Loss of Reactor Coolant Inventory and Potential Loss of Emergency Mitigation Functions While in a Shutdown ConditionML031060404 |
Person / Time |
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Site: |
Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant ![Entergy icon.png](/w/images/7/79/Entergy_icon.png) |
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Issue date: |
01/18/1995 |
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From: |
Grimes B Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
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To: |
|
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References |
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IN-95-003, NUDOCS 9501110412 |
Download: ML031060404 (10) |
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Similar Documents at Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant |
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Mclaughlin on NRC, Regarding NRC Information Notice 2006-13: Groundwater Contamination 2020-09-03 The following query condition could not be considered due to this wiki's restrictions on query size or depth: <code> [[:Beaver Valley]] OR [[:Millstone]] OR [[:Hatch]] OR [[:Monticello]] OR [[:Calvert Cliffs]] OR [[:Dresden]] OR [[:Davis Besse]] OR [[:Peach Bottom]] OR [[:Browns Ferry]] OR [[:Salem]] OR [[:Oconee]] OR [[:Mcguire]] OR [[:Nine Mile Point]] OR [[:Palisades]] OR [[:Palo Verde]] OR [[:Perry]] OR [[:Indian Point]] OR [[:Fermi]] OR [[:Kewaunee]] OR [[:Catawba]] OR [[:Harris]] OR [[:Wolf Creek]] OR [[:Saint Lucie]] OR [[:Point Beach]] OR [[:Oyster Creek]] OR [[:Watts Bar]] OR [[:Hope Creek]] OR [[:Grand Gulf]] OR [[:Cooper]] OR [[:Sequoyah]] OR [[:Byron]] OR [[:Pilgrim]] OR [[:Arkansas Nuclear]] OR [[:Three Mile Island]] OR [[:Braidwood]] OR [[:Susquehanna]] OR [[:Summer]] OR [[:Prairie Island]] OR [[:Columbia]] OR [[:Seabrook]] OR [[:Brunswick]] OR [[:Surry]] OR [[:Limerick]] OR [[:North Anna]] OR [[:Turkey Point]] OR [[:River Bend]] OR [[:Vermont Yankee]] OR [[:Crystal River]] OR [[:Haddam Neck]] OR [[:Ginna]] OR [[:Diablo Canyon]] OR [[:Callaway]] OR [[:Vogtle]] OR [[:Waterford]] OR [[:Duane Arnold]] OR [[:Farley]] OR [[:Robinson]] OR [[:Clinton]] OR [[:South Texas]] OR [[:San Onofre]] OR [[:Cook]] OR [[:Comanche Peak]] OR [[:Yankee Rowe]] OR [[:Maine Yankee]] OR [[:Quad Cities]] OR [[:Humboldt Bay]] OR [[:La Crosse]] OR [[:Big Rock Point]] OR [[:Rancho Seco]] OR [[:Zion]] OR [[:Midland]] OR [[:Bellefonte]] OR [[:Fort Calhoun]] OR [[:FitzPatrick]] OR [[:McGuire]] OR [[:LaSalle]] OR [[:Fort Saint Vrain]] OR [[:Shoreham]] OR [[:Satsop]] OR [[:Trojan]] OR [[:Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant]] </code>.
