IR 05000461/2019011
| ML19128A329 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Clinton  |
| Issue date: | 05/08/2019 |
| From: | Karla Stoedter NRC/RGN-III |
| To: | Bryan Hanson Exelon Generation Co, Exelon Nuclear |
| References | |
| IR 2019011 | |
| Download: ML19128A329 (21) | |
Text
May 8, 2019
SUBJECT:
CLINTON POWER STATION, UNIT 1DESIGN BASES ASSURANCE INSPECTION (TEAM); INSPECTION REPORT 05000461/2019011
Dear Mr. Hanson:
On March 29, 2019, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Clinton Power Station, Unit 1. On April 11, 2019, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. John Kowalski and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
The NRC inspectors documented one finding of very low safety significance (Green) in this report. The finding did not involve a violation of NRC requirements.
If you disagree with a finding not associated with a regulatory requirement in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; and the NRC resident inspector at Clinton. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Karla K. Stoedter, Chief Engineering Branch 2
Docket No.: 05000461 License No.: NPF-62
Enclosure:
Inspection Report
Docket Number:
05000461
License Number:
Report Number:
Enterprise Identifier: I-2019-011-0024
Licensee:
Exelon Generation Company, LLC
Facility:
Clinton Power Station
Location:
Clinton, IL
Inspection Dates:
March 11, 2019, to March 29, 2019
Inspectors:
J. Benjamin, Senior Reactor Inspector
W. Hopf, Electrical Contractors
V. Petrella, Reactor Inspector
J. Robbins, Senior Reactor Inspector
L. Rodriguez, Reactor Inspector
R. Waters, Mechanical Contractor
Approved By:
Karla K. Stoedter, Chief
Engineering Branch 2
Division of Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting a Design Bases Assurance (Team) Inspection at Clinton Power Station, Unit 1, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
Findings and violations being considered in the NRCs assessment are summarized in the table below.
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to Have Procedures Ensuring Satisfactory Performance of Decay Heat Removal Systems during Station Blackout Event Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green FIN 05000461/2019011-01 Open/Closed None (NPP)71111.21M The inspectors identified a Green finding for the licensee's failure to have procedures ensuring the satisfactory performance of the high pressure core spray (HPCS) system and the suppression pool during a station blackout out (SBO) event as delineated in NUMARC 87-00.
Specifically, Procedures Clinton Power Station (CPS) 4402.01 and CPS 4407.01 did not ensure the HPCS system and the suppression pool would remain available for decay heat removal for the duration of the SBO event.
Additional Tracking Items
None.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
===71111.21M - Design Bases Assurance Inspection (Teams)
The inspectors evaluated the following components and listed applicable attributes, permanent modifications, and operating experience:
Design Review - Large Early Release Frequency (LERFs) (IP Section 02.02)===
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Turbine
- Technical Specifications;
- Visual non-intrusive walkdown to assess the installation configuration, material condition, and potential vulnerability to hazards;
- Normal, abnormal, and emergency operating procedures;
- Protection against internal events;
- Protection against external events;
- Maintenance effectiveness;
- Overall system health;
- Translation of vendor specifications;
- Testing; and
- Calculations:
o Accumulator sizing; o Maximum allowable accumulator leakage; o Minimum accumulator backup air bottle pressure o Valve weak link analysis; o Steam line pressure drop; and o Battery capacity.
Design Review - Risk-Significant/Low Design Margin Components (IP Section 02.02) (6 Samples)
- (1) Primary System Safety Relief Valve F047A
- Technical Specifications;
- Visual non-intrusive walkdown to assess the installation configuration, material condition, and potential vulnerability to hazards;
- Normal, abnormal, and emergency operating procedures;
- Protection against internal events;
- Protection against external events;
- Maintenance effectiveness;
- Overall system health;
- Translation of vendor specifications;
- Testing; and
- Calculations:
o Weak link analysis; and o Minimum voltage analysis.
- (2) High Pressure Core Spray Injection Valve 1E22-F004
- Technical Specifications;
- Visual non-intrusive walkdown to assess the installation configuration, material condition, and potential vulnerability to hazards;
- Normal, abnormal, and emergency operating procedures;
- Protection against internal events;
- Protection against external events;
- Maintenance effectiveness;
- Overall system health;
- Translation of vendor specifications;
- Testing; and
- Calculations:
o Thrust margin; o Motor sizing calculation; o Minimum voltage; and o Electrical protection and coordination.
