IR 05000528/1979002
| ML17296A465 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 06/20/1979 |
| From: | Dodds R, Eckhardt J, Narbut P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17296A463 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-528-79-02, 50-528-79-2, 50-529-79-02, 50-529-79-2, NUDOCS 7910170510 | |
| Download: ML17296A465 (22) | |
Text
U. S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY Cosi&ISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND"ENFORCEMENT
REGION V
- -;Report No.
"Docket No.
50-528/79-02 50-529/79-02 50-528 50-529 License No.
CPPR-141 CPPR-142 Safeguards Group-Licensee:
Arizona Public Service Company P. 0.
Box 21666 Phoenix, Arizona 85036
"..Facility Name.
Palo Verde Units 1 and
4Inspection at:
Palo Verde Site, Maricopa County, Arizona March 19-23, 1979 Zmspection conducted:
-,Qnspectors:
0 c<Ma~,.
C~
r Inspector
.
E.
V rderbrue ge
,
R J.
.
k ardt, Reac or Inspector c
L-P.
P.
Harb
, Reactor Inspectoc
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J.
0. Elin, Reactor Inspector
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- Approved by:
R. T.
Dod s, Chief, Reactor Engineering Support Section, Rea'ctor Construction and Engineering Support Branch ate S gned Zu
ate igned 0 /Zca/T~
Date Signed zg 7R ate Signed 7c ate igned
'ummarY:
Ins ection of March 19.-23
,1979 Re ort'os.
50-528 79-02 and 50-529 79-02 Areas Ins ected:
Routine, unannounced inspection of construction activities, snclu ing:
fo ow-up of open items, containment post-tensioning system, structural concrete, reactor coolant system welding, electrical components and
'ystems, and qualification of electrical penetrations.
The inspection involved 87 inspector-hours onsite by four HRC inspectors.
k '.
Results:
Three items 'of noncompliance sere identified in connection isith the Unit I emergency diesel generators.
No items of noncompliance mere identified in the other areas inspected.
RV Form 219 (2)
e
DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Arizona Public Service Com an
- E. E.
Van Brunt, Jr., Vice President/Project Director
- J. A. Roedel, guality Assurance tlanager L.
W. Price, Field Engineering Supervisor
- R. L. Hand, Site equality Assurance Supervisor G. Pankonin, equality Assurance Engineer R.
D. Forrester, guality Assurance Engineer N. S. Ruiz, quality Assurance Engineer Bechtel Power Cor oration
- M. J. Stubblefield, Field Construction Manager
- A. K. Priest, Project Field Engineer J. L. Black, Resident Engineer D. R. Hawkinson, Project quality Assurance Engineer
- J. E. Pfunder, Senior equality Assurance Engineer
- C. F. Gaither, Project Field Engineer - Administration
- H. P. Smith, Project Field guality Control Engineer L. Afek, Lead Field Engineer - mechanical L. Blackburn, guality Control Engineer - Records V. Hattson, Lead guality Control Engineer - Melding and NDE G.
Evans, Lead Field Engineer - Electrical J.
Bombard, Field Engineer - Electrical R.
Regenos, Field Engineer - Instrumentation T. Horst, Lead Field Engineer - Civil R. Lykens, Lead guality Control Engineer
> Civil R. Peck, equality Control Engineer H. Pear, Assistant Project guality Control'ngineer J. Hale, Civil Engineer - Unit 1 S. Kutzley, Hechanical Engineer V. Nienstadt, guality Control Engineer - Civil 2.
Construction Status The licensee reported that as of Harch 15, 1979, the approximate completion status of Unit 1 was 35.8/, Unit 2 was 13.3Ã, and Unit 3 was still. 0.5/.
The overall project was considered to be 24.5A complete.
~r
~A.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Ins ection Findin s
a.
(Closed) Followup Item (50-528/78-06).
Defect indication in body casting of 10-inch HPCI gate valve No. ISI-470 on Unit !
Y t
-2-The inspector examined the records of ultrasonic, dye penetrant and radiographic examination performed after the indication was ground out.
The records showed that the defect had been satisfactorily removed and that no wall thickness degradation had occurred.
This item is closed.
(Closed) Followup Item (50-528/78-08/02).
Records were not available to verify the absence of plastic deformation of the polar crane bridge beams during test lifting prior to steam generator and reactor vessel placement in Unit l.
