ML032340718
| ML032340718 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 08/16/2003 |
| From: | Ernstes M Operator Licensing and Human Performance Branch |
| To: | Scalice J Tennessee Valley Authority |
| Shared Package | |
| ML032380265 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-259/02-301, 50-260/02-301, 50-296/02-301 50-259/02-301, 50-260/02-301, 50-296/02-301 | |
| Download: ML032340718 (32) | |
See also: IR 05000259/2002301
Text
Final Submittal
BROWNS FERRY
EXAM 2002-301
50-259, 50-260, & 50-296
DECEMBER 13,16-19,2002
1.
As Given Simulator Scenario Operator Actions ES-
D-2
BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT
INITIAL LICENSE SCENARIO OUTLINE
Scenario Obiective
Evaluate the operators in using the emergency depressurization contingency procedure based on are2
radiation.
Scenario Summary
Initial Conditions:
100% RTP
D diesel generator tagged
Events:
Alternate stator cooling water pumps and notification of 2-SR-3.3.6.1.2(3C) failure
APRM failure
Slow loss of HP feedwater heating on B string
Spurious reactor water cleanup system isolation
Inadvertent RCIC start
RCIC steam leak
Scenario Seauence
The DUO alternates stator cooling water pumps
APRM 2 fails high
A slow (hut slowly increasing) leak develops in B2 high pressure heater requiring isolation
The reactor water cleanup system spuriously isolates
RCIC gets an inadvertent initiation signal and is secured
RCIC develops an unisolable steam leak requiring emergency depressurization on high area radiation
Event one - Alternate stator cooline water pumps
The DUO alternates stator cooling water pumps.
Malfunctions required
None
Objective:
Evaluate the DUO in use of normal operating procedures.
Success Path:
Start 2B stator cooling water pump and stop 2A stator cooling water pump
Event two - Failure of APRM 2
The BUO determines APRM 2 has failed and bypasses the APRM.
Malfunctions Required
1
Objective:
Evaluate the BUO on use of the Alarm Response Procedures in responding to the failed APRM. Evaluate
the SRO on use of Technical Specifications.
Success Path
The BUO manually bypasses APRM 2 and the SRO determines only three APRMs required.
Event three - Slowlv increasine leak on B2 high Dresswe heater
The crew will respond to a rising high pressure heater level in accordance with the ARPs and AOI-6-1A.
Malfunctions Required
1
Objective:
Evaluate the BUO on use of Abnormal Operating Instructions in responding to a rising high pressure heater
level.
Success Path:
Determine which heater has the leak
Dispatch personnel to investigate
Reduce reactor power to <91% when steam valves isolate
Reduce power to <79% when the feedwater isolation valves are closed
Notify reactor engineer
Event four: S
p
p
The crew responds to an isolation of the RWCU.
Malfunctions Required:
1
Objective:
Evaluate the BUO and DUO on use of Abnormal Operating Instructions in responding to a loss of the
reactor water cleanup system.
Success Path:
Ensure auto actions (isolations) have occurred
Check area temperatures and radiation
Notify chemistry and reactor engineering
Return system to service following determination of cause
Event 5 -
The crew responds to an inadvertent RCIC initiation.
Malfunctions Required:
1
Objective:
Evaluate the DUO and SRO in-response toan abnormal occurrence.
Success Path:
Recognize RCIC initiation
Secure RCIC
Initiate and investigation
Event 6 - RCIC steam leak
The crew will respond to an unisolable RCIC system leak and emergency depressurize due to high area
radiation in secondary containment.
Malfunctions Required: 1 ( 2 if HPCI is initiated)
Objective:
Evaluate the crew on their response to a major event - an unisolable leak in the reactor building which leads
to emergency depressurizing due to two area radiations above max safe.
