LR-N05-0377, Revision to Request for Changes to Technical Specifications Containment Systems - Containment Cooling System

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Revision to Request for Changes to Technical Specifications Containment Systems - Containment Cooling System
ML052300234
Person / Time
Site: Salem  PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 08/11/2005
From: Joyce T
Public Service Enterprise Group
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
LCR S03-07, LR-N05-0377
Download: ML052300234 (24)
v • d • e


Text

PSEG Nuclear LLC P.O. Box 236, Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038-0236

'AUG 1 1 2005 LR-N05-0377 LCR S03-07 0 S G" NuclearLLC U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 REVISION TO REQUEST FOR CHANGES TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS - CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION UNITS I and 2 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSES DPR-70 and DPR-75 DOCKET NOs. 50-272 and 50-311 Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90, PSEG Nuclear LLC (PSEG) hereby requests a revision to the request for changes to the Technical Specifications (TS) for the Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 and 2 that was previously submitted.

By letter, LR-N04-0089, dated April 15, 2004 and revised by letter LR-N04-0343, dated August 11, 2004, PSEG submitted a request to revise the Salem Unit 1 TS to reflect the addition of the chilled water system (closed loop) to provide cooling water to the Containment Fan Cooling Units (CFCUs). This request also addressed a non-conservative Action Statement for Salem Units 1 and 2. The proposed revision is to withdraw the closed loop chilled water cooling modifications to the CFCUs, but maintain the change for the non-conservative TS. In accordance with 10 CFR 50.91 (b)(1), a copy of this submittal has been sent to the State of New Jersey.

During the licensing review in preparation of the previous submittal described above, it was discovered that a potentially non-conservative Action Statement exists in the current TS for Salem Units 1 and 2. The pertinent Action Statement is TS 3.6.2.3 Action b,which currently allows three or more CFCUs to be inoperable provided both containment spray pumps are operable. PSEG deemed this Action Statement to be non-conservative since it allows the plant to operate for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> with less than three CFCUs operable. PSEG reported this condition under LER 04-002, dated May 20, 2004 (LR-N04-0191). This Action Statement is being modified as shown in Attachment 1 & 2. In accordance with NRC Administrative Letter 98-10, PSEG has implemented temporary instructions that will require the affected Salem unit to enter TS 3.0.3 with less than three CFCUs operable regardless of the number of containment spray pumps operable. These restrictions will be in place until this amendment request is approved and implemented.

PSEG has verbally notified the NRC of the decision not to pursue, at this time, the CFCU modifications involving the addition of a closed loop chilled water system.

95-2168 REV. 7/99

'AUG 11 2005 Document Control Desk 2 LR-N05-0377 The original License Change Request is being modified, since it also included a revision to the non-conservative Action Statement (TS 3.6.2.3 Action b) that is independent of the addition of the closed loop chilled water system. Thus, PSEG requests NRC review of the changes to correct this Action Statement. , contains a mark-up of the original submittal detailing the withdrawn TS changes due to the deletion of the chilled water system. The Description and No Significant Hazards Evaluation provided with the original submittal remain applicable for the portions involved with this request. includes only the applicable TS pages affected by the non-conservative TS and the proposed changes.

PSEG has evaluated the proposed changes in accordance with 10 CFR 50.91 (a)(1), using the criteria in 10 CFR 50.92 (c), and has determined this request involves no significant hazards considerations. This amendment to the Salem TS meets the criteria of 10 CFR 51.22 (c)(9) for categorical exclusion from an environmental impact statement.

Should you have any questions regarding this request, please contact Mr. Steve Mannon at 856-339-1129.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Sincerely, Executed on 6' Ova ahmao DC Ia Site Vice President Salem Station Units 1 and 2 Attachments (2)

Document Control Desk 3 LR-N05-0377 AUG 1 2005 cc Mr. Samuel. J. Collins, Administrator - Region I U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mr. Stewart Bailey, Licensing Project Manager - Salem & Hope Creek Mail Stop 0881 Washington, DC 20555-0001 USNRC Senior Resident Inspector - Salem (X24)

Mr. K. Tosch, Manager IV Bureau of Nuclear Engineering PO Box 415 Trenton, NJ 08625

Document Control Desk LR-N05-0377 REVISION TO REQUEST FOR CHANGES TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS - CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION UNITS I & 2 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSES DPR-70 AND DPR-75 DOCKET NOs. 50-272 AND 50-311 ATTACHMENT I PROPOSED CHANGES WITHDRAWN

