IR 05000461/2019002
| ML19225D301 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Clinton  |
| Issue date: | 08/13/2019 |
| From: | Kenneth Riemer NRC/RGN-III/DRP/B1 |
| To: | Bryan Hanson Exelon Generation Co, Exelon Nuclear |
| References | |
| IR 2019002 | |
| Download: ML19225D301 (19) | |
Text
August 13, 2019
SUBJECT:
CLINTON POWER STATIONINTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000461/2019002
Dear Mr. Hanson:
On June 30, 2019, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Clinton Power Station. On July 17, 2019, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. T. Stoner and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
The NRC inspectors documented one finding of very low safety significance (Green) in this report. The finding did not involve a violation of NRC requirements.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment or a finding not associated with a regulatory requirement in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Clinton.
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Kenneth R. Riemer, Chief Branch 1 Division of Reactor Projects
Docket No. 50-461 License No. NPF-62
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Number:
05000461
License Number:
Report Number:
Enterprise Identifier: I-2019-002-0068
Licensee:
Exelon Generation Company, LLC
Facility:
Clinton Power Station
Location:
Clinton, IL
Inspection Dates:
April 01, 2019 to June 30, 2019
Inspectors:
G. Edwards, Health Physicist
E. Sanchez Santiago, Senior Reactor Inspector
D. Sargis, Resident Inspector
Approved By:
Kenneth R. Riemer, Chief
Branch 1
Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Clinton Power Station, Unit 1, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to Properly Evaluate the Plant Risk for an Emergent Condition Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Events Green FIN 05000461/2019002-01 Open/Closed
[H.9] - Training 71111.13 The inspectors identified a Green finding for the licensees failure to follow Procedure WC-AA-100-1006, On-Line Risk Management. Specifically, the licensee failed to contact the site risk management engineer when they encountered a non-quantified configuration within their risk management system (Paragon). The licensee made changes to Paragon to ensure they were more aware of when a non-quantified configuration existed.
Additional Tracking Items
Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status LER 05000461/2017010-00 Division 1 Transformer Failure Leads to Instrument Air Isolation to Containment Requiring a Manual Reactor Scram 71153 Closed LER 05000461/2017010-01 Division 1 Transformer Failure Leads to Instrument Air Isolation to Containment Requiring a Manual Reactor Scram 71153 Closed LER 05000461/2017-010-02 LER 2017-010-02 for Clinton Power Station, Unit 1, Division 1 Transformer Failure Leads to Instrument Air Isolation to Containment Requiring a Manual Reactor Scram 71153 Closed URI 05000461/2017012-03 Evaluation of RCE 04082490,
Reactor Scram from Trip of 1AP07EJ 93812 Closed LER 05000461/2018-005-02 LER 2018-005-02 for Clinton Power Station, Unit 1,
Unplanned Reactor Scram During Maintenance Outage Due to High Intermediate Range Monitor Flux 71153 Closed
PLANT STATUS
The unit operated at full achievable power (approximately 99 percent power) and approximately 1120 MWe for the majority of the inspection period.
On May 23, 2019, unit power was lowered to approximately 48 percent to perform a main condenser tube leak repair. The unit returned to full power on May 28,
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed plant status activities described in IMC 2515 Appendix D, Plant Status and conducted routine reviews using IP 71152, Problem Identification and Resolution. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection
Summer Readiness Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors evaluated summer readiness of offsite and alternate alternating current (AC) power systems on June 25, 2019.
