ML043310339

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Letter from Sarah Hofmann Enclosing the Vermont Department of Public Service Reply to Answer of Applicant to the Department'S Request for Leave to File a New Contention
ML043310339
Person / Time
Site: Vermont Yankee File:NorthStar Vermont Yankee icon.png
Issue date: 11/17/2004
From: Hoffmann S
State of VT, Dept of Public Service
To:
NRC/SECY/RAS
Byrdsong A T
References
50-271-OLA, ASLBP 04-832-02-OLA, RAS 8893
Download: ML043310339 (28)
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Text

Ifl5. 5 93 112 STATE STREET FAX: (802) 828-2342 DRAWER 20 'TY (VT): 1-800-734-8390 MONTPELIER VT 05620-2601 e-mail: vtdpsepsd.state.vt.us TEL: (802) 828-2811 Internet: http://www.state.v:.us/psd DOCKETED USNRC STATE OF VERMONT DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SERVICE November 17, 2004 (3:43pm)

OFFICE OF SECRETARY RULEMAKINGS AND ADJUDICATIONS STAFF November 17, 2004 Office of the Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 Attention: Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff Re: Docket No. 50-271 -

ASLBP No. 04-832-02-OLA Extended Power Uprate at Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station

Dear Sir/Madam:

Please find enclosed for filing an original and two copies of the Vermont Department of Public Service Reply to Answer of Applicant to the Department's Request for Leave to File a New Contention, Affidavit of William K. Sherman, Exhibit 40, Exhibit List, and Certificate of Service.

If you have any questions about this filing, please call me at 802-828-3088. Thank you for your assistance in making this filing.

Very truly yours, Sarah Hofman&'

Special Counsel cc: As per Certificate of Service 74emp late -sac /-o0l

Alex S. Karlin, Chair* Raymond Shadis*

Administrative Judge Staff Technical Advisor Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel New England Coalition Mail Stop T-3F23 P.O. Box 98 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Edgecomb, ME 04556 Washington, DC 20555-0001 Anthony Z. Roisman, Esq.*

Dr. Anthony J. Baratta* National Legal Scholars Law Firm Administrative Judge 84 East Thetford Rd.

Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Lyme, NH 03768 Mail Stop T-3F23 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Brooke Poole, Esq.*

Washington, DC 20555-0001 Robert Weisman, Esq.*

Marisa Higgins, Esq.

  • Lester S. Rubenstein* Office of the General Counsel Administrative Judge Mail Stop 0-15 D21 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop T-3F23 Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 Office of the Secretary*

ATTN: Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff Mail Stop: 0-16C1 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 Office of Commission Appellate Adjudication Mail Stop: O-16C1 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 John M. Fulton, Esq.*

Assistant General Counsel Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.

440 Hamilton Avenue White Plains, NY 10601 Jay E. Silberg, Esq.*

Matias Travieso-Diaz, Esq.*

Shaw Pittman, LLP 2300 N St., NW Washington, DC 20037-1128

DOCKETED USNRC November 17, 2004 (3:43pm)

UNITED STATES OFFICE OF SECRETARY NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION RULEMAKINGS AND ADJUDICATIONS STAFF BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of )

) Docket No. 50-271 ENTERGY NUCLEAR VERMONT )

YANKEE LLC AND ENTERGY NUCLEAR )

OPERATIONS, INC. ) ASLBP No. 04-832-02-OLA (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station) )

VERMONT DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SERVICE REPLY TO ANSWER OF APPLICANT TO THE DEPARTMENT'S REQUEST FOR LEAVE TO FILE A NEW CONTENTION INTRODUCTION After a careful review of the proposed Sixth Contention and with the benefit of substantial knowledge of the technical and safety issues raised by the proposed contention, the NRC Staff has concluded that it "does not oppose the admission of DPS's late-filed contention".

Not surprisingly given Applicant's interests in the proceeding, Applicant is adamantly opposed to the admission of the Department of Public Service's ("DPS") Sixth Contention. Because the NRC Staff does not oppose the admission of the DPS Sixth Contention, this Reply only addresses the Applicant's arguments.

The DPS Contention 6 meets all the criteria for admission and all the criteria for admission as a late-filed contention. Applicant's contrary arguments contain distortions of the facts and misrepresentations of the arguments advanced by DPS, and should not prevail.

Vermont Department of Public Service Reply to Answer of Applicant to DPS Request for Leave to File New Contention NRC Docket No. 50-271 ASLBP No. 04-832-02-OLA Page 2 of 8 RELEVANT LEGAL STANDARDS The Department addressed the relevant legal standard for the filing of contentions in its Reply to Answers of Applicant and Staff filed October 7, 2004, and at Oral Argument in this proceeding on October 21 and 22, 2004 in Brattleboro, Vermont. In addition the DPS addressed the criteria for the filing of new contentions pursuant to 10 CFR §2.309(f)(2) in its Request for Leave to File a New Contention. The Department relies on and incorporates by reference these previous recitations of the relevant legal framework.

