ML032340725
| ML032340725 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  (DPR-033, DPR-052, DPR-068) |
| Issue date: | 08/16/2003 |
| From: | Ernstes M Operator Licensing and Human Performance Branch |
| To: | Scalice J Tennessee Valley Authority |
| Shared Package | |
| ML032380265 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-259/02-301, 50-260/02-301, 50-296/02-301 50-259/02-301, 50-260/02-301, 50-296/02-301 | |
| Download: ML032340725 (27) | |
See also: IR 05000259/2002301
Text
Draft Submittal
(Pink Paper)
BROWNS FERRY
EXAM 2002-301
50-259, 50-260, & 50-296
DECEMBER 13,16-19,2002
1.
Operating Test Simulator Scenarios
BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT
INITIAL LICENSE SCENARIO OUTLINE
Page 1 of 3
i/
Scenario Obiective
Evaluate the operators in using the emergency depressurization contingency procedure based on
area high radiation.
Scenario Summary
Initial Conditions:
100% RTP
D diesel generator tagged
.
Events:
RClC steam leak
2-SR-3.3.6.1.2(3C), HPCl Rupture Disk, in progress
Alternate stator cooling water pumps and notification of 2-SR-3.3.6.1.2(3C) failure
Slow loss of HP feedwater heating on B string
Spurious reactor water cleanup system isolation
28 reactor feedwater pump trip
2A and 2C reactor feedwater pump trip
Scenario Sequence
The DUO alternates stator coolina water PumPS
Event one - Alternate stator coolina water pumps and notification of 2-SR-3.3.6.1.2(3C) failure
The DUO alternates stator cooling water pumps and the SRO receives notification of an SR
failure.
The SRO receives a report that 2kR-3.3.6.1.2(3C) has failed
A slow (but slowly increasing) leak develops in 82 high pressure heater
L
The reactor water cleanup system spuriously isolates
28 reactor feedwater pump trips
2A and 2C reactor feedwater pumps trip
When RClC is used for level control a leak into secondary containment develops
Malfunctions required: None
Objective:
Evaluate the DUO in use of normal operating procedures and evaluate the SRO in use of
Technical Specification.
Success Path:
s
Start 28 stator cooling water pump and stop 2A stator cooling water pump
Determine T.S. 3.3.6.1 for HPCl failure - not action required, only three switches required
Page 2 of 3
Event two - Slow loss of HP feedwater heatina on B string
The crew responds to a slowly increasing leak in 82 high pressure heater.
Malfunctions Required: 1
Objective:
Evaluate the crew on use of Abnormal Operating Instructions in responding to the heater leak.
Success Path:
.
Notify Reactor Engineer
b
Dispatch personnel to heat controls
Reduce power to 91% when extractions isolate
With heater level still rising, reduces power to 79% and isolates feedwater side of heater
string
Event three - Spurious reactor water cleanup Svstem isolation
The crew will respond to a spurious isolation of the reactor water cleanup system
Malfunctions Required: 1
Objective:
Evaluate the BUO on use of Abnormal Operating Instructions in responding to a loss of the
reactor water cleanup system.
Success Path:
Verify isolation valves close
Check related temperatures
Notify chemistry and reactor engineer
Event 4 - 28 reactor feedwater pumD trip
The crew responds to a spurious feedwater pump trip.
Malfunctions Required: 1
Objective:
Evaluate the BUO on use of Abnormal Operating Instructions in responding to a loss of the
reactor feedwater pump.
Success Path.
Ensure unit is stable
Dispatch personnel to investigate
i_/
Page 3 of 3
Event 5 - 2A and 2C reactor feedwater pumps trip
The crew responds to a sudden loss of reactor feedwater and a low level scram.
Malfunctions Required: 2
Objective:
Evaluate the crew in response to loss of feedwater and inevitable reactor scram
Success Path:
Event 6 - RClC steam leak
The crew will respond to an unisolable RClC system leak and emergency depressurize due to
high area radiation in secondaly containment.
Malfunctions Required: 1 ( 2 if HPCl is initiated)
Objective:
Evaluate the crew on their response to an unisolable leak in the reactor building which leads to
emergency depressurizing due to two area above max safe.