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:
- (1) Residual heat removal B during residual heat removal A system outage window on April 19, 2019
- (2) Standby gas treatment A during standby gas treatment B outage on May 16, 2019
- (3) Standby gas treatment B during standby gas treatment A system outage window on May 21, 2019
71111.05Q - Fire Protection
Quarterly Inspection (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated fire protection program implementation in the following selected areas:
- (1) Fire Zone CB-6, main control room complex, elevation 800 feet 0 inches on April 18, 2019
- (2) Fire Zone D-4, division 3 emergency diesel generator room, elevation 737 feet 0 inches on June 5, 2019
- (3) Fire Zone CB-1i, air handling equipment area, elevation 825 feet 0 inches on June 6, 2019
- (4) Fire Zone A-3f, division 2 switchgear room, elevation 781 feet 0 inches on June 6, 2019
- (5) Fire Zone A-2c, low pressure coolant system pump room, elevation 707 feet 6 inches, 712 feet 0 inches on June 17, 2019
71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures
Inspection Activities - Internal Flooding (IP Section 02.02a.) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated internal flooding mitigation protections in the:
- (1) Control room ventilation train A room on June 25, 2019
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during a downpower to 49 percent power for condensor tube leak repair on May 23, 2019.
Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator requalification training on May 22, 2019.
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Routine Maintenance Effectiveness Inspection (IP Section 02.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of routine maintenance activities associated with the following equipment and/or safety significant functions:
- (1) Residual heat removal B availability with only one room cooler in service on April 25, 2019
- (2) Shutdown service water ventilation system review of (a)(1) action plan on May 20, 2019
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities:
- (1) Elevated risk due to P-850 outage on April 14, 2019
- (2) Planned Yellow risk for residual heat removal A system outage window on April 19, 2019
- (3) Risk associated with unplanned reserve auxiliary transformer 1A1 feed breaker unavailability on May 22, 2019
- (4) Planned Yellow risk for division 3 shutdown service water system outage window on June 20, 2019
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 02.02) (7 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
- (1) Action Request 4225522, EOID SLC Pump A Crankcase Oil Level Low OOS After Pump Operability Run. on April 4, 2019
- (2) Action Request 4239028, Division 3 Lube Oil Filter DP Low Out of Normal Range, on April 15, 2019
- (3) Action Request 4235978, 1SX01PB: Loss of MCR Indication Green Light, on April 29, 2019
- (5) Action Request 4244550, Ammeter for SLC Squib A&B Continuity Greater than 5 Milliamps, on May 2, 2019
- (6) Action Request 4246118, Out of Spec Data 8801.07 1H13P662-C-A13-A125, on May 6, 2019
- (7) Action Request 4249344, Unexpected System Response During 9431.03D, on May 16, 2019
71111.18 - Plant Modifications
Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:
- (1) Engineering Change 392055, Determination of Allowable Secondary Containment Boundary Breach Size, on June 25, 2019
71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing
Post Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following post maintenance tests:
- (1) Testing of control room ventilation system train A after maintenance on May 3, 2019
- (2) Testing of division 2 emergency diesel generator undervoltage relays after maintenance on May 17, 2019
- (3) Standby gas treatment system damper 0FZVG006A post maintenance test on May 21, 2019
- (4) Standby gas treatment system damper 0FZVG003B post maintenance test on May 24, 2019
71111.22 - Surveillance Testing
The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:
Inservice Testing (IP Section 03.01)
Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
- (1) High pressure core spray pump and water leg pump operability run on April 9, 2019
- (2) CPS 9069.01, Shutdown Service Water Pump B Operability Test, on May 21, 2019
71114.06 - Drill Evaluation
Select Emergency Preparedness Drills and/or Training for Observation (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
- (1) Technical Support Center only drill on June 2,
RADIATION SAFETY
71124.02 - Occupational ALARA Planning and Controls
Radiological Work Planning (IP Section 02.01) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the licensees radiological work planning.
- (1) The inspectors evaluated the licensees radiological work planning by reviewing the following activities:
- C1R18 Fuel Floor Activities No Cavity Access
- C1R18 Fuel Floor Reactor Disassembly/Reassembly Activities
- C1R18 Cavity Decon Activities
- C1R18 Suppression Pool Diving
Verification of Dose Estimates and Exposure Tracking Systems (IP Section 02.02) (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated dose estimates and exposure tracking.