Success Path
Recognize all three reactor feedpumps tripped
Initiate manual scram
Enter EOI-1
Recognize HPCI fails to control in automatic and take manual control
Return to RCIC for level control after HPCI logic power loss
Dispatch personnel to isolate RCIC when leak occurs
Enter EOI-3
Maintain RPV level with C RFP after RCIC loss
Emergency depressurize per C2 when 2 area radiations above max safe
Enter EOI-2
Initiate suppression pool cooling
Scenario Recaoitulation
Total Malfunctions
6
Abnormal Events 5
Major Transients 2
EOIs Entered
3
EO1 Contingencies
1 (C2)
Appendix D
Scenario Outline Final Form ES-D-1 (R8, S1)
~~~~~~~~~
~
~
Event No.
'acility: Brown Fern, Nuclear Plant Scenario No.: 02NRC-3
ixaminers:
Operators:
Op-Test No.: -
Malf. No. Event Type*
Event
Description
nitial Conditions: 100% RTP, D diesel generator tagged for mainrenance
~ - --,
C(DU0)
H eater tube rupture
(SRO)
sw05
CWJO)
Spurious isolation of the reactor water cleanup system
TO2
C(DU0)
Inadvertent RCIC start
batch
C(BU0)
Trip of all RFPs
hP07
C(DU0)
HPCI Flow controller failure
IC09
M(ALL)
RCIC leak into secondary containment requiring emergency depressurization
'urnover: Alternate stator cooling water pumps per OI-35A. Section 6.3., 2B Reactor Feedwater pump oscillating
nd is in Auto to collect data. Storms passing through the area.
one
!N(DUO) b UO alternates stator cooling water pumps.
I
I
I
Inn116
/(BUO)
Failure of APRM 2
Slowly increasing leak in B2 high pressure heater string (recirc and drive
Ifw05b
P,,,,)
lrods,
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
Appendix D
Operator Actions Final Form ES-D-2 (R8, S1)
~~~~
....
~~
Scenario No.: 02NRC-3
Event No.: 1
Page 1
of -1-
Appendix D
Operator Actions Final Form ES-D-2 (R8, SI)
Scenario No.: 02NRC-3
Event No.: 2
Page 1
of -1-
Appendix D
Operator Actions Final Form ES-D-2 (R8, S1)
Time
Position
Applicants Actions or Behavior
!B
nnounces BYPASS VALVES TO CONDENSER NOT CLOSED alarm
er 2-ARP-9-6A, Window 9
Directs entry into 2-AOI-6-1A
B
Adjusts flow and power as directed by the SRO
Verifies valve positions per Attachment 1 and monitors thrust bearing temperature
educes reactor power with upper runback
tD
befers to 2-01-6 for turbine load restrictions
IDetermines load restricted to 920 MWe
I
I
Appendix D
Operator Actions Final Form ES-D-2 (R8, S1)
p-Test No.: -
Scenario No.: 02NRC-3
Event No.: 3 Page 1
of 2
Appendix D
Operator Actions Final Form ES-D-2 (R8, Sl)
Op-Test No.:
~
Scenario No.: 02NRC-3
Event No.: 4
Page 1
of 2
Event Description: Spurious reactor water cleanup system isolation
D
Enters AOI-64-2A
D
D
D
D
Notifies chemistry that RWCU system is out of service
Checks area temperatures
Checks area radiation monitors for rise
Requests reactor engineering to make heat balance check
Notifies chemistry that RWCU is out of service
>KU
irects RWCU returned to service per 2-01-69 when cause determined
II
I
I
ispatch AUO to RWCU control Panel for return to service
I
I/
ID
peturn RWCU per 2-01-69
I
Reset PCIS
Notify chemistry of return to service
Evaluate Tech Specs (TRM TSR 3.4.1) chemistry sampling is required if
not returned to service
Appendix D
Operator Actions Final Form ES-D-2 (R8, S1)
D
D
Op-Test No.: -
Scenario No.: 02NRC-3
Event No.: 4
Page 2
of 2
vent Description: Spurious reactor water cleanup system isolation
ens 2-FCV-69-8
Closes 2-FCV-69-8
Notifies SRO that RWCU has been returned to service
I
I
irects the AUO to place the demins in service as 2-FCV-69-8 is closed
Scenario No.: 02NRC-3
Event No.:
5
Page
of 1
Op-Test No.: -
Event Description: Inadvertent RCIC start.