ARGUMENT DPS Contention 6 states:

The Application for Amendment, Including All Supplements Thereto, Fails To Comply With 10 CFR 50 Appendix R, Specific Requirements, Paragraph L(2)(b) Because It Does Not Verify The Assumption, Used For Purposes of the Safe Shutdown Capability Analysis (SSCA), that the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System Can Be Made Operable In Sufficient Time To Permit The Operator To Perform the Required Actions Before Core Uncovery.

Applicant asserts that DPS Contention 6 does not identify a genuine issue in dispute, that it lacks a factual and legal basis, and does not entitle DPS to any relief. The extent to which Applicant is forced to stretch facts and mischaracterize arguments advanced by DPS in making its assertions, is evidence of their lack of merit. DPS Contention 6 identifies a genuine disputed issue that has a factual and legal basis, and would entitle DPS to relief.

Vermont Department of Public Service Reply to Answer of Applicant to DPS Request for Leave to File New Contention NRC Docket No. 50-271 ASLBP No. 04-832-02-OLA Page 3 of 8 A. DPS Proposed Contention 6 Identifies a Genuine Issue in Dispute Applicant contends that there is no real dispute, because Applicant has promised it will verify that it meets the regulatory time frames for taking certain actions, and thus no dispute exists. Applicant equates a commitment to perform verification with actually fulfilling the regulatory requirement. Applicant ignores the fact that the regulation in question, 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, L(2)(b) calls not for an assertion that verification will be performed but a demonstration by the Applicant that a safe shutdown will occur. Applicant concedes it has not yet conducted the necessary testing to demonstrate that a safe shutdown will occur. It is not clear that Applicant will be able to verify that operators can take the necessary actions to prevent core uncovery. The commitment to perform a verification does not equate to a satisfactory result being found in such a verification.

Performing a verification is not the end in itself If it were certain the verification would confirm the outcome, there would be no need for a verification in the first place. It is the results of a verification that are controlling, not that a verification is promised in the future. Certainly based on its initial uprate application filing, Applicant thought it had the bases to verify that operator action could be taken in sufficient time to prevent core uncovery, but it turned out Applicant was wrong as evidenced initially by the need to file Supplement 17 (DPS Exhibit 38) on September 30,2004, and now shown to be a result of the August 2004 NRC Engineering

Vermont Department of Public Service Reply to Answer of Applicant to DPS Request for Leave to File New Contention

-NRCDocket No. 50-271 ASLBP No. 04-832-02-OLA Page 4 of 8 Team Inspection (Preliminary Results attached hereto as Exhibit DPS-40' and only available since the DPS filed its Request for Leave to File a New Contention). In this instance, although the Applicant will perform a verification in the future, it is necessary to see if the verification process was properly conducted and to see if it demonstrates compliance with the regulatory standard. Until and unless that process is properly and favorably completed, a genuine dispute exists regarding Applicant's ability to comply with applicable regulations 2.

B. DPS Contention 6 Has a Firm Factual and Legal Basis that the Applicant seeks to Obfuscate Applicant bases its argument that the Contention has no factual or legal basis by use of a disingenuous argument.. It takes the plain meaning of the Applicant's Supplement to its application and uses distortions to attempt to show it does not prove the point being made by DPS. After correctly quoting from the DPS filing ("'Applicant has now withdrawn the bases upon which it assumedoperatoraction could be taken to prevent core uncovery.' DPS Request at 2" (emphasis added here))(App. Opp. at 6), Applicant mischaracterizes this as a claim that it has withdrawn its "Application"(id. at 6-7). To buttress its rebuttal to this distortion of the DPS argument, Applicant underscores the language in Supplement 17 (Exhibit DPS-38) which self-

'Exhibit DPS-40: Letter to Jay Thayer of Entergy from Wayne Lanning of the NRC dated November 5, 2004, "Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station - Preliminary Results of the August 2004, Engineering Team Inspection" 2 Once the verification is completed, and assuming on its face it demonstrates compliance, there may be still be issues related to the verification process itself. There not only has to be a verification, but a properly conducted verification that would lead one to have confidence in the results.

Vermont Department of Public Service Reply to Answer of Applicant to DPS Request for Leave to File New Contention NRC Docket No. 50-271 ASLBP No. 04-832-02-OLA Page 5 of 8 servingly asserts that the Supplement "does not change the scope or conclusions in the original application" (App. Opp. at 7). Thus, Applicant attempts to mislead this Board into believing that DPS has argued that the "Application" was withdrawn when, in fact, DPS only claims, and Applicant does not rebut, that the bases for the assumption used to prove compliance with RCIC operation requirements have been withdrawn. Applicant's only arguments are made against its distorted view of DPS's contention. The interests ofjustice are not well served by an Applicant that so vigorously advocates its position that it mischaracterizes an opponent's position.

As is plain on the face of Supplement 17 .(Exhibit DPS-38) Applicant is withdrawing and changing the assumptions that went into the calculated time frames to core uncovery as a result of extended power uprate. Failing to address that language explicitly, Applicant points to boiler plate language3 that appears in similar form in virtually all the Supplements filed by.Applicant to show that it did not "withdraw" or "revise" its Application. Such characterizations of the filing provide no basis to reject the clear import of the filing. Applicant would not. have filed Supplement 17 if it did not perceive a problem which needed correction. Whether it is called a withdrawal, revision, or amendment the plain meaning of Supplement 17 is that a problem existed with Safe Shutdown Capability Analysis, which was also discovered by the NRC 3 Similar language appears in almost all the Supplements filed by Applicant: "This supplement to the license amendment request provides additional information to update Entergy's application for a license amendment and does not change the scope of conclusions in the original application, nor does it change Entergy's determination of no significant hazards consideration." In some instances the "additional information" language is not included in the boiler plate statement.

