ML031280334

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License Amendment Request Re Increase to Spent Fuel Pool Maximum Enrichment Limit with Soluble Boron Credit, Attachment I Through F
ML031280334
Person / Time
Site: Calvert Cliffs Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 05/01/2003
From: Katz P
Constellation Energy Group
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
Download: ML031280334 (63)
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Text

{{#Wiki_filter:CA06011 Rev.0 Page 94 ATTACHMENT I SELECTED KENO INPUT FILES

D:\Keno\kenoinp\KUlAO1.inp CAO6011 REV =CSAS25 P A4 C SFP, KUlA01, 5.00 W/O U-235, 0.0 MWD/T, 0 PPM, 4C, w/CARBORUNDUM 63E. 44GROUPNDF5 LATTICECELL U02 1 0.945 277.15 92235 5.00 92238 95.00 END ARBMTIN 0.06425 10 0 0 0 50112 0.914 50114 0.624 50115 0.348 50116 14.186 5011 7 7.563 50118 24.055 50119 8.594 50120 32.917 50122 4.75.5 50124 6.043 2 1.000 277.15 END FE 2 0.0 7.621100E-5 277.15 END NB 2 0.0 4.164700E-4 277.15 END ZR 2 0.0 4.152000E-2 277.15 END H20 3 1.000 277.15 END SS3041. 4 1.000 277.15 END B4C 5 0.240685 277.15 END ZIRC44 6 1.000 277.15 END END COMP SQUAREPITCH 1.4732 .96774 1 3 1.1176 2 0.98552 0 END SFP, KUlA01, 5.00 W/O U-235, 0.0 MWD/T, 0 PPM, 4C, w/CARBORUNDUM READ PARAM TME=500.0 NUB=YES FAR=YES GEN=1010 NPG=600 NSK=10 END PARAM READ BOUNDS ALL=MIRROR END BDUNDS READ GEOM UNIT 1 CYLINDER I1 1 0.48387 50.0 -50.0 CYLINDER 80 1 0.49276 50.0 -50.0 CYLINDER 21 0.55880 50.0 -50.0 CUBOID 1 0.73660 -0.73660 0.73660 -0.73660 50.0 -50.0 UNIT 2 CYLINDER 1 1.31445 50.0 -50.0 CYLINDER 6 1 1.41605 50.0 -50.0 CUBOID 1 1.47320 -1.47320 1.47320 -1.47320 50.0 -50.0 UNIT 3 CUBOID 55 1 8.25500 -8.25500 0.11430 -0.11430 50.0 -50.0 CUBOID 44 1 8.25500 -8.25500 0.26670 -0.26670 50.0 -50.0 UNIT 4 CUBOID 55 1 0.11430 -0.11430 8.25500 -8.25500 50.0 -50.0 CUBOID 44 1 0.26670 -0.26670 8.25500 -8.25500 50.0 -50.0 UNIT 5 CUBOID 441 1.4620875 -1.4620875 0.1524 -0.1524 50.0 -50.0 UNIT 6 CUBOID 4I 1 0.1524 -0.1524 1.3096875 -1.3096875 50.0 -50.0 UNIT 7 AARPAY 1 -1.4732 -1.4732 -50.0 GLOBAL UNIT 8 AARRAY 2 -10.3124 -10.3124 -50.0 CUBOID 3 1 12.8190625 -12.8190625 12.8190625 -12.8190625 50.0 -50.0 HOLE 3 0.0 11.141075 0.0 HOLE 3 0.0 -11.141075 0.0 HOLE 4 11.141075 0.0 0.0 HOLE 4 -11.141075 0.0 0.0 HOLE 5 9.7170875 11.026775 0.0 HOLE 5 -9.7170875 11.026775 0.0 HOLE 5 9.7170875 -11.026775 0.0 HOLE 5 -9.7170875 -11.026775 0.0 HOLE 6 11.026775 9.5646875 0.0 HOLE 6 11.026775 -9.5646875 0.0 HOLE 6 -11.026775 9.5646875 0.0 HOLE 6 -11.026775 -9.5646875 0.0 END GEOM READ ARRAY ARA=1 NUX=2 NUY=2 NUZ=1 FILL 1 1 1 1 END FILL ARA=2 NUX=7 NUY=7 NUZ=l FILL 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 2 7 7 7 2 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 2 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 2 7 7 7 2 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 END FILL

  • END ARRAY read plot ttl=' X-Y GEOMETRY FOR UNIT 1 SFP '

Page 1 (09/13/2002 11:04:53 AM)

D:\Keno\kenoinp\KUlAOl.inp xul=O. yul=12.0 zul=0.0 xlr=12.0 ylr=0.0 zlr=0.0 uax=1.0 vdn=-1.0 nax=600 end plot UA0 IIE gj6 0 END DATA END PAg6E  ?*~ Page 2 (09/13/2002 11:04:53 AM)

D:\Keno\kenoinp\KUlA12.inp =CSAS25 CASiO 11 REV SFP, KUlA12, 5.00 W/O U-235, 0.0 MWD/T, 0 PPM, 4C, w/CARBORUNDUM 44GROUPNDF5 LATTICECELL U02 1 0.945 277.15 92235 5.00 92238 95.00 END PASE 97 ARBMTIN 0.081875 10 0 0 0 50112 0.914 50114 0.624 50115 0.348 50116 14.186 50117 7.563 50118 24.055 50119 8.594 50120 32.917 50122 4.755 50124 6.043 2 1.000 277.15 END FE 2 0.0 1.483200E-4 277.15 END CR 2 0.0 7.586200E-5 277.15 END O 2 0.0 2.958500E-4 277.15 END ZR 2 0.0 4.251400E-2 277.15 END H20 3 1.000 277.15 END SS3044 4 1.000 277.15 END B4C 5 0.240685 277.15 END ZIRC4 4 6 1.000 277.15 END END COMP SQUAREPITCH 1.4732 .96774 1 3 1.1176 2 0.98552 0 END SFP, KUlA12, 5.00 W/O U-235, 0.0 MWD/T, 0 PPM, 4C, w/CARBORUNDUM READ PARAM TME=500.0 NUB=YES FAR=YES GEN=1010 NPG=600 NSK=10 END PARAM READ BOUNDS ALL=MIRROR END BOUND, READ GEOM UNIT 1 CYLINDER 1 1 0.48387 50.0 -50.0 CYLINDER I0 1 0.49276 50.0 -50.0 CYLINDER 2 1 0.55880 50.0 -50.0 CUBOID 3 1 0.73660 -0.73660 0.73660 -0.73660 50.0 -50.0 UNIT 2 CYLINDER 3 1 1.31445 50.0 -50.0 CYLINDER I6 1 1.41605 50.0 -50.0 CUBOID 3 1 1.47320 -1.47320 1.47320 -1.47320 50.0 -50.0 UNIT 3 CUBOID 5 1 8.25500 -8.25500 0.11430 -0.11430 50.0 -50.0 CUBOID 4 1 8.25500 -8.25500 0.26670 -0.26670 50.0 -50.0 UNIT 4 CUBOID 5 1 0.11430 -0.11430 8.25500 -8.25500 50.0 -50.0 CUBOID 4 1 0.26670 -0.26670 8.25500 -8.25500 50.0 -50.0 UNIT 5 CUBOID 4 1 1.4620875 -1.4620875 0.1524 -0.1524 50.0 -50.0 UNIT 6 CUBOID 4 1 0.1524 -0.1524 1.3096875 -1.3096875 50.0 -50.0 UNIT 7 ARRAY 1 -1.4732 -1.4732 -50.0 UNIT 8 ARRAY 2 -10.3124 -10.3124 -50.0 CUBOID 3 1 12.8190625 -12.8190625 12.8190625 -12.8190625 5SD.0 -50.0 HOLE 3 0.0 11.141075 0.0 HOLE 3 0.0 -11.141075 0.0 HOLE 4 11.141075 0.0 0.0 HOLE 4 -11.141075 0.0 0.0 HOLE 5 9.7170875 11.026775 0.0 HOLE 5 -9.7170875 11.026775 0.0 HOLE 5 9.7170875 -11.026775 0.0 HOLE 5 -9.7170875 -11.026775 0.0 HOLE 6 11.026775 9.5646875 0.0 HOLE 6 11.026775 -9.5646875 0.0 HOLE 6 -11.026775 9.5646875 0.0 HOLE 6 -11.026775 -9.5646875 0.0 GLOBAL UNIT 9 ARRAY 3 -128.190625 -128.190625 -50.0 CUBOID 3 1 128.190625 -128.190625 128.190625 -128.190625 5()i.0 -50.0 END GEOM READ ARRAY ARA=1 NUX=2 NUY=2 NUZ=1 FILL 1 1 1 1 END FILL ARA=2 NUX=7 NUY=7 NUZ=1 FILL 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 2 7 7 7 2 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 27 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 2 7 7 7 2 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 END FILL Page 1 (09/13/2002 11:05:50 AM)

D:\Keno\kenoinp\KUlAl2.inp ARA=3 NUX=10 NUY=10 NUZ=l CAO6 Q I RE @ FILL 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 PAGE: 9f 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 END FILL END ARRAY read plot ttl=' X-Y GEOMETRY FOR UNIT 1 SFP xul=-130. yul=130. zul=0.0 xlr=130.0 ylr=-130.0 zlr=0.0 uax=1.0 vdn=-1.0 nax=600 end plot END DATA END Page 2 (09/13/2002 11:05:51 AM)

D: \Keno\kenoinp\KUlEO3 . inp =CSAS25 CAI60 I I RE V G SFP, KUlEO3, 5.00 W/O U-235, 0.0 MWD/T, 300 PPM, 4C, w/CARBORUNDUM PA 6 E 44GROUPNDF5 LATTICECELL U02 1 0.945 277.15 92235 5.00 92238 95.00 END ZIRC4 2 1.000 277.15 END ARBMH3BO3 0.00171582 3 1 1 0 5000 1 1001 3 8016 3 3 1.0 277.15 END H20 3 1.000 277.15 END SS304 4 1.000 277.15 END B4C 5 0.240685 277.15 END ZIRC4 6 1.000 277.15 END H20 7 0.8862 277.15 END ARBMH3BO3 0.00171582 3 1 1 0 5000 1 1001 3 8016 3 7 0.8862 277.15 END SS304 7 0.099531 277.15 END ZIRC4 7 0.006273 277.15 END INCONELS 7 0.008020 277.15 END H20 8 0.8600 277.15 END ARBMH3BO3 0.00171582 3 1 1 0 5000 1 1001 3 8016 3 8 0.8600 277.15 END SS304 8 0.111098 277.15 END INCONELS 8 0.028908 277.15 END SS304 9 1.000 277.15 END REG-CONCRETE 10 1.000 277.15 END END COMP SQUAREPITCH 1.4732 .96774 1 3 1.1176 2 0.98552 0 END SFP, KUlE03, 5.00 W/O U-235, 0.0 MWD/T, 300 PPM, 4C, W/CARBORUNDUM READ PARAM TME=500.0 NUB=YES FAR=YES GEN=1010 NPG=600 NSK=10 END PARAM READ BOUNDS ALL=MIRROR END BOUNDS READ GEOM UNIT 1 CYLINDER 1 1 0.48387 347.218 0.0 CYLINDER 0 1 0.49276 347.218 0.0 CYLINDER 2 1 0.55880 347.218 0.0 CUBOID 3 1 0.73660 -0.73660 0.73660 -0.73660 347.218 0.0 CUBOID 7 1 0.73660 -0.73660 0.73660 -0.73660 386.0673 0.0 CUBOID 8 1 0.73660 -0.73660 0.73660 -0.73660 386.0673 -13.32484 CUBOID 3 1 0.73660 -0.73660 0.73660 -0.73660 415.93516 -45.39234 UNIT 2 CYLINDER 3 1 1.31445 347.218 0.0 CYLINDER 6 1 1.41605 347.218 0.0 CUBOID 3 1 1.47320 -1.47320 1.47320 -1.47320 347.218 0.0 CUBOID 7 1 1.47320 -1.47320 1.47320 -1.47320 386.0673 0.0 CUBOID 8 1 1.47320 -1.47320 1.47320 -1.47320 386.0673 -13.32484 CUBOID 3 1 1.47320 -1.47320 1.47320 -1.47320 415.93516 -45.39234 UNIT 3 CUBOID 5 1 8.25500 -8.25500 0.11430 -0.11430 347.218 0.0 CUBOID 3 1 8.25500 -8.25500 0.11430 -0.11430 415.93516 -45.39234 CUBOID 4 1 8.25500 -8.25500 0.26670 -0.26670 415.93516 -45.39234 UNIT 4 CUBOID 5 1 0.11430 -0.11430 8.25500 -8.25500 347.218 0.0 CUBOID 3 1 0.11430 -0.11430 8.25500 -8.25500 415.93516 -45.39234 CUBOID 4 1 0.26670 -0.26670 8.25500 -8.25500 415.93516 -45.39234 UNIT 5 CUBOID 4 1 1.4620875 -1.4620875 0.1524 -0.1524 415.93516 -45.39234 UNIT 6 CUBOID 4 1 0.1524 -0.1524 1.3096875 -1.3096875 415.93516 -45.39234 UNIT 7 ARRAY 1 -1.4732 -1.4732 -45.39234 UNIT 8 ARRAY 2 -10.3124 -10.3124 -45.39234 CUBOID 3 1 12.8190625 -12.8190625 12.8190625 -12.8190625 415.93516 -45.39234 HOLE 3 0.0 11.141075 0.0 HOLE 3 0.0 -11.141075 0.0 HOLE 4 11.141075 0.0 0.0 HOLE 4 -11.141075 0.0 0.0 HOLE 5 9.7170875 11.026775 0.0 HOLE 5 -9.7170875 11.026775 0.0 HOLE 5 9.7170875 -11.026775 0.0 HOLE 5 -9.7170875 -11.026775 0.0 HOLE 6 11.026775 9.5646875 0.0 HOLE 6 11.026775 -9.5646875 0.0 HOLE 6 -11.026775 9.5646875 0.0 HOLE 6 -11.026775 -9.5646875 0.0 GLOBAL UNIT 9 ARRAY 3 -128.190625 -128.190625 -45.39234 CUBOID 3 1 128.190625 -128.190625 128.190625 -128.190625 1067.12766 -45.39234 CUBOID 9 1 128.190625 -128.190625 128.190625 -128.190625 1067.12766 -45.86859 CUBOID 10 1 128.190625 -128.190625 128.190625 -128.190625 1067.12766 -228.74859 Page 1 (09/13/2002 11:06:41 AM)

D:\Keno\kenoinp\KUlEO3.inp END GEOM A0 R READ ARRAYXv & ARA=l NUX=2 NUY=2 NUZ=l PA163 forh FILL 11 1 1 END FILL ARA=2 NUX=7 NUY=7 NUZ=l FILL 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 2 7 7 7 2 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 2 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 2 7 7 7 2 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 END FILL ARA=3 NUX=10 NUY=10 NUZ=l FILL 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 END FILL END ARRAY read plot ttl=' X-Y GEOMETRY FOR UNIT 1 SFP AT Z=-45.5 CM' xul=-26.0 yul=26.0 zul=-45.5 xlr=26.0 ylr=-26.0 zlr=-45.5 uax=1.0 vdn=-l.O nax=600 end plot END DATA END Page 2 (09/13/2002 11:06:41 AM)

D:\Keno\kenoinp\KUlGO1.inp CAO6~lS' REVf & =CSAS25 SFP, KUlGO1, 5.00 W/O U-235, 0.0 NWD/T, 300 PPM, 4C, w/CARBORUNDUM 