TABLE 3.3-5 ENGINEERFD SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE ITFMSTIMFS INITIATING SIGNAL AND FUNCTION

1. Manual
a. Safety Injection (ECCS)

Feedwater Isolation Reactor Trip (SI)

Containment Isolation-Phase "A" Containment Ventilation Isolation mt Applicable Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps 'Not Applicable Service Water System Not Applicable Containment Fan Cooler Not Applicable

b. Containment Spray Not Applicable Containment Isolation-Phase "B" Not Applicable Containment Ventilation Isolation Not Applicable
c. Containment Isolation-Pha e Containment Ventilation so

( Not Applicable Not Applicable

d. Steam Line Isolation Not Applicable 2.
a. s 27.0(1)
b. Rea rip (from SI) s 2.0 C. F te solation s 10.0
d. o al ent Isolation-Phase "A" s 17.0(2)/27.0(3)
e. ment Ventilation Isolation Not Applicable

,xdiiary Feedwater Pumps s 60 ervice Water System s 13.0(2)/45.0(3)

Containment Fan Coolers s 60.0 (7)

SALEM - UNIT 1 3/4 3-27 Amendment No.

TABLE 3.3-5 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATION 4 (1) Diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays included. Response time limit%

includes opening of valves to establish SI path and attainment of discharge press centrifugal charging pumps, SI and RHR pumps.

(2) Diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays not included. Offsite available. Response time limit includes opening of valves to establish SI pat attainment of discharge pressure for centrifugal charging pumps.

(3) Diesel generator starting and sequence loading delays included. Res limit includes opening of valves to establish SI path and attainment of disch ssure for centrifugal charging pumps.

(4) On 2/3 in any steam generator.

(5) On 2/3 in 2/4 steam generators.

(6) The response time is the time the isolation circuitry in the isolation setpoint to the time the Isolation Valves are fully shut.

(7) The response time includes the time to automati ate the chilled water supply and align the service water flow to the CFCUs follo offsite power, it also includes the time delay s n cident coincident with a loss of c with isolation of the Turbine I

Generator Area service water header.

UNIT I 3/4 3-31 Amendment No.

3/4.6

.~~~~-

CONTAINMENT --- .-

SYSTEMS 314.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT --

CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.1.1 Primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be maintained.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

Without primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY, restore CONTAINMENT hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in CQ the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />. 4' SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.1.1 Primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY shall be al. At least once per 31 days by verifying that each ment manual valve or blind flange that is located outside containment and require losed during accident conditions is closed, except for containment isolation lye t are open under administrative controls. Valves and blind flanges in hi n areas may be verified by use of administrative controls.

a2. Prior to entering Mode 4 from Mode 5 i o armed within the last 92 days by verifying that each containment manual valv nge that is located inside containment and required to be closed during a conditions is closed, except for containment isolation valves that are open un istrative controls. Valves and blind flanges in high radiation areas may be v ed se of administrative controls.

b. By verifying that each contr ock is OPERABLE per Specification 3.6.1.3.

c;.At least once per 12 hp > ciyng that the surveillance Fequirernents--of 4.6.2.3.a are mtfrn SK pe petrain Ch thc ontaent fan coil units.

d. At lcast once per 18 m y verifying that the suwyeillanc requirements of 4.6.2.3.d arc met for penctrntassociated with the containment fan coil units.

.9

-U w GALEM - UNIT I 3/4 6-1 Amendment No.22 I

3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES  ;

3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT 314 6.1.1 CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY Primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY ensures that the release of radioactive material fro e containment atmosphere will be restricted to those leakage paths and associate k es assumed in the accident analyses. This restriction, in conjunction with the leakage ion, will limit the site boundary radiation doses to within the limits of 10 CFR 100 cident conditions.

The purpose of this surveillance requirement (4.6.1.1a) is not to perform an ma-nipulations, but to verify that containment isolation valves capable of beir tioned are in their proper safety position (closed).

Physical verification (hands on verification) that these penetrations ntent isolation valves) are in the proper position is performed prior to entering Mode 4 from 5 a documented in the appropriate valve line-up. Allowing the use of administrative me n y compliance with the surveillance requirement for these valves is acceptable based o ed access to these areas in Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4 for ALARA reasons. Therefore, the ili of misalignment of these containment isolation valves, once they have been verified in the p position, is small.

