IR 05000498/2020002
| ML20212L874 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | South Texas  |
| Issue date: | 07/31/2020 |
| From: | Jeffrey Josey NRC/RGN-IV/DRP/RPB-A |
| To: | Gerry Powell South Texas |
| References | |
| IR 2020002 | |
| Preceding documents: |
|
| Download: ML20212L874 (36) | |
Text
July 31, 2020
SUBJECT:
SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ELECTRIC GENERATING STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000498/2020002 AND 05000499/2020002
Dear Mr. Powell:
On June 30, 2020, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2. On July 9, 2020, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff.
The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
Three findings of very low safety significance (Green), that involved violations of NRC requirements, are documented in this report. We are treating these findings as non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Licensee-identified violations which were determined to be of very low safety significance are documented in this report. We are treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violations or the significance or severity of the violations documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the NRC Resident Inspector at South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Jeffrey E. Josey, Chief Reactor Projects Branch A Division of Reactor Projects
Docket Nos. 05000498 and 05000499 License Nos. NPF-76 and NPF-80
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers:
05000498 and 05000499
License Numbers:
Report Numbers:
05000498/2020002 and 05000499/2020002
Enterprise Identifier: I-2020-002-0012
Licensee:
STP Nuclear Operating Company
Facility:
South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2
Location:
Wadsworth, TX 77483
Inspection Dates:
April 1, 2020 to June 30, 2020
Inspectors:
I. Anchondo-Lopez, Reactor Inspector
J. Drake, Senior Reactor Inspector
M. Holmberg, Senior Reactor Inspector
G. Kolcum, Senior Resident Inspector
A. Sanchez, Senior Resident Inspector
C. Stott, Resident Inspector
F. Thomas, Reactor Inspector
Approved By:
Jeffrey E. Josey, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch A
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at South Texas Project Electric Generating Station, Units 1 and 2, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information. A licensee-identified non-cited violation is documented in report section 7115
List of Findings and Violations
Inadequate Design Change Modification for Reactor Vessel Head Vent Solenoid Valves Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000498/2020002-01 Open/Closed
[H.14] -
Conservative Bias 71111.17T The inspectors identified a self-revealed, Green non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50,
Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the licensees failure to recognize critical differences between the replacement controllers for the new solenoid valves that rendered both trains of the reactor vessel head vent system vulnerable to a common mode failure.
Specifically, the licensee installed a modification in the reactor vessel head vent system that resulted in a loss of the system safety function for greater than the technical specification allowed outage time.
Failure to Follow Procedure During A Surveillance Results in an Inoperable Train of Essential Cooling Water Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000498,05000499/2020002-02 Open/Closed
[H.12] - Avoid Complacency 71111.22 A self-revealed Green non-cited violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1.a, Regulatory Guide 1.33, Section 3.m, Service Water System, was documented for the failure to follow the surveillance procedure for the Unit 2, train A, essential cooling water (ECW) which challenged system operability. Specifically, plant equipment operators in the ECW pump room failed to implement step 5.2.2 of Procedure 0PSP03-EW-0017, Essential Cooling Water System Train A Testing, Revision 41, to verify ECW self-cleaning strainer was running, instead, the plant equipment operator performed step 5.4.2 that secured the ECW self-cleaning strainer.
Inadequate Risk Assessment of Switchyard Activities Results in Loss of 345kV South Bus Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Events Green NCV 05000498,05000499/2020002-03 Open/Closed
[H.1] -
Resources 71153 The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing Green non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) for the failure to perform an adequate risk assessment to manage the increase in risk of performing activities in the switchyard. Specifically, on March 24, 2020, the licensee failed to implement risk mitigative actions during switchyard maintenance activities, and the result was the loss of the 345kV south bus, partial loss of offsite power to both Units 1 and 2.
Additional Tracking Items
Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status LER 05000498,05000499/
2020-001-00 LER 2020-001-00 for South Texas Project, Units 1 and 2,
Automatic Actuation of Emergency Diesel Generators due to Lockout of Switchyard Electrical Bus 71153 Closed LER 05000499/2019-002-00 LER 2019-002-000 for South Texas Project, Unit 2,
Incorrect Sequencer Part Replacement Leads to Undervoltage Signal and Valid Actuation of Emergency Diesel Generator.
71153 Closed LER 05000499/2019-001-00 LER 2019-001-00 for South Texas Project, Unit 2,
Equipment Clearance Order Error Leads to Loss of Primary Containment Integrity 71153 Closed LER 05000498/2019-002-00 LER 2019-002-00 for South Texas Project, Unit 1,
Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications and Loss of Safety Function due to Inoperable Reactor Head Vent Throttle Valves 71153 Closed LER 05000498/2019-002-01 LER 2019-002-01 for South Texas Project, Unit 1,
Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications and Loss of Safety Function due to Inoperable Reactor Head Vent Throttle Valves 71153 Closed
PLANT STATUS
Unit 1 began the inspection period in Mode 6 during refueling outage 1RE22. The main generator breaker was closed on April 17, 2020, ending the refueling outage. Unit 1 reached rated thermal power on April 22, 2020, and remained there for the rest of the period.
Unit 2 operated at rated thermal power for the entire inspection period
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/readingrm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html.
Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
Starting on March 20, 2020, in response to the National Emergency declared by the President of the United States on the public health risks of the coronavirus (COVID-19), resident inspectors were directed to begin telework and to remotely access licensee information using available technology. During this time the resident inspectors performed periodic site visits each week and during that time conducted plant status activities as described in IMC 2515, Appendix D; observed risk-significant activities: and completed on site portions of IPs. In addition, resident and regional baseline inspections were evaluated to determine if all or portions of the objectives and requirements stated in the IP could be performed remotely. If the inspections could be performed remotely, they were conducted per the applicable IP. In some cases, portions of an IP were completed remotely and on site. The inspections documented below met the objectives and requirements for completion of the IP.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection
Seasonal Extreme Weather Sample (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated readiness for seasonal extreme weather conditions prior to the onset of hurricane season for the following systems:
- The Units 1 and 2, essential cooling water pond (ultimate heat sink)
- The South Texas Project 345kV switchyard
- (2) The inspectors evaluated readiness for seasonal extreme weather conditions prior to the onset of summer heat conditions for the following systems:
- Units 1 and 2, standby transformers
- Units 1 and 2, engineered safety features transformers
External Flooding Sample (IP Section 03.03) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated flood protection barriers, mitigation plans, procedures, and equipment are consistent with the licensees design requirements and risk analysis assumptions for coping with external flooding:
Units 1 and 2, essential cooling water intake structure, emergency diesel generator flood panel areas on May 26, 2020, and this closes out the partial sample documented in inspection report STP2020001, Section 71111.01
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
- (1) Unit 1, train C emergency diesel generator following restoration from surveillance activities May 5, 2020
- (2) Unit 1, train B low head safety injection while train C equipment was out of service for planned maintenance on May 8, 2020
- (3) Unit 2, train B component cooling water while train C was out of service for maintenance on May 12, 2020
- (4) Unit 1, train B emergency diesel generator while train C was out of service for maintenance on May 12, 2020
- (5) Unit 1, train C main steam system while train D was out of service for planned maintenance May 14, 2020
- (6) Unit 2, turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump while train C emergency diesel generator was out of service for planned maintenance on June 11, 2020
Complete Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated system configurations during a complete walkdown of the Unit 2 trains A, B, and C emergency diesel generators during the week of June 22, 2020
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality, material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
- (1) Unit 2, train C component cooling water pump and heat exchanger rooms, Fire Area 27 on May 19, 2020
- (2) Unit 2, train B essential cooling water pump and traveling water screen rooms, Fire Area 57, on May 27, 2020
- (3) Unit 2, standby transformer, Fire Area 99, on May 27, 2020
- (4) Unit 2, electrical auxiliary building train B cable spreading/power cabling area, Fire Area 31 on June 22, 2020
- (5) Unit 2, electrical auxiliary building train A electrical penetration area, Fire Area 02 on June 22, 2020
71111.07A - Heat Sink Performance
Annual Review (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated readiness and performance of:
- (1) Unit 1, train B emergency diesel lube oil and jacket water heat exchangers the week of May 1, 2020, and this closes out the partial sample documented in inspection report STP2020001, Section 71111.07A
71111.08P - Inservice Inspection Activities (PWR) PWR Inservice Inspection Activities Sample (IP Section 03.01)
- (1) The inspectors verified that the reactor coolant system boundary, steam generator tubes, reactor vessel internals, risk-significant piping system boundaries, and containment boundary are appropriately monitored for degradation and that repairs and replacements were appropriately fabricated, examined and accepted by reviewing the following activities from March 18, to April 3, 2020:
03.01.a - Nondestructive Examination and Welding Activities
- Magnetic Particle Examinations: Main Steam System - Pipe Lug Welds 30-MS-1001-GA2/ 27PL1-27PL8/30-MS-1001-GA2 and Reactor Vessel Closure Head Stud 2A
- Ultrasonic Examinations: Pressurizer Pipe-to-Safe-end Overlay Weld 14-WOL-N2, Pressurizer Spray Nozzle-to-Safe End Weld PRZ-1-N2-SE-WOL, Control Rod Drive Housing No. 68 Lower Weld RRVH-CRD-68L, Reactor Coolant System: Branch Connection-to-Bent Pipe 2-RC-1220-BB1, Reactor Coolant System: Pipe-to-Branch Connection 4-RC-1323-BB1 Weld 4 and Reactor Coolant System:
Pipe-to-Branch Connection 4-RC-1126-BB1 Weld 6
- Visual Examinations (VT-1): Reactor Vessel Closure Head Nuts 1A through 36A
- Gas Tungsten Arc Weld (Manual): Essential Cooling Water System - Pipe welds HFW-1402, 1405, 1408 - Repair Plan 1-18-003, Work Order 6009129 and Work Authorization No. 68994
03.01.c - Pressurized-Water Reactor Boric Acid Corrosion Control Activities.
