ML102420042

New England Coalitions Motion to Reopen the Hearing and for the Admission of New Contentions

ML102420042
Person / Time
Site:	Vermont Yankee File:NorthStar Vermont Yankee icon.png
Issue date:	08/20/2010
From:	Shadis R New England Coalition
To:	Karlin A, Wendy Reed, Richard Wardwell Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
SECY RAS
References
50-271-LR, ASLBP 06-849-03-LR, RAS M-443
Download: ML102420042 (47)

Text

I I UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD Before Administrative Judges:

Alex S. Karlin, Chairman Dr. Richard E. Wardwell Dr. William H. Reed DOCKETED USNRC August 23, 2010 (8:00a.m.)

OFFICE OF SECRETARY RULEMAKINGS AND ADJUDICATIONS STAFF In the Matter of ENTERGY NUCLEAR VERMONT YANKEE, L.L.C.,

and ENTERGY NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, INC.

(Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station)

Docket No. 50-271 -LR ASLBP No. 06-849-03-LR August 20, 2010 NEW ENGLAND COALITION'S MOTION TO REOPEN THE HEARING AND FOR THE ADMISSION OF NEW CONTENTIONS I. INTRODUCTION On July 8, 2010, the Commission returned this matter to the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board ("Board") on remand in order to allow the New England Coalition, Inc. (NEC) and the Department of Public Services of the State of Vermont (Vermont) the opportunity to submit a revised Contention 2.1 In addition, the Commission ordered that the proceeding remain open during the pendency of the remand. Further the Commission stated that "NEC and Vermont are free to submit a motion to reopen the record pursuant to 10 C.F.R. §2.326, should they seek to address any genuinely new issues related to the license renewal application that previously could not have been raised." Id. at 10 n.37.

Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, L.L.C., and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), CLI-10-17, 72 NRC, slip op. at 2 and 51-56 (July 8, 2010) 4e-"

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On July 12, 2010, the Board issued a Scheduling Order pursuant to the Commission's ruling, setting the following schedule:

1. Revised Contention 2: If NEC or Vermont seeks to submit a revised Contention 2, it shall do so on or before August 20, 2010. Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(h),

answers shall be filed within twenty-five (25) days after the service of the revised contention and replies shall be filed seven (7) days after service of the answers.

2. Motion to Reopen: If any party seeks to file a motion to reopen, it shall be filed on or before August 20, 2010. Any such motion shall separately address each of the criteria specified in 10 C.F.R. § 2.326 and shall be accompanied by the specified affidavit(s).

a. If the motion to reopen relates to a contention not previously in controversy, then the motion shall be accompanied by such new contention together with a filing supporting the admissibility of the new contention under 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(1) and 2.309(c). 2 3 Selection of Hearing Procedures: Any submission of a revised Contention 2 or a motion to reopen accompanied by a new contention, may address the selection of hearing procedures pursuant to 10 C.F.R. §§ 2.309(g) and 2.3 10.

II. REVISED CONTENTION 2 - The Commission offers that New England Coalition may now propose a revised Contention 2, in as much as the Board had promised it would take up Contention 2 should New England Coalition prevail with Contentions 2a and 2b.

NEC Contention 2, as accepted by the Board reads, Entergy's License Renewal Application does not include an adequate plan to monitor and manage the effects of aging [due to metal fatigue] on key reactor components that are subject to an aging management review, pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 54.21(a) and an evaluation of the time limited aging analysis,[TLAA]

pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 54.21 (c).

NRC Regulation and guidance allow either an Aging Management Plan (AMP) or a TLAA, or both to satifisfy the general requirements to address metal fatigue of reactor components identified in 10CFR§54 and NUREG 1801 (GALL REPORT).

2 The regulation specifies that new contentions filed in association with a motion to reopen must satisfy the requirements for "non-timely" contentions under 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(c). See. 10 C.F.R. § 2.326(d).

2

Subsequent to the Board's acceptance of Contention 2, Entergy VY submitted a first and second refinement of TLAA.

NEC followed each TLAA amendment with a new or amended contention arguing generally that Entergy's CUF and CUFen analyses were fatally flawed. These contentions were accepted and nominated by the Board as 2a and 2b.

If NEC prevailed on 2a and 2b, it would mean that Entergy VY would either have to produce yet another TLAA or rely on its AMP (and a projected transient or fatigue cycle count.

If Entergy went that route then presumably New England Coalition's Contention 2 could be revived with respect to the AMP.

NEC prevailed on 2a and 2b, but only to the extent that in a Partial initial decision, the Board ordered applicant commitments to perform fatigue analysis of additional sample components before, not after, issuance of a final initial (ASLB) decision.

The Board ordered that Entergy VY take an approach to the additional analyses that would be identical to that taken on Board approved sample analyses.

The Board also ruled that New England Coalition could propose a new contention based on the new analyses, but could not revisit ("rehash") the technical issues already adjudicated.

NRC Staff petitioned for Commission review of the Board's Partial Initial Order.

Entergy VY promptly provided the analyses ordered and New England Coalition filed a new contention (2c) taking issue with Entergy VY's rote application of its approach to the first sample set at the new sample set, arguing, among other things, that different geometries, materials, and physical conditions demanded a variation on the approach to the first sample set.

The Board rejected New England Coalition's proposed Contention 2c, calling it an attempt to "rehash" technical issues already adjudicated.

3

NEC petitioned for Commission review.

The Commission has now ruled, overturning that portion of the Partial Initial Decision finding in favor of NEC regarding the timing of confirmatory analyses, thus preserving the NRC Staff s prerogative to pull dicey issues out of hearing space to be dealt with after intervenor's hearing rights have been exercised and dispensed with. The Commission is also upholding the Board's rejection of 2c, but remanding to the Board so that NEC may have the opportunity to file a revised Contention 2...because it was "promised".

New England Coalition has consulted its experts, colleagues, and legal counsel and can find no opening for redress of outstanding dispute with the licensee regarding metal fatigue AMP or TLAA through a revised Contention 2 because the decisions of the Board and the Commission render an AMP unnecessary and a TLAA unassailable on its (lack of) technical merits.

Thus NEC is thoroughly confounded; and will not propose at this time a revised Contention 2, and will instead defer to the judgment of history in as much as fatigue cracks have already begun to develop in the reactor nozzle cladding at Vermont Yankee.

III.

MOTION TO REOPEN A CLOSED RECORD TO CONSIDER ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE PURSUANT TO 10 CFR § 2.326 A. Timeliness Applicable Rule 10 CFR § 2.326 (1) The motion must be timely. However, an exceptionally grave issue may be considered in the discretion of the presiding officer even if untimely presented.

New England Coalition moves to reopen the record to consider additional evidence raised in New England Coalition's proposed new contention regarding inadequate aging management 4

review, inadequate time-limited aging-analysis (TLAA) and lack of an adequate aging management program for safety-related electrical cables susceptible to wetting or submergence.

New England Coalition has brought this motion to reopen and its proposed contention within the pendancy of the remand in accord with the Commission's Order of July 8, 2010.

New England Coalition brought this motion and contention as soon as sufficient evidence had accrued to adduce the basis and substance of the contention. New England Coalition could not have raised this issue as a proposed contention in timely fashion (within 60 days of FR Notice of an Opportunity for a Hearing) because no relevant evidence was available to New England Coalition at that time.

The first document indicating that the subject of New England Coalition's proposed new contention might be an issue at Vermont Yankee was NRC Inspection Report 05000-271-10-002 (ADAMS AkccesSion No.MLt01*,)3363), which was published May 10. 2010, at a time when litigants were still waiting the Commission's decision on NEC and Staff Motion's for Review.

New England Coalition has since diligently pursued additic*nai..

evimlen,0ce ' W fl.......,, L'-r'y' s approach to addressing the probiem of aging acceleration due to wetting and subinerecnce of safety-related electrical cables not qualified for wet or submerged conditions.