                                                                                       %AGE A       IR 44GROUPNDF5 LATTICECELL U02           1 0.945 277.15 92235 5.00 92238 95.00 END ZIRC4        2 1.000                     277.15        END ARBMH3BO3 0.00171582 3 1 1 0 5000 1 1001 3 8016 3 3 1.0 277.15 END H20          3 1.000                     277.15       END SS304        4 1.000                     277.15       END B4C          5 0.240685                  277.15       END ZIRC4        6 1.000                     277.15       END H20          7 0.8862                    277.15       END ARBMH3BO3 0.00171582 3 1 1 0 5000 1 1001 3 8016 3 7 0.8862 277.15 END SS304        7 0.099531                  277.15       END ZIRC4        7 0.006273                  277.15       END INCONELS     7 0.008020                  277.15       END H20          8 0.8600                    277.15       END ARBMH3BO3 0.00171582 3 1 1 0 5000 1 1001 3 8016 3 8 0.8600 277.15 END SS304        8 0.111098                  277.15       END INCONELS     8 0.028908                  277.15       END SS304        9 1.000                     277.15       END REG-CONCRETE 10 1.000                     277.15        END END COMP SQUAREPITCH    1.4732 .96774   1 3    1.1176  2  0.98552 0      END SFP, KUlG01, 5.00 W/O U-235, 0.0 MWD/T, 300 PPM, 4C, w/CARBORUNDUM READ PARAM TME=500.0      NUB=YES FAR=YES GEN=1010 NPG=600 NSK=10 END PARAM READ BOUNDS    ALL=MIRROR END BOUNDS READ GEOMM UNIT 1 CYLINDER   1 1 0.48387 347.218 0.0 CYLINDER   0 1 0.49276 347.218 0.0 CYLINDER   2 1 0.55880 347. 218 0.0 CUBOID     3 1 0.73660 -0.73660 0. 7 3660 -0.73660 347.218               0.0 CUBOID     7 1 0.73660 -0.73660 0. 73 660 -0.73660 386.0673              0.0 CUBOID     8 1 0.73660 -0.73 660 0.73660 -0.73 660 386.0673          -13.32484 CUBOID     3 1 0.73660 -0.73 660 0.73660 -0.73660 438.1373           -45.39234 UNIT 2 CYLINDER   3 1 1.31445 347. 218     0.0 CYLINDER   6 1 1.41605 347.218 0.0 CUBOID     3 1 1.47320 -1.470       1.47320 -1. 47320 347.218    0.(

CUBOID 7 1 1.47320 -1.47320 1.47320 -1.47320 386.0673 0.0 CUBOID 8 1 1.47320 -1.47320 1.47320 -1.47320 386.0673 -13.32484 CUBOID 3 1 1.47320 -1.47320 1.47320 -1.47320 438.1373 -45.39234 UNIT 3 CUBOID 5 1 8.25500 -8.25500 0.11430 -0.11430 347.218 0.0 CUBOID 3 1 8.25500 -8.25500 0.11430 -0.11430 415.93516 -13.32484 CUBOID 4 1 8.25500 -8.25500 0. 2 6670 -0.2 6670 415.93516 -13.32484 CUBOID 3 1 8.25500 -8.25500 0. 2 6670 -0.2 6670 438.1373 -45.39234 UNIT 4 CUBOID 5 1 0.11430 -0. 11430 8.25500 -8.25500 347.218 0.0 CUBOID 3 1 0.11430 -0.11430 8.25500 -8.25500 415.93516 -13.32484 CUBOID 4 1 0.26670 -0.26670 8.25500 -8.25500 415.93516 -13.32484 CUBOID 3 1 0.26670 -0.2 6670 8.25500 -8.2 5500 438.1373 -45.39234 UNIT 5 CUBOID 4 1 1.4620875 -1.4620875 0.1524 -0.1524 415.93516 -13.32484 CUBOID 3 1 1.4620875 -1.4620875 0.1524 -0.1524 438.1373 -45.39234 UNIT 6 CUBOID 4 1 0.1524 -0.1524 1.3096875 -1.3096875 415.93516 -13.32484 CUBOID 3 1 0.1524 -0.1524 1.3096875 -1.3096875 438.1373 -45.39234 UNIT 7 ARRAY 1 -1.4732 -1.4732 -45.39234 UNIT 8 ARRAY 2 -10.3124 -10.3124 -45.39234 CUBOID 3 1 12.8190625 -12.8190625 12.8190625 -12.8190625 438.1373 -45.39234 HOLE 3 0.0 11.141075 0.0 HOLE 3 0.0 -11.141075 0.0 HOLE 4 11.141075 0.0 0.0 HOLE 4 -11.141075 0.0 0.0 HOLE 5 9.7170875 11.026775 0.0 HOLE 5 -9.7170875 11.026775 0.0 HOLE 5 9.7170875 -11.026775 0.0 HOLE 5 -9.7170875 -11.026775 0.0 HOLE 6 11.026775 9.5646875 0.0 HOLE 6 11.026775 -9.5646875 0.0 HOLE 6 -11.026775 9.5646875 0.0 HOLE 6 -11.026775 -9.5646875 0.0 UNIT 11 Page 1 (09/13/2002 11:08:21 AM)

D:\Keno\kenoinp\KUlG01.inp CYLINDER 1 1 0.48387 399.288 52.07 CAM6 X1 RE V 0 CYLINDER CYLINDER 0 1 0.49276 399. 288 2 1 0.55880 399.288 52.07 52.07 PACEt/ oL CUBOID 3 1 0.73660 -0.73660 0. 73 660 -0.73660 399.288 52.07 CUBOID 7 1 0.73660 -0.73660 0. 73 660 -0.73 660 438.1373 52.07 CUBOID 8 1 0.73660 -0.73660 0.73 660 -0.73 660 438.1373 38.74516 CUBOID 3 1 0.73660 -0.73 660 0. 73 660 -0.73 660 438.1373 -45.39234 UNIT 12 CYLINDER 3 1 1.31445 399.288 52.07 CYLINDER 6 1 1.41605 399. 288 52.07 CUBOID 3 1 1.47320 -1.47320 1. 47320 -1.47320 399.288 52.07 CUBOID 7 1 1.47320 -1.47320 1.47320 -1.47320 438.1373 52.07 CUBOID 8 1 1.47320 -1.47320 1.47320 -1.47320 438.1373 38.74516 CUBOID 3 1 1.47320 -1.47320 1.47320 -1.47320 438.1373 -45.39234 UNIT 13 CUBOID 5 1 8.25500 -8.25500 0.11430 -0.11430 347.218 0.0 CUBOID 3 1 8.25500 -8.25500 0.11430 -0.11430 415.93516 -13.32484 CUBOID 4 1 8.25500 -8.25500 0.26670 -0.2 6670 415.93516 -13.32484 CUBOID 3 1 8.25500 -8.25500 0.26670 -0.2 6670 438.1373 -45.39234 UNIT 14 CUBOID 5 1 0.11430 -0.11430 8.25500 -8.25500 347.218 0.0 CUBOID 3 1 0.11430 -0.11430 8.25500 -8. 25500 415.93516 -13.32484 CUBOID 4 1 0.26670 -0.26670 8.25500 -8. 2 5500 415.93516 -13.32484 CUBOID 3 1 0.26670 -0.2 6670 8.25500 -8.25500 438.1373 -45.39234 UNIT 15 CUBOID 4 1 1.4620875 -1.4620875 0.1524 -0.1524 415.93516 -13.32484 CUBOID 3 1 1.4620875 -1.4620875 0.1524 -0.1524 438.1373 -45.39234 UNIT 16 CUBOID 4 1 0.1524 -0.1524 1.3096875 -1.3096875 415.93516 -13.32484 CUBOID 3 1 0.1524 -0.1524 1.3096875 -1.3096875 438.1373 -45.39234 UNIT 17 ARRAY 7 -1.4732 -1.4732 -45.39234 UNIT 18 ARRAY 8 -10.3124 -10.3124 -45.39234 CUBOID 3 1 12.8190625 -12.8190625 12.8190625 -12.8190625 438.1373 -45.39234 HOLE 13 0.0 11.141075 0.0 HOLE 13 0.0 -11.141075 0.0 HOLE 14 11.141075 0.0 0.0 HOLE 14 -11.141075 0.0 0.0 HOLE 15 9.7170875 11.026775 0.0 HOLE 15 -9.7170875 11.026775 0.0 HOLE 15 9.7170875 -11.026775 0.0 HOLE 15 -9.7170875 -11.026775 0.0 HOLE 16 11.026775 9.5646875 0.0 HOLE 16 11.026775 -9.5646875 0.0 HOLE 16 -11.026775 9.5646875 0.0 HOLE 16 -11.026775 -9.5646875 0.0 UNIT 20 ARRAY 3 -128.190625 -128.190625 -45.39234 UNIT 21 ARRAY 4 -102.552500 -128.190625 -45.39234 UNIT 22 ARRAY 5 -128.190625 -102.552500 -45.39234 UNIT 23 ARRAY 6 -89.7334375 -128.190625 -45.39234 UNIT 24 ARRAY 9 -128.190625 -128.190625 -45.39234 GLOBAL UNIT 30 CUBOID 3 1 661.51125 -656.74875 363.37875 -398.62125 1067.12766 -45.39234 HOLE 22 473.86875 25.63E3125 0.0 HOLE 21 236.934375 0.0 0.0 HOLE 20 0.0 0.0 0.0 HOLE 20 -262.5725 0.0 0.0 HOLE 20 -525.1450 0.0 0.0 HOLE 23 224.1153125 -263.84a 25 0.0 HOLE 24 0.0 -263.84a 25 0.0 HOLE 24 -262.5725 -263.84a25 0.0 HOLE 24 -525.1450 -263.84,25 0.0 CUBOID 9 1 661.9875 -657.2250 363.8550 -399.0975 1067.12766 -45.86859 CUBOID 10 1 768.6675 -840.1050 546.7350 -581.9775 1067.12766 -228.74859 END GEON READ ARRAY ARA=1 NUX=2 NUY=2 NUZ=1 FILL 1 1 1 1 END FILL ARA=2 NUX=7 NUY=7 NUZ=1 FILL 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 2 7 7 7 2 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 2 7 7 7 Page 2 (09/13/2002 11:08:21 AM)

D:\Keno\kenoinp\KUlGOl.inp tA 0 Oi: REV 7277727 PARE fec6 END FILL ARA=3 NUX=10 NUY=10 NUZ=1 FILL 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 END FILL ARA=4 NUX=8 NUY=10 NUZ=1 FILL 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 END FILL ARA=5 NUX=10 NUY=8 NUZ=1 FILL 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 END FILL ARA=6 NUX=7 NUY=10 NUZ=1 FILL 18 8 18 8 18 8 18 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 END FILL ARA=7 NUX=2 NUY=2 NUZ=1 FILL 11 11 11 11 END FILL ARA=8 NUX=7 NUY=7 NUZ=1 FILL 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 12 17 17 17 12 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 12 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 12 17 17 17 12 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 END FILL ARA=9 NUX=10 NUY=10 NUZ=1 FILL 18 8 18 8 18 8 18 8 18 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 88 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 Page 3 (09/13/2002 11:08:22 AM)

D:\Keno\kenoinp\KUlGOl.inp 88 88 88 88 88 C A 6011 RE V 0 88 8 8 8 8 8 8 88 A /o9 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 PA E 14Y 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 END FILL END ARRAY 'read plot 'ttl=' KUlGO1 X-Y GEOMETRY FOR UNIT 1 SFP AT Z=-10.0 CM' 'xul=-700.0 yul=400.0 zul=-10.0 xlr=700.0 ylr=-425.0 zlr=-10.0 'uax=1.0 vdn=-1.0 nax=800 NDN=650 'end plot 'read plot 'ttl=' KUlGO1 X-Z GEOMETRY FOR UNIT 1 SFP AT Y=-380.0 CM' 'xul=-700.0 yul=-380.0 zul=470.0 xlr=700.0 ylr=-380.0 zlr=-60.0 'uax=1.0 wdn=-1.O nax=800 NDN=650 'end plot 'read plot 'ttl=' KUlGO1 Y-Z GEOMETRY FOR UNIT 1 SFP AT X=11.0 CM' 'xul=11.0 yul=400.0 zul=470.0 xlr=11.0 ylr=-400.0 zlr=-60.0 'vax=1.0 wdn=-1.0 nax=800 NDN=650 'end plot END DATA END Page 4 (09/13/2002 11:08:22 AM)

D:\Keno\kenoinp\KUlIO1.inp =CSAS25 PG.E /<R SFP, KUlIO1, 5.00 W/O U-235, 0.0 MWD/T, 300 PPM, 4C, w/CARBORUNDUM 44GROVJPNDF5 LATTICECELL U02 1 0.945 277.1.5 92235 5.00 92238 95.CD0 END ZIRC4 2 1.000 277.15 END ARBMH3BO3 0.00171582 3 1 1 0 5000 1 1001 3 8016 3 3 1.0 277.15 END H20 3 1.000 277.15 END SS304 4 1.000 277.15 END B4C 5 0.240685 277.15 END ZIRC4 6 1.000 277.15 END H20 7 0.8862 277.15 END ARBMH3BO3 0.00171582 3 1 1 0 5000 1 1001 3 8016 3 7 0.8862 277.15 END SS304 7 0.099531 277.15 END ZIRC4 7 0.006273 277.15 END INCONELS 7 0.008020 277.15 END H20 8 0.8600 277.15 END ARBMH3BO3 0.00171582 3 1 1 0 5000 1 1001 3 8016 3 8 0.8600 277.15 END SS304 8 0.111098 277.15 END INCONELS 8 0.028908 277.15 END SS304 9 1.000 277.15 END REG-CONCRETE 10 1.000 277.15 END END COMP SQUAREPITCH 1.4732 .96774 1 3 1.1176 2 0.98552 0 END SFP, KUlIO1, 5.00 W/O U-235, 0.0 MWD/T, 300 PPM, 4C, w/CARBORUNDUM READ PARAM TME=500.0 NUB=YES FAR=YES GEN=1010 NPG=600 NSK=10 END PARAM READ BOUNDS ALL=MIRROR END BOUNDS READ GEOI4 UNIT 1 CYLINDER 1 1 0.48387 347.218 0.0 CYLINDER 0 1 0.49276 347.218 0.0 CYLINDER 2 1 0.55880 347.218 0.0 CUBOID 3 1 0.73660 -0.73660 0.73660 -0.73660 347.218 0.0 CUBOID 7 1 0.73660 -0. 73 660 0.73660 -0.73660 386.0673 0 .0 CUBOID 8 1 0.73660 -0. 73 660 0.73660 -0.73660 386.0673 -13.32484 CUBOID 3 1 0.73660 -0. 73 660 0.73660 -0.73660 415. 93516 -45.39234 UNIT 2 CYLINDER 3 1 1.31445 347.218 0.0 CYLINDER 6 1 1.41605 347.218 0.0 CUBOID 3 1 1.47320 -1.47320 1.47320 -1.47320 347.218 0.0 CUBOID 7 1 1.47320 -1. 47320 1.47320 -1.47320 386.0673 0.0 CUBOID 8 1 1.47320 -1.47320 1.47320 -1.47320 386.0673 -13.32484 CUBOID 3 1 1.47320 -1.47320 1.47320 -1.47320 415.93516 -45.39234 UNIT 3 CUBOID 5 1 8.25500 -8.25500 0.11430 -0.11430 347.218 0.0 CUBOID 3 1 8.25500 -8.25500 0.11430 -0.11430 415.93516 -13.32484 CUBOID 4 1 8.25500 -8.25500 0.2 6670 -0.26670 415.93516 -13.32484 CUBOID 3 1 8.25500 -8.25500 0.26670 -0.26670 415.93516 -45.39234 UNIT 4 CUBOID 5 1 0.11430 -0.11430 8.25500 -8.25500 347.218 0.0 CUBOID 3 1 0.11430 -0.11430 8.25500 -8.25500 415.93516 -13.32484 CUBOID 4 1 0.26670 -0.26670 8.25500 -8.25500 415.93516 -13.32484 CUBOID 3 1 0.26670 -0. 26670 8.25500 -8.25500 415.93516 -45.39234 UNIT 5 CUBOID 4 1 1.4620875 -1.4620875 0.1524 -0.1524 415.93516 -13.32484 CUBOID 3 1 1.4620875 -1.4620875 0.1524 -0.1524 415.93516 -45.39234 UNIT 6 CUBOID 4 1 0.1524 -0.1524 1.3096875 -1.3096875 415.93516 -13.32484 CUBOID 3 1 0.1524 -0.1524 1.3096875 -1.3096875 415.93516 -45.39234 UNIT 7 ARRAY 1 -1.4732 -1.4732 -45.39234 UNIT 8 ARRAY 2 -10.3124 -10.3124 -45.39234 CUBOID 3 1 12.8190625 -12.8190625 12.8190625 -12.8190625 415.93516 -45.39234 HOLE 3 0.0 11.141075 0.0 HOLE 3 0.0 -11.141075 0.0 HOLE 4 11.141075 0.0 0.0 HOLE 4 -11.141075 0.0 0.0 HOLE 5 9.7170875 11.026775 0.0 HOLE 5 -9.7170875 11.026775 0.0 HOLE 5 9.7170875 -11.026775 0.0 HOLE 5 -9.7170875 -11.026775 0.0 HOLE 6 11.026775 9.5646875 0.0 HOLE 6 11.026775 -9.5646875 0.0 HOLE 6 -11.026775 9.5646875 0.0 HOLE 6 -11.026775 -9.5646875 0.0 UNIT 11 Page 1 (09/13/2002 11:08:41 AM)

