L-13-176, Generic Safety Issue 191 Resolution Plan

Generic Safety Issue 191 Resolution Plan

ML13136A144
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley
Issue date:	05/16/2013
From:	Emily Larson FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
GSI- 191, L-13-176, TAC MC4665, TAC MC4666
Download: ML13136A144 (23)

Text

FENOC _E Beaver ValleyPower Sfafion P.O. Box4 FirstEnergy NuclearOperatingCompany Shippingport,PA 15077 Eric A. Larson 724-682-5234 S[e VicePresident Fax:724-643-8069 M a y1 6 ,2 0 1 3 L-13-176 10 cFR 50.54(f)

ATTN: DocumentControlDesk U. S. NuclearRegulatory Commission Washington, DC20555-0001

SUBJECT:

BeaverValleyPowerStation,UnitNos.1 and2 BVPS-1DocketNo.50-334,LicenseNo.DPR-66 BVPS-2DocketNo.50-4'12, LicenseNo. NPF-73 GenericSafetylssue191Resolution Plan(TACNos.MC4665andMC4666)

Thisletterfonryards informationregarding resolutionof GenericSafetylssue191, "Assessment of DebrisAccumulation on Pressurized-Water ReactorSump Performance," for BeaverValley PowerStation,UnitNos.1 (BVPS-1) and2 (BVPS-2).

NuclearRegulatory Commission (NRC)staffhasinteracted withthe industryand stakeholders to developoptionsforthe resolution of GenericSafetylssue191"The NRCstaffpaperSECY-12-0093 presentsclosureoptionsfor GenericSafetylssue191.

Attachments1 and 2 provideinformation regardingthe currentstatusof effortsto addressGenericLetter20A4-02, "Potentiallmpactof DebrisBlockageon Emergency Recirculation DuringDesignBasisAccidentsat Pressurized WaterReactors," and describethe GenericSafetylssue191closureoption,resolution plan,andassociated implementation schedulefor BVPS-1and BVPS-2,respectively. Theseattachments alsodescribemitigation measuresappropriate to supportthe implementation schedule.

Attachment3 providesreferences for informationcitedin Attachments1 and2, and relatedcorrespondence. Attachment 4 providesa listof regulatorycommitments includedin thissubmittal.lf thereareanyquestions or if information additional is required,pleasecontactMr.ThomasA. Lentz,Manager FleetLicensing, at (330)315-6810.

BeaverValleyPowerStation,UnitNos.1 and2 L-13-176 Page2 I declareunderpenaltyof perjurythatthe foregoingis true and correct.Executedon May I b ,2a8.

Sincerely, ilf,/^-

EricA. Larson Attachments:

1. BeaverValleyPowerStation,UnitNo.1, GenericSafetylssue191,In-Vessel EffectsResolution Plan

2. BeaverValleyPowerStation,UnitNo.2, GenericSafetylssue191,In-Vessel EffectsResolution Plan

3. References

4. RegulatoryCommitment List cc: NRCRegionlAdministrator NRCResidentlnspector NRCProjectManager DirectorBRP/DEP SiteBRP/DEPRepresentative

ATTACHMENT 1 L-13-176 BeaverValleyPowerStation,UnitNo. 1, GenericSafetylssue191,In-Vessel EffectsResolution Plan Page 1 of 9

==

Introduction:==

FirstEnergy NuclearOperating Company(FENOC)hasselectedOption2, deterministic path,of NuclearRegulatory Commission (NRC)staffpaperSECY-12-0093, "Closure Optionsfor GenericSafetylssue191,Assessment of DebrisAccumulation on Pressurized-Water ReactorSumpPerformance," for BeaverValleyPowerStation,Unit No. 1 (BVPS-1)and intendsto pursuerefinements to evaluationmethodsand acceptance criteria.ln addition,the resolutionscheduledefinedin SECY-12-0093 will alsobe adheredto as describedherein.The NuclearEnergy (NEl)

Institute closure optiontemplatedatedNovember9, 2012was usedto developthisresponse.This submittalprovidesa resolution planthatfollowsthe deterministic pathof Option2 (referredto as NEItemplateoption2a).

To supportuseof thispath,for the periodrequiredto completethe necessaryanalysis andtesting,FENOChasevaluated the designand procedural thatexistto capabilities identifydefensein depthmeasuresto detectand mitigatein-vesselblockage.A description of thesemeasuresto detectand mitigatein-vesselblockageis provided laterin thisdocument.A summaryof the existingmarginsandconservatisms thatexist for BVPS-1arealsoincludedin thisdocument.References citedin thisattachment are listedin Attachment3.

CurrentGontainmentFiberStatus:

A bypasstestwas performedwith an objectiveto collectand recordthe fibrousdebris bypassfractionfor the BVPS-1prototypical sumpstrainer.Sumpstrainerbypass testingwas completed for BVPS-1in the springof 2008,at theAlionHydraulics Laboratory.Thistestingestablished the quantityof fiberthatpassedthroughthe strainerovera rangeof approachvelocities andheadlosses.Scaleddebrisquantities usedfor thesetestswerederivedfromthe primary linebreakwithincontainment that yieldsthe mostfibrousdebrisandthe highestapproachvelocity.

The strainerbypasstestingwas creditedfor determiningthe amountof fiber that reachesthe vessel. In addition,the bypasstestingwas reviewedand generallyaligns withthe conceptsoutlinedby the NRCat the NEIWorkshopheldon October18, 2012.

For example,the debriswas addedto the tank in incrementsof approximately one sixteenthinchof bedthickness, anda bagcapturemethodwas used.

Sumpstrainerheadlosstestingwas conducted in the springof 2008in accordance with the March2008protocol(Reference1) preparedby the NRC. In the summerof 2010 an additionalstrainerheadlosstest was performedfor a 6 inchpressurizer safetyrelief valvelinebreak. Thetotalquantityof fibrousinsulation was 11.8pounds(lbs)for 2008 L-13-176 Page2 of I strainerheadlossTest 6 (Reference 2). This quantity(11.8 lbs) boundsbreaksother thanthe pressurizer safetyreliefvalvelinebreak,including the debrisquantities for the BVPS-1loop break, pressurizer surgeline break, safety injectionline break, residual heat removalline break,and reactorvessel nozzlebreak. The total quantityof fibrous insulationwas 1A7.4 lbs for 2010strainerheadlossTest7 (Reference3). This quantity (107.4lbs) boundsthe debrisquantities for the BVPS-1pressurizer safetyreliefvalve linebreak. Thirtypoundsof latentfibermustbe addedto thesequantities(thequantity of 30 lbs is basedon testingand boundsthe calculated quantity). This makesthe total debrisquantitythat couldbe transported to the strainer,41.8lbs (11.8 lbs plus30 lbs) for Test6 and 137.4lbs(107.4 lbsplus30 lbs)for Test7.