.New England Coalition has not found any evidence of follow-un on the above rrcecrinccd insoection reoort by NRC or the licensee in any NRC or licensee documents to date. With regard to the scerousncss of the situation and its relevance to the period of license renewal. Nrevw-England Coalition has found within recent weeks both NRC and EPRI documents that auite plainly spell out deep-concern on an industry-wide basis, for example:

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Regulatory and management concern regarding reliability of medium voltage systems in nuclear power plants has been increasing for 5-10 years. The Staff of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) are concerned that wetted (up to and including submergence) medium voltage cable circuits may be degrading to a point at which multiple cable circuits may fail when called upon to perform functions affecting safety... This report provides guidance for developing and implementing a cable aging management pro g'rrm bir lnedixmn-voltage cable circuits in nuclear power plants.

Page 1, Plant Support Engineering, " Aging Management Program Guidance for Medium Voltace Cable Systems for Nuclear Power Plants." 1020805 Final report, June 2010. Electric Power Research institute Electric cables are one of the most important cormroienti h. a nociea* oti, bcauý. they provide the power needed to operate safety-related equipment and to transmit su-rnas to and from the various controllers used to perform safety operations in the plant. hn spite of their importance, cables tpicallv receive little attention because they are considered nassive. lone-lived comionents that have oroven to be very reliable over the vears.

'Thle integritv of electric cables is ra itered. t.-.

-xtent ttr-,nh -

eauipiment to which they are attached; however, dtis testine does not soec.ficaiiv tbcus on -te cables and may not be sufficient to detect all of the aeing mechanisms to which a particular cabw ;.

s.csbi. if meiiei, siss remain undetctietd. ibey can eventuaiiv lead to of ca,,e,tcrfonnancc and possiblv cabie failure. in reswonse to Gencric Letter 2007-.01. licensees orovided data showing that the number of cable failures is increasinm with oiant aae and that cable failures aife ccurmu wnta, ti-4a--vza iic,.

These cable failures have resulted in Elant tran-,si-ents an=d shutdowns. tens cvf safewt ert.-eTdancv.

entries into limitine conditions for o*eration. and OhailenLe= to plant ooerators. Tlt daia also show that as inmwv unanticivated fin-service). cable failures occur as do testing failures. Based on tjis infomamion and the fact that flicensees ire now considerina license extension to 60 years and mnore NRC is considerine the need to monitor the condition of electric cables throughout their installed life throuch the implementation of a cable condition monitoring Drogram Page v ofJNUREG/CR 7000 r11, isii >Ne-w g1e,,zu.

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brought this issue betfre the Board as soon as practicably possible following the apprehension of utfticient information.

-2. ThAis Is a Significant Safc-ty IssueC Applicable Rule 10 CFR § 2.326 (2) The motion must address a significant safety or envir-onmenisu.

For all of the good reasons evidenced in the foregoing, the Board must find that this is a significant safety issue.

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C. A Materially Different Result Would be or Would have been Likely had the Newly Proffered Evidence been Considered Initially.

Applicable Rule 10 CFR § 2.326 (3) The motion must demonstrate that a materially different result would be or would have been likely had the newly proffered evidence been considered initially.

Had the newly proffered evidence been considered initially, it is reasonable to assume, based on the weight of the evidence and the safety significance of the issue, that, in keeping with 10 CFR§54 the Board would have rejected Entergy's LRA pending a submittal and demonstration of an adequate AMP or TLAA for electrical cables susceptible to wetting or submergence, because in considering the evidence it is highly unlikely that Board could have positively contributed to a Commission finding that aging management review, aging nmanagement planning, or aging analysis had been properly performed in keeping with 10 CFR

§54.29 (a) and §54.21 (a). (Please see EPRI Report above, NRC Inspection Report following, and the Declaration of Paul M. Blanch (attached)

D. Declaration and Affidavit of Expert, Paul M. Blanch.

Applicable Rule 10 CFR § 2.326 (b) The motion must be accompanied by affidavits that set forth the factual nmd/or tech*-'-'

b frte

.10,-;:.,

a that the criteria of paragraph (a) of this section have b~.

1d.tisfe Affidavaws must be given by competent individuals with knowledge of the facts iiegc,. or

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r~ae to he isves-dence contained M-1aO 145 plec iE,,o, r

siannardar*s0f s uTOart. Each of the c-rkeilae musi be seDarateiv addressed. with a specific explanation of why it has bccn met. When muliioe ete;a ia :

lrvoiwca. d? m(1;rxm oarticu arirv each issue it seeks to intlate and sueciiv the < iactual ano/ý' tecnnicai oases which it believes supriort the claim tha-this issue mee.s the criteria i1 paragranh ia) ofins secthis Attached is the Declaration and Affidavit of Paul M. Blanch of West Hartford. Connecticut. Mr.

Blanch is an Electrical Engineer. with more than 40 years experience in nuclear power aeneration.

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He has been accepted as an expert witness in NRC license renewal proceedings now in litigation regarding Indian Point, Units II and III. Mr. Blanch's Declaration and Affidavit discusses in detail the factual and technical bases upon which New England Coalition's proposed new contention is based. Mr. Blanch's Declaration and Affidavit is summarized in Section Below.

D. Motion to Reopen Must Also Satisfy 10§2.309(c)

Applicable Rule 10 CFR § 2.326 (d) A motion to reopen which relates to a contention not previously in controversy among the parties must also satisfy the requirements for non-timely contentions in § 2.309(c).

IV. MOTION TO ADMIT NEW CONTENTION PURSUANT TO 10 CFR § 2.309(f)(1) andl0 CFR § 2.309 (c).

New England Coalition respectfully moves admission of the following contention:

A. Content of the proposed Contention Applicable Rule: 10CFR (f) (1) Contentions. (1) A request for hearing or petition for leave to intervene must set forth with particularity the contentions sought to be raised.

Proposed New Contention. Applicant has not demonstrated adequate aging management review and/or time-limited aging analysis nor does the applicant have in place an adequate aging management program to address the effects of moist or wet environments on buried, below grade, underground, or hard-to-access safety-related electrical cables, thus the applicant does not comply with NRC regulation (10 CFR §54.21 (a) and guidance and/or provide adequate assurance of protection of public health and safety (54.29(a).

B. New England Coalition Now Addresses Individually Each Requirement under 10CFR§ 2.309 (f).

1. Specific Statement of Law or Fact to be Controverted 8

Applicable Rule: 10CFR § 2.309 (f)(1) (i) Provide a specific statement of the issue of law or fact to be raised or controverted.

This contention is based on the fact the applicant has recently discovered safety related electrical cables, not qualified for wet conditions, submerged in water, thus providing a challenge to the integrity of cable insulation and cable operability exacerbated by aging and with adequate protections against such flooding nowhere contemplated in the license renewal application (LRA).

Compliance with 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1), "Maintenance Rule," and 10 CFR 50.49, "Environmental Qualification of Electric Equipment Important to Safety for Nuclear Power Plants," is vital to preserving Current Licensing Basis [CLB]; in turn a requisite foundation for license renewal. At Vermont Yankee, electrical components have been subjected to environments for which they are not designed or qualified Upon information and belief, it is New England Coalition's assessment that buried, underground, and inaccessible low and medium voltage cables (less than 35 KV) electrical cables, including splices, terminations) and other vital electrical components electrical cables within the scope of Maintenance Rule have not been adequately monitored by the licensee to demonstrate that the cables can perform their design functions when called upon. Nor does the applicant's aging management plan as provided in the LRA address deficiencies now apparent in their current wholly inadequate monitoring program.

NRC regulations require that cables be able to perform their design function when subiected to anticipated environmental conditions, such as moisture. filoodina. heat. and radiation. Further, the design should minimize the probability of power interruption when transferrina Dower between sources. The cable failures that could disable safety-related or risk-significant equipment are expected to have monitoring programs to demonstrate that the cables 9

can perform their design function when called upon. Governing regulations include,10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion (GDC) 2, "Design Bases for Protection Against Natural Phenomena," 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion (GDC) 4, "Environmental and Dynamic Effects Design Bases," 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, GDC 17, "Electric Power Systems," 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, GDC 18, "Inspection and Testing of Electric Power Systems," 10 CFR 50.49, "Environmental Qualification of Electric Equipment Important to Safety for Nuclear Power Plants," 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B. Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, "Test Control," 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Actions."

