IR 05000461/2019010
| ML19184A105 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Clinton  |
| Issue date: | 07/02/2019 |
| From: | Kenneth Riemer Reactor Projects Branch 1 |
| To: | Bryan Hanson Exelon Generation Co, Exelon Nuclear |
| References | |
| IR 2019010 | |
| Download: ML19184A105 (21) | |
Text
July 2, 2019
SUBJECT:
CLINTON POWER STATION, UNIT 1BIENNIAL PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000461/2019010
Dear Mr. Hanson:
On May 24, 2019, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a Problem Identification and Resolution inspection at your Clinton Power Station, Unit 1 and discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. T. Stoner and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
The NRC inspection team reviewed the stations corrective action program and the stations implementation of the program to evaluate its effectiveness in identifying, prioritizing, evaluating, and correcting problems, and to confirm that the station was complying with NRC regulations and licensee standards for corrective action programs. Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that your staffs performance in each of these areas adequately supported nuclear safety.
The team also evaluated the stations processes for use of industry and NRC operating experience information and the effectiveness of the stations audits and self-assessments.
Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that your staffs performance in each of these areas adequately supported nuclear safety.
Finally the team reviewed the stations programs to establish and maintain a safety-conscious work environment, and interviewed station personnel to evaluate the effectiveness of these programs. Based on the teams observations and the results of these interviews the team found no evidence of challenges to your organizations safety-conscious work environment. Your employees appeared willing to raise nuclear safety concerns through at least one of the several means available.
The NRC inspectors did not identify any finding or violation of more than minor significance. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Kenneth Riemer, Chief Branch 1 Division of Reactor Projects
Docket No.: 05000461 License No.: NPF-62
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000461/2019010
Inspection Report
Docket Number:
05000461
License Number:
Report Number:
Enterprise Identifier: I-2019-010-0044
Licensee:
Exelon Generation Company, LLC
Facility:
Clinton Power Station, Unit 1
Location:
Clinton, IL
Inspection Dates:
May 06, 2019 to May 24, 2019
Inspectors:
J. Bozga, Senior Reactor Inspector
J. Neurauter, Senior Reactor Inspector
C. Phillips, Project Engineer
D. Sargis, Resident Inspector
Approved By:
Kenneth Riemer, Chief
Branch 1
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting a biennial problem identification and resolution inspection at Clinton Power Station, Unit 1 in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
No findings were identified.
Additional Tracking Items
Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status URI 05000461/2019010-01 Fuses Subject to Part 21 Potentially Installed in Safety-Related Circuits 71152B Open
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
71152B - Problem Identification and Resolution Biennial Team Inspection (IP Section 02.04)
The inspectors performed a biennial assessment of the licensees corrective action program, use of operating experience, self-assessments and audits, and safety conscious work environment.
- Corrective Action Program Effectiveness: The inspectors assessed the corrective action programs effectiveness in identifying, prioritizing, evaluating, and correcting problems.
- Operating Experience, Self-Assessments and Audits: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the stations processes for use of operating experience, audits and self-assessments.
- Safety Conscious Work Environment: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the stations programs to establish and maintain a safety-conscious work environment.
INSPECTION RESULTS
Assessment 71152B Corrective Action Program Effectiveness: Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that the licensees performance in each of these areas adequately supported nuclear safety.
Effectiveness of Problem Identification: Overall, the stations effectiveness at identifying issues at a low threshold and properly entering them into the Corrective Action Program (CAP) as required by station procedures was inconsistent. There were several items that were not identified or were not entered into the CAP when identified. For example, non-cited violation (NCV) 2018050-02 described how between May 11 and May 17, 2018, equipment operators repeatedly failed to identify that the isolation valves from the Division 2 emergency diesel generator (EDG) air start receivers to the air start motors were locked closed and failed to identify that this made the Division 2 EDG inoperable.
In addition, NCV 2018004-02 described how the station failed to recognize the conditions present for steam voiding in the B residual heat removal (RHR) shutdown cooling return line.
After the inspectors brought this to the licensee's attention, the licensee wrote Action Request (AR) 4166749, NRC Question on Potential Voiding of Piping Near 1E12F053B, in response to the inspectors questions. The station evaluated the condition in EC 625392, Evaluation of Potential Voiding of RHR [residual heat removal] B Shutdown Cooling Injection Line, and determined that a void would be present if the body-to-bonnet leak worsened or if the system depressurized as it would during shutdown and cooldown.
Also, NCV 2019011-01 described how station procedures Clinton Power Station (CPS) 4402.01 and CPS 4407.01 did not ensure the high pressure core spray system and the suppression pool would remain available for decay heat removal for the duration of a station blackout event. This was identified by an NRC engineering team and was communicated to the licensee who then had to be prompted by the NRC team on more than one occasion before it was finally entered into the CAP.
