IR 05000461/2019002

Integrated Inspection Report 05000461/2019002 (DRP-K.Riemer)

ML19225D301
Person / Time
Site:	Clinton
Issue date:	08/13/2019
From:	Kenneth Riemer NRC/RGN-III/DRP/B1
To:	Bryan Hanson Exelon Generation Co, Exelon Nuclear
References
IR 2019002
Download: ML19225D301 (19)

Text

ust 13, 2019

SUBJECT:

CLINTON POWER STATIONINTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000461/2019002

Dear Mr. Hanson:

On June 30, 2019, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Clinton Power Station. On July 17, 2019, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. T. Stoner and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

The NRC inspectors documented one finding of very low safety significance (Green) in this report. The finding did not involve a violation of NRC requirements.

If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment or a finding not associated with a regulatory requirement in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region III; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Clinton.

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Kenneth R. Riemer, Chief Branch 1 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No. 50-461 License No. NPF-62

Enclosure:

As stated

Inspection Report

Docket Number: 05000461 License Number: NPF-62 Report Number: 05000461/2019002 Enterprise Identifier: I-2019-002-0068 Licensee: Exelon Generation Company, LLC Facility: Clinton Power Station Location: Clinton, IL Inspection Dates: April 01, 2019 to June 30, 2019 Inspectors: G. Edwards, Health Physicist E. Sanchez Santiago, Senior Reactor Inspector D. Sargis, Resident Inspector Approved By: Kenneth R. Riemer, Chief Branch 1 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Clinton Power Station, Unit 1, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.

List of Findings and Violations Failure to Properly Evaluate the Plant Risk for an Emergent Condition Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Initiating Events Green [H.9] - Training 71111.13 FIN 05000461/2019002-01 Open/Closed The inspectors identified a Green finding for the licensees failure to follow Procedure WC-AA-100-1006, On-Line Risk Management. Specifically, the licensee failed to contact the site risk management engineer when they encountered a non-quantified configuration within their risk management system (Paragon). The licensee made changes to Paragon to ensure they were more aware of when a non-quantified configuration existed.

Additional Tracking Items Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status LER 05000461/2017010-00 Division 1 Transformer Failure 71153 Closed Leads to Instrument Air Isolation to Containment Requiring a Manual Reactor Scram LER 05000461/2017010-01 Division 1 Transformer Failure 71153 Closed Leads to Instrument Air Isolation to Containment Requiring a Manual Reactor Scram LER 05000461/2017-010-02 LER 2017-010-02 for Clinton 71153 Closed Power Station, Unit 1, Division 1 Transformer Failure Leads to Instrument Air Isolation to Containment Requiring a Manual Reactor Scram URI 05000461/2017012-03 Evaluation of RCE 04082490, 93812 Closed Reactor Scram from Trip of 1AP07EJ LER 05000461/2018-005-02 LER 2018-005-02 for Clinton 71153 Closed Power Station, Unit 1,

Unplanned Reactor Scram During Maintenance Outage Due to High Intermediate Range Monitor Flux

PLANT STATUS

The unit operated at full achievable power (approximately 99 percent power) and approximately 1120 MWe for the majority of the inspection period.

On May 23, 2019, unit power was lowered to approximately 48 percent to perform a main condenser tube leak repair. The unit returned to full power on May 28,

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed plant status activities described in IMC 2515 Appendix D, Plant Status and conducted routine reviews using IP 71152, Problem Identification and Resolution. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection Summer Readiness Sample (IP Section 03.01)

(1) The inspectors evaluated summer readiness of offsite and alternate alternating current (AC) power systems on June 25, 2019.

71111.04 - Equipment Alignment Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01)

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:

(1) Residual heat removal B during residual heat removal A system outage window on April 19, 2019

(2) Standby gas treatment A during standby gas treatment B outage on May 16, 2019

(3) Standby gas treatment B during standby gas treatment A system outage window on May 21, 2019

71111.05Q - Fire Protection Quarterly Inspection (IP Section 03.01)

The inspectors evaluated fire protection program implementation in the following selected areas:

(1) Fire Zone CB-6, main control room complex, elevation 800 feet 0 inches on April 18, 2019

(2) Fire Zone D-4, division 3 emergency diesel generator room, elevation 737 feet 0 inches on June 5, 2019

(3) Fire Zone CB-1i, air handling equipment area, elevation 825 feet 0 inches on June 6, 2019

(4) Fire Zone A-3f, division 2 switchgear room, elevation 781 feet 0 inches on June 6, 2019

(5) Fire Zone A-2c, low pressure coolant system pump room, elevation 707 feet 6 inches, 712 feet 0 inches on June 17, 2019

71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures Inspection Activities - Internal Flooding (IP Section 02.02a.)

