IR 05000482/1982019
| ML20028E202 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Wolf Creek  |
| Issue date: | 12/09/1982 |
| From: | Hunnicut D, Hunnicutt D, Johnson W, Mullikin R, Tomlinson D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20028E197 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-482-82-19, NUDOCS 8301210070 | |
| Download: ML20028E202 (11) | |
Text
,
.
.
APPENDIX U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
NRC Inspection Report:
STN 50-482/82-19 Docket:
STN 50-482 Category A2 Licensee:
Kansas Gas and Electric Company P. O. Box 208 Wichita, Kansas 67201 Facility Name: Wolf Creek, Unit 1 Inspection at:
Burlington, Coffey County, Kansas Inspection conducted:
November 15-19, 1982 Inspectors 1 h/J wwhy#
/2/'//B1 et>D. P. Tomlinson, Reactor Inspector, Engineering Section Dat6 (paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9)
ql
/ '/ 9 [L
.
.
o R. P. Mullikin, Reactor Inspector, Engineering Section Date (paragraphs 1, 2, 4, 5, 9)
Jh )N 2h
,
<<f
/3/f/92-Reviewed:
j t>W. D. Johnson, Chief, Reactor Project Section C D6te'
Approved:
b b] Ynlw,M'
/f/9/92.
D. M. Hunnicutt, Chief, Engineering Section Datt Inspection Summary Inspection conducted November 15-19, 1982 (Report STN 50-482/82-19)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection covering a review of quality related records relative to riectric cable terminations and related equipment; review of cable storage; review of actions taken related to vendor supplied control panel welds; review of actions taken related to unresolved item 81-15; investigation of seven allegations made by a former employee.
This inspection involved 60 inspector hours by two NRC inspectors.
Results: Within the five areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
8301210070 821216 PDR ADOCK 05000482 O
- - -..
_. _ _ _
__
__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _.
. _..
-
.
_ _. _
-
.
~
.
,
-
.
DETAILS
'
1.
Persons Contacted Principal Licensee Employees
- V. Canalis, Construction Engineer
- L. A. Gabryelski, Quality Control Engineer
- 0. L. Thero, QA Surveillance
- C. E. Parry, Supervisor,.QA Systems
,
Other Personnel B. Shinneman, Electrical Quality Inspector (Daniel International Corporation)
- N. A. Schryer, Projects Quality Inspection. Manager (Daniel International
.
Corporation)
- C. M. Herbst, Lead Site Liaison Engineer (Bechtel)
- J. S. Newcomer, Assistant Site Liason Engineer (Bechtel)
J. Paxton, Cable Installation Superin.endent (Davis Electric)
During this inspection, other site management, engineering, QC, and
,
l construction personnel were contacted.
!
- Denotes those attending the exit interview.
2.
Site Tour The NRC inspectors walked through various construction and storage areas to observe construction activities in progress and to inspect the general state of cleanliness and adherence to housekeeping requirements.
The tour
-
included the reactor building, reactor auxiliary building, and several outside storage areas.
i No violations or deviations were identified.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous Findings (Closed) Unresolved Item (STN-50-482/81-15).
NRC Inspection Report 50-482/81-15 identified an unresolved item concern-ing Procedure WP-VII-208 which allowed the alteration and cutting of support material to shape and size by mechanical or thermal means without
!
,.
--
. -., - _,,...
.,.. -
.
- - _ - _
-_-
.
-
.
-
.
engineering approval.
Revision 11 to the subject procedure has been issued and clarifies this activity.
All hanger drawings now stipulate tolerances for all hanger parts which may require minor modifications of part length at installation.
Engineering approval is required only if the part length alteration exceeds these design tolerences.
If the part length change is greater than permitted by the drawing, a field change request (FCR) is initiated and approval by Bechtel Engineering is required.
In the case of both minor and major alterations, the true conditions and dimensions are recorded on field drawings and are ultimately incorporated into the final "as-built" drawings.
This item is considered closed.
4.
Review of Quality Related Records (Electric Cable, Terminations and Related Equipment)
The NRC inspector examined the Daniel International Construction (DIC) QC records and reports dealing with receipt inspection and materials certi-fication, electric cable and raceway installation, cable nondestructive examination (NDE), and nonconformance reports.
a.
Receipt Inspection and Materials Certification Records were examined by the NRC inspector pertaining to electric cable, terminations and related equipment, and receipt inspection and materials certification. The records were inspected to determine whether received material met or failed to meet requirements and whether specifications, including acceptable qualification test results (where applicable), were conformed to.
The following DIC Material Receiving Reports (MRR) (including receiving and storage inspection checklists, purchase orders, receiving QC inspection reports, and test reports) were examined.