The 6endve watercaccumulatr rvessel and discha.g ontai tion to maintain S atte filledq, Ubonooled thuid tgnditiofs in thenentainenat fan oiaewitlhfcn) cooing during-cident fops conditions. The service water accGumulator: vessel ai  ;-~fE; valves wevce installedtadrs the Generir, Lettei: 96 06 issues of column s pa-WW_&raticcmer and two phase flow vdUFing an accident involving a less of offsite poer efThe qeq Mfead4-the service water accumulator vessel and discharge valveas required in TS 2 ontainment Cooling System is required to ensure the integrity of containment penet ad 3,ciated with the containment cooling fan G94- units during accident conditions. If a-F ~e water accumulator vessel-does not meet the vessel surveillance requirements list 4.6.2.3a, the Action Statement TS 3.6.2.3d will require returning the service wate umulator to the required parameters within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> or a unit shutdown will be r hese actions are designed to ensure-,that, the containment integrity requirements; FCL1 cooling loops are met. oF if the dischafge valve response time does not mc*Pcr.l Gesptanse crriteria when tested in accordance with pfrocedures, the contaiRmen jelqiects of the CFGW cooling loops .ewdusivel supplied byath nprbea ir vese rdischarge valve arc not mnet. Limiting ConditionR for Operation 3.6.1.1 is appillr,,a "he cooling loops for the two GFGU's exclusively supplied by the inoperable aGGu111,01 to_ be remoed fromn service and isolated to maintain containment integrity. _%

3/4 6.1.2 CONTAINII AKAGE The limitations o o t nt leakage rates ensure that the total containment leakage volume will not exceed ssumed in the accident analyses at the peak accident pressure Pa. As an added con ,the measured overall integrated leakage rate (Type A test) isfurther limited to le qual to 0.75 La or less than or equal to 0.75 L,, as applicable, during performanc eriodic test to account for possible degradation of the containment leakage barriers akage tests.

The - e testing for measuring leakage rates are consistent with the Containment Lo R~eTesting Program.

Adz isCONTAINMENT AIR LOCKS kCor inment air locks form part of the containment pressure boundary and provide a means for nnel access during all MODES of operation. Each air lock isnominally a right circular linder, 10 feet in diameter, with a door at each end. The doors are interlocked during normal operation to prevent simultaneous opening.

SALEM - UNIT I B 314 6-1 Amendment No. 22l

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 4

CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.2.3 Five containment cooling fans shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3 ACTION:

a. With one or two of the above required containment cooling fans idle, estore the in-operable cooling fan(s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be tte HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the fo hours.
b. With three or more of the above required containment coo inoperable,-aFd-both containment spray systems OPERABLE, restore at least ling fans to OPERABLE status within 72-1 hours or be in at least HOT STAND the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />. Restor remaining inoperable cool-ing fans to OPERABLE status within 7 days of initi ss or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOW ie following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
c. Operation with Emergency Containment Cjg ter System (service water) shall be limited to 30 continuous days' or be Il e~ HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN withj hwing 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable. IL#1
d. With the service water accumulato ' i restore the accumulator to OPERABLE status within 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> at least HOT STANDBY WITHIN the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN wr e following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
e. While operating on the N rm oainment Cooling System (Chilled Water), and upon a loss of the chille ystem capability, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> either re-establish containment cooling (n mergency) or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> andSHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

and_

' Option beyond 30 days, while using Service Water, may be allowed based on an engi-

?i evaluation that takes into consideration the requirements of NRC Generic Letter

'8%9 ervice Water Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equipment.

l- UNIT 1 314 6-1 1 Amendment No.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.2.3 Each containment cooling fan shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> by:
1. Verifying the water level in each-the service water accumulator greater than or equal to 226-204 inches and less than or equao inches.
2. Verifying the temperature in eaeh-the service water acc ato is greater than or equal to 550F and less than or equal to
3. Verifying the nitrogen cover pressure in eaoh-the w er accumula-tor vessel-is greater than or equal to 435-61 psigft han orequal to 460 psig.
b. At least once per 31 days by:
1. Starting (unless already operating) eac m he control room in low speed.
2. Verifying that each fan operates f t 15 minutes in low speed.
3. Verifying the fixed resistan c eonding to greater than or equal to 1200 gpm SW flow to ea by testing with chilled watery.
c. At least once per 92 days by:
1. Stroking each valve th ons to isolate normal cooling water dur-ing accident condit
2. Stroking each v;n nctions to initiate emergency containment cooling water du ident conditions.