The certain consequences of this nonconformance would be contrary to providing reasonable assurance of adequate protection of the public health and safety.

Finally, the application fails to provide accurate and complete information, including adequate aging management review, adequate time-limited aging analysis adequate aging management plans as set forth in 10 CFR 50.29(a) and 54.21 (a) (c)

2. Basis for the Contention Applicable Rule: 10CFR § 2.309 (f)(1) (ii) Provide a brief explanation of the basis for the contention; On May 10, 2010, NRC issued Inspection Report 05000271-10-002 (ADAMS ML-101300363) in which it was stated, pp.4 -5 Green. The inspectors identified an NCV of very low safety significance (Green) ofi 0 CFR Part 50, Appendix S, Criterion III, "Design Control," because Entergy did not select and review safety-related cables suitable for application in the environment in which they were found. Specifically, Entergy allowed the continuous submergence of safety-related cables that were not qualified for 10

continuous submergence and failed to demonstrate that the cables would remain operable. Entergy initiated CR-VTY-2009-04142 and CR-VTY-2010-01422 to address the issues, commenced dewatering of the affected manholes, and initiated a preventive maintenance plan to ensure proper conditions.

This finding is more than minor because if left uncorrected, the performance deficiency had the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern.

Specifically, the inspectors noted that the insulation of continuously submerged cables would degrade more than dry or periodically wetted cables which would lead to failures. The inspectors determined the significance of the finding using iMC0609.04, "Phase 1 -Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings." The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it was a design or qualification deficiency which was confirmed to have not resulted in a loss of operability or functionality. Specifically, the continuously submerged cables were not designed or qualified for that environment but were still fully capable of performing their design functions. The inspectors determined this finding had across-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution within the CAP component because Entergy personnel did not thoroughly evaluate the problem when submerged cabling was identified. (P.1 (c)) (Section 40A2) pp.19 21 2 Annual Sample: Review of Submerged Safety-related Cables

a. Inspection Scope (1 sample)

[additional information].

... CR-VTY-2009-04142 documented the identification of safety-related cables found submerged in water on November 28, 2009, for an indefinite period of time.

[emphasis added]... The inspectors assessed Entergy's problem identification threshold, operability determination, extent of condition... The inspectors identified an NCV of very low safety significance (Green) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix S, C~iterion lIi "Design Control" because Entergy did not select and review safety-related cabies suitable for application in the environment in which they were found.

Soecifically, Entergy allowed the continuous submergence of safety-related cables that were not qualified for continuous submergence and failed to demonstrate that the cables would remain operable. [emphasis added]

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... Entergy's staff concluded that of the 57 manholes or handholes that were inspected, 12 manholes or hand holes contained cables that were submerged. Two manholes, MH-32(SII) and MH-33(SII) contained safety-related cables that were submerged. These cables were control cables for the EDGs [Emergency Diesel Generators], and control and power cables for the EDG fuel oil transfer pumps.

Neither of the manholes with submerged safety-related cables contained sump pumps or other de-watering devices. Entergv's staff entered this issue into the CAP as CR-VTY-2009- 04142. generated a work order to dewater the manholes beginning April 5-8, 2010, and developed a preventive maintenance frequency for subsequent pump downs. [This does not constitute an aging management program]

11

... inspectors concluded that Entergy failed to ensure that the cables were maintained in a design condition for the anticipated environmental conditions by not thoroughly evaluating the effect of continuous cable submergence. [an adequate aging management program would "thoroughly evaluate the effect of continuous cable submergence" and lay plans to replace cables not qualified for anticipated conditions.]

In addition, the inspectors reviewed EN-DC-346, "Cable Reliability Program,"

issued on December 31,2009, and noted that it states, in part, "".cables should be kept dry if possible to increase longevity of the insulation system" and "If manual inspections and pumping are used to maintain a cable system dry, the intervals must be sufficient to keep the cables dry." Therefore, the inspectors identified that Entergy's staff had not implemented timely corrective actions to address submerged cables in manholes and had deferred the implementation of corrective actions with an insufficient basis given an initial dewatering scheduled for April 5-8, 2010.

Entergy initiated CR-VTY-2009-04142 and CR-VTY-2010-01422 to address the issues, commenced dewatering of the affected manholes, and initiated a preventive maintenance plan to ensure proper conditions... The inspectors identified a performance deficiency because Entergy staff did not maintain safety-related cables.in an environment for which they were designed and qualified. The issue was within Entergy's ability to foresee and correct and should have been prevented...

inspectors determined the finding is more than minor because if left uncorrected, the performance deficiency had the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, the inspectors noted that the insulation of continuously submerged cables would degrade more than dry or periodically wetted cables which would lead to failures.

The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it was a design or qualification deficiency which was confirmed to have not resulted in a loss of operability or functionality. Specifically, the continuously submerged cables were not designed or qualified for that environment but were still fully capable of performing their design functions...

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," requires, in part, that measures shall be established to ensure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions. Measures shall also be established for the selection and review for suitability of application of materials, parts, and equipment that are essential to the safety-related functions of the structures, systems and components.

Contrary to the above, Entergy had not established measures to select and review for suitability of application of parts and materials that were essential to the safety-related functions of control and power cables for the EDGs... Corrective actions 17

included generating a work order to dewater the manholes and developing a preventive maintenance frequency for subsequent pump downs.

Please take note that "dewater[ing]" manholes does not assure that all cables are not submerged for the simple fact that cable low points are often not in manholes and may be separated from manholes by natural dams or foundation walls over which a given cable may pass. Further, developing a new frequency for pump downs can hardly be considered an amendment to the AMP for buried, belowground or inaccessible electrical cables, which petitioners would offer is what is called for in this situation.

Upon obtaining this report, New England Coalition sought to confirm through document search and through raising this issue directly with NRC in public meeting opportunities (Annual Assessment-June 22, 2010 and Chairman's Site Visit -July 14, 2010), that the applicant has amended its buried, underground, or inaccessible electrical cable aging management program to include a review of cable environmental qualification, an inventory of cable susceptible to wet or submerged conditions, or a schedule of preventative inspection, testing, maintenance or systematic replacement in order to assure operability of vulnerable safety-related cables under accident conditions and within the scope of 10 CFR§54.4 To date New England Coalition can find no evidence of this.

Further the applicant has offered no amendment to its application nor has it proposed a license condition that would encompass the newly discovered vulnerability of its safety-related cables to wetting, submergence and a resulting increased rate of aging.

New England Coalition disputes therefore the applicant's attestation that their LRA is accurate and complete, in particular with respect to aging management of safety-related electrical cables.

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If the applicant did not know about the above described violations of NRC regulation and cable vulnerabilities until the referenced inspection, it was obligated to seek a license or technical specification amendment or file an amendment to its LRA upon realizing the vulnerability.

However, as the inspection report says, "The issue was within Entergy's ability to foresee and correct and should have been prevented."

New England Coalition contends that the issue was indeed within Entergy's ability to foresee and, as such, should have been incorporated in its proposed cable AMP. It was not considered in the AMP despite ample notice of the issue by both EPRI and NRC. NRC notices include, Information Notice 1989-63: "Possible Submergence of Electric Circuits Located Above the Flood Level Because of Water Intrusion and lack of Drainage," Information Notice 2002-12:

"Submerged Safety-Related Electrical Cables" (ADAMS Accession No. ML020790238), GL 2007-01: "Inaccessible or Underground Power Cable Failures that Disable Accident Mitigation Systems or Cause Plant Transients" (ADAMS Accession No.ML070360665), "and Generic Letter 2007-01 "Inaccessible or Underground Power Cable Failures That Disable Accident Mitigation Systems or Cause Plant Transients" (ADAMS Accession No.ML082760385).

3. The Issue is Within Scope Applicable Rule: 10CFR § 2.309 (f)(1) (iii) Demonstrate that the issue raised in the contention is within the scope of the proceeding; New England Coalition seeks an opportunity to provide to the board testimony and other evidence that will show that the applicant has not included in its Time Limited Aging analysis nor in its proposed aging management programs adequate consideration of environmentally accelerated age-related degradation of buried, underground, or inaccessible safety-related 14

electrical cable; and that this failure is a detriment to assurance of protection of public health and safety.

