Information Notice 1991-85, Potential Failures of Thermostatic Control Valves for Diesel Generator Jacket Cooling Water

From kanterella
(Redirected from Information Notice 1991-85)
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Potential Failures of Thermostatic Control Valves for Diesel Generator Jacket Cooling Water
ML031190379
Person / Time
Site: Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant, Crane  
Issue date: 12/26/1991
From: Rossi C
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
IN-91-085, NUDOCS 9112190286
Download: ML031190379 (6)


UNITED STATES

'NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

WASHINGTON, D.C.

20555

December 26, 1991

NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 91-85:

POTENTIAL FAILURES OF THERMOSTATIC CONTROL

VALVES FOR DIESEL GENERATOR JACKET COOLING

WATER

Addressees

All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power

reactors.

Purpose

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information

notice to alert addressees to the potential for failure of thermostatic control

valves for diesel generator jacket cooling water.

It is expected that recipi- ents will review the information for applicability to their facilities and

consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, sugges- tions contained in this information notice are not NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required.

Description of Circumstances

On September 10, 1991 at the Catawba Nuclear Station, Unit 2, the Duke Power

Company (the licensee3 removed emergency diesel generator (EDG) 2A from service

for minor corrective and preventive maintenance. The next day, the engine was

successfully tested for its performance in a no load condition for 5 minutes

and was shut down.

Shortly afterwards, the engine was restarted for a 1-hour

operability test. After operating the EDG for 15 minutes at full load, opera- tors observed that the engine cooling water and lube oil temperatures were

increasing abnormally. The engine oil level was checked and found to be within

normal range. After about 20 minutes, alarms for high lube oil inlet and

outlet (1750F) and high jacket water (1750F) temperatures were received.

Responding to these alarms, an operator verified that the nuclear service water

supply valve was open and that the flow was within normal range. After operat- ing for about 28 minutes, the engine tripped on a high lube oil outlet tempera- ture (2000F).

After the trip and while the engine was coasting to a stop, an

explosion occurred in the crankcase.

Upon examining the engine, the licensee

determined that a thermostatic valve in the jacket cooling water system had

failed resulting in the engine overheating, which resulted in significant

engine damage.

Further details of the event may be found in Licensee Event Report 50-414/91-10

or NRC Inspection Report 50-414/91-21.

(I:9129086

IN 91-85

December 26, 1991 Discussion

At Catawba, the cooling water system for the Transamerica Delaval DSRV-16-4

(16 cylinder) diesel generator engine supplies cooling water to the engine

jacket, the engine lube oil cooler, the combustion air after-coolers, and the

governor lube oil cooler. An engine-driven circulation pump circulates cooling

water through the closed loop system that includes a three-way thermostatic

control valve (AMOT Model 8D).

When the jacket water temperature is low, the

AMOT valve, which works similarly to the thermostat in an automobile engine, diverts diesel jacket cooling flow from the heat exchanger, which is cooled by

nuclear service water. The AMOT valve modulates open to control the tempera- ture of the diesel jacket water to about 1650F as the engine reaches operating

temperature.

Heat is transferred through the heat exchanger to the plant's

nuclear service water system.

The licensee's investigation revealed that the AMOT thermostat valve had

malfunctioned and caused the engine to overheat.

During the operability test, the AMOT valve only partially opened from the bypass position, thus allowing

the jacket and lube oil temperatures to rise above normal operating tempera- tures.

With the engine fully loaded, the temperature of the oil and water rose

to 2000F. At these elevated temperatures, the oil emitted an increased amount

of vapors. The elevated temperatures also affected the clearances between the

moving parts and reduced the oil's lubricating qualities.

The heat generated

by-th- friction-between-the-piston-and-liner--ignited-the-oil-vapors._The

-

ignition of the oil vapors caused the rapid pressure increase and the explosion

in the crankcase.

The AMOT valve malfunctioned because two of the four "power elements" (sensing

elements) in the valve had failed.

Licensee personnel examined these elements

at the licensee's metallurgical laboratory and attributed the root cause of the

failure to slow growing intergranular stress corrosion cracking.

The cracking

caused small openings that allowed the thermally active medium of the power

element to leak out.

This loss of thermally active medium directly affects the

actuating rod travel (valve stroke). The failed elements were those originally

provided with the engine in 1979.

The licensee had also found degraded power

elements during a recent inspection of the Unit 1 diesel engines.

The vendor's

documentation indicates that the power elements have a 15-year shelf life and

should be inspected at intervals of 2 to 3 years to detect and make provision

for normal wear.

The licensee's corrective actions include changing the AMOT power element

replacement schedule and evaluating changing the engine oil to a type with

increased film strength and greater stability at elevated temperatures.

