IR 05000352/2019003
| ML19316B358 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Limerick  |
| Issue date: | 11/12/2019 |
| From: | Jon Greives Reactor Projects Region 1 Branch 4 |
| To: | Bryan Hanson Exelon Generation Co, Exelon Nuclear |
| Greives J | |
| References | |
| IR 2019001, IR 2019003, ISFSI IR 2019001 | |
| Download: ML19316B358 (16) | |
Text
November 12, 2019
SUBJECT:
LIMERICK GENERATING STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000352/2019003 AND 05000353/2019003 AND INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE INSTALLATION INSPECTION REPORT 07200065/2019001
Dear Mr. Hanson:
On September 30, 2019, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2. On October 18, 2019, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. Martin Bonifanti, Plant Manager, and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violation or significance or severity of the violation documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Limerick.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Limerick. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Jonathan E. Greives, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects
Docket Nos. 05000352, 05000353,
and 07200065 License Nos. NPF-39 and NPF-85
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers:
05000352, 05000353, and 07200065
License Numbers:
Report Numbers:
05000352/2019003, 05000353/2019003, and 07200065/2019001
Enterprise Identifier: I-2019-003-0052
I-2019-001-0071
Licensee:
Exelon Generation Company, LLC
Facility:
Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2
Location:
Sanatoga, PA 19464
Inspection Dates:
July 1, 2019 to September 30, 2019
Inspectors:
H. Anagnostopoulos, Senior Health Physicist
D. Beacon, Project Engineer
B. DeBoer, Health Physicist
S. Hammann, Senior Health Physicist
S. Haney, Resident Inspector
S. Rutenkroger, Senior Resident Inspector
A. Turilin, Reactor Inspector
Approved By:
Jonathan E. Greives, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 4
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Limerick Generating Station (LGS),
Units 1 and 2 in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Loss of Power to Offgas Components Led to Manual Reactor Trip Due to Inadequate Response Procedure Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Events Green NCV 05000353/2019003-01 Open/Closed
[P.3] -
Resolution 71153 A self-revealing Green non-cited violation of LGS Unit 2 Technical Specification 6.8.1.a was identified when a response procedure used to stabilize the plant did not fully address a loss of power which impacted the Unit 2 offgas system. This led to degrading main condenser vacuum which required a manual reactor trip on June 4, 2019.
Additional Tracking Items
Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status LER 05000353/2019-001-0 LER 2019-001-00 for Limerick Unit 2, Valid Actuation of the Reactor Protection System due to a Trip of D214-24 Load Center 71153 Closed
PLANT STATUS
Unit 1 began the inspection period at rated thermal power. On September 13, 2019, the unit was down powered to 63 percent for a post-summer load drop for planned activities such as a control rod pattern adjustment and maintenance on the main condenser tubes and the '1C' reactor feedwater pump turbine. The unit was returned to rated thermal power on September 17, 2019, and remained at or near rated thermal power for the remainder of the inspection period.
Unit 2 operated at or near rated thermal power for the entire inspection period.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed plant status activities described in IMC 2515 Appendix D, Plant Status, and conducted routine reviews using IP 71152, Problem Identification and Resolution. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection
Seasonal Extreme Weather Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated readiness for seasonal extreme weather conditions prior to the seasonal hot temperatures in August 2019, including the following systems:
Spray pond and spray pond spray network
Residual heat removal service water system (RHRSW)
Emergency service water system
71111.04Q - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
- (1) Unit 2 standby liquid control system on July 3, 2019
- (2) Unit 1 and Unit 2 remote shutdown panels on August 7, 2019
- (3) Unit common 101 electrical transformer, bus, and switchgear on September 11, 2019
71111.05Q - Fire Protection
Quarterly Inspection (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated fire protection program implementation in the following selected areas:
- (1) Fire areas 60 and 61, Unit 2 A and C core spray pump rooms on July 18, 2019
- (2) Fire area 19, Unit 2 D21 emergency 4 kV switchgear room on August 7, 2019
- (3) Fire area 8, Unit 1 class 1E battery room on August 15, 2019
- (4) Fire areas 22 and 23, Unit 1 and Unit 2 cable spreading rooms on September 11, 2019
- (5) Fire areas 25 and 26, Unit common auxiliary equipment room and remote shutdown control room on September 19, 2019
71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures
Inspection Activities - Underground Cables (IP Section 02.02c.) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated cable submergence protection in:
- (1) Manhole 101E cable vault on July 8, 2019, and manhole 102W cable vault on July 9, 2019
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during Unit 2 control rod exercise testing on September 6, 2019, and during Unit 1 power ascension on September 16, 2019.
