Information Notice 1991-62, Diesel Engine Damage Caused by Hydraulic Lockup Resulting from Fluid Leakage Into Cylinders

Diesel Engine Damage Caused by Hydraulic Lockup Resulting from Fluid Leakage Into Cylinders

ML031190183
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant
Issue date:	09/30/1991
From:	Rossi C Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
IN-91-062, NUDOCS 9109240248
Download: ML031190183 (7)

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 September 30, 1991 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 91-62: DIESEL ENGINE DAMAGE CAUSED BY HYDRAULIC LOCKUP

RESULTING PROM FLUID'LEAKAGE INTO CYLINDERS

Addressees

All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power

reactors.

Purpose

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissionj(NRC) is issuing this information notice

to alert addressees to the possibility of severe damage to the emergency diesel

generator (EDG) engine caused by hydraulic lockup resulting from fluid which

has leaked into cylinders of the diesel engine. It is-expected that recipients

will review the information for'applicability to their facilities and consider

actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions

contained in this information notice are not NRC requirements; therefore, no.,..:

specific action or written response is required.

Description of Circumstances

On June 16, 1991, during a precautionary check in preparation for a routine

surveillance test of a Unit 2 emergency diesel generator (EDG), Southern

California Edison, the licensee at the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, found several pints of water in an engine cylinder. This precautionary check

allowed the licensee to avert severe engine damage. The licensee immediately

stopped the surveillance, declared the EDG inoperable, and initiated a work

order to determine the cause..'After removing the cylinder module, the licensee

found that a small leak path had slowly developed on the head gasket, allowing

the jacket 'cooling water to intrude.into the cylinder. The licensee had

operated this engine 7 days earlier without difficulty. Apparently, a suf-.

ficient amount of fluid had leaked after this previous test to partially fill

the cy-li.nder with water. The licensee determined that if the EDG had been

~9O2428ZA

IN 91-62 September 30, 1991 started on this occasion without first being checked for water in the cylin- ders, the EDG would have been severely damaged by hydraulic lockup of the

cylinder. While performing a similar precautionary check in 1987, the licensee

discovered a similar condition on a Unit 1 EDG that was caused by a cracked

cylinder. Furthermore, an EDG at the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station was

severely damaged in 1986 because it was started after water leaked into a

cylinder through a cracked cylinder wall.

Discussion

Because of the incompressible nature of water and fuel oil, the presence of

significant amounts of fluid in an engine cylinder can cause hydraulic lockup

during the compression stroke. When the force from the starter and other

firing cylinders tries to overcome this lockup, the engine could be severely

damaged. The fluid can come from a number of sources such as a leaking head

gasket, a cracked cylinder or head, or a defective fuel injector or lube oil

system. EDG vendors such as Transamerica Delaval, Incorporated (TDI

Instruction Manual, Volume 1, Model DSRV-20-4 Diesel Engine/Generator, page 4-2) and the General Motors Company, Electro-Motive Division (GM/EMD

Scheduled Maintenance Program, Stationary Power Units with Turbocharged

Engines, Maintenance Instruction 1728, Revision C, November 1977), have

recognized the significance of this hazard and have recommended that their

clients first check for fluid in the cylinders before starting the engine if

the-engine-has -been-shut-down-and-coo-led-for-aprolonged-periokd The- NRC

has discussed this problem with experienced diesel engine operators and

understands that this is also a common practice in non-nuclear industries.

To prepare the engine for each surveillance start, the operators at San Onofre

lock out the engine's automatic-start feature, open the indicator petcocks

(test valves) on all cylinders, and rotate the engine slowly to check for

fluid in the cylinders. After verifying the absence of fluid in the cylinders, the operators start the EDG. The NRC conducted an informal survey of resident

inspectors at plants of other NRC licensees and found that not all NRC

licensees are following this practice, possibly because the EDG becomes tempo- rarily inoperable while it is locked out with the cylinder petcocks open.

The NRC has also addressed this issue in its "Safety Evaluation Report Related

to the Operability and Reliability of Emergency Diesel Generators Manufactured

by Transamerica Delaval, Inc.," NUREG-1216, August 1986, beginning on page B-4, and in a contract study "Review of Resolution of Known Problems in Engine

Components for Transamerica Delaval Inc. Emergency Diesel Generators," PNL-5600,

December 1985, on page 4.160. These documents are available in the NRC Public

Document Room at 2120 L Street N.W., Washington, D.C. 20555.

IN 91-62 ^.

