6315 and 6316)

Prccedures call for establishing separate male and female decontamination facilities. One representative barracks /;building wil be.established and. in use during this exercise.

Evacuees that are monitored at the Decontamination Center are registered by Public Health personnel solely to document evacuees that have been monitored, and if necessary, decontaminated. Registration for.the Congregate Care takes place in Registration Building 4008.

Nasal swabs are only required at the discretion or direction of the County Health Officer. This procedure will not be.demrnstrated during this exercise. No evacuees will disrobe, shower nor be directed to don alternate clothing duringthis exercise.

7. MONITORING.-ATRECEPTION AND CONGREGATE CARE AREA (Outside Reception" Build. 4008).

Two portal monitors will be set up with one in use and the other serving as back-up. Monitors at this location do not register evacuees. Evacuees are instructed to enter the Registration Building where Social Services and ARC register people using the appropriate forms. All evacuees registering at this location will first be monitored.

8. EMERGENCY WORKER EXPOSURE CONTROL (EWEC)

Only monitoring and decon functions will use EWEC equipment and procedures. The Evacuee or Emergency Worker Decon Center Manager is the site EWEC manager and instructs workers in accordance with SOP HP-7, Guide 2 and HP-1 1. Knowledge and use of EWEC

) equipment, forms, procedures and management will be demonstrated in buildings 6315 and 6316. Reporting exposures to the Health Agency Operations Center will be simulated.

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COUNTY OF SAN LUIS'OBISPO- EVACUEE MONITORING DECONTAMINATION CONGREGATE CARE & EMERGENCY WORKER & VEHICLE MONITORING &

DECONTAMINATION EXERCISE APRIL 30, 2003 OBJECTIVES AND EXTENT OF PLAY

9. NUMBER OF EVACUEES AND VEHICLES The population evacuee numbers' are drawnfro'rni the 2002 Wilbur Smith Evac uation Times Study. This document has been provided earlier. The estimated maximum population from the-Federal EPZ' (PAZs 1,-2,3,4,5) that could evacuate north- to, Camp Roberts is 22,787.

Twenty percent of this number is4,557.§This number does not include school populations as they are moved early in the emergency and do not go to Camp Roberts. Portal monitoring at a rate of 7 seconds per evacuee per portal monitor at a 50 minute monitor operation time per hour, 429 evacuees could be processed per monitoring unit per hour. At the 429/ hour rate, 5,143 evacuees' per portal monitor could be monitored in a .12hour period. This capacity exceeds the required evacuee processing rate and additionally is based on conservative monitoring processing times. The result is that I portal monitor is needed at the Camp Roberts facility to monitor twenty percent of the population in a1 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> timeframe. However 2 portal monitors at separate locations on April 30,' at Camp Roberts and 1 unit at El Chorro will be dernonstrated,'each portal monitor unit will have a second monitor setup as a backup.

At 2.7 evacuees per vehicle some 1,688 vehicles would arrive at Camp Roberts for monitoring in a 12 h6ur'p6riod.' 'It-is estimated that 3'minutes is required pervehicle to monitor. One representative evacuee vehicle monitoring procedure will be demonstrated for evaluation.'

10. SPECIAL NEEDS POPULATIONS '- ' "-;" .

The Camp Roberts facility is nbt'well:suited for handling special n'eeds:'populations, Including mobility handicapped'individuals. Person's requiring -special needs attention or handicapped facilities are monitored and registered at the Camp Roberts Facilities and -then assigned to another facility off of the' Camp Roberts premises in accordance with standard ARC procedures. Through mutual aid 'channelsi during real emergencies supplemental resources to accommodate larger numbers-of 'special needs populations, including the addition of ramps and railings would be acquired.