- (1) The inspectors reviewed the following As-Low-As-Reasonably-Achievable (ALARA)planning documents:
- ALARA Plan CL-1-18-00902; C1R18 Fuel Floor Activities No Cavity Access
- ALARA Plan CL-1-18-00901; C1R18 Fuel Floor Reactor Disassembly/Reassembly Activities
- ALARA Plan CL-1-18-00906; C1R18 Cavity Decontamination Activities
- ALARA Plan CL-1-18-00701; C1R18 Suppression Pool Diving
If applicable: Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the following radiological outcome evaluations:
- ALARA Work-In-Progress Review CL-1-18-00403; Auxiliary Building Steam Tunnel Feedwater/Main Steam Work
- ALARA Work-In-Progress Review CL-1-18-00413; Auxiliary Building Steam Tunnel/Containment Steam Tunnel/Reactor Water Clean Up Work Activities
- ALARA Work-In-Progress Review CL-1-18-00418; C1R18 Outage Flow Accelerated Corrosion Piping Replacement Activities
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification
The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
MS06: Emergency AC Power Systems (IP Section 02.05)===
- (1) Unit 1, April 1, 2018 - March 31, 2019
MS07: High Pressure Injection Systems (IP Section 02.06) (1 Sample)
- (1) Unit 1, April 1, 2018 - March 31, 2019
MS08: Heat Removal Systems (IP Section 02.07) (1 Sample)
- (1) Unit 1, April 1, 2018 - March 31, 2019
71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution
Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (IP Section 02.03) (1 Sample)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:
Semiannual Trend Review (IP Section 02.02) (1 Sample)
- (1) The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program for potential adverse trends in fire pump A deficiencies that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue.
71153 - Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Report (IP Section 03.02)
The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs):
- (1) LER 05000461/2018-005-02, Unplanned Reactor Scram during Maintenance Outage Due to High Intermediate Range Monitor Flux (ADAMS Accession:
ML18151A471). The inspectors reviewed the updated LER submittal. The previous LER submittal was reviewed in Inspection Report 05000461/2019001 where a finding was documented regarding the circumstances surrounding this LER.
- (2) LER 05000461/2017-010-02,01,00, Division 1 Transformer Failure Leads to Instrument Air Isolation to Containment Requiring a Manual reactor Scram (ADAMS Accession: ML19022A264). The inspectors determined that it was not reasonable to foresee or correct the cause discussed in the LER; therefore, no performance deficiency was identified. The inspectors also concluded that no violation of NRC requirements occurred. The circumstances surrounding this LER are also discussed in the closure of URI 05000461/2017012-03 documented in section 93812 of this report.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
- TEMPORARY INSTRUCTIONS, INFREQUENT AND ABNORMAL
93812 - Special Inspection Team The inspectors reviewed the actions associated with unresolved item 05000461/2017-012-03.
INSPECTION RESULTS
Observation: Repeat Deficiencies of Fire Pump A Trend Review 71152 During the inspection quarter, the inspectors reviewed a significant number of licensee corrective action program documents to assess the following performance attributes:
- complete, accurate, and timely documentation of the identified problem in the corrective action program;
- evaluation and timely disposition of operability and reportability issues;
- consideration of extent of condition and cause, generic implications, common cause, and previous occurrences;
- completion of corrective actions in a timely manner commensurate with the safety significance of the issue; and
- identification of negative trends associated with equipment performance that can potentially impact nuclear safety.
The inspectors reviewed the site's response to several deficiencies associated with the A fire pump due to the high number and repetitive nature of the deficiencies. The inspectors identified that in 2018 and the first quarter of 2019, the A fire pump experienced seven separate occurrences of either failing to start or starting below the low pressure setpoint.
The licensee performed repairs for each of the failures, but did not prevent the failures from recurring. The inspectors identified that all of the licensees corrective actions addressed the immediate cause of the failure without identifying any underlying causes that may have contributed to the repetitive failures.
The inspectors noted that the failure of a sensing line on the fire pump relief valve in April 2019 was identical to a failure that occurred in September 2018. The repair that took place in September 2018 used a procedure that relied heavily on skill of the craft, and gave no detail for the proper configuration of the sensing line. This led to the April failure of the sensing line. The inspectors also noted that the repair to the sensing line in April relied on skill of the craft, and the new sensing line had deformations from the bending process which has the potential to result in an additional failure. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program and replaced the sensing line with a flexible line to eliminate the deformations associated with the bending process.
