Text

Request for Change to Technical Specifications Administrative and Editorial Changes
	ML030380172
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	01/29/2003
From:	O'Connor T; Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	; Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
	LCR S03-01, LR-N03-0014
	Download: ML030380172 (16)
	v • d • e

PSEG Nuclear LLC P.O. Box 236, Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038-0236 JAN 2 9 2003 0 PSE7dG Nuclear LLC LR-N03-0014 LCR S03-01 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Gentlemen:

REQUEST FOR CHANGE TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS ADMINISTRATIVE AND EDITORIAL CHANGES SALEM GENERATING STATION UNITS I AND 2 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSES NOS. DPR-70 AND DPR-75 DOCKET NOS. 50-272 AND 50-311 Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90, PSEG Nuclear LLC (PSEG) hereby requests a revision to the Technical Specifications (TSs) for Salem Generating Station Units 1 and 2. In accordance with 1 OCFR50.91 (b)(1), a copy of this submittal has been sent to the State of New Jersey.

The proposed amendment corrects errors in the TSs for Salem Units I and 2.

PSEG has evaluated the proposed changes in accordance with IOCFR50.91(a)(1),

using the criteria in I0CFR50.92(c), and has determined this request involves no significant hazards considerations. An evaluation of the requested changes is provided in Attachment I to this letter. The marked up Technical Specification pages affected by the proposed changes are provided in Attachment 2.

PSEG requests approval of the proposed License Amendment by September 1, 2003 to be implemented within 60 days.

If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Mr. Paul Duke at (856) 339-1466.

95-2168 REV. 7/99

Document Control Desk LR-N03-0014 I declare under penalty of Executed on JAN 2 9 2003 the foregoing is true and correct.

/ý11zo/-

- Nuclear Operations Attachments (2)

Document Control Desk

-3 LR-N03-0014 C:

Mr. H. Miller, Administrator - Region I U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 Mr. R. Fretz, Project Manager - Salem U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop 8B2 Washington, DC 20555 USNRC Senior Resident Inspector - Salem (X24)

Mr. K. Tosch, Manager IV Bureau of Nuclear Engineering PO Box 415 Trenton, New Jersey 08625 JAN 2 9 2003

Document Control Desk LR-N03-0014 Attachment I LCR S03-01 SALEM GENERATING STATION UNITS 1 AND 2 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSES NOS. DPR-70 AND DPR-75 DOCKET NOS. 50-272 AND 50-311 EVALUATION OF REVISIONS TO THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS EDITORIAL CHANGES Table of Contents

1.

D ES C R IPT IO N.....................................................................................................

1

2.

PRO PO SED CHANG E.........................................................................................

1

3.

BA C KG R O U N D....................................................................................................

1

4.

TECHNICAL ANALYSIS..................................................................................

2

5.

REGULATORY SAFETY ANALYSIS...............................................................

3 5.1 No Significant Hazards Consideration.......................... "............................

3 5.2 Applicable Regulatory Requirements/Criteria.........................................

4

6.

ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION............................................................

4

7.

REFERENC ES...............................................................................................

4

Document Control Desk LR-N03-0014 Attachment I LCR S03-01 REQUEST FOR CHANGE TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS EDITORIAL CHANGES

1.

DESCRIPTION The proposed amendment corrects errors in the Salem Unit I and 2 Technical Specifications (TSs).

2.

PROPOSED CHANGE The following changes are proposed:

a.

The second equation in Salem Unit 2 Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.2.2 on page 3/4 2-5 will be revised to read as follows:

Fo(z) < Er

K(z) for P*<50.5, and 0.5

b.

Salem Unit 2 TS Table 3.3-6 will be revised to indicate that one operable channel of containment air particulate activity reactor coolant system (RCS) leakage detection instrumentation is required for operation in Modes 1 through 4.

c.

