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Category:NRC Information Notice
MONTHYEARInformation Notice 2010-12, Intervenors' Fifth Motion to Amend And/Or Supplement Proposed Contention No. 5 (Shield Building Cracking). Appendix VI: NRC FOIA Responses (B-51 Through B-53); Turkey Point Event Report; NRC Information Notic2012-08-17017 August 2012 Intervenors' Fifth Motion to Amend And/Or Supplement Proposed Contention No. 5 (Shield Building Cracking). Appendix VI: NRC FOIA Responses (B-51 Through B-53); Turkey Point Event Report; NRC Information Notice 2010-12: Containment Liner Cor Information Notice 2010-12, Intervenors' Fifth Motion to Amend and/or Supplement Proposed Contention No. 5 (Shield Building Cracking). Appendix VI: NRC FOIA Responses (B-51 Through B-53); Turkey Point Event Report; NRC Information Notice 2010-12: Contain2012-08-17017 August 2012 Intervenors' Fifth Motion to Amend and/or Supplement Proposed Contention No. 5 (Shield Building Cracking). Appendix VI: NRC FOIA Responses (B-51 Through B-53); Turkey Point Event Report; NRC Information Notice 2010-12: Containment Liner Cor Information Notice 2010-12, Intervenors' Fifth Motion to Amend and/or Supplement Proposed Contention No. 5 (Shield Building Cracking). Appendix VI: NRC FOIA Responses (B-51 Through B-53); Turkey Point Event Report; NRC Information Notice 2010-12: Con2012-08-17017 August 2012 Intervenors' Fifth Motion to Amend and/or Supplement Proposed Contention No. 5 (Shield Building Cracking). Appendix VI: NRC FOIA Responses (B-51 Through B-53); Turkey Point Event Report; NRC Information Notice 2010-12: Containment Liner Cor Information Notice 2002-13, E-mail from H. Nieh, Oedo to A. Levin, Ocm, Et Al., Issuance of Information Notice 2002-13, Fwd: E-mail from D. Pickett T Davis-Besse Communication Plan2002-04-0404 April 2002 E-mail from H. Nieh, Oedo to A. Levin, Ocm, Et Al., Issuance of Information Notice 2002-13, Fwd: E-mail from D. Pickett T Davis-Besse Communication Plan Information Notice 2002-11, Recent Experience with Degradation of Reactor Pressure Vessel Head2002-03-12012 March 2002 Recent Experience with Degradation of Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Information Notice 1999-28, Recall of Star Brand Fire Protection Sprinkler Heads1999-09-30030 September 1999 Recall of Star Brand Fire Protection Sprinkler Heads Information Notice 1999-27, Malfunction of Source Retraction Mechanism in Cobalt-60 Teletherapy Treatment Units1999-09-0202 September 1999 Malfunction of Source Retraction Mechanism in Cobalt-60 Teletherapy Treatment Units Information Notice 1999-26, Safety and Economic Consequences of Misleading Marketing Information1999-08-24024 August 1999 Safety and Economic Consequences of Misleading Marketing Information Information Notice 1999-25, Year 2000 Contingency Planning Activities1999-08-10010 August 1999 Year 2000 Contingency Planning Activities Information Notice 1999-24, Broad-Scope Licensees' Responsibilities for Reviewing and Approving Unregistered Sealed Sources and Devices1999-07-12012 July 1999 Broad-Scope Licensees' Responsibilities for Reviewing and Approving Unregistered Sealed Sources and Devices Information Notice 1999-23, Safety Concerns Related to Repeated Control Unit Failures of the Nucletron Classic Model High-Dose-Rate Remote Afterloading Brachytherapy Devices1999-07-0606 July 1999 Safety Concerns Related to Repeated Control Unit Failures of the Nucletron Classic Model High-Dose-Rate Remote Afterloading Brachytherapy Devices Information Notice 1999-22, 10CFR 34.43(a)(1); Effective Date for Radiographer Certification and Plans for Enforcement Discretion1999-06-25025 June 1999 10CFR 34.43(a)(1); Effective Date for Radiographer Certification and Plans for Enforcement Discretion Information Notice 1999-21, Recent Plant Events Caused by Human Performance Errors1999-06-25025 June 1999 Recent Plant Events Caused by Human Performance Errors Information Notice 1999-20, Contingency Planning for the Year 2000 Computer Problem1999-06-25025 June 1999 Contingency Planning for the Year 2000 Computer Problem Information Notice 1999-19, Rupture of the Shell Side of a Feedwater Heater at the Point Beach Nuclear Plant1999-06-23023 June 1999 Rupture of the Shell Side of a Feedwater Heater at the Point Beach Nuclear Plant Information Notice 1999-18, Update