- Evaluations: 19-3869-3 - Centrifugal Charging Pump 1B Outboard Seal is leaking, 20-62-2 - Leakage from High Head Safety Injection Pump 1C Mechanical Seal and Condition Report Engineering Evaluation (CREE)
No. 17-16232-2 - Code Case N-566-2 Engineering Evaluation Residual Heat Removal System Heat Exchanger 1B Flange
- Corrective Actions: 19-3645 - Wet and Discolored Deposits at the Packing Gland of 1-RH-0067A, 19-7057-Dry and White Deposits at the Tubesheet to Flange of the 1B Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger and 19-7066 - Significant Dry and Discolored Deposits at the Packing Gland of 1-SI-FCV-0852
03.01.d - Pressurized-Water Reactor Steam Generator Tube Examination Activities.
- Eddy current examination of the tubes in the Unit 1 steam generators A, B, C and D
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed a Unit 1 operations crew respond to a degraded condition which caused an increase of unidentified reactor coolant leakage on June 18, 2020.
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated a Unit 1 operations crew in the simulator for a training scenario involving a steam leak in containment and a loss-of-coolant accident on June 29, 2020.
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remain capable of performing their intended function:
- (1) Unit 1, train B emergency diesel generator's status in 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) due to continued unavailability time as a result of maintenance, scheduling, and equipment issues and closes out the partial sample documented in Inspection Report STP2020001, Section 71111.12
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (7 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and appropriate work controls were addressed;
- (1) Unit 1, unplanned risk due to train B essential cooling water maintenance resulting in entering the Configuration Risk Management Program (CRMP) on February 9, 2020, and this closes out the partial sample documented in Inspection Report STP2020001, Section 71111.13
- (2) Unit 1, unplanned risk due to maintenance on train B emergency diesel generator going longer than expected and resulted in entering the CRMP on February 17, 2020, and this closes out the partial sample documented in Inspection Report STP2020001, Section 71111.13
- (3) Unit 1, train D 125vdc battery and inverter maintenance that resulted in the planned entry into the CRMP on February 19-20, 2020, and this closes out the partial sample documented in inspection report STP2020001, Section 71111.13
- (4) Unit 1, train A 125vdc battery and inverter maintenance that resulted in the planned entry into the CRMP on February 26-27, 2020, and this closes out the partial sample documented in Inspection Report STP2020001, Section 71111.13
- (5) Unit 1, train B 125vdc battery and inverter maintenance that resulted in the planned entry into the CRMP on March 4-5, 2020, and this closes out the partial sample documented in Inspection Report STP2020001, Section 71111.13
- (6) Unit 1 entered the CRMP for isolating the 1A safety injection accumulator due to leakage through check valve RH-32A on April 30, 2020
- (7) Unit 1, train D battery installation of a temporary modification that jumpered out battery cell number 5 and resulted in entry into the CRMP on June 13, 2020
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
- (1) Unit 1, operability determination of the reactor vessel head studs that exceeded the preload elongation tolerances during reactor vessel head tensioning on April 5, 2020
- (2) Unit 1, operability evaluation of train C diesel generator that failed to complete its 5-minute cooldown period after a surveillance run on April 9, 2020
- (3) Unit 1, operability evaluation of the train A high head safety injection pump that failed to meet acceptance criteria during comprehensive pump test on March 19, 2020
- (4) Unit 1, train A residual heat removal (RHR) and low head safety injection systems due to the train A safety injection accumulator leakage into the RHR heat exchanger
71111.17T - Evaluations of Changes, Tests, and Experiments Sample Selection (IP Section 02.01)
The inspectors reviewed the following evaluations, screenings, and/or applicability determinations for 10 CFR 50.59 from May 2017 through May 2020.
(1)15-22176-3 Use of Speed Crete as welded joint sealant in prestressed concrete embedded cylinder pipe.
(2)17-118-148 Engineering Evaluation of Parker Fitting 48F-5-2 for use in the Standby Emergency Diesel Generator Starting Air System Air Starting Valve
- (3) T1-12-26471-1 Installation of an Upstream Pressure Control Valve to Prevent Cavitation of N1CPPCV5805N (Mixed Bed Service Vessel N Sample Cooler Inlet Pressure Control Valve)
- (4) T1-20-45-1 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 14 Terry Turbine Alternate Drain line (5)20-2312-6 Installation of Metal Oxide Varistors (MOV's) For Unit 1 Rx Vessel Head Vent Throttle Valves Positioners HY0601 and HY0602
- (6) TL2-18-10183 High Side Tubing Crimp on Unit 2 Reactor Coolant System Loop 2B Flow Transmitter D2RCFT0428 (7)17-23295-3 Install Pipe Cap Downstream of Safety Injection Accumulator Nitrogen Supply Vent Valve, A1SIHCV0900 (8)16-128-325 Evaluation of Belleville Washer (9)19-872-1 Extend the Quality Life (QL) of the Primary Sampling Systems Target Rock Solenoid Valves and Reed Switches (10)18-5242-2 Replacement Valve for Application 2R172TCV0392 (11)18-11062-2 Update Vendor Drawing and Setpoint List for CCP 1B Lube Oil Pressure Switch (12)15-14074-4 Create Environment Data Table for Rosemount Transmitters in EQDB Database (13)15-20773-1 Validate and Update Loading for 125 VDC Distribution Panel PL039A (14)15-20773-2 Validate and Update Loading for remaining circuits on Class 1E 125 VDC Distribution Panels PL039B, PL039C, PL040A, PL 139A, PL 139B, and PL 139C (15)16-128-30 Rosemount Differential Pressure Transmitter 1151DP Replacement Part (16)16-128-94 Alternate Replacement Limitorque Actuator for B320-10 (17)16-2214-10 Revise Environmental Qualification DBD to address QDPS On-going Qualification in Mild Environment (18)12-31926-43 Class 1E 4.16 KV Circuit Breaker Replacements (19)17-20542-7 Replace Emergency Transformer 138 KV Circuit Switch Operator; ## 81 (20)17-22335-2 Replace 27C Relay (ITE J13) Associated in Control Circuit for Containment Spray Pump 1B (21)15-16599-37 Application of The Mechanical Stress Improvement Process (MSIP) To Reactor Vessel Nozzles (22)15-110072-2 Replace Unit 1 Reactor Vessel Head Vent Throttle Valves with Upgraded Bolted Bonnet Design (23)14-12285-20 Perform a 50.59 Screen/Evaluation to address concerns raised in NSAL 14-5 (24)16-5792-13 Update UFSAR 15.1.5 to incorporate revised HZP MSLB core response analysis due to RCCA D-6 removal (25)18-2757-11 Temporary Installation of a Portable Heater/Fan Unit in Doorway (Door 307) of Room 321 (E1C11 125 Volt QC Battery Rack Room) on the 60-foot Elevation of the Electrical Auxiliary Building (EAB)
(26)19-10118-9 Replace Primary Fuses in Aux Relay Panel for Unit 1 Reactor Vessel Head Vent Valve HCV0601 and 602 (27)18-88-275 Replacement Size 3 and 4 Magnetic Motor Starters for Class 1E Application
71111.18 - Plant Modifications
Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:
- (1) Unit 1, implementation of the exigent Technical Specification change to lower pressure in all three trains of safety injection accumulators to stop nitrogen gas accumulation in the train A RHR heat exchanger on May 29, 2020
- (2) Unit 1, train D 125Vdc battery cell number 5 jumper due to degraded cell voltage on June 13, 2020
71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing
Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following post maintenance test activities to verify system operability and functionality:
- (1) Unit 1, train A steam generator narrow range level set 3 L-0518 following card replacement on February 8, 2020
- (2) Unit 1, train C residual heat removal heat exchanger component cooling water return flow valve FV-4565 following solenoid valve replacement on March 11, 2020
- (3) Unit 1, auxiliary air lock following hydraulic solenoid valve replacement on April 9, 2020
- (4) Unit 1, train A low head safety injection pump discharge to cold leg check valve following repair on April 14, 2020
- (5) Unit 1, train C essential chiller 12C following emergent maintenance to replace the temperature element and temperature control module on May 11, 2020
- (6) Unit 1, operating crew respond to a degraded condition which caused an increase of unidentified reactor coolant leakage on June 18, 2020
71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities
Refueling/Other Outage Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated refueling outage 1RE22 activities from March 13 through April 17, 2020, which completes the partial sample documented in Inspection Report STP2020001, Section 71111.20
71111.22 - Surveillance Testing
The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:
Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01)
- (1) Unit 1, train C emergency diesel generator surveillance test on March 11, 2020, and this closes out the partial sample documented in Inspection Report STP2020001, Section 71111.22
- (2) Unit 1, trains A, B, and C emergency diesel interdependence test on April 2, 2020
- (3) Unit 1, high pressure turbine load swing test on April 20, 2020.