Salem Unit I TS 3/4.7.6 Action Statements "d." (for Modes 1, 2, 3 and 4) and "e." (for Modes 5 and 6) will be revised to refer to Action 25 in TS Table 3.3-6. Salem Unit 2 TS 3/4.7.6 Action Statements "d." (for Modes 1, 2, 3 and 4) and "e." (for Modes 5 and 6) will be revised to refer to Action 28 in TS Table 3.3-6.

3.

BACKGROUND

a.

LCO 3.2.2 defines limits for the heat flux hot channel factor Fa(Z) in two equations, one applicable when thermal power is greater than 50% of rated thermal power (P > 0.5), and the other applicable when thermal power is less than or equal to 50% of rated thermal power (P _ 0.5).

Salem Unit 2 TS 3.2.2 incorrectly indicates that both equations are applicable for P > 0.5. The limits were correctly stated in License Change Request S94-41 (Reference 1). Salem Unit I LCO 3.2.2 and the Core Operating Limits Reports for Salem Units 1 and 2 contain the correct limit.

The error was introduced during preparation of the retyped pages for Salem Unit 2 TS Amendment 197 (Reference 2).

b.

TS Table 3.3-6 contains a list of radiation monitoring instruments and associated operability requirements. For containment air particulate activity RCS leakage detection, one channel is required per Reference 3, 1

Document Control Desk LR-N03-0014 Attachment I LCR S03-01 but the required minimum number of operable channels is omitted from the table in the Salem Unit 2 TSs. This error appears to have been introduced during the preparation of retyped pages for implementation of Salem Unit 2 TS Amendment 173 (Reference 4).

Table 3.3-6 in the Salem Unit I TSs contains the correct information.

c.

TS 3/4.7.6 describes the operability requirements for the common control room emergency air conditioning system (CREACS). In Modes 1, 2, 3 and 4, with one or both series isolation dampers on a normal Control Area Air Conditioning System (CAACS) outside air intake or exhaust duct inoperable, Action Statement "d." applies. If a normal outside air intake isolation damper is inoperable, the required action (securing at least one intake isolation damper in the closed position) causes both radiation monitors in the affected intake to be inoperable. Action Statement "d."

refers to TS Table 3.3-6 Action 24 [27 for Unit 2] which applies to operation with one intake radiation monitor inoperable. For operation with both intake radiation monitors inoperable, TS Table 3.3-6 Action 25 [28 for Unit 2] applies.

The same error also exists in Action Statement "e." for Modes 5 and 6.

This error resulted from changes to TS Table 3.3-6 that were part of Amendment 225 for Unit I and Amendment 206 for Unit 2 (Reference 5).

Previously, TS Table 3.3-6 Action 24 [27 for Unit 2] contained the required actions for operation with one and with both radiation monitor channels inoperable in a control room air intake. In Amendment Nos. 225 and 206, the single Action was divided into two separate Actions 24 and 25 [27 and 28 for Unit 2]. TS 3/4.7.6 Action Statements "d." (for Modes 1, 2, 3 and 4) and "e." (for Modes 5 and 6) were not revised to reflect the change to TS Table 3.3-6.

4.

TECHNICAL ANALYSIS

a.

The proposed change to Salem Unit 2 LCO 3.2.2 is editorial in nature, correcting a typographical error.

b.

The proposed change to Salem Unit 2 TS Table 3.3-6 is editorial in nature, correcting a typographical error.

c.

The proposed changes to TS 3/4.7.6 Action Statements "d." (for Modes 1, 2, 3 and 4) and "e." (for Modes 5 and 6) are administrative in nature, correcting an inconsistency between TS sections.

None of the proposed changes affect the intent of any TS requirements.

2

Document Control Desk LR-N03-0014 Attachment I LCR S03-01

5.

REGULATORY SAFETY ANALYSIS 5.1 No Significant Hazards Consideration PSEG Nuclear LLC (PSEG) has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, "Issuance of amendment" as discussed below:

1.

Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

Response

No.