D:\Keno\kenoinp\KUlIO1.inp CAG6[Q i i REV E 1 1 0.48387 399.288 CYLINDER CYLINDER 0 1 0.49276 399.288 52.07 52.07 PAPE o6o CYLINDER 2 1 0.55880 399. 288 52.07 CUBOID 3 1 0.73660 -0.73660 0.73660 -0.73660 399.288 52.07 CUBOID 7 1 0.73660 -0.73660 0.73660 -0.73660 438.1373 52.07 CUBOID 8 1 0.73660 -0.73660 0.73660 -0.73660 438.1373 38.74516 CUBOID 3 1 0.73660 -0.73660 0.73660 -0.73660 438.1373 -45.39234 UNIT 12 CYLINDER 3 1 1.31445 399. 2 88 52.07 CYLINDER 6 1 1.41605 399. 288 52.07 CUBOID 3 1 1.47320 -1.47320 1.47320 -1.47320 399.288 52.07 CUBOID 7 1 1.47320 -1.47320 1.47320 -1.47320 438.1373 52.07 CUBOID 8 1 1.47320 -1.47320 1.47320 -1.47320 438.1373 38.74516 CUBOID 3 1 1.47320 -1.47320 1.47320 -1.47320 438.1373 -45.39234 UNIT 13 CUBOID 5 1 8.25500 -8.25500 0.11430 -0 .11430 347.218 0.0 CUBOID 3 1 8.25500 -8.25500 0.11430 -0.11430 415.93516 -13.32484 CUBOID 4 1 8.25500 -8.25500 0.26670 -0.26670 415.93516 -13.32484 CUBOID 3 1 8.25500 -8.25500 0.2 6670 -0.2 6670 438.1373 -45.39234 UNIT 14 CUBOID 5 1 0.11430 -0 .11430 8.25500 -8.25500 347.218 0.0 CUBOID 3 1 0.11430 -0.11430 8.25500 -8.25500 415.93516 -13.32484 CUBOID 4 1 0.26670 -0.26670 8.25500 -8.25500 415.93516 -13.32484 CUBOID 3 1 0.26670 -0.26670 8.25500 -8.25500 438.1373 -45.39234 UNIT 15 CUBOID 4 1 1.4620875 -1.4620875 0.1524 -0.1524 415.93516 -13.32484 CUBOID 3 1 1.4620875 -1.4620875 0.1524 -0.1524 438.1373 -45.39234 UNIT 16 CUBOID 4 1 0.1524 -0.1524 1.3096875 -1.3096875 415.93516 -13.32484 CUBOID 3 1 0.1524 -0.1524 1.3096875 -1.3096875 438.1373 -45.39234 UNIT 17 ARRAY 9 -1.4732 -1.4732 -45.39234 UNIT 18 ARRAY 10 -10.3124 -10.3124 -45.39234 CUBOID 3 1 12.8190625 -12.8190625 12.8190625 -12.8190625 438.1373 -45.39234 HOLE 13 0.0 11.141075 0.0 HOLE 13 0.0 -11.141075 0.0 HOLE 14 11.141075 0.0 0.0 HOLE 14 -11.141075 0.0 0.0 HOLE 15 9.7170875 11.026775 0.0 HOLE 15 -9.7170875 11.026775 0.0 HOLE 15 9.7170875 -11.026775 0.0 HOLE 15 -9.7170875 -11.026775 0.0 HOLE 16 11.026775 9.5646875 0.0 HOLE 16 11.026775 -9.5646875 0.0 HOLE 16 -11.026775 9.5646875 0.0 HOLE 16 -11.026775 -9.5646875 0.0 UNIT 21 XCYLINDER 1 1 0.48387 347.218 0.0 XCYLINDER 0 1 0.49276 347.218 0.0 XCYLINDER 2 1 0.55880 347.218 0.0 CUBOID 3 1 347.218 0.0 0.73660 -0.73660 0.73660 -0.73660 CUBOID 7 1 386.0673 0.0 0.73660 -0.73660 0.73660 -0.73660 CUBOID 8 1 386.0673 -13.32484 0.73660 -0.73660 0.73660 -0.73660 UNIT 22 XCYLINDER 3 1 1.31445 347.218 0.0 XCYLINDER 6 1 1.41605 347.218 0.0 CUBOID 3 1 347.218 0.0 1.47320 -1. 47320 1. 47320 -1.47320 CUBOID 7 1 386.0673 0.0 1.47320 -1.47320 1.47320 -1.47320 CUBOID 8 1 386.0673 -13.32484 1.47320 -1.47320 1.47320 -1.47320 UNIT 23 ARRAY 7 -13.32484 -1.4732 -1.4732 UNIT 24 ARRAY 8 -13.32484 -10.3124 -10.3124 UNIT 30 ARRAY 3 -128.190625 -128.190625 -45.39234 UNIT 31 ARRAY 4 -102.552500 -128.190625 -45.39234 UNIT 32 ARRAY 5 -128.190625 -102.552500 -45.39234 UNIT 33 ARRAY 6 -89.7334375 -128.190625 -45.39234 UNIT 34 ARRAY 11 -128.190625 -115.3715625 -45.39234 UNIT 35 ARRAY 12 -128.190625 -12.8190625 -45.39234 UNIT 36 ARRAY 13 -89.7334375 -115.3715625 -45.39234 UNIT 37 ARRAY 14 -89.7334375 -12.8190625 -45.39234 GLOBAL UNIT 40 CUBOID 3 1 661.51125 -656.74875 363.37875 -398.62125 1067.12766 -45.39234 HOLE 32 473.86875 25.638125 0.0 HOLE 31 236.934375 0.0 0.0 HOLE 30 0.0 0.0 0.0 HOLE 30 -262.5725 0.0 0.0 HOLE 30 -525.1450 0.0 0.0 Page 2 (09/13/2002 11:08:41 AM)

D:\Keno\kenoinp\KUlI01.inp CA60 I IE Q- 

                                                                                      ~p'A cE t&7 HOLE    36    224.1153125      -251.023       0.0 HOLE    34       0.0           -251.023       0 .0 HOLE    34   -262.5725         -251.023       0.0 HOLE    34   -525.1450         -251.023       0 .0 HOLE    37    224.1153125      -379.215       0.0 HOLE    35       0.0           -379.215       0.0 HOLE    35   -262.5725         -379.215       0.0 HOLE    35   -525.1450         -379. 215      0 .0 HOLE    24   -250.0 -356.082 6       426.24756 CUBOID    9 1 661.9875     -657. 2250    363.8550     -399.0975  1067.12766  -45.86859 CUBOID 10 1 768.6675       -840. 1050    546.7350     -581.9775  1067.12766 -228.74859 END GEOM READ ARRAY ARA=1 NUX=2 NUY=2 NUZ=1 FILL       I 1 1 1 END FILL ARA=2 NUX=7 NUY=7 NUZ=1 FILL 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 2 7 7 7 2 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 2 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 2 7 7 7 2 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 END FILL ARA=3 NUX=10 NUY=10 NUZ=1 FILL 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 END FILL ARA=4 NUX=8 NUY=10 NUZ=1 FILL 8  8   8 8 8 8 8  8 8  8   8 8 8 8 8  8 8  8   8 8 8 8 8  8 8  8   8 8 8 8 8  8 8  8   8 8 8 8 8  8 8  8   8 8 8 8 8  8 8  8   8 8 8 8 8  8 8  8   8 8 8 8 8  8 8  8   8 8 8 8 8  8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 END FILL ARA=5 NUX=10 NUY=8 NUZ=1 FILL 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8      8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8      8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8      8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8      8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8      8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8      8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8      8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8      8 END FILL ARA=6 NUX=7     NUY=10  NUZ=1 FILL 8    8   8 8   8    8  8 8    8   8 8   8    8  8 8    8   8 8   8    8  8 8    8   8 8   8    8  8 8    8   8 8   8    8  8 8    8   8 8   8    8  8 8    8   8 8   8    8  8 8    8   8 8   8    8  8 a    8   8 8   8    8  8 a    8   8 8   8    8  8 Page 3      (09/13/2002 11:08:41 AM)

D:\Keno\kenoinp\KUlIO1.inp A OS0 l e:! 

                                                                                '1 END FILL ARA=7 NUX=1 NUY=2 NUZ=2                                          PAS E j FILL     21 21 21 21 END FILL ARA=8 NUX=l NUY=7 NUZ=7 FILL 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 22 23 23 23 22 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 22 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 22 23 23 23 22 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 END FILL ARA=9 NUX=2 NUY=2 NUZ=1 FILL     11 11 11 11 END FILL ARA=10 NUX=7 NUY=7 NUZ=1 FILL 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 12 17 17 17 12 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 12 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 12 17 17 17 12 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 END FILL ARA=11 NUX=10 NUY=9 NUZ=1 FILL 8  8  8  8  8   8 8   8  8 8 8  8  8  8  8   8 8   8  8   8 8  8  8  8  8   8 8   8  8   8 8  8  8  8  8   8 8   8  8   8 8  8  8  8  8   8 8   8  8   8 8  8  8  8  8   8 8   8  8   8 8  8  8  8  8   8 8   8  8   8 8  8  8  8  8   8 8   8  8   8 8  8  8  8  8   8 8   8  8   8 END FILL ARA=12 NUX=10 NUY=1 NUZ=1 FILL 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18   18 18 END FILL ARA=13 NUX=7 NUY=9 NUZ=1 FILL 8  8  a  8  8   8 8 8  8  8  8  8   8 8 8  8  8  8  8   8 8 8  8  8  8  8   8 8 a  8  8  8  8   8 8 8  8  8  8  8   8 8 8  8  8  8  8 8   8 8  8  8  8  8 8   8 8  8  8  8  8   8 8 END FILL ARA=14 NUX=7 NUY=1 NUZ=1 FILL 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 END FILL END ARRAY

'read plot 'ttl=' KUlIO1 X-Y GEOMETRY FOR UNIT 1 SFP AT Z=030.0 CM' 

'xul=-700.0 yul=400.0 zul=030.0 xlr=700.0 ylr=-425.0 zlr=030.0

'uax=1.0 vdn=-1.0 nax=800 NDN=650 'end plot 'read plot 'ttl=' KUlI0l X-Z GEOMETRY FOR UNIT 1 SFP AT Y=-356.0 CM' 'xul=-700.0 yul=-400.0 zul=470.0 xlr=700.0 ylr=400.0 zlr=-60.0 'uax=1.0 wdn=-1.0 nax=800 NDN=650 'end plot 'read plot 'ttl=' KUlIO1 Y-Z GEOMETRY FOR UNIT 1 SFP AT X=11.0 CM' 'xul=11.0 yul=400.0 zul=470.0 xlr=11.0 ylr=-400.0 zlr=-60.0 'vax=1.0 wdn=-1.0 nax=800 NDN=650 Page 4 (09/13/2002 11:08:41 AM)

D:\Keno\kenoinp\KUlIOl.inp CA06Qf ' RE V 0 PA GE 10' 'end plot END DATA END Page 5 (09/13/2002 11:08:42 AM)

ATTACHMENT (5) CALVERT CLIFFS UNIT 1 SFP DILUTION ANALYSIS Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Inc. May 1, 2003

EN-1-100 Forms Appendix Revision 2 ESP No.: IES200100780 Supp No. I0 Rev. No. 0 Page 1 of 1 FORM 19, CALCULATION COVER SHEET INITIATION (Control Doc Type - DCALC) Page 1 of 4G DCALC No.: CA06016 Revision No.: 0 Vendor Calculation (Check one): al Yes 3 No Responsible Group: NEU Responsible Engineer: Gerard E. Gryczkowski CALCULATION ENGINEERING 3 Civil E Instr& Controls Z Nuc Engrg DISCIPLINE: E Electrical El Mechanical E Diesel Gen Project E Life Cycle Mngmt E Reliability Engrg E Nuc Fuel Mngmt E1 Other:

Title:

UNITS 1 AND 2 SPENT FUEL POOL DILUTION ANALYSIS Unit El UNIT 1 El t JNIT 2 1 COMMON Proprietary or Safeguards Calculation El EYES Z NO Cormnents: Vendor Calc No.: REVISION No.: Vendor Name: Safety Class (Check one): E SR E2 AQ E NSR There are assumptions that require Verification during walkdown: AIT #: This calculation SUPERSEDES: REVIEW AND APPROVAL: Responsible Engineer: Gerard E. Gryczkowski - . Date: / / Independent Reviewer: K.I.R.Knippel I A m Date: Approval: M.T.Finley Date: I I - - ,

CA06016 Rev.0 Page 2

2. LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES Page Latest Page Latest Page Latest Page Latest Page Latest Rev Rev Rev Rev Rev 001 0 002 0 003 0 004 0 005 0 006 0 007 0 008 0 009 0 010 0 011 0 012 0 013 0 014 0 015 0 016 0 017 0 018 0 019 0 020 0 021 0 022 0 023 0 024 0 025 0 026 0 027 0 028 0 029 0 030 0 031 0 032 0 033 0 034 0 035 0 036 0 037 0 038 0 039 0 040 0 041 0 042 0 043 0 044 0 045 0 046 0

CA06016 Rev.0 Page 3

3. REVIEWER COMMENTS

CA06016 Rev.0 Page 4

4. TABLE OF CONTENTS
01. COVER SHEET ..................................................... 1
02. LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES .................................................... 2
03. REVIEWER COMMENTS .................................................... 3
04. TABLE OF CONTENTS ..................................................... 4
05. PURPOSE .................................................... 5
06. INPUT DATA AND TECHNICAL ASSUMPTIONS ..................................................... 7
07. REFERENCES ................................................... 11
08. METHODOLOGY, CALCULATIONS, AND RESULTS ............................................... 14
09. DOCUMENTATION OF COMPUTER CODES ................................................... 25
10. CONCLUSIONS ................................................... 26 ATTACHMENT A: DENSITY CALCULATIONS .................................................... 30 ATTACHMENT B: FUEL DATA SPREADSHEET........................................................34 ATTACHMENT C: SFP SINGLE RACK PLANAR GEOMETRY ................................. 36 ATTACHMENT D: UNIT 1 SFP PLANAR GEOMETRY ............................................... 38 ATTACHMENT E: UNIT 2 SFP PLANAR GEOMETRY ............................................... 41 ATTACHMENT F: SFP AXIAL GEOMETRY .................................................... 44 LAST PAGE OF REPORT ................................................... 46

CA06016 Rev.0 Page 5

5. PURPOSE The objective of this evaluation is to confirm that design features, instrumentation, administrative procedures, and sufficient time are available to detect and mitigate boron dilution in the spent fuel pool (SFP) before the boron concentration is reduced below the value assumed in the SFP criticality analyses which credit boron to remain below the design basis criticality limit of 0.95 k-eff. This report identifies the potential boron dilution sources and dilution events, the instrumentation available for detection of dilution, and the operating and administrative procedures available for the detection and mitigation of dilution. The report also identifies the potential events which could dilute the soluble boron contained in the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant (CCN-PP) Units 1 and 2 SFPs and quantifies the dilution rates and response times of each event. This report provides a methodology to evaluate potential spent fuel pool dilution events and is provided in conjunction with the criticality methodology of References 1 and 2.