The inspector examined the measurement data obtained during the test lift and discussed the subject with the field engineer in charge of making the measurements.
The measurements were direct readings from a scale attached to each bridge girder taken with optical devices set up on the concrete containment structure at the approximate level of the crane rails.
The data showed that the deflection at all ten points of measurement were within the crane manufacturer's (Whiting) calculated values which were based upon the elastic properties of the material.
The data also showed that both girders had exper ienced the same amount of deflection differential (5/32-inch) at the test load pick-up point after the trolley, with suspended test load, had traversed the required path for the placement of steam generator No. 1.
The 5/32-inch differ-ential was attributed to creepage factors associated with the many com-ponents involved in the trolley/girder/support structure combination.
The inspector concluded that the data demonstrated that plastic deforma-tion of the crane bridge had not occurred.
This item is closed.
(Closed)
Followup Item (50-528/78-06).
The inspection plan for the precision flame-cutting associated with hole elongations in brackets for the Unit 1 polar crane girders did not address slag/dross removal and the absence of cracks.
According to the assigned Bechtel inspector, he routinely examined the flame-cut surfaces for slag and dross even though it was not specified on.the inspection plan.
He stated that when he. made his inspection, he
"wiped away" any material present as the precision flame-cutting torch left a smooth cut surface with a minimal amount of very loosely adhering residue.
The NRC inspector examined metal surfaces that had just been cut with the precision torch in the welder training booth and observed
..
that the residue was a very loosely adhering, flaky type material, and noted that it was present in very small quantities.
It was"",also observed that the work-procedures specified, and the inspection records verified, magnetic particle examination of the flame-cut surfaces to expose any microcracks that might be present.
This item is closed.
1'Closed)
Unresolved Item (50-528/78-06).
A question was raised with respect to potential for segregation during stockpiling of large aggre-gate at the concrete batch plan P
-3-The licensee performed aggregate gradation tests at the top, middle and bottom of the large aggregate stockpile.
The results-of the grada-tion tests were examined by the inspector and demonstrated that the requirements of ASTft C-33-74 had been met.
This item is closed.
e.
(Open) Unresolved Item (50-528/78-09/01).
Voids were observed in several concrete construction joints where expanded metal sheathing was being used for formwork.
The licensee had not completed the technical review of this item.
Preliminary action had been taken, however, to instruct field engineers by memorandum that extensive voids should be removed.
The inspector examined a construction joint for a beam seat where expanded metal was being used in the Unit 2 auxiliary building(placement 2A071 between construction lines A8 and AH). It was observed that voids 1/4 to 1/2 inch in depth existed in 'approximately 15! of the vertical and 30Ã of the horizontal portion of the joint.
The licensee representatives restated their intent to complete the technical review.
f.
(Closed)
Followup Item (50-528/78-09/04).
Rejection criteria for quality control inspection of bolt torquing may not assure adequacy of electri-cal raceway installations.
The inspector examined HP/P QCI 252.0, Cable Tray Hanger Installation, and NP/P QCI 253.0, Conduit and Junction Box Installation, to assure that the inspection sample plans had been upgraded to insure an adequate level of confidence in bolt torquing.
Additionally, the revised sample plans were noted to include provisions. for increasing the sample size if repeating reject patterns are detected.
The inspector also examined approximately 200 feet of safety related cable trays, selected at random, for which quality control inspections had been completed.
In all cases examined, torque settings on the splice plate bolts were found to conform with the specified requirements..-
This item is closed.
-'-.4.
Structural Concret'e a.
'Observation of Mork and
>1ork Activities The activities of preplacement inspection and curing for concrete placement 2A071 in Unit 2 auxiliary building were examined for con-formance to the requirements of specifications 13-CN-375, 'Placing of Reinforcing Steel, specification 13-CN-365, Installation, Placing, Furnishing arid Curing of Concrete; procedure MP/P QCI 52'.0, Concrete Placement; and procedure WP/P QCI 54.0, Concrete Post Placement.
The inspection included an examination of form cleanliness, form tightness, spacing between formwork and reinforcing steel, reinforcing steel clean-liness and spacing, and imbedment bolt bending.
Additionally, the inspector examined curing temperature controls, and duration of curing.
No items of noncompliance or deviation were observed; however, the following potential anomaly was identified.