The inspectors evaluated internal flooding mitigation protections in the:

(1) Control room ventilation train A room on June 25, 2019

71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01)

(1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control room during a downpower to 49 percent power for condensor tube leak repair on May 23, 2019.

Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator requalification training on May 22, 2019.

71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness Routine Maintenance Effectiveness Inspection (IP Section 02.01)

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of routine maintenance activities associated with the following equipment and/or safety significant functions:

(1) Residual heat removal B availability with only one room cooler in service on April 25, 2019

(2) Shutdown service water ventilation system review of (a)(1) action plan on May 20, 2019

71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01)

The inspectors evaluated the risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities:

(1) Elevated risk due to P-850 outage on April 14, 2019

(2) Planned Yellow risk for residual heat removal A system outage window on April 19, 2019

(3) Risk associated with unplanned reserve auxiliary transformer 1A1 feed breaker unavailability on May 22, 2019

(4) Planned Yellow risk for division 3 shutdown service water system outage window on June 20, 2019

71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 02.02)

The inspectors evaluated the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:

(1) Action Request 4225522, EOID SLC Pump A Crankcase Oil Level Low OOS After Pump Operability Run. on April 4, 2019

(2) Action Request 4239028, Division 3 Lube Oil Filter DP Low Out of Normal Range, on April 15, 2019

(3) Action Request 4235978, 1SX01PB: Loss of MCR Indication Green Light, on April 29, 2019

(4) Action Request 4744878, Unexpected MCR Alarm Trouble DG 1B, on May 1, 2019

(5) Action Request 4244550, Ammeter for SLC Squib A&B Continuity Greater than 5 Milliamps, on May 2, 2019

(6) Action Request 4246118, Out of Spec Data 8801.07 1H13P662-C-A13-A125, on May 6, 2019

(7) Action Request 4249344, Unexpected System Response During 9431.03D, on May 16, 2019

71111.18 - Plant Modifications Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02)

The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:

(1) Engineering Change 392055, Determination of Allowable Secondary Containment Boundary Breach Size, on June 25, 2019

71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing Post Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01)

The inspectors evaluated the following post maintenance tests:

(1) Testing of control room ventilation system train A after maintenance on May 3, 2019

(2) Testing of division 2 emergency diesel generator undervoltage relays after maintenance on May 17, 2019

(3) Standby gas treatment system damper 0FZVG006A post maintenance test on May 21, 2019

(4) Standby gas treatment system damper 0FZVG003B post maintenance test on May 24, 2019

71111.22 - Surveillance Testing The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests: Inservice Testing (IP Section 03.01)

(1) Clinton Power Station (CPS) 9069.01, SX Pump C Operability Test, on June 25, 2019

Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)

(1) High pressure core spray pump and water leg pump operability run on April 9, 2019

(2) CPS 9069.01, Shutdown Service Water Pump B Operability Test, on May 21, 2019

(3) CPS 9434.02A21, ATWS Reactor Pressure B21-N401A Channel Calibration, on June 5, 2019

71114.06 - Drill Evaluation Select Emergency Preparedness Drills and/or Training for Observation (IP Section 03.01)

(1) Technical Support Center only drill on June 2,

71124.02 - Occupational ALARA Planning and Controls Radiological Work Planning (IP Section 02.01)

The inspectors evaluated the licensees radiological work planning.

(1) The inspectors evaluated the licensees radiological work planning by reviewing the following activities:

• C1R18 Fuel Floor Activities No Cavity Access

• C1R18 Fuel Floor Reactor Disassembly/Reassembly Activities

• C1R18 Cavity Decon Activities

• C1R18 Suppression Pool Diving Verification of Dose Estimates and Exposure Tracking Systems (IP Section 02.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated dose estimates and exposure tracking.