- (4) Unit 1, train B 125Vdc battery monthly surveillance test on May 11, 2020
- (5) Unit 2, train S reactor trip breaker testing on May 22, 2020
- (6) Unit 1, loop 4 set 4 delta T and T average calibration on June 4, 2020
- (7) Unit 1, loop 2 set 2 delta T and T average calibration on June 9, 2020
Inservice Testing (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1, train B residual heat removal inservice test on March 11, 2020, and this closes out the partial sample documented in inspection report STP2020001, Section 71111.22
- (2) Unit 2, turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump surveillance test on June 18, 2020
- (3) Unit 2, train A essential cooling water in-service surveillance test on June 20, 2020
Containment Isolation Valve Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) Unit 2, auxiliary air lock local leak rate test on May 11,
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification
The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
MS05: Safety System Functional Failures (SSFFs) Sample (IP Section 02.04)===
- (1) Unit 1, April 1, 2019 through March 31, 2020
- (2) Unit 2, April 1, 2019 through March 31, 2020
BI01: Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Specific Activity Sample (IP Section 02.10) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1, April 1, 2019 through March 31.2020
- (2) Unit 2, April 1, 2019 through March 31, 2020
BI02: RCS Leak Rate Sample (IP Section 02.11) (2 Samples)
- (1) Unit 1, April 1, 2019 through March 31, 2020
- (2) Unit 2, April 1, 2019 through March 31, 2020
71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution
Semiannual Trend Review (IP Section 02.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program for potential adverse trends that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue.
Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (IP Section 02.03) (1 Sample)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:
- (1) An electrical supervisor manipulated plant equipment without permission and procedure during walkdown of Unit 1 train C essential chiller as documented in Condition Report CR 2019-10223
71153 - Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Report (IP Section 03.02)
The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs):
- (1) LER 05000499/2019-001-00, Equipment Clearance Order Error Leads to Loss of Primary Containment Integrity (ADAMS Accession No.: ML19119A270). This licensee event report is closed.
- (2) LER 05000499/2019-002-00, Incorrect Sequencer Part Replacement Leads to Under voltage Signal and Valid Actuation of Emergency Diesel Generator (ADAMS Accession No.: ML19353C818). The circumstances surrounding this LER were previously documented in Inspection Report 05000498/2019004 and 05000499/2019004 in the Inspection Results Section of that report. This licensee event report is closed.
- (3) LER 05000498;05000499/2020-001-00 Automatic Actuation of Emergency Diesel Generators due to Lockout of Switchyard Electrical Bus (ADAMS Accession Number ML20143A188). This licensee event report is closed.
- (4) LER 05000498/2019-002-01, Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications and Loss of Safety Function due to Inoperable Reactor Head Vent Throttle Valves (ADAMS Accession No. ML19331A039) The inspection conclusions associated with this LER are documented in this report under Inspection Results Section 71111.17T.
INSPECTION RESULTS
Inadequate Design Change Modification for Reactor Vessel Head Vent Solenoid Valves Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems
Green NCV 05000498/2020002-01 Open/Closed
[H.14] -
Conservative Bias 71111.17T The inspectors identified a self-revealed, Green non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the licensees failure to recognize critical differences between the replacement controllers for the new solenoid valves that rendered both trains of the reactor vessel head vent system vulnerable to a common mode failure.
Specifically, the licensee installed a modification in the reactor vessel head vent system that resulted in a loss of the system safety function for greater than the technical specification allowed outage time.
Description:
On October 30, 2018, the licensee replaced A1RCHCV0601 and B1RCHCV0602, the solenoid operated valves for the reactor vessel head vent system, with a new bolted bonnet design and new positioner controllers. The engineering change package failed to recognize that the new controller circuitry had overvoltage protection system that shorted the power supply to ground when voltage limits for the controller card were exceeded. Additionally, the licensee failed to recognize that the DC power supply in use was not well regulated and was subject to large voltage spikes under varying conditions. On November 2, 2018, the licensee noted that power supply fuses for HCV0601 had again blown.
On December 31, 2018, reactor head vent throttle valve (RHVTV) 'A' (HCV0601)unexpectedly auto transferred to the auxiliary shutdown panel and the control room declared the valve inoperable. With one train of the reactor vessel head system inoperable, the licensee failed to establish additional operator actions to verify the operability of the remaining train.
On July 30, 2019, a training instructor with students discovered that reactor vessel head vent valve 'B' (HCV0602) control unit had a blown fuse and the control room declared valve HCV0602 inoperable. Following a review of records and logs, Engineering determined that the fuse to reactor vessel head vent valve 'B' had blown on or about June 24, 2019. This failure would have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident (both vent valves being declared inoperable at the same time)and exceeded the technical specification action statement allowed outage time of 30 days.
This event is considered a loss of a safety function.
The licensee implemented multiple corrective actions attempting to correct the condition before the underlying cause was fully understood. These included installing higher amperage fuses, replacing the terminal box noise suppressors, installing metal oxide varistor at the positioners, and installing an RC (resistive capacitive) filter across the 125VDC at the positioners HCV0601 and HCV0602 as additional protection. After contacting the vendor, the licensee determined that the underlying cause of the failures was an inadequately regulated DC power supply and decided that installation of a better regulated DC power supply, to filter any voltage transients caused by electromagnetic or radio frequency interference, was necessary to correct the problem.
Corrective Actions: This condition has been entered into the corrective action program as Condition Report CR-2020-5798. As an interim action, the licensee powers down the reactor vessel head vent positioners before any planned start of the emergency diesel generators or their fans and checks the power fuses after any unplanned start of the emergency diesel generators or their fans.
Corrective Action References: Condition Report CR-2020-5798
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The licensees failure to recognize critical differences between the replacement controllers overvoltage protection system was a performance deficiency.
Specifically, the failure to understand the differences between the original valve controller and the replacement introduced a common mode failure to both trains. This combined with a failure to implement adequate compensatory measures following inadequate corrective actions resulted in a loss of safety function for greater than technical specification allowed outage time.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. This failure could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident (both vent valves being declared inoperable at the same time) and exceeded the technical specification action statement allowed outage time of 30 days. This event is considered a loss of a safety function, but the finding did not result in a loss of PRA function of a single train, or multiple trains of a technical Specification piece of equipment for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or allowed outage time, and is therefore of very low safety significance, Green.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.14 - Conservative Bias: Individuals use decision-making-practices that emphasize prudent choices over those that are simply allowable. A proposed action is determined to be safe in order to proceed, rather than unsafe in order to stop. The licensee failed to fully evaluate the design of the overvoltage protection system for the new controllers and assumed it functioned similar to the overvoltage protection of the original controllers.,.
Enforcement:
Violation: Violation: 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, requires, in part, that the design control measures shall provide for verifying or checking the adequacy of design by the performance of a suitable testing program. The verifying or checking process shall be performed by individuals or groups other than those who performed the original design, but who may be from the same organization. Where a test program is used to verify the adequacy of a specific design feature in lieu of other verifying or checking processes, it shall include suitable qualifications testing of a prototype unit under the most adverse design conditions. Design changes, including field changes, shall be subject to design control measures commensurate with those applied to the original design and be approved by the organization that performed the original design unless the applicant designates another responsible organization.
Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to ensure that the design changes that replaced the reactor vessel head vent valve position controllers were fully evaluated to fully evaluate the design of the overvoltage protection system for the new controllers and assumed it functioned similar to the overvoltage protection of the original controllers. This evaluation should have ensured that the circuitry was compatible with the DC power supply providing power to the valves and controllers.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Failure to Follow Procedure During a Surveillance Results in an Inoperable Train of Essential Cooling Water Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems
Green NCV 05000498,05000499/2020002-02 Open/Closed
[H.12] - Avoid Complacency 71111.22 A self-revealed Green non-cited violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1.a, Regulatory Guide 1.33, Section 3.m, Service Water System, was documented for the failure to follow the surveillance procedure for the Unit 2, train A, essential cooling water (ECW) which challenged system operability. Specifically, plant equipment operators in the ECW pump room failed to implement step 5.2.2 of procedure 0PSP03-EW-0017, Essential Cooling Water System Train A Testing, Revision 41, to verify ECW self-cleaning strainer was running, instead, the plant equipment operator performed step 5.4.2 that secured the ECW self-cleaning strainer.
Description:
On June 20, 2020, during a Unit 2, train A, ECW surveillance, 0PSP03-EW-0017, Essential Cooling Water System Train A Testing, Revision 41, the control room requested the plant equipment operator to perform step 5.2.2 to verify the ECW strainer was running. The plant equipment operator (PEO1) repeated the request back to the control room operator correctly, to perform Step 5.2.2. With the concurrence of an experienced plant equipment operator (PEO2) in the field peer checking, PEO1 performed step 5.4.2 to remove the strainer from service. A visual and audible alarm immediately sounded in the control indicating that the train was in an abnormal alignment. Operations immediately declared the train A ECW inoperable. Control room operators immediately asked the plant equipment operators (PEO1 and PEO2) to stop any further actions, and using the 0POP02-EW-0001, Essential Cooling Water Operations, Revision 83, promptly restored the ECW train to an operable status.
The license determined that the PEOs (performer and peer checker) were both present at the pre-job brief. During the brief, operations discovered that PEO1 had never performed this surveillance, so PEO2 was assigned to peer-check the evolution. PEO1 was seen highlighting steps to be performed in the field. After the issue, PEO1 stated that it was loud and could not hear very well, the first step highlighted was step 5.4.2, not step 5.2.2, and the peer-checker was rendered useless by not providing appropriate oversight of this activity.
The licensees prompt human performance checklist determined that the PEO1 performed the wrong step, therefore failed to operate the plant in accordance with the procedure and was over reliant on the highlighted portions of the procedure. The high noise level challenged communications.
Corrective Actions: Unit 2 control room operations suspended the surveillance, restored train A ECW to an operable status within 4-minutes per a normal system operating procedure. Following an investigation, a lessons learned was distributed to the rest of the operations department.
Corrective Action References: Condition Report CR 2020-6765
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The failure to follow an operations surveillance procedure involving safety-related equipment, which operability, was a performance deficiency. Specifically, while performing a surveillance on the Unit 2 train A ECW, plant equipment operators in the field performed step 5.4.2 of Procedure 0PSP03-EW-0017, Essential Cooling Water System Train A Testing, Revision 41, to secure the essential cooling water self-cleaning strainer instead of the directed step 5.2.2 which was to ensure that the essential cooling water self-cleaning strainer was running. This inappropriate action challenged train A ECW operability. Unit 2 operators restored the train to its original configuration within 4 minutes.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the human performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the plant equipment operators human performance error resulted in an inoperable ECW train and an unexpected entry into a 7-day Technical Specification action statement.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. Specifically, the finding did not result in a loss of PRA function of a single train, or multiple trains of a technical specification piece of equipment for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or allowed outage time, and is therefore of very low safety significance, Green.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.12 - Avoid Complacency: Individuals recognize and plan for the possibility of mistakes, latent issues, and inherent risk, even while expecting successful outcomes. Individuals implement appropriate error reduction tools. Specifically, the Unit 2 plant equipment operators did not consider potential undesirable consequences of their actions before performing surveillance procedure steps and did not implement appropriate error-reduction tools.
Enforcement:
Violation: Technical Specification 6.8.1.a, requires, in part, that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained in accordance with Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, February 1978. Section 3.m, Procedures for Startup, Operation, and Shutdown of Safety-Related PWR Systems, of that appendix, requires, in part, that that the instructions for energizing, startup, shutdown, and changing mode of operation should be prepared for the service water system (essential cooling water at South Texas Project). The licensee established 0PSP03-EW-0017, Essential Cooling Water System Train A Testing, Revision 41, to meet the Regulatory Guide requirement. Step 5.2.2 states, Verify ECW SELF CLEANING STRAINER 1A(2A) is running.
Contrary to the above, on June 20, 2020, plant equipment operators failed to follow the step 5.2.2 and actually performed step 5.4.2 which secured the essential cooling water self-cleaning strainer, thereby challenging train A inoperability. This was an unplanned 7-day shutdown action statement of Technical Specification 3.7.7.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as an non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Licensee-Identified Non-Cited Violation 71152 This violation of very low safety significance was identified by the licensee and has been entered into the licensee corrective action program and is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Violation: This violation of very low safety significance was identified by the licensee and has been entered into the licensees corrective action program and is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Technical Specification 6.8.1.a, Regulatory Guide 1.33, Appendix A, 1978, Section 9, states that maintenance that can affect the performance of safety-related equipment should be properly preplanned and performed in accordance with written procedures, documented instructions, or drawings appropriate to the circumstances.
Contrary to the above, on September 17, 2019, maintenance (troubleshooting) was performed on the Unit 1 train C essential chiller without written instructions or procedures.
Specifically, an electrical supervisor was contacted by Unit 1 control room and asked to look at the chiller due to apparent drifting chiller output temperature discovered on an operator round. The electrical supervisor actually manipulated the operable and protected safety-related essential chiller and left a temperature control switch in off position.
Operations returned, with the electrical supervisor, a short time later to procedurally verify the temperature control loop operation and discovered the switch out of position. At that time the electrical supervisor voluntarily admitted to manipulating the component without permission or procedure.
Significance/Severity: Green. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process For Findings At-Power, dated December 13, 2019, the inspectors determined that the performance deficiency did not result in a loss of PRA function of a single train, or multiple trains of a technical specification piece of equipment for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or allowed outage time and is therefore of very low safety significance.
Corrective Action References: Condition Report CR 2019-10223
Observation: Semi-Annual Trend Review 71152 The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program entries, maintenance activities, emergent maintenance issues, plant health reports, outage performance reviews, NRC generated condition reports, and NRC inspector walkdowns.
The inspectors noted and documented the following issues and trends:
- As documented in NRC Inspection Report IR 2019-004, there continues to be issues with station personnel consistently and reliably following station procedures. Recent examples are: 1) failure to follow the correct procedure step which resulted in making the Unit 1 train A ECW inoperable (CR 2020-6765), 2) an electrical supervisor failed to get permission or follow any applicable procedure to troubleshoot and manipulate the Unit 1 train C essential chiller temperature control module vein switch and resulted in making the train inoperable (CR 2019-10223), 3) during the Unit 1 train B emergency diesel generator 6-year maintenance electricians wired relays incorrectly, which led to an extra 2 days of unavailability and contributed to an unplanned entry into the Configuration Risk Management Program (CR 2020-1854), and 4) a plant equipment operator performing a restoration procedure on the wrong diesel generator resulted in making the Unit 1 train B emergency diesel generator inoperable (CR 2019-5842). While the licensee has taken action to lower the number of events, the inoperability of equipment with a failure to implement and follow procedures is an unacceptable trend.
- The resident inspectors as well as the licensee, both recognize a trend related to vendor performance due to a lack of adequate vendor oversight. Recent examples to support the trend are: 1) vendor involved in the loss of the 345kV south bus (CR 2020-3665), vendor at the main cooling reservoir river make up facility that leaked hydraulic fluid into the Colorado River which required three notifications to the state of Texas (CR 2020-1924, -3285, -5777), 3) main turbine vendor that inadvertently closed on instrument air valve (which was a near miss for a reactor trip)and issues with high pressure turbine replacement which resulted in an unnecessary heavy lift of plant equipment (CR 2020-5491, -2349), 4) vendor issues with reactor vessel head tensioning which extended the time with reactor coolant system level at head flange level (CR 2020-4352), 5) the vendor maintenance on check valve RH-32 that failed to resolve leak by and resulted in a significant challenge to Unit 1 operation and required a license amendment to temporarily resolve (CR 2020-4781), and 6) vendor failed to fabricate an adequate ECW travelling screen replacement (20-1490). The licensee initiated Condition Reports CR 2020-5829 and 2020-5911 to note the trend and the quality department elevating the trend for additional focus and resolution, respectively.
