ML051660207

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
License Amendment Request: Eliminate Use of the Term Core Alterations in the Technical Specifications
ML051660207
Person / Time
Site: Calvert Cliffs  Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 06/07/2005
From: Vanderheyden G
Constellation Energy Group
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
Download: ML051660207 (25)
v • d • e


Text

George Vanderheyden 1650 Calvert Cliffs Parkway Vice President Lusby, Maryland 20657 Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant 410.495.4455 Constellation Generation Group, LLC 410.495.3500 Fax Constellation Energy June 7, 2005 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 ATTENTION: Document Control Desk

SUBJECT:

Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Unit Nos. 1 & 2; DocketNos. 50-317 & 50-318 License Amendment Request: Eliminate Use of the Term CORE ALTERATIONS in the Technical Specifications Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90, the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Inc. hereby requests an amendment to the Renewed Operating License Nos. DPR-53 and DPR-69 to eliminate the use of the term CORE ALTERATIONS in the Technical Specifications. Suspending core alterations has no effect on the initial conditions or mitigation of any design basis accident or transient, and these requirements impose an operational burden with no corresponding safety benefit. Therefore, the uses of the defined term CORE ALTERATIONS are proposed to be removed from the Technical Specifications. The proposed amendment incorporates changes reflected in Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) 471-T and should be considered as the lead plant request. During development of this amendment request it was determined that a revision to TSTF-471 -T was needed for Technical Specification 3.9.2. This amendment request includes that revision (see Attachment 1). The TSTF concurs with this change and will formally revise TSTF-471-T in parallel with the review ofthis amendment request. The proposed amendment also makes additional changes from TSTF-5 1-A.

The significant hazards discussion and the technical basis for this proposed change are provided in Attachment (1). Mark ups of the affected Technical Specification pages are provided in Attachment (2).

The Technical Specification Bases will be changed as appropriate to support this information.

We request approval of the proposed change by January 1, 2006 to support planning and scheduling for the spring 2006 refueling outage. Note that this requested approval date does not impact continued operation of the Units. We also request a 60 day implementation period for the approved amendment to allow sufficient time to implement procedure changes and operator training associated with this change.

Document Control Desk June 7, 2005 Page 2 Should you have questions regarding this matter, please contact Mr. L. S. Larragoite at (410) 495-4922.

Very 1 STATE OF MARYLAND

TO WIT:

COUNTY OF CALVERT 1,George Vanderheyden, being duly sworn, state that I am Vice President - Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Inc. (CCNPP), and that I am duly authorized to execute and file this License Amendment Request on behalf of CCNPP. To the best of my knowledge and belief, the statements contained in this document are true and correct. To the extent that these statements are not based on my personal knowledge, they are based upon information provided by other CCNPP employees and/or consultants. Such information has been reviewed in accordance with company practice and I believe it be reliable.

Subscribed and sworn before me, a Notary Puffn and for the State of Maryland and County of

.5/ 87aqy , this 7ft day of t 2005.

WITNESS my Hand and Notarial Seal:

/'~A/ ~2* Z99 My Qommission Expires:

I Date GViPSF/bjd Attachments: (I) Technical Basis and No Significant Hazards Consideration (2) Marked up Technical Specification Pages cc: R. V. Guzman, NRC Resident Inspector, NRC S. J. Collins, NRC R. 1.McLean, DNR

ATTACHMENT (1)

TECHNICAL BASIS AND NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. DESCRIPTION
2. PROPOSED CHANGE
3. BACKGROUND
4. TECHNICAL ANALYSIS
5. NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION
6. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
7. PRECEDENTS
8. REGULATORY COMMITMENTS Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power, Inc.