Vermont Department of Public Service Reply to Answer of Applicant to DPS Request for Leave to File New Contention NRC Docket No. 50-271 ASLBP No. 04-832-02-OLA Page 6 of 8 Inspection Team (See Exhibit DPS-40), associated with the initiation of a RCIC from alternate shutdown panels. To Applicant's credit, it is trying to find a solution to the problem and a proposed solution is contemplated in Supplement 17. It should not cloud the credit it is due for its candor in seeking to correct a problem by refusing to accept the logical consequence of its admission of a problem: Applicant admits it cannot now demonstrate compliance with the applicable regulation. Until and unless it does, a factual and legal basis exists for finding that DPS Contention 6 should be admitted.

Applicant also contends that DPS Contention 6 should not be admitted because the' information upon which the new contention is based is not materially different than information previously available. 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(2)(ii). Applicant once again relies on the self-serving boiler plate language in its Supplement to say the change is not material. This reliance ignores the underlying information itself which clearly demonstrates the materiality of the new information. The assumptions contained in the original Application have been found to no longer be supportable because, "[t]he analysis was found to be out of date and non-conservative, effectively reducing the margin available for event mitigation by 50%." Exhibit DPS-40 at A-7.

Moreover, if there is no assurance that the RCIC will be operable in the time required, core uncovery could occur with potentially serious consequences. The RCIC system is used for reactor water level control in the event of a fire caused evacuation of the control room. The performance goal of the level control function is to maintain the reactor coolant level above the top of the core (Appendix R, §1I L2b). The time for accomplishing RCIC initiation for the

Vermont Department of Public Service Reply to Answer of Applicant to DPS Request for Leave to File New Contention NRC Docket No. 50-271 ASLBP No. 04-832-02-OLA Page 7 of 8 proposed uprate is 21.3 minutes (reduced from 25.3 minutes at current power level) - see PUSAR, Table 6-5 (Exhibit DPS-39). Applicant has not shown that operators can perform this initiation within this time period. Failing this initiation, the core could be uncovered resulting in fuel damage and radiation release. Furthermore, at hearing DPS will contest the method Entergy uses to make it's determination. For example, Entergy does not use the 2-sigma value for decay heat uncertainty which it has stated it uses in other analyses. Nor does Entergy use the design basis value of 85 degrees F for initial service water temperature, but rather a less conservative value of 80 degrees F. At hearing DPS will show Entergy has even less time to perform the required actions than claimed.

Finally, Applicant returns to the issue of verification and contends that a license amendment-cannot be rejected because of a pending verification. The Applicant perhaps misunderstands the DPS concern. The timeline for a safe shutdown associated with the initiation of RCIC from alternate panels, is what the Department is concerned about. The verification is part of the process to ensure that the Applicant has met its regulatory obligations but it is the regulatory obligation pursuant to 10 C.F.R., Appendix R, to ensure a safe shut -down that is the heart of DPS Contention 6.

C. The Proposed Contention Would Clearly Entitle DPS to Relief Applicant continues to revert to hanging its arguments on verification alone. It assumes that verification will prove that it meets the requirements, and, therefore failure to have performed the verification is of no consequence. This is not true. An analysis that is found to be

Vermont Department of Public Service Reply to Answer of Applicant to DPS Request for Leave to File New Contention NRC Docket No. 50-271 ASLBP No. 04-832-02-OLA Page 8 of 8 out of date and non-conservative, that reduces the time margins available for event mitigation by 50%, is definitely something the must either be remedied or the license amendment application must be denied. The DPS is not intent on the promise of verification but on the verification findings, and most importantly, on the results (see Argument A above). The DPS wants to know that a safe shutdown can be performed in a RCIC from alternate shutdown panels in a time frame that is safe and does not pose any significant hazards to the people of Vermont.

CONCLUSION For all the reasons state here and provided in the Vermont Department of Public Service Request for Leave to File a New Contention, DPS urges the Board to admit DPS Contention 6, and grant the DPS a subpart G hearing to resolve the disputes that exist over the Applicant's Application, as previously argued by~the DPS in our written filings and at oral argument.

Respectfully submitted, Sarah Hofmn Special Counse Department of Public Service 112 State Street - Drawer 20 Montpelier, VT 05602-2601 Anthony Z. Roisman National Legal Scholars Law Firm 84 East Thetford Rd.

Lyme,NH 03768 Dated this 17' day of November 2004 at Montpelier, Vermont.