Finally, AR 4172856, NRC Observation, dated September 13, 2018, documented an NRC observation that a ladder was tied off to safety-related service water piping that was under 4 inches in diameter with no evaluation. This was not allowed without an evaluation per CPS 1019.05, Appendix C. The inspectors identified this as a concern and it took additional questions and prompting before the licensee identified this as a problem that needed to addressed through CAP. This issue was not documented in a previous NRC inspection report because it was considered a minor performance deficiency when a further evaluation determined it was acceptable to tie off the ladder to the pipe.
Effectiveness of Prioritization and Evaluation of lssues: ln-depth reviews of a risk-informed sampling of ARs, work orders (WOs), and cause evaluations were completed, including a 5-year time period for the Division 1 EDG. The team determined that the issues were generally being appropriately prioritized and evaluated for resolution. There were, however, examples of where the NRC identified flaws in the licensee's methods of evaluation. On September 13, 2018, the licensee performed a water hammer evaluation to determine whether voiding in the RHR shutdown cooling injection line would impact operability. The evaluation was documented in Engineering Change (EC) 625522, Evaluation of Water Hammer Forces From Potential Voiding in RHR Shutdown Cooling Injection Line. Based on the evaluation the licensee concluded the resulting water hammer event would be 10 pound-force (lbf), which was within the capability of the piping and support structures. Therefore, the licensee concluded there was no impact to operability, and operations removed the item from the potential limiting condition for operation list. The inspectors reviewed the calculation and identified multiple deficiencies that significantly impacted the conclusion reached by the licensee. Subsequently the licensee performed a more detailed evaluation that concluded the resulting water hammer event would be approximately 4600 lbf. Though the calculated margin from the initial evaluation was significantly reduced, the conclusion of the second evaluation was still within the capability of the system. The inspectors reviewed the updated calculation and did not identify any additional deficiencies. This performance deficiency was also described in NCV 2018004-02.
The inspectors reviewed the licensees evaluation of low pipe wall thickness readings on the A minimum flow line of the RHR system documented in AR 04133436, Low Thickness Readings Discovered On A RHR Minimum Flow Line, dated May 2, 2018. Specifically, the licensee performed EC 624133, Evaluate RHR A Minimum Flow Line Wall Thinning, Revision 1, to demonstrate operability of this piping and concluded that the piping met the design basis and American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) code requirements. However, the inspectors identified that in EC 624133 the licensee calculated an average pipe section modulus around the pipe circumference at the location of low pipe wall thickness readings used to further calculate pipe stress. In addition, the inspectors did not identify specification of an average section modulus to calculate pipe stress in the ASME code. The licensee entered the concern into the CAP as AR 04250898, PI&R Inadequate Methodology in EC 624113, dated May 22, 2019, that indicated using an average section modulus to calculate pipe stress was not a methodology recognized by the ASME code. In addition, AR 04250898 documented reasonable assurance that the A minimum flow line of RHR system was operable by using pipe stress acceptance criteria in Appendix F of Section III of the ASME code in comparison to pipe stress conservatively factored to account for wall thinning. Section C.11 of NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0326, Operability Determinations & Functionality Assessments for Conditions Adverse to Quality or Safety, issued November 20, 2017, documents the licensee may use criteria in Appendix F for piping and piping support operability determinations. This was considered a minor performance deficiency.
The inspectors reviewed the licensees evaluation associated with snubber 1RT01003S failed function test documented in AR 04011410, Mechanical Snubber 1RT01003S Failed Function Test, dated May 16, 2017. Specifically, snubber 1RT01003S failed its drag test and was found locked in the hot setting position. The licensee performed EC 619714 to evaluate the effect of this additional restraint to ensure the piping system was not overstressed. The inspectors noted that EC 619714 did not consider the effect of thermal binding during system cooldown on pipe stress and support loads as the as found snubber did not return to its cold setting. The licensee entered the concern into the CAP as AR 04251430, Failed Snubber Evaluation Inadequate, dated May 23, 2019, that documented immediate corrective action that evaluated the condition and concluded no stress limit was exceeded. Since failed snubber 1RT01003S was replaced, the inspectors also reviewed the licensees associated VT-3 visual examination reports and verified no relevant / recordable indications were identified for the restraint. This was considered a minor performance deficiency.
Effectiveness of Corrective Actions: The team concluded that the corrective actions that were implemented were neither consistently robust nor consistently completed. For example, in 2017 and early 2018 the licensee took actions to address a declining trend in human performance errors. The inspectors reviewed those corrective actions and documented the results in NRC inspection report 2018003. In May 2018 at least six separate procedure errors resulted in the Division 2 EDG remaining unavailable when it was being depended upon for plant safety. This was documented in NCV 2018050-01 which became a White finding. Predominately because of this event the inspectors found the licensees previous corrective actions regarding human performance to be ineffective. Since that event the licensee has taken more robust corrective actions in regard to human performance. There have been fewer human performance events since the implementation of these new corrective actions.
