Information Notice 1991-59, Problems with Access Authorization Programs
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555
September 23, 1991 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 91-59: PROBLEMS WITH ACCESS AUTHORIZATION PROGRAMS
Addressees
All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power
reactors.
Purpose
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice
to alert addressees to two areas of continuing problems with access authoriza- tion programs. One area involves licensee contractors or subcontractors not
completing the requirements for background investigations or falsifying records;
the other involves the improper administration or compromise of psychological
tests.
It is expected that recipients will review the information for appli- cability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid
similar problems. However, suggestions contained in this information notice
are not NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is
required.
Description of Circumstances
In recent months, the NRC has received numerous reports and allegations that
some licensee contractors or subcontractors have certified individuals as
satisfactorily meeting the licensee's requirements for background investiga- tions without completing all required residence, employment, education, or
reference checks. One contractor certified to a licensee that an employee was
suitable for unescorted site access before receiving a response to an investi- gative inquiry initiated in accordance with the licensee's approved security
plan. The contractor subsequently received derogatory information in response
to the inquiry that would have led to the denial of access but did not act upon
the information. The licensee discovered the information when reviewing the
contractor's screening files and immediately suspended the employee's unescorted
access. The access was later withdrawn because of the information. This event
and similar problems in the past have prompted the licensee to require copies
of all contractor and subcontractor background investigations and to perform
the adjudication reviews to determine access suitability instead of accepting
the contractors' or subcontractors' determinations. Similar screening problems
have prompted other licensees to require copies of all derogatory information
developed from background investigations conducted by their contractors or
subcontractors.
91* 10114
IN 91-59 September 23, 1991 The NRC has also recently received numerous reports concerning licensee con- tractors or subcontractors who have provided false certification regarding the
length of time individuals had been employed.
In one case, a union business
agent (BA) certified to a licensee that certain individuals had been members of
the union for 3 years and, to the best of the BA's knowledge, had shown no
adverse character traits.
The certification qualified the individuals for an
exemption from background screening requirements as set forth in the licensee's
approved security plan because of the BA's personal knowledge of the individ- uals resulting from the length of union membership.
The licensee subsequently
discovered that the BA had falsified the certification.
None of the individuals
had been members of the union for 3 years, and in fact, were not even members
of the BA's union local.
Licensees identified some of these problems when auditing contractor or sub- contractor programs.
One effective audit technique used was telephone contact
with the applicant's previous employers and references to verify information
supplied by the contractor or subcontractor doing the screening.
In addition to receiving reports of problems with background investigations, the
NRC has received allegations that some licensee contractors and subcontractors
have improperly administered or deliberately compromised psychological tests, or have falsified the results of such tests.
Some of the allegations were
similar to cases discussed in IN 88-91, "Improper Administration and Control of
Psychological Tests," in that individuals allegedly completed tests in unproc- tored settings.
In one case, an individual allegedly took a psychological test
for employment at a nuclear facility in a motel room in which someone called
out the "correct" answers to produce the desired profile.
It was also alleged
that some falsification of test results occurred because contractors exerted
pressure on subcontractors to have certain numbers of craft workers certified
as acceptable by certain dates for licensees during reactor outages.
Discussion
The NRC has issued IE Circular 78-17, "Inadequate Guard Training/Qualification
and Falsified Training Records," October 13, 1978; IE Circular 79-03, "Inade- quate Guard Training/Qualification and Falsified Records," February 23, 1979;
Information Notice (IN) 82-07, "Inadequate Security Screening Programs,"
March 16, 1982; IN 83-15, "Falsified Pre-Employment Screening Records,"
March 23, 1983; IN 87-64, "Conviction for Falsification of Security Training
Records," December 22, 1987; IN 88-26, "Falsified Pre-Employment Screening
Records," May 16, 1988; and IN 88-91, "Improper Administration and Control
of Psychological Tests," November 22, 1988.
These documents alerted addressees
IN 91-59 September 23, 1991 to the possibility that contractors might submit falsified records to meet
licensees' commitments to the NRC, identified weaknesses in the administration
and control of psychological tests used in personnel screening programs, and
reminded licensees of the importance of adequate program audits.
On April 25, 1991, the NRC published Section 73.56 of Title 10 of the Code
of Federal Regulations (10 CFR 73.56), "Personnel Access Authorization
Requirements for Nuclear Power Plants" (Access Authorization Rule) to provide
increased assurance that individuals granted unescorted access to protected
and vital areas are trustworthy and reliable and do not pose a threat to
commit radiological sabotage.
Under the provisions of 10 CFR 73.56(a)(4),
licensees may accept an access authorization program, or part of a program, used by its contractors or vendors for their employees provided it meets the
rule requirements. Clear specification of screening requirements in the work
contract is an effective method to safeguard against inadequate access
authorization programs. Under the provisions of 10 CFR 73.56(g)(2), each
licensee who accepts the access authorization program of a contractor or
vendor must audit the program every 12 months to ensure that the requirements
of the Access Authorization Rule, as specified in their approved security
plan, are met.
