Potential for Water Hammer During Restart of Residual Heat Removal PumpsML031140526 |
Person / Time |
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Site: |
Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, 05000000, Zimmer, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant, Skagit, Marble Hill |
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Issue date: |
02/11/1987 |
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From: |
Jordan E NRC/IE |
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To: |
|
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References |
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IN-87-010, NUDOCS 8702100126 |
Download: ML031140526 (5) |
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Similar Documents at Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, 05000000, Zimmer, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant, Skagit, Marble Hill |
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Category:NRC Information Notice
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Mclaughlin on NRC, Regarding NRC Information Notice 2006-13: Groundwater Contamination 2020-09-03 The following query condition could not be considered due to this wiki's restrictions on query size or depth: <code> [[:Beaver Valley]] OR [[:Millstone]] OR [[:Hatch]] OR [[:Monticello]] OR [[:Calvert Cliffs]] OR [[:Dresden]] OR [[:Davis Besse]] OR [[:Peach Bottom]] OR [[:Browns Ferry]] OR [[:Salem]] OR [[:Oconee]] OR [[:Mcguire]] OR [[:Nine Mile Point]] OR [[:Palisades]] OR [[:Palo Verde]] OR [[:Perry]] OR [[:Indian Point]] OR [[:Fermi]] OR [[:Kewaunee]] OR [[:Catawba]] OR [[:Harris]] OR [[:Wolf Creek]] OR [[:Saint Lucie]] OR [[:Point Beach]] OR [[:Oyster Creek]] OR [[:Watts Bar]] OR [[:Hope Creek]] OR [[:Grand Gulf]] OR [[:Cooper]] OR [[:Sequoyah]] OR [[:Byron]] OR [[:Pilgrim]] OR [[:Arkansas Nuclear]] OR [[:Three Mile Island]] OR [[:Braidwood]] OR [[:Susquehanna]] OR [[:Summer]] OR [[:Prairie Island]] OR [[:Columbia]] OR [[:Seabrook]] OR [[:Brunswick]] OR [[:Surry]] OR [[:Limerick]] OR [[:North Anna]] OR [[:Turkey Point]] OR [[:River Bend]] OR [[:Vermont Yankee]] OR [[:Crystal River]] OR [[:Haddam Neck]] OR [[:Ginna]] OR [[:Diablo Canyon]] OR [[:Callaway]] OR [[:Vogtle]] OR [[:Waterford]] OR [[:Duane Arnold]] OR [[:Farley]] OR [[:Robinson]] OR [[:Clinton]] OR [[:South Texas]] OR [[:San Onofre]] OR [[:Cook]] OR [[:Comanche Peak]] OR [[:Yankee Rowe]] OR [[:Maine Yankee]] OR [[:Quad Cities]] OR [[:Humboldt Bay]] OR [[:La Crosse]] OR [[:Big Rock Point]] OR [[:Rancho Seco]] OR [[:Zion]] OR [[:Midland]] OR [[:Bellefonte]] OR [[:Fort Calhoun]] OR [[:FitzPatrick]] OR [[:McGuire]] OR [[:LaSalle]] OR [[:05000000]] OR [[:Zimmer]] OR [[:Fort Saint Vrain]] OR [[:Shoreham]] OR [[:Satsop]] OR [[:Trojan]] OR [[:Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant]] OR [[:Skagit]] OR [[:Marble Hill]] </code>.
