IR 05000461/1993017

Insp Rept 50-461/93-17 on 930810-0913.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensees Actions on Plant Operations,Maint,Engineering & Plant Support

ML20058M338
Person / Time
Site:	Clinton
Issue date:	09/21/1993
From:	Hague R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:
Shared Package
ML20058M333	List: IR 05000461/1993017 ML20058M330
References
50-461-93-17, NUDOCS 9310050119
Download: ML20058M338 (11)

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t U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Report N /93017(DRP)

Docket N License No. NPF-62 Licensee: Illinois Power Company 500 South 27th Street Decatur, IL 62525 facility Name: Clinton Power Station Inspection At: Clinton Site, Clinton, Illinois Inspection Conducted: August 10 - September 13, 1993  !

Inspectors: P. G. Brochman F. L. Brush C. J. Phillips

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Approved By: -

RichardL.[ lay 6e, Chief fh7 Date i Reactor Pro)(cts Section IC Inspection Summarv i

inspection from Auaust 10 throuah September 13. 1993. (Report No. 50-461/93017 ;

(DRP))

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced safety inspection by the resident i inspectors of licensee actions on plant operations, maintenance, engineering, and plant suppor !

Results: No violations or deviations were identifie l 9310050119 930928 ) PDR ADDCK 05000461 p O PDR a

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Executive Summary Plant Operations ,

As of the end of the report period, the plant was at 90 percent power and '

coasting down in preparation for the September 26, 1993 refueling outag Engineering

The licensee completed a substantial reevaluation of the fire loading calculation for the plant. One calculation was-in error for the Division (

III battery room. The licensee implemented compensatory fire watches and ;

initiated a modification to install a smoke detecto *

The licensee completed extensive testing of the Division III shutdown i service water system (SX) and concluded that the closing speed for several !

flow control valves was too fast. The high closure speed was believed to '

be the initiator for the hydraulic transients observed on the SX syste :

The closure speed was decrease The licensee's initial actions to -

address this issue - 2 years ago - were wea Plant Support

Problems found during quality assurance codits were not being included in the final audit repor *

Radiation Protection's control of radiography was very goo ,

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. DETAILS ,

i Persons Contacted l Illinois Power Company (IP) ,

• J. Perry, Senior Vice President J. Cook, Vice President and Manager of Clinton Power Station (CPS)

J. Miller, Manager - Nuclear Station Engineering Department (NSED)

• R. Wyatt, Manager - Quality Assurance  :

• D. Thompson, Manager - Training

• J. Palchak, Manage! - Nuclear Planning and Support

• F. Spangenberg, III, Nuclear Strategic Change leader .

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• R. Phares, Director - Licenring L. Everman, Director - Radii' ion Protection ,

• P.. Yocum, Director - Plant Op. ations

• W. Clark, Director - Plant Maintenance l

K. Moore, Director - Plant Technical W. Bousquet, Director - Plant Support Services -

• Elsasser, Director - Planning & Scheduling 3 R. Kerestes, Director - Nuclear. Safety and Analysis '

• D. Korneman, Director - Systems and Reliability, NSED

• J. Langley, Director' . Design and Analysis, NSED '

• K. Graf, Director - Engineering Projects, NSED

• J. Sipek, Supervisor - Regulatory Interface D. Smith, Supervisor - Security ,

R. Rod, Supervisor - Outage Planning J. Taylor, Supervisor - Nuclear Support Services

The inspectors also contacted and interviewed other licensee and contractor personnel during the course of this inspectio *

Denotes those present during the exit interview on September 13, 199 j Action on Previous Inspection Findings ,

(Closed) Inspection follow-up Item (461/93009-03(DRP)): What was the cause of pressure transients in the shutdown service water (SX) system?