i/
Recognize loss of all feedwater
Manually scram the reactor before auto scram on low level
Maintain water level with RCIC, HPCl and CRD
\\-,
Success Path:
Direct RClC isolated locally
Scenario Recapitulation
Total Malfunctions
6
Abnormal Events
3
Major Transients
2
EOls Entered
3
EO1 Contingencies
1 (C2)
Recognize RClC leak (alarms) after RClC initiated
Recognize RClC fails to isolate and attempt to manually isolate
Emergency depressurize when two areas above max safe
Restore RPV level to +2 to +51 inches with condensate, RHR, core spray, HPCl
Recognize HPCl auto control failure and take manual control (If used)
c
Appendix D
Operator Actions
Form ES-D-2 (R8, S
II
Op-Test No.: __ Scenario No.: 02NRC-3
Event No.: 1
Page 1
of -1-
Appendix D
Operator Actions
Form ES-D-2 (R8, S
I,
Op-Test No.: __ Scenario No.: 02NRC-3
Event No.: 1
Event Description: Normal OperationdHPCI pressure switch failure
Page 1
of -1-
rewired
I
I
Time
I
I Announces B1 and 82 heater extraction isolation
Position
Applicant's Actions or Behavior
SRO fi
Directs Dower reduction to ~79%
Enters GOI-100-12.
Power Maneuverina
-~ 1
i
BID 9
Notifies chemistlv and rad con of Dower reduction
Crew
Appendix D
Operator Actions
I,
-
BID
~~
3
b
c-
~
Evaluate Tech Soecs CfRM TSR 3.4.1) chemistw sarnDlina is reauired if
~ _ _ _ _ _
c
Event Description: 2B Reactor Feedwater Pump Trip
8
c
ppendix D
Operator Actions
Form ES-D-2 (R8, S I
Op-Test No.: -
Scenario No.: 02NRC-3
Event No.:
Page 1
of -1-
Event Description: 2A and 2C Reactor Feedwater Pump Trips
1 Recoonizes trio of 2C RFP
I
Appendix D
Operator Actions
Op-Test No.: -
Scenario No.: 02NRC-3
Event No.: 3
Page 1
of 2
Event Description: RClC Steam Leak
l/,
Appendix D
Operator Actions
Form ES-D-2 (R8, S'l)
Op-Test No.: -
Scenario No.: 02NRC-3
Event No.: 5
Page -2-
of 2
Event Description: RClC Steam Leak (Continued)
I
I
Time
Position
Applicant's Actions or Behavior
Directs all available suppression pool cooling placed in service
D I _
I Places H202 analyzers in service
Places all available suppression pool cooling in service
BID
I
Page 1 of 4
BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT
INITIAL LICENSE SCENARIO OUTLINE
ii
Scenario Obiective
Evaluate the operators in using the emergency depressurization (C2) and alternate level control
(CI) EO1 contingency procedures.
Scenario Summaw
Initial Conditions: 79% RTP, 2C RHR pump tagged, 2-SR-3.5.1.7, HPCl Flow Rate Test, in
progress.
Events:
Alternate EHC pumps
Power ascension
. SRV-1-22 fails open
.
MSlV closurelLOCA
Scenario Sequence
HPCl steamline breaks during flow rate SR and fails to auto isolate
Recirculation pump vibration, seal leakage and scram
. . . .
L-, .
Alternate EHC pumps
Continue power ascension at prescribed rate
HPCl steamline breaks during SR requiring manual isolation and EOI-3 entry
SRV-1-22 fails open and closes when DUO responds by cycling the valve
2A recirc pump develops vibration problems to the point of causing seal failure, requiring
pump trip and isolation but the suction valve will not close
drywell pressure begins increasing
Power oscillation develop requiring a manual scram
The MSlVs fail closed due to a fuse failure in the Group I isolation circuit
The RPV water level drop to below -100 requiring implementation of C1, alternate level
control
When water level reaches TAF (-162) the crew emergency depressurizes and reestablishes
normal water level with low pressure systems
Page 2 of 4
Event one -Alternate EHC pumps
The DUO will alternate EHC pumps IAW 01-47.
Malfunctions required: None
Objective:
Evaluate the crew during normal operating evolutions.
v
Success Path:
Start 28 EHC pump
Stop 2A EHC pump
Event two - Power ascension
The crew will raise reactor power at the prescribed rate using recirc flow.
Malfunctions required: None
Objective:
Evaluate the crew during normal operating evolutions.
Success Path:
Use peer checker
Event three - HPCl steamline break
Raise reactor power at the desired rate
L
The crew will respond to a HPCl steamline leak, and failure to auto isolate, in accordance with
the Abnormal Operating Instructions and will briefly enter 01-3.
Malfunctions Required: 2
Objective:
Evaluate the crew in use of Abnormal Operating Instructions during a HPCl steamline break and
failure to auto isolate. Evaluate the SRO who will briefly enter EOI-3 and make a technical
specification determination.
Success Path:
9
Close FCV-1-55 and FCV-1-56
Recognize HPCl steamline break - alarms, area temps, area radiation
Recognize failure of HPCl to auto isolate and manually isolate
Determine unit in 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> LCO (TS 3.5.1.D-HPCI and C RHR inop)
Determine 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> to tag a HPCl steamline isolation valve closed (TS 3.6.1.3)
Page 3 of 4
Event 4 - SRV-1-22 fails open
The crew will respond to an SRV failing open using the Abnormal Operating Instructions. The
valve will close when cycled.