- The inspectors identified a trend in the number of persistent issues in the emergency diesel generator systems. Recent examples include: 1) multiple issues with emergency diesel generators failing to enter into their cooldown mode - after unloading the diesel and shutting it off, the diesel is, by design, run for 5-minutes before completely securing. This function is not safety-related and failure is indicative of a failed relay, but in order to prove operability the diesel must be fast started, which can impact service life due to unnecessary wear on the diesels, 2) repeated air leaks from the starting air system, 3) issues with remote monitoring of fuel oil tank levels from the control room, 4) maintenance rule unavailability for the Unit 1 train B diesel, which has been in 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) status since June 2019 due to unavailability hours, but has continued to accumulate unavailability due to a combination of equipment issues, inadequate maintenance scheduling and human performance issues, and 5) a cracked exhaust manifold that has required a significant amount of engineering, maintenance, and operations resources to justify operability, as well as persistent NRC inspector challenges. The licensee failed to take advantage of opportunities to replace the exhaust manifold and have rescheduled the proper repair of the manifold several times and is now scheduled in November 2020 due to summer peak operations and COVID-19. If the schedule holds, the station will have been living with this issue, on a highly risk-significant plant component, for 15 months. The residents had discussions with engineering and maintenance on June 11, 2020, to express the concern of these numerous issues and the possibility that they could cloud and make future issues more difficult to diagnose. The licensee acknowledged the trend and initiated Condition Report CR 2020-7746 to further evaluate and resolve the trend.
Licensee-Identified Non-Cited Violation 71153 This violation of very low safety significance was identified by the licensee and has been entered into the licensee corrective action program and is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Violation: Technical Specification 3.6.1.1, Primary Containment, requires that primary containment integrity shall be maintained.
Contrary to the above, from September 3, 2019, until September 5, 2019, Unit 2 primary containment integrity was not maintained. Specifically, the Unit 2 inside containment hydrogen monitoring sample inlet test valve (2-CM-0005) was open at the same time as outside containment post-accident sampling system (PASS) test vent valve (2-AP-0004).
The outside containment PASS air sample isolation valve (2-AP-2456) located between these two valves was being replaced due to leakage. This configuration provided a pathway through containment penetration M-82D which is comprised of one-inch diameter piping.
Significance/Severity: Green. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix H, Containment Integrity Significance Determination Process, dated April 30, 2020, the inspectors determined that this performance deficiency did not appreciably increase the Large Early Release Frequency for Unit 2 due to the small size of the piping involved. For this reason, the inspectors concluded that the finding is of very low safety significance (Green).
Corrective Action References: Condition Report CR 19-9764
This finding closes LER 05000499/2019001, Equipment Clearance Order Error Leads to Loss of Primary Containment Integrity.
Inadequate Risk Assessment of Switchyard Activities Results in Loss of 345kV South Bus Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Events
Green NCV 05000498,05000499/2020002-03 Open/Closed
[H.1] -
Resources 71153 The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing Green non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) for the failure to perform an adequate risk assessment to manage the increase in risk of performing activities in the switchyard. Specifically, on March 24, 2020, the licensee failed to implement risk mitigative actions during switchyard maintenance activities because of an inadequate risk assessment, which resulted in the loss of the 345kV south bus, which was a partial loss of offsite power to both Units 1 and 2.
Description:
On March 24, 2020, Unit 1 was defueled during Refueling Outage 1RE22, while Unit 2 was in Mode 1 at full power. Unit 1 had train B emergency diesel generator (EDG) in operation carrying the 4160kV bus due to planned maintenance. Unit 2 had no Technical Specification components out of service. Transmission and distribution service provider (TDSP) personnel were performing transmission line relay testing on a 345kV line.
At 10:46 a.m., TDSP personnel had a human performance error while performing relay testing caused by applying test equipment to the wrong relay which resulted in the south bus and standby transformer 2 lockouts. The effects on the units are as follows (All equipment responded and functioned as designed without issue.):
Unit 1
Unit 1 experienced an undervoltage condition on trains A and C engineered safety features (ESF) buses, both associated EDGs started and powered the ESF buses. The 1B spent fuel pool cooling pump lost power leaving only the 1A pump in service. The time-to-boil in spent fuel pool was 11 hours1.273148e-4 days <br />0.00306 hours <br />1.818783e-5 weeks <br />4.1855e-6 months <br />. Operators restored full spent fuel pool cooling at 10:56 a.m.,
10 minutes following the loss of one train of cooling, with a non-detectable increase in spent fuel pool temperature. One fuel bundle was also in the process of being moved and was suspended due to the loss of power. On the turbine deck, a small load was suspended over the deck. Unit 1 had all three EDGs in operation carrying all ESF buses, and all outage activities were ceased.
Unit 2
Unit 2 experienced an undervoltage condition on the train B ESF bus and its associated EDG started and powered the ESF bus. The 2A spent fuel pool cooling pump was lost leaving only the 2B pump in service. The time-to-boil in the spent fuel pool was 45 hours5.208333e-4 days <br />0.0125 hours <br />7.440476e-5 weeks <br />1.71225e-5 months <br />. Full spent fuel pool cooling was restored at 12:31 p.m.
The three ESF buses (Unit 1 trains A and C, and Unit 2 train B) were re-aligned to the Unit 1 standby transformer 1, which is powered by the 345kV north bus, and EDGs were secured.
TDSP replaced the damaged components and the 345 south bus was restored at 9:32 p.m.
The Unit 2 train B ESF bus was then realigned to standby transformer 2 at 10:05 p.m. Both units were completely restored to normal configuration at this time.
The inspectors reviewed the licensees root cause evaluation. The evaluation identified the direct root cause of the event to be a human performance error by TDSP employees in the switchyard. The TDSP employees energized and began testing the wrong relay which resulted in the lockout of the 345kV south bus and the standby transformer 2. Because the human performance error belonged to the TDSP employees and corrective action to prevent recurrence was determined to be unfeasible, corrective actions were focused on South Texas Project programs and processes to correct and prevent a similar issue from re-occurring.
The inspectors determined that the evaluation was thorough and reviewed the long-standing history of issues with switchyard work management going as far back as the early 1990s.
There was a similar event in 2010, in which the 345kV north bus was lost due to a TDSP employee human performance issue. Corrective actions from that event appear to have been mildly effective and short lived. The procedure at the center of the event is 0PGP03-XS-0001, Switchyard Management and its eight revisions since 2010. The procedures purpose is to define and facilitate the process for scheduling and performing maintenance in the switchyard as well assessing the risk for any given work activity. Over the years, the licensee vaguely adhered to the switchyard management procedure and it is evident that South Texas Project management has not supported the procedure and program well enough to consistently maintain a well-qualified switchyard coordinator who can properly implement the program. The initial work that was scheduled during this most recent Unit 1 refueling outage (1RE22) was initially presented by a switchyard coordinator in April 2019.
That switchyard coordinator retired and was replaced with a coordinator that was not fully qualified in August 2019. The switchyard work was reviewed again prior to the outage and the new coordinator determined that the maintenance work by TDSP would not be an Impactive Activity in accordance with the vague definition of an Impactful Activity in the switchboard management procedure. As a result, STP did not implement risk mitigative actions, such as conducting a pre-job brief with TDSP personnel providing direct oversight of the vendor, which failed to prevent the unexpected partial loss of offsite power.
Corrective Actions: Immediate actions were to stand down the TDSP work in the switchyard, to implement human performance error reduction tools to further possible errors in the switchyard, restore spent fuel pool cooling in both units, and to restore the 345kV south bus and normal ESF bus alignments. The corrective actions from the root cause evaluation involve strengthening the 0PGP03-XS-0001, Switchyard Management procedure, specifically focusing on the roles and responsibilities for the Switchyard Coordinator and reinvigorating the South Texas Project management participation in re-establishing a collaborative working relationship with the TDSP.
Corrective Action References: Condition Report CR 2020-3665
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The failure to adequately assess maintenance risk for switchyard relay testing was a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined that the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the protection against external factors attribute and adversely affected the Initiating Events Cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during power operations.
Specifically, while TDSP workers were performing maintenance activities in the 345kV switchyard, a human performance error resulted in a loss of the 345kV south bus which was a partial loss of power for both units.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609, Appendix K, Maintenance Risk Assessment and Risk Management SDP. A note in the appendix given below:
Note: This guidance does not apply to the following situations:
- (1) those licensees who only perform qualitative analyses of plant configuration risk due to maintenance activities, or
- (2) performance deficiencies related to maintenance activities affecting SSCs needed for fire or seismic mitigation. When performance deficiencies are identified with either 1 or 2 above, the significance of the deficiencies must be determined by an internal NRC management review using risk insights where possible in accordance with IMC 612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports.
Because the licensee uses qualitative analyses for all switchyard work, Situation 1 above applies. Therefore, the significance of this performance deficiency must be determined by internal NRC management review. It should be noted that the internal management review was an artifact of the early significance determination process that was superseded by Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix M, Significance Determination Process Using Qualitative Criteria, issued in December of 2006 after the current revision of Appendix K.