- (3) Safety-related 480Vac Switchgear AP05E
- Technical Specifications;
- Visual non-intrusive walkdown to assess the installation configuration, material condition, and potential vulnerability to hazards;
- Normal, abnormal, and emergency operating procedures;
- Protection against internal events;
- Protection against external events;
- Maintenance effectiveness;
- Overall system health;
- Translation of vendor specifications;
- Testing:
o Load testing; o Relay calibration; and o Terminal resistance.
- Calculations:
o Loading; o Short circuit; o Voltage regulation; o Coordination; o Bus capacity; and o Overcurrent protection.
- (4) Safety-related 4kVac Switchgear AP07E
- Technical Specifications;
- Visual non-intrusive walkdown to assess the installation configuration, material condition, and potential vulnerability to hazards;
- Normal, abnormal, and emergency operating procedures;
- Protection internal events;
- Protection against external events;
- Maintenance effectiveness;
- Overall system health;
- Translation of vendor specifications;
- Testing:
o Loading; o Degraded voltage relay drop out; and o Terminal resistance.
- Calculations:
o Bus loading; o Short circuit; o Supple voltage; o Breaker coordination; o Bus capacity; o Static VAR compensator voltage; o Overcurrent protection; and o Overload heating impact.
- Technical Specifications;
- Visual non-intrusive walkdown to assess the installation configuration, material condition, and potential vulnerability to hazards;
- Normal, abnormal, and emergency operating procedures;
- Protection against internal events;
- Protection against external events;
- Maintenance effectiveness;
- Overall system health;
- Translation of vendor specifications;
- Testing; and
- Calculations:
o Weak link analysis.
(6)125 VDC Battery 1A
- Technical Specifications;
- Visual non-intrusive walkdown to assess the installation configuration, material condition, and potential vulnerability to hazards;
- Normal, abnormal, and emergency operating procedures;
- Protection against internal events;
- Protection against external events;
- Maintenance effectiveness;
- Overall system health;
- Translation of vendor specifications;
- Testing; and
- Calculations:
o Hydrogen generation; o Seismic qualification of battery and battery racks; o Sizing; and o Station blackout loading.
Modification Review - Permanent Mods (IP Section 02.03) (5 Samples)
- (1) Engineering Change (EC) 324675, "Install Static VAR Compensator Unit on Reserve Auxiliary Transformer";
- (2) EC 324759, "Install Static VAR Compensator Unit on Emergency Reserve Auxiliary Transformer";
- (3) EC 621081, "High Pressure Core Spray Discharge Relief Valve Modification";
- (4) EC 400235, "Removal of Main Steam Line Flow Restrictor Differential Pressure Line Snubbers and Pipe Supports"; and
- (5) EC 622359, "Replacement of Dry Type Transformer 1AP11E".
Review of Operating Experience Issues (IP Section 02.06) (2 Samples)
- (1) NRC Information Notice 2017-03, "Anchor/Darling Double Disc Gate Valve Wedge Pin and Stem-Disc Separation Failures"; and
- (2) NRC Information Notice 2017-06, "Battery and Battery Charger Short-Circuit Current Contributions to a Fault on the Direct Current Distribution System".
INSPECTION RESULTS
Failure to Have Procedures Ensuring Satisfactory Performance of Decay Heat Removal Systems during Station Blackout Event Cornerstone Significance Cross-cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green FIN 05000461/2019011-01 Open/Closed None (NPP)71111.21M The inspectors identified a Green finding for the licensee's failure to have procedures ensuring the satisfactory performance of the HPCS system and the suppression pool during a SBO event as delineated in NUMARC 87-00. Specifically, Procedures CPS 4402.01 and CPS 4407.01 did not ensure the HPCS system and the suppression pool would remain available for decay heat removal for the duration of the SBO event.