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator requalification training on September 16, 2019.
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Routine Maintenance Effectiveness Inspection (IP Section 02.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of routine maintenance activities associated with the following equipment and/or safety significant functions:
- (1) Unit 2 A and B primary containment instrument gas on September 20, 2019
Quality Control (IP Section 02.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated maintenance and quality control activities associated with the following equipment performance activity:
- (1) Unit common A RHRSW spray network piping replacement on August 26 - September 7, 2019
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities:
- (1) Unit 2 D24 emergency diesel generator lube oil leak on July 23, 2019
- (2) Unit 1 high pressure coolant injection pump, valve, and flow surveillance test on July 31, 2019
- (3) Unit 2 D22 emergency diesel generator planned maintenance on August 8, 2019
- (4) Unit 2 reactor core isolation cooling system surveillance testing on August 16, 2019
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 02.02) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
- (1) Unit 2 high pressure coolant injection following observed oil seal leakage on July 10, 2019
- (3) Unit 2 D24 emergency diesel generator lube oil leak assessment for common cause on July 24, 2019
- (4) Unit common, A RHRSW west side thinned piping on August 25, 2019
71111.18 - Plant Modifications
Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:
- (1) Temporary modification to replace a D24 emergency diesel generator lube oil instrumentation line with a pressure retaining plug on July 25, 2019
- (2) Modifications to the C spray pond spray network for added flanges and strut modifications for piping replacement on July 29, 2019
71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing
Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following post maintenance tests:
- (1) Unit common C RHRSW system pipe replacement on July 30, 2019
- (2) Unit 2 D23 emergency diesel generator lube oil pipe nipple replacement on July 30, 2019
- (3) Unit 2 'D23' emergency diesel generator following jacketwater leak repair on September 12, 2019
71111.22 - Surveillance Testing
The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:
Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01)
- (1) ST-6-092-311-2, Unit 2 'D21' emergency diesel generator slow start on September 30, 2019
Inservice Testing (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
- (1) ST-6-092-324-1, Unit 1 D14 emergency diesel generator fast start surveillance and load reject test on July 25, 2019
- (2) ST-6-055-230-1, Unit 1 high pressure coolant injection pump, valve, and flow on July 31, 2019
71114.06 - Drill Evaluation
Drill/Training Evolution Observation (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated:
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the approved standardized emergency response organization minimum staffing demonstration drill on September 24,
RADIATION SAFETY
71124.07 - Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program
Site Inspection (IP Section 02.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the radiological environmental monitoring program implementation.
- (1) The inspectors verified that the Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program quantified the impact of radioactive effluent releases to the environment and sufficiently validated the integrity of the radioactive gaseous and liquid effluent release program.
The inspectors verified that the Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program was consistently implemented with the licensees technical specifications and/or Offsite Dose Calculation Manual and validated that the program met the design objectives in Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50.
Groundwater Protection Initiative (GPI) Implementation (IP Section 02.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors verified that the licensee is continuing to implement the voluntary Nuclear Energy Institute/Industry Ground Water Protection Initiative.