11. MONITORING AND DECONTAMINATION OF EMERGENCY-WORKERS &

EMERGENCY WORKER EQUIPMENT I VEHICLES.: , - . ;'  ;

The demonstration of Evaluation Criteria 6.b.1 Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Worker Equipment will be conducted oat of.sequence'frorm-.the?'Apdril,30, '2003-Exercise on June 4, 2003. This demonstration will be at the County.El Chorro:-Reg'ional Park Camp Ground at 10:00 AM. The monitoring of two and decontamination of one County fire engine is representative of contaminated equipment and vehicles and will take place in a blacktop and dirt roadway area just east of the camp ground showering facility: This area and shower building serve as an Emergency Worker Decontamination Facility. A minimum of two emergency workers will be monitored and decontamination simulated. The setup of this demonstration may be evaluated; however this is an 'active showering facility,for the camp ground and public' usage will be considered. - . -

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t .  : . ,. e e  : -' # . *-:....*. . .*E

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DECONTAMINATION EXERCISE 01 APRIL 30, 2003 OBJECTIVES AND EXTENT OF PLAY TERMINATION OF EXERCISE FOR EMERGENCY EVENTS The Drill Director may terminate the exercise should emergency conditions occur that require the attention of exercise participants, controllers or evaluators.

Special activities or security concerns~that may arise at or potentially significantly impact Camp Roberts and or its staff may preempt the exercise.

The Drill Director will. make, a reasonable atterhpf to coordinate planned or emergency Exercise termination with key exercise evaluators, managers and participant representatives.

EXTENT OF PLAY AGREEMENT The Final Objectives and Extent of Play will be reviewed and approved by FEMA Region IX staff. The Extent of Play identifies the extent of demonstration by Evaluation Criteria. This Objectives and Extent of Play package constitutes the agreed upon FEMA REP Evaluation Criteria and sub-elements and.the level of participation and demonstration for this exercise.

It is requested that all areas of this exercise demonstration be subject to immediate feedback and correction under REP Initiative guidelines. On approval of this Extent of Play and demonstration Evaluation Criteria, any subsequent FEMA request to modify or expand the scope of the Extent ofPlay or ,Criteria must be made prior to March 25, 2003.

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t

. . . .I 03BOB/Chorro obj&play April 7, 2003 f-shared COUNTY OF SAN LUIS OBISPO- EVACUEE MONITORING DECONTAMINATION CONGREGATE CARE & EMERGENCY WORKER & VEHICLE MONITORING &

DECONTAMINATION EXERCISE -

col APRIL 30, 2003 OBJECTIVES AND EXTENT OF'PLAY FEMA EXERCISE EVALUATION CRITERIA THAT WILL BE DEMONSTRATED CRITERIA NUREG Evaluation Criteria Description and Demonstration

'0654.- - 5 1.d.1 F.1.,2 Communications Eq'uipment - At lea'st two communications systems are available, 'at least dne-operates properly, and communications links are 'established ard main'tained with appropriate locations.

Commnunications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations.

The ORO demonstrated on October 23, 2002 simulated communications to the Camp Roberts site by-telephone and ARES

' RACES backup radio cominunications.:

On April 30,'2003 primrary intra and intercommunications will-be by

'telephone and fa'x using' the 'Camp R6berts PtX system Connected to the public telephone systen Hand held'radioi will be used in the field between the various functioiaJ areas and'vXithidfin`tional groups during the'exercise. ' - J.. '--

Secondary communications would b6 by County orlagency radios, pagers and cell or satellite phones' ndtthis ivii rinot bedemonstrated except as above....

Alternate orbackup communications will be demonstrated by the ARES/RACES amate6r radio contingent centered in Congregate Care Administration, building 4008.'

Telephone communications to and fromo the simulated County EOC, Phone Assistance Center, ARC Chapter EOC and other off Base location's will be answered or received from the exercise Sim Cell located in building 4008. ' '

1.e.1 H,J.10.a Equipment and Suppliesto Support Operations - Equipment, maps, b.e.f.j.k, displays,'dosimetry, potassium iodide (KI), and other supplies are 11 ,K.3.a sufficient'to support e rerg'ency operations.