The inspectors did not identify any violations of NRC requirements.
Observation: Observation for the review of Action Request 4204867, 4.16 kV Degraded Voltage Relays Trending OOT 71152 During the inspection quarter, the inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective actions associated with Action Request 4204867, 4.16kV Degraded Voltage Relays Trending OOT.
The inspectors assessed the following performance attributes in their review:
- complete and accurate identification of the problem in a timely manner commensurate with its safety significance and ease of discovery;
- consideration of the extent of condition, generic implications, common cause, and previous occurrences;
- evaluation and disposition of operability/functionality/reportability issues;
- classification and prioritization of the resolution of the problem commensurate with safety significance;
- identification of corrective actions, which were appropriately focused to correct the problem; and
- completion of corrective actions in a timely manner commensurate with the safety significance of the issue.
The inspectors selected this sample due to the safety significance of the degraded voltage relays and to ensure the licensee was taking appropriate corrective actions to address the identified trend. As a result of their review, the inspectors did not identify a performance deficiency associated with this issue.
Unresolved Item (Closed)
Evaluation of RCE 04082490, Reactor Scram from Trip of 1AP07EJ 05000461/2017012-03 93812
Description:
During a Special Inspection of the events related to the Division 2 4160/480 VAC transformer failure on December 9, 2017, the inspectors concluded that sufficient information was not available to identify generic implications or potential performance deficiencies with design, manufacture or maintenance of the dry-type transformers pending completion of the licensees root cause analysis to be documented in RCE 04082490, Reactor Scram from Trip of 1AP07EJ. The inspectors documented this as an unresolved item in Inspection Report 05000461/2017012. The licensee completed the root cause evaluation on October 4, 2018, and concluded the failure was due to excessive layer-to-layer design stress within the 4160V winding. On October 10, 2018, ABB issued a Part 21 Notification of Deviation directly related to this issue.
The inspectors reviewed:
- Root Cause Evaluation 04082490, Reactor Scram from Trip of 1AP07EJ;
- Root Cause Report 01594407, Automatic Trip of Breaker 1AP07EJ - 0AP05E2 Transformer Failure, associated with a 2013 transformer failure;
- Root Cause Report 04082490, Transformer Failure results in Trip of 4160V 1A1 Breaker 1AP07EJ and a loss of power to 480V UNIT SUB STA A (0AP05E) & 480V UNIT SUB STA 1A (1AP11E), associated with a 2017 transformer failure;
- Transformer Relay Operation targets associated with the 2013 and 2017 transformer failures;
- The Exelon Clinton Transformer Failure Analysis Report for Return Unit TX06855 provided by ABB; and
- Part 21 Notification of Deviation 2018-25-00, 10 CFR Part 21 Notification of Deviation, Dry Type Transformer Serial # 24-26458.
Based on the inspectors review of the materials provided, discussions with licensee staff, and discussions with ABB staff, the inspectors did not identify any performance deficiencies with the design, manufacture or maintenance of the dry-type transformers.
As far as the potential for generic implications, the scope of the material provided by the licensee and collected by the inspectors was limited to the design of transformers provided to Clinton Power Station. Therefore, the inspectors had no method of determining if this same issue existed with other Gould transformer designs or with transformers produced by Gould for other clients. Additionally, many different vendors manufacture transformers across the nuclear fleet. The specific issues that contributed to the transformer failures at Clinton resulted in a Part 21 Notice of Deviation being submitted by ABB on October 10, 2018.
Corrective Action Reference(s): Root Cause Evaluation 04082490, Reactor Scram from Trip of 1AP07EJ.
Failure to Properly Evaluate the Plant Risk for an Emergent Condition Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Initiating Events
Green FIN 05000461/2019002-01 Open/Closed
[H.9] - Training 71111.13 The inspectors identified a Green finding for the licensees failure to follow Procedure WC-AA-100-1006, On-Line Risk Management. Specifically, the licensee failed to contact the site risk management engineer when they encountered a non-quantified configuration within their risk management system (Paragon). The licensee made changes to Paragon to ensure they were more aware of when a non-quantified configuration existed.