on Nrc'S Year 2000 Activities for Material Licensees and Fuel Cycle Licensees and Certificate Holders1999-06-14014 June 1999 Update on Nrc'S Year 2000 Activities for Material Licensees and Fuel Cycle Licensees and Certificate Holders Information Notice 1999-17, Problems Associated with Post-Fire Safe-Shutdown Circuit Analyses1999-06-0303 June 1999 Problems Associated with Post-Fire Safe-Shutdown Circuit Analyses Information Notice 1999-16, Federal Bureau of Investigation'S Nuclear Site Security Program1999-05-28028 May 1999 Federal Bureau of Investigation'S Nuclear Site Security Program Information Notice 1999-15, Misapplication for 10CFR Part 71 Transportation Shipping Cask Licensing Basis to 10CFR Part 50 Design Basis1999-05-27027 May 1999 Misapplication for 10CFR Part 71 Transportation Shipping Cask Licensing Basis to 10CFR Part 50 Design Basis Information Notice 1999-14, Unanticipated Reactor Water Draindown at Quad Cities Unit 2, Arkansas Nuclear One Unit 2, & FitzPatrick1999-05-0505 May 1999 Unanticipated Reactor Water Draindown at Quad Cities Unit 2, Arkansas Nuclear One Unit 2, & FitzPatrick Information Notice 1999-13, Insights from NRC Inspections of Low-and Medium-Voltage Circuit Breaker Maintenance Programs1999-04-29029 April 1999 Insights from NRC Inspections of Low-and Medium-Voltage Circuit Breaker Maintenance Programs Information Notice 1999-12, Year 2000 Computer Systems Readiness Audits1999-04-28028 April 1999 Year 2000 Computer Systems Readiness Audits Information Notice 1999-11, Incidents Involving the Use of Radioactive Iodine-1311999-04-16016 April 1999 Incidents Involving the Use of Radioactive Iodine-131 Information Notice 1999-08, Urine Specimen Adulteration1999-03-26026 March 1999 Urine Specimen Adulteration Information Notice 1999-09, Problems Encountered When Manually Editing Treatment Data on the Nucletron Microselectron-HDR (New) Model 105-9991999-03-24024 March 1999 Problems Encountered When Manually Editing Treatment Data on the Nucletron Microselectron-HDR (New) Model 105-999 Information Notice 1999-07, Failed Fire Protection Deluge Valves & Potential Testing Deficiencies in Preaction Sprinkler Systems1999-03-22022 March 1999 Failed Fire Protection Deluge Valves & Potential Testing Deficiencies in Preaction Sprinkler Systems Information Notice 1999-06, 1998 Enforcement Sanctions as a Result of Deliberate Violations of NRC Employee Protection Requirements1999-03-19019 March 1999 1998 Enforcement Sanctions as a Result of Deliberate Violations of NRC Employee Protection Requirements Information Notice 1999-06, 1998 Enforcement Sanctions As a Result of Deliberate Violations of NRC Employee Protection Requirements1999-03-19019 March 1999 1998 Enforcement Sanctions As a Result of Deliberate Violations of NRC Employee Protection Requirements Information Notice 1999-05, Inadvertent Discharge of Carbon Dioxide Fire Protection System and Gas Migration1999-03-0808 March 1999 Inadvertent Discharge of Carbon Dioxide Fire Protection System and Gas Migration Information Notice 1999-04, Unplanned Radiation Exposures to Radiographers, Resulting from Failures to Follow Proper Radiation Safety Procedures1999-03-0101 March 1999 Unplanned Radiation Exposures to Radiographers, Resulting from Failures to Follow Proper Radiation Safety Procedures Information Notice 1999-03, Exothermic Reactors Involving Dried Uranium Oxide Powder (Yellowcake)1999-01-29029 January 1999 Exothermic Reactors Involving Dried Uranium Oxide Powder (Yellowcake) Information Notice 1999-02, Guidance to Users on the Implementation of a New Single-Source Dose-Calculation Formalism and Revised Air-Kerma Strength Standard for Iodine-125 Sealed Sources1999-01-21021 January 1999 Guidance to Users on the Implementation of a New Single-Source Dose-Calculation Formalism and Revised Air-Kerma Strength Standard for Iodine-125 Sealed Sources Information Notice 1999-01, Deterioration of High-Efficiency Particulate Air Filters in a Pressurized Water Reactor Containment Fan Cooler Unit1999-01-20020 January 1999 Deterioration of High-Efficiency Particulate Air Filters in a Pressurized Water Reactor Containment Fan Cooler Unit Information Notice 1998-45, Cavitation Erosion of Letdown Line Orifices Resulting in Fatigue Cracking of Pipe Welds1998-12-15015 December 1998 Cavitation Erosion of Letdown Line