The fiber bypasspercentagewas 8.0 percent,basedon the resultsof plant specific strainerbypasstesting. The bypassfractioncan be appliedoverthe rangeof breaks sincethe testingshowedthattherewas openscreenareawiththe boundingfiberload.

The amountof fiberbypassthat mayreacheachfuelassemblywas calculated on a per assemblybasis. The amountof fiber per assemblyin grams(g) was calculatedby multiplyingthe total fiber (41.8 lbs or 137.4 lbs) by the fiber bypass percentage (8.0percent)and converting the resultfrom poundsto gramsand then dividingthat by the numberof fuel assemblies (157). Thus,the totalfiberbypassloadwas'9.7grams per fuel assembly(g/FA)for Test 6 and 31.8 gramsper fuel assemblyfor Test 7, as shownin thefollowingequations.

g 41.8lbsx0.080x 453.6 Test6: lb= s.73-157FA FA g

137.4lbsx0.080 x 453.6 Test7: tb = 3 1 . 8g 157FA FA Therefore,for BVPS-1, the onlybreakthat exceedsthe acceptance criteriaof 15 g/FA (Reference 4) was a breakassociated witha pressurizer safetyreliefvalveline. Other breaksfall withinthe acceptance criteria. Actionsto addressthe pressurizer safety reliefvalvelinearedescribedunderthe headingResolution Schedulebelow.

StrainerHeadLoss Status:

FirstEnergy NuclearOperating Companyhaspreviously providedthe resultsof strainer headlosstesting,includingchemicaleffects,in references 2 and3. Thesetests demonstrated acceptableresultswith regardto allowable strainer headloss. Concerns of the NRCstaffassociated with GenericSafetylssue191, "Assessment of Debris Accumulation on Pressurized Water Reactor Sump Performance," Generic Letter L-13-176 Page3 of 9 2004-0l "Potentiallmpactof DebrisBlockageon EmergencyRecirculation During DesignBasisAccidentsat Pressurized WaterReactors," and BVPS-1strainerheadloss havebeenaddressed as describedin references 2, 3, and5. Thereare no outstanding issueswith respectto headlosstesting.

Characterizationof In-VesselEffects:

FirstEnergy NuclearOperating Companyintendsto followthe resolution strategy proposedby the Pressurized WaterReactorOwnersGroup(PWROG)to establish in-vessel debrisfimitsfor the BVPS-1typeplantdesign.Thisapproachis expectedto establishin-vesseldebrislimitsin excessof thatcurrently established by Westinghouse reportWCAP-16793, Revision2 (Reference 6).

LicensingBasisCommitments:

Thereis currentlyonlyoneopenFENOCcommitment for BVPS-1regarding Generic Letter2004-02.The commitment to the NRCis contained in a June 30, 2009 FENOC letter(Reference 2) thatstates:

It is recognized thattheNRCreviewof WCAP-16793-NP, Revision1, hasnot been completed.Any additional actionsrequiredto addressNRCquestions willbe addressed. Theduedateis,within90 daysafterissuanceof thefinalNRCsafety evaluation on WCAP-16793-NP, Revision1.

The NRChasnot issueda safetyevaluation forWCAP-16793-NP, Revision1. In the interimWCAP-16793-NP, Revision2, OctoberzAfi (Reference 6), was issuedby Westinghouse for reviewand approvalby the NRC. A safetyevaluationfor Revision2 of WCAP-16793-NP wasmadeavailable by the NRCon April16,2013(Reference 7).

The abovecommitment, listedas Commitment 1 in Attachment 2 of Reference 2, is herebyreplacedwiththe commitments describedunderthe Resolution Schedule headingbelowand listedin Attachment 4.

ResolutionSchedule:

FirstEnergy NuclearOperating Companywillachieveclosureof GenericSafety lssue191and addressGenericLetter2004-02perthe scheduleprovidedbelow. The resultsof the PWROGin-vesseleffectstestingeffortwill be utilizedto closethe remaining issuefor BVPS-1if it providesa conclusion thatsupportsthe currentfibrous fuelassemblyloadingforthe BVPS-1limitingbreak(pressurizer safetyreliefvalveline).

The PWROGprogramresultsare expectedto be availableand provided to the NRC stafffor reviewin the fall of 2014(Reference 8).

Measurements willbe takenin preparation for insulation modifications associated with the BVPS-1pressurizer safetyreliefvalveinletlines,if it is determined thatthe PWROG in-vesseleffectstestingeffortdoesnot supportclosureof GenericSafetylssue191and L-13-176 Page4 of 9 GenericLetter2AA4-02 for BVPS-1.Thisactionwillbe accomplished duringthe BVPS-1refueling outagein the fallof 2013.

Insulationfor the BVPS-1pressurizer safetyreliefvalveinletlineswillbe replacedor modifiedas appropriate if it is determined thatthe PWROGin-vesseleffectstesting effortdoesnot supportclosureof GenericSafetylssue191and GenericLetter2004-02 for BVPS-1.Thisactionwillbe accomplished by the endof the refueling outagein the faflof 2A16,if needed.

ThefinalGenericLetter2004-02supplemental responsefor BVPS-1will be providedto the NRCwithin6 monthsafterthe NRCapproves, by issuanceof a safetyevaluation, the new PWROGtopicalreportaddressing additionalin-vesseleffectstestingefforts thatare currentlybeingpursued.

UpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReportchangeswillbe completed to updatethe current licensingbasisfor BVPS-1as appropriate, following NRC acceptance of thefinal docketedGenericSafetylssue191response for BVPS-1andcompletion of any identified insulation modifications for BVPS-1thatmaybe required.

Summaryof ActionsGompleted:

A strainerreplacement was installedat BVPS-1duringthe fall 2007refuelingoutage (1R18).The newreplacement straineris of ControlComponents Incorporated (CCl) design,and increased the availablesurfaceareafromapproximately 130squarefeetto 3400squarefeet.

The BVPS-1startsignalfor the recirculation spraysystempumpswas changedfroma fixedtimedelayto an engineeredsafetyfeaturesactuationsystemsignalbasedon a refuelingwaterstoragetanklevellowcoincident witha containment pressurehigh-high signal.Thischangewascompleted duringthefall2007refueling outage(1R18),and pool willallowsufficient depthto coverthe sumpstrainer before initiatingrecirculation flow.