Malfunctions required: 1
Objective:
Evaluate the crew on Abnormal Operating Instruction usage while responding to an open SRV.
Success Path:
Recognize SRV open
Cycle the valve
Recognize valve close
Event 5 - Recirc vibration, seal leakage. power oscillations and scram
The crew will experience 2A recirc pump vibration which leads to seal failure, pump trip and
power oscillations requiring a manual scram.
Malfunctions required: 4
Objective:
Evaluate the crew response to an abnormal event (recirc pump vibration, leakage, trip) using the
abnormal operating instructions and recognizing power oscillations requiring a scram.
c,
Request engineering evaluation of operability
Success Path:
i-,
Change pump speed
Recognize seal failure
Recognize power oscillations
Manually scram
Recognize pump vibration and dispatch personnel
Trip and isolate recirc pump
Recognize failure of suction valve to isolate and dispatch personnel to investigate
L-.
Page 4 of 4
Event 6 - MSlV closure/LOCA
When the crew inserts a manual scram the MSlVs close due a fuse failure leaving them with
RCIC, CRD and SLC for high pressure level control with an increasing recirc pump piping leak.
They will ultimately be required to depressurize due to being unable to maintain RPV level above
TAF.
Malfunctions Required: 2
Objective:
Evaluate the crew in recognizing a condition requiring a manual scram (power oscillation) and
implementation of the EOls including contingencies C1 (alternate level control) and C2
(emergency depressurization).
Success Path:
C'
. .
L,
. . . . .
Recognize MSlV closure
Control pressure 800-1000 psig with alternate means (SRVs, RCIC)
Attempt to maintain RPV level + 2 to +51"
Enter EOI-1 and 2
Initiate suppression pool cooling
Spray the suppression chamber
Initiate a cooldown'
Spray the drywell
trip 28 recirc pump
stop drywell blowers
Report CRD pumps tripped
Send personnel to perform Appendix 78, RPV Makeup from the SLC Test Tank
At RPV level -100" to -122 enter C1
Inhibit ADS
Stop spraying containment
Emergency depressurize when RPV level reaches TAF
Restore RPV level to + 2 to +51" with low pressure systems
Scenario RecaDitulation
Total Malfunctions:
9
Abnormal Events:
2
Major Transients:
2
EOls Entered
3
EO1 Contingencies
2
ppendix D
Operator Actions
Form ES-D-2 (R8, S
c
Time
Position
Applicant's Actions or Behavior
Dir-
IAW GO1 -
-
100 12 and 01-68
DUO I
I
i/
Event Description: HPCl steam line break
BID
ODens FCV-1-55 and 56 (9-3)
SRO 1
Determines 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> to isolate and taa either FCV-73-2 or 3 TTS 3.6.1.3)
________
ii
c
reauests enaineerina evaluation
I
I
I
r
~
I
I
N
U
Op-Test No.: -
Scenario No.: NRC-4 Event No.: 5
Page 1
of 2
>e
c
4
Appendix D
Operator Actions
OpTest No.: __ Scenario No.: NRC-4 Event No.: 5 Page 2
of 2
Op-Test No.: __ Scenario No.: NRC-4 Event No.: 6 Page 1
of 4
W
b
I
1 SRO
1 Directs ADoendix 8G Derformed
1
BID
Op-Test No.: __ Scenario No.: NRC-4 Event No.: 6 Page 2
of 4
L/,
ii
Crew
BID
Operator Actions
Form ES-D-2 (R8, S I
Appendix D
Ir
Appendix 7B (SLC)
Monitors drywelllPSCland RPV water level
Enters C! at -100 to -122
Directs ADS inhibited
Closes RFP discharge valves
Reports 2A CRD pump tripped
Inhibits ADS (Critical Task)
Afler entering Cldirects
Terminating containment sprays
Aligning all available injection systems for injection
(Continued)
Op-Test No.: -
Scenario No.: NRC-4 Event No.: 6
Event Description: MSlV closure/LOCA (Continued)
Page 3
of 4
Appendix D
Operator Actions
Op-Test No.: -
Scenario No.: NRC-4 Event No.: 6
Page 4
of __
4
Event Description: MSlV closurelLOCA (Continued)
BID
When directed by SRO, terminates containment sprays and aligns RHR
for LPCl injection
Opens and verifies open 6 ADS valves (Critical Task)
-
BID
Restores RPV water level to +2to +51" using: (Critical Task)
Condensate
C2 and directs the following:
Open 6 ADS valves
Restore RPV level to + 2 to +51"
It
I
1 SRO
1 Classifies event as a Site Area Emergency (1 .l-Sl)
I