Therefore, the inspectors requested that the senior reactor analyst initiate a review in accordance with Appendix M.
Appendix M, step 4.1, Initial Evaluation, directs the user to determine if there are any significance colors that can reasonably be excluded from further consideration using available quantitative and/or qualitative methods and best available information. The senior reactor analyst reviewed the licensees risk evaluation of the event that occurred on March 24, 2020. While this evaluation was mostly qualitative, it specifically addressed the impact to core damage frequency from the event. The performance deficiency was the failure to perform a risk assessment prior to the work in the switchyard. The analyst noted that, while risk management actions are used to protect redundant equipment, wrong-component events are not explicitly modeled when performing a maintenance rule risk assessment. Therefore, the analyst determined that the licensees assessment would bound the appropriate maintenance rule evaluation. Based on the licensees assessment and other information available to the analyst, the analyst determined that the finding was of, at most, very low safety significance, Green.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.1 - Resources: Leaders ensure that personnel, equipment, procedures, and other resources are available and adequate to support nuclear safety.
Specifically, South Texas Project site management failed to ensure they adequately supported the switchyard management program, procedure and to provide an adequately trained switchyard coordinator without collateral responsibilities to ensure error free maintenance in the 345kV switchyard.
Enforcement:
Violation: 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(4) states, in part, before performing maintenance activities (including but not limited to surveillance, post-maintenance testing, and corrective and preventive maintenance), the licensee shall assess and manage the increase in risk that may result from the proposed maintenance activities. The licensee uses Procedure 0PGP03-XS-0001, Switchyard Management, Revision 8, to assess and manage the risk from switchyard maintenance activities.
Contrary to the above, on March 24, 2020, licensee personnel failed to adequately assess and manage the risk from switchyard maintenance activities. Specifically, the failure to recognize the increased risk and take risk mitigative actions for maintenance activities in the 345kV switchyard, which resulted in a loss of the 345kV south bus, which represented a partial loss of offsite power to both units.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On April 3, 2020, the inspectors presented the Inservice inspection results to Mr. J. Connolly, Executive Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On May 15, 2020, the inspectors presented the Evaluations of Changes, Tests, and Experiments inspection results to Mr. J. Connolly, Executive Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On May 21, 2020, the inspectors presented revised results for the Evaluations of Changes, Tests, and Experiments to Mr. L. Sterling, Regulatory Affairs Manager, and other members of the licensee staff.
- On July 9, 2020, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to G. T. Powell, President and CEO, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-YYYY-NNNN
20-5447
Procedures
0POP02-CC-0001 Component Cooling Water
Procedures
0003
Emergency Diesel Generator 13(23)
Procedures
0001
Main Steam System
Procedures
Safety Injection Initial Lineup
Procedures
Fire Preplan Electrical Auxiliary Building, Electrical
Penetration Area Train A
Procedures
Fire Preplan Electrical Auxiliary Building Cable
Spreading/Power Cabling Area, Train B
Procedures
Fire Preplan Mechanical Auxiliary Building CCW Pump and
Chiller, Train C
Procedures
Fire Preplan Mechanical Auxiliary Building CCW Pump and
Chiller, Train C
Procedures
Fire Preplan Mechanical Auxiliary Building CCW Heat
Exchangers
Procedures
Fire Preplan Mechanical Auxiliary Building CCW Heat
Exchangers
Procedures
Fire Protection System Functionality Requirements
Procedures
Fire Preplan for the Standby Transformer
Procedures
Fire Preplan for the Standby Transformer
Procedures
0604
Fire Preplan Essential Cooling Water Intake Structure Pump
Room Train B
Procedures
0604
Fire Preplan Essential Cooling Water Intake Structure Pump
Room Train B
71111.07A Calculations
MC-6476
71111.07A Miscellaneous
ESF Diesel Generator 12 Lube Oil Cooler Tube Scale
Inspections
2/2020
71111.07A Miscellaneous
ESF Diesel Generator 12 Jacket Water Cooler Tube Scale
Inspection
2/2020
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
71111.08P Calibration
Records
ACTS TGX-001-
20
0.560 Bobbin @ 80IPS
Revision 0
71111.08P Calibration
Records
ACTS TGX-002-
20
0.560 Bobbin @ 40IPS
Revision 0
71111.08P Calibration
Records
ACTS TGX-003-
20
0.540 Bobbin @ 30IPS
Revision 0
71111.08P Calibration
Records
ACTS TGX-004-
20
Coil +PT
Revision 0
71111.08P Calibration
Records
ACTS TGX-006-
20
Single Coil +PT - Non-Mag Biased
Revision 0
71111.08P Calibration
Records
ACTS TGX-007-
20
Single Coil +PT - Mag Biased
Revision 0
71111.08P Calibration
Records
ANTS TGX-A-020
Bobbin Coil
Revision 0
71111.08P Calibration
Records
ANTS: TGX-B-
20
coil +PT RPC
Revision 0
71111.08P Calibration
Records
ANTS: TGX-C-
20
RPC - U-bend, midrange frequency +PT
Revision 0
71111.08P Calibration
Records
ANTS: TGX-E-
20
Bobbin Coil and Rotating Coil
Revision 0
71111.08P Calibration
Records
UTCAL-2020-012
Ultrasonic Calibration - Examination Report UT-2020-015
03/19/2020
71111.08P Calibration
Records
UTCAL-2020-013
Ultrasonic Calibration - Examination Report UT-2020-015
03/19/2020
71111.08P Calibration
Records
UTCAL-2020-020
Ultrasonic Calibration - Examination Report UT-2020-021
03/24/2020
71111.08P Calibration
Records
UTCAL-2020-021
Ultrasonic Calibration - Examination Report UT-2020-021
03/24/2020
71111.08P Calibration
Records
UTCAL-2020-034
Ultrasonic Calibration - Examination Report UT-2020-028
03/27/2020
71111.08P Calibration
Records
UTCAL-2020-035
Ultrasonic Calibration - Examination Report UT-2020-028
03/27/2020
71111.08P Calibration
Records
UTCAL-2020-036
Ultrasonic Calibration - Examination Report UT-2020-028
03/27/2020
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
71111.08P Calibration
Records
UTCAL-2020-037
Ultrasonic Calibration - Examination Report UT-2020-028
03/27/2020
71111.08P Calibration
Records
UTCAL-2020-038
Ultrasonic Calibration - Examination Report UT-2020-028
03/27/2020
71111.08P Calibration
Records
UTCAL-2020-041
Ultrasonic Calibration - Examination Report UT-2020-036
03/30/2020
71111.08P Calibration
Records
UTCAL-2020-042
Ultrasonic Calibration - Examination Report UT-2020-036
03/30/2020
71111.08P Corrective Action
Documents
CA 19-3869-3
Centrifugal Charging Pump 1B Outboard Seal is Leaking
Greater than 5 dpm with the Pump Running (Tier 1
Evaluation)
5/2/2019
71111.08P Corrective Action
Documents
CA 20-62-2
Leakage from High Head Safety Injection Pump 1C
Mechanical Seal Leakage has Accumulated on Pump
Housing Base (Tier 1 Evaluation)
01/30/2020
71111.08P Corrective Action
Documents
CR 18-14004
Enhancements of the Contract Welding Requirements to
11/14/2018
71111.08P Corrective Action
Documents
CR 18-2694
Increased Trend of Failures with Controllers on the New
Hydrazine Pumps
03/04/2018
71111.08P Corrective Action
Documents
CR 19-1891
Internal Erosion on the 6 Alum. Bronze Piping Tee and
Flanges of EW-0189
2/17/2019
71111.08P Corrective Action
Documents
CR 19-1966
WE NSAL-05-2-Steam Generator Secondary Side 2.5 Inch
or Less Diameter Un-Reinforced Penetration Cover Plate
Stress Report Error
2/19/2019
71111.08P Corrective Action
Documents
CR 19-3645
Wet and Discolored Deposits at the Packing Gland of 1-RH-
0067A Indicative of an Active Packing Leak
03/28/2019
71111.08P Corrective Action
Documents
CR 19-4031
DG-12 Crack on Exhaust Piping-Weld Repair Filler
04/05/2019
71111.08P Corrective Action
Documents
CR 19-5705
When Boric Acid Conditions are Screened, the 3Q CR
Action Template is not Being Completed
05/21/2019
71111.08P Corrective Action
Documents
CR 19-7057
Dry and white deposits at the tubesheet to HX flange of RHR
HX 1B
06/27/2019
71111.08P Corrective Action
Documents
CR 19-7066
Significant Dry and Discolored Deposits at the Packing
Gland of 1-SI-FCV-0852
06/27/2019
71111.08P Corrective Action
CR 19-9714
Evaluate Reclassifying Reactor Vessel flange Leak-off Lines
09/04/2019
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Documents
71111.08P Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CA 20-3934-1
Condition Report Engineering Evaluation 20-3934-1, IWA-
240 demonstration of PDI-UT-10
03/31/2020
71111.08P Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR 20-3934
Document Usage and Demonstration of Generic Procedure
PDI-UT-10 in a Condition Report Engineering Evaluation
03/28/2020
71111.08P Drawings
404490
Construction Drawing Spray Line, STP Unit 1
Revision 2
71111.08P Engineering
Evaluations
CREE No. 10-
21733-1
Replacement Reactor Vessel Head (RRVH) Internal
Disconnect Device (IDD) Penetrations (weld build-up
location), a Technical Position
Revision 0
71111.08P Engineering
Evaluations
CREE No. 17-
232-2
Code Case N-566-2 Engineering Evaluation-System Heat
11/16/2017
71111.08P Miscellaneous
South Texas Project 1 RE22 Outage Eddy Current
Certification Review
03/24/2020
71111.08P Miscellaneous
NDE-PQ-2015-002, Procedure Qualification (Procedure
10/26/2015
71111.08P Miscellaneous
Certificate of Qualification-David R. Kleinjan
01/17/2020
71111.08P Miscellaneous
Certificate of Qualification-James H. Hoover
01/16/2020
71111.08P Miscellaneous
Certificate of Qualification - Mary Matteson
01/30/2020
71111.08P Miscellaneous
Certificate of Qualification - Eduardo M. Barrera
01/16/2020
71111.08P Miscellaneous
STP Nuclear Operating Company, Certification Record No.