G.d.At least once per 18 m rifying that on a safety injection test signal:

1. Each sutomatically in low speed.
2. The a tic valves and dampers actuate to their corrGctpositions that M~e normal containment cooling water and initiate emergency con-s&aini~nt cooling water to the containment cooling fans receive the J}JFed actuation signals.

is isolated, by testing with service water.

- UNIT 1 3/4 6-11a Amendment No.

  • 4 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS AIR TEMPERATURE A

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION b.r WI 3.6.1.5 Primary containment average air temperature shall not exceed 1200 F.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION: 4 With the containment average air temperature > 1200F, reduce the aver N perature to within the limit within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />, or be in at least HOT STANDBY within text irs and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS A

4.6.1.5 Verify limit at least once per twenty four hours.

IGES TO THIS PAGE ILLUSTRATION ONLY

[- UNIT I 3/4 6-7 Amendment 4l95

ILIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.4.1 At least two independent service water loops shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

With only one service water loop OPERABLE, restore at least two loops to OP BL tatus within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and i SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.4.1 At least two service water loops shall be demonstrated

a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that e (manual, power operated or automatic) servicing safety related equipment is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in its co josition.
b. At least once per 18 months durin u , by verifying that each automatic valve servicing safety related e n actuates to its correct position on Safeguards Initiation signal, exces oted in Surveillance Requirement 4.6.2.3.d.2.

I- UNIT 1 3/4 7-1 6 Amendment

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 4

BASES 3/4.6.1.4 INTERNAL PRESSURE The limitations on containment internal pressure ensure that: 1) the containment stru is prevented from exceeding its design negative pressure differential with respect to th u atmosphere of 3.5 psig and 2) the containment peak pressure does not exceed the pressure of 47 psig during the limiting pipe break conditions. The pipe breaks c re LOCA and steam line breaks.

The limit of 0.3 psig for initial positive containment pressure is consistent h t ident analyses initial conditions. A The maximum peak pressure expected to be obtained from a LOCA j2ine break event is 47 psig.

3/4.6.1.5 AIR TEMPERATURE The limitations on containment average air temperature et the overall containment average air temperature does not exceed the initial oeperature condition assumed in the accident analysis for a LOCA or steam line break. In or r ermine the containment average air temperature, an average is calculated using ents taken at locations within containment selected to provide a representative sa Ir!lfoverall containment atmosphere.

The OPERABILITY of the containment coo ensures that the containment air temperature will be maintained within limits ur ormal operation.

3/4.6.1.6 CONTAINMENT STRUCTURA RITY This limitation ensures that the struct Zky of the containment will be maintained comparable to the original design s an for the life of the facility. Structural integrity is required to ensure that the contain withstand the design pressure. The visual inspections of the concrete and he Type A leakage test both in accordance with the Containment Leakage Rate Tti ogram are sufficient to demonstrate this capability.

I- UNIT 1 B 3/4 6-2 Amendment No. 207 l

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS 3/4.6.2.1 CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the containment spray system ensures that containment dep n and cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA. The pressure H and resultant lower containment leakage rate are consistent with the assumpti in the accident analyses.

Revised Westinghouse analysis (WCAP 16193 dated March, 2004) tak for post-LOCA recirculation sprays to ensure that containment heat removal t to remove the maximum possible discharge of mass and energy release to co t.

Normal plant operation and maintenance practices are not exp e rigger surveillance requirement 4.6.2.1.d. Only an unanticipated circumstance woul this surveillance, such as inadvertent spray actuation, a major configuration change, or o oreign material control when working within the affected boundary of the system. If an curred that presents the potential of creating nozzle blockage, an evaluation woul ormed by the engineering organization to determine if the amount of nozzle blocka e wou. impact the required design capabilities of the containment spray system. If the ev determines that the containment spray system would continue to perform its design bai ct then performance of the air or smoke flow test would not be required. If the e lo nnot conclusively determine the impact to the containment spray system, then the ke flow test would be performed to determine if any nozzle blockage has occurred.