(1) The inspectors reviewed the following As-Low-As-Reasonably-Achievable (ALARA)planning documents:

• ALARA Plan CL-1-18-00902; C1R18 Fuel Floor Activities No Cavity Access

• ALARA Plan CL-1-18-00901; C1R18 Fuel Floor Reactor Disassembly/Reassembly Activities

• ALARA Plan CL-1-18-00906; C1R18 Cavity Decontamination Activities

• ALARA Plan CL-1-18-00701; C1R18 Suppression Pool Diving If applicable: Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the following radiological outcome evaluations:

• ALARA Work-In-Progress Review CL-1-18-00403; Auxiliary Building Steam Tunnel Feedwater/Main Steam Work

• ALARA Work-In-Progress Review CL-1-18-00413; Auxiliary Building Steam Tunnel/Containment Steam Tunnel/Reactor Water Clean Up Work Activities

• ALARA Work-In-Progress Review CL-1-18-00418; C1R18 Outage Flow Accelerated Corrosion Piping Replacement Activities

OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE

===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:

MS06: Emergency AC Power Systems (IP Section 02.05) ===

(1) Unit 1, April 1, 2018 - March 31, 2019 MS07: High Pressure Injection Systems (IP Section 02.06) (1 Sample)

(1) Unit 1, April 1, 2018 - March 31, 2019

MS08: Heat Removal Systems (IP Section 02.07) (1 Sample)

(1) Unit 1, April 1, 2018 - March 31, 2019

71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (IP Section 02.03)

The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:

(1) Action Request 4204867, 4.16 kV Degraded Voltage Relays Trending OOT

Semiannual Trend Review (IP Section 02.02) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program for potential adverse trends in fire pump A deficiencies that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue.

71153 - Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Report (IP Section 03.02)

The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs):

(1) LER 05000461/2018-005-02, Unplanned Reactor Scram during Maintenance Outage Due to High Intermediate Range Monitor Flux (ADAMS Accession:

ML18151A471). The inspectors reviewed the updated LER submittal. The previous LER submittal was reviewed in Inspection Report 05000461/2019001 where a finding was documented regarding the circumstances surrounding this LER.

(2) LER 05000461/2017-010-02,01,00, Division 1 Transformer Failure Leads to Instrument Air Isolation to Containment Requiring a Manual reactor Scram (ADAMS Accession: ML19022A264). The inspectors determined that it was not reasonable to foresee or correct the cause discussed in the LER; therefore, no performance deficiency was identified. The inspectors also concluded that no violation of NRC requirements occurred. The circumstances surrounding this LER are also discussed in the closure of URI 05000461/2017012-03 documented in section 93812 of this report.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

- TEMPORARY INSTRUCTIONS, INFREQUENT AND ABNORMAL 93812 - Special Inspection Team The inspectors reviewed the actions associated with unresolved item 05000461/2017-012-03.

INSPECTION RESULTS

Observation: Repeat Deficiencies of Fire Pump A Trend Review 71152 During the inspection quarter, the inspectors reviewed a significant number of licensee corrective action program documents to assess the following performance attributes:

• complete, accurate, and timely documentation of the identified problem in the corrective action program;

• evaluation and timely disposition of operability and reportability issues;

• consideration of extent of condition and cause, generic implications, common cause, and previous occurrences;

• completion of corrective actions in a timely manner commensurate with the safety significance of the issue; and

• identification of negative trends associated with equipment performance that can potentially impact nuclear safety.

The inspectors reviewed the site's response to several deficiencies associated with the A fire pump due to the high number and repetitive nature of the deficiencies. The inspectors identified that in 2018 and the first quarter of 2019, the A fire pump experienced seven separate occurrences of either failing to start or starting below the low pressure setpoint.

The licensee performed repairs for each of the failures, but did not prevent the failures from recurring. The inspectors identified that all of the licensees corrective actions addressed the immediate cause of the failure without identifying any underlying causes that may have contributed to the repetitive failures.

The inspectors noted that the failure of a sensing line on the fire pump relief valve in April 2019 was identical to a failure that occurred in September 2018. The repair that took place in September 2018 used a procedure that relied heavily on skill of the craft, and gave no detail for the proper configuration of the sensing line. This led to the April failure of the sensing line. The inspectors also noted that the repair to the sensing line in April relied on skill of the craft, and the new sensing line had deformations from the bending process which has the potential to result in an additional failure. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program and replaced the sensing line with a flexible line to eliminate the deformations associated with the bending process.