[Table view]The following query condition could not be considered due to this wiki's restrictions on query size or depth: <code> [[:Beaver Valley]] OR [[:Millstone]] OR [[:Hatch]] OR [[:Monticello]] OR [[:Calvert Cliffs]] OR [[:Dresden]] OR [[:Davis Besse]] OR [[:Peach Bottom]] OR [[:Browns Ferry]] OR [[:Salem]] OR [[:Oconee]] OR [[:Mcguire]] OR [[:Nine Mile Point]] OR [[:Palisades]] OR [[:Palo Verde]] OR [[:Perry]] OR [[:Indian Point]] OR [[:Fermi]] OR [[:Kewaunee]] OR [[:Catawba]] OR [[:Harris]] OR [[:Wolf Creek]] OR [[:Saint Lucie]] OR [[:Point Beach]] OR [[:Oyster Creek]] OR [[:Watts Bar]] OR [[:Hope Creek]] OR [[:Grand Gulf]] OR [[:Cooper]] OR [[:Sequoyah]] OR [[:Byron]] OR [[:Pilgrim]] OR [[:Arkansas Nuclear]] OR [[:Three Mile Island]] OR [[:Braidwood]] OR [[:Susquehanna]] OR [[:Summer]] OR [[:Prairie Island]] OR [[:Columbia]] OR [[:Seabrook]] OR [[:Brunswick]] OR [[:Surry]] OR [[:Limerick]] OR [[:North Anna]] OR [[:Turkey Point]] OR [[:River Bend]] OR [[:Vermont Yankee]] OR [[:Crystal River]] OR [[:Haddam Neck]] OR [[:Ginna]] OR [[:Diablo Canyon]] OR [[:Callaway]] OR [[:Vogtle]] OR [[:Waterford]] OR [[:Duane Arnold]] OR [[:Farley]] OR [[:Robinson]] OR [[:Clinton]] OR [[:South Texas]] OR [[:San Onofre]] OR [[:Cook]] OR [[:Comanche Peak]] OR [[:Yankee Rowe]] OR [[:Maine Yankee]] OR [[:Quad Cities]] OR [[:Humboldt Bay]] OR [[:La Crosse]] OR [[:Big Rock Point]] OR [[:Rancho Seco]] OR [[:Zion]] OR [[:Midland]] OR [[:Bellefonte]] OR [[:Fort Calhoun]] OR [[:FitzPatrick]] OR [[:McGuire]] OR [[:LaSalle]] OR [[:05000000]] OR [[:Zimmer]] OR [[:Fort Saint Vrain]] OR [[:Shoreham]] OR [[:Satsop]] OR [[:Trojan]] OR [[:Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant]] OR [[:Skagit]] OR [[:Marble Hill]] </code>. |
SSINS No.: 6835 IN 87-10
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 February 11, 1987 IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 87-10: POTENTIAL FOR WATER HAMMER DURING RESTART
OF RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL PUMPS
Addressees
All boiling water reactor (BWR) facilities holding an operating license or a
construction permit.
Purpose
This information notice is to alert addressees of the potential for water
hammer in the residual heat removal (RHR) system of BWRs during a design basis
loss of coolant accident (LOCA) coincident with a loss of offsite power (LOOP)
if the RHR system is aligned to suppression pool cooling. Recipients are
expected to review the information for applicability to their facilities and
consider actions, if appropriate, to preclude similar problems occurring at
their facilities. However, suggestions contained in this information notice do
not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written
response is required.
Description of Circumstances
On December 11, 1986, the Susquehanna nuclear power plant reported that based
on results of an ongoing review of the potential effects of water hammer
events, the RHR system could be susceptible to water hammer loads that would
exceed the allowable stresses in the RHR system and piping. The specific
condition of concern involves a design-basis LOCA coincident with a LOOP, while
one or one RHR loops are in the suppression pool cooling mode. During the
power loss and subsequent valve realignment, portions of the RHR system will
void because of the drain down to the suppression pool as a result of elevation
differences. A water hammer may occur in those RHR loops that were in the
suppression pool cooling mode when the RHR pumps restart after the diesel
generators reenergize the buses.
The core spray system also may be subject to such a water hammer if it is lined
up in the suppression pool mixing mode full flow test.
The Susquehanna design basis for LOCA/LOOP assumes that the suppression pool
cooling flow path valves are initially closed in the standby lineup. The
potential duration factor used in the consideration of the coincident LOCA/LOOP
with the RHR in suppression pool cooling mode was one percent, or roughly 90
hours per year.