3/4.6.2.2 SPRAY ADDITIVE SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the spray additiv ensures that sufficient NaOH is added to the containment spray in the event of a . he limits on NaOH minimum volume and conccntrationconcentration ensure iodine removal efficiency of the spray water is maintained because of the increase i e, and 2) corrosion effects on components within containment are minimized. The c in water volume limit includes an allowance for water not usable because of tank disc ar location or other physical characteristics. These assumptions are consistent withodi e removal efficiency assumed in the accident analyses.

3/4.6.2.3 CONTAINMENT LG SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the c ment cooling system ensures that: 1) the containment air temperature and p e will be maintained within limits 2) adequate heat removal capacity is availa wh operated In conjunction with the containment spray systems during post-LOC o and 3) provides sufficient air circulation In containment post-LOCA to hav, mixing rate between the sprayed and unsprayed regions of containment.

NORMAL MENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM - Chilled Water SVstem An ind entainment Fan Cooling Units (CFCUs) non-safety related chilled water coolin yst with redundant components Is supplied for Salem Unit 1. The Normal Con-talgg fling Water System (NCCWS) provides chilled water for containment cooling d n ormal power operation, normal shutdown, and refueling. It Is not relied upon for

^, basis accident heat removal. The system is capable of maintaining normal con-e t temperatures at approximately 901F but, for conservatism and safety margin, the k~acc~ent analysis, for containment response following a DBA, assumes containment tem-ure of 1200F at the onset of the accident.

LEM - UNIT 1 B 3/4 6-3 Amendment No. 2M

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES Service Water (SW) cooling is required during any DBA that releases mass/energy int containment, even if the CFCU NCCWS remains available, since the DBA heat loa trip out the chillers on overload. A revised Westinghouse analysis, that credits im CFCU fouling factor and improvements In accident modeling, shows that only C s, each with a minimum of 1200 gpm SW flow, are adequate for DBA contain t g.

However, since the current source term dose calculations credits the equivale Us for DBA containment air mixing and iodine scrubbing, and a single active c ilure (SACF) will disable two CFCUs, the Containment Cooling System Techni Sp'fications will retain the requirements to maintain five CFCUs operable.

On a safety injection signal, the CFCU flow is automatically reali r NCCWS to ECCWS. The CFCU chilled water system is isolated and service wat othen aligned by first opening the CFCU SW supply header Isolation valves and t ning the SW return header isolation valves. However, if a LOOP occurs at the same e, W valve opening Is delayed until after the SW pumps are restarted.

The CFCU NCCWS is the normal mode for containment nder all normal plant conditions, including power operations, shutdown pe nd refueling. The CFCU NCCWS has been designed with substantial redundancy and bility such that the CFCU NCCWS is expected to be available to support plant,_ions. In the unlikely event that the CFCU NCCWS is unavailable to support plant oa and to prevent unnecessary transients on the units, service water can be use for gal plant cooling under the con-ditions described in the Abnormal Operation se o The surveillance requirements ensure that:

a. Each NCCWS valve actuate sed position to isolate the non-safety related portions of the CFC i g water system.
b. Each ECCWS valve actuat the open position to automatically initiate SW cooling to the three ed by that header. The limiting single failure Is addressed by hvyin oseparate CFCU SW headers each of which can cool the minimum number of CFCUs.
c. The service wgecumulator ensures the tank contains sufficient water and nitrogerfm.a water filled, subcooled fluid conditions In all five containment cIl unit (CFCU) cooling loops In response to a loss of off-site power, wil njecting nitrogen cover gas Into the containment fan coil unit lo uming the most limiting single failure.
d. Eac il have a minimum SW flow of 1200 gpm.

The service umulator functions to maintain water filled, subcooled fluid conditions ntainment fan coil unit (CFCU) cooling loops during accident conditions rvice water accumulator was Installed to address the Generic Letter 96-06 issue n separation water-hammer and two phase flow during an accident Involvi of offsite power. The operability of the service water accumulator is req nt ded to prevent water column separation in the CFCU headers. TS 3.6.2.3 ACt, ent d. applies when the service water accumulator does not meet the aI le surveillance requirements.

^ BU and LOCA containment response analyses have been performed for Salem Unit 1.'Ejiese analyses included long-term pressure and temperature profiles. All cases ana-bS resulted in a peak containment pressure that was less than 47 psig.

- UNIT 1 B 3/4 63a Amendment No.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES .-. -

In addition, long-term cases were well below 50% of the peak value within 24 hou Based on the results, all applicable Standard Review Plan (SRP) criteria for Salem U are satisfied.