Orifices Resulting in Fatigue Cracking of Pipe Welds Information Notice 1998-44, Ten-Year Inservice Inspection (ISI) Program Update for Licensees That Intend to Implement Risk-Informed ISI of Piping1998-12-10010 December 1998 Ten-Year Inservice Inspection (ISI) Program Update for Licensees That Intend to Implement Risk-Informed ISI of Piping Information Notice 1998-43, Leaks in Emergency Diesel Generator Lubricating Oil & Jacket Cooling Water Piping1998-12-0404 December 1998 Leaks in Emergency Diesel Generator Lubricating Oil & Jacket Cooling Water Piping Information Notice 1998-42, Implementation of 10 CFR 55.55a(g) Inservice Inspection Requirements1998-12-0101 December 1998 Implementation of 10 CFR 55.55a(g) Inservice Inspection Requirements Information Notice 1998-41, Spurious Shutdown of Emergency Diesel Generators from Design Oversight1998-11-20020 November 1998 Spurious Shutdown of Emergency Diesel Generators from Design Oversight Information Notice 1998-41, Spurious Shutdown of Emergency Diesel Generators From Design Oversight1998-11-20020 November 1998 Spurious Shutdown of Emergency Diesel Generators From Design Oversight Information Notice 1998-39, Summary of Fitness-for-Duty Program Performance Reports for Calendar Years 1996 and 19971998-10-30030 October 1998 Summary of Fitness-for-Duty Program Performance Reports for Calendar Years 1996 and 1997 Information Notice 1998-40, Design Deficiencies Can Lead to Reduced ECCS Pump Net Positive Suction Head During Design-Basis Accidents1998-10-26026 October 1998 Design Deficiencies Can Lead to Reduced ECCS Pump Net Positive Suction Head During Design-Basis Accidents Information Notice 1990-66, Incomplete Draining and Drying of Shipping Casks1998-10-25025 October 1998 Incomplete Draining and Drying of Shipping Casks Information Notice 1998-38, Metal-Clad Circuit Breaker Maintenance Issues Identified by NRC Inspections1998-10-15015 October 1998 Metal-Clad Circuit Breaker Maintenance Issues Identified by NRC Inspections Information Notice 1998-37, Eligibility of Operator License Applicants1998-10-0101 October 1998 Eligibility of Operator License Applicants Information Notice 1998-36, Inadequate or Poorly Controlled, Non-Safety-Related Maintenance Activities Unnecessarily Challenged Safety Systems1998-09-18018 September 1998 Inadequate or Poorly Controlled, Non-Safety-Related Maintenance Activities Unnecessarily Challenged Safety Systems Information Notice 1998-34, Configuration Control Errors1998-08-28028 August 1998 Configuration Control Errors Information Notice 1998-33, NRC Regulations Prohibit Agreements That Restrict or Discourage an Employee from Participating in Protected Activities1998-08-28028 August 1998 NRC Regulations Prohibit Agreements That Restrict or Discourage an Employee from Participating in Protected Activities Information Notice 1998-31, Fire Protection System Design Deficiencies and Common-Mode Flooding of Emergency Core Cooling System Rooms at Washington Nuclear Project Unit 21998-08-18018 August 1998 Fire Protection System Design Deficiencies and Common-Mode Flooding of Emergency Core Cooling System Rooms at Washington Nuclear Project Unit 2 Information Notice 1998-30, Effect of Year 2000 Computer Problem on NRC Licensees and Certificate Holders1998-08-12012 August 1998 Effect of Year 2000 Computer Problem on NRC Licensees and Certificate Holders Information Notice 1998-29, Predicted Increase in Fuel Rod Cladding Oxidation1998-08-0303 August 1998 Predicted Increase in Fuel Rod Cladding Oxidation 2012-08-17
[Table view] |
SSINS No.: 6870
UNITED STATES Accession No.:
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 8002280671 OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 May 8, 1980
IE Information Notice 80-20
LOSS OF DECAY HEAT REMOVAL CAPABILITY AT DAVIS-BESSE UNIT 1 WHILE IN A
REFUELING MODE
Description of Circumstances
On April 19, 1980, decay heat removal capability was lost at Davis-Besse Unit 1 for approximately two and one-half hours. At the time of the event, the unit
was in a refueling mode (e.g., RCS temperature was 90F; decay heat was being
removed by Decay Heat Loop No. 2; the vessel head was detensioned with bolts in
place; the reactor coolant level was slightly below the vessel head flanges;
and the manway covers on top of the once through steam generators were removed).