87A 7
IN 87- February , 1987 Contrary to the design basis assumption, a licensee review of operating hi story
found that the worst case RHR system usage factor approached 25% during cycles
in which significant safety relief valve weeping was experienced.
For interim corrective action, the licensee has modified operating procedures
to allow, at a time, only one loop of RHR to operate in suppression pool
cooling. In addition, the licensee will revise plant procedures to address the
restart of an RHR pump if it trips while operating in the suppression pool
cooling mode. The core spray system is currently prohibited from being
operated in the suppression pool mixing mode, except for required surveillance
testing.
Discussion:
The NRC discussed the potentia'I for this general type of event in Engineering
Evaluation No. AEOD/E309, "The Potential for Water Hammer During the Restart of
RHR Pumps at BWR Nuclear Power Plants," dated April 1983.
In the type of scenario discussed in AEOD/E309, the line most likely to drain
and experience a water hammer is the drywell spray line because it has the
largest elevation difference between it and the suppression pool. RHR system
pipes less than 33 feet above the suppression pool will not usually drain
because atmospheric pressure will support a column of water that high. A water
hammer in the drywell spray line could endanger RHR system integrity, and thus
jeopardize all modes of RHR including low-pressure coolant injection.
The analysis performed by the licensee of the Susquehanna nuclear power plant
goes beyond AEOD/E309 In that detailed site-specific computer modeling was
performed which shows that piping system integrity could be challenged.
Besides Susquehanna, other plants may have high usage factors for suppression
pool cooling mode and large elevations differences in the RHR system, making
those plants potentially subject to water hammer in the RHR system.
No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.
If you have questions about this matter, please contact the Regional Adminis- trator of the appropriate NRC regional office or this office.
Edward L. Jordan, Director
Division of Emergency Preparedness
and Engineering Response
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Technical Contacts: Eric Weiss, 1E
(301) 492-9005 George Lanik, IE
(301) 492-9007 Attachment: List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices
by phone
LPlisco for *SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE
- EAB:DI EPER:IE Region I *IE EAB:DEPER:IE *EGCB:DEPER:IE IE D:Do :9 EWWei s! ;:ew JWiggins DGable JRosenthal RLBaer SASchartz ELJordan
01/14/A37 01/20/87 01/15/87 01/23/87 01/30/87 / 02/ /w87 . 02/51/87
Attachment 1 IN 87-10
February 11, 1987 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED
1E INFORMATION NOTICES
Information Date of
Notice No. Subject Issue Issued to
87-09 Emergency Diesel Generator 2/5/87 All power reactor
Room Cooling Design facilities holding
Deficiency an OL or CP
87-08 Degraded Motor Leads in 2/4/87 All power reactor
Limitorque CD Motor facilities holding
Operators an OL or CP
87-07 Quality Control of Onsite 2/3/87 All power reactor
Dewatering/Solidification facilities holding
Operations by Outside an OL or CP
Contractors
87-06 Loss of Suction to Low- 1/30/87 All power reactor
Pressure Service Water facilities holding
System Pumps Resulting From an OL or CP
Loss of Siphon
87-05 Miswiring in a Westinghouse 2/2/87 All Westinghouse
Rod Control System power reactor
facilities holding
an OL or CP
87-04 Diesel Generator Fails 1/16/87 All power reactor
Test Because of Degraded facilities holding
Fuel an OL or CP
87-03 Segregation of Hazardous 1/15/87 All NRC licensees
87-02 Inadequate Seismic Quali- 1/15/87 All power reactor
fication of Diaphragm facilities holding
Valves by Mathematical an OL or CP
Modeling and Analysis
87-01 RHR Valve Misalignment 1/6/87 All PWR facilities
Causes Degradation of holding an OL or CP
ECCS in PWRs86-110 Anomalous Behavior of 12/31/86 All BWR facilities
Recirculation Loop Flow holding an OL or CP
in Jet Pump BWR Plants
OL = Operating License
CP = Construction Permit
IN 87- February , 1987 Contrary to the design basis assumption, a licensee review of operating history
found that the worst case RHR system usage factor approached 25% during cycles
in which significant safety relief valve weeping was experienced.