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Based on the c incerns identified by the resident inspectors and the '

failure of the civider plate on a VC chiller, the licensee instrumented ;

the SX system a .d performed testing to identify any possible pressure transient initia. or The 'icensee determined that the flow control valves for the Division J: 1 switchgear chiller (VX) and control room chiller (VC) heat exchangers closed too fast. These valves were operated ;

by hydramotor actuators and the rapid closing caused a pressure transient ;

in the SX syste j

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This was the probable cause of the bent divider plates in the VC chiller ;

and the lifting of the Division III SX relief valv The licensee ;

analyzed the test data and concluded that the system pressure did not !

exceed the ASME code' limit for the piping. The licensee intended to *

adjust the closure times on the valves to minimize any pressure i transient The inspectors reviewed the licensee's analysis and :

corrective actions and have no further concerns in this matter. However, other aspects of the licensee's performance on this issue are discussed in paragraph No violations or deviations were identifie ! Plant Operations r

The unit was online the entire report period and was at 90 percent power on September 13, 1993, coasting down in preparation for the fourth refueling outag Operatio al Safety (71707)

l The inspectors observed control room operation, reviewed applicable logs, and conducted discussions with control room operator During these >

discussions and observations, the operators were alert, cognizant of plant ;

conditions, attentive to changes in those conditions, and took prompt !

action when appropriate. The inspectors verified the operability of l selected emergency systems, reviewed tagout records, and verified the l proper return to service of affected component >

No violations or deviations were identifie . Maintenance Observations Of Work Activities

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The inspectors observed mahntenance and surveillance activities of both !

safety-related and nonsafety-related systems and components listed belo '

These activities were reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted in '

accordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides, industry codes or standards, and in conformance with technical specification ;

Document Activity ,

9080.01 Division I DG Operability Test D33023 Fabrication of Piping for Modification RT033 e D33024 Fabrication of Piping for Modification RT034

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No violations or deviations were identifie ;

American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Boiler and Pressure Vesse? Code

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! inqineerina Division Ill Batterv Room Smoke Detector In 1992, the licensee initiated an extensive project to recalculate the loadings for 128 plant fire zone During this effort, it determined that the original calculations for the Division III battery room were non-conservativ The actual fire loadin determined to be 87,000 Btu /ft', instead of 29,000 Btu /ft* g wasThe ,

original calculations had been a basis for a deviation to Section .

III.F of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, which required an automatic .

fire detection system be installed in areas that contain safe  :

shutdown or safety-related equipmen As a result of its new :

calculations, the licensee determined that the room required a fire !

detecto As corrective action, the licensee implemented ,

compensatory measures and created a modification to install a fire detector in the battery room. The licensee intended to install the ,

detector by June 199 ' Shutdown Service Water (SX) Pressure Transients i In late 1991, the inspectors noted that the SX relief valve ,

(ISX154C) on the Division Ill switchgear room heat exchanger appeared to have lifte This information was given to the license The licensee evaluated the ccadition; however, a root cause for the relief valve lifting was not initiated at that tim '

In 1992, the inspectors again noted that the valve appeared to have lifted. This time the licensee recoved the valve and bench tested ,

i During the test, the valve twice lifted slightly below its i setpoint of 170 psig and once at the normal setpoint. The licensee replaced the valve. The licensee also walked down this portion of the system and did not observe any damage to piping, hangers, or embedments, tio further actions were taken. A detailed walkdown of :

the SX system had been performed by Sargent & Lundy engineers in early 1991 as part of another issue. tio problems were observed at t that tim .

In early 1993, the inspectors again noticed water weeping from the ISX154C's discharge tailpipe. Based on the latest NRC observations and its own identification of a bent divider plate on the "A" control room chiller's (VC) heat exchanger, the licensee undertook !

a thorough analysis of the SX system. The licensee instrumented the SX system and performed testing to identify any possible pressure ,

transient initiator Analysis of the test data indicated that a possible cause of the pressure transient was the chillers' flow control valves stroking too quickly. The hydramotor actuators for these valves stroked open slowly, but closed at the original maximum factory speed. The licensee has changed the speed of the actuators to correct the proble .