[Table view]The following query condition could not be considered due to this wiki's restrictions on query size or depth: <code> [[:Beaver Valley]] OR [[:Millstone]] OR [[:Hatch]] OR [[:Monticello]] OR [[:Calvert Cliffs]] OR [[:Dresden]] OR [[:Davis Besse]] OR [[:Peach Bottom]] OR [[:Browns Ferry]] OR [[:Salem]] OR [[:Oconee]] OR [[:Mcguire]] OR [[:Nine Mile Point]] OR [[:Palisades]] OR [[:Palo Verde]] OR [[:Perry]] OR [[:Indian Point]] OR [[:Fermi]] OR [[:Kewaunee]] OR [[:Catawba]] OR [[:Harris]] OR [[:Wolf Creek]] OR [[:Saint Lucie]] OR [[:Point Beach]] OR [[:Oyster Creek]] OR [[:Watts Bar]] OR [[:Hope Creek]] OR [[:Grand Gulf]] OR [[:Cooper]] OR [[:Sequoyah]] OR [[:Byron]] OR [[:Pilgrim]] OR [[:Arkansas Nuclear]] OR [[:Three Mile Island]] OR [[:Braidwood]] OR [[:Susquehanna]] OR [[:Summer]] OR [[:Prairie Island]] OR [[:Columbia]] OR [[:Seabrook]] OR [[:Brunswick]] OR [[:Surry]] OR [[:Limerick]] OR [[:North Anna]] OR [[:Turkey Point]] OR [[:River Bend]] OR [[:Vermont Yankee]] OR [[:Crystal River]] OR [[:Haddam Neck]] OR [[:Ginna]] OR [[:Diablo Canyon]] OR [[:Callaway]] OR [[:Vogtle]] OR [[:Waterford]] OR [[:Duane Arnold]] OR [[:Farley]] OR [[:Robinson]] OR [[:Clinton]] OR [[:South Texas]] OR [[:San Onofre]] OR [[:Cook]] OR [[:Comanche Peak]] OR [[:Yankee Rowe]] OR [[:Maine Yankee]] OR [[:Quad Cities]] OR [[:Humboldt Bay]] OR [[:La Crosse]] OR [[:Big Rock Point]] OR [[:Rancho Seco]] OR [[:Zion]] OR [[:Midland]] OR [[:Bellefonte]] OR [[:Fort Calhoun]] OR [[:FitzPatrick]] OR [[:McGuire]] OR [[:LaSalle]] OR [[:Fort Saint Vrain]] OR [[:Shoreham]] OR [[:Satsop]] OR [[:Trojan]] OR [[:Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant]] </code>. |
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 January 18, 1995 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 95-03: LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT INVENTORY AND POTENTIAL
LOSS OF EMERGENCY MITIGATION FUNCTIONS WHILE IN
A SHUTDOWN CONDITION
Addressees
All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power
reactors.
Purpose
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information
notice (IN)to alert addressees to a recent incident involving a loss of
reactor coolant inventory while in a shutdown condition at a Westinghouse
pressurized-water reactor. The incident is unique because the initiating
event has the potential to create an accident and cause a loss of accident
mitigation capability. It is expected that recipients will review the
information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as
appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in
this notice do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action
or written response is required.
Background
NRC has issued a number of generic communications describing events at reactor
facilities involving inadvertent loss of reactor coolant inventory while the
facility was in a shutdown condition. In Generic Letter 88-17, "Loss of Decay
Heat Removal (DHR)," the staff requested several actions to address loss of
DHR events that occurred while the reactor was in a shutdown condition. In
two information notices (IN90-55, "Recent Operating Experience on Loss of
Reactor Coolant Inventory While in a Shutdown Condition," and IN 91-42, "Plant
Outage Events Involving Poor Coordination Between Operations and Maintenance
Personnel During Valve Testing and Manipulations"), the staff discussed
inadvertent loss of inventory events. A document issued by the NRC Office for
Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data (AEOD/E704), "Discharge of Primary
Coolant Outside of Containment at PWRs While on RHR Cooling," reported six
additional events having similar characteristics.
This IN deals with the Wolf Creek draindown event of September 17, 1994. A
similar event occurred at Braidwood in 1990. Both events involved operators
inadvertently transferring more than 9000 gallons of reactor coolant system
(RCS) inventory to the refueling water storage tank (RWST) while preparing to
shift operation of the residual heat removal (RHR) trains. However, the Wolf
Creek event occurred when the RCS was pressurized to 340 psi at a temperature
9501110412 t1.0(4 5-il
v
IN 95-XX
January xx, 1995 The Wolf Creek draindown event has been classified (November 22, 1994) by the
Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data and the Office of
Nuclear Reactor Regulation as a "Significant Event for the Performance
Indicator Program."
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact
one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of
Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
Brian K. Grimes, Director
Division of Project Support
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contacts: J. Frederick Ringwald, RIV
(316) 364-8653 John Kauffman, AEOD
(301) 415-6830
Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
DOCUMENT NAME: G:\JRT\INDRAFT.WC
______ v,'c C7L= & 7&-eh EJali-r on l ___A __ _
OFFICE OECB:DOPS SC/OECB:DOPS SRXB:DSSA l C/SRXB:DSSA
NAME lJTappert EGoodwin l _LLois l RJones
DATE l______ /9/ / 12 / /
lOFFICE TA/OECB:DOPS C/OECB:DOPS D/DOPS l _ _
NAME RKiessel AChaffee BGrimes - _
l DATE I I/
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
IN 95-03 January 18, 1995 of 300 OF. As a result, more than 9000 gallons of RCS inventory was drained
from the RCS to the RWST in about 1 minute.