September 30, 1991 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If

you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact one

of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear

Reactor Regulation project manager.

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Even ssessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contacts: Andrew Hon, RV

(714) 492-2641 Peter Prescott, NRR

(301) 492-1011 Vern Hodge, NRR

(301) 492-1861 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices -

Attachsent

IN 91-62 Septeber 30, 1991 LIST OF RECEINTLY ISSUED

IlRt IFORIATION NOTICES.

Imforertion Date of

Rotice No. Subject Issuance Issued to

9141 Preliminary Results of 09/30/91 All holders of OLs or CPs

telidation Testing of for nuclear power reactors

Motor-O ated Valve and metor-operated valve

Diagnostic Equipment (NOV)diagnostic equiprent

vendors identified herein.

91-60 False Alarms of Alarm 09/24/91 All Nuclear Regulatory Com- Aat ters Because of mission (NRC licensees

Radiofrquency Inter- authorized to ase sealed

ference sources for Industrial

radioragphy.

91-59 Probles with Access 09/23/91 All holders of OLs or CPs

Authorization Progres for nuclear power reactors.

91-58 Dependency of Offset 09/20/91 All holders of OLs or CPs

Disc Butterfly Valve s for nuclear power reactors.

Operation on Orientation

with Respect to Flow

9147 Operational Exparience 09/19/91 All holders of OLs or CPs

on Bus Transfers for nuclear power reactors.

91-56 Potential Radioactive 09/19/91 All holders of OLs or CPs

Leakage to Tank Vented for nuclear power reactors.

to Atmosphere

91-65 Failures Causedby An 09/16/91 All holders of OLs or CPs

Improperly Adjusted Test for nuclear power reactors.

Link In 4.16 KYGeneral

Electric Switchgear

• 5-18 Failures of lndervoltage 09/10/91 All holders of OLsor CPsfor

Supp. I Output Circuit Boards In Westinghouse (i)-designed

the Mestinghouse4esigted nuclear power reactors.

Solid State Protection

Systse

914 Feresn Experience Regard- 09/06/91 All holders of OLsor CPs

Ing moron Dilution for pressurized water

reactors (PWRs).

DL

• perating License

CF

• Ce straction Permit

IN 91-XX

S-eptember xx, 1991

_,Ege 2 of 2 Discussion

Because of the incompressible nature of water and fuel oil, the presence of

significant amounts of fluid in an engine cylinder can cause hydraulic lockup

during the compression stroke. When the force from the starter and other

firing cylinders tries to overcome this lockup, the engine could be severely

damaged. The fluid can come from a number of sources such as a leaking head

gasket, a cracked cylinder or head, or a defective fuel injector or lube oil

system. EDG vendors such as Transatnerica Delaval, Incorporated (TDI) and the

General Motors Company, Electro-Motive Division (GM/EMD), have recognized the

significance of this hazard and have recommended that their clients first check

for fluid in the cylinders before starting the engine if the engine has been

shut down and cooled for a prolonged period (8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> or more). This is also a

common practice among EDG users in non-nuclear industries.

To prepare the engine for each surveillance start, the operators at San Onofre

lock out the engine's automatic-start feature, open the indicator petcocks

(test valves) on all cylinders, and rotate the engine slowly to check for

fluid in the cylinders. After verifying the absence of fluid in the cylinders, the operators start the EDG. The NRC conducted an informal survey of resident

inspectors at plants of other NRC licensees and found that not all NRC

licensees are following this practice, possibly because the EDG becomes tempo- rarily inoperable while it is locked out with the cylinder petcocks open.

The NRC has also addressed this issue in its "Safety Evaluation Report Related

to the Operability and Reliability of Emergency Diesel Generators Manufactured

by Transamerica Delaval, Inc.," NUREG-1216, August 1986, beginning on page B-4, and in a contract study "Review of Resolution of Known Problems in Engine

Components for Transamerica Delaval Inc. Emergency Diesel Generators,"

PNL-5600, December 1985, on page 4.160.

This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If

you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact one

of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear

Reactor Regulation project manager.