It is New England Coalition's position that not only is the scope of the proceeding defined by the accepted contentions, but that the Board has the affirmative duty to take up and review any issues it finds are safety significant and relevant to the license renewal application and/or the proposed extended period of operation.

The Board is the adjudicatory eyes and ears of the Commission. With respect to LRAs, there can be little dispute that the Board should consider within scope of a license proceeding all information that NRC regulation requires of the applicant. In this instance, the Board must look to 1 OCFR § 54.21. Here emphasis has been added to point out items applicable to New England Coalition's proposed new contention:

Each application must contain the following information:

(a) An integrated plant assessment (IPA). The IPA must--

(1) For those systems, structures, and components within the scope of this part, as delineated in § 54.4, identify and list those structures and components subject to an aging management review. Structures and components subject to an aging management review shall encompass those structures and components--

(i) That perform an intended function, as described in § 54.4, without moving parts or without a change in configuration or properties. These structures and components include, but are not limited to, the reactor vessel, the reactor coolant system pressure boundary, steam generators, the pressurizer, piping, pump casings, valve bodies, the core shroud, component supports, pressure retaining boundaries, heat exchangers, ventilation ducts, the containment, the containment liner, electrical and mechanical penetrations, equipment hatches, seismic Category I structures, electrical cables and connections, cable trays, and electrical cabinets, excluding, but not limited to, pumps (except casing), valves (except body), motors, diesel generators, air compressors, snubbers, the control rod drive, ventilation dampers, pressure transmitters, pressure indicators, water level indicators, switchgears, cooling fans, transistors, batteries, breakers, relays, switches, power inverters, circuit boards, battery chargers, and power supplies; and 15

(ii) That are not subject to replacement based on a qualified life or specified time period.

4. The Issues Raised are Material Applicable Rule: 10CFR § 2.309 (f)(1) (iv) Demonstrate that the issue raised in the contention is material to the findings the NRC must make to support the action that is involved in the proceeding; New England Coalition's proposed new contention, if it prevails, would result in findings of consequence regarding the application.

10 CFR 54.29 has it that a renewed license may be issued by the Commission only if the Commission finds [first, though the ASLB] that the application is accurate and complete as to compliance with 10CFR§54.29 (a)(1) and (a)(2) such that there is reasonable assurance that the activities will continue to be conducted in accordance with the CLB, and that any changes made to the plant's CLB are in accord with the Act and the Commission's regulations. Included here are (1) managing the effects of aging during the period of extended operation on the functionality of structures and components that have been identified to require review under § 54.21 (a)(1); and (2) time-limited aging analyses that have been identified to require review under § 54.21 (c).

New England Coalition's contention concerns the unanalyzed, unplanned for aging of wetted or submerged safety related electrical cables.

10 CFR§ 54.21 defines the required technical information contents of applications as structures and components subject to an aging management review shall encompass those structures and components--(i) That perform an intended function, as described in § 54.4, without moving parts or without a change in configuration or properties. These structures and components include, but are not limited to.. electrical cables and connections.... (ii) That are not subject to replacement based on a qualified life or specified time period.

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Thus, the subject of New England Coalition's Petition is entrained in regulation as, electrical cables, a subject are upon which the Commission make a finding in order to issue a renewed license.

5. Concise Statement of the Facts and Expert Opinion Applicable Rule: 10CFR § 2.309 (f)(1) (v) Provide a concise statement of the alleged facts or expert opinions which support the requestor's/petitioner's position on the issue and on which the petitioner intends to rely at hearing, together with references to the specific sources and documents on which the requestor/petitioner intends to rely to support its position on the issue; New England Coalition has provided through this Motion and continues to provide, through its expert and on its own, references upon which New England Coalition intends to rely at hearing.

The facts are these, on May 10, 2010, NRC reported the flooding of a manhole which contained safety-related electric cables, not rated for submergence or wetted conditions, at the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station. A plain reading of the inspection report (referenced above) will show that the AMP proposed in the VY LRA is not adequate to prevent repetition of submergence nor is it adequate to detect wetted conditions elsewhere. Further, the report shows Vermont Yankee employees were not adequately instructed to enable them to determine the significance of finding non-qualified safety related cables in a flooded compartment. These issues are not reflected in Entergy's proposed Aging Management Program and Entergy has made no effort to amend the program to reflect these realities.

Mr Paul Blanch states in his declaration, Cables play vital roles in the operation of a nuclear power plant. This is clearly recognized by 10 CFR 54.4 and 54.21. Low voltage and medium voltage cables are clearly defined in NUREG 1801 (GALL) as follows:

17

"The power cables and connections addressed are low-voltage (<1000V) and medium-voltage (2 kV to 35 kV). High voltage (>35 kV) power cables3 and connections have unique, specialized constructions and must be evaluated on an application specific basis" The NRC's Inspection Report of Vermont Yankee dated May 10, 2010 states:

"The inspectors identified an NCV of very low safety significance (Green) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix S, Criterion III, "Design Control," because Entergy did not select and review safety-related cables suitable for application in the environment in which they were found.

Specifically, Entergy allowed the continuous submergence of safety-related cables that were not qualified for continuous submergence and failed to demonstrate that the cables would remain operable. Entergy initiated CR-VTY-2009-04142 and CR-VTY-2010-01422 to address the issues, commenced dewatering of the affected manholes, and initiated a preventive maintenance plan to ensure proper conditions."

And "Two manholes, MH-32(SII) and MH-33(SII) contained safety-related cables that were submerged. These cables were control cables for the EDGs, and control and power cables for the EDG fuel oil transfer pumps [Emphasis added]. Neither of the manholes with submerged safety-related cables contained sump pumps or other de-watering devices."

Based upon more than 40 years of engineering, operation and design experience, I believe these cables are designed to operate between <1000 to 35,000 volts as defined in NUREG 1801.

"This information from the May 10, 2010 NRC's Inspection Report is new and has not been previously identified either within Vermont's License Renewal Application or discussed in the NRC's Safety Evaluation Report."

In his declaration, Mr. Blanch quotes, "10 C.F.R. § 54.4,

(a) Plant systems, structures, and components within the scope of this part are-

' Cables designed for service between 1000 and 2000 volts are not defined.

18

(1) Safety-related systems, structures, and components which are those relied upon to remain functional during and following design-basis events (as defined in 10 CFR 50.49 (b)(1)) to ensure the following functions-(i) The integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary; (ii) The capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition; or (iii) The capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents which could result in potential offsite exposures comparable to those referred to in § 50.34(a)(1), § 50.67(b)(2), or § 100.11 of this chapter, as applicable.

(2) All non-safety-related systems, structures, and components whose failure could prevent satisfactory accomplishment of any of the functions identified in paragraphs (a)(1)(i), (ii), or (iii) of this section.(3) All systems, structures, and components relied on in safety analyses or plant evaluations to perform a function that demonstrates compliance with the Commission's regulations for fire protection (10 CFR 50.48), environmental qualification (10 CFR 50.49),

pressurized thermal shock (10 CFR 50.61), anticipated transients without scram (10 CFR 50.62),

and station blackout (10 CFR 50.63).

(b) The intended functions that these systems, structures, and components must be shown to fulfill in § 54.21 are those functions that are the bases for including them within the scope of license renewal as specified in paragraphs (a)(1) - (3) of this section.

"I also reviewed 10 C.F.R. § 54.21. Specifically, § 54.21(a)(1) provides:...Based on my review" Mr. Blanch, opines, " of 10 C.F.R. § 54.2 1(a)(1), and 10 CFR § 54.4, electrical cables are included within the scope of § 10 CFR 54, irrespective [emphasis added]of the design of or the applied voltage.

A diligent review of the LRA and the NRC Staff's SER finds no such Time Limited Aging Analysis (TLAA) or Aging Management Program (AMP); thus I am led to conclude that the LRA is inaccurate and incomplete with respect to TLAA or AMP of below-grade, buried, underground, or otherwise inaccessible safety-related electrical cable."