Time
etermines T.S. 3.5.3 - 14 Day LCO for RCIC h o p
Position
Applicant's Actions or Behavior
D
Announces RCIC inadvertent start
Appendix D
Operator Actions Final Form ES-D-2 (R8, SI)
p-Test No.: __ Scenario No.: 02NRC-3
Event No.: 6
Page 1
of -3-
I
~~
Enters EOI-1 on low reactor water level
Directs level controlled by HPCI and CRD Per Appendices SD and SB
Enters AOI-100-1
D
D
Uses HPCI for reactor water level control per Appendix SD
Recognizes HPCI fails to control in AUTO
Transfers HPCI to manual control
D
B
Controls RPV level with HPCI in manual
Raises CRD flow per Appendix 5B
D
[After water level is controlled at -50 with HPCI) Recognizes HPCI logic
power failure
Op-Test No.: -
Scenario No.: 02NRC-3
Event No.: A
Page 2
of _1_
Event Description: RCIC Steam Leak
~
Time
1
(SRO
irects RCIC placed in service
places RCIC in service
Position
Applicants Actions or Behavior
D
Verifies RCIC low controller in auto/600 gpm
D
Resets and opens 2-FCV-71-9
B
B
Directs C Reactor Feedpump for level control per Appendix 5A
Controls RPV level with C reactor feedpump per Appendix 5.4
Directs Appendix 8G or restoration of drywell air
Performs Appendix 8G
(Continued)
Appendix D
Operator Actions Final Form ES-D-2 (R8, S1)
Time
Position
Applicants Actions or Behavior
Determines 2 area radiations above max safe
Directs emergency depressurization per C2
Determines suppression pool level >5.5 feet
Directs BUO to open 6 ADS valves
D
Opens 6 ADS valves
D
D
B
Determines ADS valves 1-19 and 1-34 failed to open
Opens 2 additional ADS valves
Verifies reactor feedpump discharge valves closed
D
B
Directs all available suppression pool coolinc per Appendix 17A
Initiates suppression pool cooling per Appendix 17A
Directs H202 Analyzers placed in service
Places H202 Analyzers in service
BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT
INITIAL LICENSE SCENARIO OUTLINE
Scenario Obiective
Evaluate the operators in using the emergency depressurization (C2) and alternate level control (CI) EO1
contingency procedures.
Scenario Summary
Initial Conditions: 79% RTP, 2C RHR pump tagged, 2-SR-3.5.1.7, HPCI Flow Ratc Test, in progrcss.
Events:
Place Suppression Pool cooling in service
Power asccnsion
HPCI steamline breaks during flow rate SR and fails to auto isolate
CRD pump 2A trip with manual stm of IB CRD pump
SRV-1-04 fails open
Recirculation pump vibration, seal lcakage and scram
MSIV closureLOCA
Scenario Sequence
Place Suppression Pool cooling in service
Continue power ascension at prescribed rate
HPCI steamline breaks during SR requiring manual isolation and EOI-3 entry
SRV-1-04 fails open and closes when DUO responds by cycling the valve
2A Recirc pump develops vibration problems to the point of causing seal failure, requiring pump trip and
isolation but the suction valve will not close
drywell pressure begins increasing
Power oscillations develop requiring a manual scram due to failure of OPRM channels
Thc MSIVs fail closcd due to a fuse failure in the Group I isolation circuit
The RPV water level drop to below -100" requiring implementation of CI, alternate level control
When water level reaches TAF (-162") thc crew emergency depressurizes and reestablishes normal water
level with low pressure systems
Event one - LOOD I1 RHR in Suooression Pool cooling
The DUO will place Loop I1 RHR in Suppression Pool cooling per 2-01-74,
Malfunctions required: None
Objective:
Evaluate the crew during normal operating evolutions.