Description:
On May 22, 2019, the licensee was performing maintenance on the 1F DC charger. Due to the maintenance, the operators declared the system unavailable and assessed the resulting risk impacts through their risk management computer program (Paragon). Concurrent to this maintenance, the licensee was scheduled to perform a monthly emergency diesel generator surveillance test. In preparation for this test the licensee transferred the 1A1 bus to be powered off of the reserve auxiliary transformer. During this evolution the 1A1 feed breaker from the reserve auxiliary transformer failed to close. The licensee proceeded to declare the 1A1 feed breaker inoperable and unavailable and assessed the combined risk using the Paragon program. Based on the results, the operators declared online risk Green.
The inspectors performed an independent check of online risk using the Paragon system as well as additional hypothetical configurations to determine what would occur if the situation degraded further. Through this review the inspectors identified a vulnerability within the Paragon system. Specifically, the inspectors identified when a plant configuration was not quantified in Paragon the probabilistic risk assessment box would be White but the overall plant risk box would default to Green. When the inspectors entered the configuration the plant was currently in, into Paragon, they identified it was a non-quantified configuration.
Procedure WC-AA-100-1006, On-Line Risk Management and Assessment, Revision 2, Section 5.4.4, stated, Once Paragon has been calculated, verify SFDTs [safety function decision tree], PTDTs [plant transient decision tree], and PRA [probabilistic risk assessment]
input are all assigned a color by Paragon. Section 5.4.5 stated, If a White PRA window is generated by Paragon, which indicates that the specific equipment combination has not been numerically quantified by the PRA and a calculation with the PRA must be performed, then:
Contact SRME [site risk management engineer] to perform the PRA calculations. Based on the inspectors review, they determined the licensee did not recognize the PRA block was White and therefore did not contact the SRME as required by the procedure prior to declaring overall plant risk Green. Subsequent quantification was performed which determined the risk remained Green for the emergent configuration. The inspectors interviewed multiple operators and determined there was a widespread knowledge gap regarding when a configuration was non-quantified in Paragon.
The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program and performed a work group evaluation. They determined there was a knowledge deficiency issue that applied to senior reactor operators on all operating crews. They also performed an extent of condition that identified two additional examples of configurations that were not quantified where the site risk management engineer was not contacted as required by procedure. For both of these examples the quantified risk remained Green. The inspectors performed an independent extent of condition review and did not identify any additional examples.
Corrective Actions: The immediate actions taken by the licensee were to quantify the emergent configuration to determine the plant risk at the time. In order to address the vulnerability with the Paragon risk defaulting to Green, the licensee revised the Paragon model to reflect overall plant risk as White when a non-quantified configuration exists. The licensee also performed training to address the knowledge gap amongst the senior reactor operators.
Corrective Action References: Action Request 4250998, NRC ID: Paragon Risk Incorrect
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The licensee failed to follow Procedure WC-AA-100-1006, On-Line Risk Management. Specifically, the licensee failed to contact the risk engineer when they encountered a non-quantified configuration within their risk management system (Paragon).
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because if left uncorrected, it would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, the failure to identify a non-quantified configuration and contact the risk engineer could lead to an undetected elevated risk condition or to not implementing necessary risk mitigation actions.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix K, Maintenance Risk Assessment and Risk Management SDP. Using this appendix, the finding was screened under the initiating events cornerstone and determined to have very low safety significance (Green) because the incremental core damage probability was calculated to be less than 1E-6.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.9 - Training: The organization provides training and ensures knowledge transfer to maintain a knowledgeable, technically competent workforce and instill nuclear safety values. Specifically, the organization did not ensure the knowledge regarding how the Paragon system worked was transferred and maintained within the operations department to ensure risk was managed and maintained appropriately.
Enforcement:
Inspectors did not identify a violation of regulatory requirements associated with this finding.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On July 17, 2019, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Mr. T. Stoner and other members of the licensee staff.