June 7, 2005

ATTACHMENT (1)

TECHNICAL BASIS AND NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION

1. DESCRIPTION This letter requests an amendment to Renewed Operating License DPR-53 and DPR-69 for Calvert Cliffs Unit Nos. I and 2 Technical Specifications, to eliminate the use of the defined term CORE ALTERATIONS. Suspending core alterations has no effect on the initial conditions or mitigation of any design basis accident or transient, and these requirements impose an operational burden with no corresponding safety benefit. Therefore, the uses of the defined term CORE ALTERATIONS are proposed to be removed from the Technical Specifications. The proposed amendment incorporates changes reflected in Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) 471-T and should be considered as the lead plant request. During development of this amendment request it was determined that a revision to TSTF-471-T was needed for Technical Specification 3.9.2. This amendment request includes that revision (see Attachment 1). The TSTF concurs with this change and will formally revise TSTF-471-T in parallel with the review of this amendment request. The proposed amendment also makes additional changes from TSTF-5 I-A.

TSTF-51-A eliminated all uses of the defined term CORE ALTERATIONS from Applicability statements and most uses of the term in Required Actions. However, in adopting portions of TSTF-5 1-A, Calvert Cliffs did not eliminate the use of the defined term CORE ALTERATIONS from Applicability statements or Required Actions. TSTF-471-T eliminates the remaining few instances of the defined term CORE ALTERATIONS. Calvert Cliffs proposes adopting the necessary portions of TSTF-51-A and TSTF-471-T to eliminate the defined term CORE ALTERATIONS from the Technical Specifications.

2. PROPOSED CHANGE The proposed license amendment would revise the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Technical Specifications to eliminate the use of the defined term CORE ALTERATIONS. The proposed changes, which are indicated on the marked up pages in Attachment (2), are described below:
1. The definition of CORE ALTERATION in Technical Specification 1.1 is deleted (TSTF47 1-T).
2. In Technical Specification 3.3.7, Containment Radiation Signal (CRS), the Applicability Statement is revised to remove the phrase "During CORE ALTERATIONS, with containment purge valves open,". Also, Required Action A.2.1 is deleted, resulting in the renumbering of Required Action A.2.2 (TSTF-5 1-A).
3. In Technical Specification 3.8.2, AC Sources - Shutdown, Required Actions A.2.1 and B.1 are deleted, resulting in the renumbering of the subsequent Required Actions (TSTF-471-T).
4. In Technical Specification 3.8.5, DC Sources - Shutdown, Required Action A.2.1 is deleted, resulting in the renumbering of the subsequent Required Actions (TSTF-471-T).
5. In Technical Specification 3.8.8, Inverters - Shutdown, Required Action A.2.1 is deleted, resulting in the renumbering of the subsequent Required Actions (TSTF-471-T).
6. In Technical Specification 3.8.10, Distribution Systems - Shutdown, Required Action A.2.1 is deleted, resulting in the renumbering of the subsequent Required Actions (TSTF-471-T).
7. In Technical Specification 3.9.1, Boron Concentration, Required Action A.l is deleted, resulting in the renumbering of the subsequent Required Actions (TSTF-471-T).
8. In Technical Specification 3.9.2, Nuclear Instrumentation, Required Action A.1 is modified to replace "CORE ALTERATIONS" with "positive reactivity additions" (TSTF-471-T). This differs from the current revision of TSTF-471-T. The current revision simply removes the term "CORE ALTERATIONS." The TSTF will revise TSTF-471-T to replace "CORE I

ATTACHMENT (1)

TECHNICAL BASIS AND NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION ALTERATIONS" with "positive reactivity additions" in parallel with the review of this amendment request. The justification for this change is given in Section 4, Technical Analysis.

9. In Technical Specification 3.9.3, Containment Penetrations, the phrase "During CORE ALTERATIONS," is deleted from the Applicability Statement. Also, Required Action A.l is deleted, resulting in the renumbering of Required Action A.2 (TSTF-5 1-A).
10. In Technical Specification 3.9.4, Shutdown Cooling (SDC) and Coolant Circulation - High Water Level, Limiting Condition for Operation Note 2.b is modified to replace "CORE ALTERATIONS are" with "Movement of fuel assemblies within Containment is" (plant specific note).

I1. In Technical Specification 3.9.6, Refueling Pool Water Level, the phrase "During CORE ALTERATIONS, except during coupling and uncoupling of control element assembly drive shafts," is deleted from the Applicability Statement. Also, Required Action A.1 is deleted, resulting in the renumbering of Required Action A.2 (TSTF-5 I-A).