The inspectors reviewed AR 04073056, Identified USFAR [updated final safety analysis report]
Chapter 10 Discrepancies Still in USAR [updated safety analysis report], dated November 9, 2017. This AR documented that actions to prepare a change package to Chapter 10 of the UFSAR had twice been generated and twice closed out without actually being performed. The change to Chapter 10 of the UFSAR was in the review process but was not implemented as of May 9, 2019. This was considered a minor performance deficiency.
The inspectors reviewed AR 04168460, DAC [derived air concentration] Value Discrepancy Discovered in Countroom Software, dated August 30, 2018. The licensee identified that the DAC values in countroom software, used to determine if a potentially airborne work area should be posted or not, did not match the inhalation DAC table values in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 20, for two radio-nuclides. The licensee performed hand calculations to verify that the room was not required to have been posted as an airborne area. A follow-up action was to go and verify that the other values in the software matched 10 CFR Part 20 values. The licensee found about 35 more radio-nuclides whose software value did not match 10 CFR Part 20 but did not go and do hand calculations for previous samples to determine if they had required posting. The licensee has since performed those hand calculations with no issues identified. Questions regarding this issue resulted in finding a similar issue in AR 02620909, 10CFR20 Inhalation DAC Value For KR-85M Found Incorrect, dated February 2, 2016. An action that came from AR 02620909 was to validate the entire library for additional errors. This was marked as complete in March 2016 but was never actually accomplished. This was documented in AR 04247547 and was considered a minor performance deficiency.
The inspectors reviewed AR 4017613, Welding Cables Through Both RT [reactor water clean up] Pump Room B Doors, dated June 2, 2017, which documented that welding cables were running through both secondary containment doors while in mode 2 ( NCV 2017003-05). The corrective actions were assignments -34 and -35 which were to complete a read and sign for all schedulers and planners on the plant barrier impairments (PBI) procedure and its interaction with the work process. The effectiveness was measured with action -42. The corrective actions (CAs) failed the first effectiveness review (EFR) as documented in AR 4062608, EFR for CAPE [corrective action program evaluation] 4017613, dated October 13, 2017. This AR documents that the EFR was done in the same month the corrective action was closed.
Therefore, the licensee should have given it more run time, and the licensee re-performed the EFR two months after the CA was closed. Action request 4073308, Effectiveness Review Results For AR 4062608, dated November 10, 2017, documented that the second EFR determined that the CA was ineffective. This time the licensee created a new CA that evaluated the PBI process and implemented actions to resolve the need for emergent PBI requests. The EFR was completed SAT for this CA. The original actions (-34 and -35) were not robust and only addressed the work planners. The later CAs took a larger view of the PBI process and addressed the issue at the shop level and maintenance planner level.
Operating Experience (OpE) and Self-Assessments and Audits: The team concluded that the licensee was generally effective in the use of OpE in the CAP, self-assessments and audits.
The team determined that when performing causal analysis and determining CAs that OpE was routinely utilized. ln addition, the team sampled OpE from NRC, industry, vendors, and third party groups and determined that for the samples selected that appropriate assessments for applicability to the licensee were performed.
Safety Conscious Work Environment: The team found evidence that the licensee's safety conscious work environment (SCWE) was appropriate. The licensee's employees appeared willing to raise nuclear safety concerns through at least one of several means available. The team observed various station meetings, including those in which new CAP items were reviewed, and interviewed a representative cross-section of station personnel, both individually and small groups. Additionally, the team assessed the overall health of the Employee Concerns Program. Specifically, the team interviewed the Employee Concerns Coordinator, reviewed recent case logs and case files and considered statement received during interviews with station personnel.
Unresolved Item (Open)
Fuses Subject to Part 21 Potentially Installed in Safety-Related Circuits05000461/2019010-01 71152B
Description:
On August 23, 2018, the NRC received a 10 CFR Part 21 notification (Part 21) under LER 05000440/2018-002-00 (ML18236A294). The Part 21 report described a manufacturing defect of Gould Shawmut TR30R fuses. The Part 21 described that the fuse internals had separated from one another indicating that they were under tension. The tension was likely placed on the fuse during manufacturing when the ferrule ends of the fuse were crimped onto the fuse barrel. The Part 21 identified that the fuse had failed even though it was never exposed to an electrical current large enough to have failed the fuse.