Plan 13-C-ZAS-130, Construction Line A7 east of line AG, specifies vertical No.
9 reinforcing steel on 6 inch spacing f'r the south face of the wall.
A few hours prior to the scheduled concrete placement, the inspector observed that three of the required vertical bars had not been installed.
The bars were subsequently installed prior to the concrete placement..
At the time the missing bars were identified by the inspector, the final verification of reinforcing steel-had not been performed by the quality control engineer (QCE)
on the preplacement checkoff sheet.
The licensee stated that the preplacement checkoff sheet is ordinarily signed
,
off just prior to the concrete placement to ensure a firal check is made that reinforcing steel has not been inadver-tantly moved during final form cleaning.
Based on discussions with licensee and constructor personnel, the inspector.
deter-.
mined that items such as bar count and bar spacing are system-matically inspected by the QCE well in advance of concrete placement in a systematic fashion, and the, inspected areas are color-coded on the placement detail drawings. 'he inspec-
.
tor observed that the placement detail drawing for the south wall had been color-coded by the QCE.
It was not apparent to the inspector that the missing vertical bars would have been discovered during the final preplacement inspection.
This item was discussed at the management interview.
Further discussion of 'the inspector's findings regarding preplacement inspection is contained in Paragraph;e, below.
b.
Revieu of ualit~Records The inspector examined the quality records for Unit 2 tendon gallery placements 2C03, 2C04, and 2C07 for conformance to the requirements of procedures MP/P QCI 52.0, 53.0 and 54.0, and specification 13-CH-365.'he records reviewed were the preplacement, placement, and postplace.-
ment checkoff sheets; the cure temperature logs; the 7 and 28 day.
compression test results; the batch 'Plant tickets; and five randomly selected nonconformance reports.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
c.
Audits The inspector examined APS audit Report No.
SQA26 of 1-27-78 and Bechtel Audit File Q.19.02.8.2.3.1 of 2-02-78, which were provided by the responsible licensee and Bechtel QA personnel as the latest
-5-gA audits relating to concrete preplacement.
The inspector examined the audit plan and dispositioning of findings for conformance to the requirequirements of ANSI N45.2.12-1974.
No items of nonconformance or deviations were identified.
d.
Surveillance Ins ections e.
I Bechtel quality assurance personnel stated that they were specifically prohibited from performing selected detail checks of items such as reinforcing steel spacing and bar counts during surveillance inspections.
Following a discussion of this topic at the exit interview, licensee quali'ty assurance management informed the inspector that this prohibi-tion on selected specific checks would be eliminated.
The licensee's followup action will be verified by the inspector during a future inspection (50-528/79-02/Ol).
ualit Assurance Trend Anal sis The inspector examined the most recent "monthly nonconformance summary report for conformance to HAPP 18.7, guality Trend Reporting.
The report examined was File No.
$.14.02.7.5.1 dated 3-19-79 covering the period of 1-15-79 to 2-09-79.
The report concluded that no adverse trends were identified for the period.
(PP 18.7 defines a trend as an incident of nonconformance that occurs three or more times during any one report period.
Bechtel quality assurance personnel provided an NCR Matrix Code used to separate the causes of nonconformances into 35 categories for the purpose. of establishing trends.
The in-spector noted five nonconformances in the monthly report.
Each was in the area of structural concrete pl,acement and was categorized as due to carelessness and not adhering to drawing requirements..
Also, each situation had been verified satisfactory prior to concrete place-ment by the preplacement inspection process, and. each was discovered after placement by virtue of the fact that the condition remained visible after placement.
Bechtel gA personnel stated that their interpretation of the definition of a trend was that items were not reported as trends unless three items of nonconformance occurred in 'the same unit in the same area by the same crew.
The inspector concluded that this interpretation of the requirements of HAPP 18.7 allowed an apparent trend inthe accuracy of preplacement inspections to go unreported to licensee management.
The failure to report these errors as a trend to management'as dis-cussed at the exit interview.
Also discussed was the need for improve-ment in preplacement inspections to preclude these types of nonconformances.
This is considered an open item and will be examined during a future inspection (50-528/79-02/02).
-6-5.
Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundar Pi in
- Unit
At the time of the inspection, automatic machine welding was in progress simul.taneously on both hot leg inlets to the steam generators.
Held No.
on steam generator No.