Description:
The licensee evaluated a SBO using the guidelines of NUMARC 87-00, "Guidelines and Technical Bases for NUMARC Initiatives Addressing Station Blackout at Light Water Reactors." The licensee's SBO coping analysis EPU-T0903, "Extended Power Uprate Task T0903 Station Blackout," Revision 0, evaluated two different methods for responding to an SBO event using either the HPCS system or the reactor core isolation cooling system. The HPCS system is considered the licensing basis system for vessel inventory makeup and core cooling during a SBO.
Analysis EPU-T0903 concluded the suppression pool temperature could exceed the heat capacity temperature limit (HCTL) approximately 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> into the 4-hour SBO coping period.
Usually, the Emergency Operating Procedures (EOP) direct operations personnel to perform an emergency depressurization of the reactor vessel when the suppression pool temperature cannot be maintained less than the HCTL. However, the SBO coping analysis assumed emergency depressurization of the reactor vessel would not be performed because it was not necessary to cope with the SBO. The coping analysis concluded the final suppression pool temperature was acceptable because it remained below the maximum suppression pool temperature limit of 185 degrees Fahrenheit. As a result, the coping analysis contained the following assumption in Section 3.2.2, "Key Assumptions," Item 15:
"Actions specified in CPS Procedures, EOP, Off-Normal Procedures, and Operating Procedures are accomplished as required, with the exception that an emergency blowdown (depressurization) as directed by EOP-6 will not be performed."
The coping analysis also contained the following recommendation in Section 3.4.1, "Recommendations," Item 3, "Revise the Primary Containment Control EOP to permit exceeding the suppression pool HCTL without requiring emergency blowdown for an SBO event."
Procedure CPS 4200.01, "Loss of AC Power," is one of the implementing procedures that would be used by the licensee during a SBO. Section 4.4.4 of the procedure designates the HPCS system as the preferred injection source. Procedure CPS 4402.01, "EOP-6 Primary Containment Control," is an EOP that would be implemented during a SBO. Procedure CPS 4402.01 directs operators to perform an emergency depressurization (i.e., blowdown)in accordance with CPS 4407.01, "EOP 3 Emergency RPV Depressurization (Blowdown),"
when the plant cannot be maintained below the HCTL. Procedure CPS 4407.01 directs operators to perform emergency depressurization as long as the action will not result in the loss of injection needed for core cooling. Therefore, when using the preferred HPCS system during a SBO, emergency depressurization would be directed because the system does not rely on reactor pressure to perform its function.
The inspectors noted Procedures CPS 4402.01 and CPS 4407.01 did not incorporate the assumption and recommendation of the SBO coping analysis that emergency depressurization would not occur during the event. Therefore, the licensee failed to meet the guidance in NUMARC 87-00, Section 2.1, "General Criteria," which states, "Procedures and equipment in light water reactors relied upon in a station blackout should ensure that satisfactory performance of necessary decay heat removal systems is maintained for the required station blackout coping duration." Specifically, Procedures CPS 4402.01 and CPS 4407.01 did not ensure the HPCS system or the suppression pool would remain available for the duration of the SBO event because they would direct emergency depressurization when the HCTL was exceeded, a scenario which was not evaluated in the SBO coping analysis.
Corrective Action(s): The licensee's immediate corrective actions included the performance of two evaluations, EC 627704, "Functionality Evaluation of Suppression Pool Temperature During Station Blackout," and EC 627757, "Evaluation of Past Plant Conditions for SBO,"
which used more realistic assumptions to demonstrate the decay heat removal functions provided by the HPCS system and the suppression pool would be maintained for the duration of a SBO event. The licensee also issued Standing Order 2019-02, "Supplemental Station Blackout Guidance," to ensure the assumptions used in the evaluations remained supported until final corrective actions could be implemented.
Corrective Action Reference(s): Action Request 04231346, "NRCID: DBAI Question Regarding RPV Blowdown During SBO."
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined the licensee's failure to have procedures ensuring the satisfactory performance of the HPCS system and the suppression pool would be maintained for the duration of a SBO event as delineated in NUMARC 87-00 was a performance deficiency. Specifically, Procedures CPS 4402.01 and CPS 4407.01 did not ensure the HPCS system or the suppression pool would remain available for the duration of the SBO event because the procedures would direct emergency depressurization of the reactor vessel when the HCTL was exceeded, a scenario which was not evaluated in the SBO coping analysis.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Procedure Quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone. Specifically, the failure to have procedures that incorporated the assumption and recommendation of the SBO coping analysis that emergency depressurization would not occur during the event did not ensure the availability and capability of the HPCS system and the suppression pool to cope with a SBO to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage).