Mr. Blanch explains, "Complete and accurate Time Limited Aging Analysis (TLAA) or an effective Aging Management Program (AMP) would take into account the potential physical 19

degradation effects of submergence in water on those electrical cables and components which are susceptible to flooding but which have not been environmentally qualified for submergence.

In the NRC Staff evaluation,SER VOLUME TWO, it stated:

"Non-Environmental Qualification Inaccessible Medium-Voltage Cable Program Summary of Technical Information in the Application. LRA Section B. 1.17 describes the new Non-Environmental Qualification Inaccessible Medium-Voltage Cable Program as consistent with GALL AMP XI.E3, "Inaccessible Medium-Voltage Cables Not Subject to 10 CFR 50.49 Environmental Qualification Requirements."

However states Mr. Blanch, "In its description of its aging management program Vermont Yankee has not proposed any methodology to precluded or detect the submergence of Medium Voltage Cables."

Further, "The majority of the cables4 at Vermont Yankee are low voltage as defined by GALL. All control circuits, instrumentation and many ac power circuits are less than 2 kv excluded by Vermont Yankee from any aging management program even though they are within the scope of 10 CFR 54.

Most of the cables within the scope of 10 CFR 54 (<2 kv) are not identified and not inspected or maintained by any aging management program. These cables are also periodically submerged and not qualified for the environment.

The polymers used for the insulation and jacket materials for electric cables, cable splices, and terminations are susceptible to aging and degradation mechanisms caused by exposure to many of the stressors encountered in nuclear power plant service environments.

4 NUREG/CR 7000 "A nuclear power plant may contain more than 50,000 electric cable circuits, of which about 60% are control circuits, 20% are instrumentation, 13% are ac power, 1% are dc power, and the remainder are miscellaneous communications circuits" 20

Longer cable circuits may pass through several different operating environments over the length of their routing throughout the plant. Portions of a cable circuit may pass through areas experiencing more harsh environmental conditions, such as high temperature, high radiation, high humidity, or flooding of underground cables. There has been concern that such local adverse environmental stressors can cause excessive aging and degradation in the exposed sections of a cable that could significantly shorten its effective service life and cause unexpected early failures5.

The integrity and function of power and instrumentation and control (I&C) cables are monitored indirectly through the performance of in-service testing of safety-related systems and components. These tests can demonstrate the function of the cables under test conditions.

However, they do not provide assurance that they will continue to perform successfully when they are called upon to operate fully loaded for extended periods as they would under normal service operating conditions or under design basis conditions. In-service testing of a cable does not provide specific information on the status of cable aging degradation processes nor the physical integrity and dielectric strength of its insulation and jacket materials.

Consequently, a cable circuit with undetected damaged or degraded insulation could pass an in-service functional test, but still fail unexpectedly when called upon to operate under anticipated environmental conditions or the severe stresses encountered during a design basis event (i.e., fully loaded equipment, more extreme environmental conditions, extended operation in a heavily loaded state6 In sum, Mr. Blanch points out, with specific references to documents and regulation, that Entergy VYs proposed AMP will not provide adequate assurance of protection against safety-related cable failure or flooding under field conditions 5 N1REG/CR-7000 6 NUREG/CR-7000 21

and when called upon for accident condition mitigation.

6. A genuine dispute exists with the applicant/licensee on a material issue of law or fact.

Applicable Rule: 10CFR § 2.309 (f)(1) (vi) In a proceeding other than one under 10 CFR 52.103, provide sufficient information to show that a genuine dispute exists with the applicant/licensee on a material issue of law or fact. This information must include references to specific portions of the application (including the applicant's environmental report and safety report) that the petitioner disputes and the supporting reasons for each dispute, or, if the petitioner believes that the application fails to contain information on a relevant matter as required by law, the identification of each failure and the supporting reasons for the petitioner's belief The material and legal dispute between New England Coalition and the applicant regarding aging management is set out at length and in detail in the foregoing sections of this Motion. In the first instance, the dispute arises when it is details of how Entergy VYs approach to aging management of safety-related buried, underground, or inaccessible electrical cables actually employed are revealed through an NRC Inspection Report-IR 05000271-10-002. The same period inspections and "de-waterings" are in the LRA, but without important and telling detail.

New England Coalition is surprised to learn, for example, that the program at Vermont Yankee, of which the AMP is a simple continuance, is not intended to prevent flood, has no in place sump pumps or monitors, and features inspections conducted at such long intervals as to challenge workers memory. New England Coalition disputes in particular Entergy VY's attestation that the LRA is accurate and complete because the LRA lacks a complete and accurate description of its cable aging management programs. Further, New England Coalition, disputes whether Entergy's AMPs as described in the LRA, Appendix B, Aging Management Programs and Activities, Page B-64. B. 1.19 NON-EQ INSULATED CABLES AND CONNECTIONS and B. 1.17 NON-EQ INACCESSIBLE MEDIUM-VOLTAGE CABLE are accurate and complete and whether they will provide adequate assurance of protection of public health and safety.

22

Further, New England Coalition asserts that the LRA should contain adequate aging management plans for all classes (voltage categories) of safety-related cables and because it doesn't, the LRA does not provide adequate assurance of protection of public health and safety.

7. Contention is Based on Available Documents and Information.

Applicable Rule: 10CFR § 2.309 (f)(1)

(2) Contentions must be based on documents or other information available at the time the petition is to be filed, such as the application, supporting safety analysis report, environmental report or other supporting document filed by an applicant or licensee, or otherwise available to a petitioner.

New England Coalition has provided references to all documents consulted in the making of this petition in the foregoing sections. They include the LRA, the SER, the CFR, NUREG 1801, NUREG CR/7000, NRC Reports, an EPRI Report, and numerous others.

V. Addressing Timeliness - 10 CFR§ 2.309 (c)

In conformance with the Commission's Order of July 8, 2010, New England Coalition addresses the factors to be balanced in determining acceptance of a non-timely filing:

(i) Good cause, if any, for the failure to file on time; The underlying information supporting New England Coalition's Motion was not manifest until recently and thus the issue could not have been raised earlier.

(ii) The nature of the requestor's/petitioner's right under the Act to be made a party to the proceeding: The petitioner is a party to the proceeding.

(iii) The nature and extent of the requestor's/petitioner's property, financial or other interest in the proceeding: New England Coalition was accepted as a party in own right in as much as it has offices with the emergency planning zone of Vermont Yankee NPP and as representative of its members living within 50 miles of Vermont Yankee NPP.

(iv) The possible effect of any order that may be entered in the proceeding on the requestor's/petitioner's interest: Any order that results in improvement of Entergy VY's aging 23

management programs for safety related cables will make Vermont Yankee NPP just that much less dangerous and increase assurance of protection of public health and safety, a palpable benefit.

(v) The availability of other means whereby the requestor's/petitioner's interest will be protected: There are no other means whereby New England Coalition's can be protected with respect to the content of the Entergy VY LRA.

(vi) The extent to which the requestor's/petitioner's interests will be represented by existing parties: New England Coalition is the only party sponsoring a proposed contention.

(vii) The extent to which the requestor's/petitioner's participation will broaden the issues or delay the proceeding: This is a single contention based on one aspect of aging management of components. It is not highly technical in nature, such as contentions dealing with complex phenomena such as metal fatigue and erosion-corrosion. New England Coalition is will to discuss settlement or in other ways work with the parties to toward a near-term resolution. New England Coalition is not averse to participating in an expedited proceeding.

(viii) The extent to which the requestor's/petitioner's participation may reasonably be expected to assist in developing a sound record: The petitioner brings well-researched fact-based argument and the service of a highly experience expert to the service of the Board in building a well-tested and sound record. New England Coalition has been an active and productive intervenor in numerous federal and state administrative proceedings dealing with nuclear subjects since 1971.

VI. MOTION TO SELECT HEARING PROCEDURE PURSUANT TO 10 CFR § 2.309(g) and 10 CFR §2.310. New England Coalition respectfully moves that the hearing resume under 24

Subpart L. All parties are now accustomed to the process of Subpart L and need little instruction

, easing the burden of the presiding panel.