The licensee initiated an action under AR 04061497-77, 10 CFR Part 21 Applicability Determination, dated September 25, 2018, to perform a Part 21 applicability determination for Clinton Power Station because Clinton was not specifically named in the Part 21. The licensee identified that they had purchased Gould Shawmut TR30R fuses, commercially dedicated them, and installed them in the plant. The licensee believed that the Part 21 would not affect the plant because the fuses purchased were commercially dedicated, checked for ferrule tightness, and checked for resistance. The licensee failed to generate a site specific AR with actions for supply and engineering to evaluate the impact to the station. As a result, the licensee failed to evaluate fuses installed during initial construction, failed to evaluate the impact on operability, and failed to determine if the commercial grade dedication process was adequate to identify this failure mechanism. The above failures were self-imposed standards, not regulatory requirements, and were of minor significance.
The inspectors questioned the adequacy of the licensee's determination that the Part 21 does not affect the site and identified that the licensee did not generate a site specific AR as required by their operating experience procedure. The licensee placed the issue in the corrective action program and evaluated the impact of the fuses. The licensee determined that the fuses identified in the Part 21 were from Lot number E-64. The fuses the licensee has installed in the plant were not from this lot, but the licensee did not know if the fuses originally installed in the plant were from lot E-64. The licensee identified that there were five locations in which a failure of the fuse would result in a partial loss of safety function.
This is an unresolved item. In order to resolve this issue, the inspectors need to know whether fuses from lot E-64 were installed in safety-related circuits.
Planned Closure Actions: The inspectors need to know if any of the fuses from lot E-64 are installed in safety-related circuits. The licensee plans to visually inspect each circuit that could contain the affected fuses. The inspectors will evaluate the results of the inspection and determine if a violation existed.
Licensee Actions: The licensee plans to determine if the affected lot of fuses were installed in the plant. The licensee plans to visually inspect each location that this type of fuse is installed.
If any fuses from the affected lot are identified, the licensee plans to replace those with fuses that were not from the affected lot.
Corrective Action References: AR 04250520, NRC Question: P21 Fuse, dated May 5, 2019 AR 04251536, Part 21 Assessment Results for TR30R Fuses, dated May 24,
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On May 24, 2019, the inspectors presented the biennial problem identification and resolution inspection results to Mr. T. Stoner and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Calculations
IP-M-0513
Division I, II and III SX Pipe Wall Thinning Analysis Including
RHR Piping
0W
Corrective Action
Documents
04034973
Oil Leak From 1SX01PA
07/24/2017
1DG005A Relief Valve Lifting Repeatedly
09/25/2014
Reactor SCRAM from Trip of 1AP07EJ
2/09/2017
1DG005A: Relief Valve Lifting Repeatedly
11/25/2015
NCV 2015003-03, Failure to Obtain Lic Amend on Sec Cnmt
Mod
2/04/2015
Upper Bearing Oil Cooler Leak
2/06/2015
1WS01PB, WS 'B' Lower Bearing Oil Level Sightglass Full
2/09/2015
10CFR20 Inhalation DAV Value for KR-85M Found Incorrect
2/02/2016
OPEX Evaluation: IER L3-16-6, Control Rod Drive Vent Plug
Leakage Concern
03/23/2016
RAT 4538 Failure: Numerous Unexpected Alarms 5010-1A,
1C, 8A
04/02/2016
1FW01PB (TDRFP B) Vibration has Continued to Degrade