For interim corrective action, the licensee has modified operating procedures
to allow, at a time, only one loop of RHR to operate in suppression pool
cooling. In addition, the licensee will revise plant procedures to address the
restart of an RHR pump if it trips while operating in the suppression pool
cooling mode. The core spray system is currently prohibited from being operated
in the suppression pool mixing mode, except for required surveillance testing.
Discussion:
The NRC discussed the potential for this general type of event in Engineering
Evaluation No. AEOD/E309, "The Potential for Water Hammer During the Restart of
RHR Pumps at BWR Nuclear Power Plants," dated April 1983.
In the type of scenario discussed in AEOD/E309, the line most likely to drain
and experience a water hammer is the drywell spray line because it has the
largest elevation difference between it and the suppression pool. RHR system
pipes less than 33 feet above the suppression pool will not usually drain
because atmospheric pressure will support a column of water that high. A water
hammer in the drywell spray line could endanger RHR system integrity, and thus
jeopardize all modes of RHR including low-pressure coolant injection.
The analysis performed by the licensee of the Susquehanna nuclear power plant
goes beyond AEOD/E309 in that detailed site-specific computer modeling was
performed which shows that piping system integrity could be challenged.
Besides Susquehanna, other plants may have high usage factors for suppression
pool cooling mode and large elevations differences in the RHR system, making
those plants potentially subject to water hammer in the RHR system.
No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.
If you have questions about this matter, please contact the Regional Adminis- trator of the appropriate NRC regional office or this office.
Edward L. Jordan, Director
Division of Emergency Preparedness
and Engineering Response
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Technical Contacts: Eric Weiss, IE
(301) 492-9005 George Lanik, IE
(301) 492-9007 Attachment: List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices
by phone
LPlisco for L *SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE
- EAB:DEPER:IE Region I *IE // EAB:DEPER:IE EGCB:DEPER:IE DD:DEPER:IE D:DEPER:IE
EWWeiss:ew JWiggins DGable JRosenthal RLB 4P?2 SASchwartz ELJordan
01/14/87 01/20/87 01/15/87 01 t/87 01/3Q/87 01/ /87 01/ /87
IN 87- February , 1987 Contrary to the design basis assumption, a licensee review of operating history
found that, during cycles in which significant safety relief valve weeping was
experienced, the worst case RHR system usage factor approached 25%.
For interim corrective action, the licensee has modified operating procedures
to allow only one loop of RHR to operate in suppression pool cooling or one
loop of core spray in suppression pool mixing mode at a time. In addition, the
licensee will revise plant procedures to address the restart of an RHR pump if
it trips while operating in the suppression pool cooling mode. The core spray
system is currently prohibited from being operated in the suppression pool
cooling mode, except for requited surveillance testing.
Discussion:
The NRC discussed the potential for this general type of event in Engineering
Evaluation No. AEOD/E309, "The Potential for Water Hammer During the Restart of
RHR Pumps at BWR Nuclear Power Plants," dated April 1983.
In the type of scenario discussed in AEOD/E309, the line most likely to drain
and experience a water hammer is the drywell spray line because it has the
largest elevation difference between it and the suppression pool. RHR system
pipes less than 33 feet above the suppression pool will not usually drain
because atmospheric pressure will support a column of water that high. A water
hammer in the drywell spray line could endanger RHR system integrity, and thus
jeopardize all modes of RHR including low pressure coolant injection.
The analysis performed by the licensee of the Susquehanna nuclear power plant
goes beyond AEOD/E309 in that detailed site-specific computer modeling was
performed which shows that piping system integrity could be challenged.
Besides Susquehanna, other plants may have high usage factors for suppression
pool cooling mode and large elevations differences in the RHR system, making
those plants potentially subject to water hammer in the RHR system.
No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.
If you have questions about this matter, please contact the Regional Adminis- trator of the appropriate NRC regional office or this office.