3. BACKGROUND The term CORE ALTERATION is defined in the Calvert Cliffs Technical Specifications as, "CORE ALTERATION shall be the movement of any fuel sources, or reactivity control components within the reactor vessel with the vessel head removed and fuel in the vessel. Suspension of CORE ALTERATIONS shall not preclude completion of movement of a component to a safe position." The proposed change will eliminate the defined term CORE ALTERATION from the Technical Specifications. Suspending core alterations has no effect on the initial conditions or mitigation of any design basis accident or transient, and these requirements impose an operational burden with no corresponding safety benefit. Therefore, the uses of the defined term CORE ALTERATIONS are proposed to be removed from the Technical Specifications.

The defined term CORE ALTERATIONS unnecessarily complicates plant operation. Great lengths have been taken to ensure that no prohibited CORE ALTERATIONS take place, such as pausing the lift of the reactor vessel head and having individuals lay on the floor or use video cameras to look under the head to ensure that no control rod drive mechanisms are still latched to avoid accidentally lifting a control rod and violating a Required Action which prohibits CORE ALTERATIONS. These actions result in increased personnel dose and have no safety benefit as the shutdown margin is determined assuming the worst configuration of control rods.

4. TECHNICAL ANALYSIS The term "core alteration" does not appear in the Standard Review Plan or in the Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations. Since CORE ALTERATIONS only occur when the reactor vessel head is removed, it only applies in Mode 6. There are only two accidents considered during Mode 6 for pressurized water reactors: a fuel handling accident and a boron dilution accident. According to the Standard Review Plan, a fuel handling accident is initiated by the dropping of an irradiated fuel assembly, either in the Containment or in the Auxiliary Building. There are no mitigation actions, except for taking credit for ventilation systems to reduce the dose consequences. Suspension of CORE ALTERATIONS, except for suspension of movement of irradiated fuel, will not prevent or impair the mitigation of a fuel handling accident.

The second analyzed event is a boron dilution accident. A boron dilution accident is initiated by a dilution source that results in the boron concentration dropping below what is required to maintain the shutdown margin. As described in the Bases for Technical Specification 3.9.1, Boron Concentration, which applies in Mode 6, "The refueling boron concentration limit is specified in the Core Operating 2

ATTACHMENT (1)

TECHNICAL BASIS AND NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION Limits Report (COLR). Unit procedures ensure the specified boron concentration in order to maintain an overall core reactivity of rff< 0.95 during fuel handling, with control element assemblies and fuel assemblies assumed to be in the most adverse configuration (least negative reactivity) allowed by unit procedures." The accident is mitigated by stopping the dilution. Likewise, the Bases for Technical Specification 3.9.2 state that source range monitors are needed to alert operators to unexpected changes in core reactivity caused by boron dilution or a misloaded fuel assembly. Suspension of CORE ALTERATIONS has no effect on the mitigation of a boron dilution accident as it is assumed that the control rods or fuel do not affect the initial conditions of a boron dilution accident since it is assumed that the control rods and fuel are in the most adverse conditions as allowed by procedure with a large safety margin (kff < 0.95). To address the possibility of a misloaded fuel assembly in Technical Specification 3.9.2, a Required Action is added that suspends positive reactivity additions if nuclear instrumentation is not available. This precludes movement of fuel assemblies which could add reactivity to the core.

The proposed change will delete the CORE ALTERATIONS requirements from the applicability of Technical Specification 3.3.7, Containment Radiation Signal, Technical Specification 3.9.3, Containment Penetrations, and Technical Specification 3.9.6, Refueling Pool Water Level. The accident postulated to occur during core alterations, in addition to fuel handling accident, is boron dilution accident. This event has been evaluated and is not postulated to result in fuel cladding integrity damage. Since the only accident postulated to occur during CORE ALTERATIONS that results in a significant radioactive release is the fuel handling accident, the proposed Technical Specification requirements omitting CORE ALTERATIONS isjustified.