Related Generic Communications

A similar failure of a thermostatic control valve, but resulting from a differ- ent failure mechanism, was discussed in NRC Information Notice 82-56,

"Robertshaw Thermostatic Flow Control Valves," December 30, 1982.

-

'\\K )

IN 91-85

December 26, 1991 This information notice requires

you have any questions about the

of the technical contacts listed

Reactor Regulation (NRR) project

no specific action or written response. If

information in this notice, please contact one

below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear

manager. .

arles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contacts:

Robert Martin, NRR

(301) 504-1493

William Orders, RII

(803) 831-2963

John Zeiler, RII

(803) 831-2963

-Attachment: -List-of Recently Issued-NRC Information Notices -

Attachment

IN 91-85 December 26, 1991 LIST OF RECENTLY

ISSUED

NRC INFORMATION

NOTICES

Information

Date of

Notice No.

Subject

Issuance

Issued to

91-84

91-83

91-18, Supp. 1

91-82

91-81

91-80

91-79

88-92, Supp. 1

91-78

Problems with Criticality

Alarm Components/Systems

Solenoid-Operated Valve

Failures Resulted in

Turbine Overspeed

High-Energy Piping Failures

Caused by Hall Thinning

Problems with Diaphragms

in Safety-Related Tanks

Switchyard Problems that

Contribute to Loss of

Offsite Power

Failure of Anchor

Head Threads on Post-

Tensioning System During

Surveillance Inspection

Deficiencies in the

Procedures for Instal- ling Therno-Lag Fire

Barrier Materials

Potential for Spent

Fuel Pool Draindown

Status Indication of

Control Power for

Circuit Breakers Used

in Safety-Related Appli- cations

12/26/91

All Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (NRC) fuel

cycle licensees, Interim

spent fuel storage licens- ees, and critical mass

licensees.

12/20/91

All holders of OLs or CPs

for nuclear power reactors.

12/18/91

All holders of OLS or CPs

for nuclear power reactors.

12/18191

All holders of OLs or CPs

1 for nuclear power reactors.

12/16/91

All holders of OLS or CPs

for nuclear power reactors.

12/11/91

All holders of OLs or CPs

for nuclear power reactors.

12/06/91

All holders of OLs or CPs

for nuclear power reactors.

11/29/91

All holders of OLs or CPs

for nuclear power reactors.

11/28/91

All holders of OLs or CPs

for nuclear power reactors.

OL - Operating License

CP

  • Construction Permit

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE, $300

FIRST CLASS MAIL

POSTAGE b FEES PAID

USNPIC

PERMIT No G 67

IN 91-85

December 26, 1991 This information notice requires

you have any questions about the

of the technical contacts listed

Reactor Regulation (NRR) project

no specific action or written response.

If

information in this notice, please contact one

below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear

manager.

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contacts:

Robert Martin, NRR

(301) 504-1493

William Orders, RII

(803) 831-2963

John Zeiler, RII

(803) 831-2963 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

  • SEE PREV OUS 4ONCURRENCES

D/ X AyRlyI

  • C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR*RPB:ADM
  • C/SPLB:DST:NRR*SELB:DST:NRR

CHBerlinger

TechEd

CEMCCracken

OPChopra

12/Z991

12/18/91

12/16/91

12/17/91

12/17/91

  • OGCB:DOEA:NRR
  • PD23:DRP:NRR
  • D/PD23:DRP:NRR*RESINSP:RII
  • SRI:RII

PCWen

REMartin

DMatthews

JZeiler

WTOrders

12/11/91

12/12/91

12/12/91

12/11/91

12/11/91 DOCUMENT NAME: IN 91-85

I

IN 91-XX

December xx, 1991

This information notice requires

you have any questions about the

of the technical contacts listed

Reactor Regulation (NRR) project

no specific action or written response. If

information in this notice, please contact one

below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear

manager.

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contacts:

Robert Martin, NRR

(301)

504-1493

William Orders, RII

(803) 831-2963

John Zeiler, RII

(803) 831-2963 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

Document Name: EDG THERMOSTATIC CONTROL

  • SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES

D/DOEA:NRR

C/OGCB:6WOAN-R*RPB:ADM

CERossi

CHBerlinger

TechEd

12/

/91

12//r/91

12/16/91

  • OGCB:DOEA:NRR
  • PD23:DRP:NRR
  • D/PD23:DRP

PCWen

REMartin

DMatthews

12/11/91

12/12/91

12/12/91 VALVE A

+

C PLB:DST:NRF

CEMCt racken

12//'//91

NRR*RESINSP:RII

JZeiler

12/11/91 I SELB:DST:NRR

OPChopra &12-.

12/X7/91

  • SRI:RII

WTOrders

12/11/91