The Wolf Creek design incorporates a 24 inch header pipe from the RWST from
which the RHR pumps, the charging pumps, the high-head injection pumps, and
the containment spray pumps take suction. If an RCS to RWST fluid transfer
filled the 24 inch header with steam and pump operation were attempted, the
pump could have been severely damaged and lost as a means of supplying RCS
makeup and core cooling. In addition, such steam would create conditions
favoring water hammer, which could be destructive to involved components.
Description of Circumstances
On September 17, 1994, the Wolf Creek Generating Station experienced a loss of
reactor coolant inventory while in a shutdown condition when operators
performed two incompatible activities concurrently. Preceding the event, operators were controlling the reactor coolant system in Mode 4 (hot shutdown)
at approximately 300 OF and 340 psig. Operations personnel found that during
the latter part of the cycle leaking check valves had diluted the boron
concentration in the RHR train B piping. Licensee procedures require that the
water in the piping be reborated before the RHR B train is put into operation
in this circumstance. This was routinely done by recirculating the RHR piping
water through the RWST using a containment spray pump.
Maintenance personnel were repairing a packing leak and performing valve
motor-operator diagnostic testing on the train A RHR discharge crossover
isolation valve. The shift supervisor decided that it would be acceptable to
stroke the train A discharge crossover isolation valve provided that the RHR
train B discharge crossover isolation valve and the RHR crossover return to
the RWST manual isolation valve remained shut. To continue the cooldown to
Mode 5, operators began preparations to start RHR train B so that reactor
coolant pumps could be secured. While personnel continued the repair and
valve motor-operator diagnostics on the train A crossover isolation valve, an
auxiliary operator opened the RHR crossover return to the RWST manual
isolation valve for the reboration. When both valves were opened, the reactor
coolant system had a draindown flowpath through RHR train A into the 24-inch
pipe that leads from the RWST. After approximately 1 minute, operators
recognized an unintended flowpath and shut the train A discharge crossover
isolation valve to terminate the draindown. The event transferred
approximately 9200 gallons of RCS water to the RWST, depressurized the RCS to
approximately 225 psig, and allowed the RCS temperature to increase by
approximately 7 *F.
Discussion
The Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data (AEOD) reviewed
this event at the Wolf Creek site from November 7 through 10, 1994, and plans
to issue a report. The following discussion is, in part, based on the AEOD
review and, in part, on the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) and
regional staff view of the potential safety implications.
IN 95-03 January 18, 1995 Two incompatible activities were performed concurrently, causing this event:
(1) alignment of the RHR train B crossover isolation valve (to adjust the
boron concentration) required the valve to be opened and (2) motor-operator
diagnostic testing required the train A RHR discharge crossover isolation
valve to be stroked open and closed. These two activities inadvertently
created the flow path for the draindown. The failure of several individuals, including the reactor operator, supervising operator, and shift supervisor, to
recognize that these activities were incompatible resulted in a loss of
control of plant configuration and directly caused the draindown event.
The shift supervisor initially recognized the potential for diverting RHR flow
from the RCS to the RWST; however, the shift supervisor failed to establish a
positive barrier, such as tagging or padlocking, to ensure that the manual
crossover return to the RWST manual isolation valve remained shut. Repair and
diagnostic testing of the train A discharge crossover isolation valve
represented work on the only available train of a safety system. These
decisions permitted work on a safety system required for safe operation of the
plant without proper controls in place to prevent an inappropriate system
configuration.
In recognition of additional challenges to plant operators during outage
conditions, the licensee had established an outage emergent work process to
evaluate unscheduled work. This process was intended to relieve some of the
additional burden that might distract the operators from properly monitoring
the safe condition of the plant. It was also intended to provide additional
assurance that potential adverse impacts on plant operation were fully
considered. However, this emergent work process was not used to evaluate the
motor-operated valve work on RHR train A.