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In Re: Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee )

LLC and Entergy Nuclear ) Docket No. 50-271 Operations, Inc. )

(Extended Power Uprate at VY) ) ASLBP No. 04-832-02-OLA AFFIDAVIT OF WILLIAM K. SHERMAN

1. My name is William K. Sherman. I am employed by the Vermont Public Service Department ("Department") in the position of State Nuclear Engineer. I have held this position since November, 1988. My duties include ongoing State regulatory oversight of the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station ("Vermont Yankee"), as well as advising the Department and other State agencies on issues related to Vermont Yankee and nuclear power. I previously submitted my resume with the Department's Notice of Intention to Participate and Petition to Intervene filed on August 30, 2004.
2. I assisted in the preparation of the Department's Reply to Answer of Applicant to the Department's Request for Leave to File a New Contention.
3. All of the technical information contained in the Department's Reply to Answer of Applicant to the Department's Request for Leave to File a New Contention is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

William K. Sherman State Nuclear Engineer Subscribed and sworn to before me this 17th day of November, 2004.

Susan Pittsley Notary Public My commission expires February 10, 2007.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of )

) Docket No. 50-271 ENTERGY NUCLEAR VERMONT )

YANKEE LLC AND ENTERGY NUCLEAR ) ASLBP No. 04-832-02-OLA OPERATIONS, INC. )

(Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station). )

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of the "Vermont Department of Public Service Reply to Answer of Applicant to the Department's Request for Leave to File a New Contention" in the captioned proceeding has been served on the following by deposit in the United States mail, first class, postage prepaid, and where indicated by an asterisk by electronic mail, this 17th day of November, 2004.

Alex S. Karlin, Chair* Dr. Anthony J. Baratta*

Administrative Judge Administrative Judge Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel. Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Mail Stop T-3F23 Mail Stop T-3F23 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 Washington, DC 20555-0001 E-mail: ask2@nrc.gov E-mail: ajbSnrc.gov Lester S. Rubenstein* Office of the Secretary*

Administrative Judge ATTN: Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Mail Stop: 0-16C1 Mail Stop T-3F23 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 Washington, DC 20555-0001 E-mail: HEARINGDOCKET@nrc.gov E-mail: lesrrrmmsn.com

Office of Commission Appellate John M. Fulton, Esq.*

Adjudication Assistant General Counsel Mail Stop: O-16CI Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 440 Hamilton Avenue Washington, DC 20555-0001 White Plains, NY 10601 jfultoleentergy.com Jay E. Silberg, Esq.* Raymond Shadis*

Matias Travieso-Diaz, Esq.* Staff Technical Advisor Shaw Pittman, LLP New England Coalition 2300 N St., NW P.O. Box 98 Washington, DC 20037-1128 Edgecomb, ME 04556 E-mail: jay.silbergeshawvpittman.com E-mail: shadisgprexar.com matias.travieso-diazeshawpittman.com Anthony Z. Roisman, Esq.* Brooke Poole, Esq.*

National Legal Scholars Law Firm Robert Weisman, Esq.*

84 -East Thetford Rd. Marisa Higgins, Esq.

  • Lyme, NH 03768 Office of the General Counsel E-mail: aroisman~valley.net Mail Stop 0-15 D21 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 bdpVnrc.gov. rrnwanrc.gov. mch5@nrc.gov Respectfully submitted, Sarah Hofm Special Counsel

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the Matter of Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee )

LLC and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. ) Docket No. 50-271 (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station) ) ASLBP. No. 04-832-02-OLA COMPLETE EXHIBIT LIST TO VERMONT DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SERVICE FILINGS AS OF NOVEMBER 17,2004

1. Draft general design criteria published July 11, 1967 (32 FR 10213)
2. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.82, Revision 3, Water Sourcesfor Long-Term Recirculation Coolingfollowing a Loss-of-CoolantAccident
3. Safety Guide (Regulatory Guide) 1.1
4. Regulatory Guide 1.82 (Rev. 0), June 1974, Sumps for Emergency Core Cooling and Containment Spray Systems
5. Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-43, Containment Emergency Sump Performance
6. NRC Bulletin 96-03, PotentialPluggingof Emergency Core Cooling Suction Strainers by Debris in Boiling-WaterReactors
7. Generic Safety Issue (GSI) 191, 4ssessment ofDebrisAccumulation on PWR Sump Pump Performance (DPS Exhibit 7)
8. NRC Bulletin 2003-01, PotentialImpact ofDebris Blockage on Emergency Sump Recirculationat Pressurized-Water Reactors
9. ACRS Thermal-Hydraulic Phenomena Subcommittee transcript, August 20, 2003
10. ACRS Full Committee transcript, September 11, 2003
11. ACRS letter of September 30,2003, DraftFinalRevision 3 to Regulatory Guide 1.82, "Water Sourcesfor Long-term RecirculationiCooling Following a Loss-of-coolant

Accident.