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, Significance Determination of Reactor Inspection Findings for At - Power Situations. The finding screened as having very low safety significance (Green) because the team answered "No" to the risk screening questions listed in IMC 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 2, Section A.
Cross-cutting Aspect: Not Present Performance. No cross cutting aspect was assigned to this finding because the inspectors determined the finding did not reflect present licensee performance.
Enforcement:
Inspectors did not identify a violation of regulatory requirements associated with this finding.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On April 11, 2019, the inspector presented the Design Bases Assurance (Team)
Inspection results to Mr. John Kowalski and other members of the licensee staff.
- On March 29, 2019, the inspector presented the Inspection Debrief to Mr. John Kowalski, Plant Manager and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
71111.21M Calculations
01HP15
Development of HPCS Pump Curves and System
Resistances
Revision 4
01ME77
Calcs for Flooding - Safe Shutdown Analysis
01/28/1990
01RI13
NPSH Calculation - RCIC Suction from Suppression Pool
Revision 2
01RI16
RCIC Development of RCIC Pump Curves and Comparison
with the System Resistance Curves for Operating Modes A,
B, C, D, and F
Revision 0
01RI17
RCIC Turbine Performance Requirements
Revision 0
19-AI-60
Electrical Heat Loading in Switchgear and Battery Rooms
Served by VX System
Revision 2
19-AJ-16
Overload Heater Sizing for AC Motor Operated Valves
Revision 3
19-AJ-19
Voltage Analysis of 125 VDC Circuits for 4 kV Circuit
Breakers Operating during LOCA
Revision 2
19-AK-13
Analysis of Load Flow, Short Circuit and Motor Starting
Using ETAP Power Station
Revision 3
19-AN-04
480V ESF Switchgear Breakers and Associated Upstream
Relay Settings
Revision 13
19-AN-20
Circuit Breaker Settings for 480V HPCS MCC (1E22-S002)
Revision 2
19-D-19
Sizing Battery Charger 1A for Division I;
Revision 0
19-D-22
Hydrogen Generated by Batteries during Charging
Revision 0
19-D-23
Estimating Load for 125 VDC System - MCC 1A
Revision 8
19-D-28
Review of Division 1 DC System Review 1A
Revision 15
19-D-42
Station Blackout Analysis - 4 Hour Battery Capacity
Revision 5
and 5A
19-D-42
Station Blackout Analysis - 4 Hour Battery Capacity
Revision 5
19-G-30
Calculation for Ampacity of Power Cables in Trays
Revision 1
NUMARC 87-00 Station Blackout Equipment List
04/07/1989
CALC 01IA044A
SRV Supply Air Design Basis
Revision 1
CALC EH22-
P041A
Piping Stress Analysis for Piping Associated with Panel
Revision 15-
A
CALC EPU-T0315 Extended Power Uprate Task T0315: SRV Setpoint
Tolerance Monitoring Program Review
Revision 0
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
CALC IP-M-0054
Minimum Pressure Required for Div 1 ADS Backup Air
Bottles
Revison 0
CQD-005460
Revised Anchor Stress Calculation for 125 V Battery Racks
1DC01E, 02E, 03E, 04E, and 05E
Revision 0
and 0A
CQD-020727
Seismic Battery Loads on DC Battery Terminal
Revision 0
CQD-041783
Westinghouse Switchgear Door Bolting Detail
2/22/1988
DKY-98-002
Use of High Purity Nitrogen for SRV Set Pressure Testing
2/18/1998
EMD-027596
Foundation Loads for 125V Battery Racks
Revision 0
IP-CL-030
Seismic Qualification of MOV 1E22F004
Revision 1,
1a, and 1b
IP-M-0001