Per Ref.45, allowing credit for soluble boron will allow the fresh fuel enrichment limit to be increased and the number of fresh fuel assemblies per cycle to be decreased. This will decrease fuel cycle costs, increase SFP cyclic capacities, decrease ISFSI requirements, decrease permanent DOE storage requirements, and result in an inherently safer operation. CCNPP currently has Technical Specification requirements on the boron concentration in the spent fuel pool that are applicable during the movement of fuel assemblies. The precedents for crediting soluble boron to provide negative reactivity in the spent fuel pool have already been established when considering abnormal or accident conditions with respect to fuel handling and misloading by applying the double contingency principle. During refueling operations, the subcritical requirement of the fuel assemblies in the reactor core is met solely by controlling the boron concentration in the filled portions of the reactor coolant system. Credit for the boron in the spent fuel pool is an extension of the use of soluble boron for reactor core reactivity control purposes. For an infinite axial and radial array of storage cells of nominal dimensions containing the maximum enrichment of 5.0 w/o Value Added Pellet (VAP) fuel at the worst case temperature of 40'F, the maximum unborated k-effective value of 0.986 is calculated with all biases and uncertainties, which is less than the 10 CFR 50.68 regulatory value of 1.0. The maximum k-effective value of 0.947 at a moderator boron concentration of 300 ppm with all biases and uncertainties is less than the 10 CFR 50.68 regulatory value of 0.95. (If credit is taken for soluble boron, the k-effective of the spent fuel storage racks loaded with fuel of the maximum fuel assembly reactivity must not exceed 0.95, at a 95% probability, 95% confidence level, if flooded with borated water, and the k-effective must remain below 1.0 (subcritical) at a 95% probability, 95% confidence level, if flooded with unborated water.). Note that 300 ppm is a minimum boron concentration requirement. Per the Technical Assumptions of Refs. I and 2, 15% should be added to this value to account for all uncertainties. Thus a boron level of 350 ppm with uncertainties is required to credit soluble boron in the SFP and to safely store 5 w/o VAP fuel in the SFP. The potential initiating events that could cause dilution of the boron in the spent fuel pool to a level below that credited in the criticality analyses fall into three categories: dilution by flooding, dilution by loss of coolant induced makeup, and dilution by loss of cooling system induced makeup. It is not credible that dilution could occur for the required length of time without operator notice, since this event would activate the high level alarm and initiate Auxiliary Building flooding. In addition, in excess of 1043000 gallons of unborated water must be added to the SFP to reach 350 ppm soluble boron concentration. This is more water volume than is contained in both pretreated water storage tanks and also more water volume than is contained in

CA06016 Rev.0 Page 6 the demineralized water storage tank and both condensate storage tanks combined. Even in the unlikely event that the SFP is completely diluted of boron, the SFP will remain subcritical by a design margin of k-eff not to exceed 0.986 including all biases and uncertainties.

CA06016 Rev.0 Page 7

6. INPUT DATA AND TECHNICAL ASSUMPTIONS (6.A) Spent Fuel Pool Geometry The SFP is a large rectangular structure that holds the spent fuel assemblies from the reactors in both units. Borated water fills the SFP and completely covers the spent fuel assemblies. The SFP is constructed of 6' of reinforced concrete and is lined with a 3/16" stainless steel plate, which serves as a leakage barrier. A 3.5' dividing wall separates the SFP, with the north half being associated with Unit-i and the south half associated with Unit-2. A slot in the dividing wall has removable gates, which allow movement of fuel assemblies between the two halves of the pool. The SFP is located in the Auxiliary Building between the two containment structures.

(Ref.8) Each half of the SFP is equipped with vertical spent fuel racks installed on the pool bottom. The fuel rack cells are individual double-walled containers approximately 14' 1" in height. The inner wall of each cell is made from a 0.06 inch thick sheet of stainless steel formed into a square cross-section container, indented on the corners, with an inside dimension of 8.5625 inches. The outer, or external, wall is also formed from a stainless steel sheet 0.06 inches thick. Plates of borated, neutron absorbing material are inserted between the two walls, in each of the four spaces formed by the indentations in the inner wall. The plates are made of a boron carbide (B4 C) composite material (carborundum in Unit 1 and Boraflex in Unit 2) and are 6.5 inches wide by 0.09 inches thick. Each plate contains at least 0.020 grams of boron-10 per square centimeter of plate. Attachments C and F display a single SEP planar and axial storage cell geometry. The spacing between the cells is maintained at 10 3/32 inches, center to center, by external sheets and welded spacers. The boron plate inserts and assembly spacing help maintain the SFP assemblies in a subcritical condition. (Ref. 15) Storage Cell Pitch = 10.09375" (Ref.15) Storage Cell Inner Dimension = 8.5625" (Ref.15) Poison Sheet = 6.5"

  • 0.09" (Ref.15)

Inner Steel Wall = 0.06" (Ref.15) Outer Steel Wall = 0.06" (Ref.15) Storage Cell Height =14' 1" (Ref.25) (6.B) SFP Levels (6.B. 1) The SFP low level alarm point is at 66'6" per Refs. 25 and 66. (6.B.2) The SFP operating level is at 67'0" per Refs.08 and 32. (6.B.3) The SFP overflow level (pipe centerline of 4" pipes) to the Auxiliary Building gravity drains is at 67'3" per Refs. 8 and 23. Note that the Auxiliary Building floor drains and the SFP overflow drains are connected, thus any backup would flood the 5' elevation first. (6.B.4) The SFP floor elevation is 69'0" per Ref.32. (6.B.5) The SFP curb elevation is 69'6" per Ref.32. (6.B.6) The fuel transfer tube midpoint elevation is 35'6" per Ref.32. (6.B.7) The SFP upper level alarm point is at 67'2.75" per Ref. 66. (6.C) Spent Fuel Pool Water Inventories at Lower Alarm Limit The Unit 1 SFP Gross Volume (VGS1) can be derived from the dimensions delineated in Attachments D and F, assuming that the SFP water level is at the lower alarm limit of 66'6" per Ref.25: VGS1 = (43'3")*(25'0"-96.0")*(66'6"-30'0") + (54'0")*(96.0")*(66'6"-29'6") + (1 1'0")*(9'0")*(30'0"-28'0") 

            = 7.433618E+07 in3 = 43018.63 ft3

CA06016 Rev.0 Page 8 The Unit 2 SFP Gross Volume (VGS2) can be derived from the dimensions delineated in Attachments E and F, assuming that the SFP water level is at the lower alarm limit of 66'6" per Ref.25: VGS2 = (43'3")*(25'0"-96.0")*(66'6"-30F0") + (54'0")*(96.0")*(66'6"-29'6") 

            = 7.399404E+07 in3 = 42820.63 ft 3 The corresponding Unit 1, Unit 2, and total SFP areas are        2 ASI = (43'3")*(25'0"-96.0")+ (54'0")*(96.0") = 168084.0 in = 1167.250 ft2 AS2 = (43'3")*(25'0"-96.0")+ (54'0")*(96.0") = 168084.0 in 2 = 1167.250 ft2 AST = 2334.500 ft2 It is necessary to adjust the SFP gross volumes by the assembly and storage rack displacements.

The Unit 1 SFP contains 830 assemblies and storage rack structures, while the Unit 2 SFP contains 1000 assemblies and storage rack structures (UFSAR 9.7.2.1). Each assembly and storage cell is composed of 176 VAP fuel pins of volume VEP, 5 guide tubes of volume VGT, an upper end fitting of volume VUEF, a lower end fitting of volume VLEF, and a storage cell of volume VSR. The data for the following calculations was extracted from Attachments A and B. VFP Tc*(0.440"/2)2*(145.9")*(176) = 3904.480 in 3 = 2.259537 ft3 VGT = 7*(1 l152 1o352 /4*(145.9")*(5) = 98.54705 in3 = 0.057030 ft3 VUEF = (1008.46665 in )*(1.-0.886177)= 114.7867 in3 = 0.066427 ft3 VLEF = (345.89186 in 3 )*(1.-0.859993) = 48.42728 in 3 = 0.028025 ft3 VSR = 4*(136.7")*366.5")*(0.09") + 4*(169")*(8.5625"+0.122")*(0.12") 

         = 1024.202 in = 0.592710 ft3 The Units 1 and 2 and combined SFP Net Volumes can thus be calculated.

VNS1 = 43018.63 ft3 - 830*(2.259537+0.057030+0.066427+0.028025+0.592710) 

         = 40525.53 ft3 VNS2 = 42820.63 ft3 - 1000*(2.259537+0.057030+0.066427+0.028025+0.59271 0)
         = 39816.90 ft3 VNS = 40525.53 ft3 + 39816.90 ft3 = 80342.43 ft3 A total SFP Net Volume of 79000 ft3 to the lower alarm limit will conservatively be used in all calculations in this work.

(6.D) Spent Fuel Pool Water Inventories at Overflow Limit The Unit 1 SFP Gross Volume (VGS1) can be derived from the dimensions delineated in Attachments D and F, assuming that the SFP water level is at the overflow limit of 67'3" per Ref.08: VGS1 = (43'3")*(25'0"-96.0")*(67'1 "-3010") + (54'0")*(96.0")*(67'1"-29'6") + (1 1'0")*(9'0")*(30'0"-28'0") 

            = 43699.52 ft3 The Unit 2 SFP Gross Volume (VGS2) can be derived from the dimensions delineated in Attachments E and F, assuming that the SFP water level is at the overflow limit of 67'3" per Ref.08:

VGS2 = (43'3")*(251'0"-96.0")*(67'1 "-30'0") + (54'0")*(96.0")*(67'1"-29'6") 

            = 43501.52 ft3 The Units 1 and 2 and combined SFP Net Volumes can thus be calculated.

VNS1 = 43699.52 ft3 - 830*(2.259537+0.057030+0.066427+0.028025+0.5927 10) 

         = 41206.42 ft3

CA06016 Rev.0 Page 9 VNS2 = 43501.52 ft3 - 1000*(2.259537+0.057030+0.066427+0.028025+0.592710) 

         = 40497,79 ft3 VNS = 41206.42 ft3 + 40497.79 ft3 = 81704.21 ft 3 A total SFP Net Volume of 80000 ft3 to the overflow limit will conservatively be used in all calculations in this work.

(6.E) Maximum SFP Decay Heat Rate The maximum decay heat rate anticipated for 1830 fuel assemblies stored in the SFP is 37.6x10 6 Btu/hr per UFSAR 9.4.1. (6.F) SFP Temperature Per UFSAR 9.4.1, in the event that any one loop is lost, the remaining two loops (either two SFPC loops or one SFPC loop and one SDC loop) can continue to maintain the pool temperature at or below 155 0 F (680 C or 341.480 K @ 0.9785 gm/cc per Ref. 16) for 1830 fuel assemblies in the SFP including a full core offload. (6.G) SIFP Time to Boil Assuming that the SFP is at 155 0 F (See 6F), the time to boil excluding assembly heatup can be computed from the appropriate Ref 16 specific enthalpies and volumes: Tsat= 155 0 F V,=0.01637 ft3 /lbm hf=123.0 btu/lbm hfgl1005. 2 btu/bm Tsat= 2120 F V,=0.01672 ft3 /lbm hf=180.2 btu/lbm hfg= 970.3 btu/bm t = (79000 ft3 )/(0.01637 ft3 /lbm)*(180.2-123.0 btu/lbm)/(37.6E+06 btu/hr) 

      = 7.3415 hr (6.H) Bounding SFP Boron Concentration The normal boron concentration maintained in the spent fuel pool is expected to be at least the same as that for the refueling boron Technical Specification. Per Refs.47 and 48, the Technical Specification Refueling Boron Concentration is greater than 2150 ppm. 2000 ppm will be conservatively used in this work.

(6.I) Time to Dilute to 350 PPM from 2000 PPM Due to Loss of Cooling Assuming that the water added to the SFP is unborated and at 100°F and assuming that sufficient unborated water is added to the SFP to maintain the SFP at 212°F, the flow rate of water out of the SFP and down the gravity drains can be calculated to be Tsat= 100°F V,=0.01613 ft3 /lbm hf=68.0 btu/lbm hfg=10 3 7 .1 btu/bm Tsat= 212'F V,=0.01672 ft 3 /lbm hf=1 80.2 btullbm hfg= 970.3 btu/bm F = (37.6E+06 btu/hr)*(0.01672 ft3 /lbm)/(180.2-68.0 btu/lbm)=5603.137 ft3 /hr = 698.57 gpm SFP dilution can be modeled by the following algorithm (Ref.45): dC/dt = -F*C/V C = CO

  • exp(-t*F/V) t = (V/F)*ln(3 Co/C) t = (80000 ft / 5603.135 ft3 /hr)
  • ln(2000/350) = 24.88 hr The amount of water flowing down the gravity drain is Vw = (24.88 hr) * (5603.137 ft3 /hr) = 139406.0 ft 3 = 1042827 gals

CA06016 Rev.0 Page 10 (6.J) Time to Fuel Uncovery Due to Loss of Cooling: The boiloff rate due the maximum decay heat rate is B = (37.6E+06 btulhr)*(0.01672 ft3 /lbm)/(970.3 btu/lbm) = 647.9151 ft3 /hr The time rate of decrease in Rool level is D = B/AST = 647.9151 ft /hr /2334.5 ft2 = 0.2775 ft/hr The time to fuel uncovery is thus t=(67'1"-45'1.625")/(0.2775 ft/hr) = 79.09 hr (6.K) RWT Boron Concentration Per Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.5.4.4 and Ref.58, the RWT boron concentration must be greater than or equal to 2300 ppm. This must be verified every 7 days. (6.L) Water Sources (MAXIMUMS) (6.L.1) 2 Pretreated Water Storage Tanks: Vol=7t(23.25 )2(39.5')=67080 ft3 =501792 gal (Refs.49-50) (6.L.2) 2 Condensate Storage Tanks: Vo1=7r(20.25 )2(32.66667')=42083 ft 3 =314801 gal (Refs.49-51) (6.L.3) 1 Demineralized Water Storage Tank: VoI=7t(20.25') 2(36.33333')=46806 ft3 =350135 gal (Refs.49-52, UFSAR 9.4.4) (6.L.4) 2 Refueling Water Tanks: Vol = 420000 gal = 56146 ft' (Refs.49 and UFSAR 9.4.4) (6.L.5) Well water: 3 well water pumps and filters at 175 gpm each (Ref.56 and UFSAR 9.4.4) (6.L.6) Water for the fire protection system is supplied by two full-capacity fire pumps. One pump is an electrically driven 2500 gpm horizontal centrifugal pump, and the other is a diesel engine-driven 2500 gpm horizontal centrifugal pump. The fire pumps take suction from the two 500000 gallon capacity pretreated water storage tanks. (Ref.54 and UFSAR 9.9.4) Fire stations HS-69-4 and HS-69-6 service the fuel handling and storage area. (Ref.54) (6.L.7) Plant service water isolation valves 0-PSW-140, 0-PSW-139, and 0-PSW-251 are low flow rate systems which take suction on the two 500000 gallon capacity pretreated water storage tanks. (Ref.54). (6.L.8) Demineralized water isolation valves 0-DW-302 and 0-DW-190 are low flow rate (150 gpm) systems which take suction on the 350000 gallon demineralized water storage tank (Ref 54 and UFSAR 9.4.4). (6.L.9) Plant heating system valve 0-PH-281 is a low flow rate system which take suction on the two 500000 gallon capacity pretreated water storage tanks. (Ref.54). (6.L.10) The two 1390 gpm SFP cooling pumps can supply 420000 gallons of borated water from each refueling water tank (Ref.54 and UFSAR 9.4.4). (6.L.I 1) No fire protection sprinkler system exists in the fuel handling area (Ref.54)

CA06016 Rev.0 Page 11

7. REFERENCES (01) "Unit I Spent Fuel Pool Enrichment Limit with Soluble Boron Credit", CA0601 1 (02) "Unit 2 Spent Fuel Pool Criticality Analysis with Soluble Boron and Bumup Credit but without Boraflex Credit", CA06015.