12. ACRS letter, May 19, 1999, The Role ofDefense in Depth in a Risk-informed Regulatory System
13. DPS letter of December 8, 2003 to the NRC Staff
14. NRC June 29, 2004 letter to DPS, response to Dec 8 letter
15. Docket No. 6812, Prefiled Direct Testimony, DPS Witness William Sherman, May 9, 2003
16. Vermont Yankee Calculation VYC-0808, Rev. 6
17. RAI SPSB-C-25
18. Section 4.2.6 of Safety Analysis Report for Constant Pressure Power Uprate ("PUSAR')
19. DPS letter of June 8, 2004 to theNRC Staff
20. Vermont Yankee Calculation VYC-0808, Rev. 6, Change 5, July 1, 2004
21. Vermont Yankee Calculation VYC-0808, Rev. 6, Change 6, July 16, 2004
22. Regulatory Guide 1.183, Alternative RadiologicalSource TernsforEvaluatingDesign Basis Accidents at Nuclear Power Reactors, July 2000
23. Unresolved Safety Issue Item A-40: Seismic Design Criteria
24. Vermont State Geologist letter of August 26, 2004, Probabilityof EarthquakeInduced Ground Accelerations at Vermont Yankee
25. NUREG-0585, TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task ForceFinalReport, October 1979
26. NUREG/CR-1250, Vol. 1, Three Mile Island,A Report to the Commissionersand the Public,NRC Special Inquiry Group, Mitchell Rogovin, Director, circa. 1980
27. Vermont Yankee Calculation VYC-0808, Rev. 6, Change 4
28. Vermont Yankee Calculation VYC-2314, Rev. 0
29. RAI SPSB-C-22
30. BWOR ECCS StrainerBlockage Issue: Summary of Research and Resolution Actions, LA-UR-01-1595, D.V.Rao, et al., March 21,. 2001
31. Knowledge Basefor the Effect ofDebris on PressurizedWater Reactor Emergency Core Cooling Sump Performance,NUREG/CR-6808, LA-UR-03-0880, February 2003.
32. CR-VTY-2004-0918, Adverse Trend Common Cause Analysis Report, MSIVAs-Found LLRTs Show an Adverse Trend, Vermont Yankee, May 5, 2004.
33. Pages A-66 and A-67 (Pinch Point Summary - Torus Water Temp/ECCSPump NPSH) from Vermont Yankee NuclearPower Station Extended Power UprateFeasibilityStudy, June 28, 2002.
34. Meniorandum of Understandingon Cooperation,Notification, andAccess Between Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee.LLC and Vermont Departmentof Public Servicefor the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station, July 30, 2002.
35. Guidancefor Interim Implementation ofNRC Policy on Cooperationwith States - State Observationof NRC Inspections, Signature by William K. Sherman, January 1, 1990.

(Please note this is a retype of the original document which is illegible.)

36. Vermont Yankee letter of November 12, 1998, Response to GenericLetter 98-04.
37. Brief for the Federal Respondents filed on July 14, 2004 in Citizens Awareness Network
v. U.S. NuclearRegulatory Commisstion, Docket Nos. 04-1145 and 04-1395 (United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit) (CAN v.. NRC).
38. Supplement No. 17: Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station Technical Specification Proposed Change No. 263 - Supplement No. 17. Extended Power Uprate - Reponses to Request for Additional Information related to the 10 CFR 50 Appendix R Timeline, September 30,2004.
39. Safety Analysis Reportfor Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station ConstantPressure Power Uprate, Pages 6-1 Ito 6-19 (Redacted).
40. Letter to Jay Thayer of Entergy from Wayne Lanning of NRC dated November 5, 2004, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station - PreliminaryResults of the August 2004, Engineering Team Inspection

November 5, 2004 Mr. Jay K. Thayer Site Vice President Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.

Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station P.O. Box 0500 185 Old Ferry Road Brattleboro, VT 05302-0500

SUBJECT:

VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION - PRELIMINARY RESULTS OF THE AUGUST 2004, ENGINEERING TEAM INSPECTION

Dear Mr. Thayer:

During the period of August 9 through September 3, 2004, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) conducted a pilot team inspection at the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station (VYNPS) in accordance with Temporary Instruction 2515/158, "Functional Review of Low Margin/Risk Significant Components and Human Actions." This pilot inspection incorporated. the best practices of existing and past design and engineering inspections and was part of an effort to improve the effectiveness of the Reactor Oversight Program at identifying significant engineering issues. The NRC had planned to conduct a public exit meeting to discuss the results of the inspection on November 9, 2004. However, we had to postpone the public meeting upon the advice of local officials due to potential public safety concerns. We are working with local, State, and Federal officials to locate a suitable location and forum for a future public meeting. In response to stakeholder requests, NRC committed to publically release the preliminary results of the inspection prior to the public exit meeting.

The enclosure to this letter provides a summary of the inspection scope and preliminary inspection results in the areas reviewed. Please note that the final inspection results, including the number of findings and characterization of their significance, may change based on additional information and further review. The final inspection results will be documented in NRC Inspection Report 05000271/2004008.

The inspection focused on verifying that the plant's design bases were correctly implemented for a sampling of components across multiple systems, both under current licensing conditions and under your proposed extended power uprate (EPU) conditions. Overall, the team found that the components and systems reviewed would be capable of performing their intended safety functions and that you have implemented sufficient design controls for engineering work conducted at VYNPS, including your EPU request. However, the team identified eight findings of very low safety significance. None of the identified findings resulted in system inoperability, but several of the findings relate to specific degraded conditions and deficiencies in the design control processes used at VYNPS to ensure that the facility remains within its licensed and analyzed design envelope. The team also identified one unresolved item associated with electrical equipment that will be reviewed further for significance and site-soecific applicability.