The inspectors did not identify any violations of NRC requirements.

Observation: Observation for the review of Action Request 4204867, 4.16 kV 71152 Degraded Voltage Relays Trending OOT During the inspection quarter, the inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective actions associated with Action Request 4204867, 4.16kV Degraded Voltage Relays Trending OOT.

The inspectors assessed the following performance attributes in their review:

• complete and accurate identification of the problem in a timely manner commensurate with its safety significance and ease of discovery;

• consideration of the extent of condition, generic implications, common cause, and previous occurrences;

• evaluation and disposition of operability/functionality/reportability issues;

• classification and prioritization of the resolution of the problem commensurate with safety significance;

• identification of corrective actions, which were appropriately focused to correct the problem; and

• completion of corrective actions in a timely manner commensurate with the safety significance of the issue.

The inspectors selected this sample due to the safety significance of the degraded voltage relays and to ensure the licensee was taking appropriate corrective actions to address the identified trend. As a result of their review, the inspectors did not identify a performance deficiency associated with this issue.

Unresolved Item Evaluation of RCE 04082490, Reactor Scram from Trip of 93812 (Closed) 1AP07EJ 05000461/2017012-03

Description:

During a Special Inspection of the events related to the Division 2 4160/480 VAC transformer failure on December 9, 2017, the inspectors concluded that sufficient information was not available to identify generic implications or potential performance deficiencies with design, manufacture or maintenance of the dry-type transformers pending completion of the licensees root cause analysis to be documented in RCE 04082490, Reactor Scram from Trip of 1AP07EJ. The inspectors documented this as an unresolved item in Inspection Report 05000461/2017012. The licensee completed the root cause evaluation on October 4, 2018, and concluded the failure was due to excessive layer-to-layer design stress within the 4160V winding. On October 10, 2018, ABB issued a Part 21 Notification of Deviation directly related to this issue.

The inspectors reviewed:

• Root Cause Evaluation 04082490, Reactor Scram from Trip of 1AP07EJ;

• Root Cause Report 01594407, Automatic Trip of Breaker 1AP07EJ - 0AP05E2 Transformer Failure, associated with a 2013 transformer failure;

• Root Cause Report 04082490, Transformer Failure results in Trip of 4160V 1A1 Breaker 1AP07EJ and a loss of power to 480V UNIT SUB STA A (0AP05E) & 480V UNIT SUB STA 1A (1AP11E), associated with a 2017 transformer failure;

• Transformer Relay Operation targets associated with the 2013 and 2017 transformer failures;

• The Exelon Clinton Transformer Failure Analysis Report for Return Unit TX06855 provided by ABB; and

• Part 21 Notification of Deviation 2018-25-00, 10 CFR Part 21 Notification of Deviation, Dry Type Transformer Serial # 24-26458.

Based on the inspectors review of the materials provided, discussions with licensee staff, and discussions with ABB staff, the inspectors did not identify any performance deficiencies with the design, manufacture or maintenance of the dry-type transformers.

As far as the potential for generic implications, the scope of the material provided by the licensee and collected by the inspectors was limited to the design of transformers provided to Clinton Power Station. Therefore, the inspectors had no method of determining if this same issue existed with other Gould transformer designs or with transformers produced by Gould for other clients. Additionally, many different vendors manufacture transformers across the nuclear fleet. The specific issues that contributed to the transformer failures at Clinton resulted in a Part 21 Notice of Deviation being submitted by ABB on October 10, 2018.

Corrective Action Reference(s): Root Cause Evaluation 04082490, Reactor Scram from Trip of 1AP07EJ.

Failure to Properly Evaluate the Plant Risk for an Emergent Condition Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Initiating Events Green [H.9] - Training 71111.13 FIN 05000461/2019002-01 Open/Closed The inspectors identified a Green finding for the licensees failure to follow Procedure WC-AA-100-1006, On-Line Risk Management. Specifically, the licensee failed to contact the site risk management engineer when they encountered a non-quantified configuration within their risk management system (Paragon). The licensee made changes to Paragon to ensure they were more aware of when a non-quantified configuration existed.