Camp Roberts is approximately 45 miles from DCPP and well beyond the Federal and expanded State Emergency Planning Zone, it is not in the Diablo Canyon prevailing down wind sector and is separated by a mountain range. Emergency Worker Exposure . Control (EWEC) equipment will be issued for workers in the areas of Monitoring and Decontamination, designated bus drivers and those who by assignment may come in contact with potentially contaminated persons, possessions or equipment. Adequate numbers of CDV-138 SRDs, current TLDs and KI along with recording and reporting procedures will be demonstrated by a representative of DCPP monitors and Public Health Nurses.

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COUNTY OF SAN LUIS OBISPO- EVACUEE MONITORING DECONTAMINATION CONGREGATE CARE & EMERGENCY WORKER & VEHICLE MONITORING &

DECONTAMINATION EXERCISE APRIL 30, 2003 OBJECTIVES AND EXTENT OF PLAY 1.e.1 State DHS will follow local EWEC policy where applicable.

The Decontamination Center Manager from County Public Health is the responsible on site EWEC coordinator and will supervise the distribution and collection of logs and dosimneters.

Knowledge of the mission or administrative exposure limit of 10OOmR and a contamination threshold limit of 200 counts per minute above background on a CDV 700 monitor will be demonstrated. In addition to CDV700 portable hand held monitors. St. Gobain TPM-903 or SAIC PPM-IOOA Portable. Portal Monitora. will be used at Evacuee Monitoring and Decon and at Registration (refer to PG&E procedure RCP EM-19 and -18).

At this time the State and Local Plans do not require the distribution of potassium iodide (KI) for the general public at Evacuee Centers and will not be demonstrated The facilities will be set up on March 26. This will simulate the actual setup.of the facilities that would occurprior to the arrival of evacuees. All necessary materials, equipment, signs, barricades, hand outs. and staff will be in piacq. ard. the facility activated as was reported in the October 23, 2002 Exercjse..

3.a.1 K.3.a,b Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control -The OROs issue, appropriate dosimetry and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to emergency .workers in accordance with the plans and procedures. Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart.

The. abqyewill.be cdemonstratedby Eerqiseplay or by interview.

Applicabl! SOPs include Emergency Services Director 111.01, County Health Officer HP/111.05, 111-06, HP 7, 8, 9, 11.

The County Emergency Services Director and Health Officer are primary decision makers with the EOC EWEC Desk coordinating information to and from the field and the Health Department Evacuation Center Monitoring and Decontamination Manager managing the site EWEC procedures.

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. . I , , I COUNTY OF SAN LUIS OBISPO-:EVACUEE MONITORING DECONTAMINATION:

CONGREGATE CARE'& EMERGENCY-WORKER & VEHICLE MONITORING &:

DECONTAMINATION EXERCISE APRIL 30, 2003 OBJECTIVES AND EXTENT OF PLAY-6.a.1 J.10.h,12' Monitoring and Decontamination of Evacuees and Emergency K.5.b Workers and the' Registration of Evacuees The (Camp Roberts Evacuee)' reception center'/ (El 'Chorro Park Emergency Worker) facilitly has appropriate space, adequate resources, 'and trained personnel to provide monitoring' decontam ination and registration of evacuees and or emergency workers (and vehicles).

Referto Sequeuice of'Play', Facilities and Function Description and Exceptions to1Extent of Play along'with SOPs 11-06,HP-6,7,8,9 and Social Services 111.07 "and American'Red Cross 111.23, for facility description, set up and procedure details related to this criteria "dembnstration.i Diablo persoinel perform set up 'and vehicle vCanyonmonitoring, portal monitoring at Monitoring and-Decontamination and at the Registration and Congregate 'Care area portal monitor, along with self monitoring for contamination following'County-SOP 111.06,HP-6 and 7. Emergency Workhrhersonnel, equipme'nt and vehicle monitoring follow HP-6, 8 and 9 Public Health Nurses set ;up '-and c6oduct evacuee and emergency worker monitoring and decontaminaation -using' procedures in SOP ll.06,HP-7,9 and 11.