The presence of the deborated water in the RHR train B piping, the attempt to
reborate, and the concurrent repair and testing of the RHR train A crossover
isolation valve raises the following concerns:
1. There is a possibility of introducing hot RCS water into the common
24-inch suction header supplied from the RWST. The RHR pumps, the
charging pumps, the high-head injection pumps, and the containment spray
pumps take suction from this header. Introducing hot RCS water into this
header could create steam conditions and interfere with RHR pump
operation. If the RHR pump were lost, alignment of the other pumps to
this header as a response to the loss of RHR cooling could have also
interfered with the operation of these other pumps.
2. There is the potential that if the draindown continued, the RHR piping
could become filled with steam. This would create conditions favoring
water hammer, which could damage valves, pumps, piping, or pipe supports.
The RWST supply to the ECCS and containment spray could be jeopardized.
IN 95-03 January 18, 1995 3. There was the possibility for inadvertent injection of relatively cold, lightly borated water from the RHR train B piping into the RCS. In the
hot shutdown condition (Mode 4), where the reactor is being borated as it
cools down, introduction of cold, lightly borated water reduces the
margin to criticality. The licensee determined that the injection of the
water from the RHR train B piping into the RCS would not have brought the
reactor to a critical state. However, the potential for criticality may
exist at other facilities under similar conditions.
The Wolf Creek draindown event has been classified by the NRC staff as a
significant event for the NRC Performance Indicator Program.
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact
one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of
Nuclear Reactor Regulation project manager.
Brian K. Grimes, Director
Division of Project Support
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contacts: J. Frederick Ringwald, RIV
(316) 364-8653 Lambros Lois, NRR
(301) 504-3233 Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
Attachment
IN 95-03 January 18, 1995 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED
NRC INFORMATION NOTICES
Information Date of
Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to
95-02 Problems with General 01/17/95 All holders of OLs or CPs
Electric CR2940 Contact for nuclear power reactors.
Blocks in Medium-Voltage
Circuit Breakers
95-01 DOT Safety Advisory: 01/04/95 All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
High Pressure Aluminum Commission licensees.
Seamless and Aluminum
Composite Hoop-Wrapped
Cylinders
94-90 Transient Resulting in a 12/30/94 All holders of OLs or CPs
Reactor Trip and Multiple for nuclear power reactors.
Safety Injection System
Actuations at Salem
94-89 Equipment Failures at 12/28/94 All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Irradiator Facilities Commission irradiator
licensees.
94-88 Inservice Inspection 12/23/94 All holders of OLs or CPs
Deficiencies Result in for pressurized water
Severely Degraded Steam reactors.
Generator Tubes
94-87 Unanticipated Crack in a 12/22/94 All holders of OLs or CPs
Particular Heat of for nuclear power reactors.
Alloy 600 Used for
Westinghouse Mechanical
Plugs for Steam Generator
Tubes
94-86 Legal Actions Against 12/22/94 All holders of OLs or CPs
Thermal Science, Inc., for nuclear power reactors.
Manufacturer of Thermo-Lag
94-85 Problems with the 12/21/94 All holders of OLs or CPs
Latching Mechanism for nuclear power reactors.
in Potter and Brumfield
R1O-E3286-2 Relays
OL = Operating License
CP = Construction Permit
K>
IN 95-03 January 18, 1995 '
3. There was the possibility for inadvertent injection of relatively cold, lightly borated water from the RHR train B piping into the RCS. In the
hot shutdown condition (Mode 4), where the reactor is being borated as it
cools down, introduction of cold, lightly borated water reduces the
margin to criticality. The licensee determined that the injection of the
water from the RHR train B piping into the RCS would not have brought the
reactor to a critical state. However, the potential for criticality may
exist at other facilities under similar conditions.
The Wolf Creek draindown event has been classified by the NRC staff as a
significant event for the NRC Performance Indicator Program.
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact
one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of
Nuclear Reactor Regulation project manager.