298
06/27/17
71111.08P Miscellaneous
STPEGS Units 1 and 2 In-service Inspection Program Plan
Revision 9
71111.08P Miscellaneous
MRS-TRC-1790
Omni 200 to TC6700 Digital Tester Equivalency
2/18/2006
71111.08P Miscellaneous
MRS-TRC-1850
Omni 200 Tester Basis for Equivalency, Appendix H
Essential Variable Characterization and ASME Code
Compliance
Revision 1
71111.08P Miscellaneous
MRS-TRC-2371
Site Validation of Appendix H / I Inspection Techniques for
South Texas Unit -1 (1RE22), Spring 2020
03/23/2020
71111.08P Miscellaneous
PDQS 322
David R. Kleinjan
09/30/2013
71111.08P Miscellaneous
PQR 254
Weld Procedure Qualification for WPS P45 (F43)-T-AG
06/14/2017
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
71111.08P Miscellaneous
SG-CDMP-19-21
South Texas 1RE22 Steam Generator Degradation
Assessment
Revision 0
71111.08P Miscellaneous
SG-SGMP-15-18
South Texas Project Unit 1 -Steam Generator Cycle 19
Condition Monitoring and Cycles 20, 21, and 22 Preliminary
Operational Assessment
Revision 0
71111.08P Miscellaneous
Welder No. C44
Certification Record
01/25/1996
71111.08P Miscellaneous
Welder No. J76
Certification Record
07/06/2011
71111.08P Miscellaneous
Welder No. L35
Certification Record
07/06/2011
71111.08P Miscellaneous
Work Order No.
96009129
CMTR - ARCOS Industries - 3/32 X 36 Wire LotNo./ Heat
No. CP0447-QU946
03/22/2017
71111.08P Miscellaneous
Work Order No.
96009129
CMTR - Energy & Process Corporation - 4 Butt Welded
Elbows
09-08-2017
71111.08P Miscellaneous
Work Order No.
96009129
CMTR - Energy & Process Corporation - 4 Butt Welded
Pipe
09-08-2017
71111.08P Miscellaneous
Work Order No.
96009129
Butt Weld Inspection Checklist, Weld HFW1402
08/15/2018
71111.08P Miscellaneous
Work Order No.
96009129
Butt Weld Inspection Checklist, Weld HFW1405
08/15/2018
71111.08P Miscellaneous
Work Order No.
96009129
Butt Weld Inspection Checklist, Weld HFW1408
08/15/2018
MT-2020-010
Main Steam Pipe Lugs 27PLl-27PL8/30-MS-1001-GA2
03/16/2020
MT-2020-014
RPV Closure Stud 2A
03/24/2020
PT-2018-029
Liquid Penetrant Examination - Weld EW-1130-HFW-1408
04/09/ 2018
PT-2018-041
Liquid Penetrant Examination - Weld EW-1130-HFW-1402
04/09/ 2018
PT-2018-043
Liquid Penetrant Examination - Weld EW-1130-HFW-1405
04/09/2018
UT-2020-015
Branch Connection-to-Bent Pipe 2-RC-1220-BB1
03/21/2020
UT-2020-020
Pressurizer Pipe to Safe-end Overlay 14-WOL-N2
03/24/2020
UT-2020-021
Pressurizer Spray Nozzle to Safe End weld Overlay PRZ-1-
N2-SE-WOL
03/24/2020
UT-2020-023
Pipe-to-Branch Connection 4-RC-1126-BB1 Weld 6
03/27/2020
UT-2020-032
CRD NO. 68 Housing Lower Weld/ RRVH-CRD-68L
03/27/2020
UT-2020-036
Pipe-to-Branch Connection 4-RC-1323-BB1 Weld 4
03/30/2020
VTI/3-2020-009
RPV Washers 1A through 36A
03/28/2020
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
WCD No. EW-
96009129
ASME Section XI Repair/Replacement Activity Pressure
Testing - ISLT Post-Maintenance Pressure Test Traveler-
1EWSYSTEM
08/16/2018
71111.08P Procedures
Steam Generator Eddy Current Testing Data Analysis
Guidelines
03/09/2020
71111.08P Procedures
General Ultrasonic Examination
Revision 8
71111.08P Procedures
Magnetic Particle Examination (Dry Powder Yoke Method)
Revision 6
71111.08P Procedures
ASME XI Examination for VT-1 and VT-3
Revision 5
71111.08P Procedures
ASME Section XI Repair/Replacement Activities
Revision 31
71111.08P Procedures
RCS Pressure Boundary Inspection for Boric Acid Leaks
Revision 13
71111.08P Procedures
Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program
Revision 12
71111.08P Procedures
Inservice Inspection Program For Welds and Component
Supports
Revision 14
71111.08P Procedures
MRS 2.4.2 GEN-
Eddy Current Inspection of Pre-service and In-service Heat
Exchanger Tubing
Revision 19
71111.08P Procedures
MRS-GEN-1127
Guideline for Steam Generator Eddy Current Data Quality
Requirements
Revision 16
71111.08P Procedures
MRS-GEN-1214
Steam Generator Channel Head Video Inspection
Revision 5
71111.08P Procedures
MRS-GEN-1240
Position Verification Procedure
Revision 7
71111.08P Procedures
MRS-SSP-1619-
TGX/THX
Steam Generator Eddy Current Data Analysis Guidelines for
Inservice Inspections at South Texas Units 1 and 2
Revision 7
71111.08P Procedures
OPEPIO-ZA-0019
Wet Fluorescent Magnetic Particle Examination For ASME
Section XI PSI/ISI
Revision 5
71111.08P Procedures
PDI-UT-10
Generic Procedure for the Ultrasonic Examination of
Revision G
71111.08P Procedures
PDI-UT-2
Generic Procedure for the Ultrasonic Examination of
Austenitic Piping Welds
Revision H
71111.08P Procedures
PDI-UT-8
Generic Procedure for the Ultrasonic Examination of Weld
Overlaid Similar and Dissimilar Metal Welds
Revision I
71111.08P Procedures
UTI-065
Ultrasonic Examination of Small-Diameter Piping Butt Welds
and Components for Thermal Fatigue Damage
Revision 0
71111.08P Procedures
WPS P45 (F43)-
T-AG
Manual GTAW
06/14/17
71111.08P Self-Assessments CR 14-10410
Risk-Informed ISI Periodic Evaluation for South Texas
06/24/14
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Project Electric Generating Station Units 1 & 2 in
Conjunction with End of the Third Interval, First Period
Procedures
0PGP03-ZG-0091 Configuration Risk Management Program
Procedures
0POP01-ZO-0011 Operability, Functionality, and Responsibility Guidance
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-YYYY-NNNN
2010-21759, 2017-17317, 2018-8223, 2018-12121, 2018-
2084, 2019-7235, 2019-8208, 2019-14780, 2020-4561,
20-5447, 2020-3414, 2020-4352
Miscellaneous
Unit 1 and 2 Pump and Valve Inservice Test Plan, Third Ten-
Year Interval
Procedures
0018A
Non-Rapid Refueling Mechanical Support
Procedures
0002
Emergency Diesel Generator 12(22)
Procedures
0003
Emergency Diesel Generator 13(23)
Work Orders
Work
Authorization
Numbers
574847, 601789, 601790
71111.17T Corrective Action
Documents
CR-YYYY-NNNN
2012-31926, 2014-12285, 2015-14074, 2015-16599,
2015-20773, 2015-22176, 2015-110072, 2016-00128,
2016-02214, 2016-05792, 2017-00118, 2017-22335,
2017-20542, 2017-23295, 2018-02757, 2018-05242,
2018-11062, 2018-88275, 2019-00872, 2019-10118,
20-02312
71111.17T Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR-YYYY-NNNN
20-5748, 2020-5794, 2020-5795, 2020-5796, 2020-5797,
20-5798, 2020-5800, 2020-5801, 2020-5802
71111.17T Drawings
204298-
0100005T3
34577698
Target Rock 810000
G
71111.17T Drawings
5N129F05016
Piping and Instrumentation Diagram Safety Injection System
71111.17T Drawings
Inch Modulating Valve Assembly And Controller
E
71111.17T Drawings
F
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
71111.17T Drawings