VII. CONCLUSION For all of the good reasons stated above, New England Coalition respectfully urges the Board to admit its proposed Contention for adjudication.

New England Coalition now eagerly awaits the Board's response.

Raymond Shadis Pro Se Representative for New England Coalition Post Office Box 98 Edgecomb, Maine 04556 207-882-7801 shadis@prexar. corn 25

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD Before Administrative Judges:

Alex S. Karlin, Chairman Dr. Richard E. Wardwell Dr. William H. Reed In the Matter of ENTERGY NUCLEAR VERMONT YANKEE, L.L.C.,

and ENTERGY NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, INC.

(Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station)

Docket No. 50-271-LR ASLBP No. 06-849-03-LR August 20, 2010 1.

DECLARATION AND AFFIDAVIT OF PAUL BLANCH Paul Blanch hereby declares under penalty of perjury that the following is true and correct:

I have been retained by the New England Coalition to provide expert services in connection with the application by Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. and its affiliates (collectively Entergy) for a renewal of Vermont Yankee nuclear power generating facility located Vernon, Vermont.

1

Experience

2.

Beginning in 1964, I served in the U.S. Navy as both a nuclear reactor operator and electric plant operator on Polaris class submarines for seven years. These submarines typically were at sea for extended tours of duty. During my Navy service, I and my fellow crew members were in close proximity to the submarines' nuclear reactors that powered the vessels whether they were under the sea or on the surface.

3.

As a qualified Reactor and Electric Plant Operator, I was responsible for the operation of the reactor and supporting safety systems including, piping, valves, radiation monitoring systems, chemical monitoring systems, reactor protection and control systems, cable and cable termination systems, turbines, generators, power supplies, inverters, breakers, switchgear, battery chargers, motor and steam-powered electric generators (AC and DC), and transformers and other components and systems required to support the safe operation of the submarine's nuclear power plant.

4.

I graduated from the U.S. Navy Electronics Technician School in 1964; the U.S. Navy Nuclear Power School, in 1966; and the U.S. Navy Submarine School, in 1968.

5.

As part of my Navy duties, I was certified as an operator/instructor at the Navy prototype reactor (S1C) in Windsor Locks, Connecticut. I instructed Navy officers and enlisted personnel on reactor operations and maintenance including the subjects of reactor and electrical theory related 2

to nuclear systems, power generation, emergency core cooling systems, emergency power systems, diesel generators, water supplies and all other systems required for the operation of the nuclear reactor.

6.

I received an honorable discharge from the Navy in 1971. In 1972, I received a Bachelor of Science in Electrical Engineering from the University of Hartford.

7.

I have more than 40 years of engineering, design, operations, maintenance, engineering management, and project coordination experience for the construction and operation of nuclear power plants. This includes positions at Northeast Utilities that involved in the design, construction, operation, and maintenance of Millstone Units 1, 2, and 3 and Connecticut Yankee (Haddam Neck). During this period, I was under the direction of the Engineering division within Northeast Utilities. I have also been employed by Consolidated Edison and Entergy at Indian Point Unit 2 as an advisor to the Chief Nuclear Officer (CNO) at that facility. I served in a similar position at Maine Yankee reporting to the CNO of Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company.

8.

I am a registered professional engineer in the State of California.

Certificate Number 2235 (currently inactive)

9.

I have actively participated in industry standards writing activities with the American Nuclear Society (ANS), Instrumentation Society of America (ISA), and the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 3

Inc. (IEEE) for use by the nuclear industry.

10.

I have been employed as a contractor for the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) for the development of computerized monitoring systems for nuclear power plants including monitoring the conditions of active devices including pressure and level monitoring systems.

11.

I have been engaged as a contractor to Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI, previously NUMARC) to educate Chief Nuclear Officers on the attributes of a Safety Conscious Work Environment (SCWE).

12.

In 1993, I was named "Engineer of the Year" by Westinghouse Electric and Control magazine for my efforts in identifying the subtle failures of active electrical devices such as pressure, level, and flow transmitters and indicators.

13.

I have reviewed Vermont Yankee's License Renewal Application and the subsequent submittals by Entergy to renew the operating licenses for Indian Point Unit 2 and Unit 3. I have also reviewed pertinent sections of the NRC's Safety Evaluation Report dated May 2008 (NUREG 1907).

Non-Environmentally-Qualified Inaccessible Medium and Low Voltage Cables and Wiring

14.

Cables play vital roles in the operation of a nuclear power plant. This is clearly recognized by 10 CFR 54.4 and 54.21.

15.

Low voltage and medium voltage cables are clearly defined in 4

NUREG 1801 (GALL) as follows:

"The power cables and connections addressed are low-voltage (<1000V) and medium-voltage (2 kV to 35 kV). High voltage (>35 kV) power cables' and connections have unique, specialized constructions and must be evaluated on an application specific basis"

16.

The NRC's Inspection Report of Vermont Yankee dated May 10, 2010 states:

"The inspectors identified an NCV of very low safety significance (Green) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix S, Criterion III, "Design Control," because Entergy did not select and review safety-related cables suitable for application in the environment in which they were found. Specifically, Entergy allowed the continuous submergence of safety-related cables that were not qualified for continuous submergence and failed to demonstrate that the cables would remain operable. Entergy initiated CR-VTY-2009-04142 and CR-VTY-2010-01422 to address the issues, commenced dewatering of the affected manholes, and initiated a preventive maintenance plan to ensure proper conditions."

And "Two manholes, MH-32(SII) and MH-33(SII) contained safety-related cables that were submerged. These cables were control cables for the EDGs, and control and power cables for the EDG fuel oil transfer pumps [Emphasis added]. Neither of the manholes with submerged safety-related cables contained sump pumps or other de-watering devices."

17.

Based upon more than 40 years of engineering, operation and design experience, I believe these cables are designed to operate between <1000 to 35,000 volts as defined in NUREG 1801.

18.

This is new information from the May 10, 2010 NRC's Inspection 1 Cables designed for service between 1000 and 2000 volts are not defined.

5

Report has not been previously identified either within Vermont's License Renewal Application or discussed in the NRC's Safety Evaluation Report.

NRC Regulations

19.

In preparing this declaration, I reviewed 10 C.F.R. § 54.4.

Specifically, § 54.4 states:

§ 54.4 Scope.

(a) Plant systems, structures, and components within the scope of this part are-(1) Safety-related systems, structures, and components which are those relied upon to remain functional during and following design-basis events (as defined in 10 CFR 50.49 (b)(1)) to ensure the following functions-(i) The integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary; (ii) The capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition; or (iii) The capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents which could result in potential offsite exposures comparable to those referred to in § 50.34(a)(1), § 50.67(b)(2), or § 100.11 of this chapter, as applicable.

(2) All nonsafety-related systems, structures, and components whose failure could prevent satisfactory accomplishment of any of the functions identified in paragraphs (a)(1)(i), (ii), or (iii) of this section.

(3) All systems, structures, and components relied on in safety analyses or plant evaluations to perform a function that demonstrates compliance with the Commission's regulations for fire protection (10 CFR 50.48), environmental qualification (10 CFR 50.49), pressurized thermal shock (10 CFR 50.61), anticipated transients without scram (10 CFR 50.62), and station blackout (10 CFR 50.63).

6

(b) The intended functions that these systems, structures, and components must be shown to fulfill in § 54.21 are those functions that are the bases for including them within the scope of license renewal as specified in paragraphs (a)(1) - (3) of this section.

20.

I also reviewed 10 C.F.R. § 54.21. Specifically, § 54.21(a)(1) provides:

§ 54.21 Contents of application-technical information.