(03) "Criticality Accident Requirements", 10 CFR 50.68 (04) "Design Bases for Protection Against Natural Phenomena", 10 CFR 50 App.A GDC 2 (05) "Fuel Storage and Handling and Radioactivity Control", 10 CFR 50 App.A GDC 61 (06) "Monitoring Fuel and Waste Storage", 10 CFR 50 App.A GDC 63 (07) "Review and Acceptance of Spent Fuel Storage and Handling Applications", B.K.Grimes (NRC) to All Power Reactor Licensees, 4/14/78 (08) "Spent Fuel Pool and Cooling System Description", Rev.0, October 1997. (15) "Nuclear Design Analysis Report for the CCNPP Unit 1 High Density Spent Fuel Storage Racks", NES Report 81A0567 Rev.2. (16) 1967 Steam Tables, New York St. Martin's press, 1967 (17) "Impact of Zirlo on the Reactivity Bias", Westinghouse Interoffice Correspondence CA-2001-0026 (18) "Implementation of Zirlo Cladding Material in CE Nuclear Power Fuel Assembly Designs", CENPD-404-P Rev.0 (19) "Nuclides and Isotopes, Chart of the Nuclides", GE Nuclear 14th Edition. (20) "Introduction to Nuclear Engineering", J.R.Lamarsh, 12/77. (21) "Standard Composition Library", NUREG/CR-0200 Rev.6 Volume 3 Section M8 (22) "Fuel Storage Rack Installation in Pool", BGE Drawing 13939-0014 Rev.5 (23) "Auxiliary Building SFP Liner Plan and Sections Sheet 1", BGE Drawing 61-706-E Rev.18. (24) " Fuel Storage Rack Installation in Pool", BGE Drawing 13939-0038 Rev.2 (25) "Fuel Handling Accident during Reconstitution", CA04048 (26) "Design Input Data for CCNPP ISFSI", NEU-01-016. (27) "Guide Tube Assembly Details", BGE Drawing E-STD-701-303 Rev.5. (28) "Evaluation of Type A Irradiated Fuel Assembly Drop on SFP Floor", BGE Calculation 95-0128 Rev.02.

CA06016 Rev.0 Page 12 (29) "Evaluation of Type B Irradiated Fuel Assembly Drop on SFP Floor", BGE Calculation 95-0125 Rev.02. (30) "Evaluation of Type C Irradiated Fuel Assembly Drop on SFP Floor", BGE Calculation 95-0180 Rev.01. (31) "Evaluation of Fuel Assembly Drop on SFP Floor", BGE Calculation 95-0115 Rev.02. (32) "Equipment Location Containment and Auxiliary Building Unit No.1 Section A-A", BGE Drawing 60215 Rev.3. (33) "SEP Cooling, Pool Fill and Drain Systems", BGE Drawing 60716, Rev.51. (34) "Area No.16 Piping Partial Plan and Sections E1.27'0" ", BGE Drawing 60421, Rev.17. (35) "Area No. 16 Spent Fuel Cooling", BGE Drawing 12530A-64, Rev.6. (36) "Area No. 16 Spent Fuel Cooling Pipe MK. No. 8" HC-4-1020", BGE Drawing 12530A-65, Rev.4. (37) "Area No. 16 Spent Fuel Cooling", BGE Drawing 12530A-55, Rev.3. (38) "Area No. 16 Spent Fuel Cooling", BGE Drawing 12530A-14, Rev.2. (39) "Area No. 16 Spent Fuel Cooling", BGE Drawing 13530A-35, Rev.4. (40) "Area No. 16 Spent Fuel Cooling", BGE Drawing 13530A-14, Rev.5. (41) "Auxiliary Building SFP Liner Sections and Details", BGE Drawing 61707SH0002, Rev. 1 9. (42) "Spent Fuel Pool Storage", SRP 9.1.2 Rev.3, 7/81. (43) "Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System", SRP 9.1.3, Rev.1, 7/81. (44) "Spent Fuel Storage Facility Design Basis", Regulatory Guide 1.13, Rev.1, 12/75. (45) "Crediting Soluble Boron in LWR Spent Fuel Pools", CE NPSD-985-P, 01/1995. (46) "New Fuel Storage", SRP 9.1.1, Rev.2, 7/81. (47) "Unit 1 Cycle 15 Technical Data Book", NEOP-13 Rev.14. (48) "Unit 2 Cycle 14 Technical Data Book", NEOP-23 Rev.14. (49) "Plant Property and Buildings", BGE Drawing 61502SH0002 Rev.19 (50) "2 Pretreated Water Storage Tanks 46'6" Dia x 39'6" High", BGE Drawing 12329A-0001 Rev.2 (51) "Condensate Storage Tank #12", BGE Drawing 12329C-12 Rev.D

CA06016 Rev.0 Page 13 (52) "Demineralized Water Tank", BGE Drawing 12329D-01. (53) "CCNPP Unit 1 and 2 Filling Spent Fuel Pool", Procedure OI-24F Rev.3. (54) "Exemption from Criticality Monitoring Requirements", Letter from C.H.Cruise to NRC, NRC-97-008, 8/19/96. (55) "Fire Suppression Water System", Technical Requirements Manual 15.7.5. (56) "Well Water", OI-23A Rev.12 (57) "SFP Skimmer Operation", OI-24C Rev. 1. (58) "Specification and Surveillance Primary Systems", CP-204 Rev.15 (59) "Control of Shift Activities", NO-1-200 Rev.22 (60) "Beyond Design Basis Accidents in Spent Fuel Pools", NUJREG- 1353, April 1989. (61) "0-TIA-2001 Master Calibration Data Package", 11/13/97 (62) "0-TIA-2002 Master Calibration Data Package", 2/4/98 (63) "O-TS-1997 Master Calibration Data Package", 8/9/00 (64) "O-TS-1 998 Master Calibration Data Package", 8/9/00 (65) "ISFSI Loading", ISFSI-01, Rev.6. (66) "Setpoint File for System 067", NEQR440, 04/13/2000.

CA06016 Rev.0 Page 14

8. METHODOLOGY, CALCULATIONS, AND RESULTS The first step in the dilution analysis is to identify potential initiating events that could cause dilution of the boron in the spent fuel pool that could eventually lead to a substantial reduction of at least several hundred ppm in the pool boron concentration. A boron dilution event in the spent fuel pool could be initiated by external events, a variety of human errors, or component malfunctions. The potential initiating events were developed based on a review of the events in NUREG -1353 (Ref.60) and a systematic evaluation of the unborated water sources that interface with the pool. External events include fire in the vicinity of the pool, external floods at the site, storms causing runoff into the spent fuel pool area, seismic induced failures of piping, missile generation causing leaks in the piping, and airplane crashes into the fuel handling building.

Other dilution events include small loss of inventory events, tank ruptures in the vicinity of the pool, breaks in the cooling system piping or heat exchangers, random breaks in the piping, dilution events initiated in the reactor coolant system, and misalignment of valves interfacing with the spent fuel pool. The NUREG-1353 initiating events include structural failures - (Missiles, Aircraft Crashes, Heavy Load Drops), pneumatic seal failures, inadvertent drainage, loss of cooling/makeup, and seismic structural failure. The methodology employed in this work entails calculation of the SFP volumes, dilution volumes, and dilution times for SFP boron dilution events with various dilution sources and flow rates. The initial SFP boron concentration was determined in Section 6.H, while the endpoint of the boron dilution event corresponds to the SFP boron concentration credited in the criticality analyses (Refs.1-2) to maintain k-eff0.95. The time to dilute to this endpoint determines the available response time for the operators to detect and stop the dilution event. (8.A) Flooding Per Ref.4, structures, systems, and components important to safety shall be designed to withstand the effects of natural phenomena, such as earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, and tsunami, without loss of capability to perform their safety functions. Even in the unlikely event that the SFP is completely diluted of boron, the SFP will remain subcritical by a design margin of k-eff not to exceed 0.986. (8.A.1) Flooding by Tsunami Since there has been no record of tsunamis on the northeastern United States coast, it is not believed that the site will be subjected to a significant tsunami effect (UFSAR 2.6.6). (8.A.2) Flooding by Hurricane The relative frequency of hurricane occurrence for the CCNPP site is slightly more than one hurricane per year. For the Probable Maximum Hurricane (PMH), it is assumed that the peak hurricane surge is coincident with normal high tide and with a 99th percentile wave height. The total predicted wave run-up is to Elevation 27.1', which is considerably less than the 69' elevation of the top of the SFP. Thus the maximum hypothetical flood level is below the top of the SFP elevation (UFSAR 2.8.3). (8.A.3) Flooding by Storms The auxiliary building is a concrete structure and qualified for high winds. Therefore, severe storms with high winds are not expected to cause sufficient damage to the roof, thus allowing a large volume of rain to enter the building and becoming an unborated source of water to the pool. The 6" lip around the SFP (BGE Drawing 61706E Sheet 1 Rev.18 - Ref.23) should cause the bulk of the entering rain water to flow out of the SFP area via the 13 floor drains, 13 doors, and 2 tendon end cap shafts.

CA06016 Rev.0 Page 15 (8.A.4) Flooding by Onsite Water Sources The onsite water sources that can flood the SFP and cause dilution below the minimum boron concentration calculated in Refs.1-2 are detailed in Section 6.L. The large volume of water necessary to dilute the pool to the boron endpoint precludes many small tanks as potential dilution sources. The large unborated water sources such as reactor makeup water and demineralizer water are in tanks at the tank farm at elevations below the spent fuel pool, so that gravity feed from these tanks to the spent fuel pool is not possible. It would be very unlikely that the large volumes of water necessary, to substantially dilute the spent fuel pool (i.e., to the boron endpoint) could be 'silently" transferred from these tanks to the spent fuel pool without being detected by plant personnel. Dilution events that have the potential to dilute the SFP boron concentration to a value less than the minimum required are not credible events based on existing level alarms and the stored inventory of demineralized water in the systems interfacing with the SFP. (8.A.4.a) Fire Protection System The possibility of a fire in the spent fuel pool area leading to a boron dilution event is not a credible event. Typically, combustible loadings around the pool area are expected to be minor. If the fire hose stations were used to extinguish a fire, the volume of water required to extinguish a local fire is not expected to be of sufficient magnitude to dilute the pool such that a several hundred ppm reduction in the pool boron concentration would occur. Water for the fire protection system is supplied by two full-capacity fire pumps. One pump is an electrically driven 2500 gpm horizontal centrifugal pump, and the other is a diesel engine-driven 2500 gpm horizontal centrifugal pump. The fire pumps take suction from the two 500000 gallon capacity pretreated water storage tanks. (Ref.54 and UFSAR 9.9.4) Fire stations HS-69-4 and HS-69-6 service the fuel handling and storage area. (Ref.54) Fire in the fuel handling building could result in a large amount of unborated water entering the SFP while attempting to extinguish the fire. The rate of addition of unborated water from a fire would be insufficient to exceed the minimum boron level of 350 ppm, since sufficient time would exist to take compensatory measures (i.e., add additional boron to the SFP). In addition, the discussion on incomplete boron mixing indicates that the unborated water would tend to float on the surface of the pool and overflow the SFP as water continues to flow into the SFP. Thus the fuel assemblies should remain surrounded by borated water. Finally, assuming that the fire is not directly over the SFP, the 6" lip around the SFP (BGE Drawing 61706E Sheet 1 Rev. 18 - Ref 23) should cause the bulk of the water used to extinguish the fire to flow out of the SFP area via the 13 floor drains, 13 doors, and 2 tendon end cap shafts. At a dilution rate of 2500 gpm directly into the SFP, it will take 6.95 hours to dilute the SFP from 2000 to 350 ppm. t = (80000 ft3) / (20052.14 ft 3/hr)

  • ln(2000/350) = 6.95 hr It is not credible that dilution could occur for this length of time without operator notice, since this event would activate the high level alarm and initiate Auxiliary Building flooding. In addition, in excess of 1043000 gallons of pretreated water must be added to the SFP to reach 350 ppm soluble boron concentration. This is twice the water volume that is contained in a single pretreated water storage tank. Assuming that a fire hose was inserted into the SFP and discharged at the maximum rate of 2500 gpm, it would exhaust the pretreated water storage tank that it was aligned to in approximately 3.45 hours. Two well water pumps would automatically actuate and pump 600 gpm into the pretreated water storage tank. An additional 13 hours would be required for the SFP to be diluted to 350 ppm at this rate.

CA06016 Rev.0 Page 16 (8.A.4.b) Plant Service Water Isolation Valves 0-PSW-140, 0-PSW-139, and 0-PSW-251 Plant service water isolation valves 0-PSW-140, 0-PSW-139, and 0-PSW-251 are low flow rate systems which take suction on the two 500000 gallon capacity pretreated water storage tanks. (Ref.54). Note that this case is bounded by 8.A.4.a. (8.A.4.c) Misalignment of Valves Interfacing with the SFP: Demineralized Water Isolation Valves 0-DW-302 and 0-DW-190 A path that interfaces with the spent fuel pool and unborated water sources could become a dilution path. If isolation valves are either left in the open position or fail in the open position, a potential dilution path is available. During spent fuel pool operation, makeup to the spent fuel pool may be required. The resins in the demineralizer tank may also have to be flushed or changed periodically. If valves are misaligned, it is possible that unborated water could be delivered to the spent fuel pool. Demineralized water isolation valves 0-DW-302 and 0-DW-190 are low flow rate (150 gpm) systems which take suction on the 350000 gallon demineralized water storage tank (Ref.54 and UFSAR 9.4.4). At a dilution rate of 150 gpm, it will take 115.9 hours to dilute the SFP from 2000 to 350 ppm. t = (80000 ft3) / (1203.128 ft 3 /hr)

  • ln(2000/350) = 115.9 hr It is not credible that dilution could occur for this length of time without operator notice, since this event would activate the high level alarm and initiate Auxiliary Building flooding. In addition, in excess of 1043000 gallons of demineralized water must be added to the SFP to reach 350 ppm soluble boron concentration. This is three times more water volume than is contained in the demineralized water tank.

