IR 05000528/1979007
| ML17296A639 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 01/11/1980 |
| From: | Dodds R, Eckhardt J, Narbut P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17296A633 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-528-79-07, 50-528-79-7, 50-529-79-07, 50-529-79-7, 50-530-79-03, NUDOCS 8003140179 | |
| Download: ML17296A639 (16) | |
Text
t 50-528/79-07 50-529/79-07 Report No.
.50-530/79-03 U. S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY CO>MISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT<'T
REGION V
Docket No.
50-528, 50-529, 50-530License No.
CPPR-141, 142, 143 Safeguards Group Arizona Public Service Company P. 0.
Box 21666 Phoenix, Arizona 85036 Faci1ity Name:
Palo Verde Units 1, 2 and
Palo Verde Site, Maricopa County, Arizona Inspection conducte Inspectors:
October 22-26, 1979 r zr 8'a
. Eckhardt, Reactor Inspector P.
P. Narbut, Reactor Inspector ate Signed Cj gO Date Signed Approved By:
Summary:
Da'
Signed Jt'6
. T. Dodds, Chief Reactor Engineering Support SectiB <<signed Reactor Construction and Engineering Support Branch Inspection on October 22-26, 1979 Re ort Nos.
50-528 79-07, 50-529/79-'07, 50-530 79-03
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inspectors of construction activities involving piping installation and welding, equipment supports and welding, structural steel welding, and concrete activities.
The inspection involved 64 inspector-hours onsite by two NRC inspectors.
Results:
Of the four areas inspected, no items of noncompliance were identified in three areas.
One item of noncompliance was identified in the area of equipment support welding.
RV Form 219(2)
sooogcoI
t P
DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted a ~
Arizona Public Service Com an APS b.
- E. E.
Van Brunt. Jr., Vice President/Project Director
+J.
A. Roedel, Manager, guality Assurance
- B. S.
Kaplan, guality Systems Supervisor
- G. E. Pankonin, guality Assurance Engineer
- R. J.
Kimmer, Site Nuclear Construction Engineer T.
W. Price, Construction Manager N.
E. Wibel, gA Engineer Bechtel Power Cor oration Bechtel C.
- D. R. Hawkinson, Project gA Supervisor
- C. E. Gaither, Assistant Project Field Engineer
- R. M. Grant. Project gC Engineer
- W. J. Stubblefield, Field Construction Manager
'S.
Palmrose, Assistant Lead Field Engineer - Civil J.
H. Arambel, Field Engineer - Civil V. Duckett, Field Engineer - Mechanical J.
R. Beers, Unit Engineer - Civil R. Marion, Field Engineer - Civil J. Hathias, gC Engineer D. Hehrhoff, gA Engineer E. Jansen, 'Piping Engineer J.
Donaldson, PWHT Coordinator B. Matson, gC Supervisor Combustion En ineerin CE S.
N.
Ma ger, Cons truetion Manager Western Stress, Inc.
S. Bell, Jobsite Supervisor
- Denotes those present at exit interview.
2.
Unit 1 Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundar Weldin a ~
Review of ualit Assurance Im lementin Procedures The following welding documents were reviewed to familiarize the inspector with the licensee's methods of implementing SAR commitments and code requirements:
(1)
Western Stress Incorporated - Nuclear guali ty Assurance Manual, ASME III Products, Issue 1, March 19, 1979
I
(2)
WPP/gCI 103.0, Revision 0, Post Weld Heat Treatment Control The results of the document examination were as follows:
The Nuclear guality Assurance Manual for Western Stress Inc.,
Section 8, states that the jobsite supervisor is responsible for the jobsite performance of heat treatment and is responsible for jobsite quality control measures.
ANSI N45.2 requires that inspection be performed by individuals other than those who performed the activity being inspected.
The following mitigating circumstances apply.
The heat treat-ment process had only been applied to five safety-related welds.
The inspector's examination of the heat treat process did not identify any significant irregularities.
Amendment
to the Western Stress guality Assurance Manual recognized the unacceptability of the jobsite supervisor being responsible for both the work performance and the quality control and attempted to resolve the problem by requiring Bechtel guali ty Control to review heat treatment documentation, but did not provide independent quality control requirements for the work process.
Bechtel guality Assurance audit personnel had per-formed three audits of the heat treatment process thus providing some degree of process quality control.