BeaverValleyPowerStation,UnitNo.1, is considered a lowto mediumfiberplant basedon approvedindustryand NRCstandardsassociated with GenericSafety fssue191andGenericLetter2004-02 Thishasbeenaccomplished throughextensive replacement of fibrousandparticulate insulation withreflectivemetalinsulation.

The sodiumhydroxide containment sumpbufferwas replacedin the spring2012 refuelingoutage(1R21).The replacement bufferis sodiumtetraborate.Thislowersthe chemicalloadingfor BVPS-1as discussed in references 9 and 10.

A containment coatingsinspection andassessment programandcontainment cleaning programbecameeffectivefor BVPSin April2008and appliesto BVPS-1refueling L-13-176 Page5 of 9 outagesbeginning withthe spring2009refueling outage(1R19).Thisreducesthe quantityof unqualifiedcoatingsand latentdebristhatmaybe transported to the sump.

lodinefilters,containinga significantamountof thinaluminumthatwouldhavebeen submerged, wereremovedfromthe BVPS-1containment. Thissupported a significant reductionin the generation of chemicalprecipitates.

Detailsof additionalactionsand modifications completedto addressGenericSafety lssue191for BVPS-1are provided in FENOClettersdatedJune30,2009and September 28,2010(references 2 and3).

Summaryof Marginsand Gonseruatisms:

Marginsandconservatisms withrespectto debrisgeneration, debristranspott,strainer head lossand chemicaleffects have been summarized in previous GenericLetter 2004-02submittals(references 2 and 3). Additionalinformation is ofieredhere.

ReactorIn-vessel FiberLoadinq The limitingbreakis a pressurizer safetyreliefvalvelinebreak,whichgenerates 31.8 g/FAof fiber. Significant fiberreduction hasbeenconducted in containment suchthat no otherevaluatedbreaksresultin excessof 15 g/FAof fiber.

Thefibrousdebrislimitsweregeneratedfromtestingconductedat limitingreactor coofantsystemflows(thatis, 44.7and 15.5gallons-per-minute perfuelassembly

[gpm/FA]).Pressurized WaterReactorOwnersGroupfuel assemblytestinghas demonstrated thatmaximumheadlossoccursat highflowconditions (44.7gpm/FA).

A smallbreaklossof coolantaccidentat a 6 inchpipenearthetop of the pressurizer (suchas the pressurizer safetyreliefvalvelinebreak)will experience a greatlyreduced flowdueto the significantly smallerbreaksizeand large elevation difference between the reactorcoreandthe break. An analysisof the pressurizer safetyreliefvalveline breakusingthe containment transientanalysis code MAAP-DBA, determined the emergencycorecoolingsystemflow rateto be approximately 23.7gpm/FA.Fuel assemblytesting performed per Westinghouse fuel assembly test report,WCAP 17057-P, Revision1 (Reference 11),usedflowratesof 44.7gpmand 15.5gpm.Thesetests consistently demonstrated thatmaximumheadlossoccursat highflowconditions; therefore,the smallerflow rateassociated withthe pressurizer safetyreliefvalveline breakwouldtranslateintoa higheracceptable in-vessel fiberload.

HotLes DrivinqHead According to WCAP-16793-NP, Rev.2, the PWROGtestingdemonstrated thatsince the hot legbreakis limitingwithrespectto allowable fiberloading, the calculation of the hot legavailable drivingheadis the relevantvaluewhendetermining if a reduction in coreflowoccurs.Forthe pressurizer safetyreliefvalve linebreak with 31.8 g/FA of fiber,the RCS'loops will remainpressurized dueto the sizeandelevationof the break; L-13-176 Page6 of 9 therefore, the hot legdrivingheadmethodology providedby WCAP-16793 doesnot applyto thisbreak.

The available drivingheadvaluefor a hot legbreakcan be compared to the differential pressurevaluerecordedfromthe testconductedwith 15 gramsof fiberto demonstrate that significantmarginexistsbetweenthe expectedpressurelossdueto a debrisbed andthe expecteddrivingheadavailable to supportcoreflow.The available drivinghead for a hotleg breakat BVPS-1is 16.37psi;the limitingAREVAEnterprises Inc.(AREVA) fuelassemblytestthatuses15 gramsof fiber(12-FG-FPC) resultedin a totalfuel assemblypressuredropof only2.7 psid. Thisconfirmsthatsignificant marginexists betweenthe hot legbreakavailable drivingheadandthe expectedpressureloss throughthe debrisbed,andtherewillbe no significant reductionin coreflow.

Severaltestswereperformedat Westinghouse, whichshowdebrisheadlossresults thatare comparable to the availabledrivingheadat BVPS-1.TestsClB49,ClB50,and CfB51eachuse50 g/FAof fiberandproduced debrisheadlossesof 14.94,17.80, and 15.35psid,respectively (followingadditionof chemical precipitates).

Since a BVPS-1 hot leg breakwill producelessthan 15 g/FAof fiber,significantmarginexistsbetween the actualfiberquantityat BVPS-1andthatwhichwas usedin theseWestinghouse FA tests.

ReactorVesselDesiqn Reactorvesseldesignswereconsidered (Reference 6) anda limitingdesignwas chosenbaseduponthe vesseldesignthatwouldbe the mostlimitingwithrespectto coreinletflowblockage.ThreeWestinghouse vesseldesignswereconsidered; designedbarrel/baffle (B/B)upflow,convertedB/B upflowand B/Bdownflow.For Westinghouse designedplants,the mostlimitingvesseldesignis the B/Bdownflow, sincethe onlymeansfor the flowto enterthe coreis throughthe lowercoreplate. A Westinghouse B/Bdownflowplantwas evaluatedusingthe WCOBRA/TRAC thermal-hydraulic computercode. Forthisevaluation, it was concluded thatsufficient liquidcan enterthe coreto removecoredecayheatoncethe plant has switched to sump recirculationwithup to 99.4percentcoreblockage.BeaverValleyPowerStation,Unit No. 1, is a converted barrel/baffleupflowplant,whichis lesslimitingfor fuelassembly blockageas statedaboveand providesan alternatepathto providecoolingto the core.

BoronPrecipitation Boronprecipitation is an issuethatbecomesproblematic withcoldlegbreaks.As statedin WCAP-16793-NP, Revision2 (Reference 6):

The limitingscenariofor boricacidprecipitation is a coldlegbreakwherethe core flowis stagnantwithonlyenoughcoreinletflowto replacecoreboil-off.