(8.A.4.d) Plant Heating System Valve 0-PH-281 Plant heating system valve 0-PH-281 is a low flow rate system which take suction on the two 500000 gallon capacity pretreated water storage tanks. (Ref.54). Note that this case is bounded by 8.A.4.a. (8.A.4.e) SFP Cooling Pumps The two 1390 gpm SFP cooling pumps can supply 420000 gallons of borated water from each refueling water tank (Ref.54 and UFSAR 9.4.4). Note that per 6.J, the RWT boron concentration exceeds that in the SFP. Thus this does not constitute a dilution event. (8.A.4.f) Incomplete Mixing Via Stratification The unlikely probability of an inadvertent boron dilution event reducing the SFP boron concentration to less than 350 ppm is based on the assumption of complete mixing of the boron in the SFP. The complete mixing assumption may not always be valid, if the circulation flow in the SFP is insufficient to prevent stratification. Where stratification has occurred (Robinson 2 12/20/88 and San Onofre 1 1/23/89 - Ref.45), it was observed that the diluted water floated on the higher borated water. This suggests that if stratification does occur, the water with the higher boron concentration will tend to be in the lower level of the SFP where the fuel assemblies are located. The possibility of boron stratification in the SFP can be eliminated by circulating the SFP water via the SFP cooling or purification systems. (8.A.4.g) Incomplete Mixing Via Ribbon Effect Another type of incomplete boron mixing is a ribbon effect, where a channel of unborated water bores its way to a SFP assembly location. If the SFP cooling or purification systems are in operation, mixing will occur in the piping systems eliminating any ribbon effects. Assuming that the SFP cooling and purification systems are not in operation, an analysis using turbulent jet and diffusion theory was performed to determine the extent of any ribbon effect. Per Ref.45,

CA06016 Rev.0 Page 17 the change in concentration per length of the jet flow can be estimated via the algorithm Q/Q= 0.42* z/d, where Q0 is the volumetric flow rate at the nozzle discharge, d is the nozzle diameter, and Q is the volumetric flow rate at a distance z from the nozzle along the axis of symmetry. The volumetric flow will increase along the jet flow path, due to entrainment of the bulk liquid as the jet flow diameter increases. The ratio of volumetric flow rate to the initial volumetric flow rate determines the amount of bulk fluid entrained in the jet flow and thus is representative of the boron concentration along the flow path C

  • Q Co * (Q - Qo)

Q/Qo = Co/(Co - C) = 0.42

  • z / d For a CO of 2000 ppm and a 10" diameter pipe (the largest discharge pipe in the SFP is an 8" diameter pipe, thus the use of a 10" pipe is conservative), C will reach 350 ppm within 29" of the nozzle discharge. Thus it is unlikely that a diluted ribbon flow of less than 350 ppm could reach the fuel, since the tops of the SFP racks and nearest nozzle are in excess of 27" above the active fuel region of the assemblies stored in the racks.

(8.A.4.h) Tank Rupture in the Vicinity of the SFP No tanks containing any significant amount of water are stored in the vicinity of the SFPs. (8.A.4.i) Breaks in the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System Piping or Heat Exchangers A break in the heat exchanger would cause a dilution of the spent fuel pool due to the inflow of water from the cooling water system. The SFPC heat exchangers are cooled by service water (UFSAR 9.4.2). The service water system is a closed system and uses plant demineralized water with a corrosion inhibitor added. Additional makeup may be provided by the condensate system. (UFSAR 9.5.2.2) Assuming that the break occurs in one loop of the SFPC system and that the corresponding 1390 gpm pump stays in operation pumping unborated water into the SFP, the time to dilution is t = (80000 ft3 ) / (11149 ft 3 /hr)

  • ln(2000/350) = 12.5 hr It is not credible that dilution could occur for this length of time without operator notice, since this event would activate the high level alarm and initiate Auxiliary Building flooding. In addition, in excess of 1043000 gallons of demineralized water must be added to the SFP to reach 350 ppm soluble boron concentration. This is more water volume than is contained in the demineralized water storage tank and both condensate storage tanks combined.

(8.A.4.k) Dilution Events Initialed in the Reactor Coolant System Another set of dilution events could be initiated by failures that could dilute both the boron concentration in the reactor coolant system (RCS) and the spent fuel pool via the refueling pool. There are valves from the CVCS to the spent fuel pool that could be left open so that an inadvertent dilution event of the reactor coolant system would not only deliver unborated water to the reactor vessel, but also to the spent fuel pool. Possible initiating events that could impact the reactor coolant system are operator error such as selecting dilution instead of makeup, failures in the makeup system (e.g., valves do not open, boric acid pumps do not operate) so that boric acid is not delivered to the blender, the valve for the emergency boration flushing line is left open, failures of the temperature control system in the thermal regenerative demineralizers during the storage mode of operation, valves left open following flushing operations of the demineralizer tanks, and valves left open after chemical addition to the chemical addition tank. The above inadvertent dilution events in the reactor coolant system would be readily observed and emergency boration would be initiated (which would provide borated water to the spent fuel pool). The amount of water required to dilute the SFP, the refueling pool, and the reactor coolant system is much greater than that required to dilute just the SFP. Thus more water volume than is

CA06016 Rev.0 Page 18 contained in the demineralized water storage tank and both condensate storage tanks combined would be required for dilution. It is not credible that dilution could occur for this length of time during a refueling outage without operator notice, since this event would activate the high level alarm and initiate Auxiliary Building flooding. (8.A.4.1) Dilution Event Coupled with a Loss of Offsite Power The SFP instrumentation is not powered from the emergency diesel generators, thus a loss of offsite power would therefore affect the plant's ability to respond to a dilution event. However, the loss of offsite power would also affect electric pumps involved in the dilution event. The large unborated water sources such as reactor makeup water and demineralizer water are in tanks at the tank farm at elevations below the spent fuel pool, so that gravity feed from these tanks to the spent fuel pool is not possible. It would be very unlikely that the large volumes of water necessary, to substantially dilute the spent fuel pool (i.e., to the boron endpoint) could be 

'silently" transferred from these tanks to the spent fuel pool without being detected by plant personnel. Dilution events that have the potential to dilute the SFP boron concentration to a value less than the minimum required are not credible events based on the stored inventory of unborated water in the systems interfacing with the SFP.

(8.B) Dilution by Loss of SFP Coolant Inventory Per Ref.44, the fuel handling and storage facilities should be designed to prevent loss of water from the fuel pool that would uncover fuel, via natural events (Seismic Category 1), dropping of heavy loads (single-failure proof crane), and small leaks (coolant makeup system and level and radiation monitors). Per Ref.5, the SFP fuel storage and handling systems shall be designed to prevent significant reduction in fuel storage coolant inventory under accident conditions. Per UFSAR 14.18.1, fuel pool structural integrity is assured by designing the pool and the spent fuel storage racks as Category I structures. Only partial structural failures, where makeup can compensate for the loss of coolant, can cause a dilution event. Even in the unlikely event that the SFP is completely diluted of boron by a total loss of inventory and a refill with unborated water, the SFP will remain subcritical by a design margin of k-eff not to exceed 0.986. (8.B.1) Earthquake and Tornado Induced Loss of Coolant Per Ref.4, structures, systems, and components important to safety shall be designed to withstand the effects of natural phenomena, such as earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, and tsunami, without loss of capability to perform their safety functions. (8.B.1.a) Tornadoes Per UFSAR 5.6.1.1, the Auxiliary Building is primarily a reinforced concrete structure and the mat foundation supports a structural steel and reinforced concrete frame, which consists mainly of reinforced concrete walls and floors. On the top structure and over the fuel handling area is a secondary steel frame structure with missile resistant concrete walls and roof, which houses the Spent Fuel Cask Handling Crane. Per UFSAR 5.6.1.3, the steel-framed structure over the SFP is designed to resist tornadoes and missiles without partial or complete collapse, except for the west wall. A study indicates that the possibility of tornado missiles impacting the SFP from the west side is remote. A minimum of 18" thick concrete for missile protection is provided in the roof and the north, east, and south walls. In addition, a 2 foot thick concrete missile barrier positioned at the 118-foot elevation protects the SFP from a high trajectory missile generated by a turbine overspeed incident (Ref.08).

CA06016 Rev.0 Page 19 (8.B.1.b) Earthquakes In accordance with Seismic Category I requirements, the SFP and SFPCS are designed to withstand the maximum calculated vibratory ground motion of an earthquake. (8.B.2) Heavy Object Drop Induced Loss of Coolant Per Ref.42, the weight of all loads being handled above stored spent filel shall not exceed that of one fuel assembly and its associated handling tool. (8.B.2.a) Dropped Cask Per Ref.7, accidents shall include dropping of a fuel assembly on top of the racks and a cask or heavy object drop onto the SFP racks. Heavy loads in excess of 1600 lbs are prohibited from travel over spent fuel assemblies in the SFP unless such loads are handled by a single-failure proof device. The Spent Fuel Cask Handling Crane was upgraded to single-failure proof in 1992, is designed in accordance with the single-failure proof criteria of NUREG-0554 and NUREG-0612, and is used to handle heavy loads in the SFP area. The maximum design rated load for the Spent Fuel Cask Handling Crane is 150 tons for the main hoist and 15 tons for the auxiliary hoist (UFSAR 9.7.2.4). Thus the cask or heavy object drop accident is not a credible event. Per UFSAR 14.18, structural integrity of the fuel pool is further ensured due to the presence of an energy absorbing cask support platform in the cask pit area of Unit I as a Seismic Category 1 structure which can absorb the impact of a cask drop from the cask handling crane and safely transfer the loads to the pit floor. This platform provides a second line of defense against the extremely unlikely event of a cask drop, which is already precluded by the single-failure-proof spent fuel handling crane. (8.B.2.b) Dropped Assembly Per IJFSAR 14.18.1, the likelihood of a fuel handling incident is minimized by administrative controls and physical limitations imposed on fuel handling operations. All refueling operations are conducted in accordance with prescribed procedures under direct surveillance of a qualified supervisor. Inadvertent disengagement of a fuel assembly from the fuel handling machine is prevented by mechanical interlocks; consequently, the possibility of dropping and damaging of a fuel assembly is remote. The maximum elevation to which the fuel assemblies can be raised is limited by the design of the fuel handling hoists and manipulators to assure that the minimum depth of water above the top of a fuel assembly required for shielding is always present. Even though the assembly drop is unlikely, per Refs.28-3 1, the SFP concrete plus liner plate are stronger than the assembly bottom casting and fuel and guide tubes for impact of a fresh or irradiated VAP fuel assembly with an inserted CEA (1350-1360 lbm). The bottom casting is, in turn, stronger than the fuel and guide tubes. Essentially all impact kinetic energy absorption will take place in the fuel and guide tubes. Interface forces between the bottom assembly and the liner plate would be limited by the buckling of the fuel and guide tubes which is of insufficient magnitude to cause perforation of the liner plate. In addition, for impact over the collection trenches in the SFP, the interface forces between the bottom assembly and the liner plate would be limited by the buckling of the fuel and guide tubes which is of insufficient magnitude to cause perforation of the liner plate. Therefore, for both full contact impact and impact over the collection trenches of a fresh or irradiated VAP fuel assembly with an inserted CEA (1350-1360 Ibm), the liner plate would not be perforated.

CA06016 Rev.0 Page 20 (8.B.2.C) Airplane Crash into the SFP Per UFSAR 5.6.1.1, the Auxiliary Building is primarily a reinforced concrete structure and the mat foundation supports a structural steel and reinforced concrete frame, which consists mainly of reinforced concrete walls and floors. On the top structure and over the fuel handling area is a secondary steel frame structure with missile resistant concrete walls and roof, which houses the Spent Fuel Cask Handling Crane. This steel-framed structure over the SFP will resist airplane crashes without partial or complete collapse. Two foot thick concrete for missile protection is provided in the roof and the north, east, and south walls. In addition, a 2 foot thick concrete missile barrier positioned at the 118-foot elevation protects the SFP from a high trajectory incident (Ref.08). It is possible that an airplane crash that does not damage the spent fuel pool could cause damage in the immediate area of the spent fuel pool. It is likely that a large fire would occur. If water were used to extinguish the fire, it is possible that the boron concentration in the spent fuel pool could be diluted significantly. However, the mean hit frequency is estimated to be 6E-9/yr in NUREG- 1353 (Ref. 60). The frequency of this event is small enough that the event need not be analyzed further. (8.B.3) Pipe Break Induced Loss of Coolant Per Ref.43, the SFP and cooling systems must be designed so that in the event of failure of inlets, outlets, piping, or drains, the pool level will not be inadvertently drained below a point approximately 10 feet above the top of the active fuel. Pipes or external lines extending into the pool that are equipped with siphon breakers, check valves, or other devices to prevent drainage are acceptable as a means of implementing this requirement. The most serious failure to the system is the loss of SFP water. This is avoided by routing all SFP piping connections and penetrations above the water level and providing them with siphon breakers to prevent gravity drainage (UFSAR 9.4.4). Per Refs.33-41, the SFP inlets to the SFP cooling and purification systems (pipes 8"-HC-4-1020 and 8"-HC-4-2020) are above the spent fuel racks but penetrate the SFP liner at 65' 11" centerline elevation, while the SFP discharge pipes from the shutdown cooling system, purification system, RWT, and demineralized water tank (10"-HC-4-1042 and 10"-HC-4-2042) are above the spent fuel racks but also penetrate the SFP liner at 65' 11" centerline elevation. The SFP does not contain any permanent drains, thereby, preventing accidental drain down. Per Ref.08, the SFP is located in the Auxiliary Building between the two containment structures. During refueling operations, the SFP is connected to the refueling pool in containment by the water-filled transfer tube, which is the only SFP penetration below the waterline. The fuel transfer tube penetration consists of a 36" diameter stainless steel tube inside a 42" diameter stainless steel penetration sleeve. The two concentric tubes are sealed to each other by a bellows-type expansion joint. Thus transfer tube leakage would require an unlikely double pipe break. During plant operations, the fuel transfer tube is closed in the SFP by a 36-inch stainless steel parallel slide gate valve. Inside the containment, the fuel transfer tube is sealed with a double 0-ring blind flange. Thus leakage during plant operations would also require the simultaneous failure of the gate valve and blind flange. Loss of SFP level via a pipe break in the refueling pool during refueling operations would be minimized by rapid closure of the transfer tube valve. (8.B.4) SFP Leakage Per UFSAR 9.4.4, the SFP is designed to preclude the loss of structural integrity. Per UFSAR 5.6.1.2, a 3/16" solid stainless steel liner plate was used on the inside face of both pools for leak tightness, and all of the field welds have leak-test channels welded to the outer side of the liner

CA06016 Rev.0 Page 21 plates. The channels are grouped into ten zones, each with its own detector pipe to localize leaks in the liner seams. Even with the precautions described, small leaks may still occur in the SFP. Early detection of pool leakage and prompt replacement of water is essential. Early leakage detection is assured by a surveillance, which requires that the minimum pool level be verified at least once every 7 days. In practice, level is checked once every 12 hours as required by the Auxiliary Building log sheets. In addition, a level alarm keeps the Control Room Operator aware of level changes. PEO 0-067-02-O-M (SFP Leakage Test) requires a regular check for leakage, as well. Per Ref.08, prompt replacement of water loss due to leakage prevents the fuel from being uncovered. Makeup water can be supplied, via the SFP Cooling and Purification System, from the refueling water tanks or the Demineralized Water System. (8.C) Loss of Cooling System Per Ref.7, accidents shall include loss of cooling systems or flow unless single failure proof. Even in the unlikely event that the SFP is completely diluted of boron due to a loss of cooling incident, the SFP will remain subcritical by a design margin of k-eff not to exceed 0.986. The Spent Fuel Pool Cooling (SFPC) system is common to both units. The SFPC system is a closed-loop system consisting of two half-capacity 1390 gpm pumps and two half-capacity heat exchangers in parallel, a bypass 128 gpm cartridge-type filter which removes insoluble particulates, and a bypass 128 gpm mixed bed resin demineralizer which removes soluble ions. The SFPC heat exchangers are cooled by service water (UFSAR 9.4.2 and Ref.08). The normal configuration for the cooling system is one pump/one cooler loop in operation on each half of the spent fuel pool to cool the water. However, the purity and clarity of the water is maintained by passing a portion of the flow through the purification system. The purification system consists of a filter to remove insoluble particulates and a demineralizer (ion exchanger) which removes soluble ions. Ten skimmers are provided in the spent fuel pools to remove accumulated dust and debris from the surface of the water. Connections are provided for tie-in to the Shut Down Cooling (SDC) system to provide for 2000 gpm of additional heat removal in the event that 1830 fuel assemblies are contained in the pool. One shutdown cooling heat exchanger in the unit whose core was off-loaded may be operated to supplement the SFP cooling system. The SFP Cooling and Purification System has temporary connections which, with the installation of spool pieces, permit cross connection with the Safety Injection System (SIS). The connections that go to the SIS are in the suction lines of the SFP pumps. The connections that return the cooled water from the SIS tap in downstream of the SFP coolers. When the pressure in the SDC system is greater than the design pressure of the SFPC system, the SFPC system is isolated from the SDC system via two manual isolation valves. Although not required by the design code, double valve isolation is provided at this system interface to meet the original FSAR design basis (UFSAR 9.4.2). Per IJFSAR 9.4.4, the design of the SFPC System and pool structural components (e.g., pool liner plate, SFPC piping and pumps) for a total loss of cooling is not part of the system's design basis. The entire SFPC system is tornado-protected and is located in a Seismic Category I structure (UFSAR 9.4.2). Even though loss of SFP cooling is not part of the design basis, the effect of that event will be analyzed. Assuming that the Units I and 2 SFPs contain 1830 assemblies generating the maximum possible heat load of 37.6E+06 btulhr (Section 6E) and assuming the worst case initial SFP temperature of 1550 F (Section 6F), then the time to boil can be calculated as 7.34 hours