Some licensees have committed to ensuring nuclear security
expertise on their audit and assessment teams.
Failure to ensure that a proper access authorization program is conducted
could compromise nuclear safety. The NRC can take enforcement action in cases
in which licensees fail, whether intentionally or unintentionally, to meet
security program plan commitments regarding their access authorization program.
Furthermore, intentional violations may subject corporations, the individual
wrongdoer, and others who knew and condoned such acts to criminal prosecution.
In IN 85-97, "Jail Term For Former Contractor Employee Who
Intent
ionally
Falsified Welding Inspection Records," IN 86-54, "Criminal Prosecution of a
Former Radiation Safety Officer Who Willfully Directed an Unqualified Indivi- dual to Perform Radiography," and IN 87-64, "Conviction For Falsification of
Security Training Records," the NRC stated that the criminal sanctions avail- able may include a fine and/or imprisonment.
On August 15, 1991, a final rule was published regarding misconduct by
unlicensed persons (56 FR 40684). This rule amended the Commission's
regulations "to put on notice all persons whose actions relate to a
licensee's activities subject to NRC regulation, that they may be subject
to civil enforcement action for deliberate misconduct" that causes the
licensee to be in violation. Periodically informing contractors, sub- contractors, and vendors that they may be subject to criminal prosecution
for intentional wrongdoing may also be a deterrent against deliberate
compromise of background screening programs.
IN 91-59 September 23, 1991 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact the
technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation project manager.
har es E.
l's1, Director
Division of Operational Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contact:
Nancy Ervin, NRR
(301) 492-0946 Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
Attachment
September 23, 1991 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED
NRC INFORMATION NOTICES
Information
Date of
Notice No.
Subject
Issuance
Issued to
91-58
91-57
91-56
91-55
Dependency of Offset
Disc Butterfly Valve's
Operation on Orientation
with Respect to Flow
Operational Experience
on Bus Transfers
Potential Radioactive
Leakage to Tank Vented
to Atmosphere
Failures Caused by An
Improperly Adjusted Test
Link In 4.16 KV General
Electric Switchgear
Failures of Undervoltage
Output Circuit Boards In
the Westinghouse-Designed
Solid State Protection
System
Foreign Experience Regard- ing Boron Dilution
Pressurizer Safety Valve
Lift Setpoint Shift
Failure of Remote Shutdown
System Instrumentation
Because of Incorrectly
Installed Components
09/20/91
All holders of OLs or CPs
for nuclear power reactors.
09/19/91
All holders of OLs or CPs
for nuclear power reactors.
09/19/91
All holders of OLs or CPs
for nuclear power reactors.
09/16/91
All holders of OLs or CPs
for nuclear power reactors.
09/10/91
All holders of OLs or CPs for
Westinghouse (W)-designed
nuclear power reactors.
09/06/91
All holders of OLs or CPs
for pressurized water
reactors (PWRs).
09/05/91
All holders of OLs or CPs
for nuclear power reactors.
09/04/91
All holders of OLs or CPs
for nuclear power reactors.
85-18, Supp. 1
91-54
89-90,
Supp. 2
91-53 OL = Operating License
CP = Construction Permit
I
'_ _
IN 91-59 September 23, 1991 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact the
technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office' of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation project manager.
Original Signed Fiy
Charles qrkbftf9Sdirector
Division of Operational Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contact:
Nancy Ervin, NRR
(301) 492-0946 Attachment:
List of Recently
Issued NRC Information Notices
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Docu enT Name:
IN-91-5
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IN 91-XX
August XX, 1991 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact the
technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation project manager.
Charles E. Rossi, Director
Division of Operational Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical Contact:
Nancy Ervin, NRR
(301) 492-0946 Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
Distribution:
Central Files
RSGB r/f
DRIS r/f
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WRussell
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JLieberman
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NEErvin
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OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
Document Name: IN 91XX
IN 91-XX
August XX, 1991 logical sabotage. Under the provisions of 10 CFR 73.56(a)(4), licensees may
accept an access authorization program, or part of a program, used by its con- tractors or vendors for their employees provided it meets the rule requirements.
Clear specification of screening requirements in the work contract is an
effective method to safeguard against inadequate access authorization programs.
Under the provisions of 10 CFR 73.56(g)(2), each licensee who accepts the access
authorization program of a contractor or vendor must audit the program every
12 months to ensure that the requirments. of the Access Authorization rule, as
specified in their approved security plan, are met.
Some licensees have com- mitted to ensuring nuclear security expertise on their audit and assessment teams.