.County 'Social Services 'uses SOP 111.07 -and is responsible for but

.reqiuests the Amneican Red Cros's's'recquested Congregate Care Center Managers'at Camp Roberts.' ARC wi-ll dembhstrate setup and operation procedures outlined in'ARC SOP 111.23. -

County Fire personnel willns't tip and operate Emergency Worker and

Worker Equipment/ Vehicle De6on'at El Chobrro Camp Ground on June 4, using HP-6,8 and 9. ' -

Referto Exception to Extent of Play, 9. Evacuee Numbers forevacuee numbers and throughpuit potential. 'Diablomonmitors will also demonstrate the required monitoring capability of a-ininm'um'average of six evacuees per minute. ' '  ; 'i 6.c.1 J.10.h,'12 Temporary Care of Evacuees - Managers-of congregate care facilities demonstrate that the centers have resources'to provide services and accommodations consistent with American Red Cross planning guidelines (found in MASS CARE-Preparedness Operations, ARC 3031). Managers demonstrate the procedures to assure that evacuees have been monitored for contamination and have been decontaminated as appropriate prior to entering congregate care facilities.

The American Red Cross as Congregate Care Center Manager will demonstrate by play and or interview Center setup and operation following SOP 111.23 including requirements of ARC 3031.

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DECONTAMINATION EXERCISE APRIL 30, 2003 OBJECTIVES AND EXTENT OF PLAY 6.c.1 County Social Services and Behavioral Health in support and assistance of Congregate Care will demonstrate procedures in County SOP 111.07 6.b.1 K.5.b Monitoring and Decontamination of Emergency Worker Equipment-The facility/ORO has adequate procedures and resources for the accomplishment of monitoring and decontamination of emergency worker equipment including vehicles.

These Criteria will be demonstrated out of sequence on June 4, 2003 at County El Chorro Regional Park Camp Ground, in an area adjacent to the camp ground shower facilities beginning at 1OAM.

Referto Exercise Facilities and Functional Locations and Exception to Extent of Play, 11.

County Fire personnel and equipment will demonstrate procedures addressing this criteria following County SOPs 111-06,HP 6,8 and 9 including monitoring, decontamination, EWEC procedures and knowledge of administrative exposure limits, contamination threshold values and EWEC procedures. Any interview questions should be addressed to the decontamination facility manager. Questions should address procedural implementation issues and not hypothetical decision making situations.

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APPENDIX 4.

EXERCISE SCENARIO This appendix is a summary of the simulated sequence of events.-- Scenario -- which was used as the basis for invoking emergency response actions by OROs in the Diablo Canyon Power Plant Off-site Camp Roberts Drill on April 30, 2003, and the El Chorro Drill on June 4, 2003.This scenario was submitted by the Diablo Canyon Power Plant and San Luis Obispo County and approved by FEMA RLX.

Requests for copies of the scenario should be made to the Diablo Canyon Power Plant.

are, ..

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9 5.0 SCENARIO 5.1 NARRATIVE

SUMMARY

The 2003 Camp Roberts'Congr'egate Care Exercise is a'continuation of the 2002 DCPP Gradedi Exercise.

Due to the severity of this accident, a General Emergency has been declared. San" Luis Obispo County Direction and Control has mandated the evacuation of the following Protective Action Zones (PAZs):

PAZ #1- 0-2 mile radius from the Diablo Canyon Power Plant.

PAZ #2 - 2-6 mile radius frorrf the 'Diablo Canyon Power Plant.'

PAZ #5 - Baywood Park,'Los'Osos, Turi Road, Los Osos Valley Road west of Turri Road,

-Clark Valley.