Edward L. Jordan, Director
Division of Emergency Preparedness
and Engineering Response
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Technical Contacts: Eric Weiss, IE
(301) 492-9005 George Lanik, IE
(301) 492-9007 Attachment: List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices
ME Region I IE ad, EAB:DEPER:IE EGCB:DEPER:IE DD:DEPER:IE D:DEPER:IE
EWhd ew Jiggins DGab1! JRosenthal RLBaer SASchwartz EtJordan
01// F/87 01/ /87 01/15/87 01/ /87 01/ /87 01/ /87 01/ /87
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list | - Information Notice 1987-02, Inadequate Seismic Qualification of Diaphragm Valves by Mathematical Modeling and Analysis (13 January 1987, Topic: Boric Acid, Overspeed trip)
- Information Notice 1987-03, Segregation of Hazardous and Low-Level Radioactive Wastes (15 January 1987, Topic: Boric Acid, Overspeed trip)
- Information Notice 1987-04, Diesel Generator Fails Test Because of Degraded Fuel (16 January 1987, Topic: Boric Acid, Coatings)
- Information Notice 1987-05, Miswiring in a Westinghouse Rod Control System (2 February 1987, Topic: Unanalyzed Condition, Boric Acid)
- Information Notice 1987-06, Loss of Suction to Low-Pressure Service Water System Pumps Resulting from Loss of Siphon (30 January 1987, Topic: Boric Acid)
- Information Notice 1987-07, Quality Control of Onsite Dewatering/Solidification Operations by Outside Contractors (3 February 1987, Topic: Boric Acid, Process Control Program)
- Information Notice 1987-08, Degraded Motor Leads in Limitorque DC Motor Operators (4 February 1987, Topic: Boric Acid, Anchor Darling)
- Information Notice 1987-09, Emergency Diesel Generator Room Cooling Design Deficiency (5 February 1987, Topic: Probabilistic Risk Assessment)
- Information Notice 1987-10, Potential for Water Hammer During Restart of Residual Heat Removal Pumps (11 February 1987, Topic: Water hammer)
- Information Notice 1987-11, Enclosure of Vital Equipment within Designated Vital Areas (13 February 1987, Topic: Contraband, Water hammer)
- Information Notice 1987-11, Enclosure of Vital Equipment Within Designated Vital Areas (13 February 1987, Topic: Contraband, Water hammer)
- Information Notice 1987-12, Potential Problems with Metal Clad Circuit Breakers, General Electric Type AKF-2-25 (13 February 1987, Topic: Water hammer)
- Information Notice 1987-13, Potential for High Radiation Fields Following Loss of Water from Fuel Pool (24 February 1987, Topic: Water hammer)
- Information Notice 1987-14, Actuation of Fire Suppression System Causing Inoperability of Safety-Related Ventilation Equipment (23 March 1987, Topic: Water hammer)
- Information Notice 1987-15, Compliance with the Posting Requirements of Subsection 223b of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as Amended (25 March 1987)
- Information Notice 1987-15, Compliance with the Posting Requirements of Subsection 223B of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, As Amended (25 March 1987)
- Information Notice 1987-16, Degradation of Static O Ring Pressure Switches (2 April 1987, Topic: Commercial Grade)
- Information Notice 1987-17, Response Time of Scram Instrument Volume Level Detectors (7 April 1987, Topic: Scram Discharge Volume, Water hammer)
- Information Notice 1987-18, Unauthorized Service on Teletherapy Units by Nonlicensed Maintenance Personnel (8 April 1987, Topic: Water hammer)
- Information Notice 1987-19, Perforation and Cracking of Rod Cluster Control Assemblies (9 April 1987)
- Information Notice 1987-20, Hydrogen Leak in Auxiliary Building (20 April 1987, Topic: Excess Flow Check Valve)
- Information Notice 1987-21, Shutdown Order Issued Because Licensed Operators Asleep While on Duty (11 May 1987, Topic: Inattentive)