The analysis and results are contained in WCAP 16193 dated March 2004.

The fixed resistance in the CFCU flow path, required for a minimum SW flow of 1200 C will be confirmed in post-installation SW flow testing. Differential pressure instru e-tween the CFCU NCCWS supply and return header and flow instrumentation will peri-odically verify that the CFCU flow path fixed resistance has not changed. A The operation of the recirculation sprays is credited for the long term4n rntainment temperature requirements. L, EMERGENCY CONTAINMENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM - Service at~DV Service Water (SW) cooling is required during any DBA that releas m^a nergy into the con-tainment, even if the CFCU NCCWS (chilled water) remains ava ince the DBA heat load will trip out the chillers on overload. Westinghouse analysis (WC redits improved CFCU fouling factor and improvements in accident modeling, shows t o CFCUs, each with a minimum of 1200 gpm SW flow, are adequate for DBA cont cooling. However, since the current source term dose calculations credits the equivalent of 3 s for DBA containment air mixing and iodine scrubbing, and a single active compone ailure (SACF) will disable two CFCUs, the Containment Cooling System Technical Specificati tain the requirements to maintain five CFCUs operable. D On a safety injection signal, the CFCU flow I o tically realigned from NCCWS to ECCWS. The CFCU chilled water system I isiservice water flow is then aligned by first opening the CFCU SW supply header i at alves and then opening the SW return header isolation valves. However, if a LO P u at the same time, the SW valve opening is delayed until after the SW pumps are re ABNORMAL OPERATION-CFCU NOR AINMENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM UNAVAILABLE 4 The CFCU NCCWS is the norml or containment cooling under all normal plant conditions, including power a shutdown periods, and refueling. The CFCU NCCWS has been designed g itantial redundancy and reliability such that the CFCU NCCWS is expected to be i to support plant operations. In the unlikely event that a loss of CFCU NCCWS c a V ccurs, both the containment temperature and pressure will quickly rise and coul xd the initial conditions assumed In the accident analysis within a few minutes. The the action to restore normal cooling, initiate Service Wa-ter cooling or shut ithin one hour will ensure operation will not proceed In an un-analyzed conditior Thiction is comparable to the TS action for primary containment internal pressur . and Is more restrictive than that for average air temperature (TS 3.6.1.5). How ults in a more immediate response since the action time starts from the loss ent and not a measured parameter.

A loss of WS capability Is defined as a loss of all CH flow to the CFCUs or a loss of m two (2) chillers, or the equivalent of two (2) chillers. Since each chiller has fo gerant circuits with a separate compressor, separate electrical circuit, re-frigera pre ure boundary, and condenser cooling coil, the four (4) chillers have a total of refrigerant circuits. A loss of more than eight (8) refrigerant circuits among t o chillers Is equivalent to a loss of more than two chillers.

ater can be used for containment cooling during normal plant operations pro-vi c illed water is restored within 30 days. Operation beyond 30 days while using Ser-ic Water may be allowed based on an engineering evaluation that takes into considera-the requirements of Generic Letter 89-13, Service Water Problems Affecting Safety-Belated Equipment.

SALEM - UNIT 1 B 3/4 6-3b Amendment No.

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES The OPERABILITY of the containment isolation valves ensures that the containment atmo will be isolated from the outside environment in the event of a release of radioactive te to the containment atmosphere or pressurization of the containment. Containment is t in the time limits specified ensures that the release of radioactive material to the enviro - l be consistent with the assumptions used in the analyses for a LOCA.

The opening of locked or sealed closed containment isolation valves (penetr paths) on an intermittent basis under administrative control includes the following cona ns: (1) sta-tioning a dedicated individual, who is in constant communication with t room, at the valve controls, (2) instructing this individual to close these valves in an ci ituation, and (3) assuring that environmental conditions will not preclude access to cIv a yes and that this action will prevent the release of radioactivity outside the containme The main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) fulfill their containmn an function as remote-manual containment isolation valves. The automatic closure of t s is not required for con-tainment isolation due to having a closed system inside con t. The remote-manual con-tainment isolation function of the MSIVs can be accomplished thgh either the use of the hy-draulic operator or when the MSIV has been tested in 4rnce with surveillance requirement 4.7.1.5 the steam assist function can be credited. l Surveillance Requirement (SR) 4.6.3.1.3 only appl]S7 (Main Steam Drain) valves and the MS18 (Main Steam Bypass) valves. The Msteam Isolation) valves are tested for main steam isolation purposes by SR 4.7.1.5. nment isolation purposes, the MS167s are tested as remote/manual valves pursuant t p tion 4.0.5.