The proposed changes to the TSs are administrative or editorial in nature and do not change the intent of any Technical Specification requirement.

No changes are being made to any plant systems, structures or components (SSCs).

Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in "the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2.

Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

Response

No.

The proposed administrative and editorial changes to the TSs do not change the design function or operation of any plant equipment.

Additionally, no new modes of plant operation are involved with these changes.

Therefore, the proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

3.

Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

Response

No.

The proposed changes are administrative and editorial corrections to the TSs that do not affect the ability of plant SSCs to perform their design basis accident functions. Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

3

Document Control Desk LR-N03-0014 Attachment I LCR S03-01 Therefore, it the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Based on the above, PSEG concludes that the proposed changes present no significant hazards consideration under the standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c), and accordingly, a finding of "no significant hazards consideration" is justified.

5.2 Applicable Regulatory Requirements/Criteria The proposed changes are editorial and administrative in nature. They correct errors in the current Salem Units I and 2 TSs and do not affect the intent of any TS requirements.

In conclusion, based on the considerations discussed above, (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

6.

ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION PSEG has determined the proposed amendment would change a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area, as defined in 10 CFR 20, or would change an inspection or a surveillance requirement. The proposed amendment does not involve (i) a significant hazards consideration, (ii) a significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite, or (iii) a significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. Accordingly, the proposed amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), an environmental assessment of the proposed change is not required.

7.

REFERENCES

1.

PSE&G letter LR-N96114, "Request for Change to Technical Specifications, Margin Recovery Program," May 10, 1996

2.

Amendment No. 197 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-75 for the Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit No. 2, January 8, 1999 (TAC No.

M95384) 4

Document Control Desk LR-N03-0014 Attachment I LCR S03-01

3.

Amendment No. 138 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-75 for the Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit No. 2, September 8, 1994 (TAC No. M89561)

4.

Amendment No. 173 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-75 for the Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit No. 2, February 6, 1997 (TAC No.

M95692)

5.

Amendment Nos. 225 and 206 to Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-70 and DPR-75 for the Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, November 2, 1999 (TAC Nos. MA0180 and MA0181) 5

Document Control Desk LR-N03-0014 LCR S03-01 SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNITS I AND 2 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSES DPR-70 AND DPR-75 DOCKET NOS. 50-272 AND 50-311 REVISIONS TO THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGES WITH PROPOSED CHANGES The following Technical Specifications for Facility Operating License DPR-70 are affected by this change request:

Technical Specification 3.7.6.1 P4a7e 314 7-18 3/4 7-19 The following Technical Specifications for Facility Operating License DPR-75 are affected by this change request:

Technical Specification 3/4.2.2 Table 3.3-6 3/4.7.6 3/4 2-5 3/4 3-39 3/4 7-15 3/4 7-16 1

PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.6 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.6.1 The common control room emergency air conditioning system (CREACS)"

shall be OPERABLE with:

a.

Two independent air conditioning filtration trainj (one from each unit) consisting of:

I.

2.

3.

4.

Two fans and associated outlet dampers, One cooling coil, One charcoal adsorber and HEPA filter array, Return air isolation damper.

b.

All other automatic dampers required for operation in the pressurization or recirculation modes.

C. The control room envelope intact.

APPLICABILITY:

ALL MODES and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies and during CORE ALTERATIONS.

ACTI**

N:

MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 a-with one filtration train inoperable, align CREACS for single filtration train operation within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months , and restore the inoperable filtration train to OPERABLE status within 30 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

b.

With CREACS aligned for single filtration train operation and with one of the two remaining fans or associated outlet damper inoperable, restore the inoperable fan or damper to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

c.

With the Control Room Envelope inoperable, restore the Control Room Envelope to OPERABLE status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months or be in at least HOT STANrDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

d.

With one or both series isolation damper(s) on a normal Control Area Air Conditioning System (CAACS) outside air intake or exhaust duct inoperable, close the affected duct within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months by use of at least one isolation damper secured in the closed position or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

(Refer to ACTION>A6t Table 3.3-6.)