In summary, with the exception of suspending movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, there are no design basis accidents or transients that are initiated by, or mitigation affected by, suspension of CORE ALTERATIONS. Therefore, since most Required Actions that require suspension of CORE ALTERATIONS also require suspension of movement of irradiated fuel, suspension of CORE ALTERATIONS provides no safety benefit. The tvo sets of Required Actions that do not also require suspension of the movement of irradiated fuel assemblies are Technical Specification 3.9.1, Boron Concentration, and Technical Specification 3.9.2, Nuclear Instrumentation. These two specifications are based on boron dilution accidents, which, as described above, do not rely on the suspension of CORE ALTERATIONS, including fuel movement, for mitigation. Therefore, for these two Technical Specifications, suspension of CORE ALTERATIONS provides no safety benefit.

5. NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant is proposing an amendment to the Technical Specifications that will eliminate the use of the term CORE ALTERATIONS. The proposed changes have been evaluated against the standards in 10 CFR 50.92 and have been determined to not involve a significant hazards consideration in that:
1. Operation ofthe facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not involve a significant increase in the probabilityor consequencesof an accidentpreviously evaluated.

The proposed change eliminates the use of the defined term CORE ALTERATIONS from the Technical Specifications. Core alterations are not an initiator of any accident previously evaluated except a fuel handling accident. Those revised Technical Specifications that protect the initial conditions of a fuel handling accident also require the suspension of movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, which protects the initial condition of a fuel handling accident. Therefore, suspension of CORE ALTERATIONS do not affect the initiators of the accidents previously evaluated and suspension of CORE ALTERATIONS does not affect the mitigation of the accidents previously evaluated.

.3

ATTACHMENT (1)

TECHNICAL BASIS AND NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accidentfrom any accidentpreviously evaluated.

No new or different accidents result from utilizing the proposed change. The changes do not involve a physical modification of the plant (i.e., no new or different type of equipment will be installed) or a significant change in the methods governing normal plant operation. In addition, the changes do not impose any new or different requirements. The changes do not alter assumptions made in the safety analysis. The proposed changes are consistent with the safety analysis assumptions.

Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

3. Operationof the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Only two accidents are postulated to occur during plant conditions where CORE ALTERATIONS may be made: a fuel handling accident and a boron dilution accident. Suspending movement of irradiated fuel assemblies prevents a fuel handling accident. Also requiring the suspension of CORE ALTERATIONS is redundant to suspending movement of irradiated fuel assemblies and does not increase the margin of safety. CORE ALTERATIONS have no effect on a boron dilution accident.

Core components are not involved in the initiation or mitigation of a boron dilution accident.

Therefore, CORE ALTERATIONS have no effect on the margin of safety related to a boron dilution accident.

Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Based on the above evaluation, Calvert Cliffs has concluded that the proposed amendment involves no significant hazards considerations under the standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c), and, accordingly, a finding of "no significant hazards consideration" is justified.

6. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION We have determined that operation with the proposed amendment would not result in any significant change in the types, or significant increases in the amounts, of any effluents that may be released offsite, nor would it result in any significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.

Therefore, the proposed amendment is eligible for categorical exclusion as set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment is needed in connection with the approval of the proposed amendment.

7. PRECEDENTS This is a lead plant application for TSTF-471-T. Therefore, we request that if approval is granted for this proposed Technical Specification amendment, it includes generic justification and approval for TSTF-471-T. As noted earlier, the TSTF will revise TSTF-471-T to include the change discussed above for Technical Specification 3.9.2.
8. REGULATORY COMMITMENTS None.

4

ATTACHMENT (2)

MARKED UP TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGES 1.1-2 3.3.7-1 3.8.2-2 3.8.2-3 3.8.2-4 3.8.5-1 3.8.5-2 3.8.8-1 3.8.8-2 3.8.10-1 3.8.10-2 3.9.1-1 3.9.2-1 3.9.3-1 3.9.3-2 3.9.4-1 3.9.6-1 Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power, Inc.

June 7, 2005

Definitions 1.1 1.1 Definitions include, where possible, comparison of the channel indication and status to other indications or status derived from independent instrument channels measuring the same parameter.

CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall be:

Analog Channels - the injection of a simulated signal into the channel as close to the primary sensor as practicable to verify OPERABILITY, including alarm and/or trip functions.

Bistable Channels - the injection of a simulated signal into the channel sensor to verify OPERABILITY including alarm and/or trip functions.

so qces, o reactivib con t. l o ts Xw

\ \\ \ \ ~~~th~a tor'Bssel witc the vsslha\eoe l lnd fl in th vessel. Suspens of COv /

ATERAT NS sha not pre lude comp etion o mov~ment f a com onent to safe po' tion.

CORE OPERATING LIMITS The COLR is the unit specific documeit that REPORT (COLR) provides cycle specific parameter limits for the current reload cycle. These cycle specific parameter limits shall be determined for each reload cycle in accordance with Specification 5.6.5. Plant operation within these limits is addressed in individual Specifications.

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 1.1-2 Amendment No. 232 CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 Amendment No. 208

CRS 3.3.7 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.7 Containment Radiation Signal (CRS)

LCO 3.3.7 Four CRS containment radiation monitor sensor modules, associated measurement channels, one CRS Actuation Logic channel, and one Manual Actuation channel shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: ,.n r , ,, N s.,r .it c During movement of irradiated fuel assemnles within containment with containment purge valves open.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME I - .I A. One radiation monitor *A. 1 Place the affected 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> sensor module or. sensor module in associated' : trip. .t : , ..

measurement channel inoperable. OR A.2 < Suspend movement of Immediately irradiated fuel assemblies within containment.

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3.3.7-1 Amendment No. 227 CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 Amendment No. 201

AC Sources-Shutdown 3.8.2 ACTIONS

NOTES -------------------

1. LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.
2. Performance of Required Actions shall not preclude completion of actions to establish a safe conservative position.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One required offsite----------- NOTE------------

circuit inoperable. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.8.10, with one required train de-energized as a result of Condition A.

A.1 Declare affected Immediately required feature(s)

.with no offsite power available inoperable.

OR ALTERATMGNS.)

Suspend movement of Immediately irradiated fuel assemblies.

AND CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3.8.2-2 Amendment No. 227 CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 Amendment No. 201

AC Sources-Shutdown 3.8.2 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. (Continued) A.21P Suspend operations Immediately I involving positive reactivity additions that could result in loss of required SDM or boron concentration.

AND A. $ Initiate action to Immediately restore required offslte power circuit to OPERABLE status.

B. One required DG Tt 1 itvnv r DrII~ L immete ..  :

- -- rod I

inoperable. ;soAT1llS- JI-Suss)end movement of Immediately irrsidiated fuel assemblies.

AND B Suspend operations Immediately I involving positive reactivity additions that could result in loss of required SDM or boron concentration.

AND' CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3.8.2-3 Amendment No. 266 CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 Amendment No. 243

AC Sources-Shutdown 3.8.2 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. (Continued) BAL Initiate action to Immediately I restore required DG to OPERABLE status.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.2.1 -------------------NOTE-------------------

The following Surveillance Requirements (SRs) are not required to be performed:

SR 3.8.1.11, SR 3.8.1.12, and SR 3.8.1.14.

I .: I .

For the LCO 3.8.2.a and LCO 3.8.2.b AC In accordance 1

__1 I . . . .

sources required to be OPERABLE, the SRs of with applicable , t . ... . .

Specification 3.8.1, "AC Sources-Operating," SRs 11 I .-.I' ..

except SR 3.8.1.4, SR 3.8.1.8, SR 3.8.1.10, SR 3.8.1.13, 3.8.1.15, and SR 3.8.1.16, are applicable.

SR 3.8.2.2 For the LCO 3.8.2.c and LCO 3.8.2.d AC In accordance sources required to be OPERABLE, the SRs with applicable required by SR 3.8.1.16, are applicable. SRs CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3.8.2-4 Amendment No. 266 CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 Amendment No. 243

DC Sources-Shutdown 3.8.5 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.5 DC Sources-Shutdown LCO 3.8.5 The required channels of DC electrical sources shall be OPERABLE to support the DC electrical power distribution subsystem(s) required by LCO 3.8.10, "Distribution Systems-Shutdown."