Therefore, boronprecipitation is notan issuefor any otherbreaksincluding the limiting BVPS-1pressurizer safetyreliefvalvelinebreak.

L-13-176 Page7 of 9 Summaryof Defense-in-Depth Measures BVPS-1hasa lowconcentration of precipitatesformedduringa lossof coolant accident,dueto the reduction of availablesubmerged aluminumin containment andthe changeof the containment sumpbufferingagentfromsodiumhydroxide to sodium tetraborate.The existingemergencyoperatingprocedure guidance for transferto hot leg recirculationis 6.5 hour5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />safterinitiation of a lossof coolantaccident.Forthistime frame,considering injectiontimeandtransferto recirculation time,it is expectedthat a reducedconcentration of precipitates wouldbe formed. However,to enhancethe capabilityto addresspostulatedcoreinletblockage,the BVPS-1emergencyoperating procedures willbe revisedusingrecentguidancefromthe PWROGto implement early switchover to hot legrecirculation should plant parameters indicate that core blockage is occurring. Thisactionwillbe takenpriorto transferto the existing"Response to DegradedCoreCooling" procedure. Appropriate operator training will be completed to addressthisemergency operatingprocedure revisionpriorto implementation. These actionswillbe completed withinsix monthsof the submittal dateof thisGenericSafety lssue191resolution plan.

Existingdefense-in-depth mitigative measuresaredescribed below.

Containment SumpScreen Actionstakenin response to NRCBulletin2003-01,"Potential lmpactof Debris Blockageon Emergency SumpRecirculation at Pressurized-Water Reactors," are describedin Referen ce 12. Theseactionscontinueto remain in effect at BVPS-1 .

ln-Vessel Thefollowingdescribes the plantspecificdesignfeaturesandprocedural capabilities thatexistfor detectingandmitigating fuelblockage.

Detectionof Inadequate ReactorCoreFlow

- Increasing coreexitthermocouple temperature indication Coreexitthermocouples are monitored as partof emergency operating procedure monitoringof statustreesandthe safetyparameterdisplaysystem.As partof operator training,the operating crewmustdemonstrate the abilityto detectincreases in coreexit thermocouple temperature indication andtransition to the appropriate emergency operatingprocedure for dealingwiththiscondition.This guidance is provided in the BVPSemergency operating procedure "User'sGuide"sectiontitled"ControlRoom Usageof StatusTrees,"andthe BVPS-1"CoreCoolingStatusTrees"procedure.

- Decreasing reactorwaterlevelindication The reactorvessellevelindicationsystemis monitoredthroughoutthe emergency operatingprocedures. Throughcontinuing training,operators demonstrate the abilityto monitorand understand the implications of a decreasing reactorvesselwaterleveland L-13-176 Page8 of 9 appropriately transitionwithinthe emergencyoperatingprocedureframeworkto mitigate thiscondition.

- Increasing containment or auxiliarybuildingradiationlevels Increasing radiationlevelswill be indicated by alarmsin the controlroomwithspecific procedural stepsin bothalarmresponse procedures andthe emergencyoperating procedures for addressing the condition.

Mitigationof Inadequate ReactorCoreFlow

- Starta reactorcoolantpump BeaverValleyPowerStation,UnitNo. 1, procedure titled,"Response to Inadequate CoreCooling," providesdirectionto starta reactorcoolantpumpif coreexit thermocouple temperature indicationis greaterthan 12A}degreesFahrenheit.This actionwouldaid in the removalof the established blockageto the coreto onceagain allownormalrecirculation injectionflowpathsto becomeeffectiveat maintaining adequatecorecooling.

- lmplementation of SevereAccidentManagement Guidelines SevereAccidentManagement Guidelines (SAMG)provideadditional guidanceand actionsfor addressing inadequate coreflowconditions.At BVPS-1 the SAMGsare enteredfromthe followingfunctionrestoration procedurefor inadequate corecooling.

Procedure titled,"Response to Inadequate CoreCooling," whencoreexit thermocouple temperatures are greater than 1200 degrees Fahrenheit andactions to coolthe coreare not successful.

The SAMGsprovidefor alternateinjectionpathsintothe reactorcoolantsystem(RCS).

SpecificSAMGsthatprovideguidancein thisareaare listedbelow.

"lnjectlntothe RCS"guideline "RCSInjection to RecoverCore"guideline The SAMGsprovidefor floodingcontainment to providefor convectivecirculation coolingof the reactor.SpecificSAMGsthatprovideguidancein thisareaare listed below.

"lnjectIntoContainment" guideline "FloodContainment" guideline "Containment WaterLevelAndVolume"guideline L-13-176 Page9 of 9 Althoughthesemeasuresare notexpectedto be requiredbasedon the verylow probability of an eventthatwouldresultin significantquantities of debrisbeing transportedto the reactorvesselthatwouldinhibitthe necessarycoolingof the fuel, theydo provide assurance additional thatthe healthandsafetyof the publicwouldbe protected.Thesemeasuresprovidesupportfor the extensionof time requiredto completelyaddressGenericLetter2004-02fior BVPS-1.

Conclusion The GenericSafetylssue191resolution pathfor BVPS-1is acceptable, basedon the informationprovidedin thisdocument.The execution in this of the actionsidentified document willresultin successful of GenericSafetylssue191andclosureof resolution GenericLetter20A4-02.

ATTACHMENT 2 L-13-176 BeaverValleyPowerStation,UnitNo.2, GenericSafetylssue191,In-Vessel EffectsResolution Plan Page1 of 8

==

Introduction:==

FirstEnergy NuclearOperating Company(FENOC)hasselectedOption2, deterministic path,of NuclearRegulatory Commission (NRC)staffpaperSECY-12-0093, "Closure Optionsfor GenericSafetylssue191,Assessment of DebrisAccumulation on Pressurized-Water ReactorSumpPerformance," for BeaverValleyPowerStation, UnitNo.2 (BVPS-2)andintendsto pursuerefinements to evaluation methodsand acceptance the resolution criteria.In addition, scheduledefinedin SECY-12-0093 will alsobe adheredto as described herein. The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI)closure optiontemplatedatedNovember 9, 2012was usedto developthisresponse.This submittalprovidesa resolution planthatfollowsthe deterministic pathof Option2 (referredto as NEItemplateoption2a).

To supportuseof thispath,for the periodrequiredto completethe necessary analysis andtesting,FENOChasevaluated the designand procedural capabilitiesthatexistto identifydefensein depthmeasures to detectandmitigatein-vessel blockage. A description of thesemeasuresto detectand mitigatein-vesselblockageis provided laterin thisdocument.A summaryof the existingmarginsandconservatisms thatexist for BVPS-2arealsoincludedin thisdocument.References citedin thisattachment are listedin Attachment3.