Success Path:
2B and 2D RHR pumps in Suppression Pool cooling
Event two - Power ascension
The crew will raise reactor power at the prescribed rate using recirc flow.
Malfunctions required
None
Objective:
Evaluate the crew during normal operating evolutions,
Success Path
Use peer checker
Raise reactor power at the desired rate
Event three - HPCI steamline break
The crew will respond to a HPCI steamline leak, and failure to auto isolate, in accordance with the
Abnormal Operating Instructions and will briefly enter EOI-3.
Malfunctions Required 2
Objective:
Evaluate the crew in use of Abnormal Operating Instructions during a HPCI steamline break and failure to
auto isolate. Evaluate the SRO who will briefly enter EOI-3 and make a technical specification
determination.
Success Path:
Recognize HPCI steamline break - alarms, area temps, area radiation
Recognize failure of HPCI to auto isolate and manually isolate
Close FCV-1-55 and FCV-1-56
Determine unit in 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> LCO (TS 3.5.1.D-HPCI and C RHR imp)
Determine 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> to tag a HPCI steamline isolation valve closed (TS 3.6.1.3)
Event 4 - CRD Dump 2A trie
The crew will respond to a trip of 2A CRD pump in accordance with 2401-85-3.
Malfunctions required. 1
Objective:
Evaluate crew response to an abnormal event (CRD pump trip) using the Abnormal Operating Instructions.
Success Path
Recognize pump trip
Place flow controller in manual at zero demand
Start 1B CRD pump and open discharge valve to Unit 2
Use manual potentiometer to set CRD flow between 45 -60 GPM and cooling water @P to 20 PSID
Place flow controller in automatic
Event 5 - SRV-1-04 fails onen
The crew will respond to an SRV failing open using the Abnormal Operating Instructions. The valve will
close when cycled.
Malfunctions required:
1
Objective:
Evaluate the crew on Abnormal Operating Instruction usage while responding to an open SRV.
Success Path:
Recognize SRV open
Cycle the valve
Recognize valve close
Event 6 - Recirc vibration. seal leakaee. Dower oscillations and scram
The crew will experience 2A recirc pump vibration which leads to seal failure, pump trip and power
oscillations requiring a manual scram.
Malfunctions required 4
Objective:
Evaluate the crew response to an abnormal event (recirc pump vibration, leakage, trip) using the abnormal
operating instructions and recognizing power oscillations requiring a scram.
Success Path:
Recognize pump vibration and dispatch personnel
Change pump speed
Recognize seal failure
Trip and isolate recirc pump
Recognize failure of suction valve to isolate and dispatch personnel to investigate
Recognize power oscillations
Manually scram
Event 7 - MSIV closureLOCA
When the crew inserts a manual scram the MSIVs close due a fuse failure leaving them with RCIC, CRD
and SLC for high pressure level control with an increasing recirc pump piping leak. They will ultimately
be required to depressurize due to being unable to maintain RPV level above TAF.
Malfunctions Required:
2
Objective:
Evaluate the crew in recognizing a condition requiring a manual scram (power oscillation) and
implementation of the EOIs including contingencies C1 (alternate level control) and C2 (emergency
depressurization).
Success Path
Recognize MSIV closure
Control pressure 800-1000 psig with alternate means (SRVs, RCIC)
Attempt to maintain RPV level +2 to +S1
Enter EOI- 1 and 2
Initiate suppression pool cooling
Spray the suppression chamber
Initiate a cooldown
Spray the drywell
trip 2B recirc pump
stop drywell blowers
Report CRD pumps tripped
Send personnel to perform Appendix 7B, RPV Makeup from the SLC Test Tank
At RPV level -100 to -122 enter C1
Inhibit ADS
Stop spraying containment
Emergency depressurize when RPV level reaches TAF
Restore RPV level to +2 to +51 with low pressure systems
Scenario Recapitulation
Total Malfunctions:
lo
Abnormal Events:
3
Major Transients: 2
EOIs Entered
3
EO1 Contingencies
2
.-
4
rdOla
C(BU0)
CRD pump 2A trips
5
adOlc
C(DU0)
6
thlla
M(ALL)
Recirc pump vibration, total seal failure.