04/13/2016
Unexpected Alarms 5050-1F/2F and 1VH01CA Trip
05/10/2016
1WS01PB, WS Pump B Leaking from Upper Bearing
05/30/2016
AR 02704548-04
NRC Information Notice 2016-11: Potential for Material
Handling Events to Cause Internal Flooding
11/14/2016
CDBI: Inappropriate Calculation Method for CR Habitability
11/17/2016
WS Requires Maintenance Rule (A)(1) Evaluation
01/09/2017
AR 03962443-97
CFR Part 21 Applicability Determination
10/12/2017
Lost 138KV Feed Causing ERAT Transient
2/24/2017
OPEX Evaluation: NRC IN 2017-01, Reactor Coolant System
Leakage from a Control Rod Drive Threaded Connection
05/05/2017
Entered 4008.01 and 4002.01 Due to FCV Runback
05/07/2017
PSU: C1R17 MSIV LLRT [local leak rate test] Tech Spec 3.6.1.3 Limit Exceeded
05/12/2017
Mechanical Snubber 1RT01003S Failed Function Test
05/16/2017
NRC Identified Two Issues Regarding Snubber Testing
05/26/2017
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
05/30/2017
Welding Cables Through Both RT Pump Room 'B' Doors
06/02/2017
AR 04022757-02
NRC Information Notice 2017-03 Anchor Darling Double Disc
Gate Valve Wedge Pin and Stem-Disc Separation Failures
08/19/2017
OPEX Review: NRC IN 2017-04, High Energy Arcing Faults in
Electrical Equipment Containing Aluminum Components
08/21/2017
OPEX Evaluation: IN 2-17-05, Potential Binding of Schneider
Electic/Square-D Master Pact 480-VAC Circuit Breaker Anti-
Pump Feature
09/05/2017
CFR Part 21 Update Regarding Grayboot Socket Contacts
09/15/2017
Gothic V8.1 and V8.2 Computer Code Errors Potential Part 21
08/22/2017
Follow Up on Overall Strategy for 1CC103 Leak
09/20/2017
Valve 1IA128B Failed Seat Leakage Test
09/23/2017
2017PIR 4410.00C001 Needs 50.59 Screening
09/27/2017
Part 21 For HMA Relay Potentially Applicable
10/10/2017
AR 04061497-77
CFR Part 21 Applicability Determination
09/25/2018
EFR for CAPE 4017613
10/13/2017
OPEX Level 3 Review - NRC IN 2017-06, Battery and Battery
Charger Short-Circuit Current Contributions to a Fault on the
Direct Current Distribution System
10/24/2017
BRE [bullet resistant enclosure] Energized Power Plug
11/01/2017
MCR [main control room] Unexpected Alarm 5067-3F MS
[main steam] Line Radiation High
11/02/2017
ERAT SVC [static variable compensator] Tripped Due to
Substation Breaker Cycling
11/05/2017
Shephard Calibrator Interlocks not Functioning as Designed
11/08/2017
Effectiveness Review Results for AR 4062608
11/10/2017
NCV 2017007-01 Fail to Eval Defeating RCIC Interlocks/Trips
11/16/2017
NCV 2017003-05 Entered Mode 2 While Secondary
Containment Inop
11/16/2017
NCV 2017003-01 Condition Based Maint Approach On MSIV
[main steam isolation valve] Leakage
11/16/2017
NCV 2017003-01 Condition Based Maint Approach on MSIV
Leakage
11/07/2017
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
NCV 2017-003-03, Fail to Perform Engineering Evaluation for
Snubber Failure
11/16/2017
NCV 2017003-04 RR Pump Runback Due to FCVs not Locked
Out
11/16/2017
IP 92723 - Inadequate Extent of Condition on NCV 2016002-
11/16/2017
RHR A & B Min Flow Piping Removed From C1R18 Scope
11/17/2017
SEC ID-Camera 37 Loss of Coverage
2/04/2017
Potential NRC SL IV Violation for Time to Boil 72.48 Screen
2/06/2017
SEC ID: EVD#2 Failed Testing
2/14/2017
Failure to Implement CAPR [corrective action to prevent
recurrence] At First Available Opportunity
01/02/2018
RCIC PCIV 1E51-F064 Isolated During 9030.01 Surveillance
01/24/2018
NRC FIN 2017012-02 Fail to Prop Classify NSR Aux
Transformer
01/30/2018
CFR Part 21 - NRC Log 2017-55 - SOR
2/08/2018
NRC NCV 2017004-02 Failure to Assess and Manage Risk
2/20/2018
NRC NCV 2017004-003, Failure to Perform an Extent of
Condition
2/20/2018
NRC SL IV NCV 2017004-04, URI 72.48 Time-to-Boil
Calculation Closed
2/20/2018