The inspector determined that the heat treatment contractor 's guali ty Control Manual had been reviewed and approved by Bechtel guality Assurance personnel.
The: jobsite supervisor s responsibility for inspec-tion is considered an unresolved item.
(Item 50-528/79-07/01)
There is no applicable requirement in the Western Stress guality Assurance Manual or related work and inspection documents to evaluate heat treatments performed since the last successful calibration of equipment when the latest calibration check being performed is found to be unacceptable.
The Western Stress supervisor in charge of work performance and quality control had not implemented the requirement.
ASME III NCA 4134.12 requires that when discrepancies in measuring equipment are found at calibration, materials previously checked (since the previous valid calibration) shall be considered unacceptable until the licensee can determine that all applicable require-ments have been met.
Other licensee personnel stated they were aware of the requirement to evaluate previous heat treat-ments and'committed to investigate further and revise procedures as required.
This item will be further inspected during a sub-sequent inspection.
(Item 50-528/79-07/02)
Observation of Work (1)
Tack weld repair on weld joint SIE 178 GCBB W002, (14-inch stainless steel safety injection) was observed.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were observe The inspector observed that the quality control checks of purge gas, cleanliness preheat and the quality control release for welding by initiating the process control sheet (HR-5) occur, as a matter of practice, after tack welds are complete.
The inspector observed that piping tack welds form approximately one-inch seqments of root weld and are, therefore.
at least equally critical to the quality of the weld as the root weld.
At the exit inter-view licensee management agreed to investigate and evaluate the methods of quality control of tack welding.
This item will be further examined during a subsequent inspec-tionn.
(Itern 50-528/79-07/03)
The inspector observed a piece of approximately 1/8-inch diameter neoprene tubing, 2-inches long, in the pipe after tack weld repair.
The welder stated it was from the oxygen analyzer and been pinched off during the original tack welding.
The safety injection piping is classified as Class B and defined by ANSI N45.2.1 which prohibits foreign material.
The welder subsequently blew the piece of tubing down the pipe with compressed air as a result of blowing the filing dust away from the repair tack weld.
The quality control inspector was then called by the welder.
The quality control inspector released the joint for welding and the root weld was initiated.
The NRC inspector notified the licensee about the tubing.
The joint was cut and the tubing retrieved.
The inspector established that piping quality control personnel verify cleanliness of piping just prior to fitup and that welding quality control personnel are chartered with the respon-sibility to verify that weld bevels are clean for welding.
The licensee stated that welders do not receive training in piping cleanliness requirements.
The licensee repre-sentative was unable to explain how piping internal cleanliness was controlled during the period between fitup cleanliness inspection and completion of the root weld.
At the exit interview licensee management committed to investigate and evaluate the cleanliness controls in effect between fitup and root welding.
This item will be further examined durihgra subsequent inspection.
(Item 50-528/79-07/04)
Post weld heat treatment of the 30-inch reactor coolant system weld H001 Line RC 084 (Steam Generator Neck to Pipe Held) was examined.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were observed.
The inspector noted that the traveler form used for the heat treatment had Item ll "Applicable Code" filled in as
"B31.1" whereas the correct code was ASME III Cl-1.
The inspector was satisfied that all technical requirements of ASt1E III Cl-1 were satisfied and that the entry was apparently an transcription erro At the exit interview licensee management committed to review the other heat treat travelers to determine if this was an isolated case and to correct the traveler in question.
This item will be further examined during a
subsequent inspection.
(Item 50-528/79-07/05)
The inspector noted that the method of attachment of thermocouples to the pipe is by flash welding.
After heat treatment is complete, the pipe is cleaned of flash weld by filing.
ASME III requires the pipe surface be examined by liquid penetrant or magnetic particle exam-ination.
The heat treat personnel stated their intention to request liquid penetrant examinations of the thermocouple locations on completed welds but could produce no procedures or travelers which stated surface examinations would be done.
At the exit interview the licensee management committed to revise procedures to require liquid penetrant examination after thermocouple flash weld removal.
This item will be further examined during a subsequent inspection.
(Item 50-528/79-07/06)
3.
Unit 1 Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundar Pi in a ~
Review of uali t Assurance Im lementin Procedures The following piping installation document was reviewed to familiarize the inspector with the licensee's methods of implementing SAR commitments.
Specification 13-PM-204, Revision 6, "Specification for Field Fabrication and Installation of Nuclear Piping Systems" No items of noncompliance or deviations were observed.
b.