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification
The inspectors verified the licensee performance indicator submittals listed below:
IE01: Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours Sample (IP Section 02.01)===
- (1) Unit 1 for the period July 1, 2018, through June 30, 2019
- (2) Unit 2 for the period July 1, 2018, through June 30, 2019
IE04: Unplanned Scrams with Complications (USwC) Sample (IP Section 02.03) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 for the period July 1, 2018, through June 30, 2019
- (2) Unit 2 for the period July 1, 2018, through June 30, 2019
MS09: Residual Heat Removal Systems (IP Section 02.08) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1 for the period July 1, 2018, through June 30, 2019
- (2) Unit 2 for the period July 1, 2018, through June 30, 2019
71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution
Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (IP Section 02.03) (1 Sample)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:
(1)
'D' Emergency Service Water (ESW) Pump Air Binding AR04123849
71153 - Followup of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Report (IP Section 03.02)
The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event report (LER):
- (1) LER 2019-001-00, Valid Actuation of the Reactor Protection System due to a Trip of D214-24 Load Center. The circumstances of this LER are documented in the Inspection Results section of this report.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
- TEMPORARY INSTRUCTIONS, INFREQUENT AND ABNORMAL
60855.1 - Operation of an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation at Operating Plants Operation of an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation at Operating Plants
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the licensees independent spent fuel storage installation cask loadings on August 26-30, 2019. Specifically, the inspectors observed the following activities:
Fuel selection and fuel loading Load movement of automated welding system
Closure welding, non-destructive weld evaluations, and helium leak testing
Transfer and transport evolutions
Radiological field surveys
INSPECTION RESULTS
Observation: D Emergency Service Water (ESW) Pump Air Binding AR04123849 71152 The inspectors reviewed Exelons evaluation and corrective actions to address the D ESW pump air binding which occurred on April 6, 2018, as documented in AR04123849. Due to the air binding, the 'D' ESW pump did not develop the required discharge pressure during a surveillance test. Operators subsequently started the B ESW pump about 10 minutes later. Shortly following start of the B ESW pump, the D ESW pump achieved the required discharge pressure and exhibited normal operating parameters until secured about an hour later. Operators declared the 'D' ESW pump inoperable, pending further investigation and operability testing, and entered the appropriate technical specification action statement.
Exelon staff subsequently performed a causal evaluation and determined the air binding was due to an infrequent operational alignment of both RHRSW loops operating while the ESW loop B (B and D ESW pumps) was idle. Exelon staff determined that when both RHRSW loops were in service, the RHRSW return headers pressurized and depending on the leak tightness of the ESW loop return check valves, the pressurized RHRSW water volume had the potential to back-leak and compress the air void normally present in the air filled ESW supply piping against the closed ESW pump discharge check valve. Exelon staff postulated that air leakage through the pump discharge check valve was not relieved through the pump packing and resulted in pressurization of the air void in the pump pipe column, displacing water in the pump column and air binding the D ESW pump.
As a corrective action, Exelon staff revised the RHRSW operating procedure to consider starting an ESW pump in each loop prior to starting the second loop of RHRSW in order to prevent the operation alignment that could cause air binding of an ESW pump. Additionally, Exelon staff scheduled corrective actions to install a continuous vent on the discharge piping of each ESW pump to preclude the pressurization of the air void by the RHRSW reverse leakage. Exelon staff also reviewed their system operating history and determined that a similar event occurred in 2006 on the C ESW pump. In response to the 2006 event (AR00466345), Exelon staff completed corrective actions, one of which was revising the ESW operating procedure to instruct operators how to alleviate the condition, should it repeat, by removing a pressure gauge on the ESW discharge piping thus depressurizing the air void. Furthermore, Exelon created an enhancement action to install a permanent vent to the ESW pumps. This action was approved by the Plant Health Committee but canceled in 2008 after being ranked below the implementation threshold.