NRC Information Notice: IN 2018-01, ISFSI Noble Gas
Releases
2/23/2018
AR 04108860-02
NRC 2018-002 Target Rock 3-Stage SRV Model 0867F
Degredation
07/13/2018
AR 04111775-05
Information Notice (IN) 2018-04: Operating Regarding Failure
of Operators to Trip the Plant when Experiencing Unstable
Conditions
06/27/2018
Part 21 - Potential Failure of Reverse Power Relays
04/11/2018
1VT02A Cooling Coil has Cracked Tube
04/19/2018
NRC Question on Last Performance of 9861.09D006
04/25/2018
NRC NCV 2018001-01 Failure to Follow Procedure Isolates
04/27/2018
Low Thickness Readings Discovered on A RHR Minimum
05/02/2018
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Flow Line
1VH01CA SX Pump Room A Area Cooler Tripped
05/04/2018
Low Thickness Readings Discovered on B RHR Minimum
Flow Piping
05/05/2018
Rejected Weld Indication During Radiography B RHR Piping
05/12/2018
9861.02D017, Leakage Needs Evaluated, RCIC Steam Supply
05/14/2018
9861.09 and Data Sheets - SX Boundary Leak Test Procedure
Changes
05/20/2018
Steam Leak in 6 Pipe Elbow on 1GS15B
05/23/2018
Piping Upstream of 1CC103 Still Leaking after Maintenance
05/31/2018
L3 OPEX Evaluation Results - Battery Charger Fault
Contribution
06/28/2018
NRC IN 2018-07: Pump/Turbine Bearing Oil Sightglass
Problems
07/18/2018
RPID: TSP 2017-67 Needs to Remain in Place Permanently
08/01/2018
RPID: Increased Dose Rates On WZ Piping
08/02/2108
NRC NCV 2018002-02, Fail to Establish Adequate Leak Test
Procedure
08/07/2018
NRC IN 2018-09: Electric Arc Flash Caused by Foreign
Material Damages Fire Door
08/11/2018
UT Pipe Wall Thinning at 4 Elbow of Pipe of 1SX21AB
08/15/2018
UT Indicates Pipe Wall Tinning at 24 Pipe of 1WS14A
08/16/2018
Leak Identified on 1DG155 Flanged Joint
08/23/2018
Leak Identified on 1DG04TA Threaded Joint
08/23/2018
Packing Leak on 1DG011A
08/23/2018
Two Threaded Joint Leaks Found on 1DG169
08/23/2018
DAC Value Discrepancy Discovered in Countroom Software
08/30/2018
UT Pipe Wall Thinning at 4 Elbow of Pipe 1SX21AA
09/13/2018
UT Pipe Wall Thinning on 2-1/2 Pipe 1WSB9W
09/14/2018
NRC Information Notice: IN 2018-11, Kobe Steel Quality
Assurance Falsification
09/26/2018
Interruption In 138 KV Line Service to CPS ERAT [emergency
reserve auxiliary transformer]
09/26/2018
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
NRC NCV 2018412-01 Fail to Search All Areas of a Vehicle
10/02/2018
NRC IN 2018-03 - Failure to Meet TSs for Changing Plant
Conditions
10/05/2018
Evaluate RHR A SDC Temperature Transient
10/27/2018
Reactor Scram on High IRM Flux
10/28/2018
Part 21 - Notification of Dry Type Transformer S/N 24-26458
11/14/2018
NRC NCV 2018041-02, Fail to Establish Acceptance Criteria
for Component Performance Monitoring
11/30/2018
Division 2 Diesel Generator 1DG01KC Oil Cooler Leak (Oil)
2/12/2018
Improve Rounds Point for Division 3 EDG
2/14/2018
Small Oil Leak on Division 3 DG AC Circ LO Pump 1DG616PA
2/29/2018
Division 2 DG Governor Oil Leak
01/07/2019
Division 2 DG 26 Cyl AC Circ Oil Pump Leak
01/07/2019
Oil Leak from Casing of 1DG16A
01/07/2019
1DG628PA Oil Leak from Fitting
01/07/2019
Oil Leaking from Fitting on 1DG605PA
01/07/2019
Division 1 DG 12 Cyl LO Filter Leak
01/09/2019
Division 1 DG 16 Cyl Crankcase Seal Leak
01/09/2019
Oil Leaking from Division 1 DG Oil Cooler Flanges
01/16/2019
SEC ID: Contingency Weapon Left Unattended in the OCA
[owner controlled area]
01/22/2019
1DG622PA Has Small Oil Leak
2/03/2019
SEC ID: Security Fencing Needs Repair
2/08/2019
NRC NCV 2018004-04 Fail Follow Proc. Resulting CRD Pump
Trip
2/14/2019
NRC NCV 2018004-03, Fail to Include Acceptance Criteria for
Division 3 EDG
2/14/2019
NRC NCV 2018004-02-Fail to ID a Degraded Cond. in RHR B
2/14/2019
NRC NCV 2018004-01 Fail to Prevent Instal of Non-Conf.