Description:

On May 22, 2019, the licensee was performing maintenance on the 1F DC charger. Due to the maintenance, the operators declared the system unavailable and assessed the resulting risk impacts through their risk management computer program (Paragon). Concurrent to this maintenance, the licensee was scheduled to perform a monthly emergency diesel generator surveillance test. In preparation for this test the licensee transferred the 1A1 bus to be powered off of the reserve auxiliary transformer. During this evolution the 1A1 feed breaker from the reserve auxiliary transformer failed to close. The licensee proceeded to declare the 1A1 feed breaker inoperable and unavailable and assessed the combined risk using the Paragon program. Based on the results, the operators declared online risk Green.

The inspectors performed an independent check of online risk using the Paragon system as well as additional hypothetical configurations to determine what would occur if the situation degraded further. Through this review the inspectors identified a vulnerability within the Paragon system. Specifically, the inspectors identified when a plant configuration was not quantified in Paragon the probabilistic risk assessment box would be White but the overall plant risk box would default to Green. When the inspectors entered the configuration the plant was currently in, into Paragon, they identified it was a non-quantified configuration.

Procedure WC-AA-100-1006, On-Line Risk Management and Assessment, Revision 2, Section 5.4.4, stated, Once Paragon has been calculated, verify SFDTs [safety function decision tree], PTDTs [plant transient decision tree], and PRA [probabilistic risk assessment]

input are all assigned a color by Paragon. Section 5.4.5 stated, If a White PRA window is generated by Paragon, which indicates that the specific equipment combination has not been numerically quantified by the PRA and a calculation with the PRA must be performed, then:

Contact SRME [site risk management engineer] to perform the PRA calculations. Based on the inspectors review, they determined the licensee did not recognize the PRA block was White and therefore did not contact the SRME as required by the procedure prior to declaring overall plant risk Green. Subsequent quantification was performed which determined the risk remained Green for the emergent configuration. The inspectors interviewed multiple operators and determined there was a widespread knowledge gap regarding when a configuration was non-quantified in Paragon.

The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program and performed a work group evaluation. They determined there was a knowledge deficiency issue that applied to senior reactor operators on all operating crews. They also performed an extent of condition that identified two additional examples of configurations that were not quantified where the site risk management engineer was not contacted as required by procedure. For both of these examples the quantified risk remained Green. The inspectors performed an independent extent of condition review and did not identify any additional examples.

Corrective Actions: The immediate actions taken by the licensee were to quantify the emergent configuration to determine the plant risk at the time. In order to address the vulnerability with the Paragon risk defaulting to Green, the licensee revised the Paragon model to reflect overall plant risk as White when a non-quantified configuration exists. The licensee also performed training to address the knowledge gap amongst the senior reactor operators.

Corrective Action References: Action Request 4250998, NRC ID: Paragon Risk Incorrect

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The licensee failed to follow Procedure WC-AA-100-1006, On-Line Risk Management. Specifically, the licensee failed to contact the risk engineer when they encountered a non-quantified configuration within their risk management system (Paragon).

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because if left uncorrected, it would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, the failure to identify a non-quantified configuration and contact the risk engineer could lead to an undetected elevated risk condition or to not implementing necessary risk mitigation actions.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix K, Maintenance Risk Assessment and Risk Management SDP. Using this appendix, the finding was screened under the initiating events cornerstone and determined to have very low safety significance (Green) because the incremental core damage probability was calculated to be less than 1E-6.

Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.9 - Training: The organization provides training and ensures knowledge transfer to maintain a knowledgeable, technically competent workforce and instill nuclear safety values. Specifically, the organization did not ensure the knowledge regarding how the Paragon system worked was transferred and maintained within the operations department to ensure risk was managed and maintained appropriately.

Enforcement:

Inspectors did not identify a violation of regulatory requirements associated with this finding.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

• On July 17, 2019, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to Mr. T. Stoner and other members of the licensee staff.