Bounding Differential Pressure Calculations for Selected HP
System MOVs
Revision 1a
IP-M-0063
ADS Accumulator Size
Revision 0
IP-M-0181
Heat Content Values for Electrical Equipment
Revision 1
IP-M-0233
System Response Time Evaluation for LPCS, HPCS, and
LPCI Injection
Revision 0
IP-M-0381
Gate Valves Subject to Pressure Locking
Revision 0
IP-M-0409
Main Control Room Temperature Rise during SBO
Revision 0
IP-M-0541
RCIC Gland Steam Failure During a Fire
Revision 0
IP-M-0559
Minimum Cooling Water Flow to RCIC Lube Oil Cooler
Revision 0
IP-O-0123
Tech Spec Indicator Loop Uncertainty Evaluation for Battery
Capacity, Float/Cell Voltage and Current, and Charger
Amps, SR 3.8.4.1, 2, and SR 3.8.6.1, 2, 5, 6, and TS PR
5.5.14a
Revision 1
IP-Q-0390
Qualify ADS and Non-ADS MSRV Air Accumulator Tanks
Due to the Increased Internal Pressure Due to Increased
Ambient Temperature of a Small Break LOCA
Revision 0
MIDACALC
Results for
1E22F004
Electrical and Motor Data, Design Thrust and Torque
Requirements
Revision 7
Corrective Action
Documents
1RI01T: Notice of Violation (White Finding) Related to
2/07/2007
NRC ID Weakness Identified in 10 CFR 50.59 Screening
Document
2/11/2009
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Computer Point C11DA009 Displaying Bad Data
06/02/2015
1DC01E DIV 1 Battery Multiple Cell Post with Blistering
07/22/2015
1DC01E Cell Post Weld Blisters Noted
2/21/2015
5067-8L SRV Monitoring System Trouble in MCR
06/04/2016
1E51C002E - RCIC TTV Latch Level Link Pin Displacement
- CCP
2/09/2016
SRV 1B21F041C Acoustic Alarm
2/11/2017
UFSAR and TS Bases Discrepancy; RCIC not an ESF
System
2/23/2017
IR 040066102
NER NC-017-008-Y: LAS HP MOV Stem Disc Separation
05/03/2017
1DC01E DIV 1 Battery Test Data UNSAT
05/10/2017
Potentially Degraded Battery Posts on 1DC01E Battery
05/16/2017
Cracks in 1DC01E Cells Observed
08/24/2017
4.0 Critique of 1E22F004 Failure Response
06/22/2018
DBAI - Calculation Does Not Identify Use of IEEE Standard
03/14/2019
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
DBAI - UFSAR and Tech Spec Bases Discrepancy; RCIC
not an ESF System
03/13/2019
NRC ID: 1WO05SJ Leak Larger than Catch Containment
03/14/2019
NRCID: DBAI Question Regarding RPV Blowdown during
03/20/2019
DBAI - Calculation Updates Missed during LAR Impact
Review
03/22/2019
NRC DBAI Basis for 9061.11C001 Acceptance Criteria
03/26/2019
DBAI Missing Evaluation for RCIC Piping Stresses at EOP
Conditions
03/27/2019
NRC DBAI: Standard Temperature in ADS Supply Calcs
03/27/2019
DBAI - Calculation 01RI16 Contains Incorrect Reference
and Value
03/27/2019
NRC DBAI: TS Bases and USAR Inconsistent
03/28/2019
NRC DBAI Observations: 9061.11C001 Temperature
03/28/2019
NRC DBAI Questions Plant Risk with RAT SVC Unavailable
03/14/2019
Training Lesson Plan has Inaccurate Description of HPCS
Injection Valve
03/26/2019
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Drawings
796E724
Nuclear Boiler System (NB) (B21-1010)
Revision 2
D-77-269
Air Accumulator Vessel Illinois Power Company
Revision 7
D-77-270
Air Accumulator Vessel Illinois Power Company
Revison 5
M01-1600;
Environmental
Zone Map
Auxiliary Fuel &
Containment Plan
EL. 778-0 &
781-0
Revision A
M05-1002 Sheet
P&ID Main Steam Clinton Power Station Clinton Illinois
Revision 0
M10-9002 Sheet
P&ID/C&I Diagram Main Steam Clinton Power Station Unit 1 Revision E
Engineering
Changes
08/13/1998
Relay Setting for SVC Operation