MRR #46376 - Connector cables and bars MRR #50625 - Batteries MRR #55530 - Lugs MRR #59162 - 350 MCM compression lugs MRR #59301 - Pressure terminal connectors MRR #63840 - Copper connectors MRR #57304 - Terminal block MRR #46351 - Heatshrink tubing and terminal lugs MRR #57707 - Lugs and cable MRR #37439 - 600 V cable MRR #37533 - 600 V cable MRR #44195 - 600 V cable No violations or deviations were identified in this portion of the inspectio.
.
-- -
-
_
.
'
.
4 b.
Installation Records The NRC inspector examined the postinstallation records for selected electric cable, termination components, and raceways (cableways).
The examination included whether cable, and termination components were installed as specified, raceways were routed for necessary separation and protection, raceway supports and anchorages were installed as specified, and whether an identification system integrating raceways with routing requirements for cables was in effect.
The DIC QC cable termination cards, QC cable termination checklists, and QC cable installation cards were examined for the following safety related power and control cables:
Power Control 1EFG06AA 1EFG06AB 1EFG020A 1EFG030B 1EFG10AA 1EFG10AB IEFG08AA 1EFG08AB 4EFG02DA 1EFR06AA 1ECY08AA 1EFR08AA 1 EGG 04AA 1EFR10AA 1 EGG 04BA 1EFR03DA INEK12AG 4EFG02DB 1NFY01AA 4EFR020A 1EJG08AA ISAZO4GA 1EMG03AA ISAZ04LA 1EMY01AA 1ECG01AB IECR08BA INEB10AA INFK01GE l
1EJB01AB The QC raceway installation cards and QC raceway checklists were
'
examined for the following raceways which are associated with several cables listed previously:
l Raceways 1C8G42, IC8F42, IC8F50, 1C8F52, IC8G50, IC8G52, 1C8J42, 1C8J50, IC8J52 No violations or deviations were identified in this portion of the inspectio r
-
.
-
.
c.
Cable Nondestructive Examination (NDE)
The NRC inspector examined records to determine whether NDE was performed on selected electrical cables and whether requirements were met.
The cable NDE included continuity tests and megger tests (cable insulation tests).
The QC cable termination checklists were examined for continuity tests results for the 13 power and 17 control cables listed in the preceding paragraph 4.b.(Installation Records).
In addition, the meg insulation test reports were examined for the 13 power cables listed in paragraph 4.b., (Note: only power cables need to be meggered).
No violations or deviations were identified in this portion of the inspection.
d.
Nonconformance Records
,
Selected DIC nonconformance reports (NCR) relative to electrical cables, terminations and related equipment were examined to ascertain whether:
(1) Records are current, legible, complete, reviewed, and readily retrievable (2) Nor.comformances are adequately described in these records and include the status of corrective actions or resolution (3) Records reflect that appropriate corrective action was taken The NCR's eviewed by the inspector were precise and easily understood.
The following NCR's were examined:
NCR #1SN6675E NCR #1SN5827E NCR #1SN6630E NCR #1SN5829E NCR #1SN6540E NCR #1SN5893E NCR #1SN6532E NCR #1SN5907E NCR #1SN6481E NCR #1SN5932E NCR #1SN6404ER NCR #1SN5992E NCR #1SN6351E NCR #1SN6121E NCR #1SN5787E NCR #1SN6237E NCR #1SN5802E No violations or deviations were identified in this portion of the inspection.
-
.
-
.
.
5.
Inspection of Cable Storage Yard The NRC inspector examined the cable storage yard and discovered that four reels of nonconforming cable had not been segregated from conforming cable.
This condition was brought to the attention of personnel at the storage yard who stated that nonconforming cable was segregated normally. A reinspection of the yard by the inspector showed that the nonconforming cable reels had been segregated in an area roped off and marked with yellow flags.
No further action is required on this matter.
The following DIC procedures were examined:
Administrative Procedure AP-VI-02, "Nonconformance Control and Reporting," Revision 15, dated November 15, 1982.
Administrative Procedure AP-VI-08, " Identification and Status of Material, Parts and Components," Revision 11, dated July 26, 1982 No violation or deviations were identified in this portion of this inspection.
6.
Review of Actions Taken Related to Vendor Supplied Control Panel Welds On July 29, 1980, KG&E requested that DIC perform a visual inspection of all welds on the main control panels supplied by Comsip Customline, Inc.
After several inspections had been performed by DIC, Comsip, and KG&E one Comsip panel was selected at the suppliers plant for seismic testing.
The sample panel was carefully selected to assure that the welds in the sample exhibited defects of at least the same types and magnitudes as those in the actual production panels.
The sample was tested on a shaker table at Acton Environmental Testing Corporation on December 9, 1980.
The test panel was subjected to five biaxial seismic tests in each 90 angular orientation for a total of twenty tests.