Each application must contain the following information:

(a) An integrated plant assessment (IPA). The IPA must--

(1) For those systems, structures, and components within the scope of this part, as delineated in § 54.4, identify and list those structures and components subject to an aging management review. Structures and components subject to an aging management review shall encompass those structures and components--

(i)

That perform an intended function, as described in§ 54.4, without moving parts or without a change in configuration or properties. These structures and components include, but are not limited to, the reactor vessel, the reactor coolant system pressure boundary, steam generators, the pressurizer, piping, pump casings, valve bodies, the core shroud, component supports, pressure retaining boundaries, heat exchangers, ventilation ducts, the containment, the containment liner, electrical and mechanical penetrations, equipment hatches, seismic Category I structures, electrical cables [emphasis added] and connections, cable trays, and electrical cabinets, excluding, but not limited to, pumps (except casing), valves (except body), motors, diesel generators, air compressors, snubbers, the control rod drive, ventilation dampers, pressure transmitters, pressure indicators, water level indicators, switchgears, cooling fans, transistors, batteries, breakers, relays, switches, power inverters, circuit boards, battery chargers, and power supplies; and (ii)

That are not subject to replacement based on a qualified life or specified time period.10 C.F.R. § 54.21(a)(1)(i), (ii).

21.

Based on my review of 10 C.F.R. § 54.21(a)(1), and 10 CFR § 7

54.4, electrical cables are included within the scope of § 10 CFR 54, irrespective of the design of or the applied voltage.

22.

A diligent review of the LRA and the NRC Staffs SER finds no such Time Limited Aging Analysis (TLAA) or Aging Management Program (AMP); thus I am led to conclude that the LRA is inaccurate and incomplete with respect to TLAA or AMP of below-grade, buried, underground, or otherwise inaccessible safety-related electrical cable.

23.

Complete and accurate Time Limited Aging Analysis (TLAA) or an effective Aging Management Program (AMP) would take into account the potential physical degradation effects of submergence in water on those electrical cables and components which are susceptible to flooding but which have not been environmentally qualified for submergence.

Consequences of Inadequate Management of Low and Medium Voltage Cables

24.

The failure to properly manage aging of electric cables at Vermont Yankee may compromise plant safety as discussed within 10 CFR 54.4:

§ 54.4 Scope.

(a) Plant systems, structures, and components within the scope of this part are--

(1) Safety-related systems, structures, and components which are those relied upon to remain functional during and following design-basis events (as defined in 10 CFR 50.49 (b)(1)) to ensure the following functions--

(i) The integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary; 8

(ii) The capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition; or (iii) The capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents which could result in potential offsite exposures comparable to those referred to in § 50.34(a)(1), § 50.67(b)(2), or § 100.11 of this chapter, as applicable.

25.

The consequence of failures of safety related cables may result in accidents beyond the Design Basis Accidents resulting in exposures to the public exceeding 10 C.F.R. § 100 limits.

26.

Failure to properly manage aging of electrical cables could result in loss of emergency power to safety equipment including station blackout loads as discussed in § 10 CFR 50.63.

27.

In the NRC Staff evaluation,SER VOLUME TWO, it stated:

"Non-Environmental Qualification Inaccessible Medium-Voltage Cable Program Summary of Technical Information in the Application. LRA Section B. 1.17 describes the new Non-Environmental Qualification Inaccessible Medium-Voltage Cable Program as consistent with GALL AMP XI.E3, "Inaccessible Medium-Voltage Cables Not Subject to 10 CFR 50.49 Environmental Qualification Requirements."

28.

In its description of its aging management program Vermont Yankee has not proposed any methodology to precluded or detect the submergence of Medium Voltage Cables.

9

29.

The majority of the cables 2 at Vermont Yankee are low voltage as defined by GALL. All control circuits, instrumentation and many ac power circuits are less than 2 kv excluded by Vermont Yankee from any aging management program even though they are within the scope of 10 CFR 54.

30.

Most of the cables within the scope of 10 CFR 54 (<2 kv) are not identified and not inspected or maintained by any aging management program. These cables are also periodically submerged and not qualified for the environment.

31.

The polymers used for the insulation and jacket materials for electric cables, cable splices, and terminations are susceptible to aging and degradation mechanisms caused by exposure to many of the stressors encountered in nuclear power plant service environments. Longer cable circuits may pass through several different operating environments over the length of their routing throughout the plant. Portions of a cable circuit may pass through areas experiencing more harsh environmental conditions, such as high temperature, high radiation, high humidity, or flooding of underground cables. There has been concern that such local adverse environmental stressors can cause excessive aging and degradation 2 NUREG/CR 7000 "A nuclear power plant may contain more than 50,000 electric cable circuits, of which about 60% are control circuits, 20% are instrumentation, 13% are ac power, 1% are dc power, and the remainder are miscellaneous communications circuits" 10

in the exposed sections of a cable that could significantly shorten its effective service life and cause unexpected early failures 3.

32.

The integrity and function of power and instrumentation and control (I&C) cables are monitored indirectly through the performance of in-service testing of safety-related systems and components. These tests can demonstrate the function of the cables under test conditions. However, they do not provide assurance that they will continue to perform successfully when they are called upon to operate fully loaded for extended periods as they would under normal service operating conditions or under design basis conditions. In-service testing of a cable does not provide specific information on the status of cable aging degradation processes nor the physical integrity and dielectric strength of its insulation and jacket materials. Consequently, a cable circuit with undetected damaged or degraded insulation could pass an in-service functional test, but still fail unexpectedly when called upon to operate under anticipated environmental conditions or the severe stresses encountered during a design basis event (i.e., fully loaded equipment, more extreme environmental conditions, extended operation in a heavily loaded state)4.

3 NUREG/CR-7000 4 NUREG/CR-7000 11

33.

The 10 CFR Part 50 regulations require licensees to assess the condition of their components, to monitor the performance or condition of structures, systems, and components in a manner sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that they are capable of fulfilling their intended functions, and to establish a test program to ensure that all testing required to demonstrate that components will perform satisfactorily in service is identified and performed.

Recent incidents involving early failures of electric cables and cable failures leading to multiple equipment failures, as cited in IN 2002-12, "Submerged Safety-Related Cables," and Generic Letter 2007-01, "Inaccessible or Underground Power Cable Failures That Disable Accident Mitigation Systems or Cause Plant Transients,"

suggest that licensee approaches to cable testing, such as in-service testing, surveillance testing, preventive maintenance, maintenance rule, etc., do not fully characterize the condition of cable insulation nor provide information on the extent of aging and degradation mechanisms that can lead to cable failure. Analysis of the summary of licensee responses to GL 2007-01 inquiries on licensees' experiences regarding cable failures and cable CM activities, revealed wide variations to the approaches and comprehensiveness of cable testing activities. Analysis of the reported cable failures also indicated a trend toward early cable failures occurring prior to 12

the end of the original 40-year license period. These data prompted the NRC to consider whether "...licensees should have a program for using available diagnostic cable testing methods to assess cable condition."5

'NUREG/CR-7000 13

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the foregoing is true and correct.

Paul M. Blanch Da~d West Hartford Connecticut

,,;rrmnnt Yankee Pcowe Staic,-

License.. enMl Applica-on Te:d-xica! Inlormarion B.i AGING MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS AND ACTIVITIES B.1.1 BURIED PIPING INSPECTION Program Description The Buried Pipino Inspection Prcgram a. VYN.? is comparable to the progran described in NUFREG-1601,.Section XI.M34, Buried :iping and Tanks Inspection.

This prcgram includes (a) pre.;entriv measures to mi.t.cgate corrosion and fb} inspections to manage the effects of corrosion on the pressure-retaining capability of buried carbon steel, stainless steel, and gray cast iron components.,Preveniive measures are in accordance with standard industry practice for maintaining external coatings and wrappfngs. Buried componen's are inspected when exca'.ated during maintenance.

Prior to entering the perid of extended operatio n, pIant operating experience will b~e reviewed to verify that an inspect.on occurred wi-.thin the past ten years. A focused inspection will be performed within the first 10 years of the period of extended operation, unless an opportunistic inspection (or arn inspection via a method that allows an assessment of pipe condition without excavation) occurs within this ten-year period.

NUREG-1801 Consistency The Buried Piping Inspection Pcogram at VYNPE is consistent with the program described in NU*.EG-1601,Section XI.M34-Buried Piping and Tanks Inspection, with exceptions and an enhancement.

Exceptions to NUREG-1801 The Buried Piping Inspection Program at VYNPS is consistent with 'he program descrided in HUREG-1 601, --ection XI.M34.. Buried Piping and Tanks Inspection, with the following exceptions and enhancement.