1 was selected for examination to ascer tain com-pliance with the governing weld procedure P1(G2)-T-I-o(ITP).
The welding
.operation was observed (pass No.
121 was in progress)
and the workman-ship appeared to be satisfactory.
The Field Helding Check List was noted to be properly filled out with hold points identified.
The weld wire issue slips and weld record sheets were examined and appeared to be in order.
The qualification records of ten of the welders who had worked on the weld were also examined.
No items of noncompliance or deviation were identified.
6.
Containment. Post-Tensionin S stem
- Unit 2 The inspector examined vertical tendon sheathing, horizontal tendon sheathing, and horizontal trumplate assemblies installed in the Unit 2 Containment struc-ture at the 96 to 106 foot elevation.
Also, installation of two 40 foot sections of'orizontal sheathing at the 106 foot elevation was observed.
The location of the installed sheathing was compared with the applicable construction draw-ings.
Coupling, joint taping, alignment, damage control, and end protection were compared with the requirements of Specification 13-CN-371, Installation Requirements for Post-Tensioning Trumplate and Sheathing.
Ten of the. licensee's quality assurance surveillance reports from 8-08-78 to 3-08-.79 related to tendon sheathing were examined.
Five nonconformance reports were issued and satisfactorily dispositioned as a result of the licensee's surveillance activity.
-7.
No deviations or items of noncompliance..were identified.
Environmental uglification of Electrical Penetration Assemblies The specification for containment electrical penetration assemblies (EPAs)
to be supplied by ITT Can'non Electric (Specification 13-EN-035, Rev. 2, 9-8-78)
was reviewed for environmental. qualification requirements.
The test procedure to be used to demonstrate
'satisfactory performance of EPAs during a design basis event was found to contain the environmental condi-
'ions specified in the PSAR..
Also, the test procedure appeared-',~to comply with the, requirements of IEEE-323, 1974, "gualifying Class lE Equipment for Nuclear Power Gene'rating Stations."
The pro'gram to be established for re-viewing test results was also discussed with the cognizant engineer and appeared to be satisfactor.
Electrical Com onents and S stems a.
Review of Install ation Instructions Documents and Procedures The inspector found a minor error in PSAR Figure 8.3-2, Hain Single
.
Line Diagram System Connection, in the designation of safety related buses in tables describing loads associated with those buses.
This typographical error was discussed with the licensee who stated that corrective action would be taken.
The inspector also reviewed WP/P gCI 258.0, Electrical Equipment Installation, and compared it to the requirements of ANSI N45.2.4-1972 (IEEE 336-1971), Installation Inspection and Testing Requirements for Instrumentation and Electrical Equipment During Construction of Nuclear Power Generating Stations.
It was found that Paragraph 7.1 of WP/P
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CI 258.0 specifies field installation per Section 3 of ANSI N45.2.4 preconstruction verification) rather than Section 4 (installation)..
The licensee stated that this also would be corrected.
b.
Observation of Work and Work Activities (1)
4160 Volt Switch ear - Unit
Safety related class 1E switchgear PB-AS-03 and PB-BS-04 were examined.
The cabinets for this switchgear were installed, but interconnection of busbars and installation of breakers had not been performed.
Also, final quality control inspections had not been made at the time of the examination.
Holes of approximately 1 1/2 toi2 inch diameter had been made in the channel shaped imbed plates in the floor of the switchgear room to allow air venting during concrete placement.
In four locations, these holes coincided with specified cabinet mounting welds which could not be made.
The licensee had initiated action for an appropriate design change and modification of the design of the corresponding imbed plates for-Units.2 and 3 so as to eliminate a similar situation for those units.
Final inspection of the switchgear installation is awaiting a resolution of this problem.
Since the licensee has taken appropriate action for this matter, the inspector had no further questions..
(2)
480 Volt Switch ear - Unit
r Safety related, class 1E, 480 volt switchgear PG-AL-31 and PG-Al -33 of Division A were examined, along with the 4160/480 volt trans-former PG-AX-03.
The cabinets for this switchgear were in place, but circuit breakers had not been installed and final quality con-trol inspections had not been performed.
The mounting of transformer
-8-PG-AY,-03:experienced similar weld problems as the 4160 volt switchgear discussed previously.
The licensee had taken similar steps to resolve this problem.
The inspector had no further questions in this area.
