ML032340725

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BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT

INITIAL LICENSE SCENARIO OUTLINE

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Scenario Obiective

Evaluate the operators in using the emergency depressurization contingency procedure based on

area high radiation.

Scenario Summary

Initial Conditions:

100% RTP

. D diesel generator tagged

2-SR-3.3.6.1.2(3C), HPCl Rupture Disk, in progress

Events:

Alternate stator cooling water pumps and notification of 2-SR-3.3.6.1.2(3C) failure

Slow loss of HP feedwater heating on B string

Spurious reactor water cleanup system isolation

28 reactor feedwater pump trip

2A and 2C reactor feedwater pump trip

RClC steam leak

Scenario Sequence

The DUO alternates stator coolina water PumPS

The SRO receives a report that 2kR-3.3.6.1.2(3C) has failed

A slow (but slowly increasing) leak develops in 82 high pressure heater

L The reactor water cleanup system spuriously isolates

28 reactor feedwater pump trips

2A and 2C reactor feedwater pumps trip

When RClC is used for level control a leak into secondary containment develops

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Event one Alternate stator coolina water pumps and notification of 2-SR-3.3.6.1.2(3C) failure

The DUO alternates stator cooling water pumps and the SRO receives notification of an SR

failure.

Malfunctions required: None

Objective:

Evaluate the DUO in use of normal operating procedures and evaluate the SRO in use of

Technical Specification.

Success Path:

Start 28 stator cooling water pump and stop 2A stator cooling water pump

s -

Determine T.S. 3.3.6.1 for HPCl failure not action required, only three switches required

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Event two - Slow loss of HP feedwater heatina on B string

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The crew responds to a slowly increasing leak in 82 high pressure heater.

Malfunctions Required: 1

Objective:

Evaluate the crew on use of Abnormal Operating Instructions in responding to the heater leak.

Success Path:

. Dispatch personnel to heat controls

Notify Reactor Engineer

Reduce power to 91% when extractions isolate

With heater level still rising, reduces power to 79% and isolates feedwater side of heater

string

Event three - Spurious reactor water cleanup Svstem isolation

The crew will respond to a spurious isolation of the reactor water cleanup system

Malfunctions Required: 1

Objective:

Evaluate the BUO on use of Abnormal Operating Instructions in responding to a loss of the

reactor water cleanup system.

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Success Path:

Verify isolation valves close

Check related temperatures

Notify chemistry and reactor engineer

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Event 4 28 reactor feedwater pumD trip

The crew responds to a spurious feedwater pump trip.

Malfunctions Required: 1

Objective:

Evaluate the BUO on use of Abnormal Operating Instructions in responding to a loss of the

reactor feedwater pump.

Success Path.

Ensure unit is stable

Dispatch personnel to investigate

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Event 5 2A and 2C reactor feedwater pumps trip

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The crew responds to a sudden loss of reactor feedwater and a low level scram.

Malfunctions Required: 2

Objective:

Evaluate the crew in response to loss of feedwater and inevitable reactor scram

Success Path:

Recognize loss of all feedwater

Manually scram the reactor before auto scram on low level

Maintain water level with RCIC, HPCl and CRD

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Event 6 RClC steam leak

The crew will respond to an unisolable RClC system leak and emergency depressurize due to

high area radiation in secondaly containment.

Malfunctions Required: 1 ( 2 if HPCl is initiated)

Objective:

Evaluate the crew on their response to an unisolable leak in the reactor building which leads to

emergency depressurizing due to two area above max safe.

\-, Success Path:

Recognize RClC leak (alarms) after RClC initiated

Recognize RClC fails to isolate and attempt to manually isolate

Direct RClC isolated locally

Emergency depressurize when two areas above max safe

Restore RPV level to +2 to +51 inches with condensate, RHR, core spray, HPCl

Recognize HPCl auto control failure and take manual control (If used)

Scenario Recapitulation

Total Malfunctions 6

Abnormal Events 3

Major Transients 2

EOls Entered 3

EO1 Contingencies 1 (C2)

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Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 (R8, S

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Op-Test No.: __ Scenario No.: 02NRC-3 Event No.: 1 Page 1 of -1-

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 (R8, S

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Op-Test No.: __ Scenario No.: 02NRC-3 Event No.: 1 Page 1 of -1-

Event Description: Normal OperationdHPCI pressure switch failure

rewired

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Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

I I Announces B1 and 82 heater extraction isolation

SRO f i

Directs Dower reduction to ~ 7 9 %

Enters GOI-100-12. Power Maneuverina

-~ 1

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SRO 9

BID Notifies chemistlv and rad con of Dower reduction

Crew

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 (R8, S I

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b

c- -

BID

~~ 3

~

SRO Evaluate Tech Soecs CfRM TSR 3.4.1) chemistw sarnDlina is reauired if

~ _ _ _ _ _

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Event Description:2B Reactor Feedwater Pump Trip

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ppendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 (R8, S I

Op-Test No.: -Scenario No.: 02NRC-3 Event No.: Page 1 of -1-

Event Description: 2A and 2C Reactor Feedwater Pump Trips

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1 Recoonizestrio of 2C RFP

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Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 (R8, S I )

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Op-Test No.: - Scenario No.: 02NRC-3 Event No.: 3 Page 1 of 2

Event Description: RClC Steam Leak

Appendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 (R8, S'l)

Op-Test No.: -Scenario No.: 02NRC-3 Event No.: 5 Page -2- of 2

Event Description: RClC Steam Leak (Continued)

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Time

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Position

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Applicant's Actions or Behavior

Places H202 analyzers in service I

Directs all available suppression pool cooling placed in service

Places all available suppression pool cooling in service

BID

Page 1 of 4

BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT

INITIAL LICENSE SCENARIO OUTLINE

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Scenario Obiective

Evaluate the operators in using the emergency depressurization (C2) and alternate level control

(CI) EO1 contingency procedures.