CurrentGontainmentFiberStatus:

A bypasstestwas performedwith an objectiveto collectand recordthe fibrousdebris bypassfractionfor the BVPS-2prototypical sumpstrainer.Sumpstrainerbypass testing was completed for BVPS-2 in the fall of 2008,at the AlionHydraulics Laboratory.

Thistestingestablished the quantityof fiberthatpassedthroughthe strainerovera rangeof approachvelocitiesand headlosses.Scaleddebrisquantitiesusedfor these testswerederivedfromthe primarylinebreakwithincontainment thatyieldsthe most fibrousdebrisandthe highestapproachvelocity The strainerbypasstestingwas creditedfor determining the amountof fiberthat reachesthe vessel.In addition, the bypasstestingwas reviewedandgenerallyaligns withthe conceptsoutlinedby the NRCat the NEIWorkshopheldon October18,2012.

Forexample,the debriswas addedto the tankin increments of approximately one sixteenthinchof bedthickness, anda bagcapturemethodwas used.

Sumpstrainerheadlosstestingwas conducted in thefallof 2008in accordance with the March2008protocol(Reference 1) preparedbythe NRC. Thetotalquantityof fibrousinsulation was 36.4 pounds (lbs) for BVPS-2strainerheadlossTest1A (references 2 and3). Thisquantityboundsthe debrisquantities for BVPS-2breaks.

L-13-176 Page2 of 8 Thirtypoundsof latentfibermustbe addedto thisquantity(thequantityof 30 lbs is basedon testingand boundsthe calculated quantity).Thismakesthe totaldebris quantitythatcouldbe transported to the strainer,66.4lbs (36.4lbs plus30 lbs). This totalvaluewas conservative basedon the conservatisms utilizedfor the analyses.

The fiber bypasspercentagewas 4.2 percent,basedon the resultsof plant specific strainerbypasstesting.The amountof fiberbypassthat mayreacheachfuelassembly was calculatedon a per assemblybasis. The amountof fiber per fuel assemblyin grams(g) was calculatedby multiplying the total fiber (66.4lbs) by the fiber bypass percentage(4.2 percent)and convertingthe resultfrom poundsto gramsand then dividingthat by the numberof fuel assemblies (157). Thus,the totalfiberbypassload for BVPS-2was 8.1 grams per fuel assembly(g/FA),as shown in the following equation.

g 66.41bsx0.042x453.6

= 8 . 18 -

FA Basedon thisfiberbypassload(8.1g/FA),boundingbreaksfor BVPS-2metthefibrous limitperfuelassemblyof 15 gramsperfuelassembly(Reference 4 and SECY-12-0093). However,FENOCplansto continueto supportthe Pressurized Water ReactorOwnersGroup(PWROG)effortto establishimprovedmarginfor in-vessel effectsthat applyto BVPS-2.

StrainerHeadLoss Status:

FirstEnergy NuclearOperating Companyhaspreviously providedthe resultsof strainer headlosstesting,including chemicaleffectsin references 2, and 3. Thesetests demonstrated acceptable resultswithregardto allowable strainerheadloss. Concerns of the NRCstaffassociated withGenericSafetylssue191,"Assessment of Debris Accumulation on Pressurized WaterReactorSumpPerformance," Generic Letter 2004 -02, "Potential lmpactof DebrisBlockageon Emergency Recirculation During DesignBasisAccidentsat Pressurized Water Reactors," and BVPS-2 headloss strainer havebeenaddressed as describedin references 2, 3, and 5. Thereare no outstanding issueswith respectto head losstesting.

Characterizationof In-VesselEffects:

FirstEnergy NuclearOperating Companyintendsto followthe resolution strategy proposedby the PWROGto establishin-vessel debrislimitsfor the BVPS-2typeplant design.Thisapproachis expectedto establishin-vessel debrislimitsin excessof that currentlyestablishedby Westinghouse reportWCAP-16793, Revision2 (Reference 6).

L-13-176 Page3 of 8 LicensingBasisCommitments:

Thereis currentlyonlyoneopenFENOCcommitment for BVPS-2regarding Generic Letter2004-02.The commitment to the NRCis contained in a June30, 2009FENOC letter (Reference 2) thatstates:

It is recognized thatthe NRCreviewof WCAP-16793-NP, Revision1, hasnotbeen completed.Any additional actionsrequiredto addressNRCquestions willbe addressed. Theduedateis,within90 daysafterissuanceof thefinalNRCsafety evaluation on WCAP-16793-NP, Revision1.

The NRChasnotissueda safetyevaluation forWCAP-16793-NP, Revision1. In the interimWCAP-16793-NP, Revision 2, October2011(Reference 6),was issuedby Westinghouse for reviewand approvalby the NRC. A safetyevaluationfor Revision2 of WCAP-16793-NP was madeavailableby the NRCon April 16,2013(Reference 7).

The abovecommitment, listedas Commitment 1 in Attachment2 of Referenc,e 2, herebyreplacedwiththe commitments describedunder the ResolutionSchedule headingbelowand listedin Attachment 4.

ResolutionSchedule:

FirstEnergy NuclearOperating Companywillachieveclosureof GenericSafety lssue191andaddressGenericLetter2004-02perthescheduleprovidedbelow.The fuelassemblyfibrousdebrisloadingfor BVPS-2is withinthe limitsestablished by Westinghouse evaluation reportWCAP-16793, Revision2. The resultsof the ongoing PWROGin-vesseleffectstestingeffortwill be utilizedto closethis remainingissuefor BVPS-2,if it providesa conclusion thatsupportsadditional marginfor the current BVPS-2fuelassemblyfibrousdebrisloading.The PWROGprogramresultsare expectedto be availableand providedto the NRCstafffor reviewin the fall of 2Q14 (Reference 8).

The finalGenericLetter2004-02supplemental responsefor BVPS-2will be providedto the NRCwithin6 monthsafterthe NRCapproves,by issuanceof a safetyevaluation, the new PWROGtopicalreportaddressing additionalin-vesseleffectstestingefforts thatare currentlybeingpursued.

UpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReportchangeswillbe completed to updatethe current licensing basisfor BVPS-2as appropriate, followingNRCacceptance of thefinal docketedGenericSafetylssue191response for BVPS-2.