- On May 9, 2019, the inspectors presented the Radiation Protection Inspection Results to Mr. T. Stoner and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Miscellaneous
Protected
Equipment
Posting VG B
OOS (WW 1920)
719 Feet Elevation of the Control/Diesel Generator Building
05/14/2019
Procedures
CPS 3312.01
47a
3312.01E001
Residual Heat Removal Electrical Lineup
3312.01V001
Residual Heat Removal Valve Lineup
17c
3319.01E001
Standby Gas Treatment Electrical Lineup
3319.01V002
Standby Gas Treatment Instrumentation Valve Lineup
6a
71111.05Q Engineering
Changes
Fire Door Acceptance Criteria
11/12/2002
Procedures
1893.04M101
707 to 712 Auxiliary: LPCS Pump Room Prefire Plan
5a
1893.04M130
781-790 Auxiliary: Div 2 Swtichgear Prefire Plan
5a
1893.04M370
25 Control: Control Room HVAC Prefire Plan
7a
71111.11Q Procedures
CPS 3005.01
Unit Power Changes
43d
CPS 3005.01
Unit Power Changes
3005.01F002
Unit Power Changes Power Decrease Flowchart
Down Power for Sequence Exchange/Condenser
Repair/Turbine Surveillances/Scram Time Testing/and NSF
Channel Monitoring
05/22/2019
Corrective Action
Documents
Unexpected Alarms 5050-1F/2F and 1VH01CA Trip
05/10/2016
1VH01CA SX Pump Room A Area Cooler Fan Tripped
05/04/2018
Div 1 SX Room Supply Fan, 1VH01CA, Exceeding MR
Performance
07/06/2018
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Evaluation of Astromed Data for 1VH01CA
04/02/2019
Miscellaneous
MRule Expert Panel Meeting Minutes
09/19/2018
MRule Expert Panel Meeting Minutes
11/15/2018
MRule Expert Panel Meeting Minutes
01/15/2019
MRule Expert Panel Meeting Minutes
07/18/2018
Exelon
Maintenance
Rule - Failure
Classification
Form
Issue Report Number: 4134393
05/04/2018
Exelon
Maintenance
Rule - Failure
Classification
Form
Issue Report Number: 2667822
05/10/2016
MR Function
Evaluation
Shutdown Service Water Cooling
03/2019
Drawings
Protected
Equipment
Posting Map RHR
'A' OOS
707 Feet Elevation of the Auxiliary Building
04/17/2019
Protected
Equipment
Posting Map RHR
'A' OOS
737 Feet Elevation of the Auxiliary Building
04/17/2019
Protected
Equipment
Posting Map RHR
'A' OOS
2 Feet Elevation of the Auxiliary Building
04/17/2019
Protected
Equipment
Posting Map RHR
'A' OOS
781 Feet Elevation of the Auxiliary Building
04/17/2019
Protected
781 Feet Elevation of the Control Building
04/17/2019
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Equipment
Posting Map RHR
'A' OOS
Protected
Equipment
Posting Map RHR
'A' OOS
2 Feet Elevation Diesel Gen Bldg
04/17/2019
Protected
Equipment
Posting Map RHR
'A' OOS
737 Feet Elevation of the Control/DG Building
04/17/2019
Protected
Equipment
Posting Map RHR
'A' OOS
719 Feet Elevation of the Control/DG Building
04/17/2019
Protected
Equipment
Posting Map RHR
'A' OOS
MCR Postings
04/17/2019
Protected
Equipment
Posting Map RHR
A OOS
699 feet Elevation of the Screen House
04/17/2019
Procedures
CPS 9053.01
RHR B Flow Path Verification
29e
Radiation
Surveys
Radiological
Survey Map
Survey #2019-031848
01/08/2019
Work Orders
EC 627526 Annunciator 5050-1L Bad Patch Jumper
04/12/2019
Work Orders
EM 1SX019B Re-install Hydramotor
06/07/2019
06/07/2019