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'I The inspectors expressed concern to engineering management that its I initial response to this problem in 1991 and 1992.was poor. Thi ;

was based on the inspectors conclusion that the pressure necessary . !

to lift the relief valve, relative to the nominal system pressure at :

that elevation (120 psig minus 27 ps_ig equaling 93 psig) was 83 l percent highe However, .the latest testing, analysis, and j corrective actions appeared to be-very good. The inspectors have no '

further concerns on this matte '

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No violations or deviations were identifie !

6. Plant Support  !

! Evaluation of Licensee Self-Assessment Capability (405001~ t i

The inspectors reviewed three quality assurance audit reports and i their associated audit check lists. The inspectors noted tha ,

problems found during the audits and listed on the audit check lists - !

were not included in the final audit repor The inspectors i expressed concern to quality assurance management that by not  ;

including this information in the audit reports, senior plant i management would receive a distorted appraisal of plant and j personnel performance. Two examples of this were:  :

In audit Q38-93-15, " Nuclear Program Procedures", the auditor !

indicated there was a possible programmatic problem relating l to the procedures involved with parts replacement based on his l observations and that there were 22 condition reports relating i to parts problems. This information was not indicated in the' !

final aud:t . repor i i

In audit '}38-93-11, " Plant Staff Operations and Operations )

Support", the audit checklist stated that standing night -l orders were used in lieu of procedures in the radwaste l operations center. The checklist -cited several examples of- '

this. This indicated that s.ome procedures were not useable and were being circumvented routinely. This infccmation was not reflected in the report nor was a condition report written for the proble Subsequent discussions with operations 1 management indicated that they were aware of this problem and I were taking action to correct i Licensee management acknowledged that a better job should have been done in including this type of information in the report and have taken steps to correct the situation. The inspectors will continue to review the licensee's efforts in this are l 6 ,

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t Radiation Protection t

The inspector observed radiography activities for three welds which had been fabricated for an upcoming modification. The inspector ;

attended the pre-job briefing and ALARA review. The briefing was !

very thorough and addressed the expected hazards, estimated dose ;

levels, access control, and contingency procedures.

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The inspectors observed the job site, perimeter control, placarding, communications, use of monitoring instruments and dosimetry, and safety techniques. Problems with monitoring equipment were promptly-

' identified and addressed. Overall, the inspector concluded that the '

licensee had done an excellent job in preparing for and performing the radiograph r Temporary Instruction (TI) 2500/028 - Employee Concerns Proqram The inspectors reviewed the licensee's employee concerns program as requested by the subject T On August 24, 1993, the requested information was sent to Rill. The information is attached to the report. The inspectors did not identify any concern No violations or deviations were identifie . Exit Interview i l i The inspectors met with the licensee representatives denoted in paragraph ,

1 at the conclusion of the inspection on September 13, 199 The inspectors summarized the_ purpose and scope of the inspection and the findings. The inspectors also discussed the likely informational content of the inspection report, with regard to documents or processes reviewed ;

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by the inspectors during the inspection. The licensee did not identify any such documents or processes as proprietar '

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Attachment: Temporary Instruction 2500/028, Appendix A  :

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Attachment 1 I

TI 2500/028 ,

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Appendix A EMPLOYEE CONCERNS PROGRAMS r

PLANT NAME:_Clinton LICENSEE:_Ill. Power _ DOCKET #:_S0-461 NOTE: Please circle yes or no if applicable and add comments in the space ;

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A. PROGRAM:

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1. Does the licensee have an employee concerns program? l (Yes or No/ Comments) - Ye They have a number of methods for ;

personnel to identify concerns. Two main ones are the Quality Concern '

Hotline and Quality Report System. The hotline is an answering machine and the report system is forms with suggestion type boxes placed around t the sit Other methods include face-to-face meetings with corporate officers, and minority, union, employee issues, and women's committee ,

2. Has NRC inspected the program? Report # NO B. SCOPE: (Circle all that apply)

e, 1. Is it for: '

a. Technical? (Yes, No/ Comments) YES b. Administrative? (Yes, No/ Comments) YES

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c. Personnel issues? (Yes, No/ Comments) YES 2. Does it cover safety as well as non-safety issues?