(See Enclosure A, Status of Davis-Besse 1 Prior to Loss of Power to Busses E-2 and F-2 for additional details regarding this event.)
Since the plant was in a refueling mode, many systems or components were out of
service for maintenance or testing purposes. In addition, other systems and
components were deactivated to preclude their inadvertent actuation while in a
refueling mode. Systems and components that were not in service or deactivated
included:
Containment Spray System;
High Pressure Injection System;
Source Range Channel 2;
Decay Heat Loop No. 1;
Station Battery 1P and 1N;
Emergency Diesel-Generator No. 1;
4.16 KV Essential Switchgear Bus Cl; and
13.8 KV Switchgear Bus A (this bus was energized but not aligned).
In brief, the event was due to the tripping of a non-safeguards feeder breaker
in 13.8 KV Switchgear Bus B. Because of the extensive maintenance and testing
activities being conducted at the time, Channels 1 and 3 of the Reactor Protec- tion System (RPS) and Safety Features Actuation System (SFAS) were being ener- gized from only one source, the source emanating from the tripped breaker.
Since the SFAS logic used at Davis-Besse is a two-out-of-four input scheme in
which the loss (or actuation) of any two input signals results in the actuation
of all four output channels (i.e., Channels 1 and 3, and Channels 2 and 4), the
loss of power to Channels 1 and 3 bistables also resulted in actuation of SFAS
Channels 2 and 4. The actuation of SFAS Channels 2 and 4, in turn, affected
Decay Heat Loop No. 2, the operating loop.
Since the initiating event was a loss of power event, all five levels of SFAS
were actuated (i.e., Level 1 - High Radiation; Level 2 - High Pressure Injec- tion; Level 3 - Low Pressure Injection; Level 4 - Containment Spray; and
IE Information Notice No. 80-20 May 8, 1980 Level 5 - ECCS Recirculation Mode). Actuation of SFAS Level 2 and/or 3 resulted in containment isolation and loss of normal decay heat pump suction
from RCS hot leg No. 2. Actuation of SFAS Level 3 aligned the Decay Heat Pump
No. 2 suction to the Borated Water Storage Tank (BWST) in the low pressure
injection mode. Actuation of SFAS Level 5 represents a low level in the BWST;
therefore, upon its actuation, ECCS operation was automatically transferred
from the Injection Mode to the Recirculation Mode. As a result, Decay Heat
Pump No. 2, the operating pump, was automatically aligned to take suction from
the containment sump rather than from the BWST or the reactor coolant system.
Since the emergency containment sump was dry, suction to the operating decay
heat pump was lost. As a result, the decay heat removal capability was lost
for approximately two and one-half hours, the time required to vent the system.
Furthermore, since Decay Heat Loop No. 1 was down for maintenance, it was not
available to reduce the time required to restore decay heat cooling.
MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THE EVENT:
The rather extended loss of decay heat removal capability at Davis-Besse Unit
1 was due to three somewhat independent factors, any one of which, if corrected, could have precluded this event. These three factors are:
(i) Inadequate procedures and/or administrative controls;
(ii)Extensive maintenance activities; and
(iii) The two-out-of-four SFAS logic.