3/4.6.4 COMBUSTIBLE GAS CONTRO L The OPERABILITY of the equipmen s ms required for the detection and control of hy-drogen gas ensures that this equipm available to maintain the hydrogen concentration within containment below its flam le it during post-LOCA conditions. Either recombiner unit is capable of controlling the exDec rogen generation associated with 1) zirconium-water reactions, 2) radiolytic decompo o ater and 3) corrosion of metals within containment.

ow [ F FORMAT CHANGES ONLYl SALEM - UNIT 1 SB3/4 6-4 Ryised byletterdated6lnOAmendment

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION .

3.7.4.1 At least two independent service water loops shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

With only one service water loop OPERABLE, restore at least two loops to E LE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.4.1 At least two service water loops shall be demonstrated

a. At least once per 31 days by verifying that e manual, power operated or automatic) servicing safety related equipment is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is In its co osition.
b. At least once per 18 months durin u by verifying that each automatic valve servicing safety related e n actuates to its correct position on Safeguards Initiation signal, excel d in Surveillance 4.6.2.3.d.2.

I- UNIT 1 3/4 7-1 6 Amendment No. 248

CONTAINMENT SYqSTEMS*

CONTAINMENT

__. ^ ,.,._ __

COOLING SYSTEM

__ a_ _ . _ . _.,.

LIMITING CONDI 3.6.2.3 Five containment cooling fans shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

a. With one or two of the above required containment cooli inoperable, restore the inoperable cooling fan(s) to OPERABLE status with y be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SH 'thinthe following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
b. With three or more of the above required contain oling fans inoperable -and both coantainment spray systems6 OPERABLE store at least three cooling fans to OPERABLE status within 72-1 hours or be st HOT STANDBY WITHIN the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />. Restore the remaining inoperable cooling fans to OPF L atus within 7 days of initial loss or be in at least HOT STANDBY within hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.2.3 OPERABLE:

UNIT 2 3/4 6-1 2 Amendment No. 4 0 5T I

Document Control Desk LR-N05-0377 REVISION TO REQUEST FOR CHANGES TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS - CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION UNITS I & 2 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSES DPR-70 AND DPR-75 DOCKET NOs. 50-272 AND 50-311 ATTACHMENT 2 PROPOSED CHANGES AFFECTED PAGES:

Unit 1 Unit 2 314 6-11 314 6-12 B 314 6-3 B 314 6-3

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.2.3 Five containment cooling fans shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

a. With one or two of the above required containment cooling fans inoperable, restore the inoperable cooling fan(s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

W bWththree or more of the above required containment c o ons inoperable-~and Loth pgay, riystoar GP 9.L<rs G^timn e at least three cooling fans to OPERABLE status within ;~huSo ei at least HOT STANDBY WITHIN the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in ~tl4aw within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />. Restore the remainingioeal cooling fans to OPERABLE status within 7 days of initial loss or be/

in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.2.3 Each containment cooling fan shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

SALEM - UNIT I 3/4 6-11 Amendment No. 2

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS , ,

3/4.6.2.1 eONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM tV op.ts8e ' C 0 b fi W eQ C awlet Ce 'Ii V, The OPERABILITY of the containment spray syster nsures that containment depressurization and cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA. The pressure reduction and resultant lower containment leakage rate are consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

Normal plant operation and maintenance practices are not expected to trigger surveillance requirement 4.6.2.1.d. Only an unanticipated circumstance would initiate this surveillance, such as inadvertent spray actuation, a major configuration change, or a loss of foreign material control when working within the affected boundary of the system. If an activity occurred that presents the potential of creating nozzle blockage, an evaluation would be performed by the engineering organization to determine if the amount of nozzle blockage would impact the required design capabilities of the containment spray system. If the evaluation determines that the containment spray system would continue to perform its design basis function, then performance of the air or smoke flow test would not be required. If the evaluation cknnot conclusively determine the impact to the containment spray system, then the air or smoke flow test would be performed to determine if any nozzle blockage has occurred.