The inspectors reviewed Exelons screening and prioritization of the corrective actions completed or planned in 2018 as well as prior actions. In 2006 the event was screened as a level 3 class B. Based on the review of the risk significance and the corrective action program process, the inspectors determined that Exelon appropriately classified the event as well as the resulting corrective actions and enhancements in 2006. The inspectors reviewed Exelons causal evaluation conducted in response to the 2018 event and determined it to be of sufficient technical rigor and depth to identify the likely causes and provide for effective corrective actions. Subsequently, the inspectors reviewed the adequacy of the implemented and/or planned corrective actions resulting from the causal evaluation and determined that the corrective actions were appropriate and commensurate with the safety significance of the issue.
Loss of Power to Offgas Components Led to Manual Reactor Trip Due to Inadequate Response Procedure Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Events
Green NCV 05000353/2019003-01 Open/Closed
[P.3] -
Resolution 71153 A self-revealing Green non-cited violation of LGS Unit 2 Technical Specification 6.8.1.a was identified when a response procedure used to stabilize the plant did not fully address a loss of power which impacted the Unit 2 offgas system. This led to degrading main condenser vacuum which required a manual reactor trip on June 4, 2019.
Description:
On June 3, 2019, a fuse failure on LGS Unit 2 caused an invalid undervoltage signal. The undervoltage signal tripped the D214-24 load center, de-energizing motor control center D214-G-D. Reactor operators took the actions directed by procedure E-D214-G-D, Loss of MCC D214-G-D, to ensure the unit remained stable. However, procedure E-D214-G-D did not address the impact to the offgas system.
With the loss of power, the A after-condenser drain valve failed closed which resulted in the after-condenser and downstream piping slowly filling with water. When offgas system conditions degraded, operators placed the B after-condenser drain valve level controller in automatic operation. However, the accumulated water already blocked flow through the system, causing the steam jet ejectors to stall and the main condenser vacuum to degrade.
The operators initially lowered reactor power, but then initiated a manual reactor trip on June 4 due to continued lowering of condenser vacuum.
Exelon performed a root cause evaluation and determined that the procedure used to stabilize the plant contained immediate actions that did not fully address the offgas system.
The in-service after-condenser drain valve was operating in the automatic mode with the redundant drain cooler valve in the manual mode and closed, in accordance with the current design. With the loss of power to the in-service after-condenser drain valve, the in-service valve closed, but the controller for the valve failed in the as-is position. With the redundant after-condenser drain valve controller in the manual mode, the system required operator action to return the system to service. Therefore, the immediate actions in procedure E-D214-G-D were not sufficient because they did not instruct the operators to place the redundant offgas controller train into service as required.
The inspectors reviewed the evaluation and past events pertaining to procedure E-D214-G-D. Of note, procedure E-D214-G-D was revised to include all plant impacts following a January 2009 event associated with the loss of a load center. To address the deficiency, Exelon personnel relied upon simulator responses to determine expected plant impacts but did not utilize electrical prints. Then, on January 24, 2019, a voltage transient caused a loss of power to motor control center D214-G-D which resulted in a loss of the steam seal evaporater and degrading condenser vacuum. The operators responded promptly to the degrading vacuum such that vacuum was able to be restored and a manual reactor trip was not required. However, the operators did not take the actions needed to prevent the loss of the steam seal evaporator which caused degrading condenser vacuum because procedure E-D214-G-D did not address the expected plant impact to the steam seal evaporator from the loss of the load center. As a result, Exelon subsequently determined that procedure E-D214-G-D still did not adequately address all plant impacts. Exelon again reviewed the loss of the load center on the simulator, but similar to the 2009 review did not review electrical prints to ensure all plant impacts were recognized and addressed.
Corrective Actions: Exelon reviewed and revised procedure E-D214-G-D, with a revision issued on August 29, 2019, and performed a review of the electrical prints to ensure all plant impacts were addressed. Exelon also initiated an extent of condition review to perform the same review for all off-normal, operational transient, and loss of electrical bus procedures to ensure all operator actions of significance that are required within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> are directed as necessary.