Parts
2/14/2019
NOS ID: Combustible Material Less than 3 Feet from a SWGR 02/14/2019
NOS ID: Wrong PIDS Methodologies Used for Testing
2/14/2019
Several Throughwall Pinhole Leaks Downstream of 1SX013D
2/18/2019
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Request for Decon of the Spent Resin Pump Room
03/01/2019
UT Pipe Wall Thinning of 3 Pipe of 1SX29BB
03/08/2019
UT Indicates Pipe Wall Thinning at 8 Pipe of 1SX04AC
03/15/2019
SX Piping Mitigation Strategy Review
03/20/2019
CAPE 04012075
Workers Enter Incorrect Elevation of the Drywell Bioshield
06/22/2017
CAPE 04181437
October Trip of Reserve Auxiliary Transformer (RAT) Static
VAR Compensator (SVC)
2/05/2018
CAPE 4017613
Secondary Containment ITS Violation
06/28/2017
CAPE 4096509
RCIC PCIV 1E51-F064 Isolated During 9030.01 Surveillance
2/28/2018
CAPR 03982792-
Modify VC Load Shedding Wiring 0AP06E (EC 625821)
2/13/2018
CAPR 03982792-
Modify VC Load Shedding Wiring 0AP05E (EC 625820)
2/26/2019
ECAP 02667822
Unexpected Alarms 5050-1F/2F and 1VH01CA Trip
06/01/2016
ECAPE 04148838 High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) 1E22-F004 Valve Found
Open
09/21/2018
RCR 04016563
07/20/2017
RCR 04082490
Transformer Failure Results in Trip of 4160V 1A1 Breaker
1AP07EJ and Loss of Power to 480V Unit Substation A
(0AP05E) and 480V Unit Substation 1A (1AP11E)
10/04/2018
RCR 4188538
2/14/2018
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
NRC ID: Gaps Associated with Actions Under 4073308
05/08/2019
NRC ID: Ineffective Action Closure
05/08/2019
NRC PI&R RHR Area Walkdown Issues
05/09/2019
PI&R Identified Min Wall Reading on 1SX21AB Below
Allowable
05/10/2019
PI&R WO Acceptance Criteria Not Per Calc
05/10/2019
PI&R 1SX21AB-4 Replacement Not Scheduled
05/10/2019
NRC ID: Root Cause Report 401653 Process Weakness
05/15/2019
NRC ID: Root Cause Report 4016563 Process Weakness
05/15/2019
NRC ID: IR 4180203 Should be Sig Level 3D
05/16/2019
NRC Question: P21 Fuse
05/20/2019
PI&R Inadequate Methodology in EC 624113
05/22/2019
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Tracability of Fuses Issued to Ops and IMD
05/22/2019
PI&R Identified Violation Actions Inadequate
05/22/2019
NRC ID: Min Wall Calcs Extent of Condition
05/22/2019
Failed Snubber Evaluation Inadequate
05/23/2019
Part 21 Assessment Results for TR30R Fuses
05/24/2019
Engineering
Changes
Evaluation of Proposed Heatup/Startup of RHR in Shutdown
Cooling
Revision 1
1SX01PC Pump Acceptance Criteria, Motors Amps and
Coastdown Time
2/05/2019
Endorsement and Application of GE Analysis for OPRM
Setpoint Change
03/07/2018
Replace Springs with Temporary Struts on RT Lines in the
Drywell (1RT01004C and 1RT01014C)
Evaluation Of Potential Voiding In RHR B Shutdown Cooling
Injection Line
Revision 0
Engineering
Evaluations
Snubber (1RT01003S) Failure Evaluation of Snubber
Inspection Program
Evaluate RHR A Minimum Flow Line Wall Thinning
Miscellaneous
AR 04005206-02
RP OE: Loss of Radiation Monitoring Equipment Due to Loss
of 23kV Station Service
06/21/2017
AR 04009125-02
- 407927 OE - Equipment Misoperation - Event Final Complete
Last Updated: 2017-05-05 Sequoyah
06/26/2017
AR 04111775-05
Information Notice 2018-04: Operating Regarding Failure of
Operators to Trip the Plant When Experiencing Unstable
Conditions
06/27/2018
Root Cause Report for Division 2 Emergency Diesel Generator
Air Receivers Found Isolated During Rounds
06/26/2018
AR 4008122-02
Exelon Nuclear Event Report (NER) AC-17-001, Reactor
Protection System B Half SCRAM (Blown Fuse Investigation)
06/21/2017
AR 4053493-35
ICES # 431701 Indian Point Unit 3 Automatic Trip Due to A
Loss of Main Generator Excitation
06/13/2019
- 432283 Loss of Instrument Air Due to Dryer Valve Failure
07/16/2018
VT-3 NDE Report, Component 1RT01003S
05/11/2017
VT-3 NDE Report, Component 1RT01003S
05/15/2017
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Event Number:
2736
Part 21 - Interim Notification of a Potential Defect on a Printed
Circuit Board
06/23/2017
LER
05000440/2018-
2-00
Part 21 - Failed Fuse Leads to Loss of Safety Function
08/23/2018
LER
05000461/2017-
009-00
Trip of Emergency Reserve Auxiliary Transformer Static VAR
Compensator Causes Positive Secondary Containment
Pressure Following Voltage Transient on 138kV Offsite Source
