IR 05000482/1982014
| ML20028B649 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Wolf Creek  |
| Issue date: | 10/27/1982 |
| From: | Johnson W, Vandel T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20028B641 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-482-82-14, NUDOCS 8212030115 | |
| Download: ML20028B649 (6) | |
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APPENDIX U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Report:
STN 50-482/82-14 Docket:
STN 50-482 Category A2 Licensee:
Kansas Gas and Electric Company P. O. Box 208 Wichita, Kansas 67201 Facility Name: Wolf Creek Generating Station Inspection At: Wolf Creek Site, Coffey County, Burlington, Kansas Inspection Conducted: September 1-30, 1982 Inspection:
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6&hr2 [
/89/-h4 T.
E'. Vandel, Senior Resident Inspector, Date
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Reactor Project Section C Approved:
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/0/27/P2.
W. D.
nson, Chief, Reactor Project Section C
' Dat'e Inspection Summary Inspection During the Month of September 1982 (Report STN 50-482/82-14)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, announced inspection by the Senior Resident Reactor Inspector covering followup to a previous inspection finding; observation of installation activities for reactor coolant pressure boundary piping and other safety-related piping systems; observations of electrical equipment and cable installations; and general plant tours. The inspection act'vity involved 53 inspector-hours by the Senior Resident Reactor Inspector.
Results: Within six areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted Principal Licensee Personnel
- J. V. Palermo, Assistant Construction Manager, Kansas City Power and Light Co.
- D. A. Colwell, QA Technologist, KG&E 0. L. Thero, QA Surveillance Supervisor, KG&E P. M. Burck, QA Engineer, KG&E Other Personnel J. De Paepe, Calibration Lab Supervisor, Daniel International Corporation (DIC)
J. Roberts, Level II Calibration Inspector, DIC Other licensee and contractor personnel were also contacted during the course of inspection activity.
- The above listed personnel attended the exit meeting held on October 4,1982.
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2.
Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Unresolved Item (482/8209-01): This item, ccacerning lack of identification and physical protection of sensing lines, although closed in NRC Inspection Report 50-482/82-11, is being further expanded on in this report.
A meeting was held on August 17, 1982, in the Architect-Engineer's (Bechtel Power Corporation) office, to review the basis for the exclusion of SNUPPS from the Westinghouse Electric Corporation (the NSSS supplier) physical separation criteria described in WCAP-7913. The reactor coolant flow instrument sensing lines had been identified as the selected example for the concern.
During the meeting it was established that the Westinghouse
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separation criteria of interest included:
(a) 18-inch minimum separation between redundant sensing lines; and (b) a sleeve of 6-inch diameter through which the lines penetrate the shieldwall.
Bechtel stated that their design criteria for control systems used in the SNUPPS is more restictive than the Westinghouse criteria in that they specify separate penetrations and 36-inch minimum separation for redundant lines.
However, it was further noted that Bechtel hazards analyses which could justify lesser design criteria in some instances include:
(a) room by room analysis; (b) jet impingement pipe breaks; and (c) pipe whip restrain *
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The Bechtel personnel stated that a hazards analysis performed on pressure boundary piping showed that the sensing lines were subject to no hazards except for a possible jet impingement from a nearby Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA). They believed that it was desirable to deviate from the separation criteria for this selected example because:
It permitted them to adhere to slope criteria keeping measuring
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instruments below the level of sensors and sensing lines It permitted them to pass stress analyses
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Additional penetrations were not required
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The support system was a simpler design
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Bechtel personnel further stated that these instrument sensing lines.are not used for plant safe shut down in the event of a LOCA and that their only function is to protect against reactor coolant pump coast-down tran-sients and/or a coolant pump locked rotor incident.
A Westinghouse letter dated August 16, 1982, stated that Westinghouse con-curs with the Bechtel intent for the RC flow impulse lines. However, they further suggested that specific analysis for other applications which Bechtel feels may deviate should be submitted for Westinghouse concurrence.
The NRC representatives accepted and agreed with the justification for devi-ation for these specific sensing lines and, in addition, concurred with the request in the Westinghouse letter regarding their review for other instances of deviations.