Brian 'K>Grim s, uirec or
Division of Project Support
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contacts: J. Frederick Ringwald, RIV
(316) 364-8653 Lambros Lois, NRR
(301) 504-3233 Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
DOCUMENT NAME: 95-03.IN
Reviewed by Technical Editor via QTE on 12/28/94 Reviewed via e-mail on 12/29/94: J. Frederick Ringwald, RIV
Dwight Chamberlain, RIV
John Kauffman, AEOD
OFFICE OECB:DOPS SC/OECB:DOPS SRXB:DSSA C/SRXB:DSSA
NAME .JTappert* EGoodwin* LLois* RJones*
DATE 112/29/94 12/29/94 12/29/9£, ,- /29/94 OFFICE _TA/OECB:DOPS C/OECB:DOPS S--_______
NAME RKiessel AChaffee* f__5______
Z________
DATE 01/ /95 12/30/94 l 01/ It95 _ _ _
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
v>
IN 95-03 January 18, 1995 3. There was the possibility for inadvertent injection of relatively cold, lightly borated water from the RHR train B piping into the RCS. In the
hot shutdown condition (Mode 4), where the reactor is being borated as it
cools down, introduction of cold, lightly borated water reduces the
margin to criticality. The licensee determined that the injection of the
water from the RHR train B piping into the RCS would not have brought the
reactor to a critical state. However, the potential for criticality may
exist at other facilities under similar conditions.
The Wolf Creek draindown event has been classified by the NRC staff as a
significant event for the NRC Performance Indicator Program.
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact
one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of
Nuclear Reactor Regulation project manager.
Division of Project Support
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contacts: J. Frederick Ringwald, RIV
(316) 364-8653 Lambros Lois, NRR
(301) 504-3233 Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
DOCUMENT NAME: 95-03. IN
Reviewed by Technical Editor via QTE on 12/28/94 Reviewed via e-mail on 12/29/94: J. Frederick Ringwald, RIV
Dwight Chamberlain, RIV
John Kauffman, AEOD
OFFICE OECB:DOPS SC/OECB:DOPS SRXB:DSSA C/SRXB:DSSA
NAME jJTappert* EGoodwin* LLois* RJones*
DATE 12/29/94 1 2_29_94_12/29__A129/94 OFFICE TA/OECB:DOPS C/OECB:DOPS l ____________
NAME RKiessel AChaffee* dI ___________
DATE 01/ /95 12/30/94_01/_ _95 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
IN 95-,W'o
January , 1995 3. There was the possibility for inadvertent injection of relatively cold, lightly borated water from the RHR train B piping into the RCS. In the
hot shutdown condition (Mode 4), where the reactor is being borated as it
cools down, introduction of cold, lightly borated water reduces the
margin to criticality. The licensee determined that the injection of the
water from the RHR train B piping into the RCS would not have brought the
reactor to a critical state. However, the potential for criticality may
exist at other facilities under similar conditions.
The Wolf Creek draindown event was classified by the Office for Analysis and
Evaluation of Operational Data and the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation as
a "Significant Event for the Performance Indicator Program" on
November 22, 1994.
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact
one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of
Nuclear Reactor Regulation project manager.
Brian K. Grimes, Director
Division of Project Support
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contacts: J. Frederick Ringwald, RIV
(316) 364-8653 Lambros Lois, NRR
(301) 504-3233 Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
DOCUMENT NAME: G:\JRT\INDRAFT.WC
Reviewed by Technical Editor via QTE on 12/28/94 Reviewed via e-mail on 12/29/94: J. Frederick Ringwald, RIV
Dwight Chamberlain, RIV
John Kauffman, AEOD
OFFICE OECB:DOPS SC/OECB:DOPS SRXB:DSSA C/SRXB:DSSA
NAME JTappert* EGoodwin* LLois* RJones*
DATE 12/29/94 12/29/94 12/29/94 12/29/94 OFFICE TA/OECB:DOPS C/OECB:DOP5i D/DOPS
NAME RKiessel AChaffee ( 7BGrimes
DATE / / IQ I / /
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
IN 95-XX
January xx, 1995 3. Finally, there is the potential that if the event continued, the RHR
piping could become filled with steam. This would create conditions
favoring water hammer, which could damage valves, pumps, piping, or pipe
supports. The RWST supply to the ECCS and containment spray could be
Jeopardized.
The Wolf Creek draindown event was classified by the Office for Analysis and
Evaluation of Operational Data and the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation as
a "Significant Event for the Performance Indicator Program" on
November 22, 1994.
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact
one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of
Nuclear Reactor Regulation project manager.