01/04/2018
LER
05000461/2018-
001-00
Degraded Personnel Airlock Interlock Results in Loss of
05/29/2018
LER
05000461/2018-
003-01
Load Driver Card Failure Resulting in High Pressure Core
Spray Inoperability
06/20/2018
LER
05000461/2018-
005-02
Unplanned Reactor Scram During Maintenance Outage Due to
High Intermediate Range Monitor Flux
04/24/2019
M-1RT01003S
Support/Hanger Drawing
F
N/A
CFR Part 21 Curtiss-Wright Grayboot Socket Contacts
06/21/2017
NSED Review
95012
Commercial Grade Dedication Summary
Revision 1
Operability
Evaluations
Oil Leak From Div 1 SX Motor
Revision 2
Procedures
CPS 9431.26
OPRM Channel Calibrations
Revision 39c
CPS 9861.09
Shutdown Service Water Boundary Valve Leak Testing
08/29/2018
VT-3 Visual Examination of Component Supports,
Attachments, and Interiors of Reactor Vessels
ER-CL-300
Clinton Power Station Snubber Program
UFSAR/FPR [fire protection report] Update Procedure
Revision 12
MA-CL-0001
Fuse Program Guidance
Revision 3
NES-MS-03.1
Piping Minimum Wall Thickness Calculation
NES-MS-03.2
Evaluation of Discrepant Piping and Support Systems
Quality Assurance Topical Report (QATR)
Revision 94
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Processing of Level 3 OPEX Evaluations
Revision 5
Issue Identification and Screening Process
Revision 8
Corrective Action Program (CAP) Procedure
Revision 6
Root Cause Analysis Manual
Revision 3
Corrective Action Program Evaluation Manual
Investigation Techniques Manual
Revision 4
Self-Assessments
Perform Self-Assessment Operational Decision Making
(ODMs) Closed Prior Year (Last 12 Months)
2/07/2017
AR 3950645-02
Maintenance Role In Work Management
01/26/2017
Nuclear Oversight Audit Report - Engineering Design Control
08/01/2017
FIN Team Process Compliance Self-Assessment
10/12/2017
Control of Quality Parts
2/28/2019
MP Use of Work Package Quality Verification Checklist
09/12/2018
2018 Clinton Clearance and Tagging Self-Assessment
01/18/2018
Clinton Reactivity Management
08/31/2018
Nuclear Oversight Audit Report - Engineering Programs and
Station Blackout
04/11/2018
Nuclear Oversight Audit Report - Materials Management and
Procurement Engineering
2/06/2019
NOSA-CPS-17-06
Radiation Protection Audit Report
07/18/2017
NOSA-CPS-17-08
Clinton Operations Audit
08/07/2017
NOSA-CPS-19-02
Security Programs Audit Report
2/20/2019
Work Orders
Replace 1SX29BB-3 Piping
04/14/2009
Coat Inside of Pipe 1SX29BB
04/13/2009
1E12D001A, Fabricate New Orifice Plate
09/17/2013
1RH198BA, Coat Prefabricated Piping Spools
04/16/2015
1E12D001A, Fabricate New Orifice Plate
04/20/2015
NDE Ultrasonic Examination, 1SX29BA-3 Piping Downstream
of 1SX23M Division 1 Orifice
03/24/2017
Install New Upper Motor Oil Cooler
04/06/2016
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Model Work Order, Measure Motor Amps and Coastdown
Time
Replace Overload Relays
05/03/2016
Operations Post Modification Test Run 1VH01CA IAW 3405.01 05/11/2016
Update OPRM Setpoints Per EC 619936
10/19/2017
T-MOD, Install Rigid Strut on 1RT01004C
05/01/2018
Remove Temporary Rigid Strut / Restore Support 1RT01004C
05/12/2018
T-MOD, Install Rigid Strut on 1RT01014C
05/01/2018
Remove Temporary Rigid Strut / Restore Support 1RT01014C
05/12/2018
Containment 828 Personnel Airlock Interlock Failure
03/30/2018
1PL12JA GGP Relay Holding Coil Potential Deficiency
05/24/2018
Replace High Pressure Core Spray Load Driver 1H13-P663-
A16-A123
06/21/2018
Replace High Pressure Core Spray Driver 1H13-P663-A16-
A121
06/22/2018
Modify VC Load Shedding Wiring, 0AP05E (EC625820)
2/22/2019
Post Modification Testing, DC Control Circuit Ground
Verification, 0AP05E (EC 625820)
2/23/2019
Post Modification Testing, Test of 480V Bus A Sequencing,
0AP05E (EC 625820)
2/23/2019
Operations Post Modification Testing, 0AP05E (EC 625820)
2/23/2019
1WSB9A: Trend in UT Results Indicate Pipe Replacement
Needed
05/19/2019
Modify VC Load Shedding Wiring, 0AP06E (EC 625821)
2/07/2018
Post Modification Testing, DC Control Circuit Ground
Verification, 0AP06E (EC 625821)
2/08/2018
Post Modification Testing, Test of 480V Bus A Sequencing,
0AP06E (EC 625821)
2/08/2018
Operations Post Modification Testing, 0AP06E (EC 625821)
2/10/2018
0AP117E, Inspect/Clean ERAT SVC Fans and Filter
03/26/2019
Measure Motors Amps and Coastdown Time
03/16/2019