The NRC inspector learned from the Branch Chief of the Safety Technology Branch of the NRC office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation that the identi-fication and color coding of redundant instrument sensing lines concern had been reviewed by their branch.
Their conclusion was that, although the lack of identification was incompatible with the electrical /instru-mentation cabling identification and color coding of redundant channels, it was not considered sufficiently significant to warrant upgrading of requirements to the licensees.
This matter is closed.
3.
Piping Systems The high pressure coolant injection system piping, from the boron injection tank to the reactor coolant cold leg inlet nozzles, was inspected by the NRC inspector.
The piping system is partly a reactor coolant (BB) system
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inside of the reactor containment building to the inside isolation valve, and partly a high pressure coolant injection (EM) system through the reactor building containment penetration and in the auxiliary building.
It is noted that portions of the piping system remain incomplete:
1.e., from the reactor coolant cold leg nozzles to the secondary shielding wall, none of the four legs have been installed yet. The results of the inspection are as follows:
Piping configuration is essentially in accordance with the applicable
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drawings and spe:ifications Correct material has beeen installed
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Installation activities are controlled as required by procedures
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Identification requirements are being followed
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Piping penetration (P-88) is installed and controlled / identified
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as specified on detail drawings Quality Control hold tags were being utilized as required (for
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identified welding problems)
Installed valves and check valves were being adequately protected
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Weld repairs (i.e., field weld F0llA on boron injection tank top
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nozzle) are being performed using appropriate procedural controls and acceptance inspection. Although, the completed weld was not accepted by the ANI, the control of the fabrication and inspection process appeared correct.
No violations or deviations were identified.
4.
Electrical Equipment and Cables Plant Class 1E electrical equipment protection and cable installation terminations were observed during this inspection period. The results of the observations are as follows:
a.
Installed Equipment Protection Electrical penetrations ZN129 and ZN293 were observed for
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protection of installed equipment. Terminal boxes were covered and space heaters were on, penetrations were pressurized with inert gas, with gauges reading approximately 40 psi.
Electrical motor operated valve HV8809-B was observed for
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installed protection.
Dust covers were in place over the valve and the motor space heater, connected by temporary cables, was on.
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b.
Cable Installation Terminations Class 1E 4160 volt switchgear cable terminations for cubicle
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NB0206 were observed being installed.
Housing bushings and 3-single conductor 250 MCM cables were being installed with the bus connections left loose for ease of subsequent hi-pot testing.
Calibration of Burndy clamping tools were observed.
A Burndy
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Y-30 Hypress hydraulic clamping tool used for installation of terminal lugs to electrical cable sizes Number 2 AWG stranded up through 750 MCM was observed being calibrated by the Daniel calibration lab.
Each tool, issued to the craft personnel for installation work, is checked at least every 30 days for the following:
(1) abuse; (2) fluid level; (3) plug dyes for proper spacing; and (4) tool operating pressure.
A calibration data sheet is completed for each calibration of each tool. This data sheet becomes a QA record.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5.
Plant Tours Plant areas were toured several times during the reporting period to observe general construction practices, area cleanliness, and storage conditions of plant equipment.
The following was observed:
a.
Fire prevention and Protection A Daniel fire protection inspector was interviewed regarding
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fire protection duties. The inspector indicated that he was
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required to:
(1) check and maintain fire extinguishers through-out the plant; (2) check for improper activities such as
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i welding without the proper fire protection equipment; and (3) to make sure that combustibles are not allowed to build up in construction areas.
He further stated that a 5-man crew is assigned this activity with 2 men scheduled on the night shifts.
Fire protection system piping, under flushing activities in the
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circulating water pump house, were observed after the 12-inch
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line had become uncoupled at three victaulic coupling joints, causing minor damage. The damage and corrective action has been completed by the construction contractor.
No violations or deviations were identified.
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6.
Exit Interview The'NRC senior resident reactor inspector and a Region IV inspector met with licensee representatives denoted in paragraph 1 on October 4,1982.
The scope and results of the inspection activity were discussed with the licensee representatives.
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