Scenario Summaw

Initial Conditions: 79% RTP, 2C RHR pump tagged, 2-SR-3.5.1.7, HPCl Flow Rate Test, in

progress.

Events:

Alternate EHC pumps

Power ascension

.. HPCl steamline breaks during flow rate SR and fails to auto isolate

SRV-1-22 fails open

Recirculation pump vibration, seal leakage and scram

MSlV closurelLOCA

Scenario Sequence

... Alternate EHC pumps

Continue power ascension at prescribed rate

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.. HPCl steamline breaks during SR requiring manual isolation and EOI-3 entry

SRV-1-22 fails open and closes when DUO responds by cycling the valve

2A recirc pump develops vibration problems to the point of causing seal failure, requiring

pump trip and isolation but the suction valve will not close

drywell pressure begins increasing

Power oscillation develop requiring a manual scram

The MSlVs fail closed due to a fuse failure in the Group I isolation circuit

The RPV water level drop to below - 1 0 0 requiring implementation of C1, alternate level

control

When water level reaches TAF (-162) the crew emergency depressurizes and reestablishes

normal water level with low pressure systems

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Event one -Alternate EHC pumps

v The DUO will alternate EHC pumps IAW 01-47.

Malfunctions required: None

Objective:

Evaluate the crew during normal operating evolutions.

Success Path:

Start 28 EHC pump

Stop 2A EHC pump

Event two - Power ascension

The crew will raise reactor power at the prescribed rate using recirc flow.

Malfunctions required: None

Objective:

Evaluate the crew during normal operating evolutions.

Success Path:

Use peer checker

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Raise reactor power at the desired rate

Event three - HPCl steamline break

The crew will respond to a HPCl steamline leak, and failure to auto isolate, in accordance with

the Abnormal Operating Instructions and will briefly enter 01-3.

Malfunctions Required: 2

Objective:

Evaluate the crew in use of Abnormal Operating Instructions during a HPCl steamline break and

failure to auto isolate. Evaluate the SRO who will briefly enter EOI-3 and make a technical

specification determination.

Success Path:

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Recognize HPCl steamline break alarms, area temps, area radiation

9 Recognize failure of HPCl to auto isolate and manually isolate

Close FCV-1-55 and FCV-1-56

Determine unit in 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months LCO (TS 3.5.1.D-HPCI and C RHR inop)

Determine 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months to tag a HPCl steamline isolation valve closed (TS 3.6.1.3)

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Event 4 - SRV-1-22 fails open

The crew will respond to an SRV failing open using the Abnormal Operating Instructions. The

c, valve will close when cycled.

Malfunctions required: 1

Objective:

Evaluate the crew on Abnormal Operating Instruction usage while responding to an open SRV.

Success Path:

Recognize SRV open

Cycle the valve

Recognize valve close

Request engineering evaluation of operability

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Event 5 Recirc vibration, seal leakage. power oscillations and scram

The crew will experience 2A recirc pump vibration which leads to seal failure, pump trip and

power oscillations requiring a manual scram.

Malfunctions required: 4

Objective:

Evaluate the crew response to an abnormal event (recirc pump vibration, leakage, trip) using the

abnormal operating instructions and recognizing power oscillations requiring a scram.

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Success Path:

Recognize pump vibration and dispatch personnel

Change pump speed

Recognize seal failure

Trip and isolate recirc pump

Recognize failure of suction valve to isolate and dispatch personnel to investigate

Recognize power oscillations

Manually scram

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Event 6 - MSlV closure/LOCA

When the crew inserts a manual scram the MSlVs close due a fuse failure leaving them with

C' RCIC, CRD and SLC for high pressure level control with an increasing recirc pump piping leak.

They will ultimately be required to depressurize due to being unable to maintain RPV level above

TAF.

Malfunctions Required: 2

Objective:

Evaluate the crew in recognizing a condition requiring a manual scram (power oscillation) and

implementation of the EOls including contingencies C1 (alternate level control) and C2

(emergency depressurization).

Success Path:

Recognize MSlV closure

Control pressure 800-1000 psig with alternate means (SRVs, RCIC)

Attempt to maintain RPV level + 2 to +51"

Enter EOI-1 and 2

Initiate suppression pool cooling

Spray the suppression chamber

Initiate a cooldown'

Spray the drywell

trip 28 recirc pump

.. stop drywell blowers

Report CRD pumps tripped

L, .. Send personnel to perform Appendix 78, RPV Makeup from the SLC Test Tank

At RPV level -100" to - 1 2 2 enter C1

.. Inhibit ADS

Stop spraying containment

. Emergency depressurize when RPV level reaches TAF

Restore RPV level to + 2 to +51" with low pressure systems

Scenario RecaDitulation

Total Malfunctions: 9

Abnormal Events: 2

Major Transients: 2

EOls Entered 3

EO1 Contingencies 2

ppendix D Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 (R8, S

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Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

SRO - r iD - -

IAW GO1 100 12 and 01-68

DUO

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Event Description: HPCl steam line break

BID ODens FCV-1-55 and 56 (9-3)

SRO 1

________ Determines 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months to isolate and taa either FCV-73-2 or 3 TTS 3.6.1.3)

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