One control panel weld failed at a ZPA (zero period acceleration) level between 5 and 6 G's.
Based on a ZPA level equal to 4.2 G's, the stresses in the test panel would be approximately 3.4 times higher than the stresses in the "as-built" control panels during a seismic event.
Based upon the results of this
" Shaker Test" and various stress analyses performed using " worst-case" l
conditions, it was concluded that the as-built welds were capable of
'
withstanding at least twice the stress levels calculated to occur during a safe shutdown earthquake (SSE).
No further action will be taken on this matter.
l l
l t
.
-
.
-
.
7.
Investigation of Allegations
On August 3, 1982, the NRC RIV office was contacted by a former site employee who voiced concerns about the construction practices used at the Wolf Creek site.
The seven allegations made by this individual and the disposition of each are:
a.
The alleger stated that certain welds "in primary tension which are only. allowed 0.010 inch undercut" by the American Welding Society (AWS) D1.1 Structural Welding Code are not properly inspected. We stated that there is no inspection criteria for welds "in primary tension." We further stated that "several inspectors in this area have little or no weld inspection background or experience."
The qualification of inspection personnel in all phases of QA/QC is one of the items reviewed in part during almost every NRC inspection.
Past inspection reports indicate that the experience and training of inspectors exceeds the requirements of ANSI N45.2.6 and SNT-TC-1A.
The training program for inspection personnel is continuous effort and records of all training received are a part of each inspectors personnel folder.
This part of the allegation could not be substan-tiated.
Paragraph 3.6.4, of the AWS Structural Welding Code (paragraph 9.25.1.5
in the 1981 edition) states " Undercut shall be no more than 0.01 inch deep when the weld is transverse to the primary stress in the part that is undercut.
Undercut shall be no more than 1/32 inch deep when the weld is parallel to the primary stress in the part that is under-cut."
In an attempt to streamline the paper work necessary for the construction of a nuclear power plant, Bechtel originated and issued
" Technical Specification for Erecting Miscellaneous Metal for the Standardized Nuclear Unit Power Plant System (SNUPPS)." This Spect-fication, Number 10466-C132, was issued and approved for use on SNUPPS sites and is a general Specification referencing a series of welding codes and standards.
Rather than individually list the various require-ments of each they were referenced in total and only the exceptions to these codes and standards were listed.
Specification 10466-C-132, i
Revision 4, paragraph 8.5.2, states " Undercut shall not exceed 1/32 inch."
Discussions with personnel in the Bechtel engineering department indicate that an exception to the 0.010 inch undercut requirement was taken by the inclusion of this line.
To clarify this requirement, Bechtel engineering will generate correspondence specifically stating this exception and the justification for it.
..
--
.
.-
.
.
Pending NRC receipt and review of these actions, this will be considered an unresolved item.
(482/8219-1)
b.
The alleger stated that certain pipe whip restraints for the main steam system were supplied by a vendor with " pathetic welding." He stated that some of these welds were repaired by site personnel.
The NRC inspector contacted the KG&E QA department personnel and questioned them about the status and present location of all vendor-supplied pipe whip restraints for the main steam piping.
A KG&E quality engineer accompanied the NRC inspector as the NRC inspector performed a visual inspection of all of the welds on four restraints that were in temporary storage on the turbine deck in the turbine building. While performing this inspection, the QA engineer noted that approximately half of the restraint end pieces had a weld that was not present on the remainder of the end pieces.
-A telephone conversation between the vendor, Bergen-Paterson, and KG&E revealed this weld was not on the fabrication drawings and should not have been included on the hardware. This condition was not noted or documented by source inspection personnel.
A similar inspection of-the remaining twelve restraints in the warehouse was performed and identical conditions were noted.
During the inspection of the welds on all 16 pipe whip restraints for the main steam system, the NRC inspector saw no evidence that repair welding had occurred on any of the component parts.
Porosity and possible nonfusion was noted at some weld ends where minor cosmetic grinding had been performed.
Because of these conditions discoverd by the quality engineer, KG&E has requested that DIC perform an indepth inspection of the main steam system restraints for total compliance to welding code and drawing requirements.
Pending completion and documentation of this inspection by DIC, this will be considered an unresolved item.
(482/8219-2)
c.
The alleger stated that the essential service water (ESW) piping was welded and buried without repairing or applying the " required dielectric coating" to the carbon steel piping.
He stated that he doubts the integrity of this piping as there was no inspection performed for damage that "might have been caused by the backfill crew." He also stated that during the backfill operation, he could
" hear gravel in hard contact with the pipe" and questions the backfill operation.
The alleger's employment at the Wolf Creek site began in June 1980.
NRC ISN-1890-M, dated July 20, 1978, and NCR ISN-0783-M, dated February 21, 1979, were both issued because of discrepancies
-.