Summaryof ActionsGompleted:

A strainerreplacement was installed at BVPS-2duringthefall2006refuelingoutage (2R12).The newreplacement straineris of Enercondesignwithbypasseliminators, L-13-176 Page4 of 8 whichincreased the available surfaceareafromapproximately 150squarefeetto 3300squarefeet.

The BVPS-2startsignalfor the recirculation spraysystempumpswas changedfroma fixedtimedelayto an engineered safetyfeaturesactuationsystemsignalbasedon a refuelingwaterstoragetanklevellowcoincident witha containment pressurehigh-high signal.Thischangewas completed duringthe spring2008refueling outage(2R13),

andwillallowsufficient pooldepthto coverthe sumpstrainerbeforeinitiating recirculationflow.

BeaverValleyPowerStation,UnitNo.2, is considered a lowfiberplantbasedon approvedindustryand NRCstandards associatedwithGenericSafetylssue191and GenericLetter2004-02.Thishas beenaccomplished throughextensivereplacement of fibrousand particulate insulationwithreflective metalinsulation.

The sodiumhydroxide containment sumpbufferwas replacedin thefall2009refueling outage(2R14).The replacement bufferis sodiumtetraborate.Thislowersthe chemical foading for BVPS-2as discussed in references 13,14and 15.

A containment coatingsinspection andassessment programandcontainment cleaning programbecameeffectivefor BVPSin April2008and appliesto BVPS-2refueling outagesbeginning withthe spring2008refueling outage(2R13).Thisreducesthe quantityof unqualified coatingsand latentdebristhatmaybe transported to the sump.

lodinefilters,containing a significantamountof thinaluminumthatwouldhavebeen submerged, wereremovedfromthe BVPS-2containment. Thissupported a significant reductionin the generation of chemical precipitates.

Detailsof additional actionsand modifications completed to addressGenericSafety lssue191for BVPS-2areprovided in FENOClettersdatedJune30,2009and September 28,2010 (references 2 and 3).

Summaryof Marginsand Conservatisms:

Marginsand conservatisms withrespectto debrisgeneration, debristransport, strainer headlossand chemicaleffectshavebeensummarized in previousGenericLetter 2004-A2submittals(references 2 and 3). Additionalinformation is offeredhere.

ReactorIn-vessel FiberLoadinq The BVPS-2strainerdesignincludesEnerconcylindrical top-hatstylestrainer assemblies withdebriseliminators. Thislimitsthe amountof debristhatcanbypassthe strainerandmakeit intothevessel.In addition,a significant debrisreduction effortwas undertaken.This,in conjunction withthe debriseliminators and the associated bypass fraction,yieldsan in-vessel loadingof lessthan15 g/FAforall evaluated breaks.

L-13-176 Page5 of I HotLeqDrivinoHead According to WCAP-16793-NP, Rev.2, the PWROGtestingdemonstrated thatsince the hot legbreakis limitingwithrespectto allowable fiberloading,the calculation of the hot legavailable drivingheadis the relevantvaluewhendetermining if a reductionin coreflowoccurs.The availabledrivingheadvaluefor a hot legbreakcan be compared pressurevaluerecordedfromthe test conductedwith 15 gramsof to the differential fiberto demonstrate that significantmarginexistsbetweenthe expectedpressureloss dueto a debrisbedandthe expecteddrivingheadavailable to supportcoreflow.The availabledrivingheadfor a hot leg breakat BVPS-2is 16.51psi;the limitingAREVA fuelassembly testthatuses15 gramsof fiber(12-FG-FPC) resultedin a totalfuel assembly pressure dropof only2.7 psid.Thisconfirms thatsignificant marginexists betweenthe hot leg breakavailabledrivingheadandthe expectedpressureloss throughthe debrisbed,andtherewillbe no significant reduction in coreflow.

Severaltestswereperformedat Westinghouse, whichshowdebrisheadlossresults thatare comparable to the availabledrivinghead at BVPS-2.TestsClB49,ClB50,and CfB51eachuse50 g/FAof fiberandproduced debrisheadlossesof 14.94,17.80,and 15.35psid,respectively (followingadditionof chemicalprecipitates). Sincea BVPS-2 hot leg breakwillproducelessthan 15 g/FAof fiber,significant marginexistsbetween the actualfiberquantityat BVPS-2andthatwhichwas usedin theseWestinghouse FA tests.

ReactolVessel Desiqn Reactorvesseldesignswereconsidered (Reference 6) anda limitingdesignwas chosenbaseduponthe vesseldesignthatwouldbe the mostlimitingwithrespectto coreinletflowbfockage.ThreeWestinghouse vesseldesignswereconsidered; designedbarrel/baffle (B/B)upflow,convertedB/B upflowand B/Bdownflow.For Westinghouse designedplants,the mostlimitingvesseldesignis the B/Bdownflow, sincethe onlymeansfor theflowto enterthe coreis throughthe lowercoreplate.A Westinghouse B/Bdownflowplantwas evaluatedusingthe WCOBRA/TRAC thermal-hydraulic computercode. Forthisevaluation, it was concluded thatsufficient liquidcan enterthe coreto removecoredecay heat once the plant has switched to sump recirculationwithup to 99.4percentcoreblockage.BeaverValleyPowerStation,Unit No.2, is a designedbarrel/baffle upflowplant,whichis lesslimitingfor fuelassembly blockageas statedaboveand providesan alternatepathto providecoolingto the core.

BVPS-2ChemicalPrecipitates The BVPS-2containment sumpbufferwas changedfromsodiumhydroxide to sodium tetraborate duringthe fall2009refueling outage(2R14).Additionally, iodinefiltersthat containa significantamountof thinaluminumthatwouldhavebeen submerged were removedfromthe BVPS-2containment.Thesemodifications haveresultedin a decreasein the quantityof post-LOCA chemical precipitates aluminumoxyhydroxide andsodiumaluminumsilicate.Forthe loopbreak,no aluminumoxyhydroxide is L-13-176 Page6 of 8 predictedto be formed,andthe otherchemicalprecipitates of concernare predictedto be in theformof sodiumaluminum silicate.

Testshavebeenperformedby the ArgonneNationalLaboratory that comparethe head lossproperties of atuminumoxyhydroxide, sodiumaluminumsilicate,and otherpotential chemicalprecipitates. Thesetestshaveshownthatmuchmoresodiumaluminum silicatethanaluminumoxyhydroxide is neededto causesignificant headloss. In the Westinghouse fuel assemblytest program, chemical precipitates were represented by aluminumo4yhyd roxide.