- Information Notice 1987-22, Operator Licensing Requalification Examinations at Nonpower Reactors (22 May 1987, Topic: License Renewal)
- Information Notice 1987-23, Loss of Decay Heat Removal During Low Reactor Coolant Level Operation (27 May 1987, Topic: Boric Acid)
- Information Notice 1987-24, Operational Experience Involving Losses of Electrical Inverters (4 June 1987)
- Information Notice 1987-25, Potentially Significant Problems Resulting from Human Error Involving Wrong Unit, Wrong Train, or Wrong Component Events (11 June 1987, Topic: Boric Acid, Fire Watch, Overspeed trip)
- Information Notice 1987-25, Potentially Significant Problems Resulting From Human Error Involving Wrong Unit, Wrong Train, or Wrong Component Events (11 June 1987, Topic: Boric Acid, Fire Watch, Overspeed)
- Information Notice 1987-26, Cracks in Stiffening Rings on 48-Inch-Diameter UF6 Cylinders (11 June 1987, Topic: Boric Acid)
- Information Notice 1987-26, Cracks in Stiffening Rings on 48-Inch-Diameter Uf6 Cylinders (11 June 1987)
- Information Notice 1987-27, Iranian Official Implies Vague Threat to U.S. Resources (10 June 1987, Topic: Boric Acid)
- Information Notice 1987-28, Air Systems Problems at U.S. Light Water Reactors (28 December 1987, Topic: Boric Acid)
- Information Notice 1987-29, Recent Safety-Related Incidents at Large Irradiators (26 June 1987, Topic: Coatings, Temporary Modification, Biofouling, Uranium Hexafluoride)
- Information Notice 1987-30, Cracking of Surge Ring Brackets in Large General Electric Company Electric Motors (2 July 1987)
- Information Notice 1987-31, Blocking Bracing, and Securing of Radioactive Materials Packages in Transportation (10 July 1987, Topic: Uranium Hexafluoride)
- Information Notice 1987-32, Deficiencies in the Testing of Nuclear-Grade Activated Charcoal (10 July 1987)
- Information Notice 1987-33, Applicability of 10 CFR Part 21 to Nonlicensees (24 July 1987, Topic: Commercial Grade)
- Information Notice 1987-34, Single Failures in Auxiliary Feedwater Systems (24 July 1987)
- Information Notice 1987-35, Reactor Trip Breaker, Westinghouse Model DS-416, Failed to Open on Manual Initiation from the Control Room (30 July 1987)
- Information Notice 1987-36, Significant Unexpected Erosion of Feedwater Lines (4 August 1987)
- Information Notice 1987-37, Compliance with the General License Provisions of 10 CFR Part 31 (10 August 1987)
- Information Notice 1987-39, Control of Particle Contamination at Nuclear Power Plants (21 August 1987, Topic: Fuel cladding, Overexposure)
- Information Notice 1987-40, Backseating Valves Routinely to Prevent Packing Leakage (31 August 1987, Topic: Packing leak)
- Information Notice 1987-41, Failures of Certain Brown Boveri Electric Circuit Breakers (31 August 1987)
- Information Notice 1987-42, Diesel Generator Fuse Contacts (4 September 1987)
- Information Notice 1987-43, Gaps in Neutron-Absorbing Material in High-Density Spent Fuel Storage Racks (8 September 1987)
- Information Notice 1987-44, Thimble Tube Thinning in Westinghouse Reactors (16 September 1987)
- Information Notice 1987-45, Recent Safety-Related Violations of NRC Requirements by Industrial Radiography Licensees (25 September 1987, Topic: High Radiation Area, Overexposure)
- Information Notice 1987-46, Undetected Loss of Reactor Coolant (30 September 1987)
- Information Notice 1987-48, Information Concerning the Use of Anaerobic Adhesive/Sealants (9 October 1987, Topic: Loctite)
- Information Notice 1987-49, Deficiencies in Outside Containment Flooding Protection (9 October 1987, Topic: Safe Shutdown)
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