(3)
4160 Volt and 480 Volt Safet Related Breakers The purchase specifications for 4160 volt.and 480 volt switchgear (13-Etl-009 and 13-EN-017, respectively)
states,
"non-class 1E and class 1E circuit breakers shall not be interchangeable."
Bechtel and licensee personnel were unable to identify for the inspector.
the features of the breakers which precludes this inte'rchangeability.
Traceability of the breakers, however, through their serial numbers, to specific switchgear was possible.
The licensee intends to examine this noninterchangeabi lity feature to facilitate the resolution of the inspector's questions on this item during a future inspection (50-528/79-02/03).
Emer enc Diesel Generators.
- Unit
The handling and storage of two emergency diesel generators, which had arrived onsite approximately ten days prior to the inspection, was examined at the time of this inspection.
These two units had been accepted by receiving inspection and turned over to construction f'r installation.
Receipt inspection documentation presented to the inspector showed no items of nonconformance in the as-received condition.
The first area examined by the inspector was the storage conditions of this equipment onsite.
The conditions observed by the inspector did not meet the requirements of ANSi N45.2.2-1972 for Level B items as
.
follows:
(2)
(3)
(4)
the diesel generators were being stored outdoors on wooden dunnage; the equipment was only partially covered with tarpaulins and the space heaters on the generators were not energized; no means had, been provided for temperature and humidity. control for the generators; and the generator internals were not protected by water vapor proof barriers and desiccant.
Photographs taken by Bechtel of this equipment shortly after arrival at the construction site, interviews with personnel present, and shipping records indicate that the environmental protection provided
for the transcontinental railroad shipment consisting only of a plastic tarpulin cover.
The photographs showed that. one of the units arrived with the tarpaulin cover almost fully ripped off. It was apparent that no attempt had been made tn protect the generators from the effects of temperature and humidity extremes, vapors, and airborne contamination, either during shipment or after arrival at the jobsite.
Examination of the receiving inspection records and interviews hith the receiving inspector and other personnel involved in the reciept of the emergency diesel generators revealed a failure-to follow the requirements of Bechtel instruction l]P/P gCI 4.0 and ANSI N45.2.2 in regard to receiving inspection.
Specifically, ANSI N45.2.2, Paragraph 5.2.2 requires "verification that coatings and preservatives are applied in accordance with specifications, pur-chase orders, or manufacturers instructions; visual inspection to assure that parts...are not...deformed or misaligned; and, visual inspection to'ssure that accessible internal...areas are within the specification requirements for dirt, soil, etc.
The receiving inspec-tion did not identify the requirements for coatings and preservatives to be applied to diesel generators or classify the equipment as to level of protection as defined by the ANSI N45.2.2. standard.
As a result, the receiving inspection did not verify that the require-ments for packaging had been met, and did not identify the fact that special requirement specified by the generator manufacturer for lift-ing of brushes from slip rings and wrapping the slip rings with a good grade of insulation paper had not been accomplished.
Furthermore, the receiving inspector did not record on the inspection report that one covering tarpaulin had tom loose in transit and had caused damage in the form of deformation and misalignment of fluid lines and valve fit-tings associated with one diesel engine.
This information was noted, however, by receiving personnel who photographed the damaged area, reportedly for the purpose of filing a claim with the shipper for destruction of the covering tarpulin..
Finally, the receiving inspec-tion did not include a visual inspection of accessible internal areas such as the generator slip rings which were viewable through an ex-panded metal mesh screen.
Inspection of these areas by the NRC inspec-tor on 3-20-79, revealed an accumulation ot'irt, moisture, and corrosion products on the slip rings and windings of the generator.
Interviews with site personnel, review of photographs taken of the diesel generators upon arrival, and comparison to the actual conditions observed on the diesel generators, disclosed that, sometime after arrival on 3-09-79, repairs were made to fluid lines and valve. fitfVngs that had been damaged on one of the diesel engines.
These repairs had not been documented or accomplished in accordance with Bechtel instruction WP/P gCI 5.0,
"Nonconforming t1aterial, Parts and Components."
l'
-10-9.
Exit Interview At the conclusion of the inspection, the inspectors met with the individuals designated in Paragraph l.
The status of each open item examined during this inspection was discussed.
Particular emphasis was placed on the need to control the shipment, receipt, storage, and repair of equipment such as the emergency diesel generator C