Regarding inadequate procedures and/or administrative controls, it should be
noted that the High Pressure Injection Pumps and the Containment Spray Pumps
were deactivated to preclude their inadvertent actuation while in the refuel- ing mode. In a similar vein, if the SFAS Level 5 scheme had been by-passed or
deactivated while in the refueling mode, or if the emergency sump isolation
valves were closed and their breakers opened, this event would have been, at
most, a minor interruption of decay heat flow.
Regarding the extensive maintenance activities, it appears that this event
would have been precluded, or at least ameliorated, if the maintenance activi- ties were substantially reduced while in the refueling mode. For example, if
the maintenance activities had been restricted such that two SFAS channels
would not be lost by a single event (e.g., serving Channels 1 and 3 from
separate sources), this event would have been precluded. Likewise, if
maintenance activities had been planned or restricted such that a backup decay
heat removal system would have been readily available, the consequences of the
loss of the operating decay heat removal loop would have been ameliorated.
Regarding the two-out-of-four SFAS logic used at Davis-Besse, even under
normal conditions, it appears that this type of logic is somewhat more suscep- tible to spurious actions than other logic schemes (e.g., a one-out-of-two
taken-twice scheme). This susceptibility is amplified when two SFAS channels
are served from one source. Consequently, when the source feeding SFAS
Channels 1 and 3 was lost, all five levels of SFAS were actuated. As stated
IE Information Notice No. 80-20 May 8, 1980 previously, this particular event would have been precluded if SFAS Channels 1 and 3 were being served from separate and independent sources. In a similar
vein, this specific event would have been precluded by a one-out-of-two taken
twice type of logic that requires the coincident actuation of or loss of power
of an even numbered SFAS Channel and an odd numbered SFAS Channel.
Since each LWR can be expected to be in a refueling mode many times during its
lifetime, licensees should evaluate the susceptibility of their plants to
losing decay heat removal capability by the causes described in this Informa- tion Notice. No specific action or response is requested at this time.
Licensees having questions regarding this matter should contact the director
of the appropriate NRC Regional Office.
_
Enclosure A
DAVIS-BESSE EVENT OF APRIL 19. 1980
STATUS OF DAVIS-BESSE 1 PRIOR TO LOSS OF POWER TO BUSSES E-2 D F-2:
1. Refueling mode with RCS temperature at 9 0 7F and level slightly beltw
vessel head flange. Bead detensioned with bolts in place. Hanway cover
om top of OTSG removed. Tygon tubing attached to lower vents of RCS hot
leg for RCS level indication. Decay heat loop 2 in uervice for RCS
cooling.
2. All non-nuclear instrument (NNI) power and Static Voltage Regulator YAR
supplied from 13.8 KZV Bus B via EBBF2. 13.8 K Bus A energized but not
connected. RPS and SFAS Channels 1 and 3 being supplied from YAL
3. Equipment Out of Service
a. Source Range Channel 2 - Surveillance
b. Emergency Diesel Generator 1 - Maintenance.
c. Decay Beat Loop 1 - Maintenance.;
4. Breakers for containment spray and EPI pumps racked out.
SEQUENCE OF ELE!S
TIME EVENT CAUSE/C010ENTS
2:00 p.m. Loss of power to Ground short on 13.8 KV breaker EBBF2 Busses E-2 and f-2 which caused breaker to open. This
(non-essential 480 interrupted power to busses E-2 and F-2 VAC) which were supplying all non-nuclear
instrument (NNI) power, channels 1 and 3 of the Reactor Protection System (RFS) and
.the Safety Features Actuation Signal (SPAS),
the computer, and much of the control room
indicators.
2:00 p.=. SFAS Level 5 (recircu- Two out of four logic tripped upon loss
lation mode) actua- of Busses E-2 and F-2. Actuation caused
tion. ECCS pump suction valves from containment
sump to open and ECCS pump suction valves
from Borated Water Storage Tank to close.
During valve travel times, gravity flow
path existed from BWST to containment sump.
2:02 p.?. Decay Reat (low Operator turned off only operating DR
pressure safety in- pump to avoid spillage of RCS water to
jection) flow secured containment via the tygon tubing for RCS
by operator level indication and open SG manway.