"The CREACS is a shared system with Salem Unit 2 7

SIe n I

Amendment No.190 SALEM - UNIT 1 3/4 7-18

PLANTr SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued)

e.

With one or both isolation damper(s) on an outside emergency air conditioning air intake duct inoperable, close the affected duct within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months by use of at least one isolation damper secured in the closed position and restore the damper(s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

f.

With any isolation damper between the normal CAACS and the CREACS inoperable, secure the damper in the closed position within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

MODES 5 and 6 or during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies and during CORE ALTERATIONS.

a.

With one filtration train inoperable, align CREACS for single filtration train operation within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months , or suspend CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.

b.

With CREACS aligned for single filtration train operation with one of the two remaining fans or associated outlet damper inoperable, restore the fan or damper to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months , or suspend CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.

c.

With two filtration trains inoperable, immediately suspend CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.

d.

With the Control Room Envelope inoperable, immediately suspend CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.

e.

With one or both series isolation damper(s) on a normal CAACS outside air intake or exhaust duct inoperable, immediately suspend CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies until the affected duct is closed by use of at least one isolation damper secured in the closed position. (Refer to ACTION zof qPIM3.3-6.)

f.

With one or both series isolation damper(s) on an outsiszrgency air conditioning air intake duct inoperable, immediately suspend CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies until the affected duct is closed by use of at least one isolation damper secured in the closed position.

To resume CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, at least one emergency air intake duct must be operable on each unit.

g.

With any isolation damper between the CAACS and the CREACS inoperable, immediately suspend CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies until the damper is closed and secured in the closed position.

SALEM - UNIT 1 3/4 7-19 Amendment No. 19 0

POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS 3/4.2.2 HEAT FLUX HOT CHANNEL FACTOR -

F (Z)

LIMITZING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.2.2 FI (z) <

KCZ) for P

- 0.5. and P

FQ (z)

X.TP

K(z) for 0.5. and 0.5 Where Fg IL the yo limit at RATEDH L POWER (RTP) specified in the CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT (COLR).

P THERMAL POWER

, and RATED THERMAL POWER KWS)

- the normalized FQ(z) as a function of core height as specified in the COLR.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1 ACTION With PQ(Z) exceeding its limit:

a.

Reduce THERMAL POWER at least It for each 21 F0 (Z) exceeds the limit within 15 minutes and similarly reduce the Power Range Neutron Flux-High Trip Setpoints within the next 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months s: POWER OPERATION may proceed for up to a total of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months ; subsequent POWER OPERATION may proceed provided the Overpower delta T Trip Setpoints have been reduced at least 14 for each It Fg(Z) exceeds the limit. The Overpower delta T Trip Setpoint reduction shall be performed with the reactor in at least HOT STANDBY.

b.

Identify and correct the cause of the out of limit condition prior to increasing THERMAL POWER above the reduced limit required by a. above; THERMAL POWER may then be increased provided FQ(Z) is demonstrated through a core power distribution measurement to be within its limit.

SALEM -

UNIT 2 Amendment No.

218 3/4 2-5

TABLE 3.3-6 RADIATION MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION MINIMUM CHANNELS INSTRUMENT OPERABLE APPLICABLE MODES ALARM/TRIP SETPOINT MEASUREMENT RANGE

1. AREA MONITORS

a.

Fuel Storage Area

b.

Containment Area

2.

PROCESS MONITORS

a.

Containment

1) Gaseous Activity a)

Purge & Pressure Vacuum Relief Isolation b)

RCS Leakage Detection 1

S15 fnR/hr 2

1,2,3&4 5103 R/hr 1#

6 Set at less than or equal and to 50% of the 10CFR20 concentration limits for gaseous effluents released to unrestricted areas.