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.

ACTIONS

NOTES -------------------

1. LCO.3.0.3 is not applicable.
  • 2. Performance of Required Actions shall not preclude completion of actions

't6 establish a safe conservative position. '*' -

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more required A.1 Declare affected Immediately DC channels required feature(s) inoperable. inoperable.

OR I AIIERA4NS.J CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3.8.5-1 Amendment No. 227 CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 Amendment No. 201

DC Sources-Shutdown 3.8.5 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. (continued) A.2 ) Suspend movement of Immediately irradiated fuel assemblies.

AND A.42 Suspend operations Immediately I involving positive reactivity additions that could result in loss of required SDM or boron concentration.

AND A. Initiate action to Immediately  :, v, i I . I. .. restore required DC . t . '. . .

electrical power subsystems to OPERABLE status.

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3.8.5-2 Amendment No. 266 CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 Amendment No. 243

Inverters-Shutdown 3.8.8 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.8 Inverters-Shutdown LCO 3.8.8 Inverter(s) shall be OPERABLE to support the onsite Class lE AC vital bus electrical power distribution subsystem(s) required by LCO 3.8.10, "Distribution Systems-Shutdown."

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.

ACTIONS

NOTE-----------------------

LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

-CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more required A.1 Declare affected Immediately, inverters inoperable. required feature(s) inoperable.

OR A.2) Suspend movement of Immediately irradiated fuel assemblies.

AND CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3.8.8-1 Amendment No. 227 CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 Amendment No. 201

Inverters-Shutdown 3.8.8 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. (continued) A.2 m Suspend operations Immediately I involving positive reactivity additions that could result in loss of required SDM or boron concentration.

A.2 @ Initiate action to Immediately restore required inverters to OPERABLE status.

5dPVTIANC DPAITTPP11'PNTSc , . ; . . . . -

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.8.8.1 Verify correct inverter voltage and 7 days alignment to required AC vital buses.

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3.8.8-2 Amendment No. 266 CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 Amendment No. 243

Distribution Systems-Shutdown 3.8.10 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3.8.10 Distribution Systems-Shutdown LCO 3.8.10 The necessary portion of AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution subsystems shall be OPERABLE to support-equipment required to be OPERABLE. -

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.

ACTIONS

NOTES ------------------------------------

1. LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.
2. Performance of Required Actiops-shall not *preclude completion of actions to establish a.safe conservative position.

CONDITION.' REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME ;

A. One or more required A.1 Declare associated Immediately AC, DC, or AC vital supported required bus electrical power feature(s) distribution inoperable.

subsystems inoperable. OR I 'A2.1 Suz~k~e1 CORE Immediately A L CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3.8.10-1 Amendment No. 227 CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 Amendment No. 201

Distribution Systems-Shutdown 3.8.10 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION I REQUIRED ACTION I COMPLETION TIME A. (continued) Suspend movement of Immediately irradiated fuel assemblies.

AND Suspend operations Immediately I involving positive A.2a) reactivity additions that could result in loss of required SDM or boron concentration.

AND Initiate actions to Immediately restore required AC, DC, and AC vital bus electrical power distribution subsystems to OPERABLE status.

AND A.2 Declare associated Immediately required shutdown cooling subsystem(s) inoperable and not in operation.

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3.8.10-2 Amendment No. 266 CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 Amendment No. 243

Boron Concentration 3.9.1 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3.9.1 Boron Concentration LCO 3.9.1 .Boron concentrations of the Reactor Coolant System and the refueling pool shall be maintained within the limit specified

-in the COLR.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 6.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Boron concentration S not. within limit.

Suspend positive Immediately reactivity additions.

AND

@ Initiate action to Immediately restore boron concentration to within limit.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.9.1.1 Verify boron concentration is within the 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> limit specified in the COLR.

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3.9.1-1 Amendment No. 227 CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 Amendment No. 201

Nuclear Instrumentation 3.9.2 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3.9.2 Nuclear Instrumentation LCO 3.9.2 Two source range monitors (SRMs) shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 6.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One required SRM A.1 Su Immediately inoperable.