2:33 p.m. Partial restoration
of power Power to Bus E-2 and SFAS channels 1 and 3 restored along with one channel of ?NNI. This
restored all essential power for ECCS.
- 2 -
TIME EVENT CAUSE/COCIENTS
2:44 p.m. . Attempt to reestab- Started DH pump 1-2 then stopped it when
lish DE flow it was determined that air was in suction
line. Pump secured to prevent damage.
3:34 p.m. Source Range
Channel 2 energized.
4:00 p.m. Restoration of Busses Busses restored sequentually as efforts
to (480 VAC) F-2, F-21, progressed to isolate ground fault.
4:06 p.m. 1-22, and F-23
4:25 p.m. DE flow restored DE pump 1-2 started after venting. RCS
temperature at 1700°F.DH flow bypassing
°oj15 6 1 Incore TC's being taken and maximum
4:46 p.m. Containment sump Precautionary measure to assure containment
pump breakers sump eater from BWST remained in aontainment.
opened Incore TC's range from 161 to 164 F.
5:40 p.m. Computer returned to Incore TC's range from 158 to 1600F.
service.
6:24 p.m. D8 flow directed RCS cooldown established at less shan 25aF
-0p through cooler per hour. RCS temperature at 150 F. Incore TC's
range from 151 to 158°F.
9:50 P.M. Power completely RCS temperature at approximately 1150P.
res tored
STATUS OF DAVIS-BESSE I AFTER RECOVERY FROM LOSS OF POWER TO BUSSES E-2 AMD F-2:
1. Refueling mode with RCS temperature at 115aF and level slightly below vessel head
flange. Read detensioned with bolts in place. Manway cover on top of OTSG
removed. Tygon tubing attached to lower vents of RCS hoc leg for RCS level
indication. Decay heat loop 2 in service for RCS cooling.
2. Bus E-2 being supplied from 13.8 EtV Bus A via breaker HAAZ2 and Bus F-2 being
supplied from 13.8 IV Bus B via breaker HBBF2.
3. Decay heat loop filled, all tags clear. Maintenance work restricted so
restoration of system will be less than two hours.
4. ECCS pump suction valves (DH-9A and DE-9B) from containment sump closed and
breakers racked out. This will prevent the suction of air into the decay
3 heat loop during a level 5 actuation (recirculation mode) when there is
no water in the zUp.
5. Equipment Out of Service:
Emergency Diesel Generator 1 - maintenance
6. Breakers for containment spray and BPI pumps racked out.
IE Information Notice No. 80-20 Enclosure
May 8, 1980
RECENTLY ISSUED
IE INFORMATION NOTICES
Information Subject Date Issued To
Notice No. Issued
80-19 NIOSH Recall of Recircu- 5/6/80 All holders of a power
lating-Mode (Closed-Circuit) reactor OL, Research
Self-Contained Breathing Reactor License, Fuel
Apparatus (Rebreathers) Cycle Facility License
and Priority I Material
License
80-18 Possible Weapons Smuggling 5/5/80 All power reactor
Pouch facilities with an OL,
fuel fabrication and
processing facilities
and Materials Priority I
licensees (processors
and distributors)
80-17 Potential Hazards Associated 5/5/80 All radiography
With Interchangable Parts Licenses
On Radiographic Equipment
80-16 Shaft Seal Packing 4/29/80 All power reactor
Causes Binding In Main facilities in your
Steam Swing Check And Region with an OL or CP
Isolation Valves
80-15 Axial (Longitudinal) 4/21/80 All Light Water Reactor
Oriented Cracking In Facilities holding power
Piping reactor OLs or CPs
80-14 Safety Suggestions From 4/2/80 All power reactor
Employees facilities with an
OL or CP
80-13 General Electric Type SBM 4/2/80 All light water reactor
Control Switches - Defective facilities holding power
Cam Followers reactor OLs or CPs
80-12 Instrument Failure Causes 3/31/80 All holders of power
Opening of PORV and Block reactor OLs and CPs
Valve
80-11 General Problems with ASCO 3/14/30 All holders of Reactor
Valves in Nuclear Application OL, CP, fuel fabrica- Including Fire Protection tion and processing
Systems facilities
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list | - Information Notice 1980-03, Main Turbine Electrohydraulic Control System (31 January 1980)