(Yes or No/ Comments) YES 3. Is it designed for:

a. Nuclear safety? (Yes, No/ Comments) YES b. Personal safety? (Yes, No/ Comments) YES c. Personnel issues - including union grievances?

(Yes or No/ Comments) YES - However, union grievances are turned over to labor relations with a response to the perso ;

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Attachment 1 4. Does the program apply to all licensee employees?

(Yes or No/ Comments) YES 5. Contractors?

(Yes or No/ Comments) YES 6. Does the licensee require its contractors and their subs to have a similar program?

(Yes or No/ Comments) NO 7. Does the licensee conduct an exit interview upon terminating employees asking if they have any safety concerns?

(Yes or No/ Comments) YES - Done by employee relation C. INDEPENDENCE:

1. What is the title of the person in charge?

Manager - Nuclear Assessment 2. Who do they report to?

Senior Vice President 3. Are they independent of line management?

YES 4. Does the ECP use third party consultants?

YES 5. How is a concern about a manager or vice president followed up?

It is taken to the next higher level, bypassing the perso D. RESOURCES:

1. What is the size of staff devoted to this program?

One full time person. Various people used for investigations depending on the subject are . What are ECP staff qualifications (technical training, interviewing training, investigator training, other)?

Personal integrity is the number one qualificatio A private investigator is sometimes used. The majority of the investigations are done by people in the nuclear assessment grou E. REFERRALS:

1. Who has follow-up on concerns (ECP staff, line management, other)? ECP Staf ~

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Attachment I F. CONFIDENTIALITY:

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1. Are the reports confidential?

(Yes or No/ Comments) YES r f

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2. Who is the identity of the alleger made known to (senior management, ECP staff, line management, other)?

(Circle, if other explain) ,

ECP Coordinator, typist, Senior VP, Manager - Nuclear Assessment, ;

Supervisor - Quality Systems

3. Can employees be:

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a. Anonymous? (Yes, No/ Comments) i YES j

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b. Report by phone? (Yes, No/ Comments)  ;

YES  !

G. FEEDBACK: I 1. Is feedback given to the alleger upon completion of the follow-up? !

(Yes or No - If so, how?)  !

YES - By written report unless they don't want one, then a copy of the !

response just goes to fil . Does program reward good ideas?

NO

3. Who, or at what level, makes the final decision of resolution?

Senior Vice President i 4. Are the resolutions of anonymous concerns disseminated? .j Yes - unless it involves a personnel attack or it involves redundant ,

concerns such as the smoking polic s 5. Are resolutions of valid concerns publicized (newsletter, bulletin board, all hands meeting, other)? YES '

H. EFFECTIVENESS:

1. How does the licensee measure the effectiveness of the program? ,

By trending and reviewing the issue l 2. Are concerns:

a. Trended? (Yes or No/ Comments) YES i b. Used? (Yes or No/ Comments) YES

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3. In the last three years how many concerns were raised? 649 '

Closed? 642 What percentage were substantiated? Don't know, but they are looking at tha ,

4. How are follow-up techniques used to measure effectiveness (random survey, interviews, other)? No formal mechanism. There.is some follow-up if the allegation was not anonymou ,

5. How frequently are internal audits of the ECP conducted and by ;

whom? No formal audits have been conducted

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I. ADMINISTRATION / TRAINING:

l. Is ECP prescribed by a procedure? (Yes or No/ Comments) YES 2. How are employees, as well as contractors, made aware of this program (training, newsletter, bulletin board, other)?

General Employee Training and bulletin board The person completing this form please provide the following information to the Regional Office Allegations Coordinator and fax it to Richard Rosano at 301-504-

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NAME: TITLE: PHONE #:

Frank Brush __/Res Ins /217-935-9521_ DATE COMPLETED:8/24/93_

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