Corrective Action Reference: IR 4254212
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The failure to adequately maintain a response procedure used to stabilize the plant following a loss of power to the offgas system which resulted in a manual reactor trip to respond to degrading condenser vacuum was reasonably within Exelon's ability to foresee and correct and should have been prevented and therefore was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Procedure Quality attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, the finding was associated with a deficient response procedure and an unplanned reactor trip occurred.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance, Green, because the finding did not cause both a reactor trip and the loss of mitigation equipment relied upon to transition the plant from the onset of the trip to a stable shutdown condition. Specifically, the main condenser was not lost since the vacuum was restored following the reactor trip because operators responded appropriately to the degrading conditions.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: P.3 - Resolution: The organization takes effective corrective actions to address issues in a timely manner commensurate with their safety significance.
Specifically, there were previous events from which Exelon revised applicable response procedures, but the corrective actions did not fully resolve the identified issues, including causes and extent of condition.
Enforcement:
Violation: LGS Unit 2 Technical Specification 6.8.1.a requires, in part, that written procedures shall be maintained for applicable procedures in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2. Regulatory Guide 1.33, Appendix A, Section 8 specifies offnormal procedures, procedures responding to losses of electrical power, and procedures for the control of radioactivity to include the offgas system. Contrary to the above, prior to August 29, 2019, Exelon failed to properly maintain offnormal response procedure E-D214-G-D for the loss of motor control center D214-G-D. Specifically, the procedure was relied upon by operators to perform actions following the loss of electrical power, but the procedure did not address all plant impacts required to be addressed by the operators within the required time which resulted in an unplanned reactor trip.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as an non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
On October 18, 2019, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Mr. Martin Bonifanti, Plant Manager and other members of the licensee staff.
On September 12, 2019, the inspectors presented the PI&R Annual Sample inspection results to Mr. Frank Sturniolo, Plant Manager and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
60855.1
Procedures
OU-LG-645
MMC Dry Shielded Canister Welding, Vacuum Drying, and
Helium Fill
Revision 14
60855.1
Procedures
Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI)
Technical Specification Testing
Revision 13
Procedures
GP-7.1
Summer Weather Preparation and Operation
Revision 39
71111.04Q Corrective Action
Documents
71111.05Q Procedures
F-A-425
Unit 1, Class 1E Battery Room 425 (EL 239)
Revision 14
71111.05Q Procedures
F-A-429
Common, Unit 2 D21 Emergency 4KV Switchgear Room
29 (EL 239)
Revision 12
Corrective Action
Documents
Corrective Action
Documents
Miscellaneous
BOP-MT-19-099
Magnetic Particle Examination Report
September 2,
2019
Miscellaneous
BOP-MT-19-103
Magnetic Particle Examination Report
September 2,
2019
Miscellaneous
BOP-MT-19-117
Magnetic Particle Examination Report
September 5,
2019
Work Orders
4945574
Procedures
HPCI Pump, Valve, and Flow Test
Revision 87
Corrective Action
Documents
Corrective Action
Documents
Miscellaneous
C Spray Pond Spray Network Piping Replacement Flange
Addition and Strut Modification
Revision 0
Miscellaneous
D24 Lube Oil Instrumentation Line to PI-GA-202D
Revision 0
Work Orders
4941627
Procedures
D14 Diesel Generator LOCA/Load Reject Testing and Fast
Start Operability Test Run
Revision 29
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Corrective Action
Documents
Corrective Action
Documents
Corrective Action
Documents
Miscellaneous
Operator Logs
March 23,
2018 -
April 11, 2018
Procedures
S11.1.A
ESW System Startup
Revision 36
Procedures
S12.1.A
RHR Service Water System Startup
Revision 56
Corrective Action
Documents
Corrective Action
Documents
Corrective Action
Documents
Corrective Action
Documents
IR 874599
Corrective Action
Documents
IR 874677