Attributes Affected Exceptions

1.

S,=

f P:cgran NUPO-I*

Cdrefers ýc buried sieel piping and

".rlzs. The VY*FPS prcgm des.

no*: inspe-c tDttecn or Aging ef*etts Inspections -iJ rnthods. tha' allow assesnvant of pipe cdi.Ion, without exav-ation nmay be subslllu;ýec for inspections requir~i*g excavation solely fc" the,urpose ýf LnspecSion:,-,

s!

6 Agý!Ig 1.1z...nagenieat Prc-grarns and X-tWtMes Page 3-15

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD Before Administrative Judges:

Alex S. Karlin, Chairman Dr. Richard E. Wardwell Dr. William H. Reed In the Matter of ENTERGY NUCLEAR VERMONT YANKEE, L.L.C.,

and ENTERGY NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, INC.

(Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station)

Docket No. 50-271-LR ASLBP No. 06-849-03-LR August 20, 2010 NEW ENGLAND COALITION'S MOTION TO REOPEN THE HEARING AND FOR THE ADMISSION OF NEW CONTENTIONS CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of the foregoing NEW ENGLAND COALITION'S MOTION TO REOPEN THE HEARING AND FOR THE ADMISSION OF A NEW CONTENTION have been served upon the following persons by E-Mail and U.S. mail, first class, Office of Commission Appellate Adjudication U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 0caarnail a nrc.gov; U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of the Secretary of the Commission Mail Stop O-16C1 Washington, DC 20555-0001 hearingdocket@nrc.gov; Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Mail Stop - T-3 F23 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 Alex S. Karlin, Chair Administrative Judge Ask2@o nrc.gov; Richard E. Wardwell Administrative Judge rew(2inrc.gov; William H. Reed Administrative Judge Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel 1819 Edgewood Lane Charlottesville, VA 22902 whrcv, I le(c!,embargmail.corn; Lauren Bregman, Law Clerk Laren.bregrana nrc.gov; Lloyd B. Subin, Esq.

Maxwell C. Smith.

Susan L. Uttal, Esq.

Mary B Spencer, Esq.

Brian Newell, Paralegal Office of the General Counsel 015D21 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 Lyod.Subingnrc.gov; Maxwell.sm ithfnrc.gov; Susan.utall Inrc.gov; bpn@nrc.gov; rncbi2nrc.gov

Sarah Hofmann, Esq.

Director for Public Advocacy Department of Public Service 112 State Street - Drawer 20 Montpelier, VT 05620-2601 Sarah.hoffinian(@state.vt. us Anthony Z. Roisman, Esq.

National Legal Scholars Law Firm 84 East Thetford Rd.

Lyme, NH 03768 aroisman@(nationallegalscholars.com Matthew Brock Assistant Attorney General Environmental Protection Division Office of the Attorney General One Ashburton Place, 18th Floor Boston, MA 02108 matthew.brock(nastate.ina.us Alan A. Pemberton, Esq.

Covington & Burling, LLP Counsel for Electric Power Research Institute 1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20004-2401 apem bertona).cov.com; dblakely(2icov.com Robert L. Stewart New England Coalition 229 Kibbee Ext.

Brookfield, Vermont 05036

&akeskis@ aol.corn Peter C. L. Roth, Esq.

Senior Assistant Attorney General State of New Hampshire Office of the New Hampshire Attorney General 33 Capitol Street Concord, NH 03301 peter,.roth @doj.gnh1i.gov Dan MacArthur, Director Town of Marlboro Emergency Management P.O. Box 30 Marlboro, VT 05344 drnacarthur@igc.oorg Callie B. Newton, Chair Gail MacArthur Lucy Gratwick Town of Marlboro SelectBoard P.O. Box 518 Marlboro, VT 05344 cbnewton@ sover.net David R. Lewis, Esq.

Matias F. Travieso-Diaz, Esq.

Elina Teplinsky, Esq.

Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman, LLP 2300 N Street, NW Washington, DC 20037-1128 david.lewis@pillsbuD,.com; matias.travesio-diaz@pillsbury.comn; elina.treplinskyva),pi IIsbury.com; blake.nelson(iiaoi Isburv.com Raymond Shadis New England Coalition P.O. Box 98 Edgecomb, ME 04556 this 20th day of August 2010 27

New England Coalition VT NH ME MA RI CT NY POST OFFICE BOX 545, BRATTLEBORO, VERMONT o5302 August 20, 2010 Office of the Secretary Attn: Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff Mail Stop: O-16C1 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 RE: Docket No. 50-271-LR, ASLBP No. 06-849-03-LR, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station (Remand)

Dear Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff,

Please find enclosed for filing before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board in the above captioned proceeding: NEW ENGLAND COALITION'S MOTION TO REOPEN THE HEARING AND FOR THE ADMISSION OF NEW CONTENTIONS; together with the DECLARATION AND AFFIDAVIT OF PAUL BLANCH Thank you for your kind attention, for New England Coalition, Inc.

Raymond Shadis Pro Se Representative Post Office Box 98 Edgecomb, Maine 04556

Hearing Docket From:

Sent:

To:

Cc:

Subject:

Attachments:

Raymond Shadis [shadis@prexar.com]

Friday, August 20, 2010 9:58 PM Karlin, Alex; Wardwell, Richard; whrcville@embarqmail.com; secy@nrc.gov; Docket, Hearing; Uttal, Susan; Subin, Lloyd; Spencer, Mary; Sarah.hofmann@state.vt.us; aroisman@nationallegalscholars.com; peter.roth@doj.nh.gov; Matthew. Brock@state.ma.us; zachary.kahn@nrc.gov; OCAAMAIL Resource; laren.bregman@nrc.gov; Smith, Maxwell; bpn@nrc.gov; Spencer, Mary; cbnewton@sover.net; dmacarthur@igc.org; david.lewis@pillsburylaw.com; matias.ttravieso-diaz@pillsburylaw.com; elina.treplinsky@pillsburylaw.com; blake.nelso@pillsburylaw.com; jakeskis@aol.com; apemberton@cov.com; dbakely@cov.com Paul Blanch; Clay Turnbull; NECNP NEW ENLAND COALITION MOTION TO REOPEN VY LRA 2010-08-20 NEC MOTION 2 REOPEN.doc; 201005 Blanch declaration VY Submerged cables (2).doc; 2010-08-20 CVR LTR.doc New England Coalition VT NH ME MA R1 CT NY POST OFFICE BOX 545, BRATTLEBORO, VERMONT o5302 August 20, 2010 Office of the Secretary Attn: Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff Mail Stop: O-16C1 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 RE: Docket No. 50-271-LR, ASLBP No. 06-849-03-LR, Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station (Remand)

Dear Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff,

Please find attached for filing before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board in the above captioned proceeding:

NEW ENGLAND COALITION'S MOTION TO REOPEN THE HEARING AND FOR THE ADMISSION OF NEW CONTENTIONS; together with the DECLARATION AND AFFIDAVIT OF PAUL BLANCH Thank you for your kind attention,

/RS for New England Coalition, Inc.

Raymond Shadis Pro Se Representative Post Office Box 98 1

Edgecomb, Maine 04556 2

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<david.lewis@pillsburylaw.com>, <matias.ttravieso-diaz@pillsburylaw.com>,

<elina.treplinsky@pillsburylaw.com>, <blake.nelso@pillsburylaw.com>,

<jakeskis@aol.com>, <apemberton@cov.com>, <dbakely@cov.com>

CC: Paul Blanch <pmblanch@comcast.net>, Clay Turnbull <turnbull@together.net>,

NECNP <necnp@necnp.org>

Subject:

NEW ENLAND COALITION MOTION TO REOPEN VY LRA Date: Fri, 20 Aug 2010 21:57:34 -0400 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="----= NextPart_000_0045_01 CB40B2.B8BA8920" X-Mailer: Microsoft Office Outlook, Build 11.0.5510 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.0.6001.18416 Thread-Index: ActAl DiH5stGdrBWSqOD+TJUV7wiSg==

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