Therefore,post-LOCAchemicalprecipitates of concernhavebeenreduced,and FA testingis basedon a more limitingchemical precipitate (aluminum oxyhydroxide) than the formpredictedto be present.

Summaryof Defense-in-Depth Measures BVPS-2hasa low levelconcentration of precipitates formedduringa lossof coolant accidentdueto the reduction of availablesubmerged aluminumin containment andthe changeof the containment sumpbufferingagentfromsodiumhydroxide to sodium tetraborate. The existingemergency operatingprocedure guidancefor transferto hot leg recirculationis 6.0 hour0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br />safterinitiation of a lossof coolantaccident.Forthistime frame,considering injectiontimeandtransferto recirculation time,it is expectedthata reducedconcentration of precipitates wouldbe formed. However, to enhancethe capabilityto addresspossiblecoreinletblockage, the BVPS-2emergency operating procedures willbe revisedusingrecent guidance from the PWROG to implement early switchover to hot leg recirculation shouldplantparameters indicatethat coreblockageis occurring. Thisactionwill be taken prior to transfer to the existing"Response to DegradedCoreCooling"procedure. Appropriate operatortrainingwillbe completed to addressthisemergency operatingprocedure revisionpriorto implementation. These actionswillbe completed withinsix monthsof the submittal dateof thisGenericSafety lssue191resolution plan.

Existingdefense-in-depth mitigativemeasuresaredescribed below.

Containment SumpScreen Actionstakenin responseto NRCBulletin2003-01,"Potential lmpactof Debris Blockageon Emergency SumpRecirculation at Pressurized-Water Reactors,n are describedin Referen ce 12. Theseactionscontinueto remainin effectat BVPS-2.

In-Vessel Thefollowingdescribes the plantspecificdesignfeaturesandprocedural capabilities thatexistfor detectingand mitigating fuel blockage.

L-13-176 Page7 of 8 Detectionof Inadequate ReactorCoreFlow

- Increasing coreexitthermocouple temperature indication Coreexitthermocouples are monitoredas partof emergencyoperatingprocedure monitoring of statustreesandthe safetyparameterdisplaysystem.As partof operator training,the operating crewmustdemonstrate the abilityto detectincreases in coreexit thermocouple temperature indication andtransition to the appropriate emergency operating procedure for dealingwiththiscondition.Thisguidanceis providedin the BVPSemergency operatingprocedure .User'sGuide"sectiontitled"ControlRoom Usageof StatusTrees,"andthe BVPS-2"CoreCoolingStatusTrees"procedure.

- Decreasing reactorwaterlevelindication The reactorvessellevelindication systemis monitored throughout the emergency operating procedures. Throughcontinuing training,operators demonstrate the abilityto monitorand understand the implications of a decreasing reactorvesselwaterleveland appropriately transition withinthe emergency operating procedure framework to mitigate thiscondition.

- Increasing containment or auxiliarybuildingradiationlevels Increasing radiationlevelswillbe indicatedby alarmsin the controlroomwithspecific procedural stepsin bothalarmresponseprocedures andthe emergency operating procedures for addressing the condition.

Mitigation of Inadequate ReactorCoreFlow

- Starta reactorcoolantpump BeaverValleyPowerStation,UnitNo.2, procedure titled,"Response to Inadequate CoreCooling,"providesdirectionto starta reactorcoolantpumpif coreexit thermocouple temperature indicationis greaterthan 12A0degreesFahrenheit.This actionwouldaid in the removalof the established blockage to the coreto onceagain allownormalrecirculation injectionflow paths to becomeeffectiveat maintaining adequatecorecooling.

- lmplementation of SevereAccidentManagement Guidelines SevereAccidentManagement Guidelines (SAMG)provideadditional guidanceand actionsfor addressing inadequate core flow conditions. At BVPS-2 the SAMGsare enteredfromthe followingfunctionrestoration procedure for inadequate corecooling.

Procedure titled,"Response to Inadequate CoreCooling," whencoreexit thermocouple temperatures aregreaterthan 120AdegreesFahrenheit andactionsto coolthe coreare not successful.

L-13-176 Page8 of I The SAMGsprovidefor alternateinjectionpathsintothe reactorcoolantsystem(RCS).

SpecificSAMGsthatprovideguidancein thisareaare listedbelow.

"lnjectIntothe RCS'guideline "RCSInjection to RecoverCore"guideline The SAMGsprovidefor floodingcontainment to providefor convectivecirculation coolingof the reactor.SpecificSAMGsthatprovideguidancein thisareaare listed below.

"lnjectIntoContainment" guideline "FloodContainment" guideline "Containment WaterLevelAndVolume"guideline Althoughthesemeasuresare notexpectedto be requiredbasedon the verylow probability of an eventthatwouldresultin significantquantitiesof debrisbeing transported to the reactorvesselthatwouldinhibitthe necessary coolingof thefuel, theydo provide additionalassurance thatthe healthandsafety the publicwouldbe of protected.Thesemeasuresprovidesupportfor the extensionof timerequiredto compfetely addressGenericLetter2004-02for BVPS-2.

Conclusion The GenericSafetylssue191resolution pathfor BVPS-2is acceptable, basedon the information providedin thisdocument.The execution in this of the actionsidentified documentwillresultin successful of GenericSafetylssue191andclosureof resolution GenericLetter2044-02.

ATTACHMENT 3 L-13-176 References Page1 of 2 1 . NRCStaffReviewGuidanceRegardingGenericLetter2A04-A2 Closurein the Area of StrainerHeadLossandVortexing, datedMarch2008,AccessionNo.

M1080230038.

2 . FENOCLetterL-09-152,

Subject:

Supplemental Response to GenericLetter 2AA4-02 (TACNos.MC4665and MC4666), datedJune30,2009, Accession No.ML091830390.

3 . FENOCLetterL-10-115,

Subject:

Response to RequestforAdditionalInformation Relatedto GenericLetter2004-02(TACNos.MC4665and MC4666),dated September 28, 2010,AccessionNo.ML102770023.

4 . NRCLetter,

Subject:

NRCReviewof NuclearEnergylnstituteCleanPlant Acceptance Criteriafor Emergency CoreCoolingSystems,datedMay2,2A12, AccessionNo.ML120730181 .

5 . NRCLetter,

Subject:

Summaryof April21,2010Category1 Teleconference with FirstEnergy NuclearOperating Companyon GenericLetter 2004-02 (TACNos.

MC4665andMC4666), datedMay 18,2010,Accession No.ML101320665.

6 . Westinghouse ReportWCAP-16793-NP, Revision2, "Evaluationof Long-Term CoolingConsidering Particulate,Fibrousand ChemicalDebrisin the Recirculating Fluid,"datedOctober2011,AccessionNo.ML112924421.