Brian K. Grimes, Director
Division of Project Support
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contacts: J. Frederick Ringwald, RIV
(316) 364-8653 Lambros Lois, NRR
(301) 504-3233 Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
DOCUMENT NAME: G:\JRT\INDRAFT.WC
Reviewed by Technical Editor via QTE on 12/28/94 Reviewed via e-mail on 12/29/94: J. Frederick Ringwald, RIV
Dwight Chamberlain, RIV
John Kauffman, AEOD
OFFICE OECB:DOPS SC/OECB:DOPS SRXB:DSSA C/SRXB:DSS~l
NAME JTappert* EGoodwin I LLois* RJones a
DATE 12/29/94 }'L_/ )$ii 9 112/29/94 /
114 f/ Af
OFFICE TA/OECB:DOPS C/OECB:DOPS D/DOPS _
NAME RKiessel AChaffee BGrimes
DATE J I frfr
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
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list | - Information Notice 1995-01, DOT Safety Advisory: High Pressure Aluminum Seamless and Aluminum Composite Hoop-Wrapped Cylinders (4 January 1995, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1995-02, Problems With General Electric CR2940 Contact Blocks In Medium-Voltage Circuit Breakers (17 January 1995)
- Information Notice 1995-02, Problems With General Electric Cr2940 Contact Blocks In Medium-Voltage Circuit Breakers (17 January 1995)
- Information Notice 1995-02, Problems with General Electric CR2940 Contact Blocks in Medium-Voltage Circuit Breakers (17 January 1995)
- Information Notice 1995-03, Loss of Reactor Coolant Inventory and Potential Loss of Emergency Mitigation Functions While in a Shutdown Condition (18 January 1995, Topic: Packing leak, Water hammer)
- Information Notice 1995-04, Excessive Cooldown and Depressurization of the Reactor Coolant System Following Loss of Offsite Power (11 October 1996, Topic: Safe Shutdown, Shutdown Margin, Probabilistic Risk Assessment, Troxler Moisture Density Gauge)
- Information Notice 1995-05, Undervoltage Protection Relay Settings Out of Tolerance Due to Test Equipment Harmonics (20 January 1985)
- Information Notice 1995-06, Potential Blockage of Safety-Related Strainers by Material Brought Inside Containment (25 January 1995, Topic: Foreign Material Exclusion)
- Information Notice 1995-07, Radiopharmaceutical Vial Breakage During Preparation (27 January 1995)
- Information Notice 1995-08, Inaccurate Data Obtained with Clamp-On Ultrasonic Flow Measurement Instruments (30 January 1995)
- Information Notice 1995-08, Inaccurate Data Obtained With Clamp-On Ultrasonic Flow Measurement Instruments (30 January 1995)
- Information Notice 1995-09, Use of Inappropriate Guidelines and Criteria for Nuclear Piping and Pipe Support Evaluation and Design (31 January 1995, Topic: Operability Determination)
- Information Notice 1995-10, Potential for Loss of Automatic Engineered Safety Features Actuation (3 February 1995)
- Information Notice 1995-11, Failure of Condensate Piping Because of Erosion/Corrosion at Flow-Straightening Device (24 February 1995, Topic: Feedwater Heater)
- Information Notice 1995-12, Potentially Nonconforming Fasteners Supplied by A&G Engineering II, Inc (21 February 1995)
- Information Notice 1995-13, Potential for Data Collection Equipment to Affect Protection System Performance (24 February 1995)
- Information Notice 1995-14, Susceptibility of Containment Sump Recirculation Gate Valves to Pressure Locking (28 February 1995)
- Information Notice 1995-15, Inadequate Logic Testing of Safety-Related Circuits (7 March 1995)
- Information Notice 1995-16, Vibration Caused by Increased Recirculation Flow in a Boiling Water Reactor (9 March 1995)
- Information Notice 1995-17, Reactor Vessel Top Guide and Core Plate Cracking (10 March 1995, Topic: Safe Shutdown)
- Information Notice 1995-18, Potential Pressure-Locking of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves (15 March 1995)
- Information Notice 1995-19, Failure of Reactor Trip Breaker to Open Because of Cutoff Switch Material Lodged in the Trip Latch Mechanism (22 March 1995)
- Information Notice 1995-20, Failures in Rosemount Pressure Transmitters Due to Hydrogen Permeation Into Sensor Cell (22 March 1995)
- Information Notice 1995-21, Unexpected Degradation of Lead Storage Batteries (20 April 1995)