NRC Docket No. 50-271 ASLBP No. 04-832-02-OLA DPS Exhibit 40 12 Pages

2 Limited extent of condition reviews, performed by the team, for several of the findings that could have been indicative of broader problems did not identify any additional findings, indicating that the original problems were not widespread and were likely not programmatic in nature. All of the team's findings are being shared with the NRC's technical staff conducting the EPU review.

Four of the findings concern topics within the scope of the NRC's EPU review. Specifically, these findings are associated with station blackout capability, the Appendix R operator timeline, the accident analysis inputs, and the validation of motor-operated valve testing methodology.

Submittal of additional information on these issues may be required to supplement the power uprate license amendment request.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its Enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is temporarily unavailable due to an ongoing security review; therefore, this document will also be posted on the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/plant-specific-items/vermont-yankee-issues.html.

Sincerely,

/RAI Wayne D. Lanning, Director Division of Reactor.Safety

Enclosure:

Summary of Inspection Scope and Preliminary Results Docket No. 50-271 License No. DPR-28

3 cc w/encl:

M. R. Kansler, President, Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.

G. J. Taylor, Chief Executive Officer, Entergy Operations J. T. Herron, Senior Vice President and Chief Operating Officer D. L. Pace, Vice President, Engineering B. O'Grady, Vice President, Operations Support J. M. DeVincentis, Manager, Licensing, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station Operating Experience Coordinator - Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station J. F. McCann, Director, Nuclear Safety Assurance M. J. Colomb, Director of Oversight, Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.

J. M. Fulton, Assistant General Counsel, Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.

S. Lousteau, Treasury Department, Entergy Services, Inc.

Administrator, Bureau of Radiological Health, State of New Hampshire Chief, Safety Unit, Office of the Attorney General, Commonwealth of Mass.

D. R. Lewis, Esquire, Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge G. D. Bisbee, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Environmental Protection Bureau J. Block, Esquire J. P. Matteau, Executive Director, Windham Regional Commission M. Daley, New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution, Inc. (NECNP)

D. Katz, Citizens Awareness Network (CAN)

R. Shadis, New England Coalition Staff G. Sachs, President/Staff Person, cto Stopthesale J. Sniezek, PWR SRC Consultant R. Toole, PWR SRC Consultant

ENCLOSURE November 5, 2004 MEMORANDUM TO: Wayne Lanning, Director Division of Reactor Safety Region I FROM: Jeffrey Jacobson, Team Leader /RAI Inspection Program Branch Division of Inspection Program Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

SUBJECT:

ENGINEERING INSPECTION PRELIMINARY RESULTS Attached to this memorandum are the preliminary results from the pilot team inspection conducted at the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station, from August 9 through 20 and August 30 through September 3, 2004. These preliminary results have been reviewed and are supported by all team members (both NRC and contractors). These preliminary results do not include issues that are of minor significance, some of which may be included in the final report in accordance with the Temporary Instruction guidance. We understand that these results will be

  • released to the licensee and the public prior to the public exit meeting, in order to facilitate discussion at that meeting.

Attachment:

As Stated

2 DOCUMENT NAME: G:kDRS\Safety Systems\Doerflein\EngrlnspPrefiminaryResultsVYMemo.wpd After declaring this document "An Official Agency Record" it will not be released to the Public.

To receive a copy of this document, indicate In the box: 'C' Copy without attachment/enclosure E"= Copy with attachment/enclosure 'N= No copy OFFICE NRR/DIPM NAME JJacobson DATE 11/05/04 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

A-l Summary of Inspection Scope and Preliminary Results A. Inspection Summarv During the period from August 9 through September 3, 2004, the NRC conducted a team inspection in accordance with Temporary Instruction 2515/158, 'Functional Review of Low Margin/Risk Significant Components and Human Actions," at the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station (VYNPS). The inspection was the first of four planned pilot inspections to be conducted throughout the country to assist the NRC in determining whether changes should be made to its Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) to improve the effectiveness of its inspections and oversight in the design/engineering area.

In selecting samples for review, the team focused on the most risk significant components and operator actions. The team selected these components and operator actions by using the risk information contained in the licensee's Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) and the NRC's Simplified Plant Analysis Risk (SPAR) models.

Consideration was also given to those components and operator actions most impacted by the licensee's request for an extended power uprate (EPU).

Many of the samples selected were located within the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC), Main Feedwater, Safety Relief Valve, Onsite Electrical Power, and Offsite Electrical Power systems. In addition, inspection samples were added based upon operational experience reviews. The team also was briefed by the NRC's technical staff currently conducting the EPU licensing review, concerning issues that had arisen during their reviews or areas that might warrant additional inspection. A total of 91 samples were chosen for the team's initial review.

A preliminary review was performed on the 91 samples to determine whether any low margin concerns existed. For the purpose of this inspection, margin concerns included original design issues, margin reductions due to the proposed EPU, or margin reductions identified as a result of material condition issues. Consideration was also given to the uniqueness and complexity of the design, operating experience, and the available defense in depth margins. Based upon these considerations, 45 of the original 91 samples were selected for a more detailed review.