ANDd A.2 Suspend operations Immediately that would cause introduction of coolant into the RCS with boron concentration less than required to meet the boron concentration of LCO 3.9.1.

B. Two required SRMs B.1 Initiate action to Immediately inoperable. restore one SRM to OPERABLE status.

AND B.2 Perform SR 3.9.1.1. Once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3.9.2-1 Amendment No. 266 CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 Amendment No. 243

Containment Penetrations 3.9.3 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3.9.3 Containment Penetrations LCO 3.9.3 The containment penetrations shall be in the following status:

a. 1. The equipment hatch closed and held in place by a minimum of four bolts, or
2. The containment outage door is capable of being closed under administrative control;
b. One door in the emergency air lock is closed;

NOTE ----------------------------

The emergency air lock temporary closure device can be used in place of an emergency air lock door.

c. The personnel air lock shall be either:
1. closed by one personnel air lock door, or 2.. capable of being closed by an OPERABLE personnel air lock door under administrative control. I
d. Each penetration providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere either:
1. closed by a manual or automatic isolation valve, blind flange, or equivalent, or
2. capable of being closed by an OPERABLE Containment Purge Valve Isolation System.

APPLICABILITY: tiring COREF ALTERATIONr During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment.

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3.9.3-1 Amendment No. 242 CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 Amendment No. 216

Containment Penetrations 3.9.3 ACTIONS I S CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION I COMPLETION TIME 7I.

A. One or more containment A14RATION&,

penetrations not in required status.

w9 Suspend movement of Immediately irradiated fuel assemblies within containment.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS _

SURVEILLANCE I FREQUENCY SR 3.9.3.1 Verify each required containment penetration 7 days - I.. I.

is in the. requi.red status.

SR 3.9.3.2 Verify each required containment purge and 24 months exhaust valve actuates to the isolation position on an actual or simulated actuation signal.

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3.9.3-2 Amendment No. 227 CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 Amendment No. 201

SDC and Coolant Circulation-High Water Level 3.9.4 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3.9.4 Shutdown Cooling (SDC) and Coolant Circulation-High Water Level LCO 3.9.4 One SDC loop shall be OPERABLE and in operation.

NOTES----------------------------

1. The required SDC loop may be not in operation for
  • 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> per 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> period, provided no operations are

.permitted that would cause introduction of coolant into the.Reactor.Cool~ant'System with boron.concentration less than that required to meet the minimum boron concentration of LCO 3.9.1.

2. The shutdown cooling pumps may be removed from operation during.the time required for local leak rate testing of containment penetration number 41 pursuant to the requirements of SR 3.6.1.1 or to permit maintenance on valves located in the common SDC suction line, provided:
a. no operations are permitted that would cause introduction.of coolant into Reactor Coolant System with boron concentration less than that required to meet the minimum boron co rentration of LCO 3.9.1,
b. (CORE A.LTERlATIONS arc supne.a
c. all containment penetrations are in the status described in LCO 3.9.3.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 6 with the water level 2 23 ft above the top of the irradiated'fuel assemblies seated in the reactor vessel.

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3.9.4-1 Amendment No. 266 CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 Amendment No. 243

r Refueling Pool Water Level 3.9.6 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3.9.6 Refueling Pool Water Level LCO 3.9.6 Refueling pool water level shall be maintained 2 23 ft above the top of the irradiated fuel assemblies seated in the reactor vessel.

APPLICABILITY: COE TLERTINS,

{nt-jn eprin excep During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies witin containment.

ACTIONS CONDITION 4.

REQUIRED ACTION I 4

COMPLETION TIME A. Refueling pool water level not within . AltEATION&.

limit.

AJ Suspend movement of Immediately irradiated fuel assemblies within containment.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.9.6.1 Verify refueling pool water level is 2 23 ft 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> above the top of the irradiated fuel assemblies seated in the reactor vessel.

CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 3.9.6-1 Amendment No. 227 CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 Amendment No. 201

Retrieved from "https://kanterella.com/w/index.php?title=ML051660207&oldid=2592556"