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contacts: Andrew Hon, RV

(714) 492-2641 Peter Prescott, NRR

(301) 492-1011 Vern Hodge, NRR

(301) 492-1861 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

• SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES Document Name: INFO NOTICE - HON, HODGE

D/DOEA:NRR C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR*RPB:ADM D/DLPQ:NRR

CERossi CHBerlinger TechEd JWRoe

09/ /91 09/ /91 09/17/91 09/ /91

• OGCB:DOEA:NRR*RI/RV *SC/RV LPEB:DLPQ:NRR C/LPEB:DLPQ:NRR

CVHodge AHon PJohnson PPrescott4"O EWBrach

09/17/91 09/17/91 09/18/91 09/l'7/91 09/ /91

IN 91-XX

September xx, 1991 during the compression stroke. When the force from the starter and other

firing cylinders tries to overcome this lockup, the engine could be severely

damaged. The fluid can come from a number of sources such as a leaking head

gasket, a cracked cylinder or head, or a defective fuel injector or lube oil

system. EDG vendors such as Transamerica Delaval, Incorporated (TDI) and the

General Motors Company, Electro-Motive Division (GM/EMD), have recognized the

significance of this hazard and have recommended that their clients first check

for fluid in the cylinders before starting the engine if the engine has been

shut down and cooled for a prolonged period (8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> or more). This is also a

common practice among EDG users in non-nuclear industries.

To prepare the engine for each surveillance start, the operator at San Onofre

locked the engine's automatic-start feature, opened the indicator petcocks

(test valves) on all cylinders, and rotated the engine slowly to check for

fluid in the cylinders. After verifying the absence of fluid in the cylinders, the operator started the EDG. The NRC conducted an informal survey of resident

inspectors at plants of other NRC licensees and found that not all NRC

licensees are following this practice, possibly because the EDG becomes tempo- rarily inoperable while it is locked with the cylinder petcocks open.

The NRC has also addressed this issue in its "Safety Evaluation Report Related

to the Operability and Reliability of Emergency Diesel Generators Manufactured

by Transamerica Delaval, Inc.," NUREG-1216, August 1986, beginning on page B-4, and in a contract study "Review of Resolution of Known Problems in Engine

Components for Transamerica Delaval Inc. Emergency Diesel Generators,"

PNL-5600, December 1985, on page 4.160.

This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If

you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact one

of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear

Reactor Regulation project manager.

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contacts: Andrew Hon, RV

(714) 492-2641 Peter Prescott, NRR

(301) 492-1011 Vern Hodge, NRR

(301) 492-1861 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

Document Name: INFO NOTICE - HON, HODGE

D/DOEA:NRR C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR RPB:ADM D/DLPQ:NRR

CERossi CHBerlinger TechEd :1'fa;n97hAJWRoe

09/ /9 1 mJi 0 9 / /91 09 f9/91 09/ /91 OGCB:DOEA zRR RI/RV'R'V. , eSC/RV  ?

'EftttfA EB:DLPQ:NRR C/LPEB:DLPQ:NRR

CVHodge i AHon 4 PJohnson A PPrescott EWBrach

09/tl/91 09//7/91 09/18/91 09/ /91 09/ /91

IN 91-62 September 30, 1991 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If

you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact one

of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear

Reactor Regulation project manager.

./,Aharles E. Rossi, d Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contacts: Andrew Hon, RV

(714) 492-2641 Peter Prescott, NRR

(301) 492-1011 Vern Hodge, NRR

(301) 492-1861 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

• SEE PREVIOUS CON R

D/dQR:t *C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR*RPB:ADM D/DLPQ:NRR

CERosifo CHBerlinger TechEd JWRoe

09 1 09/23/91 09/17/91 09/ /91

• OGCB:DOEA:NRR*RI V *SC/RV *LPEB:DLPQ:NRR C/LPEB:DLPQ:NRR

CVHodge AHon PJohnson PPrescott EWBrach

09/17/91 09/17/91 09/18/91 09/19/91 09/ /91 DOCUMENT NAME: IN 91-62

IN 91-XX

September xx, 1991 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If

you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact one

of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear

Reactor Regulation project manager.

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contacts: Andrew Hon, RV

(714) 492-2641 Peter Prescott, NRR

(301) 492-1011 Vern Hodge, NRR

(301) 492-1861 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

Document Name: INFO NOTICE - HON, HODGE

• SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES ( 4I--

D/DOEA:NRR C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR*RPB:ADM D(;3SQ:.NRR lac

CERossi CHBerlinger TechEd JWRV)n

09/ /91 09/43/91 09/17/91

• OGCB:DOEA:NRR*RI/RV *SC/RV *LPEB:DLPQ:NRR C 4 /r LPQ:NRR

CVHodge AHon PJohnson PPrescott E9/i9

09/17/91 09/17/91 09/18/91 09/19/91