.
..
.
-
,
-.
.-
._
...
.
.
---.
-
..
,
'
.
,
E in the coating on the ESW system pipe spools and welds.
Both had been issued and corrections were being made prior to the alleger's arrival onsite.
The actions required by these NCR's included an
,
inspection of each pipe spool for coating integrity, the wrapping of
each pipe joint af ter welding, and an "over-the-ditch" final coating.
inspection.
In addition, the actions required by NCR IDN-ISN-1890-M included an inspection for coating damage _when the backfill in the ditch has reached a level six inches below the horizontal center line of the pipe.
Any discrepant areas were to be repaired in
'
accordance with WP-VII-202 prior to the completion of the backfill
'
operation.
'A review of records of the backfill operation and discussions with four persons involved with this work indicate that the coating of the pipe and welded joints was as required when the
-
'
pipe was placed in the ditch and when the backfill was partially completed.
The backfill material below, around, and immediately over the ESW system was a coarse sand material which #3s compacted into place by the use of one-man tamping machines.
As this method
,
was used until the backfill reached a level one foot above the pipe,
it is extremely doubtful that anyone "could hear gravel in hard contact" with the piping or that any significant damage could
have occurred to the piping or the coating.
This allegation could not be substantiated.
d.
The alleger stated that no cathodic protection was installed for this system as was done at the other SNUPPS site.
He stated that this concern is-for the " uncoated field welds."
i l
The NRC inspector contacted four DIC engineers in the piping and I
civil engineering disciplines and discovered from conversations and record review that the required cathodic protection had been provided during.the installation of the piping.
The anodes were
,
being installed and permanently tied-in at the time of this inspection.
Because this installation and tie-in did not occur during the alleger's term of employment, he possibly assumed that it would not occur at all.
This allegation was found to be without merit.
l e.
The alleger stated that "some welds" on piping hangers were reworked following final inspection.
This allegation was based on his
" personal knowledge of the work performed by inspectors on the main steam line hangers."
l
!
l
. -. - -
. - - - -
.
. --
.
.
-
.
-
..
As was stated above in paragraph 78, the NRC inspector conducted a visual examination of all available permanent restraints and hangers for evidence that any authorized or unauthorized repairs had been made to any of the welds.
Repair areas were noted on several of the temporary hangers and supports - for these lines.
It is possible that the alleger saw these and mistook them for permanent structures.
This allegation could not be substantiated.
f.
The alleger stated that, although he is not positive that it has occurred, it is possible to " forge material heat numbers" from one piece of material to another."
This item was previously documented as a site audit finding and is presently the subject of an NRC investigation being conducted by the RIV Office of Investigation.
This item will not be addressed in this report.
g.
The alleger stated that repairs are being made to ASME,Section III, piping and that the site authorized nuclear inspector (ANI) "is not allowed to review the paperwork." He stated that these are minor repairs such as buffing or sanding and that no subsequent visual of surface inspection are performed after the repairs are made.
The NRC inspector and the KG&E QA supervisor conducted a record
-
review of welding repair instruction sheets selected at random.
all cases it was noted the instructions included a surface inspection (magnetic particle or liquid penetrant) following any metal reinoval operation.
If subsequent' welding was necessary, further provisions for a postweld inspection were included.
On each of the sheets that included a " hold point" for ANI inspection, the hold points had been acknowledged and signed by an ANI.
A discussion with two ANI's disclosed that minor sanding and buffing are being accomplished on numerous components and piping weld surfaces without an immediate surface reinspection but these operations are being performed only on ASME class 1 and class 2 items that will be subjected to preservice inspection (PSI) and future inservice inspections (ISI). A welded joint or component that has been accepted to the requirement of ASME,Section III, may require further surface conditioning prior to performing the ASME B&PV Code,Section XI PSI and ISI examinations. All surfaces affected by this preconditioning will be re-examined as part of the PSI.
The NRC inspector, ANI, and KG&E QA found no evidence that any repairs were being made without the proper authorization, documentation, and subsequent surface inspections.
This allegation could not be substantiated.
_
_ _. - _
,
-
-
~
.
- .
..
'
8.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, violations, or deviations.
An unresolved item related to the acceptance criteria for weld undercut is discussed in paragraph 7A.
A second unresolved item related to vendor-supplied welded components is discussed in paragraph 78.
,
9.
Exit Interview The NRC inspectors met with licensee representatives and Mr. T. E.
Vandel, NRC Resident Inspector (denoted in paragraph 1) on November 19, 1982, and summarized the scope and findings of the inspection.
.
i
.
2
-
. - - ~.-
--,. _,.
,m-
-
,_
.--r.
-
-
-
-.. ~
.,n.,
, _,-,,,
--