B. Preliminary Inspection Results

1. Electrical Power Sources The team reviewed the adequacy of the onsite and offsite electrical power sources that supply power to the safety related components chosen for detailed review. Particular focus was paid to the offsite power sources and grid stability, Attachment

A-2 as they would be impacted by an EPU. The team performed a detailed review of the ability of the Vernon Hydro-Electric Station to supply emergency power to VYNPS in the event of a station blackout caused by a disturbance in the electrical distribution system (grid).

Results The team found that, overall, the design, operation, maintenance and material condition of the offsite and onsite electrical power sources were adequate to support the operation of safe shutdown equipment under the range of current and proposed EPU design bases conditions. However, the team identified the following findings:

Availability of Power from Vernon Station The team identified that the licensee had not demonstrated that the alternate alternating current (AC) power source would be available within the time required following a loss of all AC power (station blackout). Specifically, for conditions where the loss of AC power could occur due to a grid collapse, VYNPS's alternate AC source, the Vernon Hydro-Electric Station, would separate from the grid and shutdown. During the inspection, the licensee estimated it would take between 20 minutes and 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> to restart the Vernon Station and configure the Vernon switchyard to supply emergency power to VYNPS. In 1992, as part of its subm'ittal to the NRC regarding VYNPS's compliance to the station blackout rule, the licensee stated that the Vernon station would be available within one hour.

The licensee had not demonstrated by test that the alternate AC source would be available within one hour, and had not completed a coping analysis for the period of time the alternate source would be unavailable. The finding is of very low safety significance because the licensee's draft coping analysis, performed during the inspection, indicated the facility could cope without electrical power for at least two hours. This issue is within the scope of NRC's EPU review.

Procedures for Assessina Offsite Power Operability The team identified that the licensee had not provided adequate procedures for the loss of the 345/115 kilovolt (kV) auto transformer. Specifically, procedures failed to provide criteria for determining the operability of the 115 kV Keene line, which is designated as an alternate immediate access power source. The finding is of very low safety significance because the team did not identify any instances where the lack of procedural guidance had resulted in inoperability of the electrical system.

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A-3 Degraded Voltaae Relay SetDoint Calculations The team identified that the licensee had not properly analyzed whether the minimum Technical Specification setting for the degraded voltage relay dropout function was sufficient to ensure that adequate voltage would be available to safety related electrical equipment. The finding is of very low safety significance because the team did not identify any instances where the degraded voltage relay dropout setting had resulted in inoperable equipment.

Vulnerabilities Due to Unarounded Electrical System The team identified an unresolved item associated with the potential for an arcing ground to propagate from non-safety-related to safety-related electrical equipment. The inability of the existing protective devices, in each switchgear, to detect and interrupt electrical malfunctions may be inconsistent with the VYNPS design bases as specified in the VYNPS Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). This issue will be reviewed further by NRC to determine applicability and safety significance.

2. Reactor Core Isolation Cooling SYstem The team reviewed selected components of the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system to ensure the system and components would be capable of performing their required design functions for both current licensing basis conditions and the proposed EPU conditions.

Results Based on review of selected system components, including the RCIC pump and turbine, auxiliary equipment, various system valves, and instrumentation and controls, the team found that the RCIC system could perform its required functions for both the current and the proposed EPU licensing and design bases conditions. However, the team identified the following findings:

Control Valve for RCIC Lube Oil Cooler The team identified that the installed RCIC system design did not comply with the UFSAR because it was not independent of the instrument air system. 'As a result, a loss of the non-safety related instrument air supply to pressure control valve PCV-13-23 could have overpressurized the RCIC pump lube oil cooler and could have diverted RCIC system flow from the reactor vessel during transient conditions. The finding is of very low safety significance because the analysis, completed by the licensee during the inspection, showed the system would have been able to perform its intended function under such conditions.

Dearaded RCIC Pressure Control Valve The team identified that the licensee failed to correct a long-standing deficiency in the operation of PCV-1 3-23, the control valve that supplies cooling water to the RCIC lube oil cooler. The team determined that during initial start-up testing, Attachment

A-4 problems were identified with operation of this valve, which affected its ability to properly supply cooling flow to the lube oil cooler. During the inspection, the licensee could not demonstrate that this issue had been entered into its corrective action program prior to the inspection, as necessary to address this problem and correct the deficiency. This finding is of very low significance because the licensee had implemented changes to its operating procedures to compensate for the deficiency by implementing manual actions.

3. Residual Heat Removal Pumps The team reviewed the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pumps to ensure the pumps would be capable of performing their required design functions for both the current and the proposed EPU licensing and design bases conditions. In its EPU submittal to the NRC, the licensee stated that credit for the containment overpressure that-would exist under postulated accident conditions would be needed to ensure adequate net positive suction head (NPSH) to the RHR pumps. Therefore, the inspection scope included specific reviews of the licensee's NPSH calculations for the RHR pumps. Although the team did not review whether crediting containment overpressure was appropriate, the team performed an independent review to ensure adequacy of the licensee's NPSH calculation.

Results Based on review of selected system components, the team found that the RHR pumps could perform their required functions for both the current and the proposed EPU licensing and design bases conditions. The team had no significant findings associated with these components.