11/13/1999
Revise RCIC Pump NPSH Calculation 01RI13
08/28/2002
25Vdc Divisions I & II Battery Cell Jumper Evaluation
Revision 0
Replace 1B33F067 A/B RR Discharge Valve Disc with Anti-
Rotation Disc
Revision 0
Removed Snubbers 1RB2456S, 1RB24566S, 1RB 2468S,
1RB 2469S, 1RB 2475s, and 1RB 2457s
Revision 0
RCIC Piping Evaluation for ELAP Temperatures
05/19/2015
Replace HPCS Relief Valve 1E22F035 with Seal Welded
Valve
07/27/2018
Replacement of Dry Type Transformer 1AP11E2
Revision 2
Functionality Evaluation of Suppression Pool Temperature
during Station Blackout
Revision 0
Engineering
Evaluations
EPU-T0315
Extended Power Uprate Task T0315: SRV Setpoint
Tolerance Monitoring Program Review
Revision 0
Miscellaneous
07/02/1986
1-LUB-TX02763S;
750kVA VPE
Ventilated Dry
Revision 2 and 6
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Type Transformer
Seismic
Certification
Report for Class
1E Electrical
Equipment
158-AM-11X6
Amendment to FMP 11X6 Rev. 0 Storage Instruction,
Inspection and Maintenance Requirements for Diaphragm
Operated Control Valves and Accessories
05/21/1976
1E22F004
Revision 7
A33007.F10-3947
Clinton Power Station SVC Design Report
Revision 0
B21-F041
Stress Report No. G471-6 125.04.07
Revision 8
C8185-000052
Justification for Two Revisions to Fisher Product Bulletin
Manual form 61.1:657 in VTIP Binder K2864-0001 Tab 16
and K2882-0106 Tab 1
Revision 0
CPS NO
1005.06f001
Safety Evaluation Screening for Modification AP-37, RAT
SVC Installation, ECNS 30526, 30527, and 30528
07/31/1999
EPU-T0902
Extended Power Uprate Task Report Anticipated Transients
without Scram
Revision 2
G471.6/125.04.10
Dikkers Nuclear Safety/Relief Valve Instruction Manual
10/02/1980
IST-CPS-BDOC-
V-16
Clinton IST Bases Document for 1B21-F047A
05/19/2011
IST-CPS-BDOC-
V-20
Clinton IST Bases Document for 1C11-F011
05/19/2011
JAP-90-034
SRV Stud Removal - MDM Process
07/18/1990
Log No 2019-02
Supplemental Station Blackout Guidance
03/24/2019
NSED Standard
MS-07-00
MOV Periodic Verification Program Scope
Revision 14
NSED-I-EE-6
Transmission Grid Conditions for Clinton Power Station
Revision 5
Product Bulletin
61.1:657
Type 657 and 667 Diaphragm Actuators
06/2002
RCIC Turbine
Vendor Manual
Type GS-2 SNT-38187-A Terry Turbine
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
K2801-030
Clinton Power Station (CPS) Unit 1 Request for Additional
Information TMI Action Item II.K.3.28 (Confirmatory Issue
047)
11/19/1984
Y-96136
Air Supply Line Testing for SRVs, ADS-SRVs and MSIVs to
Satisfy Design and Licensing Bases
01/28/1991
Y-96190
CPS 9061.11 Pressure Drop Test Acceptance Criteria
2/06/1991
Procedures
01RI15
RCIC TS SR for RCIC Pump Differential Pressure at Rated
Flow
Revisions 1,
1a, and 1b
1014.11
6900, 4160, 480 Vac Switchgear Circuit Breaker Operability
Program
Revision
005E
3309.01
High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS)
Revision 17e
3310.01
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RI)
Revision 30d
3315.02
Leak Detection
Revision 15a
3501.01
High Voltage Auxiliary Power System
Revision 29
3501.01C001
Generator Backfeed Checklist
Revision 10
3501E001
High Voltage Auxiliary Power System Lineup
Revision 14
3504.01
346 and 138kV Switchyard
01/11/2017
3505.01
346 and 138 kV Switchgear (SY)
Revision
20E
3505.01C005
RAT B - LTC Manual Switching Order
Revision 0d
3506.01
Diesel Generator and Support System Electrical Lineup