PAZ #9 - Route 1 west of Cuesta College, Morro Bay, Cayucos, Whale Rock Reservoir.

Camp Roberts has been activated, and the' support personnel from the County and American Red Cross are ready to receive evacuees.

The timeline of the 2002 Annual Exercise has been modified to accommodate the performance of this exercise (See Section 5.3 Timeline).

5.2 INITIAL CONDITIONS A series of terrorist attacks werecommitted this morning against Diablo Canyon. Ultimately, a loss of coolant accident '(LOCA) occurred, complicated by a loss of all vital power, which resulted in significant core damage in the Unit-1 reactor. A pressure increase inside containment following the LOCA-has resulted in a' breach of containment. integrity, and radioactive gases and fission products are being released to the environment via the Unit-1 plant vent. At this point San Luis Obispo County Reception & Care Centers are activated, and Department 'of Social Services (DSS) advises 'that Camp Roberts will be opened to receive evacuees.

5.3 TIMELINE -

An overview of the events leading up to the evacuation of the public has been described in section 5.1. The following timeline is provided to detail the actions taken by San Luis Obispo County, the American Red Cross-San Luis Obispo Chapter, and the California National Guard at Camp Roberts. The underlined times listed below follow the timeline of the 2002 Exercise, developed from scenario events along with actual player response times. The modified times for purposes of this Congregate Care Exercise are bolded in the right column.

April 30, 2003 - Camp Roberts Exercise 5.0 - I

5.0 SCENARIO 5.3 TIMELINE continued Annual Cong. Care Exercise Exercise Times Times 2002 2003 0254 - 2:40 Alert #29 declared due to a bomb being found and Shift Manager judgment 0925 - 4:12 Loss of 230kV Startup Power due to car bomb.

0945- 4:32 Loss of 500kV transmission line to DCPP due to airplane attack on substation.

10-16 5:03 Site Area Emergency (SAE) #17 is declared based on RM judgement.

- 5:22 A second device detonates, causing a loss of high pressure cooling pumps 10.12 - 5:04 EOC decision for activation of Congregate Care Center.

a1125 - 6:12 Camp Roberts is open for ARC and DSS to set up for evacuees.

1210 - 6:57 Design Basis Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) occurs, and containment purge valves fail due to high containment pressure, resulting in release path to plant vent. Fuel damage is occurring and a high level radioactive release is now in progress.  :

1214 - 7:01 A General: Emergency is declared due to LOCA with high containment radiation levels.

1215 - 7:02 Recommendation for evacuation of PAZs 1 & 2 submitted to' Emergency Services Director located in County Direction & Control.

1220 7:07 Direction & Control issues a PAD to evacuate PAZ 1 & 2.

133)0 - 7:51 Dose projection indicate TEDE PAG (1 rem) exceeded in PAZs 1, 2, 5 and 9; a dose-based PAR upgrade is formulated and approved by for evacuation of these zones.

1338 - 7:57 Direction & Control issues a PAD to evacuate PAZs 5 & 9.

1405 - 8:52 San Luis Obispo Department of Social Services (DSS) advises that Camp Roberts will be opened to receive evacuees.

1435 - 9:22 California Highway Patrol closes off north and southbound traffic on highway 101 (north of Camp Roberts and south of Five cities area).

151 - 10:00 Camp Roberts is ready to receive evacuees.

April 30, 2003 - Camp Roberts Exercise 5.0 -2

5.0' SCENARIO *. .

5.1 NARRATIVE

SUMMARY

The 2003 El Chorro Regional Park Exercise isa continuation of the 2002 Graded E~ercise.

Due to the severity of this'accident,' ar General- Eergency hasbendcad.SnLs

.bispoCounty Command -has mandated 'the evacuation -of the following'-Protective Action

'Zones (PAZs):

PAZ #1 - 0-2 mnile radius frm the"Diablo Canyon Power Plant.

PAZ #2 -. 2-6 mile radius from the Diablo Canyon Power Plant.