- Information Notice 1980-05, Chloride Contamination of Safety Related Piping & Components (8 February 1980)
- Information Notice 1980-06, Notification of Significant Events at Operating Power Reactor Facilities (29 July 1980, Topic: Earthquake, Fatality)
- Information Notice 1980-07, Pump Shaft Fatigue Cracking (29 February 1980, Topic: Water rod)
- Information Notice 1980-08, the States Company Sliding Link Electrical Terminal Block (7 March 1980)
- Information Notice 1980-08, The States Company Sliding Link Electrical Terminal Block (7 March 1980)
- Information Notice 1980-09, Possible Occupational Health Hazard Associated with Closed Cooling Systems for Operating Power Plants (7 March 1980)
- Information Notice 1980-10, Partial Loss of Non-Nuclear Instrument System Power Supply During Operation (7 March 1980, Topic: Water rod)
- Information Notice 1980-11, Generic Problems with Asco Valves in Nuclear Applications Including Fire Protection Systems (14 March 1980)
- Information Notice 1980-12, Instrument Failure Causes Opening of Porv & Block Valve (31 March 1980)
- Information Notice 1980-13, General Electric Type Sbm Control Switches Defective CAM Followers (2 April 1980)
- Information Notice 1980-14, Safety Suggestions from Employees (2 April 1980)
- Information Notice 1980-15, Axial (Longitudinal) Oriented Cracking in Piping (21 April 1980, Topic: Liquid penetrant)
- Information Notice 1980-15, Axial (longitudinal) Oriented Cracking in Piping (21 April 1980, Topic: Liquid penetrant)
- Information Notice 1980-16, Shaft Seal Packing Causes Binding in Main Steam Swing Disc Check & Isolation Valves (29 April 1980)
- Information Notice 1980-19, Niosh Recall of Recirculating-Mode (Closed Circuit) Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (Rebreather) (6 May 1980)
- Information Notice 1980-19, Niosh Recall of Recirculating-Mode (closed Circuit) Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (rebreather) (6 May 1980)
- Information Notice 1980-20, Loss of Decay Heat Removal Capability at Davis-Besse Unit 1 While in a Refueling Mode (8 May 1980)
- Information Notice 1980-21, Anchorage & Support of Safety-Related Electrical Equipment (16 May 1980, Topic: Earthquake)
- Information Notice 1980-22, Breakdowns in Contamination Control Programs (28 May 1980)
- Information Notice 1980-25, Transportation of Pyrophoric Uranium (30 May 1980)
- Information Notice 1980-26, Evaluation of Contractor QA Programs (10 June 1980)
- Information Notice 1980-27, Degradation of Reactor Coolant Pump Studs (11 June 1980, Topic: Boric Acid)
- Information Notice 1980-29, Broken Studs on Terry Turbine Steam Inlet Flange (7 August 1980, Topic: Overspeed trip)
- Information Notice 1980-31, Maloperation of Gould-Brown Boveri 480 Volt-Type K-6005 & K-Don 6005 Circuit Breakers (27 August 1980)
- Information Notice 1980-34, Boron Dilution of Reactor Coolant During Steam Generator Decontamination (26 September 1980, Topic: Boric Acid, Shutdown Margin, Eddy Current Testing)
- Information Notice 1980-37, Containment Cooler Leaks & Reactor Cavity Flooding at Indian Point Unit 2 (24 October 1980)
- Information Notice 1980-38, Cracking in Charging Pump Casing Cladding (30 October 1980, Topic: Boric Acid, Nondestructive Examination)
- Information Notice 1980-39, Malfunction of Solenoid Valves Manufactured by Valcor Engineering Corp (31 October 1980)
- Information Notice 1980-40, Excessive Nitrogen Supply Pressure Actuates Safety-Relief Valve Operation to Cause Reactor Depressurization (7 November 1980)
- Information Notice 1980-41, Failure of Swing Check Valve in Decay Heat Removal System at Davis Besse Unit No.1 (10 November 1980)
- Information Notice 1980-42, Effect of Radiation on Hydraulic Snubber Fluid (24 November 1980)
- Information Notice 1980-43, Failures of Continuous Water Level Monitor for Scram Discharge Volume at Dresden Unit No.2 (5 December 1980, Topic: Scram Discharge Volume)
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