1,2,3,4&5 per ODCM Control 3.3.3.9 1

1,2,3&4 N/A 10-'-104 mR/hr 1-10' R/hr i01-l0( cpm 101-106 cpm

2)

Air Particulate Activity a)

Purge & Pressure Vacuum Relief Isolation b)

RCS Leakage Detection 6

)1, 2, 3&4

!2x background N/A 25 101-106 cpm" 101*106 cpm "With fuel in the storage pool or building.

The plant vent noble gas monitor may also function in this capacity when the purge/pressure-vacuum relief isolation valves are open.

Amendment No.

217 SALEM -

UNIT 2 23 26 26 24 ACTION 3/4 3-39

PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.6 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.6 The common control room emergency air conditioning shall be OPERABLE with:

a.

Two independent air conditioning filtration trains unit) consisting of:

1.

2.

3.

4.

Two fans and associated outlet dampers, One cooling coil, One charcoal adsorber and PEPA filter array, Return air isolation damper.

system (CREACS)*

(one from each

b.

All other automatic dampers required for operation in the pressurization or recirculation modes.

c.

The control room envelope intact.

APPLICABILITY:

ALL MODES and during movement of irradiated and during CORE ALTERATIONS.

fuel assemblies ACTION:

MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 a..With one filtration train inoperable, align CREACS for single filtration train operation within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months , and restore the inoperable filtration train to OPERABLE status within 30 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

b.

With CREACS aligned for single filtration train operation and with one of the two remaining fans or associated outlet damper inoperable, restore the inoperable fan or damper to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

c.

With the Control Room Envelope inoperable, restore the Control Room Envelope to OPERABLE status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

d.

With one or both series isolation damper(s) on a normal Control Area Air Conditioning System (CAACS) outside air intake or exhaust duct inoperable, close the affected duct within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months by use of at least one isolation damper secured in the closed position or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and inf OLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months . (Refer to ACTIO4 f Table 3.3-6.)

The CREACS is a shared system with Salem Unit 1 Amendment No.173 I

3/4 7-25 SALEM - UNIT 2

PLANT SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued) 33=33u3=t=333t t

U333 333m 3333u=muiS~l~t~Imt= inf~u tmum.in333333t mm 333 winU333=

e.

with one or both isolation damper(s) on an outside emergency air conditioning air intake duct inoperable, close the affected duct within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months by use of at least one isolation damper secured in the closed position and restore the damper(s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

f.

With any isolation damper between the normal CAACS and the CREACS inoperable, secure the damper in the closed position within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

MODES 5 and 6 or during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies and during CORE ALTERATIONS.

a.

With one filtration train inoperable, align CREACS for single filtration train operation within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months , or suspend CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.

b.

With CREACS aligned for single filtration train operation with one of the two remaining fans or associated outlet damper inoperable, restore the fan or damper to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months , or suspend CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.

c.

With two filtration trains inoperable, immediately suspend CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.

d.

With the Control Room Envelope inoperable, immediately suspend CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.

e.

With one or both series isolation damper(s) on a normal CAACS outside air intake or exhaust duct inoperable, immediately suspend CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies until the affected duct is closed by use of at least one isolation damper secured in the closed position.

(Refer to ACTION-V Table 3.3-6.)

f.

With one or both series isolation damper(s) on an ogtLide emergency air conditioning air intake duct inoperable, immediately suspend CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies until the affected duct is closed by use of at least one isolation damper secured in the closed position.

To resume CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel assemblies, at least one emergency air intake duct must be operable on each unit.

g.

With any isolation damper between the CAACS -and the CREACS inoperable, immediately suspend CORE ALTERATIONS and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies until the damper is closed and secured in the closed position.

Amendment No.1 7 3 I

3/4 7-16 SALEM - UNIT 2

v t e Letter Sequence Request
TAC:MB7541, (Approved, Closed)
Initiation Request Acceptance... Administration Questions Answers Results Approval Other: ML031110171
MONTHYEAR2003-04-17 [Table View]

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