Observation of Work Final weld contour grinding of 14-inch stainless steel safety injection joint SI-E-179-BCAA was observed.
The grinder was using new (not previously used)
wheels.
WPP gCI 101.1, Revision 11, of October 15, 1979 entitled
"Welding Control," Paragraph 6.5, requires that grinding wheels to be used on stainless steel be marked with red paint to indicate their exclusive use on stainless steel.
However, General Welding Specification G'HS-SN, Revision 4, Amendment 1, of January 8,
1979, Paragraph 4.1.4, states that grinding on stainless steel should be accomplished with new or suitably redressed grinding wheels.
The licensee representative stated that gCI 101.1 contained the requirements intended to be followe (2)
(3)
At the exit interview licensee management committed to resolve the procedural discrepancy and to determine whether the observed use of unmarked grinding wheels on stainless steel was an isolated case.
This item will be inspected during a future inspection.
(Item 50-528/79-07/07)
The quality control inspection of cladding on the inside diameter of the 30-inch reactor coolant system pipe to reactor vessel nozzle weld W002 on line RC 079 was examined.
The cladding was inspected and accepted by the quality control engineer and released for liquid penetrant examination.
The cladding had a 3/16-inch deep smoothly contoured depression for a circumferential distance of approximately four inches.
The licensee, Bechtel, and Combustion Engineering were contacted to establish whether the condition found was acceptable.
No inspection acceptance criteria were established as to the acceptability of depressions in the cladding.
At the exit interview licensee management committed to investigate and initiate action to ensure criteria are established to ensure minimum cladding thicknesses.
This item will be inspected further during a future inspection.
(Item 50-528/79-07/08)
Liquid penetrant examination of 30-inch reactor coolant system pipe to reactor vessel nozzle weld W002 RC-079 outer diameter was examined.
The weld joint was rejected for rounded indications in excess of the ASME III require-ments.
Ho items of noncompliance or deviations were observed.
4.
E ui ment Su ort Installation and Weldin The following completed equipment support installation and welding was examined to ascertain compliance with appropriate equipment support drawings and AWS D.l.l requirements:
a.
Unit 1 Diesel Generators (two) - foundation embeds and studs b.
Unit 1 Auxiliary Feed Pump (motor driven)
c.
Unit 1 and 2 Low-Pressure Safety Injection Pumps (two each unit)
d.
. Unit 1 and 2 Containment Spray Pumps (two each unit)
e.
Unit
Steam Generator Base Assemblies
C
-6-The support assemblies of the LPSI and CS Pumps are each made up of three columns fillet welded to base plates.
Measurements of the four-welds for each column to base plate indicated 17 of 48 fillet welds for the four Unit
and 16 of 48 fillet welds for the four Unit 2 pumps were undersized.
Bechtel drawing 13-C-ZAS-242, Revision 4, requires 5/16-inch fillet welds connecting the columns to the base plates.
The undersized welds varied from one to twelve inches over the 12-inch length of each weld with the smallest size of 3/16-inch for the Unit
LPSI Pump SlB-POl and 1/4-inch for the other pump support assemblies.
This is considered an item of noncompliance.
5.
Structural Steel Weldin Welding activities of three in-process welds of Unit 1 Auxiliary Building structural steel beams at elevation 156 feet were observed and compared with AWS D.l.l requirements.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were observed.
6.
Concrete Activities The following concrete activities were examined to ascertain com-pliance with Specification 13-CM-365,
"Forming, Placing, Finishing, and Curing of Concrete:"
Location Placement No.
~Activit Unit 1 spray pond slab 1Y116 preplacement, placement, curing Unit 1 Auxiliary Building lA152 roof curing Unit 2 containment dome 1C117 curing Unit 3 tendon gallery exterior wall 3C009 preplacement, placement, curing
'Specific attributes examined included concrete cover for reinforcing steel, cleanliness, concrete free fall. concrete horizontal flow, consolidation, sampling and testing, and curing adequacy.
Also, the preplacement, placement and curing records for these placements were reviewed.
In addition, the installed Unit 3 containment vertical tendon trumplate assemblies were examined.
Ho items of noncompliance or deviations were observe 'r
7.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance, or deviations.
An unresolved item disclosed during the inspection is discussed in Paragraph 2.
8.
Exit Interview The inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in Para-graph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on October 26, 1979 and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection as stated in this report.
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