CA06016 Rev.0 Page 22 (Section 6G). Time to core uncovery is 78.9 hours (Section 6J). However, loss of coolant via boiling will not result in a loss of soluble boron, since the soluble boron is not volatile. Thus loss of SFPC system without makeup flow is not a mechanism for boron dilution. If sufficient unborated water is added to the SFP to just keep the water from boiling and if the excess fluid flows down the Auxiliary Building gravity drains associated with the SFP overflow level (Section 6.B.3), it would take 24.88 hours to dilute the SFP to 350 ppm (Section 6.1). It is not credible that dilution could occur for this length of time without operator notice, since this event would activate the high level alarm and initiate Auxiliary Building flooding. In addition, in excess of 1043000 gallons of demineralized water must be added to the SFP to reach 350 ppm soluble boron concentration. This is three times more water volume than is contained in the demineralized water tank. (8.D) Radiation Monitors and Alarms Per Ref.6, appropriate systems shall be provided in fuel storage and radioactive waste systems and associated handling areas (i) to detect conditions that may result in loss of residual heat removal capability and excessive radiation levels and (ii) to initiate appropriate safety actions. Per Ref.43, the SFPCS except for the cleanup portion of the system must withstand the effects of natural phenomena, must have an adequate monitoring system (leakage detection, radioactivity monitors, conductivity monitors, flow alarms, temperature alarms, level alarms), must have adequate valve isolation, must have an inservice inspection program. (8.D.1) Radiation Monitors Per UFSAR 14.18.1, radiation monitors located at the fuel handling areas would provide both audible and visual warning of high radiation levels in the event of a low water level or dropped assembly in the SFP. Per Ref.54, three area radiation monitors are provided for detecting high radiation levels in the fuel storage areas. The monitors are located in the SFP area, the Spent Fuel Handling Machine, and the New Fuel Storage Area. Each monitor contains a gamma sensitive Geiger-Mueller tube and has an indicating range of 10-4 to 101 R per hour. The SFP area and New Fuel Storage Area monitor alarm setpoint is 5x10-3 R per hour, while the Spent Fuel Handling Machine monitor alarm setpoint is lxi0-2 R per hour. At the alarm setpoint, audible and visual alarms annunciate locally and in the Control Room. The output of each monitor is also recorded in the Control Room. Radiation monitors are also installed in the Service Water return header from the SFP coolers to detect possible in-leakage of radioactive liquids through the heat exchangers (UFSAR 9.5.2.2). (8.D.2) SFP High Level Alarms The spent fuel pool high level alarm would alert the operators to increasing volume in the spent fuel pool. If the alarm does not function, water would be flowing out of the pool and would drain to other levels in the building such that a dilution event would be readily noticed well before any substantial reduction in the spent fuel pool boron concentration occurs. Per Section 6.B.7, the high level alarm point is at 67' 2.75". (8.D.3) SFP Low Level Alarms The spent fuel pool low level alarm would alert the operators to decreasing volume in the spent fuel pool. If the alarm does not function, the pool level could continue to drop. Eventually, radiation from the fuel in the SFP racks would cause the radiation alarms to activate. Per Section 6.B.1, the low level alarm is at 66'6".

CA06016 Rev.0 Page 23 (8.D.4) SFP Temperature Alarm SFP temperature instrumentation 0-TIA-2001 and 0-TIA-2002 provides SFP indication and alarm on the control room panel 1C13. The instrument temperature range is from 800 F to 160 0 F, while the upper alarm setpoint is at 120 0 F (Refs.61-62). (8.D.5) SFP Cooling System Alarms Temperature switch 0-TS-1997 (-1998) on the SFP cooler outlet causes an audio-visual alarm to actuate in the Control Room if the outlet temperature reaches 1 107F. This alarm (SFP Cooler Disch Temp Hi) is on panel IC13 (Refs.63-64). Additional instrumentation is provided to monitor the pressure and flow of the spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system. (8.E) Supervision and Inspection Dilution of the SFP to below the minimum boron level of 350 ppm will be prevented by supervision and inspection activities. (8.E.1) Filling the SFP Via Procedure OI-24F Filling the SFP with demineralized water from the Demineralized Water Tank or with borated water from the Refueling Water Tank is controlled by Procedure OI-24F (Ref.53). In each case, an operator must be stationed on the 69 foot level to monitor SFP level, while lineup is being performed and while the pool is being filled. The operator monitoring the pool levels shall be in radio communication with the control room and with the person doing the lineup. If demineralized water is being added to the SFP via the 69' demineralized water hose connection (150 gpm), the rate of SFP level rise is very slow (-1 inch/br), therefore a continuous SFP watch is not required. However, frequent tours of the SFP area are required and the level must be closely monitored at 1C 13 in the control room. (8.E.2) Inspection of the Pretreated Water Storage Tank Via TRM 15.7.5 Technical Verification Requirement 15.7.5.1 requires verification that each Pretreated Water Storage Tank contains greater than or equal to 300000 gallons of water every 7 days. (8.E.3) SFP Skimmer Operation Via OI-24C Per Ref.57, prior to placing any skimmers on service, the SFP water level shall be at least one or two inches above the top edge of the skimmer plate. In addition, all SFP system evolutions shall be supervised by a Plant Watch Supervisor. (8.E.4) SFP Boron Level Per Ref.58, the SFP boron concentration should be verified to be at the Refueling Boron Concentration Administrative Limit in Modes 1-5 at least once per week. In Mode 6, the verification shall be performed daily. (8.E.5) Control of Shift Activities Via NO-1-200 Per Ref.59, the duties of Operations shall include (a) During core alterations, a Senior Reactor Operator shall be designated as Fuel Handling Supervisor, shall directly supervise alteration from the Containment 69' elevation, and have no other concurrent duties. His duties shall also include implementation of appropriate AOPs for abnormally rising count rates and reduction in SFP level. (b) Plant Operators shall make one complete round during each 12 hour shift including level indication in the SFP area. The operator shall identify and contain all water leakage and shall look for damaged piping and instrument tubing, noting excessive vibration. (c) An operator shall normally be present at a pump prior to startup.

CA06016 Rev.0 Page 24 (8.E.6) ISFSI Cask Loading Per Ref.65, approximately 1000 gallons of borated water are pumped from the SFP to the DSC/TC prior to insertion of the DSC/TC into the SFP. In addition. demineralized water is used to wash down the TC and cables to control contamination and is used to fill the DSC/TC annulus. This has the potential to cause some dilution of the SFP. However, the following administrative controls minimize the dilution potential: (1) the control room supervisor and plant chemistry shall be notified prior to the discharge of water into the SFP, (2) pipes and hoses passing into the SFP shall not be left unattended, (3) ensure that plant chemistry is notified to collect a SFP sample to verify a boron concentration greater than 1950 ppm prior to DSC/TC operations, (4) notify control room supervisor that no actions shall be taken that may reduce SFP boron concentration. Note that the maximum dilution rate for this operation is -200 gpm, thus the consequences of this operation are bounded by those of Section 8.A.4.a.

CA06016 Rev.0 Page 25

9. DOCUMENTATION OF COMPUTER CODES No computer codes were utilized in this work.

CA06016 Rev.0 Page 26

10. CONCLUSIONS The objective of this evaluation is to confirm that design features, instrumentation, administrative procedures, and sufficient time are available to detect and mitigate boron dilution in the spent fuel pool before the boron concentration is reduced below the value assumed in the SFP criticality analyses which credit boron to remain below the design basis criticality limit of 0.95 k-eff. This report identifies the potential boron dilution sources and dilution events, the instrumentation available for detection of dilution, and the operating and administrative procedures available for the detection and mitigation of dilution. The report also identifies the potential events which could dilute the soluble boron contained in the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant (CCNPP) Units 1 and 2 SFPs and quantifies the dilution rates and response times of each event. This report provides a methodology to evaluate potential spent fuel pool dilution events and is provided in conjunction with the criticality methodology of References 1 and 2.

Per Refs.1-2, a boron level of 350 ppm with uncertainties is required to credit soluble boron in the SFP and to safely store 5.0 w/o VAP fuel in the SFP. The normal boron concentration maintained in the spent fuel pool is expected to be at least the same as that for the refueling boron Technical Specification, which is greater than 2150 ppm. 2000 ppm was conservatively used in this work. The potential boron dilution sources include the two 500000 gallon Pretreated Water Storage Tanks, the two 314800 gallon Condensate Storage Tanks, the 350000 gallon Demineralized

_Water-Storage-lTankthe two-420-000gallon-Refueling-Waterlanksaand tbrheewelwaterpumps___ ___

and filters at 175 gpm each. Water for the fire protection system is supplied by two full-capacity 2500 gpm fire pumps, which take suction from the two 500000 gallon capacity pretreated water storage tanks. No fire protection sprinkler system exists in the fuel handling area. Plant service water isolation valves 0-PSW-140, 0-PSW-139, and 0-PSW-251 are low flow rate systems which take suction on the two 500000 gallon capacity pretreated water storage tanks. Demineralized water isolation valves 0-DW-302 and 0-DW-190 are low flow rate (150 gpm) systems which take suction on the 350000 gallon demineralized water storage tank. Plant heating system valve 0-PH-281 is a low flow rate system which take suction on the two 500000 gallon capacity pretreated water storage tanks. The two 1390 gpm SFP cooling pumps can supply 420000 gallons of borated water from each refueling water tank. Potential initiating events that could cause dilution of the boron in the spent fuel pool to a level below that credited in the criticality analyses fall into three categories: dilution by flooding, dilution by loss of coolant induced makeup, and dilution by loss of cooling system induced makeup. Even in the unlikely event that the SFP is completely diluted of boron, the SFP will remain subcritical by a design margin of k-eff not to exceed 0.986. Dilution by flooding includes the effects of tsunamis, hurricanes, storms, failure of the fire protection system, failure of the plant service water isolation valves, misalignment of the demineralized water isolation valves, failure of the plant heating system valves, effects of the SFP cooling pumps, tank rupture in the vicinity of the SFP, breaks in the SFP cooling system piping or heat exchangers, and reactor coolant system failures. Since there has been no record of tsunamis on the northeastern United States coast, it is not believed that the site will be subjected to a significant tsunami effect. While the relative frequency of hurricane occurrence for the CCNPP site is slightly more than one hurricane per year, the total predicted wave run-up is to Elevation 27.1', which is considerably less than the 69' elevation of the top of the SFP. The auxiliary building is a concrete structure and qualified for high winds; therefore, severe storms with high winds are not expected to cause sufficient damage to the roof and thus will not result in

CA06016 Rev.0 Page 27 a large volume of rain entering the building and becoming an unborated source of water to the pool. In addition, the 6" lip around the SFP should cause the bulk of the entering rain water to flow out of the SFP area via the 13 floor drains, 13 doors, and 2 tendon end cap shafts. Onsite water sources can flood the SFP and cause dilution below the minimum boron concentration. The worst case dilution source is a 2500 gpm fire hose discharging directly into the SFP. At a dilution rate of 2500 gpm directly into the SFP, it will take 6.95 hours to dilute the SFP from 2000 to 350 ppm. It is not credible that dilution could occur for this length of time without operator notice, since this event would activate the high level alarm and initiate Auxiliary Building flooding. In addition, in excess of 1043000 gallons of pretreated water must be added to the SFP to reach 350 ppm soluble boron concentration. This is more water volume than is contained in both pretreated water storage tanks and also more water volume than is contained in the demineralized water storage tank and both condensate storage tanks combined. Dilution events that have the potential to dilute the SFP boron concentration to a value less than the minimum required are not credible events based on existing level alarms and the stored inventory of unborated water in the systems interfacing with the SFP. The unlikely probability of an inadvertent boron dilution event reducing the SFP boron concentration to less than 350 ppm is based on the assumption of complete mixing of the boron in the SFP. The complete mixing assumption may not always be valid, if the circulation flow in the SFP is insufficient to prevent stratification. Where stratification has occurred, it was observed that the diluted water floated on the higher borated water. This suggests that if -st -sti-ricati on-does-occur, thewater-with-the-igher-boron-concentrationwilLtend-to-bein-the -____ lower level of the SFP where the fuel assemblies are located. The possibility of boron stratification in the SFP can be eliminated by circulating the SFP water via the SFP cooling or purification systems. Another type of incomplete boron mixing is a ribbon effect, where a channel of unborated water bores its way to a SFP assembly location. If the SFP cooling or purification systems are in operation, mixing will occur in the piping systems eliminating any ribbon effects. If the SFP cooling and purification systems are not in operation, an analysis using turbulent jet and diffusion theory indicates that the fluid will homogenize within 29" of the nozzle discharge. Thus it is not possible that a diluted ribbon flow of less than 350 ppm could reach the fuel. Dilution via loss of SFP coolant inventory includes the effects of tornadoes, earthquakes, cask drop, assembly drop, airplane crash, pipe break and general SFP leakage. Structural failures caused by dropping of heavy loads or by missiles are postulated to cause enough damage to the pool so that there is no possibility of retaining water in the pool. Since the pool cannot hold water, this accident sequence directly leads to a zircaloy cladding fire and cannot cause a dilution event. Only partial structural failures, where makeup can compensate for the loss of coolant, can cause a dilution event. Even in the unlikely event that the SFP is completely diluted of boron by a total loss of inventory and a refill with unborated water, the SFP will remain subcritical by a design margin of k-eff not to exceed 0.986. The steel-framed structure over the SFP is designed to resist tornadoes and missiles. In addition, a 2 foot thick concrete missile barrier positioned at the 118-foot elevation protects the SFP from a high trajectory missile generated by a turbine overspeed incident. In accordance with Seismic Category I requirements, the SFP and SFPCS are designed to withstand the maximum calculated vibratory ground motion of an earthquake. The Spent Fuel Cask Handling Crane was upgraded to single-failure proof in 1992 and is used to handle heavy loads in the SFP area. Thus the cask or heavy object drop accident is not a credible event. Structural integrity of the fuel pool is further ensured due to the presence of an energy