3/4.6.2.2 SPRAY ADDITIVE SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the spray additive system ensures that sufficient-NaOH is added to the containment spray in the event of a LOCA. The limits on NaOH minimum volume and concentration, ensure that 1) the iodine removal efficiency of-the spray water is maintained because of the increase in pH value, and 2) corrosion effects on components within containment are minimized. The contained water volume limit includes an allowance for water not usable because of tank discharge line location or other physical characteristics. These assumptions are consistent with the iodine removal efficiency assumed in the accident analyses.

3/4.6.2.3 CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the containment cooling system ensures that adequate heat removal capacity is available when operated in conjunction with the containment spray systems during post-LOCA conditions.

The surveillance requirements for the service water accumulator vessels ensure each tank. contains sufficient water and nitrogen to maintain water filled, subcooled fluid conditions in three containment fan coil unit (CFCU) cooling loops in response to a loss of offaite power, without injecting nitrogen covergas into the containment fan coil unit loops assuming the most limiting single failure. The surveillance requirement for the discharge SALEM - UNIT 1 E 3/4 6-3 Amendment No. ot,*

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.2.3 Five containment cooling fans shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

a. With one or two of the above required containment cooling fans inoperable, restore the inoperable cooling fan(s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
b. With three or more of the above required containment cooli fans

/inoperable,>d-A sc L-Fy systains OP opth-e coen~tite .......

t.......... R {i¢r stor :at\

least three cooling fans to OPERABLE status within-7e hour/ or in at least HOT STANDBY WITHIN the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in U T within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />. Restore the remaining inoperable cooling fans to OPERABLE status within 7 days of initial loss or be

( in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.2.3 Each containment cooling fan shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

SALEM - UNIT 2 3/4 6-12 Amendment No. ;A5:

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES O 3/4.6.2 DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS , I u W,4 aftae DIC canobio 3/4.6.2.1 CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM / t I r TheOPRA~LTYofth 4Vae .Ccra1'e'seCcDOtAIV ; r'1 The OPERABoLITY of the containment spray systeifensures that contaTnment depressurization and cooling capability will be available in the event of a LOCA. The pressure reduction and resultant lower containment leakage rate are consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

c)rcmstne wuld n-ithe containment spray system also provides a mechanysm or removing iodine from the containment atmosphere andr therefore the time Normal plaentoperato andamaneanepatie not exetedt F

(reuireentsforrestoring an inoperable spray system to OPERABLE status have /

triggr sureillace requiremednt 4.6-.fd Onlydan naniciate Normal plant operation and maintenance practices are not expected to trigger surveillance requirement 4.6.2.1.d. Only an unanticipated circumstance would initiate this surveillance, such as inadvertent spray actuation, a major configuration change, or a loss of foreign material control when working within the affected boundary of the system. If an activity occurred that presents the potential of creating nozzle blockage, an evaluation woul&.be performed by the engineering organization to determine if the amount of nozzle blockage would impact the required design capabilities of the containment spray system. If the evaluation determines that the containment spray system would continue to perform its design basis function,

  • then performance of the air or smoke flow test would not be required. If the evaluation cannot conclusively determine the impact to the containment spray system, then the air or smoke flow test would be performed to determine if any nozzle blockage has occurred.

3/4.6.2.2 SPRAY ADDITIVE SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the spray additive system ensures that sufficient NaOH is added-to the containment spray in the event of a LOCA. The limits on NaOH volume and concentration, ensure that 1) the iodine removal efficiency of the spray water is maintained because of the increase in pH value, and 2) corrosion effects on components within containment are minimized. The contained water volume limit includes an allowance for water not usable because of tank discharge line location or other physical characteristics.

These assumptions are consistent with the iodine removal efficiency assumed in the accident analyses.

3/4.6.2.3 CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the containment cooling system ensures that adequate heat removal capacity is available when operated in conjunction with the containment spray systems during post-LOCA conditions..

T containment cooling system and the containment spagseEr Te t

/ edundant to each other in providing post accide th containment\

/ tmosphere. As a result of this r dunda ~~f~oig capability, the\

/allowable out of service time r for the containment cooling system have been appropriately However, the allowable out of service time V requirements for t SALh tht UI 2 her ntainment spray system have been maintained consistent ESF equipment since the containment spray inoperable sy o provdes a mechanism for removing iodine from the containment SALEM - UNIT 2 B 3/4 6-3 evfvbyMCTdt ro 1.20-P

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