PAZ #5,-. Baywood Park -Los" Osos,r Turn -Road, Los Osos Valley Road -west of Turrn

• .Road; Clark Valley.~ .. . '

PAZ #9 - Route 1 west of C6,st'a 'C~olle ge, Morro'Bay,, Cayucos, Whale Rock Reservoir.

El Chorro Regional Park has been' activated 'and the support ,personnel from the County and PG&E are rea'dy to receiv'e emergency workers ~and~ thei'r work vYehicles.

The timeline of the '2002 Graded -Exercise~ Thai beet) modified to accommodate the

performance of this exercise (See Section 53 Timeline.)1-r'7a June 4, 2003 - El Chorro Regional Park Exercise . .5.0 -2

5.0 SCENARIO 5.2 INITIAL CONDMONS A series of terrorist attacks were committed this morning against Diablo Canyon. Ultimately, a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) occurred, complicated by a loss of all vital power, which resulted in significant core damage in the Unit-1 reactor. A pressure increase inside containment following the LOCA has resulted in a breach of containment integrity, and radioactive gases and fission products are being released to the environment via the Unit-1 plant vent. At this point San Luis Obispo County Reception & Care Centers are activated, and Department of Social Services (DSS) advises that Camp Roberts will be opened to receive evacuees.

5.3 TIMELINE An overview of the events leading up to the evacuation of the public has been described in section 5.1. The following timeline is provided to detail the actions taken by San Luis Obispo County, the American Red Cross-San Luis Obispo Chapter, and the California National Guard at Camp Roberts. The underlined times listed below follow the timeline of the 2002 Exercise, developed from scenario events along with actual player response times. The modified times for purposes of this Congregate Care Exercise are bolded in the right column.

5.3 TIMELINE continued Annual Cong. Care Exercise Exercise Times Times 2002 2003 0254 - 2:40 Alert #29 declared due to a bomb being found and Shift Manager judgment 0925 - 4:12 Loss of 230kV Startup Power due to car bomb.

0945- 4:32 Loss of 500kV transmission line to DCPP due to airplane attack on substation.

1016 - 5:03 Site Area Emergency (SAE) #17 is declared based on RM judgement.

122 - 5:22 A second device detonates, causing a loss of high pressure cooling pumps 1012 - 5:04 EOC decision for activation of Congregate Care Center.

1125 - 6:12 Camp Roberts is open for ARC and DSS to set up for evacuees.

12 - 6:57 Design Basis Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) occurs, and containment purge valves fail due to high containment pressure, resulting in release path to plant vent. Fuel damage is occurring and a high level radioactive release is now in progress.

12.14 - 7:01 A General Emergency is declared due to LOCA with high containment radiation levels.

June 4, 2003 - El Chorro Regional Park Exercise 5.0 - 3

I I .  ::t

.5.0. .SCENARIO . . .. . .

1215- 7:02 Recommendation for evacuation of PAZs 1 & 2 submitted to Emergency Services Director located in County Direction & Control.

1220 - 7:07 Direction & Control issues a PAD to evacuate PAZ 1 & 2.

1330 - 7:51 Dose projection indicate TEDE PAG (1 rem) exceeded in PAZs 1, 2, 5 and 9; a dose-based PAR upgrade is formulated and approved by for evacuation of these zones.

. - . I 1338 - :57 Direction & Control issues a PAD to evacuate PAZs 5 & 9.

1405 - 8:52 San Luis Obispo Department of Social Services (DSS) advises that Camp Roberts will be opened to receive evacuees.

1435 - 9:22 California Highway Patrol closes off north and southbound traffic on highway 101 (north of Camp Roberts and south of Five cites area).

1513 - 10:00 El Chorro Regional Park is ready to receive Emergency Workers and their work vehicles.

f . . - -

, I I I I .. , ., . . ,,,

June 4, 2003 - El Chorro Regional Park Exercise 5.0- 4