7 . NRCLetter,

Subject:

FinalSafetyEvaluation for PressurizedWaterReactorOwners GroupTopicalReportWCAP-16793-NP, Revision2, Evaluationof Long-Term CoolingConsidering ParticulateFibrousand GhemicalDebrisin the Recirculating Fluid"(TACNo.ME1234), datedApril8,2013,Accession Nos.ML13084A152 and M113084A154.

8 . Pressurized WaterReactorOwnersGroupLetterOG-12-395,

Subject:

PWROwners GroupGSI-191In-Vessel DebrisProgram(PA-SEE-0312 Rev.4 and PA-SEE-4872, Revision0), datedSeptember 20, 2012,AccessionNo.ML122900033.

9 . FENOCLetterL-11-141,

Subject:

License Amendment Request10-021, Replacement of BeaverValleyPowerStationUnitNo. 1 SprayAdditiveSystemby Containment SumppH ControlSystem,datedMay27,2A11, Accession No.

ML111510646.

10.NRCLetter,

Subject:

BeaverValleyPowerStation,UnitNos.1 and2 - lssuanceof Amendments Regarding the SprayAdditiveSystemby Containment SumppH ControlSystem(TACNos.ME6352and ME6353),datedMarch14,2012, Accession No.ML120530591 .

L-13-176 Page2 of 2 11.PressurizedWaterReactorOwnersGroupLetterOG-11-291,Subject PWROwners GroupForInformationOnly- WCAP-17057-P/NP, Revision1, "GSl-191Fuel AssemblyTestReportfor PWROG,"(PA-SEE-0312, Revision2) dated October12,2011, AccessionNo.ML11293A098 12.NRCLetter,

Subject:

BeaverValley PowerStation UnitNos.1 and2 (BVPS-1and2)

Response to NRCBulletin2003-01,Potentiallmpactof DebrisBlockageon EmergencySumpRecirculation Reactors(TACNos.MB9554 at Pressurized-Water and M89555),datedSeptember 6, 2005,AccessionNo.ML052410375.

13.FENOCLetterL-08-236,

Subject:

LicenseAmendment RequestNo.08-006, Replacement of BeaverValleyPowerStationUnitNo.2 SprayAdditiveSystemby Containment SumppH ControlSystem,datedSeptember24,2008, Accession No.M1082730716.

14.FENOCLetterL-08-350, Subject.Response to Requestfor Supplemental Information RegardingContainment SprayAdditiveSystemLicenseAmendment Request(TACNos.MD9734and MD9735),datedNovember10,2008,Accession No.M1083180133.

15.NRCLetter,

Subject:

BeaverValley PowerStation,UnitNos.1 and2 - lssuanceof Amendments Re:SprayAdditiveSystemby Containment SumppH Control (TACNos.MD9734and MD9735), datedApril16,2009, Accession No.M1090780352.

ATTACHMENT 4 L-13-176 Regulatory Commitment List Page1 of 2 Thefollowinglistidentifies thoseactionscommitted to by FirstEnergy NuclearOperating Company (FENOC) for BeaverValleyPowerStation (BVPS) Unit Nos. 1 and2 in this document.Any otheractionsdiscussedin the submittalrepresent intendedor planned actionsby FENOC.Theyare describedonlyas information and are not Regulatory Commitments. -

PleasenotifyMr.ThomasA. Lentz,Manager FleetLicensing, at 330-315-6810 of anyquestionsregarding thisdocumentor associated Regulatory Commitments.

Requlatory Commitment DueDate

1. Measurements willbe takenin Thisactionwillbe accomplished preparation for insulationmodifications duringthe BVPS-1refueling outage associated withthe BVPS-1pressurizer in thefallof 2013.

safetyreliefvalveinletlines,if it is determined thatthe PWROGin-vessel effectstestingeffortdoesnot support closureof GenericSafetylssue191and GenericLetter2004-02for BVPS-1.

2. lnsulationfor the BVPS-1pressurizer Thisactionwillbe accomplished by safetyreliefvalveinletlineswillbe the end of the refueling outagein replacedor modifiedas appropriateif it is the fall af 2A16,if needed.

determined thatthe PWROGin-vessel effectstestingeffortdoesnot support closureof GenericSafetylssue191and GenericLetter2004-02for BVPS-1.

3. The finalGenericLetter2OO4-02 Within6 monthsafterthe NRC supplemental response for BVPS-1will approves, by issuanceof a safety be providedto the NRC. evaluation, the newPWROGtopical reportaddressing additional in-vesseleffectstestingeffortsthat are currentlybeingpursued.

4. UpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReport Following NRCacceptance of the changeswill be completedto updatethe finaldocketedGenericSafety currentlicensing basisfor BVPS-1as lssue191response for BVPS-1and appropriate. completion of any identified_

insulation modifications for BVPS-1 thatmay be required.

L-13-176 Page2ot 2 Requlatorv Commitment DueDate

5. TheBVPS-Iemergency operating Theseactionswillbe completed procedures willbe revisedusingrecent withinsixmonthsof thesubmittal guidance fromthe PWROGto implement dateof thisGenericSafety earlyswitchover to hotlegrecirculation lssue191resolution plan.

shouldplantparameters indicatethat coreblockage is occuning.Thisaction willbetakenpriorto transferto the existing"Response to Degraded Core Cooling'procedure. Appropriate operator trainingwillbecompleted to addressthis emergency operating procedure revision priorto implementation

6. ThefinalGenericLetter2004-02 Within6 monthsafterthe NRC supplemental response for BVPS-2will approves, by issuance of a safety be provided to the NRC. evaluation, thenewPWROGtopical reportaddressing additional in-

1,:J'",iJ":T1"3,"J,

7. UpdatedFinalSafetyAnalysisReport FollowingNRCacceptanceof the changeswill be completedto updatethe finaldocketedGenericSafety currentlicensing basisfor BVPS-2as lssue191response for BVPS-2.

appropriate.

8. The BVPS-2emergencyoperating Theseactionswill be completed procedureswill be revisedusingrecent withinsix monthsof the submittal guidancefromthe PWROGto implement date of this GenericSafety earlyswitchover to hot leg recirculation lssue191resolution plan.

should plant parameters indicatethat core blockageis occurring.This action will be takenpriorto transferto the existing'Responseto DegradedCore Cooling"procedure.Appropriateoperator trainingwill be completedto addressthis emergencyoperatingprocedurerevision priorto implementation.