VTD-T020-0052
Vendor Technical Document For Target Rock 810000-X
Positioner Technical And Installation Manual TRP 9375 For
South Texas Project Nuclear Operating Company
71111.17T Engineering
Changes
14-12-285
Modify use of WRB-2M DNB Correlation in UFSAR Accident
Analyses
71111.17T Engineering
Changes
15-22176
Use of Speed Crete as welded joint sealant in prestressed
concrete embedded cylinder pipe
71111.17T Engineering
Changes
16-128-325
Evaluation of Belleville Washer
01/29/2018
71111.17T Engineering
Changes
16-2214-10
Revise Environmental Qualification DBD to Address QDPS
On-going Qualification in Mild Environment
07/25/2017
71111.17T Engineering
Changes
16-5792
Update UFSAR 15.1.5 to Incorporate Revised HZP MSLB
Core Response Analysis Due to RCCA D-6 Removal
71111.17T Engineering
Changes
17-118-148
Engineering Evaluation of Parker Fitting 48F-5-2 for use in
the Standby Emergency Diesel Generator Starting Air
System Air Starting Valve
71111.17T Engineering
Changes
17-20542-7
Replace Emergency Transformer 138KV Circuit Switch
Operator
05/09/2018
71111.17T Engineering
Changes
17-22335-2
Replace 27C Relay (ITE J13) Associated in Control Circuit
for Containment Spray Pump 1B
10/19/2017
71111.17T Engineering
Changes
17-23295-3
Install Pipe Cap Downstream of Safety Injection Accumulator
Nitrogen Supply Vent Valve, A1SIHCV0900
09/20/2018
71111.17T Engineering
Changes
18-11062-2
Update Vendor Drawing and Setpoint List for CCP 1B Lube
Oil Pressure Switch
10/02/2018
71111.17T Engineering
Changes
18-5242-2
Replacement Valve for Application 2R172TCV0392
04/20/2018
71111.17T Engineering
Changes
18-88-275
Replacement Size 3 & 4 Magnetic Motor Starters for Class
1E Application
2/05/2019
71111.17T Engineering
Changes
19-10118-9
Replace Primary Fuses in Aux Relay Panel for Unit 1
Reactor Vessel Head Vent Valve HCV0601 & 602.
71111.17T Engineering
Changes
19-872-1
Extend the Quality Life (QL) of the Primary Sampling
Systems Target Rock Solenoid Valves and Reed Switches
04/30/2019
71111.17T Engineering
Changes
20-2312-6
Installation Of Metal Oxide Varistors (MOV's) For Unit 1 Rx
Vessel Head Vent Throttle Valves Positioners HY0601 and
03/19/20
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
HY0602
71111.17T Engineering
Changes
20-2312-6
Installation of Metal Oxide Varistors (MOVs) for Unit 1 RX
Vessel Head Vent Throttle Valves Positioners HY0601 and
HY0602
71111.17T Miscellaneous
CFR 50.59 Resource Manual
71111.17T Miscellaneous
2-31926-43
Class 1E 4.16KV Circuit Breaker Replacements
11/27/2018
71111.17T Miscellaneous
15-14074-4
Create Environment Data Table for Rosemount Transmitters
in EQDB database
01/30/2019
71111.17T Miscellaneous
15-20773-1
Validate and Update Loading for 125 Volt DC Distribution
Panel PL039A
09/18/2018
71111.17T Miscellaneous
15-20773-2
Validate and Update Loading for Remaining Circuits on
Class 1E 125 Volt DC Distribution Panels PL039B, PL039C,
PL040A, PL139A, PL139B and PL139C
2/17/2019
71111.17T Miscellaneous
16-128-30
Rosemount Differential Pressure Transmitter 1151DP
Replacement Part
07/09/2018
71111.17T Miscellaneous
16-128-94
Alternate replacement Limitorque actuator for B320-10
10/08/2018
71111.17T Miscellaneous
18-2757-11
Temporary Installation of a Portable Heater/Fan Unit in
Doorway (Door 307) of Room 321 (E1C11 125 Volt QC
Battery Rack Room) on the 60 foot Elevation of the Electrical
Auxiliary Building (EAB)
05/22/2018
71111.17T Miscellaneous
NSAL-14-5
Lower Than Expected Critical Heat Flux Results Obtained
During Departure from Nucleate Boiling Testing
06/17/2014
71111.17T Miscellaneous
QDPS Life 001
QDPS Ongoing 1E Qualification Beyond 5 Years
71111.17T Miscellaneous
Report No.: 9375
810000-x Positioner Technical And Installation Manual
A
71111.17T Miscellaneous
TB-17-3
7300 NAL Board Influenced by Voltage Transients Caused
by Unsuppressed Solid State Protection System Input Relay
Coil
10/23/2017
71111.17T Miscellaneous
TRP No.: 9918
Design Report For Target Rock Modulating Solenoid
Operated Valve Model 79AB-003BB
A
71111.17T Procedures
License Compliance Review
71111.17T Procedures
Configuration Management Program
71111.17T Procedures
0PGP03-ZO-0003 Temporary Modifications
71111.17T Procedures
Design Change Package
71111.17T Procedures
Non-Design Configuration Change
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
71111.17T Procedures
10CFR50.59 Evaluations
71111.17T Procedures
Control of the 10 CFR 50.59 Resource Manual
71111.17T Procedures
Safety Injection Accumulators
71111.17T Procedures
Safety Injection System Initial Lineup
71111.17T Procedures
0POP02AE0005
138 KV Circuit Switcher Operation
71111.17T Procedures
0POP02AF0001
71111.17T Procedures
0POP02EE0001
ESF (Class 1E) DC Distribution System
71111.17T Procedures
0POP02FW0001
Main Feedwater
106
71111.17T Procedures
0POP02SP0001
Solid State Protection System
71111.17T Procedures
Safety Injection System Accumulator Valves Functional Test
71111.17T Procedures
0POP11DJ0001
Class 1E 125V DC Battery Feeder Breaker Replacement
71111.17T Procedures
0POP11DJ0002
Online Class 1E 125V DC Battery and Inverter Removal
from Service and Restoration
71111.17T Work Orders
96011079
Safety Injection Accumulator Nitrogen Supply Vent Valve
06/05/18
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-YYYY-NNNN
20-1334, 2020-1460, 2020-4229, 2020-3700, 2020-5599,
2018-13641, 2014-10004
Miscellaneous
VTD-T905-0006
Operating and Maintenance Instructions for Containment
Auxiliary Airlock
Procedures
ASCO Solenoid Valve EQ Replacement
Procedures
Component Cooling Water System Train 1C(2C) Valve
Operability Test
Work Orders
Work
Authorization
Number
27539, 592943, 631598, 557157, 519513, 488580, 451089,
560852, 554901, 605180, 633202, 546428, 503628
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-YYYY-NNNN
20-2774, 2020-2889, 2020-5401, 96-14089, 2020-6175,
2018-3366
Procedures
1E Battery Monitoring and Maintenance Program
Procedures
0PSP03-DG-0003 Standby Diesel 13(23) Operability Test
0PSP03-DG-0022 Standby Diesel Interdependence Verification
Procedures
Residual Heat Removal Pump 1B(2B) Inservice Test
Procedures
0006S
Train S Reactor Trip Breaker TADOT
Procedures
Delta T and T Average Loop 2 Set 2 Calibration (T-0420)
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Procedures
Delta T and T Average Loop 4 Set 4 Calibration (T-0440)
Procedures
25 Volt Class 1E Battery Monthly Surveillance Test
Procedures
25 Volt Class 1E Battery Intercell Connection Resistance
Surveillance Test
Procedures
Load Swing Test
Work Orders
Work
Authorization
Number
591405