(SRO)
SRV-1-04 fails open and closes when cycled
thl2a
thlOa
C(BU0)
Failure of Recirc suction valve to close
override
L
rpl 1
th33b
M(ALL)
MSIV closure, main steamline leak in drywell
rdOla
C(BU0)
1B CRD pump trips
rdOlb
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (1)nstrument. (C)omponent, (M)ajorAppendix D
Operator Actions
Final Form ES-D-2 (R8, S1)
Op-Test No.: -
Scenario No.: NRC-4 Event No.: 1
Event Description: Place Loop I1 RHR in Suppression Pool cooling
Page 1_
of 1
Time
Position
Applicants Actions or Behavior
Directs placing Loop I1 RHR in Suppression Pool cooling in service
DUO
I
I
hrottle open 2-FCV-23-52 to establish flow (1350-4500 gpm)
Places suppression pool cooling in service per 2-01-74:
Start RHRSW pump B2B1
Throttle open 2-FCV-23-46 to establish flow (1350-4500 gpm)
Open 2-FCV-74-71
Start 2B RHR pump
Throttle open 2-FCV-74-73 to establish flow of 7000-10000 gpm
Start RHRSW pump DuDl
I
I
I
Appendix D
Operator Actions Final Form ES-D-2 (R8, S1)
Scenario No.: NRC-4 Event No.: 2
Page 1
of 1
nt Description: Power ascension
Appendix D
Operator Actions Final Form ES-D-2 (R8, S1)
Op-Test No.: __ Scenario No.: NRC-4 Event No.: 3
Event Description: HPCI steam line break
Page 1
of 2
Time
Position
Applicants Actions or Behavior
Directs DUO to continue with 2-SR-3.5.1.7 at Step 7.11
DUO
Starts SGT C per 2-01-65
Starts HPCI Steam Packing Exhauster
&ens 2-FCV-73-36
Throttles open 2-FCV-73-35 (- 7 seconds)
Announce HPCI turbine start over plant PA system
I
I
place Aux Oil pump HS to start
II
Announces Reactor Bldg Hi Rad alarm
Evacuates HPCI area
Opens 2-FCV-73-30
Opens 2-FCV-73-16
DUO
I
phrottles 2-FCV-73-35 & 36 to establish rated flow at - 1150 psig
I
Closes 2-FCV-73-2 & 3
Notifies Rad Con
Monitors lowering HPCI area temperatures and radiation levels
Appendix D
Operator Actions Final Form ES-D-2 (RS, S1)
Determines Unit in 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> LCO (TS 3.5.1.D - HPCI and C RHR imp)
Determines 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> to isolate and tag either FCV-73-2 or 3 (TS 3.6.1.3)
ent Description: CRD pump 2A trip
It
I
I
I
Calls for maintenance/outside US to check 2A CRD pump
I1
I
I
II
Appendix D
Operator Actions Final Form ES-D-2 (R8,
S1)
Op-Test No.: __ Scenario No.: NRC-4 Event No.: -5_
Event Description: SRV-1-04 fails open
Page 1
of 1
Time
Position
Applicants Actions or Behavior
Crew
Recognizes SRV open
DUO
I
I
II
verifies in ITS that SRV is still operable as relief valve
alarm
lowering generator output
Directs response IAW AOI-1-1
Determines SRV-1-04 from acoustic monitor
II
I
Places SRV-1-04 from close to open several times
Reports SRV-1-04 closed
Op-Test No.: -
Scenario No.: NRC-4 Event No.: 6
Event Description: Recirc vibration, seal leakage, power oscillations'-and scram
Page 1
of 2
.~ ~~.
..
~~~~~
.