4. Safety Relief Valves and Code Safety Valves The team reviewed analyses and modification packages associated with the safety relief valves (SRVs) and code safety valves needed to support the proposed EPU.

Results The team found that the analysis and modification package for the installation of an additional code safety valve was adequate to support the increased steam flow expected to result from the proposed EPU conditions. Additionally, the team Attachment

A-5 found that the modified back-up nitrogen bottle system provided an adequate supply of nitrogen to the SRVs. The team had no significant findings associated with these components.

5. Reactor Feedwater and Condensate ComDonents The team reviewed selected components of the Reactor Feedwater and Condensate systems to ensure the components would be capable of performing their required design functions for both current licensing basis conditions and the proposed EPU conditions.

Results Based on review of selected components, including the feed pumps and associated controls, feed and condensate flow controls, and feedwater piping and thermal sleeves, the team found that the increased feedwater flow resulting from the proposed EPU would not adversely affect the capability of the Feedwater and Condensate system components to perform the risk significant functions of these maintenance rule systems. The team had no significant findings associated with these components.

6. Reactor Building to Torus Vacuum Breakers The team reviewed selected components of the Reactor Building-to-Torus Vacuum Breaker system and associated components to ensure the components would be capable of performing their required design functions for both current licensing basis conditions and the proposed EPU conditions.

Results Based on review of selected system components, the team found that the Reactor Building-to-Torus Vacuum Breaker. system could perform its required functions for both the current and the proposed EPU licensing and design bases conditions. The team had no significant findings associated with this system.

7. Review of Analysis Inputs The team reviewed a sample of plant parameters and design inputs to the VYNPS accident and transient analyses to ensure that the analysis inputs were technically correct and valid under current and proposed EPU design bases conditions.

Results The team found that, in general, plant parameters and design inputs used in the accident and transient analysis were valid .under current and proposed EPU conditions. However, the team identified the following finding:

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A-6 Condensate Storage Tank Temperature Control The team identified that the licensee failed to take measures to ensure the condensate storage tank (CST) temperature was maintained within the values assumed in the facility's accident and transient analysis. As a result, the team found that actual CST temperature during certain periods of plant operation had exceeded the values assumed in the analysis. This finding is of very low safety significance because sufficient margin remained to ensure equipment supplied by-the CST could perform its intended function. This issue is within the scope of NRC's EPU review.

8. Review of ODerating Exgerience and Generic Issues The team reviewed selected operating experience issues that had occurred at other facilities for their possible applicability to VYNPS. Several issues that appeared to be applicable to VYNPS were selected for a more in-depth review.

Additional consideration was given to those issues that might be impacted by the licensee's proposed EPU.

Results Except for some deficiencies noted with the licensee's implementation of the motor operated valve periodic verification program, the team did not identify significant issues relative to VYNPS's actions to review and address operating experience issues. However, the team identified the following finding:

Motor Operated Valve Periodic Verification Program The team identified that the diagnostic tests of motor operated valves at VYNPS were conducted using procedures that did not include adequate acceptance limits or trending requirements and were conducted using a test methodology that had not been adequately validated to demonstrate that the tested MOVs would be capable of performing satisfactorily under design basis conditions. This finding is of very low safety significance because no examples of degraded or inoperable valves were identified during the inspection. This issue is within the scope of NRC's EPU review.

9. Review of Operator Actions The team reviewed risk significant, time critical operator actions that presented little margin between the time required and time available to complete the action.

For each selected operator action scenario, the team verified that operating procedures were consistent with operator actions for a given event or accident condition and that the operators had been adequately trained and evaluated for each action. Control room instrumentation and alarms were also reviewed by the team to verify their functionality and to verify,alarm response procedures were accurate to reflect current plant configuration. Additionally, the team performed a Attachment

A-7 walkdown of accessible field portions of the reviewed systems to assess material condition and to verify that field actions could be performed by the operators as described in plant procedures.

The team also reviewed each operator action to assess the impact the proposed EPU could have on further reducing the margin available for task completion and to verify that the associated EPU plant modifications would be reviewed by the licensee for any affect on the operators ability to complete the critical actions within the required time parameters.

Results In general, the team concluded that the plant procedures, operator training, plant instrumentation and alarms, and analyzed timelines would allow operators to take the actions required to respond to design bases events and accident conditions. The critical operator actions had been evaluated or were scheduled for evaluation of the time margins available for task completion under proposed EPU conditions. However, the team identified the following finding:

Timeline for Shutdown Outside the Control Room The team identified that the Safe Shutdown Capability Analysis associated with the initiation of RCIC from alternate shutdown panels (outside the control room) during an Appendix R fire scenario had not been updated to account for increased operator action times associated with new electrical safety requirements. The analysis was found to be out of date and non-conservative, effectively reducing the time margin available for event mitigation by 50%. This finding is of very low safety significance because under current licensed operating conditions, sufficient margin would remain to ensure that the core would not be uncovered during the analyzed event. This issue is within the scope of NRC's EPU review. Had this finding not been identified, the loss of margin may have prevented the operators from initiating the RCIC system in sufficient time to prevent core uncovery under EPU conditions.

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