Failure to ensure that a proper access authorization program is conducted could
compromise nuclear safety. The NRC can take enforcement action in cases in
which licensees fail, whether intentionally or unintentionally, to meet security
program plan commitments regarding their access authorization program. Further- more, intentional violations may subject corporations, the individual wrongdoer, and others who knew and condoned such acts to criminal prosecution. In
IN 85-97, "Jail Term For Former Contractor Employee Who
Intent
ionally Falsified
Welding Inspection Records," IN 86-54, "Criminal Prosecution of a Former
Radiation Safety Officer Who Willfully Directed an Unqualified Individual to
Perform Radiography," and IN 87-64, "Conviction For Falsification of Security
Training Records," the NRC stated that the criminal sanctions available may
include a fine and/or imprisonment.
Periodically informing contractors, subcontractors, and vendors that they may
be subject to criminal prosecution for intentional wrongdoing may be a deterrent
against deliberate compromise of background screening programs.
No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.
If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the technical
contact listed below or the appropriate regional office.
Charles E. Rossi, Director
Division of Operational Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical Contact:
Nancy Ervin, NRR
(301) 492-0946 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
Distribution:
See next page
- SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE
OFC
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OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
Document Name: IN 91XX
IN 91-XX
August XX, 1991 logical sabotage. Under the provisions of 10 CFR 73.56(a)(4), licensees may
accept an access authorization program, or part of a program, used by its con- tractors or vendors for their employees provided it meets the rule requirements.
Clear specification of screening requirements in the work contract is an
effective method to safeguard against inadequate access authorization programs.
Under the provisions of 10 CFR 73.56(g)(2), each licensee who accepts the access
authorization program of a contractor or vendor must audit the program every
12 months to ensure that the requirments of the Access Authorization rule, as
specified in their approved security plan, are met.
Some licensees have com- mitted to ensuring nuclear security expertise on their audit and assessment teams.
Failure to ensure that a proper access author iation program is conducted could
compromise ny
he NRC k Aefenforcement action in cases in
which licensees iase
fai
to meet security program plan commitments regarding
thefr access authorizati
program because ef inattention to detail, human error, or other unintentional acts.
yiolations caused by intentional4-tes may subject
corporations, the individual irongdoer, and others who knew and condoned such
acts to criminal prosecution. In IN 85-97, "Jail Term For Former Contractor
Employee Who
Intent
ionally Fal ified Welding Inspection Records," IN 86-54,
"Criminal Prosecution of a For er Radiation Safety Officer Who Willfully Directed
an Unqualified Individual to Pe form Radiography," and IN 87-64, "Conviction For
Falsification of Security Train g Records," the NRC stated that the criminal
sanctions available may include
fine and/or imprisonment.
Periodically informing contractors subcontractors, and vendors that they may
be subject to criminal prosecution or intentional wrongdoing may be a deterrent
against deliberate compromise of ba ground screening programs.
No specific action or written respons is required by this information notice.
If you have any questions about this m tter, please contact the technical
contact listed below or the appropriate egional office.
Cha les E. Rossi, Director
\\ A4I
Divi ion of Operational Events Assessment
Offic of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical Contact:
Nancy rvin, NRR
(301) 492-0946 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
Distribution:
SKee next page
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- SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE
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Document Name: IN 91XX
I
4 IN 91-XX
April XX, 1991 Records," 86-54, Criminal Prosecution of a Former Radiation Safety Officer
Who Willfully Directed an Unqualified Individual to Perform Radiography,"
and 87-64, "Conviction For Falsification of Security Training Records," the
NRC stated that the criminal sanctions available may include a fine and/or
imprisonment. Periodically informing contractors, subcontractors, and vendors
that they may be subject to criminal prosecution for intentional wrongdoing
may be an effective deterrent against deliberate compromise of background
screening programs.
No specific action or written response is required by
this information notice. If you have any questions about this matter, please
contact the technical contact listed below or the Regional Administrator of
the appropriate regional office.
Charles E. Rossi, Director
Division of Operational Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical Contact:
Nancy Ervin, NRR
(301) 492-0946 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
Distribution:
RSUB r/f
DRIS r/f
JGPartlow
WRussell
CBerlinger
JLieberman
RFonner
BKGrimes
PMcKee
LBush
NErvin
Central Files
- SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE
OFC
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DATE :5/ /91
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Document Name: IN 91XX 2
IN 91-XX
August XX, 1991 No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.
If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the technical
contact listed below or the appropriate regional office.
Charles E. Rossi, Director
Division of Operational Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical Contact:
Nancy Ervin, NRR
(301) 492-0946 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
Distribution:
Central Files
RSGB r/f
DRIS r/f
JGPartlow
WRussell
CBerlinger
JLieberman
RFonner
BKGrimes
PMcKee
LBush
NEErvin
- SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE
OFC
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- TECH ED
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DATE :8/ / 1
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IN 91XX