~~
~
~
~
~
~
I
Position
BUODUO
Applicant's Actions or Behavior
Announces Recirc 2A vibration alarm and consults ARP (9-4A- )
Dispatches AUO to local panel to check vibration
E
Time
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
BUODUO
Monitors Recirc pump temperatures
Contact Reactor Engineer
Directs BUO to reduce speed of 2A R ecirc pump to reduce vibration
BUO reduces Recirc A speed and DUO serves as peer checker
I
board
BUODUO
I
(Continued)
Announces Recirc A seal leakage alarm
Identifies seal leakage via instrumentation
Recognizes lowering pressure on R ecirc pump A #1 seal
Directs crew to watch for signs of increased leakage
Recognizes Recirc pump A seal leakoff high alarm and informs SRO
Recognizes lowering pressure on Recirc pump A outboard seal and
BUODUO
informs SRO
When vibration report received or dual seal failure is reported, directs
A R ecirc pump tripped and isolated
Directs actions IAW AOI-68-1
Trips Recirc pump A and closes the discharge valve
Dispatches AUO to Recirc MG set to control temperatures
Determines Recirc A suction valve will not close and informs SRO
irects AUO to attempt to close R ecirc A suction valve from electrical
Op-Test No.: __ Scenario No.: NRC-4 Event No.: 6
Page 2
of 2
Event Description: Recirc vibration, seal leakage, power oscillations and scram (Continued)
Time
Position
Applicants Actions or Behavior
BUO
Check power/flow map to verify in region 1
Checks APRMs and LPRMs for indication of power oscillations
Informs SRO of power oscillation indications
Directs inserting emergency shove sheet control rods
Appendix D
Operator Actions Final Form ES-D-2 (R8, S1)
p-Test No.: -
Scenario No.: NRC-4 Event No.: 7
Page 1
of 4
ent Description: MSIV closureLOCA
Directs determining cause of MSIV isolation (Group 1)
Directs Appendix 8G, CAD crosstie to DW control air
Enters EOI-2 and directs:
Appendix 12, venting primary containment
places H202 analyzers in service
II
I
ISuppression pool cooling placed in service, Appendix 17A
I
Appendix 12, venting primary containment
Places H202 analyzers in service
Verifies all available DW cooling in service
Verification of all available DW cooling in service
II
I
k f o r m s Appendix 8G, CAD crosstie to DW control air
I
BUO
I
I
(Continued)
Appendix D
Operator Actions Final Form ES-D-2 (R8, S1)
Op-Test No.: -
Scenario No.: NRC-4 Event No.: 7
Event Description: MSIV closureLOCA (Continued)
Page 2
of 4
I
I
I
Time I
Position
Applicants Actions or Behavior
BUODUO
onitors containment parameters
When suppression chamber pressure exceeds 12 psig or SRO
determines drywell temperature cannot be maintained <280F then
directs the following:
DUO
Sprays the suppression chamber IAW Appendix 17C
Ensure Recirc pumps tripped
Stop all drywell blowers
Drywell sprays IAW Appendix 17B
BUO
Trips Recirc pump B
Secures drywell blowers
(Continued)
Appendix D
Operator Actions Final Form ES-D-2 (RE, Sf)
Scenario No.: NRC-4 Event No.: 7
Page 3
of 4
Appendix D
Operator Actions Final Form ES-D-2 (R8, S1)
Time
~
p-Test No.: __ Scenario No.: NRC-4 Event No.: 7
Position
Applicants Actions or Behavior
When RPV water level reaches TAF (-162 ) and before -190 enters
C2 and directs the following:
Open 6 ADS valves
Restore RPV level to +2 to +51
Page 4
of A
DUO
When directed by SRO, terminates containment sprays and aligns
Opens and verifies open 6 ADS valves (Critical Task)
Core Spray (Appendix )
Condensate (Appendix )
I
I
I
BUODUO
Pstores RPV water level to +2 to +51 using: (Critical Task)
A
I
I
HR (Appendix )
Classifies event as a Site Area Emergency (1.141)