• On May 9, 2019, the inspectors presented the Radiation Protection Inspection Results to Mr. T. Stoner and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

71111.04 Miscellaneous Protected 719 Feet Elevation of the Control/Diesel Generator Building 05/14/2019

Equipment

Posting VG B

OOS (WW 1920)

Procedures CPS 3312.01 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) 47a

CPS Residual Heat Removal Electrical Lineup 17

3312.01E001

CPS Residual Heat Removal Valve Lineup 17c

3312.01V001

CPS Standby Gas Treatment Electrical Lineup 11

3319.01E001

CPS Standby Gas Treatment Instrumentation Valve Lineup 6a

3319.01V002

71111.05Q Engineering EC 339805 Fire Door Acceptance Criteria 11/12/2002

Changes

Procedures CPS 707 to 712 Auxiliary: LPCS Pump Room Prefire Plan 5a

1893.04M101

CPS 781-790 Auxiliary: Div 2 Swtichgear Prefire Plan 5a

1893.04M130

CPS 825 Control: Control Room HVAC Prefire Plan 7a

1893.04M370

71111.11Q Procedures CPS 3005.01 Unit Power Changes 43d

CPS 3005.01 Unit Power Changes 44

CPS Unit Power Changes Power Decrease Flowchart 0

3005.01F002

OP-AB-300-1003 Down Power for Sequence Exchange/Condenser 05/22/2019

Repair/Turbine Surveillances/Scram Time Testing/and NSF

Channel Monitoring

71111.12 Corrective Action AR 2667822 Unexpected Alarms 5050-1F/2F and 1VH01CA Trip 05/10/2016

Documents AR 4134393 1VH01CA SX Pump Room A Area Cooler Fan Tripped 05/04/2018

AR 4153750 Div 1 SX Room Supply Fan, 1VH01CA, Exceeding MR 07/06/2018

Performance

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

AR 4235715 Evaluation of Astromed Data for 1VH01CA 04/02/2019

Miscellaneous MRule Expert Panel Meeting Minutes 09/19/2018

MRule Expert Panel Meeting Minutes 11/15/2018

MRule Expert Panel Meeting Minutes 01/15/2019

MRule Expert Panel Meeting Minutes 07/18/2018

Exelon Issue Report Number: 4134393 05/04/2018

Maintenance

Rule - Failure

Classification

Form

Exelon Issue Report Number: 2667822 05/10/2016

Maintenance

Rule - Failure

Classification

Form

MR Function Shutdown Service Water Cooling 03/2019

Evaluation

71111.13 Drawings Protected 707 Feet Elevation of the Auxiliary Building 04/17/2019

Equipment

Posting Map RHR

'A' OOS

Protected 737 Feet Elevation of the Auxiliary Building 04/17/2019

Equipment

Posting Map RHR

'A' OOS

Protected 762 Feet Elevation of the Auxiliary Building 04/17/2019

Equipment

Posting Map RHR

'A' OOS

Protected 781 Feet Elevation of the Auxiliary Building 04/17/2019

Equipment

Posting Map RHR

'A' OOS

Protected 781 Feet Elevation of the Control Building 04/17/2019

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

Equipment

Posting Map RHR

'A' OOS

Protected 762 Feet Elevation Diesel Gen Bldg 04/17/2019

Equipment

Posting Map RHR

'A' OOS

Protected 737 Feet Elevation of the Control/DG Building 04/17/2019

Equipment

Posting Map RHR

'A' OOS

Protected 719 Feet Elevation of the Control/DG Building 04/17/2019

Equipment

Posting Map RHR

'A' OOS

Protected MCR Postings 04/17/2019

Equipment

Posting Map RHR

'A' OOS

Protected 699 feet Elevation of the Screen House 04/17/2019

Equipment

Posting Map RHR

A OOS

Procedures CPS 9053.01 RHR B Flow Path Verification 29e

Radiation Radiological Survey #2019-031848 01/08/2019

Surveys Survey Map

Work Orders WO 4895407-03 EC 627526 Annunciator 5050-1L Bad Patch Jumper 04/12/2019

71111.19 Work Orders WO 1784832-05 EM 1SX019B Re-install Hydramotor 06/07/2019

WO 1784832-06 EM 1SX019B PMT Stroke 06/07/2019

WO 1806791-02 EQ-CL044-01 Overhaul Damper Actuator 0FZVG006A 05/21/2019

WO 4680097-02 EQ-CL044-01 Perform EQ Hydramotor PM 05/21/2019

WO 4680098-02 EQ-CL044-03 Perform EQ Hydramotor PM 05/21/2019

WO 4681309-01 EQ-CL044-01 Perform EQ Hydramotor PM 05/21/2019

71111.22 Corrective Action AR 4209561 Local Instrument Rack Root Valves Found Closed 01/09/2019

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

Documents AR 4237978 CW C Motor Air Filter Needs to be Replaced ASAP 04/09/2019

AR 4238690 NRC Identified Procedure Execution Errors in 9051.01 04/10/2019

Drawings Drawing M05- P&ID High Pressure Core Spray (HP) AH

1074

Procedures CPS 9051.01 HPCS Pump & HPCS Water Leg Pump Operability 48e

CPS HPCS Pump and HPCS Water Leg Pump Operability Data 48c

9051.01D001 Sheet

Work Orders WO 4879467 9051.01R22 OP HPCS Pump & Wtr Leg Pump Oper (RCIC 04/09/2019