EQ-CL044-01 Overhaul Damper Actuator 0FZVG006A
05/21/2019
EQ-CL044-01 Perform EQ Hydramotor PM
05/21/2019
EQ-CL044-03 Perform EQ Hydramotor PM
05/21/2019
EQ-CL044-01 Perform EQ Hydramotor PM
05/21/2019
Corrective Action
Local Instrument Rack Root Valves Found Closed
01/09/2019
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Documents
CW C Motor Air Filter Needs to be Replaced ASAP
04/09/2019
NRC Identified Procedure Execution Errors in 9051.01
04/10/2019
Drawings
Drawing M05-
1074
P&ID High Pressure Core Spray (HP)
AH
Procedures
CPS 9051.01
HPCS Pump & HPCS Water Leg Pump Operability
48e
9051.01D001
HPCS Pump and HPCS Water Leg Pump Operability Data
Sheet
48c
Work Orders
9051.01R22 OP HPCS Pump & Wtr Leg Pump Oper (RCIC
Strg Tank)
04/09/2019
ALARA Plans
CL-1-18-00701
C1R18 Supp Pool Diving
CL-1-18-00901
C1R18 FF RX Disassembly/Reassembly Activities
CL-1-18-00902
C1R18 FF Activities No Cavity Access
CL-1-18-00906
C1R18 FF Cavity Decon Activities
Corrective Action
Documents
RPID: Dose For CP Resin Line Clog Requires SAC
Approval
2/11/2018
RPID: Dose Rate Alarm
05/02/2018
RPID: Lack of Rigor In ALARA Planning
10/30/2018
Miscellaneous
Clinton Power Station C1R18 RP/ALARA Refuel Outage
Report Spring 2018
07/16/2018
Procedures
ALARA Program
Emergent Dose Control and Authorization
Outage Exposure Estimating and Tracking
Radiological Risk Management
Radiation Work
Permits (RWPs)
C-1-18-00906
C1R18 FF Cavity Decon Activities
CL-1-18-00701
C1R18 Supp Pool Diving
CL-1-18-00901
C1R18 FF RX Disassembly/Reassembly Activities
CL-1-18-00902
C1R18 FF Activities No Cavity Access
Self-Assessments AR 04197610
Pre-NRC Inspection, 71124.02 Occupational ALARA
Planning and Controls
01/11/2019
Corrective Action
Documents
EOID: FP A Did Not Auto Start at Expected Pressure
2/09/2018
EOID: FP A Abnormal Starting Indications
03/13/2018
Cooling Water Leak on B Fire Pump
06/28/2018
OFP01PA Failed to Start in Manual 1 Position
07/14/2018
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
EOID: OFP01PA, Fire Pump A, Failed to Start for
Operability
08/06/2018
Leak on A Fire Pump 1FP013
09/11/2018
Auto Start of B Fire Pump Due to Leakby
10/09/2018
Trend IR: OFP01PA Abnormal Starting Conditions
10/09/2018
OFP01PA Abnormal Starting Condition for 9071.01 on
10/13/2018
10/13/2018
EOID: Fire Pump A Did Not Start During 9071.02
01/07/2019
OFP01PA Unexpectedly Started During 9071.02
01/08/2019
FP A Did Not Start on Leading Starting Solenoid
01/11/2019
1FP013 Sensing Line for Fire Pump A Broke Off
04/08/2019
NRC Question on FP A and RHR Snubber
04/19/2019
Unexpected Auto Start OFP01PA
06/22/2019
Engineering
Changes
ECN 28017
Replace Soft Copper Tubing with Flexible Connections
07/07/1993
ECN 29606
Allow the Use of CLA/VAL Company Catalog Number
2050B-4KG1 as a Replacement for Catalog Number 2050B-
4KG
2/22/1996
Work Orders
Leak on A Fire Pump OFP013
09/25/2018
The Scope of this Task is to Rework the Copper Tubing on
1FP013
09/12/2018
1FP013 Sensing Line for Fire Pump A Broke Off
04/19/2019
The Scope of this Task is to Repair/Replace the Sensing
Line Tubing to Valve 1FP013 for Fire Pump A
04/08/2019