Revision
18C
3514.01C005
4160 V Bus 1A1 (1AP07E) Outage
Revision 7
3514.01E005
4160 V Bus 6900, 4160, 480 V Circuit Breakers
Revision 8c
3808.01
RCIC Turbine Overspeed Trip Test
Revision 10b
4100.01
Reactor Scram
Revision 23f
200.01
Loss of AC Power
Revision 26
200.01C002
Revision 5a
200.01D008
Emergency Bus 1A1 Trip Data Sheet
Revision 2a
4411.03
Injection/Flooding Sources
Revision 10d
4411.04
Throttling ECCS Flow
Revision 5d
8491.01
Cable Pulling
03/27/2013
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
9051.02
HPCS Valve Operability Data Sheet
Revision 42b
9054.01 C002
RCIC High Pressure Operability Checks
08f
9054.01 C003
RCIC Low Pressure Operability Checks
Revision 05f
9054.05
Revision 33d
9054.06
RCIC Discharge Header Filled and Flow Path Verification
and Flow Controller Checks
Revision 28
Control of Cable Management Database
Revision 3
CPS 3214.01
Revision 27c
CPS 8216.02
Safety/Relief Valve Removal and Installation
Revision 21
EOP 1a
Revision 30
EOP 2
RPV Flooding
Revision 30
EOP 3
Emergency RPV Depressurization (Blowdown)
Revisions
26, 27, 28,
29, and 30
EOP 6
Primary Containment Control
Revisons 26,
27, 28, 29,
and 30
RPV Control
Revision 30
IP-M-0587
RCIC EOP Operation Maximum Suppression Pool
Temperature
Revision 0
N-CL-OPS-
209002
High Pressure Core Spray System
Revision 3
N-CL-OPS-
217000
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling
Revision 6
OP-CL-101-1001-
F-02
Start of Scram Choreography
Revision 1a
OP-CL-102-106-
1001
Operator Response Time Master List at CPS
Revision 8c
P927-000001
PCI Energy Services MDM Stud Cutting Procedure
Revision 0
EOP-1A, ATWS RPV Control with a Group 1 Isolation
Revision 0
Shipping Records
PO # 000074880
Amergen/Exelon Clinton Nuclear Station
11/2005
Work Orders
GEK-75652A;
Operation and
Maintenance
07/02/1986
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Instructions for
Automatic
Depressurization
System
Overhaul Actuator and Replace Accessories 1C11F011
01/24/2008
Replaced SRV with a Qualified Spare
05/11/2015
10/15/2013
Perform Flowscan in Support of the AOV Program
1C11F011
10/19/2013
9061.11R20 OP La Check Valve Operation
10/28/2013
9012.01B20 VER SDV Vent and Drain Valve Operation
01/29/2014
1E22F035 HPCS Injection Line Relief Valve Leaking 1-2
10/25/2017
HPCS RTT (All Channels)
2/23/2017
9061.11R20 OP La Check Valve Operation
05/15/2015
Overhaul Actuator and Replace Accessories 1C11F011
05/23/2017
9061.11R20 Op La Check Valve Operation
05/27/2017
9012.01a20 OP SDV Vent and Drain Valve Operation
10/30/2015
HPCS 1E22F004 Valve Functional Test
05/20/2017
Removed Snubbers in Accordance with EC 400235
05/22/2017
Division I Battery 1DC01E Modified Performance Test
05/04/2018
SDV Drain Valves (F011 and F191) Failing 9012.01 Stroke
Surveillance
05/26/2017
CAT A Valve LRT 1E22F004 HPCS Injection
04/17/2018
9012.01a20 OP SDV Vent and Drain Valve Operation
10/24/2017
OP SDV Vent and Drain Valve Operation
07/24/2018
9012.01a20 OP SDV Vent and Drain Valve Operation
10/23/2018
OP DIV I ICV and Charger Checks
2/19/2018
HPCS Valve Operability (Stroke Time)
01/11/2019
9012.01a20 OP SDV Vent and Drain Valve Operation
01/22/2019
RCIC High Pressure Test and Valve Operability
01/23/2019
Replace SRV with a Qualified Spart
2/18/2004
Tail Pipe Temp Indicator Hose is Cut
2/22/2004
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Replaced SRV with a Qualified Spare
01/22/2010