CA06016 Rev.0 Page 28 absorbing cask support platform in the cask pit area of Unit 1 as a Seismic Category 1 structure which can absorb the impact of a cask drop from the cask handling crane and safely transfer the loads to the pit floor. This platform provides a second line of defense against the extremely unlikely event of a cask drop, which is already precluded by the single-failure-proof spent fuel handling crane. In addition. an analysis of the pool floor indicates that the SFP bottom is capable of safely withstanding the impact of the accidental drop of the cask. Cracks will be developed by diagonal tension near the support but they will be of microscopic type considering the sheer stresses. The structural integrity of the SFP bottom will not be impaired. The likelihood of a fuel handling incident is minimized by administrative controls and physical limitations imposed on fuel handling operations. All refueling operations are conducted in accordance with prescribed procedures under direct surveillance of a qualified supervisor. Inadvertent disengagement of a fuel assembly from the fuel handling machine is prevented by mechanical interlocks; consequently, the possibility of dropping and damaging of a fuel assembly is remote. For both full contact impact and impact over the collection trenches of a fresh or irradiated VAP fuel assembly with an inserted CEA (1350-1360 lbm), the liner plate would not be perforated. The steel-framed structure over the SFP will resist airplane crashes without partial or complete collapse. Two foot thick concrete for missile protection is provided in the roof and the north, east, and south walls. In addition, a 2 foot thick concrete missile barrier positioned at the 118-foot-elevation-protectsthe-SFTfrom-a-hightrajectoryincident.-- __ The most serious failure to the system is the loss of SFP water. This is avoided by routing all SFP piping connections and penetrations above the water level and providing them with siphon breakers to prevent gravity drainage. The SFP does not contain any permanent drains, thereby, preventing accidental drain down. Dilution may also occur via loss of SFP cooling. The design of the SFPC System and pool structural components (e.g., pool liner plate, SFPC piping and pumps) for total loss of cooling is not part of the system's design basis. The entire SFPC system is tornado-protected and is located in a Seismic Category I structure. Even though loss of SFP cooling is not part of the design basis, the effect of that event was analyzed. Assuming that the Units 1 and 2 SFPs contain 1830 assemblies generating the maximum possible heat load of 37.6E+06 btu/hr and assuming the worst case initial SFP temperature of 155TF, then the time to boil can be calculated as 7.34 hours. Time to core uncovery is 78.9 hours. However, loss of coolant via boiling will not result in a loss of soluble boron, since the soluble boron is not volatile. Thus loss of SFPC system without makeup flow is not a mechanism for boron dilution. If sufficient unborated water is added to the SFP to just keep the water from boiling and if the excess fluid flows down the Auxiliary Building gravity drains associated with the SFP overflow level, it would take 24.88 hours to dilute the SFP to 350 ppm. It is not credible that dilution could occur for this length of time without operator notice, since this event would activate the high level alarm and initiate Auxiliary Building flooding. In addition, in excess of 1043000 gallons of demineralized water must be added to the SFP to reach 350 ppm soluble boron concentration. This is three times more water volume than is contained in the demineralized water tank. The instrumentation available for detection of dilution are the following: SFP Radiation Monitors and Alarms, SFP High Level Alarms, SFP Low Level Alarms, SFP Temperature Alarm, and SFP Cooling System Alarms. Additional instrumentation is provided to monitor the pressure and flow of the spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system.

CA06016 Rev.0 Page 29 Operating and administrative procedures are available for the detection and mitigation of dilution events. Filling the SFP with demineralized water from the Demineralized Water Tank or with borated water from the Refueling Water Tank is controlled by Procedure OI-24F. In each case, an operator must be stationed on the 69 foot level to monitor SFP level, while lineup is being performed and while the pool is being filled. The operator monitoring the pool levels shall be in radio communication with the control room and with the person doing the lineup. The SFP boron concentration should be verified to be at the Refueling Boron Concentration Administrative Limit in Modes 1-5 at least once per week. In Mode 6, the verification shall be performed daily. Per procedure NO-1-200, during core alterations, a Senior Reactor Operator shall be designated as Fuel Handling Supervisor, shall directly supervise alteration from the Containment 69' elevation, and have no other concurrent duties. His duties shall also include implementation of appropriate AOPs for abnormally rising count rates and reduction in SFP level. Plant Operators shall make one complete round during each 12 hour shift including level indication in the SFP area. The operator shall identify and contain all water leakage and shall look for damaged piping and instrument tubing, noting excessive vibration. An operator shall normally be present at a pump prior to startup. In conclusion, the potential initiating events that could cause dilution of the boron in the spent fuel pool to a level below that credited in the criticality analyses fall intO three categories: dilution by flooding, dilution by loss of coolant induced makeup, and dilution by loss of cooling system induced makeup. It is not credible that dilution could occur for the required length of _-timne-without-operator notice,-since-this-event-w-ould-activate thiehighlievel alarm and initiate Auxiliary Building flooding. In addition, in excess of 1043000 gallons of unborated water must be added to the SFP to reach 350 ppm soluble boron concentration. This is more water volume than is contained in both pretreated water storage tanks and also more water volume than is contained in the demineralized water storage tank and both condensate storage tanks combined. Even in the unlikely event that the SFP is completely diluted of boron, the SFP will remain subcritical by a design margin of k-eff not to exceed 0.986.

CA06016 Rev.0 Page 30 ATTACHMENT A DENSITY CALCULATIONS

Densities A I B C D E G H 1 Carborundum Material Densities: 2 _ 3 F= B4C density fraction = B10L I PST / B1OA MWB4C / AWB4I DB4C 1 4 F= 0.240685 0.213007 0.191706 6 B1OL = B10 Loading (gm/cm2) 0.020 0.017700 0.015930 Ref.15 7 PST = Poison Sheet Thickness (cm) = 0.090"

  • 2.54 = 0.2286 0.2286 0.2286 Ref.15 8 B1OA = Abundance of B10 in aff 0.19900 0.19900 0.19900 Ref.19 9 B11A= B11 abundance in a/f L 0.80100 0.80100 0.80100 Ref.19 10 AWB10 = B10 atomic weight in gm/mole 10.012937 10.012937 10.012937 Ref.19 11 AWB11 = B11 atomic weight in gm/mole 11.009306 11.009306 11.009306 Ref.19 12 AWB = B atomic weight in gm/mole 10.81103 10.81103 10.81103 calculated 13 AWC = Atomic Weight of C 12.01100 12.01100 12.01100 Ref.19 14 MWB4C = Molecular Weight of B4C 55.2551 55.2551 55.2551 calculated 15 AWB4 = Atomic Weight of Natural B in B4C 43.2441 43.2441 43.2441 calculated 16 DB4C Density of B4C in gm/cc 2.52 2.52 2.52 Ref.21 17 B1OW = B10 abundance in w/f 0.18431 0.18431 0.18431 Ref.21 18 19 20 ZiRLO Materiai Densities I 21 T ___

22 N(ATOMS/B-CM) = DZ

  • f
  • NA / AW / C I 24 f(w/o) AW(gm/mole) N 25 Sn 1.00 118.71 3.2594E-04 26 Fe 0.11 55.847 7.6211 E-05 27 Nb 1.00 92.90638 4.1647E-04 28 Zr 97.89 91.224 4.1520E-02 29 100.00 30 31 f = Zirlo composition in w/o Refs.17-18 32 DZ = Zirlo density in gm/cc 6.425 Ref.18 33 AW = Atomic weight in gm/mole Ref.19 34 NA = Avogadro's Number in atoms/mole 6.022E+23 Ref.20 35 C = barns/cm2 1.OOE+24 Ref.20 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 4-7 48 49 50 z1 inp.XLS

Densities pete' 3L A B C l D E F G H 51 OPTIN Material Densities 52 53 N(ATOMS/B-CM) = DZ

  • f
  • NA /AW / C 54 55 f(w/o) AW(gm/mole) N 56 Sn 1.25 118.71 4.1535E-04 57 Fe 0.21 55.847 1.4832E-04 58 Cr 0.10 51.996 7.5862E-05 59 0 0.12 15.9994 2.9585E-04 60 Zr 98.32 91.224 4.2514E-02 61 100.00 62 63 f = Optin composition in w/o Refs.17-18 64 DZ = Optin density in gm/cc 6.550 Ref.18 65 AW = Atomic weight in gm/mole Ref. 19 66 NA = Avogadro's Number in atoms/mole 6.022E+23 Ref.20 67 C = barns/cm2 1.OOE+24 Ref.20 68 69 70 Soluble Boron Density 7T1 _ _

72 D(H3BO3) = f

  • D(H20)
  • MW(H3BO3) / AWB Density of H31303 in gm/cc 7'2 1 1 1 1 i 74 IB1OA = B10 abundance in w/o I 19.9 Ref.19 75 B11A = B11 abundance in w/o l 80.1 Ref.19 76 AWB10 = B10 atomicweight in gm/mole 10.012937 Ref.19 77 AWB11 = B11 atomic weight in gm/mole 11.009306 Ref.19 78 AWB = B atomic weight in gm/mole 10.81103 calculated 79 AWH = H atomic weight in gm/mole 1.00780 Ref.19 80 AWO = 0 atomic weight in gm/mole 15.99940 Ref.19 81 MWH3BO3 = H3BO3 molecular weight in gm/mole 61.83263 calculated 82.

83 f DH20 DH3BO3 84 0.000100 1.0000 0.00057194 85 0.000200 1.0000 0.001143881 86 0.000300 1.0000 0.001715821 87 0.000400 1.0000 0.002287761 88 0.000500 1.0000 0.002859702 89 0.002000 1.0000 0.011438806 90 0.000100 1.0000 0.00057194 91 0.000200 0.9785 0.001119287 92 0.000300 0.9785 0.001678931 93 0.000400 0.9785 0.002238574 94 0.000500 0.9785 0.002798218 95 0.002000 0.9785 0.011192872 96 _ _ _ _ _ _ 98 991 11001 z1 inp.XLS

C4cft 16 /t&2g Densities 3G3 A B C D E F G H 101 Upper End Fitting: 102 Length 8.12 in 20.6248 cm UFSAR Fig.3.3-1 103 Width 8.12 in 20.6248 cm UFSAR Fig.3.3-1 104 Height 15.295 in 38.8493 cm Ref.25 105 Total Volume 1008.46665 in3 16525.8075 cc 106 InconelX-750 1100 gm Ref.26 107 SS-304 5080 gm Ref.26 108 Zirc-4 680 gm Ref.26 109 SS-302 7980 gm Ref.26 11 0 Inconel X-750 8.30 gm/cc-ref Ref.21 111 SS-304 7.94 gm/cc-ref Ref.21 112 Zirc-4 6.56 gm/cc-ref Ref.21 11 3 SS-302 7.94 gm/cc-ref Ref.21 114 Inconel X-750 132.5301 cc 0.008020 vol frac 11 5 SS-304 639.7985 cc 0.038715 vol frac 116 Zirc-4 103.6585 cc 0.006273 vol frac 117 SS-302 1005.0378 cc 0.060816 vol frac 11 8 Water Vol 14644.7826 cc 0.886177 vol frac 119 120 121 Lower End Fitting: 122 Length 8.12 in 20.6248 cm UFSAR Fig.3.3-1 123 Width 8.12 in 20.6248 cm UFSAR Fig.3.3-1 124 Height 5.246 in 13.32484 cm Ref.25 125 Volume 345.89186 in3 5668.152086 cc 126 Inconel-625 1360 gm Ref.26 127 SS-304 5000 gm Ref.26 128 Inconel 8.30 gm/cc-ref Ref.21 129 SS-304 7.94 gm/cc-ref Ref.21 130 Inconel 163.8554 cc 0.028908 vol frac 131 SS-304 629.7229 cc 0.111098 vol frac 1 32 Water Vol 4874.5737 cc 0.859993 vol frac z1 inp.XLS

CA06016 Rev.0 Page 34 ATTACHMENT B FUEL DATA SPREADSHEET

Fuel Ai e-13-51", 217 Assemblies per core UFSAR 3.1 _ 77 _ CEAs per core UFSAR 3.1 176 Rods per assembly ____ UFSAR 3-1 5 Guide tubes per assembly UFSAR 3.1 136.7 347.218 in-cm Active core height UFSAR 3.1 __ 1.035 2.6289 in-cm Guide tube ID BGE Drwg E-550-701-303 - Ref.27 1.115 2.8321 _ in-cm Guide tube oD __ _ BGE Drwg E-550-701-303 - Ref.27 0.580 1.4732 in-cm Fuel rod pitch UFSAR Figure 3.3-1 0.20 0.508 in-cm jAssembly spacing, fuel ros surface-surface UFSAR Table 3.3-5 8.12 20.6248 T in-cm Assembly pitch (14*0.58") UFSAR Figure 3.3-1 __ 0.06 0.1524 { in-cm Assembly gap (8.18"-8.12") UFSAR Figure 3.3-1 548 deg F Tcold UFSAR Figure 4-9 572.5 deg F Tave UFSAR Figure 4-9 599.4 __deg F Thot UFSAR Figure 4-9 ____ 532 deg F Thzp UFSAR Figure 4-9 _ __ __ I _ _ _ _ _ _ Standard Fuel Design 0.3795 0.96393 in-cm Pellet diameter (A-C U1) UFSAR Table 3.3-1 15.4626 in3 Pin fuel volume _ 0.3805 0.96647 in-cm Pellet diameter (A-C U2) UFSAR Table 3.3-2 15.5442 in3 Pin fuel volume _ __ 0.3765 0.95631 in-cm Pellet diameter (D-S U1, D-R U2) UFSAR Table 3.3-1/2 ____ 15.2191 in3 Pin fuel volume 0.388 0.98552 in-cm Clad ID (A-C U1-U2) ____ ___ UFSAR Table 3.3-1/2 0.384 0.97536 in-cm Clad ID UFSAR Table 3.3-1/2 0.440 1.1176 1 in-cm Clad OD UFSAR Table 3.3-1/2 10.170 _ 1gmicc _ IStack height density (max) UFSAR Table 3.3-1/2 0.9279 Stack height density (% TD) VAP Fuel Design 0.381 0.96774 in-cm Pellet diameter UFSAR Table 3.3-1/2 15.585 in3 Pin fuel volume 0.388 0.98552 in-cm Clad ID UFSAR Table 3.3-1/2 0.440 1.1176 in-cm Clad OD UFSAR Table 3.3-1/2 10.310 gm/cc Stack height density UFSAR Table 3.3-1/2 0.9407 < Stack height density (% TD) SAS2H Larger UnitCell Effective Radii for 176 pin assembly (Standard and VAP Fuel Design) 1.31445 frncm Clad ID/2 = 1.035"/2 = 0.5175" (H20) 1.41605 cm CladOD12 = 1.115"/2 = 0.5575" (Zirc) 1.66233 cm SQRT[4*(0.58)A2/pi] = 0.65446" (H20) 5.20391 l cm SQRT[196*(0.58)A2/5/pi] = 2.04878" (Fuel) 5.22314 l cm SQRT[(8.15)A2/5/pi] = 2.05635" (H20) In ORNL/TM-12667, uses 8.18". SAS2H Larger Unit Cell Effective Radii for 172 pin assembly (Standard and VAP Fuel Design) 1.31445 cm Clad ID/2 = 1.035"/2 = 0.5175" (H20) 1.41605 cm CladOD/2 = 1.115"/2 = 0.5575" (Zirc) 1.66233 cm SQRT[4*(0.58)A2/pi] = 0.65446" (H20) 5.15054 cm ISQRT[192*(0.58)A2/5/pi] = 2.02777" (Fuel) 5.22314 l cm SQRT[(8.15)A2/5/pil = 2.05635" (H20) In ORNLITM-12667, uses 8.18". Data.xis

CA06016 Rev.0 Page 36 ATTACHMENT C SFP SINGLE RACK PLANAR GEOMETRY 

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CA06016 Rev.0 Page 38 ATTACHMENT D UNIT 1 SFP PLANAR GEOMETRY

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CA06016 Rev.0 Page 44 ATTACHMENT F SFP AXIAL GEOMETRY

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