Strg Tank)

71124.02 ALARA Plans CL-1-18-00701 C1R18 Supp Pool Diving 1

CL-1-18-00901 C1R18 FF RX Disassembly/Reassembly Activities 1

CL-1-18-00902 C1R18 FF Activities No Cavity Access 1

CL-1-18-00906 C1R18 FF Cavity Decon Activities 1

Corrective Action AR 04021978 RPID: Dose For CP Resin Line Clog Requires SAC 12/11/2018

Documents Approval

AR 04133783 RPID: Dose Rate Alarm 05/02/2018

AR 04189624 RPID: Lack of Rigor In ALARA Planning 10/30/2018

Miscellaneous Clinton Power Station C1R18 RP/ALARA Refuel Outage 07/16/2018

Report Spring 2018

Procedures RP-AA-400 ALARA Program 16

RP-AA-400-1004 Emergent Dose Control and Authorization 9

RP-AA-400-1006 Outage Exposure Estimating and Tracking 9

RP-AA-401-1002 Radiological Risk Management 12

Radiation Work C-1-18-00906 C1R18 FF Cavity Decon Activities 1

Permits (RWPs) CL-1-18-00701 C1R18 Supp Pool Diving 1

CL-1-18-00901 C1R18 FF RX Disassembly/Reassembly Activities 1

CL-1-18-00902 C1R18 FF Activities No Cavity Access 1

Self-Assessments AR 04197610 Pre-NRC Inspection, 71124.02 Occupational ALARA 01/11/2019

Planning and Controls

71152 Corrective Action AR 4102571 EOID: FP A Did Not Auto Start at Expected Pressure 02/09/2018

Documents AR 4114259 EOID: FP A Abnormal Starting Indications 03/13/2018

AR 4151106 Cooling Water Leak on B Fire Pump 06/28/2018

AR 4155730 OFP01PA Failed to Start in Manual 1 Position 07/14/2018

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or

Procedure Date

AR 4162045 EOID: OFP01PA, Fire Pump A, Failed to Start for 08/06/2018

Operability

AR 4171931 Leak on A Fire Pump 1FP013 09/11/2018

AR 4181805 Auto Start of B Fire Pump Due to Leakby 10/09/2018

AR 4181882 Trend IR: OFP01PA Abnormal Starting Conditions 10/09/2018

AR 4183344 OFP01PA Abnormal Starting Condition for 9071.01 on 10/13/2018

10/13/2018

AR 4208675 EOID: Fire Pump A Did Not Start During 9071.02 01/07/2019

AR 4209062 OFP01PA Unexpectedly Started During 9071.02 01/08/2019

AR 4210167 FP A Did Not Start on Leading Starting Solenoid 01/11/2019

AR 4237524 1FP013 Sensing Line for Fire Pump A Broke Off 04/08/2019

AR 4241610 NRC Question on FP A and RHR Snubber 04/19/2019

AR 4258696 Unexpected Auto Start OFP01PA 06/22/2019

Engineering ECN 28017 Replace Soft Copper Tubing with Flexible Connections 07/07/1993

Changes ECN 29606 Allow the Use of CLA/VAL Company Catalog Number 02/22/1996

2050B-4KG1 as a Replacement for Catalog Number 2050B-

4KG

Work Orders WO 4829081 Leak on A Fire Pump OFP013 09/25/2018

WO 4829081-01 The Scope of this Task is to Rework the Copper Tubing on 09/12/2018

1FP013

WO 4907584 1FP013 Sensing Line for Fire Pump A Broke Off 04/19/2019

WO 4907584-01 The Scope of this Task is to Repair/Replace the Sensing 04/08/2019

Line Tubing to Valve 1FP013 for Fire Pump A

17