- Information Notice 1995-22, Hardened or Contaminated Lubricant Cause Metal-Clad Circuit Breaker Failures (21 April 1995)
- Information Notice 1995-23, Control Room Staffing Below Minimum Regulatory Requirements (24 April 1995)
- Information Notice 1995-24, Summary of Licensed Operator Requalification Inspection Program Findings (25 April 1995, Topic: Job Performance Measure, License Renewal)
- Information Notice 1995-25, Valve Failure During Patient Treatment with Gamma Stereotactic Radiosurgery Unit (11 May 1995, Topic: Overdose)
- Information Notice 1995-26, Defect in Safety-Related Pump Parts Due to Inadequate Treatment (31 May 1995)
- Information Notice 1995-27, NRC Review of Nuclear Energy Institute, Thermo-Lag 330-1 Combustibility Evaluation Methodology Plant Screening Guide. (31 May 1995, Topic: Safe Shutdown, Fire Barrier, Exemption Request, Fire Protection Program)
- Information Notice 1995-28, Emplacement of Support Pads for Spent Fuel Dry Storage Installations at Reactor Sites (5 June 1995, Topic: Safe Shutdown, Tornado Missile, Safe Shutdown Earthquake, Earthquake)
- Information Notice 1995-29, Oversight of Design and Fabrication Activities for Metal Components Used in Spent Fuel Dry Storage Systems (7 June 1995, Topic: Nondestructive Examination)
- Information Notice 1995-30, Susceptibility of Low-Pressure Coolant Injection Valves to Pressure Locking (3 August 1995, Topic: Hydrostatic, Power-Operated Valves)
- Information Notice 1995-31, Motor-Operated Valve Failure Caused by Stem Protector Pipe Interference (9 August 1995)
- Information Notice 1995-32, Thermo-Lag 330-1 Flame Spread Test Results (10 August 1995, Topic: Fire Barrier)
- Information Notice 1995-33, Switchgear Fire and Partial Loss of Offsite Power at Waterford Generating Station, Unit 3 (23 August 1995, Topic: Overspeed trip)
- Information Notice 1995-34, Air Actuator and Supply Air Regulator Problems in Copes-Vulcan Pressurizer Power-Operated Relief Valves (25 August 1995)
- Information Notice 1995-35, Degraded Ability of Steam Generators to Remove Decay Heat by Natural Circulation (28 August 1995)
- Information Notice 1995-36, Potential Problems with Post-Fire Emergency Lighting (29 August 1995, Topic: Safe Shutdown, Emergency Lighting, Exemption Request)
- Information Notice 1995-37, Inadequate Offsite Power System Voltages During Design-Basis Events (7 September 1995)
- Information Notice 1995-38, Degradation of Boraflex Neutron Absorber in Spent Fuel Storage Racks (8 September 1995)
- Information Notice 1995-39, Brachytherapy Incidents Involving Treatment Planning Errors (19 September 1995, Topic: Brachytherapy, Underdose)
- Information Notice 1995-40, Supplemental Information to Generic Letter 95-03, Circumferential Cracking of Steam Generator Tubes. (20 September 1995, Topic: Hydrostatic, Nondestructive Examination, Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1995-41, Degradation of Ventilation System Charcoal Resulting from Chemical Cleaning of Steam Generators (22 September 1995, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1995-42, Commission Decision on Resolution of Generic Issue 23, Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Failure. (22 September 1995, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1995-43, Failure of Bolt-Locking Device on Reactor Coolant Pump Turning Vane (28 September 1995, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1995-44, Ensuring Compatible Use of Drive Cables Incorporating Industrial Nuclear Company Ball-Type Male Connectors (26 September 1995, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1995-45, American Power Service Falsification of American Society for Nondestructive Testing Certificates (4 October 1995, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1995-46, Unplanned, Undetected Release of Radioactivity from the Exhaust Ventilation System of a Boiling Water Reactor (6 October 1995, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1995-47, Unexpected Opening of a Safety/Relief Valve & Complications Involving Suppression Pool Cooling Strainer Blockage (30 November 1995)
... further results |
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